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.WO' 


THE 


LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


BY 


THEOPHILUS   PARSONS,   LL.D., 

AUTHOR    OF    TREATISES    ON    THE    ELEMENTS    OF    MERCANTILE    LAW,    ON    THE    LAW  OF    SHtPPING    ASD 
ADMIRALTY,    ON    MARINE    INSURANCE,    ON    PARTNERSHIP.    ON    NOTES    AND    BILLS, 
AND    ON    THE    LAWS    OF    BUSINESS    FOB   BUSINESS    MEN. 


Volume  I. 


SEVENTH    EDITION. 


WITH   ADDITIONS   BY 


WILLIAM    V.    KELLEN. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,    BROWN,   AND    COIilPANY. 

1883. 


vi.l 


T 
Ta567c 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  j'ear  1853,  by 
Theophilus  Paksons, 
In  the  Clerk's  OfBce  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 
Copyright  renewed  1881,  by  Tiieopiiilus  Paksons. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1855,  by 

TuEoriiiLus  Parsons, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 

Copyright  renewed  1883,  by  Cathakine  A.  Parsons. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1857,  by 

Theophilus  Paksons, 

In  &«  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1860,  by 

Theopiiilus  Parsons, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  j'ear  1864,  by 

TiiEoi'HiLus  Parsons, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  187.3,  by 

TiiEorniLL's  Parsons, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1883,  by 

David  L.  Wehstek,  Francis  A.  Dewson,  and  Charles  M.  Kked,  Trustees. 

In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Umverrity  Press: 
.TonN  Wilson  a.vd  Son,  Camrridoe. 


TO 


WILLIAM     H.    PRESCOTT,    ESQ., 

THE   HISTORIAN   OF   SPAIN,    MEXICO,    AND   PERU. 

I  MIGHT,  perhaps,  find  some  excuse  for  dedicating  this  work  to 
you,  in  the  natural  desire  of  connecting  my  own  labors  with  those 
which  have  won  for  you  and  for  our  country  so  much  renown. 
And  even  more  in  the  friendship,  which  began  so  long  ago  we  can- 
not remember  its  beginning ;  and  in  the  long  years,  that  through 
childliood,  youth,  and  manhood,  have  brought  us  upon  the  con- 
fines of  age,  if  not  beyond  them,  has  never  for  a  moment  been 
broken. 

But  neither  of  these  is  my  principal  motive.  That,  I  must 
confess  to  be,  a  strong  and  irrepressible  desire  to  speak  of  your 
father ;  to  express,  however  imperfectly,  my  gratitude  to  him ;  and 
to  execute,  even  in  this  slight  degree,  the  purpose  I  have  long  had, 
of  putting  on  record  my  testimony  to  the  excellence  of  one  who 
stood  for  many  years  at  the  head  of  his  profession,  who  was  my 
master  during  my  apprenticeship  to  the  law,  and  ever  after  my 
revered  instructor  and  invaluable  friend. 

It  was  in  1815  that  I  entered  his  office  as  a  student.  I  had  been 
accustomed  all  my  life  to  see  him  often,  and  hear  liim  often  spoken 
of,  for  our  families  were  intimate,  and  he  was  among  my  father's 
most  valued  friends;  and  I  had  always  heard  him  mentioned  with 
a  kind  and  degree  of  respect  that  seemed  to  be  paid  to  him  alone. 
I  knew  that  he  had  held  the  highest  place  in  his  profession  for 
some  years  ;  but  the  regard  and  reverence  generally  accorded  to 
him  were  more  than  any  mere  professional  success  could  win. 
When  I  entered  his  office,  he  had  already  given  up  a  large  part  of 


IV  DEDICATION. 

his  business,  lie  did  not  go  oiten  into  court ;  but  1  heard  him  in 
some  important  cases,  and  was  a  constant  observer  of  the  relations 
between  him  and  his  numerous  clients.  And  it  was  not  long 
before  I  leii-ned  the  grounds  of  his  high  social  and  professional 
position. 

In  the  first  place,  let  me  speak  of  his  judgment  and  sagacity.  1 
cannot  conceive  of  any  person  possessing,  in  greater  perfection, 
that  admirable  thing  we  call  good  sense.  I  doubt  whether,  in  his 
long  and  active  life,  he  ever  made  any  one  mistake  of  importance. 
Whoever  em|)loyed  him  in  any  business,  soon  saw  that  the  wisest 
ching  that  could  be  done  in  his  case,  and  at  every  step  of  it,  was 
always  the  very  thing  that  was  done.  Hence  a  confidence  without 
limit  was  reposed  in  his  opinion ;  and  his  advice  was  accepted  and 
followed  by  all  who  received  it,  as  if  it  made  further  inquiry  or 
consideration  wholly  unnecessary. 

The  next  quality  1  would  mention,  was  a  kindred  and  connected 
one  ;  I  mean  his  perfect  truthfulness.  It  seemed  as  if  he  could 
not  deceive ;  and  if  he  had  the  faculty  originally  he  must  have  lost 
it  liy  non-user.  It  made  no  difference  on  which  side  of  a  question 
the  party  propounding  it  to  him  stood  ;  for  his  answer  was  to  the 
question,  and  not  to  the  man.  Whether  he  dealt  with  a  client,  an 
adverse  party,  a  witness,  the  jury,  or  the  court,  he  dealt  with  them 
all  honestly.  He  had,  what  1  am  sorry  to  call  the  rare  quality,  of 
loviii'j  truth  so  well,  that  his  view  of  it  was  not  to  be  distorted  or 
obstructed,  either  by  any  interest  or  any  feeling  of  his  own  or  of 
those  whom  he  represented,  or  by  any  disturbing  influences  of  cir- 
cumstances or  position. 

I  speak  last  of  his  learning,  although  this  was  perhaps  more 
frequently  remarked  upon  liiaii  his  moral  qualities,  however  deeply 
they  were  felt.  He  had  passed  many  years  in  laborious  and  well- 
dircctod  study  ;  for  he  was  led  to  this,  both  by  his  sense  of  duty 
to  his  clients,  and  by  his  sagacity,  which  told  him  that  here  he 
must  find  the  means  of  sound  judgment  and  usefidness  and  suc- 
cess; and  also  l»y  llu-  love  of  liis  profession  and  of  the  law  as  a 
science.    For  many  years  after  he  had  withdrawn  from  the  pro- 


DEDICATION.  V 

fession,  both  as  advocate  and  chamber-counsel,  he  still  continued 
his  legal  studies ;  and  often  when  I  have  called  upon  him  and 
stated  some  difficult  question  which  had  occurred  in  my  practice, 
he  would  —  not  for  a  fee  —  but  in  his  kindness  to  me,  and  his  love 
of  the  law,  enter  upon  the  investigation  with  the  zeal  of  earlier 
days,  and  give  me  the  whole  benefit  of  his  vast  knowledge  and  his 
unerring  sagacity. 

To  these  qualities  I  must  add  that  of  universal  kindness  and 
unfailing  courtesy.  And  certainly  I  have  given  good  reasons  why 
he  held  so  long  the  headship  of  a  profession  in  which  it  is  not  easy 
to  climb  to  the  high  places,  and  very  difficult  to  hold  them  ;  and 
also,  why,  outside  of  his  profession  and  by  society  at  large,  he  was 
venerated  during  his  long  life  as  few  men  among  us  have  ever 
been.  Let  me  add,  that  while  he  manifested,  wherever  in  the  con- 
duct of  his  affairs  it  was  needed,  the  firmness  and  fearlessness 
that  he  inherited  from  a  father  who  stood  like  a  tower  of  strength 
in  command  of  the  American  forces  at  Bunker  Hill,  he  was  ever, 
and  remarkably,  unassuming,  retiring,  and  modest.  It  is  difficult 
to  believe  that  he  could  not  measure  his  own  success,  or  that  he 
did  not  know  his  high  position ;  but  no  one  ever  heard  a  word  or 
a  tone  from  him  which  indicated  such  knowledge. 

He  was  not  eloquent,  and  never,  to  my  knowledge,  attempted  to 
be  ;  and  yet  he  was  a  most  successful  advocate.  It  was  his  pur- 
pose and  endeavor  to  do  for  every  client,  and  in  every  case,  all 
that  could  be  done  by  learning,  sense,  industry,  and  honesty  ;  this 
he  knew  he  could  do,  and  did.  And  more  than  this  he  had  no 
desire  to  do. 

Such  was  William  Prescott.  When  he  died  in  1844,  at  the 
age  of  82,  I  had  known  him  intimately  for  twenty-nine  years,  and 
had  known  of  him  many  more.  And  I  never  yet  heard  a  word 
spoken,  and  I  never  heard  of  a  word  spoken,  to  his  disparagement 
or  dispraise,  during  his  long  life  or  since  its  close,  by  any  person 
whomsoever;  nor  even  have  I  heard  the  "but"  or  "if"  with 
which  many  indulge  themselves  in  qualifying  and  clouding  the 
commendation  they  cannot  but  render.    He  has  left  behind  him 


vi  DEDICATION. 

no  brilliant  speeches  to  be  remembered  and  quoted ;  no  books  in 
which  the  fruits  of  his  learning  and  wisdom  were  gathered  and 
preserved  ;  and  they  who  knew  him  are  passing  away,  and  already 
his  reputation  is  becoming  traditional.  And  very  glad  shall  I  be, 
if,  by  this  slight  memorial,  I  may,  for  a  single  moment,  arrest  the 
waves  of  time,  in  their  advancing  flow  over  the  sands  in  which  are 
written  his  name,  and  the  names  of  many  others  of  our  best  and 
greatest. 

TIIEOPHILUS    PARSONS. 
Cambridge,  October,  ISoo. 


ADVERTISEMENT   TO   THE   SEVENTH   EDITION. 


The  preparation  of  this  edition  of  Parsons  on  Contracts  was 
begun  by  the  editor  under  the  supervision  of  the  learned  author. 
The  intention  then  was  that  such  new  matter  as  might  be  prepared 
should  be  incorporated  with  the  old,  both  in  the  text  and  the 
notes,  and  that  full  responsibility  for  all  changes  should  l)e  borne 
by  the  editor.  After  the  death  of  Professor  Parsons,  however,  it 
was  deemed  advisable  to  present  in  this  edition  the  text  and  notes 
of  the  last  edition,  as  revised  by  him,  intact  and  unchanged,  save 
where  subsequent  statutory  enactments  made  such  changes  im- 
perative. The  new  matter  which  has  been  added  appears  in  the 
form  of  separate  notes,  which  are  indicated  by  numerals  and  ex- 
tend across  the  page  at  the  bottom.  An  attempt  has  been  made 
to  give  in  the  most  compact  form,  consistent  with  clearness  of 
statement,  the  results  of  all  the  important  cases  decided  since  the 
last  edition  was  published.  More  than  five  thousand  of  such  cases 
have  been  digested  from  the  original  reports,  and  either  cited  or 
the  exact  point  decided  presented  briefly,  in  this  edition.  It  is 
hoped  that  the  value  of  this  standard  work  has  been  in  some  de- 
gree increased,  and  that  it  will  continue  to  give  effective  aid,  as 
the  learned  author  intended  it  should,  both  to  the  student  and 

active  practitioner. 

W.  V.  K. 

Boston,  December,  1883. 


\ 


CONTENTS. 


PART   I. 

THE    LAW   OF   CONTRACTS    CONSIDERED    IN   REFERENCE    TO    THE 
OBLIGATIONS  ASSUMED  BY   THE   PARTIES. 


PRELIMINARY   CHAPTER. 
Section  I. 

Pagk 
Of  the  extent  and  scope  of  the  law  of  contracts 3 

Section  II. 
Definition  of  contracts 5 

Section  III. 
Classification  of  contracts 7 


BOOK   I. 

OF   PARTIES   TO   A   CONTRACT. 

CHAPTER   I. 

Classification  of  Parties 9 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   11. 

OF  JOINT   PARTIES. 

Section  I. 
Whether  parties  are  joint  or  several 11 

Section  II. 
Of  some  incidents  of  joinder 21 

Section   III. 
Of  contribution 31 

CHAPTER   III. 

AGENTS. 

Section  I. 
Of  agency  in  general 38 

Section  II. 
In  what  manner  authority  may  be  given  to  an  agent 46 

Section  III. 
Subsequent  confirmation 48 

Section  IV. 
Signature  by  an  agent .54 

Section  V 
Duration  and  extent  of  authority 59 

Section  VI. 
The  right  of  action  uudor  a  contract 65 


CONTENTS.  Xi 

Section  VII. 
Liability  of  au  agent 67 

Section  VIII. 
Revocation  of  authority 73 

Section  IX. 
How  the  principal  is  affected  by  the  misconduct  of  his  agent     ....       78 

Section  X. 
Of  notice  to  an  agent 80 

Section  XI. 
Of  shipmasters 84 

Section  XII, 
Of  an  action  against  an  agent  to  determine  the  right  of  a  principal     .     .       85 

Section  XIII. 
The  rights  and  obligations  of  principal  and  agent  as  to  each  other      .     .       87 

Section  XIV. 
Of  public  agents ' 98 

CHAPTER   IV. 

FACTORS  AND  BROKERS. 

Section  I. 

Who  is  a  factor  and  who  a  broker 100 

Section  II. 
Of  factors  under  a  commission 100 

Section  III. 
Of  the  duties  and  the  rights  of  factors  and  brokers 102 


Xii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   V. 
Servants 112 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Attorxeys 122 

CHAPTER  VII. 

TRUSTEES. 

Section  I. 
Origin  of  trusts 133 

Section  II. 
Classification  of  trusts 134 

Section  III. 
Private  trustees 135 

Section  IV. 
Public  trustees 138 

CHAPTER   VIII. 
Executors  and  Administrators 141 

CHAPTER  IX. 

GUARDIANS. 

Section  I. 

Of  the  kinds  of  guardians 148 

Section  II. 
Of  the  duty  and  power  of  a  guardian  .     .  , 149 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

CHAPTER  X. 
CouroRATioxs 153 

CHAPTER   XI. 

Joint-stock  Companies 162 

CHAPTER  Xn. 

PARTNERSHIP. 
Section  I. 
What  constitutes  a  partnership 165 

Section  II. 
Of  the  real  estate  of  a  partnership 167 

Section  III. 
Of  the  good-will 172 

Section  IV. 
Of  the  delectus  personarum 173 

Section    V. 
How  a  partnership  may  be  formed 174 

Section  VI. 
Of  the  right  of  action  between  partners 184 

Section  VII. 
Of  the  sharing  of  losses 187 

Section  VIII. 
Of  secret  and  dormant  partners 188 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

Section  IX. 
Of  retiring  partners 190 

Section  X. 
Of  nominal  partners  .     .  193 

Section  XI. 
When  a  joint  liability  is  incurred 194 

Section  XII. 
Of  the  authority  of  each  partner .     .     .     19G 

Section  XIII. 
Power  of  a  majority 210 

Section  XIV. 
Of  dissolution 218 

Section  XY. 
Of  the  rights  of  creditors  in  respect  to  partnership  funds 231 

Section  XVI. 
Limited  partnership 240 

CHAPTER   XIII. 
New  Pauties  by  Xovatiox 244 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

NEW  PARTIES   RY  ASSIGNMENT. 

Section  I. 
Of  assignments  of  choses  in  action 250 

Section  II. 
Of  the  manner  of  a-ssignment 250 


CONTENTS.  XT 

Section  III. 
Of  the  equitable  defences 257 

Section  IV. 
Covenants  annexed  to  land 259 

CHAPTER  XV. 

GIFTS. 

Section  I. 

Of  gifts  inter  vivos 262 

Section  II. 
Of  gifts  causa  mortis 265 

CHAPTER   XVI. 

INDORSEMENT. 

Section  I. 

Of  the  nature  and  effect  of  indorsement 268 

Section  II. 
Of  the  essentials  of  negotiable  notes  and  bills     .     .     .     .- 276 

Section  III. 
"Wlio  may  indorse 283 

Section  IV. 
Of  indorsement  after  maturity 288 

Section  V. 
Of  accommodation  paper 293 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

Section  VI. 
Of  notes  on  demand 291 

Section  VII. 
of  the  transfer  of  bills  and  notes 297 

Section  VIII. 
Of  presentment  for  acceptance 302 

Section   IX. 
Of  presentment  for  payment 305 

Section  X. 
Of  whom,  when,  and  where,  the  demand  should  be  made 311 

Section  XI. 
Of  notice  of  non-payment 314 

Section  XII. 
Of  protest 325 

Section  XIII. 
Oi  damages  for  non-payment  of  bills 327 

Section  XIV. 
Bills  of  lading 328 

Section  XV. 
Of  property  passing  with  possession 329 


CONTENTS.  XVll 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

INFANTS. 

Section   I. 

Incapacity  of  infants  to  contract 333 

Section   II. 
Of  the  obligations  of  parents  in  respect  to  infant  children      .....     338 

Section   III. 
Voidable  contracts  for  necessaries 352 

Section  IV. 
Of  the  torts  of  an  infant 356 

Section   V. 
Of  the  effect  of  an  infant's  avoidance  of  his  contract 360 

■  Section    VI. 
Of  ratification 363 

Skction    VII. 
Who  may  take  advantage  of  an  infant's  liability 369 

Section  VIII. 
Of  the  marriage  settlements  of  an  infant 371 

Section   IX. 

Infant's  liability  with  respect  to  fixed  property  acquired  by  his  contract .     372 

Section   X. 
Of  illegitimate  children 376 

VOL.    I.  6 


XVlll  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   XVIII. 

OF  THE  CONTRACTS  OF   MARRIED   WOMEN. 

Sectiox  I. 

Of  the  general  effect  of  marriage 378 

Section  II. 
Of  the  contracts  of  a  married  woman  made  before  marriage      ....     380 

Section  III. 
Of  the  contracts  of  a  married  woman  made  during  her  marriage    .  384 

Section  IV. 
Of  the  disability  of  a  wife  to  act  as  a  single  woman 405 

Section  V. 
Of  the  separate  estate  of  a  married  woman 408 

CHAPTER   XIX. 

PERSONS  OF  INSUFFICIENT  MIND   TO   CONTRACT. 

Section  I. 

Non  compotes  mentis 433 

Section  II. 
Spendthrifts 439 

Section'  HI. 
Seamen 440 

Section   IV. 
Persons  under  duress 443 


CONTENTS.  xix 

CHAPTER  XX. 
Aliens 447 

CHAPTER   XXI. 

Of  Outlaws,  Persons  attainted,  and  Persons  excommunicated  .     451 

BOOK    II. 

CONSIDERATION   AND  ASSENT. 

CHAPTER   I. 

CONSIDERATION. 

Section  I. 
Th3  necessity  of  a  consideration .     455 

Section  II. 
Kinds  of  consideration 458 

Section  III. 
Adequacy  of  consideration 465 

Section  IV. 
Prevention  of  litigation 467 

Section  V. 
Forbearance 470 

Section  VI. 
Assignment  of  debt 474 


XX  CONTENTS. 

Section  VII. 
Work  and  service 475 

Section  VIII. 
Trust  and  confidence 476 

Section  IX. 
A  promise  for  a  promise 477 

Section  X. 
Subscription  and  contribution 482 

Section  XI. 
Of  consideration  void  in  j)art 485 

Section  XII. 
Illegality  of  consideration 486 

Section   XIII. 
Impossible  considerations ....    489 

Section  XIV. 
Failure  of  consideration 492 

Section  XV. 
liights  of  a  stranger  to  the  consideration 496 

Section  XVI. 
The  time  of  the  consideration 498 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

CHAPTER  II. 

ASSENT  OF  THE  PARTIES. 

Section  I. 
What  the  assent  must  be 505 

Section  II. 
Contracts  on  time 510 

BOOK    III 

THE  SUBJECT-MATTER   OF  CONTRACTS. 

CHAPTER   I. 
Peeliminary  Remarks 519 

CHAPTER   II. 
Purchase  and  Sale  of  Real  Property 522 

CHAPTER   III. 

HIRING  OF  REAL  PROPERTY. 

Section  I. 
Of  the  lease 530 

Section  II. 
Of  the  general  liabilities  of  the  lessor 531 

Section  III. 
Of  the  general  liability  and  obligation  of  the  tenant 533 


Xxii  CONTENTS. 

Section  IV. 
Of  surrender  of  leases  by  operation  of  law 543 

Section  V. 
( )f  away-going  crops 544 

Section  VI. 
Of  fixtures 545 

Section  VII. 
Of  notice  to  quit 547 

Section   VIII. 
Of  apportionment  of  rent 550 

Section  IX. 
Of  remedy  for  non-payment  of  rent 552 

CHAPTER   IV. 

PURCHASE  AND  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 

Section  I. 
Essentials  of  a  sale ^^^ 

Section  II. 
.\  bsolute  sale  of  chattels ^'^' 

Section   III. 
Price,  and  agreement  of  parties 561 

Section   IV. 
The  effect  of  a  Halo 562 


CONTENTS.  XXm 

Section   V. 
Of  possession  and  delivery 568 

Section  VI, 
Conditional  sales 577 

Section  VII. 
Bought  and  sold  notes 583 

Section   VIII. 
Of  sales  to  arrive 594 

Section    IX. 
Mortgages  of  chattels 611 

CHAPTER   V. 
Warranty 614 

CHAPTER   VI. 

STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU. 

Section  I. 
What  the  right  of  stoppage  is,  and  who  has  it 639 

Section  II. 
When  and  how  the  right  may  be  exercised 615 


INDEX  TO  CASES  CITED. 


[The  references  are  to  the  bottom  paging.] 


Page 

Aaron  v.  Second  Avenue  R.  R.  Co.  iii.  199 

A.  B.'s  Estate  i.  127 

Abat  V.  Penny  i.  224 

Abbey  v.  Cliase  i.  55,  72 

V.  Dewey  ii.  713 

V.  Devo  i.  387 

Abbot  V.  Bayley  i.  372 

V.  Hermon  i.  500 

V.  Massie  ii.  680 

Abbott  V.  Alsdorf  i.  523 

V.  Broome  ii.  513 

V.  Burbage  iii.  442 

V.  Fisher  i.  469 

V.  Goodwin  i.  612 

V.  Hendricks  i.  290 

V.  Hides  iii.  439,  462,  469 

V.  Keitli  ii.  848  ;  iii.  79 

V.  Parfitt  i.  143 

V.  Rogers  i-  489 

V.  Rose  ii.  861 

V.  Sebor  ii.  511 

V.  Shawmut  Ins.  Co.  ii.  557 

V.  Shepard           *  i.  515 

V.  Straiten  iii.  374 

Abeel  v.  Radcliff  i.  532  ;  iii.  14, 19 

Abell,  Ex  parte  i.  238 

V.  Warren  i.  337 

Aberfoyle,  The  ii.  454 

Abernetliy  v.  Hutcl;inson  ii.  332 

Abington  v.  North  Bridgewater        ii.  708 

Abitbol  r.  Bristow  ii.  628 

Abnev  v.  Kingsland  i.  570 

Abo,  tlie  ii.  519 

Aborn  v.  Bosworth  i.  332 

Abraham  r.  Plestoro  iii.  409,  436 

V.  R^'nolds  ii.  46 

Abrahams  v.  Bunn  iii.  125,  135 

Abraliat  i\  Brandon  ii.  837 

Abrams  v.  Pomeroy  ii.  685 

Absolon  V.  Marks  i.  278 

Acatos  V.  Burns  ii.  456 

Acebal  v.  Levy  i.  562;  iii.  14,  51,  58 

Acey  V.  Fernie  i.  42,  59 ;  ii.  617 

Acherley  v.  Vernon  ii.  659,  660 

Acheson  v.  Chase  iii.  144 

Acker  v.  Ledyard  ii.  860;  iii.  314 

V.  Phoenix  i.  562 


Acker  v.  Withrill  i.  554 

Ackerman  v.  Emott  i.  137 

Ackermann  v.  Elirensperger  iii.  Ill 

Ackerson  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  iii.  186 

Ackland  v.  Pearce  iii.  127 

Ackley  v.  Kellogg       ii.  150,  151,  227,  230 

V.  Hoskins  i.  56 

Acome  v.  Tlie  Am.  Mineral  Co.  i.  504 

Acorn,  The  ii.  437 

A'Court  V.  Cross  iii.  71,  76 

Acraman  v.  Morrice  iii.  4.34 

Ada,  Tiie  ii.  637 

Adair  v.  Brimmer  i.  146 

V.  Wincliester  i.  251 

Adam,  Ex  parte  iii.  414 

Adams  v.  Adams  i.  351 ;  ii.  93 

V.  Blanhenstein  ii.  196 

v.  Blethen  i.  271 

V.  Blodgett  iii.  402 

V.  Burks  "  ii.  321 

V.  Carroll  i.  183 

V.  Claxton  iii.  300,  421 

V.  Clem  ii.  1.58 

V.  CouUiard  ii.  894 

V.  Curtis  i.  399 

V.  Edwards  ii.  306 

V.  Frye  ii.  857 

V.  Gay  ii.  900,  905,  906 

V.  Hackett  iii.  502 

V.  Hamell  ii.  900 

V.  Hardy  i.  274,  283 

V.  Haught  ii.  418 

V.  Hayes  i.  263 

V.  Hill  ii.  635 

V.  Johnson  i.  622 

V.  Jones  ii.  4,  14 

V.  Kerr  ii.  719 

V.  Lambert  i.  524,  582 

V.  Lindsell  i.  514 

V.  London  &  Blackwall  Railway 

Co.  iii.  307 

V.  Mackay  i.  409 

V.  Malkin  iii.  416 

V.  M'Millan  iii.  12,  14 
V.  New  Orleans  Steam  Tow-Boat 

Co.  ii.  182 

V.  O'Conner  i.  580 

V.  O'Connor  i.  678 


XXVI 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Adams  v.  Otterbank  i.  321,  GGO 

V.  Palmer  iii.  4'j;) 

V.  Kobinson  i.  240 

V.  Rockingham  Ins.  Co.  ii.  476,  57G 

V.  Saundars  ii-  5'jG 

t'.  Scales  iii.  11 

V.  Shelby  ii.  923 

V.  Smith  i.  292 

r.  Statham  ii.  82G 

V.  Steer  ii.  C3G 

V.  Storey  iii.  385 

v.  Tapling  ii.  823 

v.  The  Sophia  ii.  461 

f.  Torbert  i.  315 

f.  Townsend  iii.  66 

V.  Warner  ii.  639 

7-.  Warren  Ins.  Co.  ii.  483 

r.  Way  iii.  113 

V.  Wlieelcr  i.  569 

V.  Williams  ii.  G  i3 

I'.  Woonsocket  Co.  ii.  45 

Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Darnell  ii.  203 

t'.  Egbert  iii.  207 

V.  Nock  ii.  260 

V.  Keagan  ii.  271 

V.  "Wilson  ii.  227 
Adamson  i-.  Jurvis            i.  36,  87;  ii.  927  ; 

iii.  206 

Aday  v.  Echols  iii.  358 

Adilerley  v.  Dixon  iii.  324 

Adtlington  r.  Allen  ii.  915 

Addis  V.  Knight  iii.  469 

Addison  v.  Gandassequi  i.  105 

V.  Gray  ii.  827,  835 

f.  Kentucky  Ins.  Co.  ii.  555 

Adeline,  The  ii.  441 

Adkins  r.  Baker  ii.  392 

V.  Watson  iii.  17 

Adlard  r.  Booth  i.  494 

Admiral,  Tlie  ii.  434 

A.  I).  Patchin.  The  i.  442 

Adventure,  The  ii.  440 

^tna  Bank  v.  Winchester  ii.  853 

jEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  France  ii.  556,  598, 

606 

V.  Olmstead  ii.  543 

t'.  Kcsh  ii.  557 

r.  Tyler  ii.  504,574,58.3,  587;  iii.  295 

Aflalo  V.  Fourdrinier  iii.  463 

African  Steamship  Co.  r.  Swanzy    ii.  454 

Agar  1-.  Biden  iii.  366 

c.  Macklcw  ii.  845;  iii.  3:i2 

Agawam  Bank  r.  Strevcr  ii.  24 

Agawam  Co   ;-.  Jordan  ii.  304 

Agnew  V.  Bank  of  Gettysburg  i.  321 

t'.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  571 

V.  McElroy  ii.  868,  871 

f.  Blatt  iii  392,  394,  437,  508 

Agra,  &c.  Bank  v.  lycigliton  iii.  224 

Agricola,  'I'lic  i.  117;  ii.  4G'.t 

Agricultural  Bank  r.  Bissell  iii.  1:;9 

V.  C'onmiercial  Bank  i.  320 

V.  The.Inne  ii.  404 

Agiiiiar  t-.  Hodgers  ii.  478,  480 

Aguire  v.  Tarmelee  i.  650 


Ahearn  v.  Ayres 

1.505 

Ahem  v.  Easterby 

i.  387 

Ah  Thaie  v.  Quan  Wan 

iii.  176 

Aid,  The 

ii.  440 

Aigen  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co. 

i.  166 

Aiken  v.  Barkley 

i.  294 

V.  Benton 

iii.  69 

V.  Dolan 

ii.  314 

V.  Manchester  Print  Works 

ii.  317, 

320,  321 

V.  Sanford 

ii. 

790,  875 

V.  Short 

i.  496 

Ainslie  v.  Boynton 

i. 

248.  258 

V.  Goff 

ii.  842 

V.  Mcdlycott 

i.  481 ;  ii.  927 

Ainsworth  v.  Partillo 

iii.  204 

V.  AValmsley                  ii 

3G7, 

373,  375 

Akcrblom  v.  Price,  &c.  Co.  ii.  440 

Akermau  r.  Humiihery  i.  652 ;  iii.  444, 

445 

Akhurst  v.  Jackson  iii.  429,  435 

Albany  Exchange  Bank  r.  Johnson 

iii.  472 

Albatross,  The,  v  Wayne  ii.  392 

Albert  v.  Lindau  i.  558;  ii.  764 

V.  Winn  i.  410 

Albcrtson  v.  Halloway  i.  495 

Albiii  V.  Presby  ii.  166 

Albion  Bank  v.  Burns  ii.  28 

AUho  v.  Agawam  Canal  Co.  ii-  46 

Alcliorne  v.  Gomme  i.  540 

Aicott  V.  Avery  iii.  477 

Alden  r.  Blague  ii.  824 

V.  Clark  ii.  6 

f.  Dewev  ii.  305,  327 

V.  Goddard  ii.  810;  iii.  102 

V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.        ii.  236 

I'.  Pearson  ii.  414 

Alder  v.  Keighley  iii.  187,  435 

V.  Saville  ii.  832,  836 

Alderman  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.        i.  570,  579 

Alderson  r.  Pope  i.  188,  211 

V.  Temple  i.  654 

Aldis  V.  Chapman  i.  393 

Aldrich  v.  Albee  ii.  783,  784,  785 

V.  Chubb  ii.  3 

V.  Grimes  i.  368 

I'.  Kinney  ii.  740 

V.  Reynolds  iii.  129 

V.  Simmons  ii.  468 

r.  Warren  i.  273 

Aldridge  i\  Johnson  i.  565 

V.  Turner  ii.  6 

A\e\yyn,  J'Jx  parte  iii.  464 

V.  Pryor  i.  604,  600 

Alexander,  Ex  parte  iii.  420 

V.  Alexander  i.  88,  89 

V.  Burnet  iii.  103,  104 

V.  Comber  iii.  59 

V.  Dcneale  i.  569 

V.  Dowie  ii.  387 

1-.  Dutton  i.  635 

V.  Gardner  i.  566,  .574,  594 

V.  Germania  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543,  546 

V.  Ghiselin  iii.  308,  344 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


XXVll 


Alexander  v.  Gibson 

i.  62 

Allen  V.  Ilallet 

ii.  45^) 

V. 

Greene 

ii.  181 

V.  Ilani 

iii.  267 

V. 

Heriot 

i.  3(i7 

i\  Hurrah 

i.  312 

V. 

Herr 

iii.  237 

V.  Ilayward 

i. 

116,  120 

V. 

Hiclcox 

ii.  802 

V.  Ilearn 

ii.  897 

V. 

Hutclieson 

i.  363 

V.  Hooker 

i.  G37 

V. 

McKenzie 

ii.  333 

t:  Hunter 

ii.  317 

V. 

Merry 

iii.  12 

V.  Jackson 

ii.  79 

V. 

Morgan 

i.  383 

r.  Jarvis 

iii.  224 

V. 

N.  W.  Univ. 

i.  94 

V.  Kincaid 

ii.  664 

V. 

Pierce 

i.  444 

r.  King 

i.  807 

?;. 

Polk 

ii.  'lOS 

V.  Lenoir 

i.  406 

V. 

Pratt 

ii.  528 

V.  Mackay 

ii. 

429, 

431, 

433,  455 

V. 

Springfield  Bank 

i.  2U2 

V.  McKean 

iii.  488 

V. 

Thomas 

i.  280 

V.  Merchants  B 

ink 

i.  41 

;  ii.  112, 

V. 

Wellington 

i.  25G 

674 

V. 

Whipple 

iii.  103 

V.  Merchants  Bank  of  N 

Y. 

i.  67 

Alexander,  llie 

ii.  385,  403,  404 

V.  Mille 

iii.  107 

Alexandre  v.  Sun  Ins.  Co.  ii.  517 

Alexandria  Cannl  Co.  i'.  Swann        ii.  825 
Alfred  v.  Fitzjaraes  ii.  51 

Alger  r.  Kennedy  i.  542 

V.  Scoville  iii.  24,  2G 

V.  Thacker  ii.  890,  891 

Alida,  Tlie  ii.  383 

Aline,  The  ii.  403 

Alivon  V.  Furnival  ii.  738;  iii.  429 

Alkan  v.  New  Hampshire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  557, 

575 

Alkinson  v.  Horrid ge  i.  635 

Allaback  v.  Utt  iii.  181 

Allaire  v.  Harrsliorne  i.  292 

V.  Whitney  iii.  235 

Allaire  Works   ■.  Guion  iii.  20(5 

Allan  V.  Eldred  i.  303 

V.  Gripper  i.  648 

Allard  v.  Greasert  iii.  53 

V.  Lamirande  ii.  909 

Allegre  v.  Maryland  Ins.  Co.    ii.  484,  524, 

587,  667,  844 

Allen  V.  Aldrich  i.  393,  396 

V.  Allen  ii.  730 

V.  Anderson  i.  637;  iii.  245 

V.  Bennett  iii.  4,  9,  18 

V.  Blunt  ii.  304;  iii.  176 

V.  Brown  ii.  28 

V.  Bryan  i.  95 

V.  Burke  iii.  309 

r.  Cameron  i.  494 

V.  Centre  Valley  Co.  i.  240 

V.  Cliambers  iii.  347 

V.  Charlestown  Ins.  Co.  ii.  555, 

560 
V.  Citizens,  &c.  Co.  i.  155 

V.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.       ii.  397,  505, 
506,  507,  515 
1-.  Culver  i.  536 

V.  Davis  i.  77,  167 

V.  Deming  ii.  900,  905,  907 

V.  Duffie  ii.  901 

V.  Dunn  i.  233 

V.  Dykers  ii.  124,  126 

V.  Edgerton  ii.  815 

V.  Fosgate  i.  11 

V.  Fourth  Bank  i.  300 


I'.  Minor  i.  335,  353 

V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  ii.  545,  547,  551, 

562 

V.  New  Gas  Co.  ii.  46 

V.  Pink  i.  634 

V.  Polereczky  i.  263 

(;.  Pawson  ii.  305 

V.  Pescous  ii.  886 

V.  Pightmere  ii.  31 

V.  Sewell  ii.  181,  194 

V.  Sliarpe  ii.  753 

v.  Smith's  Adm'r  i.  307,  308 

V.  Sugrue  ii.  507 

V.  Suydam  i.  92  ;  iii.  206 

V.  Thompson  ii.  9 ;  iii.  27 

V.  Watson  ii.  847 

V.  Wells  i.  232,  238 

V.  Williams  i.  329;  ii.  411 

V.  Woonsocket  Co.  i.  166,  224 

Allen's  Estate  iii.  348 

Aller  V.  Aller  i.  457 

Allerton  v.  Lang  i.  264 

AUeson  v.  Mar.sh  ii.  459 

AUetson  v.  Chichester  ii.  610 

Alley  V.  Deschamps  iii.  305,  338,  339 

Alliance  Bank  v.  Kearsley  i.  207 

Alliance  Ins.  Co.  v.  La.  State  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  641,  567 

Allibone  v.  Hager  i.  161 

Allies  V.  Probj-n  ii.  819 

Aliin  V.  Shadburne  ii.  852 

Ailing  V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  274 

Allison  V.  Haydon  ii.  60 

Allkins  V.  Jupe  i.  Ill 

Allmand  v.  Russell  iii.  382 

Allnutt  V.  Ashenden  ii.  24 

Allore  V.  Jewell  i.  435 

AUoway  v.  Braine  iii.  311 

All  wood  V.  Haseldon  i.  306 

Alman  i\  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Almgren  v.  Dutilh  ii.  420,  421 

Almy  V.  Wilcox  i.  393 

V.  Winslow  i.  281 

Alna  V.  Henckell  ii.  512 

V.  Plummer  iii.  12,  14,  248 

Alner  i'.  George  ii.  749 

Aloff  t).  Scrimshaw  ii.  850 


XXVIU 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Alonzo  Pearce,  M<atter  of  iii.  477 

Alsager.  Ex  }>arte  iii.  427 

V.  St.   Katlierine's    Dock    Com- 
pany ii.  41.>,  648 
Alsop  r.  Coit  ii.  52(5 

r.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.       ii.  483,  489, 

4yi 

1-.  Price  iii.  4G6 

Alston  V.  Balls  ii.  134 

I'.  Herring  ii.  417 

V.  Mechanics  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524,  552 

V.  State  Bank  iii.  82 

Altham's  case  ii-  68t) 

Altliorfe  r.  Wolfe  _  i.  l^W 

Alvanley  v.  Kinnaird  iii.  370,  371 

Alves  r.  Hodgson  ii.  700 

Alvord  V.  Smith  i.  174 

Alvord  Carriage  Co.  v.  Gleason  i.  54G 

Amble  V.  Whipple  i.  219 

Ambler  ;•.  Bradley  i.  180 

Ambrose  v.  McDonald  i.  130 

Amelia,  The  ^        ii.  396 

Amer  v.  Longstreth  i.  93  ;    iii.  183, 

186 

Amer.,  &c.  Co.  r.  Gurnee  ii.  28 

V.  Wolf  ii.  203 

American  Bank  v.  Doolittle  i.  210 

V.  Jenness  i.  296 

American  K.xpress  Co.  i'.  Sands        ii.  270 

American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bryan  ii.  499 

r.  Center  ii.  507,  510 

1-.  Day  ii.  586,  592 

V.  Francia  ii.  506 

V.  Griswold  ii.  484,  492,  493,  506 

V.  Henley  ii.  614 

V.  Hutton  ii.  488 

t;.  Klink  ii.  014,  615 

V.  Malione  ii.  543 

V.  Oakley  i.  154 

V.  Ogden  ii.  397,  506,  507,  5.30, 

531 

r.  Robertshaw  ii.  605 

American  Wine  Co.  v.  Brasher         ii.  922 

Amery  v.  Rogers  ii.  480 

Ames  V.  Chew  iii.  456 

V.  Colburn  ii.  861 

V.  Dyer  ii.  383 

V.  Foster  iii.  26 

V.  (iilman  iii.  427 

r.  Howard  ii.  303,  307,  315 

r.  King  ii.  373 

I'.  Mtrriam  i.  296 

'•.Mill  ward  ii.  832 

V.  Quimby  i.  561 

Amethyst,  The  ii.  4.30,  437,  439,  441 

Amherst  Academy  v.  Cowls  i.  484 

Amiable  Nancy  iii.  186,  196 

Amicable  Society  v.  Bolland  ii.  601, 

610 
Amidown  v.  Osgood  i.  192 

V.  Woodman  i.  322 

Amies  v.  Stevens  ii.  171,  172 

Amis  r.  The  Louisa  ii.  381 

Amor  V.  Fearon  ii.  38,  39 

Atnory  v.  Broderick  i.  572,  580 


Amory  i\  Francis 
t'.  Gilinan 
V.  Jones 
V.  Kannoffsky 
I'.  McGregor 
V.  Melvin 


iii.  468 

ii.  489,  896 

ii.  602 

i.  41,  543 

iii.  206 

i.  534 


AmoskeaiT,  &c.  Co.  v.  John  Adams, 

The  ii.  435 

V.  Moore  i.  315 

Amoskeag  Man.  Co.  v.  Garner         ii.  377 

I'.  Spear    ii.  352,  358,  370,  371,  373, 

374,  375,  377 

Amsinck  v.  Bean  i.  224;  iii.  475 

Anistel,  The  ii.  385 

Anclier  v.  Bank  of  England  i.  286 

Ancrum  v.  Slone  iii.  114 

Anderson  v.  Anderson  ii.  92 

V.  Baker  i.  264 

V.  Bruner  i.  62 

V.  B  nekton  iii.  239 

r.  Bnrnett  ii.  915 

V.  Chcnney  i.  232 

v-  Cliick  iii.  12 

V.  Clark  iii.  278 

1-.  Coonley  i.  39 

V.  Davis  ii.  8 

V.  Drake  i.  311 

V.  Edie  '}}.  605 

V.  Ewing  iii-  233 

V.  Fitzgerald  u.  596,  598 

V.  Harold  iii.  6 

V.  Hawkins  ii.  753 

V.  Hodgson  i.  573 

V.  Mannon  ii.  28 

V.  Martindale  i.  14,  17,  23,  31 

V.  Miller  i.  255  ;  iii.  435 

V.  Morice  i.  601 

V.  New  Jersey  ii.  47 

V.  Nicholas  i.  670 

V.  Pitcher  ii.  670 

V.  Pope  i.  193 

V.  Powell  i.  175 

r.  Robson  i.  332 

V.  Scott  iii.  46 

V.  Simpson  iii.  39 

V.  Smith  i.  641 

V.  Thornton  ii.  481,  522,  625 

V.  Tomkins  i.  200,  201,  207 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  i.  29 

r.  Van  Alen  i.  268 

V.  Wallace  ii.  834 

V.  Wheeler  iii.  508 

Andover,  The  ii-  412 

Andovcr  Savings  Bank  v.  Adams    ii.  769 

Andree  v.  Fletcher  ii.  481 

Andrew  r.  Allen  i.  68 

V.  Boughey  ii.  751 

V.  Dieterich  ii.  914 

Andre wes  i'.  Carstin  i.  175 

Andrews  v.  Belfield  ii.  63 

t'.  Bell  iii.  339 

V.  Bond  i.  253,  286 

V.  Boyd  i.  308 

V.  Brown  iii.  68,  369 

V.  Campbell  i-  248 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


XXIX 


Andrews  v.  Durant  ii.  380,  050 

V.  Essex  Insurance  Company   ii.  4y5, 
49(5,  540 
V.  Estes  i.  55;  ii.  421 

c.  Franklin  i.  280 

V.  Herriot  ii.  719,  738,  740 

V.  His  Creditors  ii.  700 

r.  Hoxie  i.  30!) 

u.  Jones  i.  382 

V.  Kneeland  i.  62,  628 

V.  Lyon  ii.  944 

V.  Palmer  iii.  427 

V.  Planters  Bank  i.  210 

I'.  Pond         ii.  700,  713,  714  ;  iii.  11(5, 
119,  145 
I'.  Torry  ii.  702 

V.  Wlieaton  i.  405 

Andriis  v.  Foster  ii.  51 

Angel  V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

V.  McLellan  i.  34(5,  349 

Angell  V.  Duke  iii.  38 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii.  616 

Angelo  V.  Angelo  ii.  91 

Angerstein  v.  Bell  ii.  488 

V.  Handson  i.  537 

Angier  v.  Angier  i.  401 

V.  Taunton  Paper  Manufactur- 
ing Co.  iii.  210 
Angle  V.  North  Western  Ins.  Co.      ii.  861 
Angus  V.  Bedford                       ii.  833,  834 
Anketel  v.  Converse  iii.  294 
Anna  Kimball,  The  ii.  413 
Annandale  v.  Harris                     i.  377,  465 
Ann  C.  Pratt,  The                     ii.  403,  404 
Ann  Caroline,  The                              ii.  432 
Ann  D.  Bichardson,  The                    ii.  452 
Annen  v.  Woodman                           ii.  480 
Annie  Lindsley,  The                          ii.  431 
Anonymous           i.  12,  60,  140,  251,  261  ; 
ii.  217,  460,  716,  765,  817,  840;  iii.  35, 
108,  117,  125,  136,  138,  141,  167,  289, 
414,  417,  427, 439,  452 
Ansell,  Ex  parte                                 iii.  429 
('.  Bobson                                      iii.  447 
Anstey  v.  Marden  iii.  26 
Anstruther  v.  Adair                             ii.  730 
Antarctic,  The                             ii.  383,  384 
Anthony  v.  Stinson                              ii.  881 
Antoni  n.  Belknap  i.  546 
Antonio  v.  Clissey                                iii.  28 
Antram  v.  Chace                    i  481 ;  ii.  838 
Antrobus  v.  Smith                 j.  263;  iii.  315 
Apollo,  The                                        ii.  888 
Apperson  v.  Cross  ii.  28 
Appleby  v.  Dodd                    i.  441  ;  ii.  458 
V.  Johnson                                      i.  505 
Applegate  v.  Jacoby                          ii.  635 
V.  Moffitt  i.  62 
Appleton  V.  Binks                      i.  68 ;  ii.  32 
V.  Chase                                        i.  481 
V.  Donaldson                               ii.  127 
V.  Fullerton                                iii.  234 
V.  Parker                                      ii.  756 
Appleton  Iron  Co.  v.  Brit.  Am.  Ass. 
Co.                                                   ii.  576 


Appollon,  The  iii.  175 

Aquila,  The  ii.  440 

Araminta,  The  ii.  467 

Aranguren  v.  Scholfield  i.  331 

Aranzamendi  r.  La.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509 

Archard  v.  Hornor  ii.  37,  44 

Archer  v.  Baynes  iii.  5, 14 

r.  Dunn  ii.  878 

V.  English  ii.  722 

V.  Hudson  i.  151 

V.  Marsh  ii.  890 

V.  Merchants,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  545 

V.  Putnam  iii.  1 17 

V.  Williams  iii.  191 

V.  Williamson  ii.  834 

V.  Zeh  iii.  48 

Archibald  v.  Merc.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 

V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  ii.  609 

V.  Thomas  ii.  631 

Arctic,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin  ii.  182 


Arden  v.  PuUen 

V.  Tucker 

V.  Watkins 
Ardesco  Oil  Co.  v.  Gilson 

V.  Bichardson 
Arey  v.  Stevenson 
Argall  V.  Bryant 

V.  Smith 
Argenbright  v.  Campbell 


i.  532,  533 

i.  22 

iii.  451 

ii.  46 

i.  536 

iii.  75 

iii.  99 

i.  242 

iii.  318,  347, 

352 

Argus  Co.  V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Albany  iii.  15 

Argyle  v.  Worthington  ii.  392 

Arkell  v.  Commerce  Ins.  Co.  ii.  552 

Armadillo,  The  ii.  403 

Armet  r.  Inness  ii.  535 

Armfield  v.  Tate  i.  367 

Armiger  v.  Clarke  iii.  366 

Armington  v.  Barnet  iii.  494,  498 

Armistead  v.  Butler  ii.  877 

V.  White  ii.  147 

V.  Wilde  ii.  158 

Arniitage  v.  Insole  i.  572 

Arniitt  v.  Breame  ii.  798,  835 

Armour  v.  McMichael  i.  293 

V.  Mich.,  &c.  R.  Co.  i.  59 

V.  Pecker  i.  580 

V.  Transatlantic  Fire  Ins.  Co.    ii.  554 

Armroyd  i:  Union  Ins.  Co.      ii.  413,  418, 

419 

Arms  r.  Ashley  i.  458 

A.  E.  M.  S.  N.  Co.  V.  Marzetti  i.  154 

Armstrong  u.  Baldock  i.  530 

V.  Burrows  ii.  687 

I'.  Cristiani  i.  322 

V.  Hussey  i.  189 

V.  Lawson  iii.  37 

V.  Lewis  i.  175 

r.  McDonald  i.  349 

V.  Percy  iii.  170,  227,  229 

V.  Robinson  i.  126 

V.  Stokes  i.  65,  67 

V.  Toler  i.  Ill,  486  ;  ii.  894 

V.  Wheeler  iii.  424 

Armstrong,  &c.  Co.  v.  Kosure  ii.  814 

V.  Arnold  ii.  869 


XXX 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Arnold  r.  Brown         i.  201,  202,  207,  224, 

225 

I'.  Crowder  i.  540 

V.  Downing  iii.  77,  82 

V.  Dresser  i.  32o 

V.  Halenbake  ii.  181 

I'.  Hudson  Kiver  R  R.  Co.       iii.  496 

V.  III.  Cent.  li.  Co.  ii.  238,  270 

V.  Lvniiin  i.  245,  497 

f.  Mayiiard  iii.  441,  442 

r.  Mayor  of  Poole         ii.  7(53 ;  iii.  307 

r.  Prout  i.  574 

f.  Richmond  Iron  Works    i.  369,  434; 

ii.  713 

V.  Spurr  i.  387 

V.  Wainwright  i.  170 

Arnot  V.  Biscoe  i.  621 

V.  Erie  R.  Co.  ii.  7 

V.  Woodburn  i.  290 

Arnott  V.  Hughes  i.  621 

V.  Redfern  iii.  113 

Arnsby  v.  Woodward  i.  539 

Arques  v.  Wasson  i.  613 

Arrington  v.  Gary  i.  109 

V.  Liscom  iii.  109 

Arrott  V.  Brown  i.  921 

Arthur  v.  Barton  i.  84 

V.  Cole  ii.  79 

V.  The  Schooner  Cassius    ii.  414,  41G, 

456;  iii.  206 

Arton  r.  Booth  i.  210;  ii.  852 

Ascough's  case  i.  541 

Ash  I'.  Putnam  i.  G53;ii.  914 

V.  Savage  i.  612 

Ashburner  v.  Balchen  ii.  422,  423 

Asliburnliam  v.  Thompson  i.  137 

Ashby  1-.  Ashby  i.  143 

V.  James  iii.  83 

V.  While  iii.  233,  234 

Ashcroft  V.  Morrin  iii.  14 

Ashford  r.  Hand  iii.  202 

Ashhurst  r.  Montour  Iron  Co.        iii.  377, 

378 

Ashley  v.  Ashley  ii.  609 

V.  Harrison  iii.  193 

V.  Pratt  ii.  534,  535 

Ashlin  V.  White  ii.  917 

Asinnole  v.  Wainwright  ii.  185 

Asiimoro  v.  Charles  iii.  230 

Ashworth  v.  Builders'  Ins.  Co.  ii.  547 

Aspdin  V.  Austin  ii.  49 

A'-jiinall  V.  Wake  i.  146 

Aspinwall  v.  Bartlet  ii.  459 

V.  Torrance  i.  70 

Associated    Firemen's    Ins.    Co.   v. 

Assum  ii.  584 

Asiin  V.  I'arkin  iii.  237 

Astlev  r.  Reynolds  i.445;  ii.  775; 

iii.  290 

V.  Wfldon  iii.  170,  172 

Aston  r.  Hcavan  ii.  180,  233 

Astorr.  Miller  i.  260 

I'.  Price  iii.  119 

V.  Union  Insurance  Company   ii.  523, 

G07 


Asylum  v.  New  Orleans  iii.  499 

Atchinson  v.  Baker  ii.  68,  70 

Atcliison  V.  Gee  ii.  897 

Atchison,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Flinn  ii.  240 

Athelstan  v.  Moon  ii.  828 

Atherton  v.  Brown  ii.  518 

V.  Hitchings  iii.  107 

V.  Newhall  iii.  50 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  575 

V.  Tilton  i.  180 

Athol  Music  Hall  Co.  v.  Carey  i.  4S3 

Atkin  V.  Acton  ii.  38,  43 

V.  Barwick  i.  563,  654 

Atkins  V.  Boylston  Fire  and  Marine 

Ins.  Go.  ii.  798 

V.  Burrows  ii.  464 

V.  (\)bb  iii.  219,  222 

0.  Curwood  i.  387,  388 

);.  Equitable  Ass.  Soc.  iii.  455 

V.  Hill  i.  141 

V.  Howe  i.  633 

V.  Johnson  i.  36 

V.  Sleeper  ii.  635 

V.  Trcdgold  iii.  87,  88 

Atkinson,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

V.  Bayntun  i.  470 

V.  Bell  ii.  380 

V.  Brindall  iii.  442 

r.  Brooks  i.  292 

V.  Brown  ii.  666,  794 

V.  Cotesworth  ii.  454 

V.  Denby  i.  446 

V.  Elliott  iii.  469 

V.  Great  Western  Ins.  Co.  ii.  500 

V.  Jordan  iii.  382,  383 

V.  Maline       ii.  380,  395,  400;   iii.  443 

V.  jManks  i.  279 

V.  Ritchie         i.  574,  606,  607 ;  ii.  805 

V.  Settree  i.  471 

V.  Teasdale  ii.  883 

V.  The  State  Bank  ii.  863 

Atkj'ns  V.  Amber  i.  107 

V.  Byrnes  i.  552 

V.  Kinnier  iii.  172 

V.  Pearce  i.  344 

Atlantic,  The  ii.  402,  403 

Atlantic  Bank  v.  Savery  i.  83 

Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gonard  ii.  404 

V.  Storrow  ii.  499 

V.  Wright  ii.  587 

Atlantic,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunn      iii.  184 

Atlantic,  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Barnes         ii.  31 

Atlas,  The  ii.  401,  MYJ. 

Atlce  V.  Backhouse        i.  445,  469;  ii.  8.-'! 

Attcnboro  v.  McKenzie  i.  282 

Attilla,  The  ii.  401 

Att'y-Gen.  ?;.  Alford  i.  136 

V.  Ansted  i.  78 

V.  Brooke  i.  532 

V.  Case  ii.  468 

V.  Clapham  ii.  632,  696 

V.  Davy  i.  160 

V.  Day  iii.  12,  340,  352 

V.  Dunn  ii.  709 

V.  Norstedt  ii-  398 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


XXXI 


Att'y-Gen.  v.  North  American  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  615 

V.  Plate  Glass  Co.  ii.  Obtj 


V.  Riddle 

i.  47 

V.  Sands 

i.  133 

V.  Sliore 

ii.  606 

V.  Sibthorp 

ii.  689 

i;.  Siddon 

i.  114 

V.  Sitwell 

iii.  354 

Attwood,  Ex  parte 

iii.  422 

V.  Clark                    1. 

581;  ii. 

666,  794 

V.  Munnings 

i.  41,  6.3 

V.  Small 

i.  78 

;   ii.  924 

V.  Taylor 

ii.  709 

;  iii.  112 

V.  

iii.  316 

Attwool  V.  Attwool 

ii.  879 

Atwater  v.  Clancy 

i.  629 

V.  Townsend 

u.  719 

;  iii.  391 

V.  Woodbridge 

iii.  498 

Atwell  V.  Mayhew 

iii.  48 

Atwill  V.  Ferritt 

ii. 

336,  338 

Atwood  V.  Cobb 

ii. 

688,  794 

V.  Emery 

ii. 

629,  666 

V.  Gillett 

i. 

224,  225 

V.  Partridge 

iii.  462 

17.  Sellar 

ii.  446 

'r.  Vincent 

iii.  297 

V.  Weeden 

ii.  896 

V.  Whittlesey 

iii.  121 

Aubert  v.  Maze 

ii. 

835,  838 

Aubery  r.  Fiske 

i.  Ill 

Aubin  V.  Bradley 

i.  578 

Auburn  Bank  v.  Lewis 

iii.  124 

Audenreid  i-.  Randall 

i. 

568,  651 

Audenried  v.  Betteley 

ii.  937 

Auer  V.  Penn 

iii.  39 

Ault  V.  Goodrich 

iii.  96 

Aultman  v.  Jett 

ii.  757 

V.  Lee 

ii. 

745,  747 

Aultman,  &c.  Co.  v.  Hetherington  ii.  757  ; 

iii.  219 

Auriol  V.  Mills  iii.  448,  449 

V.  Thomas  iii.  143 

Aurora,  The  ii.  404 

Aurora"  Borealis,  The,  v.  Dobbie      ii.  392 

Aurora  City  v.  West  ii.  870;  iii.  113 

Aurora  Ins.  Co.  v.  Eddy  ii.  552 

V.  Kranich  ii.  587 

Austen  v.  Wilward  i.  28 

Austin  V.  Crawford  iii.  204 

Austin,  Ex  parte  iii.  428 

V.  Bethnal  Green  Guardians      i.  154 

V.  Bostwick  iii.  88 

V.  Boyd  i.  274-283 

V.  Burns  i.  279,  280 

V.  Caverley  iii.  491 

V.  Charlestown  Female  Seminary 

i.  370 
V.  Drew  ii.  567,  569 

V.  Hall  i.  26 

V.  Holland  i.  190 

V.  Johnson  iii.  403 

V.  Lawar  i.  151 

f.  Munro  i.  145 

V.  Sawyer  iii.  35 


Austin  V.  The  M.  S.  &L.  Railway  Co. 

ii.  256,  264,  265,  268 

V.  Walker  iii.  119 

V.  Wilson  i.  326,  408  ;  iii.  185 

Australia  Bank  v.  White  ii.  113 

Australian  lioval  Mail  Steam  Nav. 


Co.  V.  Marzetti 
Auworth  V.  Johnson 
Averill  v.  Hedge 

V.  Irish 

V.  Loucks 
AA-^erline  v.  Whisson 
Avery  v.  Baum 

V.  Bowden 

V.  Cheslyn 

V.  Hackley 

V.  Lauve 

V.  Pitch 

V.  Scott 

V.  Stewart 


V.  Wilson 
Aveson  v.  Kinnaird 
Awde  V.  Dixon 
Ayer  v.  Bartlett 

V.  Chase 

V.  Hall 

V.  Hawkins 

f.  Hutchins 

V.  New  England  Ins.  Co 

V.  Spring 

V.  Warren 
Ayers  v.  Hewitt  i 

Aylett  V.  Ashton 
Ayliff  V.  Archdale 

V.  Tracy 
Aymar  v.  Astor 

V.  Sheldon 
Aynsworth,  Ex  parte 
Ayres  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co. 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Western  R.  Co. 
Ayton  V.  Bolt 


i.  154 

i.  535 

i.  514 

ii.  129 

i.  169 ;  iii.  402 

i.  124 

ii.  939 

ii.  425 

i.  547 

iii.  421 

i.  165 

iii.  202 

ii.  846 

1.  821;  ii.  783,  797, 

799 

i.  572 

ii.  593 

i.  273,  285 

i.  578 

ii.  57 

ii.  377 

ii.  763  ;  iii.  82 

i.  293,  295 

ii.  600 

iii.  239 

i.  407 

.  369;  ii.  924 

iii.  357,  368 

i.  353 

ii.  77  ;  iii.  33 

ii.  181,  428 

i.  314 

iii.  171 

i.  467 

ii.  575 


ii.  252 
iii.  71 


B. 


B.  &  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Collins 

ii.  227 

Babb  V.  Clemson 

i.  568 

Babcock  v.  Beman 

i.  288 

V.  Case 

ii.  814 

V.  Hawkins 

ii.  818 

V.  Herbert 

ii.  181 

V.  Montgomery 

Ins.  Co. 

ii.  567,  569, 
571 

V.  Orbison 

i.  91 

V.  Smith 

i.  400 

V.  Stone 

i.  209 

V.  Tiiompson 

ii.  896 

V.  Weston 

iii.  394 

V.  Wilson 

i.481 

Bach  V.  Longman 

ii.  334 

V.  Owen 

i.  572,  580 

XXXll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Bacl)clder  v.  Fiske 

i.  30,  32 

Bailey  v.  Smith 

1. 

562,  504 

Baclielour  v.  Gage 

iii.  44y 

I'.  Smock 

i.  281 

Bacliurst  r.  Cliiickard 

i.  234 

V.  Taylor 

ii. 

344,  801 

Backliouse  v.  Charlton 

i.  227 

V.  The  Mayor  of  New  York 

iii.  483 

I,'.  Moiiim 

iii.  345,  365,  371 

Baileyville  v.  Lowell 

i.  474 

V.  Sneeil 

ii.  171 

Haillie  v.  Kell 

ii.  43 

Backniaii  r.  Jenks 

i.  282 

Hailly,  Ex  parte 

iii.  414 

r.  Wriplit 

i.  48(5 

Baily  v.  Curling 

ii.  833 

Backus  V.  Coyne 

i.  200  ;  ii.  447 

i:  Merrell 

ii.  920 

V.  Lebanon 

iii.  480,  494,  41)8 

V.  Taylor 

ii. 

348,  349 

V.  Spaulding 

i.  477 

Bain  v.  Brown 

1.  94 

V.  The  Marengo 

ii.  410 

V.  Clark 

i.  104 

Bacon,  Ex  parte 

iii.  435 

V.  Fothergill 

Iii.  240 

V.  Brown 

1.622;  ii.  705,922 

Bainbridge  v.  Firmston 

i.  477 

V.  Charlton 

ii.  73o 

r.  Neilson 

Ii. 

504,  512 

V.  Oanson 

ii.  849 

V.  Pinhorn 

iii.  472 

V.  Dubarry 

ii.  829 

V.  Wade                          ii 

8;  iii.  10,  17 

V.  Dyer 

i.  309,  310 

V.  Wilcox 

iii.  1.59 

V.  Eccles 

iii.  15,  50 

Baines  v.  Holland 

ii.  520 

V.  Jones 

ii.  325 

V.  Jevons 

iii.  50 

V.  Rives 

iii.  100 

V.  Wood  fall 

i.  500 

V.  Sontlley 

i.  G6 

Baird  v.  Folliver 

iii.  108 

Bacot  V.  I'arnell 

ii.  138 

IK  Mathews 

i.  024 

Baflcock,  Ex  parte 

iii.  418 

Bakeman  v.  Pooler 

ii.  776 

Baddeicy  v.  Mortlock 

ii.  69,  70,  74 

Baker,  Ex  parte 

.324;  ii.  408 

Badelcy  r.  Vigurs 

ii.  792 

V.  Adams 

i.  549 

Badger,  In  re 

ii.  310 

V.  Adm.  of  Backus 

i.  161 

V.  Daenicke 

ii.  700 

V.  Arnot 

i.02 

V.  Glcns'  Falls  Ins. 

Co.                ii.  580 

V.  Baker 

ii.  693 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  512,  513 

V.  Barney                        1 

401 

;  iii.  415 

V.  Piiinney 

358,  300,  361 

V.  Boston 

iii.  510 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  587 

V.  Briggs 

i.  283 

V.  Titconib 

iii.  202 

V.  Brown 

ii.  882 

Bail! am  v.  Tucker 

ii.  129, 395,  400 

V.  Cart w  right 

ii.  71 

Badnall  c.  Samuel 

i.  323 

V.  City  of  New  York  Steamship 

Bage,  Ex  parte 

iii.  422 

ii.  435 

Bagoly  V.  Forder 

i.  339 

V.  Cook 

iii.  288 

Bagg  V.  Jefferson 

ii.  875 

i\  Corey 

ii.61,458 

Bnglehole  v.  Walters 

1.634;  ii.  31)4 

V.  Dcssauer 

ii.  156 

Bagley  r.  Fiiidlay 

iii.  224 

V.  Dewey 

ii.  851 

V.  l\'(lilie 

iii.  158,  173 

V.  Frellsen 

i.  246 

V.  Smith 

i.  219 

I'.  Fuller 

iii.  275 

Bagott  V.  Mullen 

i.  37 

V.  Gray 

ii. 

380,  394 

Bags  of  Linseed 

ii.  407 

V.  Higgins 

ii.  650 

Baikie  v.  Chandless 

i.  120 

V.  Hoag 

ii.  105 

Baile  V.  St.  Joseph  Ins. 

Co.             iii.  3i:9 

V.  Jacob 

1.  471 

Bailey  v.  Adams 

ii.  20,  28 

V.  Jordan 

iii.  34 

V.  Bailey 

ii.  92 

V.  Keen 

1 

339,  475 

V.  Bamberger 

i.  360 

I'.  Ludlow 

ii.  545 

V.  Beiisley 

i.  505 

V.  Manufacturers  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  428, 

V.  Bidwell 

1.273 

497 

1-.  Bussing 

1.  130 

V.  Newton 

ii.  089 

V.  Chapman 

i.  109 

r.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  240 

V.  Damon 

ii.  407,  423 

r.  Scott 

i.  283 

V.  Day 

ii.  749 

V.  Stackpoole 

ii.  705 

V.  Finch 

iii.  4(10 

I'.  Stonebreaker 

ii.  749 

V.  Freeman 

11.  7;  iii.  18 

V.  Taylor 

ii.  333 

V.  Ilasting.s 

iii.  237 

V.  Union  Life  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  006 

V.  Hudson  R.  Co. 

i.  579 

V.  Wheaton          Iii.  394, 

397, 

409,  507 

V.  Mogg 

ii.  00 

V.  White 

ii.  79 

0.  Ogden 

Iii.  014 

V.  Wimpee 

i.  239 

f.  Porter 

i.  322 

V.  Woodruff 

ii.  143 

r.  Quint 

ii.  221 

Baker's  Appeal 

i.  231 

V.  Shaw 

iii.  20'.) 

Balch,  Ex  parte 

ii.  804 

V.  Simonds 

ii.  795 

V.  Smith 

i.  256 

INDEX  TO   CASES  CITED. 


XXXIH 


Balcom  v.  Richards  iii.  91 

Baldey  v.  Parker  i.  525,  571 ;  iii.  40 

Baldney  v.  Ritchie  ii.  ^^96 

Baldwin  v.  Bank  of  La.        i.  326  ;  ii.  113 

V.  Bank  of  Newbury  iii.  390 

V.  Burrows  i.  174 

V.  Casella  i.  82,  113 

V.  Chouteau  Ins.  Co.  ii.  471 

V.  McCrae  ii.  871 

V.  Munn  iii.  245,  240,  247 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.eOl 

V.  Palmer  iii.  00 

V.  Potter  i.  90 

V.  Society    for    Dif.    of    Useful 

Knowledge  iii.  330,  360 

,         V.  United  States  Tel.  Co.    ii.  279,  280, 

282,  285,  287,  300 

V.  Williams  iii.  57 

Baldy  v.  Stratton  ii.  73,  75 

Baley  v.  Homestead  Fire  Ins.  Co.    ii.  570 

Balfe  V.  West  ii.  107,  112 

Ball  V.  Bullard  iii.  107 

V.  Coggs  iii.  324,  306,  307 

V.  Consolidated,  &c.  Co.  ii.  881 

V.  Dunsterville  i.  122,  212,  485 

v.  Gilbert  ii.  896,  897 

V.  Loomis  i.  509 

i;.  Newton  i.  506 

V.  Stanley  ii.  753,  779 

V.  Storie  ii.  625 

Ballard  v.  Burget  i.  580 

V.  Burgett  i.  557 

I'.  Child  i.  260 

V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  484 

V.  Noaks  ii.  818 

V.  Oddey  iii.  125 

V.  Walker  iii.  9 

Ballinger  v.  Bourland  iii.  144 

V.  Edwards  iii.  136,  156 

Ballou  V.  Farnuni  i.  117 

V.  Jones  ii.  944 

V.  Talbot  i.  72 

Ballston  Spa  Bank  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A. 

ii.  552 
Balmain  v.  Shore  i.  169,  226 

Balmanno  v.  Lumley  iii.  357 

Balme  v.  Hutton  iii.  434,  441 

Baltimore,  The  ii.  438 

V.  Baltimore,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  i.  151 

V.  Reynolds  i.  98 

Baltimore  Turnpike  v.  Boone  iii.  186 

Baltimore  &  Susquebannah  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Nesbit  iii.  506 

Baltimore,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dalrymple 

ii.  130 
Baltimore,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blocker 

iii.  184 
V.  Breining  iii.  180 

V.  Campbell  ii.  257 

V.  Rathbone  ii.  270 

V.  State  ii.  817 

V.  Wilkens  i.  44 

V.  Wilkinson  ii.  277 

Bamber  v.  Savage  iii.  9 

Bamford  v.  Harris  ii.  880 


Bamford  v.  lies 

V.  Sliuttleworth 
Bampton  v.  Paulin 
Banbury,  Ex  parte 
Bancroft  v.  Dumas 

V.  Hall 

V.  Merchants'  Despatch  Co. 

V.  Snodgrass 
Bandy  v.  Cartwright 
Banglay,  Ex  parte 
Bangor  v.  Coding 

V.  Warren 
Bangor  Bank  i\  Treat 
Bangs  V.  Moslier 

V.  Strong 
Bank  v.  CarroUton  R.  Co. 

V.  Curry 

V.  McChord 

I'.  Myers 

V.  Savery 

V.  Spicer 

V.  Woods 
Bank  of  America  v.  Senior 
Bank  of  Augusta  v.  Earle  ii.  698 

Bank  of  Australasia  v.  Bank  of  Aus- 
tralia i.  487 
Bank  of  Beloit  v.  Beale                        i.  570 
Bank  of  California  v.  West.  Un.  Tel. 

Co.  ii.  290 

Bank  of  Cape  Fear  v.  Sewell  i.  322 

Bank  of  Catskill  v.  Messenger  i.  28 

Bank  of  Cbenango  v.  Osgood  i.  28 

V.  Root  i.  211 

Bank  of  Chilicothe  v.  Dodge  iii.  355 

Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Fitzhugh  ii.  669 

V.  Laurence  i.  320 

V.  Patterson's  Administrator        i.  22, 
154;  ii.  61 
Mechanics' 

ii.  853 


ii.  18 

i.  85 

iii.  31 

iii.  446 

i.  489 

i.  312 

ii.  227 

i.  194 

i.  531 

iii.  465 

ii.  221 

ii.  757 

i.  12 

ii.  27,  30 

ii.  28 

i.  220 

ii.  861 

ii.  861 

i.  323 

i.  298 

ii.  755 

i.  327 

i.  298 


Bank   of    Commerce 

Bank  Ass. 

V.  Union  Bank  i.  300 

Bank  of  England,  Ex  paTte  iii.  472 

Bank  of  Galliopolis  v.  Trimble  ii.  722 

Bank  of  Georgia  v.  Lewin  ii.  716 

Bank  of  Ireland  v.  Beresford  iii.  495 

Bank  of  Lansingburg  v.  Crary  iii.  35 

Bank  of  Louisiana  v.  Tournillon        i.  320 

Bank  of  Louisville  v.  Young  iii.  123 

Bank  of  Metropolis  v.  Guttschlick      i.  52 

V.  N.  E.  Bank  ii.  113;  iii.  281 

Bank  of  Middlebury  ?'.  Rut.  &  W. 

R.  R.  Co.  i.  22 

Bank  of  Mobile  v.  King  i.  65 

Bank  of  Monro  v.  Strong  iii.  130 

Bank  of  Mutual  Redemption  v.  Stur- 

gis  iii.  276 

Bank  of  North  America  v.  Bangs      i.  300 

V.  Kirby  .  i.  313 

V.  M'Call  ii.  742 

V.  Wheeler  ii.  738 

Bank  of  Orleans  v.  Smith  ii.  112 

Bank  of  Pittsburg  v.  Neal  i.  65 

Bank  of  Rochester  v.  Jones      i.  107,  108  ; 

iii.  275 
Bank  of  Salina  v.  Babcock  i.  292 


XXXIV 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Bank  of  Sandusky  v.  Scoville  i.  292 

Bank  of  South  Carolina  ;•.  Mvers      i.  317 
Bank  of  St.  Albans  v.  i\  &  M.  Bank 

i.  300 
V.  Scott  iii.  139 

Bank  of  Tennessee  ;•.  Johnson  i.  290 

Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  v.  Mudg- 

ett  i.  190 

Bank  of  the  State  v.  Bank  of  Cape 

Fear  i.  309 ;  iii.  486 

Bank  of  United  States  v.  Binney      i.  204 

V.  Carneal  i.  803 

V.  Dandridge  i.  154 

I'.  Davis  i.  80,  83,  321 

V.  Donally  ii.  700,  719,  721 

V.  Dunsetii  iii.  238 

V.  Halstcad  iii.  391 

V.  Leathers  i.  326 

V.  Lyman  i.  G6 

V.  Owens  iii.  116,  117,  132 

V.  Waggener  iii.  IIG,  118 

Bank  of  Utica  v.  Bender  i.  310,  318 

V.  McKinster  ii.  112 

V.  riiillips  iii.  143 

V.  Smith  i.  311 ;  ii.  G()9 

V.  Wi.ger  iii.  123,  189,  143 

Bank  of  Washington  v.  Neale  ii.  113 

?•.  Triplet  ii.  669 

Bank  of  Watertown  v.  Assessors  of 

Watertown  iii.  498 

Bank,  First  Nat.,  of  Whitehall  v.  Lamb 

iii.  124 
Bankard  i-.  Bait.  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  271 

Banker  r.  Banker  ii.  87 

Banks  v.  Adams  ii.  827 

i;.  Gibson  ii.  369 

r.  Ilaskie  i.  582 

V.  Marshall  i.  270 

V.  Martin  i.  83 

V.  Mitchell  i.  187 

V.  Tike  ii.  878 

V.  Walker  i.  448 

r.  Werts  ii.  898 

V.  White  i.  532 

Bannister  v.  Read  ii.  654 

Bannon  v.  Baltimore,  &.C.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  178 
Banorgec  ?'.  Tlovey  i.  46,  122 

Banton  v.  Iloomes  ii.  877 

Baptist  Church  v.  Brooklyn  Fire  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  470 

Barber  i\  Andover  iii.  494 

V.  Barber  iii.  90 

f.  Barnes  i.  220 

V.  Mrace  ii.  448,  609 

V.  Briton  i.  42 

V.  Brown  i.  496;  ii.  870 

V.  Butcher  ii.  509 

V.  Fox  i.  141,  471 

V.  fJingoll  i.  48 

V.  Hartford  Bank  i.  23:; 

V.  I'ott  ii.  748 

V.  Root  ii.  730 

Barbin  v.  rolice  Jury  iii.  233 


Barclay,  Ex  parte 

V.  Bailey 

V.  Cousins 

V.  Kennedy 

V.  l..ucas 

V.  Stirling 

V.  Walmsley 
Barcraft  v.  Snodgrass 
Barden  v.  Keverberg 


i.  322 ;  iii.  468 

i.  303 

ii.  483 

iii.  161 

ii.  20,  21 

ii.  483 

iii.  14G 

i.  194 

i.  407 


Bard  well  v.  Conway  Ins.  Co.  ii.  580 

V.  Lydall  ii.  4,  6 

V.  Perry  i.  231,  239 

Barefoot,  The  ii.  437 

Barfield  v.  Nicholson  ii.  336 

Barfoot  v.  Freswell  ii.  642 

Barger  v.  Collins  i.  254 

Bargett  v.  Orient  Ins.  Co.  ii.  478 

Barhydt  v.  Ellis  ii.  31 

Baricknian  v.  Kuykendall  iii.  14 

Baring  v.  Christie  ii.  644 

I'.  Clark  i.  326 

V.  Corie  5.  107  ;  ii.  938 

V.  Lyman  i.  187 

Barker  v.  Baltimore,  &c.  R.  Co.        ii.  447 

V.  Binninger  ii.  936 

V.  Blakes  ii.  519,  520 

V.  Bradley  ii.  11 

V.  Braham  i.  53;  ii.  873,  874 

V.  Bucklin  iii.  24,  28 

V.  Cassidy  iii.  100 

V.  Cheriot  ii.  413 

V.  Clarke  i.  316 

V.  Dinsmore  i.  556 

V.  Goodair  i.  224,  258 

V.  Harrison  i.  522 

V.  Hibbard  i.  365 

V.  Hodgson  ii.  425 

V.  Lees  ii.  848 

V.  Mar.  Ins.  Co.  i.  93 

V.  Parker  ii.  21,  22 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.      ii.  447,  517,  518, 

519 

V.  Pittsburgh  iii.  483 

V.  Richardson  i.  26,  210  ;  ii.  749 

V.  Roberts  ii.  144 

V.  Scuddcr  ii.  32 

V.  St.  Quintin  ii.  849 

V.  Sutton  ii.  792 

V.  Vansommer  iii.  117 

V.  Windle  ii.  422 

Barkley  v.  Hanlan  i.  470 

V.  Rensselaer  i.  75 

Barklio  v.  Scott  i.  1C6,  213 

Barksdale  v.  Brown  i.  60 

Barley  v.  Walford  ii.  917 

Barlow  v.  Bishop  i.  285,  392 

V.  Leekie  ii-  473 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  i.  468 

V.  Planters  Bank  i.  321 

V.  Scott  i.  505 

I'.  Wain  Wright  i.  543 

Barnanl  v.  Adams  ii.  444,  445,  416 

V.  Backhaus  ii.  896 

V.  Bartholomew  iii.  75,  HI 

V.  Bridgcman  i.  84 


INDEX  TO    CASES    CITED. 


XXXV 


Barnard  v.  Gushing 

ii.  645 

Barrett  v.  Buxton 

i.  4.35 

V.  Eaton 

i.  612,  613 

V.  Charleston  Bank 

i.  317 

V.  Godscall 

iii.  440 

V.  Deere 

ii.  747,  774 

V.  Kellogg 

i.  029 

V.  Dutton 

ii.  425 

V.  Lee 

iii.  340 

V.  French 

ii.  035 

V.  Poor 

ui.  176,  186 

V.  Goddard 

i.  560,  648 

V.  Yates 

i.  627 

V.  Hall              i. 

625; 

ii.  307,  314,  315 

V.  Young 

iii.  120 

V.  Jermy 

ii.  547 

Barnehurst  v.  Cabbot 

i.  472 

r.  Lewis 

ii.  764 

Barnes,  Ex  parte 

iii.  427 

V.  McKenzie 

i.  232 

V.  Barnes 

iii.  507 

V.  Pritchard 

i.  578 

V.  Bartlett 

iii.  217 

V.  Stockton,  &c. 

Railway            ii.  638 

V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co 

iii.  349 

V.  Swann 

i.  188,  204 

V.  Cole 

ii.  247,  429 

V.  Thorndike 

ii.  862 

V.  Gorliam 

i.  280 

V.  Union  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.   i.  254  ;  ii.  56-5, 

V.  Hedley 

i.  460 ;  iii.  128 

584 

V.  Holcomb 

i.  611 

Barrick  v.  Buba 

ii.  425 

V.  Marshall 

ii.  220 

Barringer  v.  King 

ii.  743 

V.  Parker 

ii.  836 

V.  Sneed 

ii.  683 

V.  Perine 

i.  482,  483,  484 

Barron  v.  Paulding 

ii.  930 

V.  Taylor 

ii.  386 

Barrow,  Ex  parte 

iii.  414 

V.  Trenton  Glass  Co. 

i.  83 

V.  Paxton 

i.  611;ii.  121 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  576 

V.  Richard 

iii.  331 

V.  Warlich 

iii.  141 

Barrows  v.  Lane 

i.  284 

Barnesley  v.  Powell 

iii.  414 

V.  Knight 

ii.  354,  355,  363,  371 

Barnesville  Bank  r.West.  Un.  Tel.  Co. 

Barry  v.  Anderson 

i.  42 

ii.  290 

V.  Boninger 

i.  109;  iii.  250 

Barnet  v.  Gilson 

ii.  820 

V.  Ln.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  500 

V.  National  Bank 

iii.  124 

V.  Nesham 

i.  182 

V.  Smith 

i.  .304 

V.  Ransom 

ii.  683 

Barnett,  Ex  parte 

iii.  420 

Barry's  case 

i.  449 

V.  Goings 

i.  409 

Barstow  v.  Adams 

iii.  426 

V.  Lambert 

i.  59 

V.  Bennett 

ii.  23 

V.  Stanton                i. 

631 ;  ii.  918.  922 

V.  Gray 

iii.  9 

Barncwell  v.  Church 

ii.  496,  529,  534 

V.  Hiriart 

i.  322 

Barney  v.  Bliss 

ii.  780 

Barter  v.  Wheeler 

ii.  223 

V.  Brown 

i.  571 

Bartholomew  v.  Jackson  i 

.475;  ii.  50,  61, 

V.  Coffin 

i.  478 

105 

V.  Currier 

i.  211 

V.  Sawyer 

ii.  .305 

V.  Frowner 

iii.  289 

V.  St.  Louis,  &c. 

R.  R 

.  Co.         ii.  210 

V.  Gritfin 

iii.  403 

Bartlett  r.  Carnley 

ii.  407 

V.  Maryland  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  504 

v.  Drake 

i.  52 

V.  Patterson 

ii.  865;  iii.  12 

V.  Farrington 

i.  5.32,  541 

V.  Prentiss 

ii.  273 

V.  Haw  ley 

i.  58,  319 

V.  Saunders 

i.l36;  iii.  422 

V.  Hoppock 

i.  631,  632 

V.  Smith 

i.  227 

V.  Knight 

ii.  741 

Barns  v.  Graham 

ii.  781,  787 

V.  Mayor 

ii.  708 

Barnum  v.  Barnum 

ii.  85 

V.  Pearson 

i.  254 

V.  Childs 

iii.  31 

V.  Pentland        i 

87; 

ii.  672,  675,  747 

V.  Vandusen 

jii.  239 

V.  Robinson 

i.  319 

Baron  v.  Abeel 

iii.  237 

V.  Van  Zandt 

i.  .381 

V.  Husband 

i.  218 

t'.  Vinor 

i.  488  ;  ii.  887 

Barougli  v.  White 

i.  295 

V.  West.  Un.  Te 

.Co. 

ii.  286 

Barr  r.  Armstrong 

i.  389 

V.  Williams 

i.  569 ;  iii.  145 

V.  Hill 

i.  460 

V.  Wyman 

i.  442 

V.  Lapsley 

iii,  331 

Bartlette  v.  Crittenden 

ii.  330,  332,  333 

V.  Marsh 

i.  316 

Bartley  r.  Richtmyer 

ii.  76 

r.  Myers                   i. 

575 ;  ii.  783,  784 

V.  Williams 

i.  185 

V.  Schroeder 

i.  78 

Bartley,  The 

ii.  440 

Barratt  v.  Allen 

i.  321 

Barton  v.  Baker 

i.  317 

Barren  v.  Trussell 

iii.  27 

V.  Fitzgerald 

ii.  633,  634,  640 

Barrels  of  Oil 

ii.  439,  440 

V.  Glover 

iii.  172 

Barret  v.  Hampton 

ii.  896 

V.  Hanson 

i.  196 

Barrett  v.  Allen 

ii.  783,  799 

V.  McKelway 

ii.  667,  672 

V.  Barrett 

ii.  874,  875,  884 

t7.  Tower 

iii.  401 

XXXVl 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Barton  v.  Wolliford  ii.  174 

Bartrara  v.  Farebrother  i.  054 

Barwis,  Ex  purte  iii.  414 

Basch  V.  Humboldt  Ins.  Co.  ii.  586 

Basil  V.  Bash  iii.  247 

V.  Hill  i.  109 

Bashford  v.  Shaw  ii.  31 

Bashore  v.  Whistler  i.  615 

Baskerville  v.  Brown  ii.  881 

Baskett  I'.  Cunningham  ii.  848 

Baskin  v.  Seeclirist  i.  540 

Bason  ?-«IIughart  iii.  25 

Bass  V.  Bass  iii.  96 

V.  Chicago,  &C.R.  Co.  ii.  246;  iii.  187 

V.  Clive  i.  300 

V.  Clivley  iii.  309 

V.  Smith  iii.  68 

r.  White  i.  576 

Basset  v.  Bassett  ii.  858 

V.  CoUis  i.  635 

y.  Kerne  ii.  784 

Bast  V.  Byrne  ii.  53 

Basten  v.  Butter  ii.  879 

Bastow  V.  Bennett  ii.  21 

Batchelder,  Re  iii.  273 

V.  Batchelder  ii.  736 

V.  Sanborn  ii  939 

V.  Sturgis  iii.  244 

Bate  V.  Burr  i.  66;  iii.  Ill 

V.  Cartwright  ii.  759 

'Bates,  Ex  parte  iii.  415 

V.  Bates  ii.  780 

V.  Cartwright  ii.  880 

V.  Chcsebro  iii.  58 

V.  Churchill  ii.  780 

V.  Coe  iii.  382 

V.  Cort  i.  478,  490 

V.  Delavan  i.  52G 

V.  Dandy  iii.  487 

V.  En  Wright  i.  306 

V.  Hewitt  ii.  526 

V.  James  i.  235 

V.  Moore  iii.  44 

V.  Staunton  ii.  152,  218;  iii.  269 

V.  Todd  i.  410 

V.  Watson  i.  462 

Bateson  v.  Gosling  i.  323 

Bath,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

Batson  v.  Donovan    ii.  217,  261,  263,  272, 

274 

Battcman  i;.  IMorford  i.  515 

Battersby  v.  Gale  ii.  385 

Battin  v.  Bigelow  iii.  236 

Battishill  i;.  Keed  iii.  235 
Battle  r.  Ivochester  City  Bank         ii.  815 

Battlcy  V.  I'"aulkner  iii.  99 

Batty  V.  Hill  ii.  371 

V.  Lloyd  iii.  150 

V.  McCumlie  i.  193 

Baubie  v.  TlMna  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Bauchor  r.  Cilley  i.  177 

Baudier,  Er  pnrlf.  i.  237 

Baudiiy  '••  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  182 

Bauenilalil  r.  Ilorr  i.  579 

Baugh  V.  Baugh  ii.  93 


Bauglier  v.  Nelson 
Biuighman  r.  Gould 
Baum  V.  Dubois 

?;.  Stevens 
Bavinston  v.  Clarke 


iii.  506 
ii.  916 
i.  123 
i.  633 
i.  355 


Baxendale  v.  Eastern  C.  Ry.  Co. 

i.446;ii.  187 
V.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co.       i.  395, 

440 

V.  Hart  ii.  273 

V.  London  R.  Co.  iii.  175 

Baxter  v.  Baxter  ii.  92 

V.  Bodkin  i.  405 

V.  Bradbury  ii.  933  ;  iii.  240 

V.  Connolly  iii.  323 

V.  Earl  of  Portsmouth        i.  434,  430 ; 

iii.  414 

V.  Lament  i.  61 

V.  Leland  ii.  410,  416,  672 

V.  Little  i.  290 

V.  New  England  Ins.  Co.  ii.  525 

V.  Nurse  ii.  35 

V.  Penniman  iii.  80,  92 

V.  People  ii.  898 

V.  Pritchard  iii.  441 

V.  Ryerss  iii.  242 

V.  Wales  i.  467 

Bay  V.  Church  i.  325 

V.  Coddington  i.  285,  292 

V.  Cook  i.  73,  140,  508 

V.  Gunn  i.  333 

Bayard  v.  Lathy  i.  303 

V.  Shunk  i.  302 ;  ii.  754 

Bayley  v.  Ashton  iii.  84 

V.  Bradley  ii.  940 

V.  Culverwell  i.  563 

r.  Edwards  i.  864  ;  ii.  740 

17.  Gouldsmith  i.  581 

V.  Homan  ii.  819 

V.  Lawrence  i.  536 

V.  Leominster  iii.  323 

V.  Manchester  i.  113 

V.  Merrill  iii.  267 

V.  Rimmcll  ii.  35 

V.  Taylor  ii.  336 

Baylie  v.  Clare  i.  446 

Baylies  v.  Fettyplace  ii.  425,  808 

V.  Sinex  iii.  293 

BaylifFe  v.  Butterworth      i.  60,  87 ;  ii.  670 

Baylis  ?'.  Attorney-General       ii.  681,  098 

V.  Baylis  ii.  93 

V.  Dinely  i.  335,  353,  363,  366 

V.  Usher  ii.  215 

Baylor  v.  Smithers  i.  569 

Bayly  v.  Garford  i.  27 

V.  Grant  ii.  459 

V.  Schofield  i.  640 

V.  Taylor  ii-  376 

Bayne  v.  Morris  ii.  834 

Baynes  v.  Fry  iii.  144 

Baynham  v.  Guy's  Hospital  i.  532 

Baynon  v.  Bailey  i.  400 

Bay  State,  The  ii.  433 

Bazcley  v.  Forder  i.  393 

Bazin  v.  Richardson  ii.  414 


Beach  v.  Beach 
V.  Berdell 
V.  Brunch 
V.  Cooke 


iii.  236 

ii.  103 

i.  87 

ii.  836 


V.  First  Methodist  Church  i.  483 

V.  Forsyth  i.  103 

V.  Hotchkiss  i.  185 

V.  Native,  The  ii.  381,  382 

V.  Eannev  iii.  189 

V.  State  Bank  i.  209,  303 

Beachey  v.  Brown  ii.  72 

Beak  v.  Beak  i.  205 

Beal  V.  Alexander  i.  299,  322 

V.  Cliase  ii.  898 

V.  Nason  iii.  511 

?).  Park,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

V.  Roberts  i.  272 

V.  Wyman  ii.  689 

Beale  v.  Beale  ii.  831 

V.  Coon  ii.  884 

V.  Hayes  iii.  173 

V.  Nind  iii.  69 

V.  Paris  i.  317 

V.  Sanders  i.  537 

V.  Slaughter  i.  282 

V.  Thompson  ii.  426 

Bealey  v.  Greenslade  iii.  83 

Bead  r.  Beall  i.  376 

V.  White  i.  543 

Beals  V.  Cobb  i.  392 

V.  Guernsey  iii.  115 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co.  ii.  573 

V.  Olmstead  i.  623,  630 

V.  Peck  i.  322 

V.  Terry  iii.  220 

Beaman  v.  Russell  ii.  859  ;  iii.  21 

Bean  v.  Amsinck  iii.  421 

V.  Atwater  ii.  661 

V.  Burbank  i.  457,  562 

V.  Green  ii.  263,  273 

V.  Herrick  i.  621 

V.  Newberry  ii.  828 

V.  Simpson  i.  258,  575  ;  ii.  784 

V.  Smallwood  ii.  307 

V.  Stupart  ii.  473,  522 

V.  Sturtevant  ii.  180,  194 

Beane  v.  The  Mazurka  ii.  438 

Bearce  v.  Barstow  iii.  131 

V.  Bowker  i.  48,  556 

Beard  v.  Denniss  ii.  893 

V.  Kirk  i.  75 

V.  Linthicum  iii.  309,  310,  347 

V.  Turner  ii.  377 

V.  Webb  i.  406 

Beardesley  v.  Baldwin  i.  280 

Beardslee  v.  Morgner  i.  2-53 

V.  Richardson  ii.  114 

Beardsley  i'.  Duntley  iii.  348 

i\  Southmayd  ii.  722 

I'.  Swann  iii.  177 

Beardsley  Scythe  Co.  v.  Foster       iii.  308 

Bears  v.  Ambler  i.  537 

Bearse  v.  Pigs  of  Copper  ii.  437 

Beatson  i'.  Haworth  ii.  534 

Beattie  v.  Lord  Ebury  i.  63 


^SES   CITED. 

xxxvu 

Beattie  v.  Robin 

i.  569 

Beatty  v.  Gilniore 

ii.  2-50 

V.  Lycoming  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  587 

V.  Randall 

ii.  931 

V.  Wray 

i.  228 

Beaty  v.  Knowler 

iii.  488 

Beaubien  v.  Beaubien 

iii.  308 

Beauchamp  v.  Damory 

iii.  243 

Beaufort,  Duke  of,  v.  Neeld 

i.  42 

Beaumont,  Ex  parte 

iii.  428 

V.  Fell 

ii.  681,  694 

V.  Greathead 

ii.  750 

V.  Meredith 

i.  230 

V.  Reeve 

i.  465 

Beauregard  v.  Case 

i.  176 

Beavan  v.  Delahay 

i.  544 

Beaver  v.  Lewis 

i.  220 

Beaver  Co.  v.  Armstrong 

i.  330 

Bechervaise  v.  Lewis 

ii.  876 

Bechtel  v.  Cone 

iii.  3.52 

Beck  V.  Allison 

iii.  329 

V.  Evans 

ii.  261,  263 

V.  Germania  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  588 

V.  Rebow 

i.  547 

V.  Robley 

i.  297 

Beck  &  Jackson,  In  re 

ii.  844 

Becker  v.  Hallgarten 

i.  645 

Beckett  v.  Addyman 

ii.  33 

V.  Taylor 

ii.  826 

Beckford  v.  Hill 

i.  174 

I'.  Hood 

ii.  330 

V.  Wade 

ii.  723 

Beckham  v.  Drake     i.  7,  55,  56,  66,  145 ; 

iii.  172,  454 

Beckley  v.  Munson  i.  33 

Beckman  v.  Shouse   ii.  134,  179,  256,  273, 

275 
Beckwith  v.  Angell  i.  284 

V.  Brown  iii.  382 

V.  Cheever  i.  511,  514 

V.  Talbot  iii.  15 

Bedam  v.  Clerkson  ii.  826,  829 

Beddingfield  v.  Ashley  iii.  1-50 

Beddoe's  Ex'rs  v.  Wads  worth  i.  144 

Bedel  V.  Powell  iii.  188 

Bedell  v.  Janney  iii.  112 

Bedell's  case  ii.  686 

Bedford  v.  Brutton  iii.  426 

V.  Hunt  ii.  304,  .309 

V.  Terhune  i.  542 

Bee,  The  ii.  437,  438 

Beebe  v.  Dudley  ii.  24,  32 ;  iii.  23 

V.  Elliott  ii.  870 

?'.  Robert  i.  66,  628 

Beecham  v.  Dodd  i.  175,  213 

Beecher  v.  Venn  i.  59 

Beecker  v.  Beecker  i.  142,  248 

Beed  v.  Blandford  ii.  814 

Beek  v.  Robley  i.  289 

Beekman   v.  Saratoga    &    Schenec- 
tady R.  R.  Co.    iii.  491,  494,  496 
V.  Wilson  iii.  442 

Beeler  v.  Young  i.  336,  337,  338,  353 

Beeman  v.  Buck  i.  623 

Beems  v.  C.  &  C.  R.  Co.  iii.  209 


XXXVIU 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Beer  r.  Beer 

Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts 

Beers  v.  Bridgeport  Spring  Co. 

V.  Crowell 

V.  Haugliton 

V.  Horton 

V.  Housatonic  K.  R.  Co. 

»'.  Keynolds 

V.  Kobinson 
Beeston  v.  Collyer 
Beete  /•.  Bidgood 
Beeteiii  i'   Burkholder 
Begbie  v.  Levi 

V.  Phosphate  Sewage  Co 


Begg  r.  Forbes 
Bchaly  v.  Hatch 
Behin  i:  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co. 
Behren  v.  Bremer 
Beilby,  Ex  ])arte 
Beinie  v.  Dord 
Beisenthal,  In  re 
Beiteunian's  Appeal 
Belcher  v.  Burnett 

V.  Campbell 

V.  Lloyd 

V.  Mcintosh 

V.  Prittie 
Belchier,  Ex  parte 

V.  Parsons 

V.  Keynolds 
Belden  v.  Seymour 
Belding  v.  Pitkin 
Beldon  v.  Campbell 
Bellbrd  v.  Crane 
Belknap  v.  Bank  of  N.  A 

V.  Bender 

V.  Wendell 
Bell,  Ex  parte 

V.  Bell 

V.  Bruen 

V.  Chaplain 

V.  Crawford 

V.  Cunningliam 

i;.  Dagg 

V.  Daniels 

V.  Francis 

V.  Gardiner 

V.  Gipps 

V.  Hagerstown  Bank 

V.  Hewitt 

V.  Horton 

V.  Kellar 

V.  Lamprey 

V.  Leggett 

V.  J..ock 

V.  Locke 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Martin 

V.  Morrison 


i.  22 

ii.  510 

j.  158 

iii.  57 

iii.  391,  3<}7 

iii.  503 

ii.  184 

i.  243 

i.  498 

ii.  85 

iiL  119 

ii.  814 

ii.  899,  907 

i.  492; 

ii.  886,  924 

ii.  024 

ii.  777 

ii.  283 

ii.  834 

iii.  456 

i.  628,  629 

iii.  442 

ii.  902,  903 

iii.  429 

iii.  435 

iii.  439,  469 

i.  536 

iii.  441 

iii.  421,  425 

iii.  421,  425,  428 

iii.  333 

ii.  685 

ii.  886,  909 

i.  84 

ii.  77 

ii.  853 

ii.  10 

i.  176 

iii.  465 

ii.  483,  486,  524,  686 

ii.  5,  634,  713 

i.  19 

iii.  72 

i.  49,  93 ;  iii.  205 

i.  272 

ii.  306,  327 

i.  163 

i.  496 

ii.  833 

i.  320 

iii.  43 

ii.  882 

i.  408 ;  ii.  14 

iii.  97 


iii.  72,  74,  78, 


V.  Moss 
V.  Newman 
V.  Gffutt 
V.  Packard 


iii.  477 

ii.  361 

i.  173 

ii.  487 

ii.  20 

88,  8!), 

91 

i.  641,  645,  651 

i.  238 

i.41 

ii.  700,  730 


Bell  V.  Palmer 

iii.  206 

V.  Piiynn 

i.  169 

V.  Quin 

i.  489 

V.  Keed 

ii. 

527,  528 

V.  Smith 

ii- 

451,  907 

V.  Speight 

i.  146 

V.  Twilight 

ii.  932 

V.  Walker 

ii.  346 

V.  Ward 

ii.  878 

V.  Welch 

ii  8 

V.  Whitehead 

ii.  341 

Bellairs  v.  Bellairs 

ii.  79 

V.  Ebsworth 

ii.  20 

Bellemire  v.  Bank  of  IT.  S. 

ii.  113 

Bcllo  Corrunnes 

ii.  442 

Belloni  v.  Freeborn 

ii.  5 

Bellows  V.  Lovell 

11.  24,  '27 

V.  Stone 

iii.  354 

Bellringer  v.  Blagrave 

iii.  361 

Beloit  V.  Morgan 

ii.  870 

Belote  V.  Wynne 

iii.  90 

Belshaw  v.  Bush 

iii.  81 

Belt  V.  Ferguson 

i.  410 

Belton,  Ex  parte 

iii.  472 

V.  Hodges 

L354 

;  iii.  414 

Belworth  v.  Hassell 

i.  583 

Beman  v.  Tugnot 

i.  488 

Bement  v.  Smith 

iii.  225 

Beraie  v.  Vandever 

i.  229 

Bemis  v.  Leonard 

ii.  796 

V.  Smith 

iii.  439 

V.  Wilder 

i.  538 

Benares,  Tlie 

ii.  454 

Bench  v.  Merrick 

ii.  70 

V.  Slieldon 

i 

620,  621 

Bend  v.  Hoyt 

i.  85 

Benden  v.  Manning 

ii.  Ill 

Bender  v.  Fromberger 

iii 

240,  242 

Bendernagle  v.  Cocks 

iii.  202 

Bendetson  v.  French 

ii.  160 

Benedict  v.  Bachelder 

ii.  905 

V.  Becbee 

iii.  36 

V.  Caffce 

i.  317 

V.  Cowden 

ii.  853 

V.  Davis 

i.  196 

V.  Field 

i.  595 

V.  Lynch 

iii.  342 

V.  Montgomery 

ii.  940 

V.  Morse 

i.  549 

V.  Smith 

i.  51 

Benefactor,  The 

ii.  433 

Benfield  v.  Solomons 

iii. 

136,  465 

Benford  v.  Schell 

i.  570 

Benham  v.  Bishop 

i. 

863,  364 

V.  United  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  524 

Benjamin  v.  Benjamin 

i.  386;  ii.  215 

V.  Groot 

iii.  104 

V.  Sinclair 

ii.  410 

V.  Tiihnan 

i.  281 

Bennccke  v.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  601 

Benncr  v.  I'uller 

i. 

578,  579 

Benners  v.  Howard 

i.  572 

Bennet,  Ex  parte 

iii.  468 

V.  Abrams 

iii. 

329,  348 

i;.  Davis 

iii. 

455,  456 

INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


XXXIX 


Bennet  v.  Jenkins 
V.  Mellor 
V.  Paine 
V.  Pixley 

Bennett,  Ex  parte 
V.  Alcott 
V.  Austin 
V.  Bean 
V.  Bennett 
V.  Bittle 
V.  Broolcs 
V.  Cad  well 
V.  Cook 
V.  Davis 
V.  DuttOQ 
V.  Filyaw 
V.  Francis 
V.  Holmes 
j;.  Hull 
V.  Lockwood 
i\  O'Brien 


iii.  240,  242 

ii.  IGO,  1(32 

i.  4G8,  4(i9 

ii.  63o 

1.  94,  95;  iii.  472 

iii.  240,  454 

ii.  762 

ii.  68,  73,  75 

ii.  91 

1.541 

ii.  902 

i.  246 

iii.  97 

i.  335 

ii.  241 

ii.  280 

ii.  772 

ii.  869 

iii.  60 

iii.  195 

ii.  117 


V.  P.  &  O.  Steamboat  Co.   ii.  241,  243 

V.  Pratt  iii.  17 

V.  Russell  i.  187 

V.  Scott  iii.  37 

V.  Shackford  iii.  293 

V.  Sims  i.  578 

V.  Smith  iii.  305 

V.  Stickney  i.  211 

V.  Stout  i.  387 

V.  Wom.ack  i.  534 

V.  Woolfolk             i.  184,  228 ;  ii.  808 

V.  Young  i.  318 

Benners  v.  Clemens  ii.  716 

Benney  v.  Pegram  i.  103 

Bennington  v.  Dinsmore  i.  282 

Benson  ».  Blunt  ii.  425 

V.  Cutler  iii.  352 

V.  Drake  ii.  903 

V.  Flower  iii.  454 

V.  Heathorn  ii.  398 

V.  Parry  iii.  144 

V.  Remington  i.  343,  348 
V.  The  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York 

iii.  483,  490 

Bent  V.  Hartshorn  ii.  23 

V.  Manning  i.  336,  338 

V.  Puller  i.  571 

Bentall  v.  Burn  iii.  49,  444 

Bentaloe  v.  Pratt  ii.  478,  532 

Bentham  v.  Cooper  iii.  17 

Bentley  v.  Columbia  Ins.  Co.  ii.  567 

V.  Doggett  i.  59 

V.  Mackay  ii.  928 

Bently  v.  Griffin  i.  388 

Benton  v.  Burgot  ii.  740 

V.  Chamberlain  i.  189 

Benyon  v.  Nettlefold  i.  486 

Berans  v.  Farrell  i.  625 

Beresford,  Ex  parte  iii.  437 

Bergen  v.  Bennett  i.  76 

Bergheim  v.  Blaenavon  Iron  Co.     iii.  219 

V.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.  ii.  212 

Bergstrom  v.  Mills  ii.  426 

Berkeley  v.  Watling      i.  328,  G61 ;  ii.  410 


Berkley  v.  Hardy  i.  122 

Berkshire  Bank  v.  Jones  i.  315 

Berkshire  Woollen  Co.  v.  Juillard     i.  205 

V.  Proctor  ii.  160,  102,  163,  164 

Bermon  i.  Woodbridge  ii.  479,  480 

Bernal  v.  Pym  iii.  270 

Bernard  v.  Torrance  i.  192 

Bcrndtson  v.  Strang  i.  650 

Berolles  v.  Ramsay  i.  339 

Berredge,  Ex  parte  iii.  427 

Berridge  v.  Fitzgerald  i.  319 

Berrill  v.  Smith  ii.  900 

Berry  v.  Alderman  i.  329 

i;.  Bates  ii.  850 

V.  Cox  iii.  368 

V.  Da  Costa  ii.  75 

V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  iii.  432 

V.  TuUen  ii.  28 

V.  Robinson  L  290,  315 

V.  Scott  ii.  60 

V.  Vreeland  iii.  187 

V.  Whitney  iii-  313 

Berthold  v.  Goldsmith  i.  41,  167 

Bertholf  v.  Quinlan  ii.  745,  747 

Berthoud  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  471, 

541 

Bertie  v.  Falkland  iii.  167 

Bertrand  v.  Barkman  i.  292 

Besch  V.  Frolich  i.  224 

Besford  v.  Saunders  i.  364,  463,  464 

Bessey  v.  Evans  ii.  425 

?;.  Windham  ii.  924 

Besshears  v.  Rowe  ii.  10 

Best  V.  Barber  i.  463 

V.  Givens  i.  364 

V.  Jolly  i.  485 

V.  Lawson  ii.  874 

V.  Nokomis  Bank  i.  298 

V.  Osborne  i.  635 

V.  Saunders  ii.  453 

V.  Stow  i.  522 ;  iii.  312,  370,  .371 

Betes  worth  v.  Dean  and  Chapter  of 

St.  Paul's  iii.  307 

Bethel,  &c.  Co.  v.  Brown  i.  567,  568 

Betsey  v.  Rhoda  ii.  459 

Betsey,  The  ii.  403 

Betterbee  v.  Davis  ii.  775 

Bettini  v.  Gye  ii.  809 

Betts  V.  Bagley  iii.  394,  396 

V.  Gibbins  i.  36,  87,  646 

V.  June  i.  227 

V.  Lee  iii.  215 

Bevan  v.  Lewis  i.  203,  206 

V.  Waters  iii.  266 

V.  Rees  ii.  775,  778 

V.  Sullivan  i.  184 

Bever  v.  Brown  ii.  8.38 

Beverley  v.  Beverley  ii.  77 

Beverley's  case  i.  433 

Beverleys  v.  Holmes  i.  457 

Beverly  v.  Burke  iii.  238 

Beverly  v.  The  Lincoln  Gas  Light  and 

Coke  Co.  i.  154,  581 

Bevier  ik  Covell  iii.  117,  138 

V.  Galloway  i.  396 


xl 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Bevin  v.  Conn.  Ins.  Co.        ii.  GOO,  605, 

607 

Bevis  V.  Ileflin  ii.  747 

Bexwell  v.  Christie  i.  529 

Beyer  v.  Beyer  ii.  91,  'J2 

Beynier  i'.  Bonsall  i.  (36 

Bevnon  v.  GocUlen  iii.  288 

B.  F.  Bruce,  Tlie  ii.  458 

Bianclii  v.  Kasli  i.  581 

Biays  v.  Chesapeake  Ins.  Co.  ii.  505 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  52i) 

Bibb  V.  Saunders  ii.  877 

Biekerton  v.  Burrell  i.  70 

Biekfonl  v.  First,  &c.  Bank  i.  58,  296 

V.  Cibbs  ii.  8,  24,  31,  32 

V.  Page  iii.  240 

Bicknell  i-.  Todd  ii.  320 

Bidault  V.  Wales  ii.  912,  915 

Bidden  V.  Dowse  i.  479,  481 

Biddieconibe  v.  Bond  i.  040 ;  ii.  633 

Bidwell  V.  Madison  i.  182 

V.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475, 

505,  521,  577 

V.  Rogers  iii.  76 

Biffin  I'.  Yorke  iii.  414 

Bigelow  V.  Baldwin  ii.  818 

V.  Benton  ii.  5 

V.  Berkshire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  603 

V.  Davis  i.  498 

V.  Dennison  i.  49,  51 

V.  Elliott  i.  189 

V.  Folger  iii.  439 

V.  Grannis  i.  304 

V.  Ileaton  ii.  221,  413 

V.  Huntley  i.  578 

V.  Jones  iii.  242 

V.  Kinney  i.  368 

V.  Maynard  ii.  831 

V.  State  Life  Ass.  ii.  G15 

V.  Stilplien  ii.  861 

V.  Wilson  i.  251,  256;  ii.  796,  797 

V.  Woodward  ii.  941 

V.  Hansen  ii.  828,  844 

V.  Lawrence  ii.  700,  894 

i;.  Wisking  ii.  051 ;  iii.  49 

Bigler  v.  Flickinger  i.  622 

V.  Hall  i.  568 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  583 

Bilbie  v.  Lumley  i.  467  ;  ii.  536 

Bilborough  v.  Holmes  i.  246 

Biles  V.  Ilohnes  ii.  134 

Bill  V.  Bainent  iii.  6,  46 

V.  Cure-ton  i.  411 

V.  Mason  ii.  488 

V.  Porter  ii.  757 

Billings  r.  Billings  ii.  92 

j;.  Tolland  Co.  Ins.  Co.       ii.  524,  547, 

551 

BiUingsly  v.  State  ii.  931 

Billon  V.  Hyde  iii.  434 

Binford,  In  re  i.  679 

Bingham  v.  Aljport  ii.  774 

V.  Bingham  iii.  354 

V.  Maxcy  i.  615 

V.  Rogers  iL  250,  259,  277 


Bingham  v.  Sessions  i.  444 

V.  Stewart  i.  58 

Binghampton  Bridge,  The  iii.  484 

Bininger  v.  Wattles  ii.  353 

Binks  v.  Lord  Kokeby  iii.  357 

Binney  v.  Le  Gal  i.  216 

Binniiigton  v.  W^allis  i.  465 

Binns  c.  Waddill  i.  208 

Birch,  Ex  parte  iii.  410,  470,  478 

V.  Depeyster  ii.  666,  879 

V.  Eai'l  of  Liverpool     ii.  49 ;  iii.  40, 

41 

V.  Funk  i.  151 

V.  Sharland  i.  463 

V.  Tebbutt  ii.  764 

Birchett  v.  Boiling  iii.  321,  326 

Bird  V.  Adams  iii.  92 

V.  Astcock  ii.  216 

V.  Bird  ii.  826 

V.  Blosse  ii.  77  ;  iii.  32 

V.  Boulter  i.  125;  iii.  11,  12 

V.  Brown  i.  49,  53,  641 

i;.  Caritat  iii.  407,  409 

V.  Cromwell  ii.  173 

V.  Gammon         i.  245,  249 ;  iii.  25,  75 

V.  Hempstead  iii.  454 

V.  Jones  i.  394 

V.  Le  Blanc  i.  315 

V.  Mayer  i.  630 

V.  Muhlenbrink  iii.  62 

V.  Munroe  iii.  10 

I'.  Pierpoint  iii.  407,  409 

Bird  of  Paradise,  The  ii.  407 

Birdsall  v.  Heacock  ii.  5 

Birdseye  v.  FUnt  i.  408 

V.  Frost  i.  617 

V.  Ray  i.  235 

Birdsong  v.  Birdsong  i.  466,  522 

Birdwell  v.  Cain  i.  137 

Birge  v.  Gardener  ii.  248 

Birkenhead,  Lancashire,  &  Cheshire 

Railway  v.  I'ilcher  i.  374,  376 

Birkett  V.  Willan  ii.  2,  612 

Birkley  v.  Presgrave  i.  34 ;  ii.  445,  448 

Birks  V.  French  i.  199 

V.  Trippet  ii.  833 

Birley  v.  Gladstone  iii.  263 
Birney  v.  N.  Y.  &  Wash.  Printing 

Tel.  Co.  ii.  279,  282,  286,  287,  288 

Bischoff  V.  Wetherell  ii.  872 

Bisel  r.  Hobbs  i.  198 

Bishop  V.  Bishop  i.  547 

.      V.  Breckels  i.  220 

V.  Chambre  ii.  360 

V.  Clay  Ins.  Co.  ii.  575 

V.  Elliott  i.  547 

V.  Montague  i.  63 

V.  Sanford  iii.  69 

V.  She|)herd  ii.  40 

V.  Smith  i.  617 

V.  Williamson  ii.  155 

r.  Wraith  i.  631 

Bishop  of  Chester  v.  John  Freeland 

i.  487 

Bissel  V.  Price  ii.  410,  412 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


xli 


Bissell  V.  Bissell 

V.  Briggs 

V.  Edwards 

V.  Erwin 

V.  Hopkins 

V.  Lloyd 

V.  Morgan 

V.  The  M.  R.  Co. 
Bissig  V.  Britton 
Bitner  v.  Brough 
Bitter  v.  Rathman 


ii.  85,  797 

ii.  740,  741;  742 

ii.  744 

iii.  242 

i.  569,  613 

i.  532 

i.  32!) 

i.  158 

ii.  10 

iii.  240 

i.  160 


Bitting  &  Waterman's  Appeal  ii.  037 

Bixby  V.  Dunlap  iii.  185 

V.  Franlilin  Ins.  Co.  ii.  386,  396,  417 

V.  Wliitney  i.  576  ;  ii.  784 

Bixler  v.  Ream  i.  472 

Bize  V.  Dickason  iii.  439 

V.  Fletcher  ii.  473,  534 

Blachford  v.  Christian  ii.  916 

Black  V.  Baxendale  iii.  207 

V.  Black  ii.  91 

V.  Blazo  iii.  411,  476 

V.  Bush  i.  231 

V.  Cord  m.  310,  314 

V.  Homershara  i.  150 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  501 

V.  Smith  ii.  775 

V.  The  Louisiana  ii.  459,  404 

V.  Ward  i.  279 

V.  Webb  i.  561 

Blackburn  v.  Gregsoa  iii.  295 

V.  Mackey  i.  341 

V.  Mann  iii.  40 

V.  Scholes  ii.  745 

V.  Smith  ii.  815 

Blackburne  v.  Thompson  ii.  482 

Blackett  v.  Royal  Exch.  Assur.  Co. 

ii.  478,  483,  639,  677 

V.  Weir  i.  31 

Blacklmrst  v.  Clinkard  i.  232 

V.  Cockell  ii.  518,  521 

Blackman  v.  Green  i.  103 

V.  Leonard  ii-  702 

V.  Neariug  i.  322 ;  ii.  797 

V.  Pierce  i.  646 

V.  Thomas  i.  108 

V.  Wheaton  ii.  928 

Blackmore,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

Blackstock  v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  198 

Blackstone  v.  Alemania  Ins.  Co.       ii.  494 

V.  Buttermore  i.  78 

Blackstone  Bank  v.  Hill  ii.  29,  768 

Blackwell  v.  Justices  of  Lawrence 

Co.  iii.  242 

V.  WiUard  i.  78 

Blad  v.  Bamfield  ii.  931 

Blades  v.  Free  i.  394,  395,  404 

Blagden,  Ex  parte  iii.  4-39,  469 

V.  Bradbear  iii.  12,  14,  347 

Blagge  V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  519 

Blagrave  v.  B.  W.  Co.  ii.  840 

Blague  V.  Gold  i.  531 
Blaine  v.  The  Charles  Carter      ii.  401, 

403 


Blair  v.  Bank  of  Tenn. 

V.  Brondey 

V.  Drew 

V.  Snodgrass 

V.  Wilson 
Blair,  &c.  Co.  v.  Walker 
Blaisdell  v.  Pray 
Blake  v.  Buchannan 

V.  Cole 

V.  Crowninshield 

V.  Dorgan 

V.  Ferris 

V.  Howe 

V.  Lanyon 

V.  McMillen 


i.  282,  .309 

iii.  107 

iii.  78,  95 

iii.  6 

ii.  755 

iii.  40 

i.  186 

i.  255 

i.  474  ;  iii.  43 

ii.  797 

i.  221 

i.  117 

i.  540 

ii.  52 

i.  312 


V.  Midland  Railway  Co.  ii.  247  ; 

iii.  177 

V.  Parlin  ii.  8 

V.  Peck  i.  471 

V.  Pegram  i.  151 

V.  Tucker  ii.  9.32,  933 

V.  Williams    ii.  718 ;  iii.  408,  409,  436 

Blakeley  v.  Bennecke  i.  67 

V.  Blakeley  i.  264,  434 

Blakely  v.  Graham  i.  49,  185 

Blakeman  v.  Fonda  iii.  76 

Blakemore  v.  E.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.      ii.  118, 

248 

V.  Glamorganshire  Can.  Nav.    ii.  638 

Blakeney  v.  Dufaur  i.  221 

y.  Goode  iii.  41 

Blakes,  Ex  parte  iii.  406,  409 

Blakesley  v.  Smallwood  ii.  877 

Blakey's  Appeal  iii.  381,  382 

Blanchard  v.  Beers  ii.  314 

V.  Blanchard  iii.  84 

V.  Brooks  ii.  932 

V.  Bucknam  ii.  460 

V.  Coolidge  i.  180 

V.  Detroit,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  307 

V.  Eldridge  ii.  318 

V.  Ely  iii.  194,  196,  199,  246 

V.  Fearing  ii.  400 

V.  Hill  ii.  348,  376 

V.  Hilliard  ii.  669 

V.  Isaacs  ii.  190 

V.  Lilley  ii.  834 

V.  Martha  Washington,  The      ii.  386 

V.  Noyes  ii.  749 

V.  Russell      ii.  698,  718 ;  iii.  385,  393, 

394,  396,  397,  401,  409, 

502,  507,  508 

V.  Sprague  ii-  311 

V.  Stevens  1-  292 

V.  Stone  ii.  866 

V.  Waite  ii.  471,  474,  539,  540 

V.  Wood  ii.  32 

Blanchard  G.  S.  Man.  Co.  v.  Warner 

ii.  828 
Blanchard   Gun   Stock  Turning  Co. 

V.  Jacobs  ii.  321 

Bland  D.  Collett  11.759,896 

V.  Haselrig  iii.  68 

Blane  v.  Proudfit  i-  48 

Blaney  v.  Hendrick  iii.  Ill,  112 


xlii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


iii.  334 

i.  274 

ii.  72 

iii.  i^'J3 

iii.  272 

ii.  4,  14 

ii.  43!) 

iii.  46,  58 

i.  380 

374;  iii.  37 

i.  490 

ii.  940 

i.  245,  255 

ii.  751,  823 

iii.  418 

i 

i 


Blantin  r.  Wliitaker 
liliinton  V.  Kno.K 
Blasilalc  v.  Bahcock 
Blasilel  V.  Fowle 
Blaichtbrd  r.  Kirkpatrick 

V.  Millikfii 
Blattmaker  r.  Saul 
Blaurett  i:  Wuodworth 
BleadcMi  r.  Hancock 
Bleelccr  v.  Hyde 
Blendon  Hall,  The 
Blenkiiisop  r.  Clayton 
Blennerliasset  v.  Mousell 
Blish  r.  Brent 
Blight  V.  Page 

V.  Rochester 
Blin  V.  Pierce 
Blinn  r.  Chester 
Bliss,  Ex  parte 
V.  Collins 
V.  Lawrence 
V.  Mclntire 
r.  Robins 
V.  Thompson 
BUven  v.  N.  E.  Screw  Co. 

V.  Hudson  R.  11.  R.  Co 
Block  i:  Bell 
Blodget  r.  Jordan 
Blodgett  V.  Sleeper 
Blofic'ld  V.  Paine 

I'.  Payne 
Blood  V.  Enos 
V.  Fairbanks 
V.  French 
V.  Goodrich 
V.  Howard  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Palmer 
V.  Shine 
Bloodgood  V.  Bruen 
Bloom  V.  Helm 
V.  McGrath 
V.  Richards 
Bloomer  i;.  Bcrnsteia 
V.  McQuewan 
V.  Millingen 
V.  Millinger 
V.  Sherman 
Blore  V.  Sutton 
Bloss  V.  Bloomer 

r.  Kittridge  ' 

Blossburg,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Tioga  R.  R. 

Co  "'•  -^"^ 

Blossom  f.  Dodd  .   o.i'\w 

Blot  V.  Boiceau      i.  74,  108 ;  in.  204,  205 

235 

Blount  V.  Hawkins  ii-  H  :  jii-  2] 

V.  Patten  ii-  334,  344 

Blow  V.  Russell  JI-  ' '-^ 

Blower  v.  Great  Western  Railway    n.  W4 


ii.  940  1  Bluck  v.  Gompertz 
iii.  44    Bluett  v.  Osborne 
iii.  176,  229  I  Blum  v.  Robertson 

iii  422  I  Bluiuantle  r.  Fitchburg  K.  Go 


iii.  7 

632 

i.  GO 

,274 


550 

,253 

ii.  862 

ii.  840 

ii.  925 

ii.  677 

ii.  153,  173 

ii.  640 

ii.  744 

1.208 

ii.  376 

ii.  372 

ii.  43 

i.  220 

i.  63 

1.  52,  123 

ii.  552 

1.581 

ii.  831 

75,  92 

210 

iii.  26 

ii.  898,  901 

ii.  813  ;  iii.  224 

ii.  319 

ii.  319 

ii.  321 

ii.  837 

iii.  359 

i.  486 

i.  621 


ui. 


Blumenlhal  v.  Brainerd      ii.  197,  212,  260 
Blumer  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ..."•olf, 

BlundelU.  Brettargh        ii.  84o ;  m.  3<52 

.360 

ii.  689,  693 

i.  216 

i.  245,  249;  iii.  28 

ii.  56 

i.  620  ;  ii.  918, 

923 ;  iii.  222 

i.  550 

iii.  369 

iii.  293 

ii.  96 

ii.  856 

i.  187 

iii.  56 

i.  209 ;  ii.  861 

i.  189  ;  iii.  247 

R.  Co.  i.  225  ; 

iii.  325 

V.  Meriden  Britannia  Co.    ii.  353, 370, 

ol  1 

''•Mostyn  .  ^J''}:,^f. 

V  Paee  i-  *j.  34,  35 

"Sitr  iii.  260,  285 

V.  Spooner  V"-  1* 

Board  of  Commissioners  ?;.  \ounger  1. 130 

Boatman's  Institution  v.  Holland       i.  2J2 

Bobbitt  r.  Shryer  .  i^-  ° 

Bobo  V.  Hansen  ..V  "^^ 

Boddam  v.  Riley  ijf-  l^j 

Bode's  Heirs  v.  Stickney  _.  "•  '^4 

Bodenham  v.  Bennett        n-  261  263,  2<2 

r.  Purchas  ii.  20,  033,  /58,  /66 

Bodger  V.  Arch  .  }}'-^^ 

Bodine  r.  Exchange  Ins.  Co.    i.  90 ;  ii.  014 

V.  Glading  "••  '^^"^ 

Bodle  V.  Chenango  Co.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  577, 586 

Bodley  i-.  Goodrich 


V.  Gladstone 

V.  Winsor 
Blunt  V.  Boyd 

r.  Melcher 
Blydenburgh  v.  Welsh 

Blythe  v.  Bennett 

r.  Dargin 

V.  Pnlteney 

V.  Waterworks 
Boalt  V.  Brown 
Boardman  v.  Close 

V.  Cutter 

V.  Gore 

V.  Keeler 

V.  Lake  Shore,  &c. 


Blowers  v.  Sturtevant 
Bloxam  r.  Hubbard 

V.  Sanders 
Bloxham,  Er  p'lrlc 
Bloxsoiue  V.  Williams 


i.  393,  394,  3'.37 

iii.  426 

i.  563,  575,  642 

iii.  451,  468 

ii.  898,  899,  905, 

907 


^  Reynolds 
Bodwell  V.  Bragg 

V.  Swan 
Boehm  v.  Stirling 

V.  Wood 
Boehme  v.  Carr 
Bogert  V.  Vermilya 
Boggs  V.  Curtin 
"i;.  Martin 
V.  Teakle 
Bogue's  Appeal 
liolianan  v.  Bohanan 
Boliannon  ;.'.  Pace 
Bohn  V.  I^oguc 
15()htlingk  v.  Inglis 
Boinest  r.  Leignez 
Boit  V.  Maybin 
Bolan  V.  Williamson 
Bold  V.  Molineux 

V.  Rayner 
Bold  Bucckugh,  The 


iii.  403 
iii.  215 
ii.  160 
iii.  179 
i.  296 
iii.  336,  338,  341 
i.  322 
iii.  89 
i.  26,  35 
iii.  270 
iu.  291,  404 
i.  232 
iii.  352 
iii.  64 
u.  341,  349 
i.  649 
i.  527 
i.  515 
ii.  155 
ii.  641,644 
i.  588 
ii.  434 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


xliii 


Boldero  r.  East  India  Company       ii.  G78 

Bolin  V.  Huffnagle  i.  049 

Bolland  v.  Nash  iii.  439,  469 

Bollanile  v.  IJisnej  ii.  (502 

Bolton  V.  Colder  ii.  671 

V.  Hillersden  i.  51 

V.  Lee  i.  12 

V.  Madden  i.  466 

V.  Prentice  i.  389,  393 

V.  Puller  i.  286  ;  iii.  440 

V.  Richards  ii.  755 

V.  Riddle  i.  563,  572 

V.  Sowerby  iii.  416 

V.  Street  iii.  123 

V.  The  Bishop  of  Carlisle  ii.  862 

Bomar  v.  Maxwell  ii.  212,  275,  276 

Bomeisler  u.  Dobson  ii. -625 

Bon  V.  Railway  Passenger  Ass.  Co. 

ii.  619 

Bonaparte,  The  ii.  404,  405 

Bonar  v.  Maedonald  ii.  19 

V.  Mitchell  1.  325 

Bonbonus,  i?x  parte  1.203 

Bond  V.  Bond  1.  433 

V.  Clark  1.  622 

V.  Cummings  ii.  712 

V.  Farnham  i.  308,  317 

V.  Gibson  i.  205,  207,  208 

V.  Hays  i.  186 

V.  Kent  iii.  295 

V.  Lockwood  i.  151 

V.  Moore  i.  308 

V.  Nutt  ii.  520,  521 

V.  Pittard  i.  188 

V.  Seymour  iii.  403;  ii.  447 

V.  The  Cora         ii.  406,  438,  439,  533 

V.  The  Superb  ii.  447 

Bondies  i-.  Sherwood  ii.  442 

Bonhani  v.  Badgley  ii.  88,  726,  727 

V.  Iowa,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559 

Bonine  v.  Denniston  ii.  7 

Bonnell  v.  Allen  i.  545 

V.  Jacobs  i.  603 

Bonner  v.  Liddell  ii.  827 

V.  Welborn  ii.  155 

Bonney  v.  Bonney  ii.  28 

V.  Foss  i.  540 

V.  Seeley  i.  33 

Bonsey  v.  Amee  ii.  380 

Bonynge  v.  Field  i.  130 

Boody  V.  McKenny  i.  362,  366,  367 

Booker  v.  Kirkpatrick  i.  226 

Bool  V.  Mix  i.  334,  362,  365 

Boon  V.  Mina.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  571 

V.  Moss  i.  172,  579 

Boone  v.  Eyre  ii.  658,  661,  662 

V.  Poindexter  iii.  136 

Boorman  v.  Am.  Express  Co.  ii.  265 

V.  Brown  iii.  235 

V.  Jenkins  i.  628,  634 

V.  Nash     iii.  220,  225,  429,  43-5,  462, 

46(5 

Boot  V.  Wilson  iii.  448,  449 

Booth  V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  45 

V.  Eighmie  iii.  25 


Booth  V.  Garelly 

ii.  321 

V.  Garnett 

ii.  835 

V.  Hartley 

iii.  370 

V.  Hodgson 

i.36 

V.  Kennard 

ii.  310 

V.  Powers 

ii.  8->} 

V.  Smith 

ii.  757,  823,  824 

V.  Spuyten  Duyvil  Rolling  Mill 

Co.  ii.  806 

V.  Storrs  ii.  8 

V.Terrell  ii.  118, 137 

V.  Tyson  ii.  785,  792 

Boothby  v.  Scales  i.  62 

Bopp  I'.  Fox  i.  167 

Boraston  v.  Green  i.  544 

Borchsenius  v.  Canutson       ii.  877;  iii.  27 

Borden  v.  Borden  ii.  810 

V.  Fitch  ii.  740 

V.  Hingham  Insurance  Co.         ii.  580 

V.  Houston  ii.  16 

V.  Sumner  iii.  409 

Border  State,  &c.  Assoc,  v.  McCarthy 

iii.  117 
Boreal  v.  The  Golden  Rose  ii.  382 

Borman  v.  Schober  iii.  292 

Boroughes's  case  ii.  645 

Borradaile  v.  Brunton  iii.  194 

V.  Hunter  ii.  158,  603 

Borrekins  v.  Bevan  i.  624,  628,  630 

Borries  v.  Hutchinson  iii.  223 

V.  Imperial  Ottoman  Bank         ii.  882 
Borrowman  v.  Drayton         i.  597  ;  ii.  674 
V.  Free  i.  565 

Borst  V.  Corey  i.  440 

Borthwick  v.  Carruthers  i.  333 

Borum  v.  Fonts  i.  127 

Bosanquet  v.  Dashwood  iii.  137 

V.  Wray  i.  186 ;  ii.  764 

Boscowitz  L\  Adams  Ex.  Co.  ii.  257 

Bosler  v.  Kuhn  iii.  478 

Bosley  v.  Chesapeake  Ins.  Co.    ii.  511,  512 
Bosnian  v.  Akeley  ii.  32 

Boson  V.  Sandford  '  ii.  182,  183 

Boss  V.  Lytton  ii.  247 

Bosseau  v.  O'Brien  i.  51 

Boslick  );.  Winton  i.  615 

Boston,  The         ii.  404,  433,  440,  443,  533 
Boston  V.  Benson  ii.  420,  856  ■ 

V.  Brazier  ii.  826 

Boston  Bank  v.  Chamberlin  i.  366 

Boston  Ice  Co.  v.  Potter  i.  246,  557  / 

Boston  India  R.  F.  v.  Hoit  ii.  740 

Boston  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Fiske     iii.  176,  185 
Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Boston 

&  Worcester  R.  R.  Co.       iii.  493, 
494,  496 
V.  Gray  ii.  838,  840 

Boston  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Salem 
&  Lowell,  B.  &  Me.,  and  Lowell  & 
L.  R.  R.  Cos.  iii.  495 

Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Babcock 

iii.  309,  367 
V.  Bartlett  i.  510;  iii.  367 

Boston  &  Sandwich  Glass  Co.  v.  Bos- 
ton i.  496 


xliv 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Boston  &  Worcester  R.  E.  Corp.  v. 

Dana  ii.  8G6 

f.  Sparliawk  ii.  944 

Bostwick  V.  Dodge  i-  292 

V.  Leach  iii.  36 

Bosvil  V.  Brander  iii.  437,  456 

Boswell  V.  Green  i.  199 

V.  Tunnell  ii-  863 

Botiller  v.  Newport  i.  373 

Bott  V.  McCoy  i.  60 

Bottomley  r.  Bovill  ii.  535 

V.  Brooke  ii.  884 

r.  Forbes  ii.  676 

Bottomly  v.  Nuttall  i.  196 

Bottsford  V.  Sandford  iii.  129 

Boucliaud  V.  Dias  ii.  807 

Bouchell  V.  Clary  i.  353 
Boucher  v.  Lawson    ii.  182,  454,  700,  739, 

894 


V.  Vanbuskirk 

iii.  307 

Boucicault  v.  Fox 

ii 

333,  338 

V.  Wood 

ii.  334 

Bouck  V.  Wilber 

iii.  333 

Boultbee  v.  Stubbs 

i.  325 

Boulter  v.  Peplow 

i.  31,  34 

Boulton  V.  Bull 

ii.  309 

V.  Jones 

i.  557 

V.  Welsh 

i.  322 

Bound  V.  Lathrop                    i 

211;  iii.  88 

Bourcier  v.  Lanusse 

ii.  730 

Bourdillon  v.  Dalton 

iii 

424,  440 

Bourke  v.  Lloyd 

ii 

831,  833 

Bourne,  Ex  parte 

iii.  441 

V.  Cabot 

iii.  452 

V.  Diggles 

i.  92 

V.  Dodsoa 

iii.  428 

V.  Freeth 

i.  103 

V.  GatlifE 

ii.  075 

V.  Mason 

i.  490 

V.  Maybin 

i.  150 

Boussinaker,  Ex  parte 

iii.  465 

Boutelle  v.  Smith 

ii.  888 

Bouton  J".  Am.  Ins.  Co. 

ii 

600,  016 

Bouttilier  v.  Thick 

ii.  840 

Bovil  V.  Hammond 

i. 

184,  185 

Bovill  ?".  Key  worth 

ii.  310 

Bowcher  v.  Noidstrom 

ii.  408 

BowdcU  V.  Parsons         i.  572 

ii. 

800,  809 

Bowdcn  V.  Gray 

i.  385 

V.  Moore 

ii.  152 

V.  Vaughan 

ii. 

523,  524 

Bowdltch  V.  Winslow 

ii.  557 

Bowdre  r.  Hampton 

iii.  88 

Bo  won  >•.  Burke 

i.  563 

f.  Hof)e  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  483 

1-.  Lake  Erie  Tel.  Co. 

ii. 

279,  290, 
294,  301 

V.  Mcrcliants  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  487 

V.  Kcwell 

i.  313 

V.  Stoddard 

ii.  070 

V.  Sullivan                        L 

502 ;  ii.  100 

Bower  c  .Major 

i.  549 

V.  Peate 

i.  116 

V.  Swadlin 

i.  210 

Bowtrbauk  v.  Montciro        i. 

112;  ii.031 

Bowers,  Ex  parte 

V.  Hurd 

V.  Jewell 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Parker 
Bowes,  Ex  parte 

V.  Howe 

V.  Siiand 

V.  Tibbets 
Bowie  V.  Kapier 

V.  Stonestreet 
Bowker  v.  Hoyt 

V.  Lowell 
Bowles  I".  Round 

V.  Woodson 
Bowling  V.  Harrison 
Bowling  Green  Bank  v.  Todd 
Bowman  v.  Bailey 

V.  Cecil  Bank 

V.  Coffroth 

V.  Curd 

V.  Floyd 

V.  Franklin 

V.  Herring 


iii.  416 

ii.  685 

ii.  856,  858 

ii.  921 

ii.  609 

iii.  416 

i.  300,  316 

i.  624  ;  ii.  024 

ii.  50,  57 

i.  102 

iii.  858 

ii.  655,  785,  791 

i.  444 

i.  526 

iii.  306,  313 

i.  309,  319 

i.  129 

i.  184 

i.  212 

ii.  895 

ii.  32 


V.  Hilton 

V.  Horsey 

V.  Officer 

V.  Sanborn 

V.  Teall 

V.  Woods 
Bowne  v.  Joy 
Bownell  v.  Briggs 
Bowring  v.  Andrews 

V.  Shepherd 
Bowsall  V.  ^IcKay 
Bowser  v.  Blits 
Bowyer  v.  Bright 
Pox  of  Bullion 
Boyce  v.  Anderson 

V.  California  Stage  Co. 

V.  Douglas 

V.  Edwards 

V.  Ewart 
Boyd  V.  Anderson 

V.  Blankman 

V.  Bopst 

V.  Brinckin 

V.  Brown 

V.  Browne 

V.  Cleaveland 

V.  Cowan 

V.  Croydon  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Day 

V.  Dubois 

V.  Graves 

V.  Hitchcock 

V.  Kennedy 

V.  Mangles 

V.  McAlpine 

V.  Plumb 

V.  Sillkin 

V.  The  Falcon 

V.  Vanderkemp 

V.  Wilson 
Boydell  v.  Drummond 


ii.  557 

i.  669 

ii.  220 

ii.  667 

i.  93 

iii.  99 

ii.  173,215;  iii.  208 

ii.  58 

ii.  739,  863,  864 

i.  66 

i.  307 

ii.  668 

in.  184 

ii.  891 

i.  526 

ii.  436 

ii.  234,  238 

ii.  230 

ii.  863 

ii.  716 

ii.  24 

i.  492 

i.  147 

i.  616 

i.  507;  iii.  .313 

iii.  188,  190 

ii.  321,  917 

i.  315 

iii.  236 

i.  158 

il.  881 

ii. 


496 

ii.  940 

ii.  751 

i.  330 

iii.  439,  469 

ii.  321 

i.  210 

i.  596 

ii.  392 

;  iii.  406 

i.  625,  028 

iu.  5,  42,  65 


i.  80 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


xlv 


Boyden  v.  Boyden 
V.  Moore 

i.  367,  370 
ii.  774 

Boyers  v.  Elliott 
Boykin  v.  Dohlonde 
Boyle,  Ex  parte 
V.  Brandon 

i.  168 

iii.  23 

iii.  469 

ii.  194 

t'.  McLauiirlilin 

ii.  198,  214 

V.  Peabody  IIcic:hts  Co.  i.  532 

V.  Zacharie   iii.  393,  394,  395, 396,  507 

Royle's  Estate  i.  411 

Boy n ton  v.  Bodwell  i-  548 

V.  Braley  iii.  273 

V.  Clinton  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475,  587 

V.  Dyer  i.  136,  137  ;  iii.  422 

V.  Hazleboom  iii.  372 

V.  Hubbard  ii.  925 

V.  Kellogg  ii.  64,  70 

V.  Page  ii.  901 

V.  Veazie  iii.  49 

Boys  V.  Ancell  iii.  172 

Boyson  v.  Coles  i.  102 

Bozon  V.  Farlow  iii.  323,  366,  374 

Brabin  v.  Hyde  iii.  20 

Bracegirdle  v.  Heald         ii.  49 ;  iii.  40,  44 

Bracey  v.  Carter  i.  128 

Bracken  v.  Miller  i.  81 

Bracket  v.  McNair  iii.  207 

Brackett  v.  Blake  i.  253 

V.  Bullard  i.  613 

V.  Evans  iii.  38 

V.  Hoyt  i.  489 

V.  Mountfort  ii.  858 

V.  Norton  ii.  746 

V.  Rich  ii.  3,  31 

V.  The  Hercules  ii.  461 

Bradburn  v.  Great  Western  K.  Co. 

iii.  186,  196 

Bradburne  v.  Botfield  i.  17,  23 

V.  Bradburne  i.  485 

Bradbury  v.  Wright  i.  533 

Braden  v.  Gardner  ii.  39 

Bradfield  v.  Tapper  iii.  83 

Bradford  v.  Bush  i.  62,  623 

V.  Gary  iii.  483 

V.  Corey  i.  317 

V.  Farrand  iii.  396,  507 

V.  French  i.  374 

V.  Greenway  i.  409 

V.  Johnson  i.  166 

V.  Manley  i.  628,  634 

V.  Tappan  i.  561 

Bradhurst  v.  Col.  Ins,  Co.     ii.  446,  449, 

510 

Bradish  v.  Henderson  ii.  115 

Bradlee  v.  Boston  Glass  Co.  i.  56 

V.  Warren  Savings  Bank  i.  64 

Bradley  v.  Bolles  ii.  385 

V.  Bradley  ii.  613 

V.  Gary  ii,  4 

V.  Chester  Valley  R.  R.  Co.      iii.  378 

V.  Davis  i.  322 

V.  Holds  worth  i.  374 

V.  Hunt  i.  266 

V.  Johnson  iii.  869 

V.  Lowry  ii.  709 


Bradley  v.  Munton  iii.  337 
V.  Mutual  Benefit  Life  Ins.  Co.  ii.  602 

V.  Nashville  Ins.  Co.  ii.  487 

V.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 

V.  Pratt  i.  353 

V.  Rea  ii.  903 

V.  Richardson  i.  101 

V.  Toder  ii.  804 
V.  Wash.  A.  &  G.  Steam  Packet 

Co.  ii.  080 

V.  Waterhouse  ii.  261 

V.  Wheeler  i.  573 

Bradlie  v.  Am.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  515 

V.  Maryland  Ins.  Co.  ii.  507 

Bradspy  v.  Clyston  ii.  826 

Bradshaw  v.  Bennett  i.  524 

V.  Buchanan  iii.  181 

V.  Combs  ii.  30 

V.  Heath  ii.  73(5 

V.  Klein  iii.  421,  441 

V.  Lancashire,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.        i.  144 

V.  IMcLoughlin  i.  450 

V.  Warner  i.  578 

Bradstreet  v.  Baldwin  ii.  415 

V.  Clark  iii.  103 

V.  Everson  i.  90 

V.  Heron  ii.  415 

V.  Neptune  Ins.  Co.  ii.  399,  718 

V.  Supervisors  of  Oneida  County 

i.  448 

Bradt  v.  Koon  iii.  286 

V.  Towsley  iii.  189 

Brady  v.  Giles  i.  119 

V.  Haines  i.  569 

V.  Little  Miami  R.  R.  Co.  i.  296 

V.  Mayor  i.  127 

V.  Todd  i.  62,  63 

Bragdon  v.  Appleton  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540 

Bragg  V.  Anderson  ii.  535 

V.  Cole  ii.  792 

V.  Fessenden  i.  123 

V.  Morrill  i.  630 

V.  New  England  Ins.  Co.  ii.  576 

Braham  v.  Bustard  ii.  353,  363 

Brahn  v.  Jersey  City,  &c.  Co.  i.  548 

Brainard  v.  Buck  iii.  72 

Braithwaite  v.  Coleman  ii.  882 

V.  Skinner  i.  141 

V.  Skofield  i.  163 

Bramah  v.  Roberts  i.  163,  294 

Bramhall  v.  Beckett  i.  292 

Brammer  v.  Jones  ii.  324 

Bramweli  v.  Halcomb        ii.  344,  348,  378 

Branch  v.  Burnley  ii.  746 

V.  Ewington  ii.  56 

V.  Wiseman  i.  232 

Branch  Bank  v.  Boykin  i.  464 

V.  James  i.  274 

Brand  v.  Boulcott  i.  20,  26,  34 

V.  Frumveller  i.  532,  534 

Brandao  v.  Barnett  ii.  113 

Brandas  v.  Barnett  iii.  281 

Brandon  v.  Brandon  iii.  471 

V.  Curling  ii.  481 

V.  Hibbert  ii.  759 


xlvi 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Brandon  v.  Hubbard 

i.  26 

f.  Ncshitt 

ii.  481 

V.  Newington 

ii.  780 

r.  Old 

i.  435 

J-.  Pate 

iii. 

426,  454 

V.  Kobinson 

iii. 

429,  449 

Brandon  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Morse 

i.  57G 

IJrandrain  v.  Wliarton 

iii.  87 

Brandt  v.  Bowlhy  i.  328; 

ii. 

412 

;  iii.  206 

V.  Lawrence 

ii. 

'90 

,  iii.  223 

Brannon  i;.  Iliirsell 

iii.  113 

Branston,  The 

ii.  438 

Brusliear  v.  West 

iii.  382 

Brasiiier  r.  Gratz 

iii. 

340,  364 

Brason  v.  Dean 

ii.  807 

Brass  v.  Maitland 

ii.  417 

V.  Wortli 

1 

.  5S 

;  ii.  129 

Braswell  v.  Am.  Ins.  Co. 

i.75 

;  ii- 

617,745 

Bratlicr  v.  IMcEvoy 

ii.  879 

Brawdy  v.  Brawdy 

iii.  349 

Braxton  ?•.  Wood 

iii.  75 

Bray  v.  Bates 

ii.  402 

V.  Gunn 

i.  88 

V.  Iladwen 

i.  321 

V.  Ilartsliorn 

ii.  308 

V.  Kettell 

ii.  421 

V.  Mayne 

ii.  131 

V.  Tlie  Atlanta 

ii.  466 

f.  Wlieeler 

i.  349 

Braynard  v.  Marshall  ii.  718 ;  iii.  394,  395, 

896,  397 
Brazelton  v.  Colj-ar  i.  99 

Brazier  v.  Bryant  ii.  762 

Brazill  V.  Isliam  ii.  820 

Breaiey  v.  Andrew  i.  473 

V.  Collins  i.  522 

Brear}'  v.  Kemp  ii.  838 

Breasted  v.  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust 

Co.  ii.  604 

Breek  r.  Cole  ii.  085 

Breckenridge's  Heirs  v.  Ormsby       i.  335, 

370 
i.  203 
i.  530 ; 
ii.  199,  805 
i.  51 
ii.  886 
ii.  818 
ii.  533 
i.  308;  ii.  32 
ii.  777 
i.  353 
ii.  404,  453 
ii.  279,  282,  285, 
287 
Brclim  V.  Great  Western  By.  Co.     ii.  239 


Breckinridge  v.  Shrieve 
Brecknock  C"o.  v.  Tritchard 

Bred  in  v.  Dubarry 
Bredin's  Appeal 
Bree  v.  Sayier 
Breed  v.  Eaton 

I'.  Hillliouse 

r.  llurd 

r.  .Indd 

V.  The  Venus 
Brees  v.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co. 


Breini^r  i;.  M(  iizler 
Breniner  v.  Williams 
Brenchley,  Ex  purte. 
Hreneman,  Ex  parte 
Brcnn.in  r.  CJiirrint 
Brenner  '•.  Duard 

V.  llerr 
Brent  v.  Cook 

V.  Green 


i.  393 

ii.  242,  243,  244 

iii.  471 

iii.  402 

iii.  202 

iii.  478 

ii.  822 

iii.  97 

1.510;  iii.  12 


Brenton  v.  Davis 
Brereton  v.  Hull 
Breslauer  v.  Brown 
Breton  v.  Hull 

V.  Woolven 
Brett  V.  Brett 

V.  Carter 

V.  Cumberland 
Brettel  v.  Williams 
Bret  ton  v.  Prat 
Breuner  v.  Liverpool  Ins.  Co 
Breverton's  case 
Brewer  ;;.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 


i.  630 

iii.  442 

iii.  411 

iii.  477 

i.  384 

ii.  732 

i.  013 

iii.  449 

iii.  18 

826,  835 

ii.  509 

i.  251 

ii.  944 

183,  454 

941 

ii.  635 

iii.  313 

ii.  708 

ii.  878 

i.  564,  560,  570 

i.  51,  52 

ii.  777 

ii.  874 

i.  578  ;  ii.  938 

ii.  814,  922 


ni. 
i.  498 : 


V.  Dew 
V.  Dyer 
V.  Hardy 
V.  Herbert 
r.  Linnasus 
r.  Norcross 
r.  Salisbury 
V.  Sparrow 

Brewers  v.  Fleming 

Brewerton  v.  Harris 

Brewster  ?•.  Baker 
V.  Burnett 
V.  De  Fremery 
V.  Edgerly  iii.  168,  173 

V.  Hammett  i.  231,  232 

V.  Hough  iii.  497,  498,  499 

t'.  Kitchcll  ii.  518,  807 

I'.  McCall's  Devisees  ii.  092 

V.  Silence  ii.  12,  GG4 

V.  Wakefield  iii.  113 

Breyfogle  v.  Becklcy  iii.  Ill 

Brice  v.  Bannister  i.  255 

V.  Stokes  i.  29 

Bricheno  v.  Thorp  i.  127 

Brichta  v.  N.  Y.  Lafayette  Company 

ii.  477,  566,  574;  iii.  436 

Brickliouse  v.  Hunter  ii.  831 

Bridge  v.  Hubbard      i.  488;  iii.  127,  129, 

131 
r.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.  i.  497 

r.  Sumner  ii.  871 

V.  The  Grand  Junction  Co.        ii.  250 
V.  Wain  iii.  195,  228 

Bridge  Proprietors  v.  Iloboken        iii.  507 

Bridgeman's  case  i.  547 

Bridgeport  Bank  v.  Dyer      ii.  669,  675, 

676 

Bridger  v.  Rice 

Bridges  v.  Berry 

V.  Ha wkes worth 

V.  Hitchcock 

V.  Mitchell 

V.  North  London,  &c.  Co. 

Bridgowatcr  Academy  v.  Gilbert 

Bridgh.im  v.  Henderson 

Brien  v.  llarriman 

Brier's  Appeal 

Brigg  V.  Washburne 

Briggs  V.  A  Light-Boat 

V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  R.  Co. 


V.  Briggs 


iii.  361 
i.  300 
ii.  106 
i.  532 
iii.  96 
ii.  251 
i.  482 
iii.  394 
i.  228 
i.  469 
ii.  895 
ii.  384 
ii.  231 ; 
iii.  212 
ii.  784 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


xlvii 


Briggs  V.  Downing 

ii.  7 

V.  Earl  of  Oxford 

iii.  ool 

V.  Georgia 

i.  128 

V.  Hall 

i.  542,  551 

".  N.  A.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  570 

V.  Partridge 

i.  Co 

V.  Strange 

ii.  394 

V.  Vanderbilt 

i.  176 

Brigham  v.  Clark 

i.  183 

V.  Home  Life  Ins.  Co. 

iii.  441 

V.  Peters 

i.  48,  51 

V.  Smith 

i.  309 

Bright  V.  Boyd 

iii.  2-38 

V.  Carpenter 

i.  274 

i;.  Cowper 

ii.  406 

i;.  Judson 

i.  292;  ii.  719 

V.  McKnight 

ii.  10 

V.  Paige 

ii.  425 

V.  Rowland 

iii.  173 

V.  Sneff 

iii.  268 

Brightman  v.  Hicks 

iii.  26 

Brlgstocke  v.  Smith 

iii.  72 

Brind  v.  Dale  ii.  134,  168,  179,  188 

Bringloe  v.  Morrice  ii.  118 

Brink  v.  Hanover  Ins.  Co.  ii.  587 

Blinker  v.  Brinker  iii.  34.3,  362 

Brinley  v.  Mann  i.  155 

V.  National  Ins.  Co.  ii.  579 

V.  Spring  ii.  395 

V.  Whiting  ii.  909 

Brinshy  v.  Gold  ii.  863 

Brisban  v.  Boyd  i.  514 

Brisbane  ?'.  Stoughton  iii.  378 

Bristol  V.  11.  &  S.  R.  R.  ii.  199 

V.  Warner  i.  282 

Bristow  V.  Eastman  ii.  748  ;  iii.  425 

V.  Whitmore  ii.  421,  454 

Bristowe  v.  Fairclough  iii.  201 

i>.  Needham  ii.  874 

Brit.  &  Am.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Colson  i.  515 

Brit.  No.  Amer.  Bank  v.  Merchants 

Bank  iii.  98 

Britannia  Co.  r.  Zingsen  ii.  11 

British  Empire,  The  ii.  442 

British  Linen  Co.  y.  Drummond      ii.  719, 

721 
British  Wagon  Co.  v.  Lea  i.  256 

Brittan  v.  Barnaby  ii.  413 

Britten  v.  Huglies  ii.  477 

Britton  v.  Angier  ii.  11 

V.  Risliop  i.  290 

r.  Turner  ii.  42,  655,  879 

Brix  V.  Brahani  i.  463 

Brizsee  v.  Maybee     iii.  183,  215,  217,  218 
Broad  v.  Jolyffe  ii.  888,  891 

I'.  Thomas  i.  109,  110 

Broadwater  v.  Blot  ii.  149 

Broadway  Bank  v.  Adams  iii.  429 

Broad  well  j;.  Getman  ii.  49;  iii.  44 

I'.  Howard  i.  565 

Brock  V.  Rice  i.  527 

V.  Thompson  iii.  126,  156 

Brockbank  v.  Anderson  ii.  937 

Brockelbank  v.  Sugrue  i.  47 

Brockway  v.  Burnap  i.  180 


Brock  way  v.  Clark 

i\  Lascala 
Broddie  v.  Johnson 
Brodie  r.  Howard 

V.  St.  Paul 
Broeder  Trow,  The 


iii.  126 

ii.  36 

iii.  72 

ii.  389,  396 

iii.  18,  66 

ii.  182 


l5roennenburgh  v.  Haycock  i.  635 

Brogden  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.         i.  507 

V.  Walker  iii.  372 

Bromage  v.  Lloyd  i.  272,  285 

V.  Prosser  iii.  177 

Bronson  v.  Alexander  i.  275 

V.  Cahill  iii.  308 

V.  Gleason  ii.  783 

V.  Green  iii.  184 

V.  Kinzie  iii.  505,  511 

V.  Newberry  iii.  506 

V.  Newbury  iii.  504 

V.  Stroud  iii.  22 

V.  Wiman  iii.  62 

Brook  V.  Brook  ii.  728 

V.  Hook  i.  279 

V.  Smith  ii.  739 

Brooke  v.  Bridges  iii-  237 

V.  Enderby  i.  189 ;  ii.  766 

V.  Evans  i.  195,  199,  203 

V.  Gaily  i.  364 

V.  Hewett  iii.  429,  435,  454 

V.  La.  St.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509 

V.  Mitchell  ii.  837 

V.  Pickwick  ii.  261,  273,  276 

V.  Washington  i.  188 

Brooker  v.  Scott  i.  337 

Brooktis,  Ex  parte  iii.  474 

Brooklyn  Bank  v.  De  Grauw  ii.  818 

Brooklyn,  The,  White  Lead  Co.  v. 

Masury  ii.  360,  371,  374 

V.  Mesury  ii.  352 

Brookman  v.  Metcalf  i.  158 ;  ii.  945 

Brooks  V.  Aston  li.  308 

V.  Ball  i.  474 

V.  Bicknell    ii.  308,  314,  315,  319,  324 

V.  Brooks  i.  228 

V.  Byam  ii.  318 

V.  Hargreaves  i.  280 

V.  Harison  iii.  181 

V.  Harrison  iii.  267 

V.  Hubbard  iii.  232,  233 

V.  Marbury  iii.  382 

V.  Mintnrn         i.  57  ;  ii.  415,  424,  425 

V.  Mitchell  i.  295 

V.  Moody  iii.  244 

V.  Oriental  Ins.  Co.  ii.  446,  491,  507 

V.  Powers  i-  569 

t'.  State  ii.  106 

V.  Stuart  i.  27  ;  ii.  851 

V.  Wheelock  iii.  312,  347 

V.  White  ii.  751,  823 

Broom  v.  Batchelor  ii.  635 

V.  Broom  i.  168 

V.  Robinson  iii.  448 

Broome,  Ex  parte  i.  229 

Broomley  v.  Holland  i.  74 

Brothers  v.  Brothers  i-  94 

Brough  V.  Oddy  iii.  318 


xlviii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Brougch  V.  Wliitmore 

ii.  483,  6G6 

Broiigliton  v.  Broughton 

i.  m 

f.  Conway 

ii.  034 

r.  Sillaway                       i 

.  527  ;  ii.  74G 

Brousseau  v.  The  Hudson 

ii.  41G 

Brouwer  v.  Hill 

i.  483 

Brower  v.  Lewis 

i.  6-28 

Brown,  Appeal  of 

i.  233 

E.r  parte               iii.  416, 

427,  463,  471 

in  re 

i.  313 

V.  Ackroyd 

1.402 

V.  Adams 

1.457 

V.  Alden 

i.  880 

V.  Allen 

i.  28,  228 

V.  Arrot 

iii.  206 

V.  Bailee 

iii.  378,  382 

V.  Bachelor 

ii.  23 

V.  Bellows 

1.561 

r.  Bement 

i.  611 

V.  Berry 

ii.  781 

V.  Bigelow                      i 

625;  iii.  427 

n.  Bigley 

1.  129 

V.  Bowen 

ii.  939 

V.  Bragg 

1.  633 

V.  Bridges 

iii.  77 

V.  Brine 

i.  470 

V.  Brown   i.  263,  266,  384,  409;  ii.  11, 
832 ;  iii.  39 
V.  Buffalo  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.       ii.  247 

V.  Burns  ii.  763 

V.  Byrne  ii.  607 

V.  Chase  i.  152 

V.  Ciiicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  187 

I'.  Clark  i.  230 

V.  Ciegg  ii.  182 

V.  Cole  i.  661 

V.  Collier  i.  463 

V.  CoUins  iii.  398 

V.  Combs  i.  560 

r.  Coombs  i.  107 

V.  Cousens  iii.  68,  107 

V.  Crump  i.  502,  536,  537 

V.  Cuming  iii.  426,  439 

V.  Cummings  iii.  199 

V.  Curtiss  i.  274  ;  ii.  7  ;  iii.  28 

V.  Davies  i.  288,  289,  293 

V.  Delano  ii.  425 

V.  Denison  ii.  150 

V.  Dewey  iii.  125 

r.  De  Winton  i.  277,  278 

V.  Dickerson  iii.  242 

r.  Donnell  i.  155 

I'.  Doyle  i.  12 

V.  Duchesne  ii.  325 

V.  Dudley  ii.  865 

V.  Dunckel  ii.  757 

V.  Durham  i.  356 

I'.  Dysinger  i.  640;  ii.  778,  779 

V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  273 

I'.  Kdes  iii.  72 

V.  Edgington  i.  630 

V.  Elkington  i.  636 

V.  Evans  ii.  827 

V.  Everhard  i.  455 

V.  Ferguson  i.  820,  823,  820 


Brown  v.  Fitch 
V.  Foster 
V.  Galloway 
V.  Gammon 
V.  Garland 
V.  George 
V.  Gibbins 
V.  Gihuan 
V.  Gilmore 
V.  Girard 
i\  Hankerson 
V.  Harrison 


i.  579 
i.  564  ;  ii.  63 

iii.  237 
ii.  789 
ii.  877 
iii.  28 
i.  196 

iii.  293 
ii.  776 
ii.  528 
ii.  829 
iii.  143,  145 


I'.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  i.  79,  200;  ii.  492 

r.  Hatton  ii.  624 

V.  Heathcote  iii.  424,  443 

V.  Iliatts  iii.  98 

V.  Howard  iii.  99 

V.  Ilunimell  iii.  485 

V.  Hunt  ii.  424 

V.  Independence,  The  ii.  464 

I'.  Joddreil  i.  434 

V.  Johnson  ii.  424,  799 

V.  Keller  i.  641 

V.  Kcwley  ii.  755 

V.  Kimball  ii.  792 

V.  Lacy  iii.  129 

V.  Langford  i.  486 

v.  Leavitt  i.  292;  ii.  848 

V.  Leeson  ii.  897 

V.  Leonard  i.  188 

V.  Litton  i.  97,  229 
V.  Lull             i.  441 ;  ii.  456,  458,  459 

V.  Maine  Bank  i.  255 

V.  Marsh  i.  28 
V.  Maxwell                i.  356;  ii.  46,  248 

V.  McCormack  ii.  933 

V.  McCune  i.  357  ;  ii.  942 
V.  McGraa               i.  74,  103,  104,  108 

V.  Miller  iii.  223 

V.  Morris  ii.  882  ;  iii.  39 

V.  Mott  i.  293 ;  iii.  451 

V.  MuUins  i.  151 

V.  Neal  ii.  772 

V.  Neilson  ii.  428,  498 

V.  Nevitt  iii.  116 

V.  Olmsted  ii.  756 

V.  Orland  ii.  624,  625 

V.  Orr  i.  392 

v.  Overton  ii.  463,  533 

V.  Patton  i.  894,  396 

V.  People's  Ins.  Co.  ii.  473 

r.  Pforr  i.  76 

V.  Prophit  ii.  28 

V.  Quilter  ii.  589 

V.  Ralston  ii.  415,  425 

V.  Rawlings  iii-  66 

V.  Reed  ii.  862 

V.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  ii.  579 

V.  Saul  ii.  753 

V.  Savage  ii.  827,  837 

V.  Sax  iii.  215 

V.  Sayles  i.  631 

V.  Simms  i.  653 

V.  Slater  ii.  635 

V.  Sloan  i.  468 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


xlix 


Brown  v.  Smith 

ii.  513 

r.  Stapyleton 

ii.  451 

V.  Sullivan 

i.  147 

V.  Swineford 

iii.  182 

V.  Tapscott 

i.  184;  ii.  390 

V.  Tarkington 

i.  273 

V.  Tayleur 

ii.  487,  532 

V.  Tighe 

iii.  323 

V.  Toell 

iii.  125 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  500,  520 

V.  United  States 

i.  449 

V.  Vawser 

ii.  837 

V.  Vigne 

ii.  487,  488 

V.  Wade 

ii.  818;  iii.  46 

V.  Wallis 

i.  546 

V.  Ward 

ii.  127 

V.  Warnock 

ii.  827,  831 

V.  Waters 

iii.  116,  129 

V.  Weber 

iii.  29 

V.  Wilkinson 

ii.  454 

V.  Williama 

ii.  555 

V.  Witter 

ii.  815 

V.  Wood 

iii.  430 

V.  Wootton 

i.  12 

V.  Yaryan 

ii.  51 

Brown's  Appeal 

i.  228 

Browne  v.  Lee 

i.  31,  34 

V.  Meverell 

ii.  828 

V.  Robinson 

ii.  882 

Brownell  r.  Flagler 

ii.  247,  248 

V.  Hawkins 

iii.  122,  127,  401 

Browning  v.  Beston 

ii.  639,  640,  641 

V.  Hart 

iii.  402 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  546 

V.  Magill 

i.  556 

V.  Marvin 

i.  224 

V.  Morris 

iii.  137 

V.  Provincial  Ins.  Co 

i.  65 

V.  Eeame 

ii.  87  ;  iii.  414 

V.  Wright 

ii.  623,  634,  640 

Broxham  v.  Wagstaffe 

ii.  37,  44 

Bruce  v.  Andrews 

iii.  277 

t>.  Bruce           i.  298; 

ii.  701,  709,  823 

V.  Hunter 

iii.  159 

V.  Learned 

iii.  216 

V.  Lytle 

i.  308,  316 

V.  Pearson 

i.  505,  506 

V.  Pettengill 

iii.  235 

V.  Schuyler 

iii.  507 

V.  Smith 

iii.  382 

V.  Wait 

iii.  277,  279 

Bruen  v.  Marquand 

i.  26,  210 

Brumby  v.  Smith 

ii.  140 

Brummel  v.  Stockton 

i.  569 

Brundage  v.  Brundage 

i,  158 

Brundige  v.  Poor 

iii.  310 

Brundred  v.  Muzzy 

i.  174 

Brundrett,  Ex  parte 
Brundridge  v.  Whitcomb 

iii.  416 

ii.  878 

Brunswick  Sav.  Inst.  v. 

Commercial 

Ins.  Co. 

ii.  476 

Brush  V.  Keeler 

ii.  897 

V.  Scribner 

i.  292 

Brutton  v.  Burton 

i.  122 

Bryan  v.  Bradley 

ii.  635 

Bryan  v.  Horseman 

iii.  69,  70 

V.  Jackson 

i.  342 

V.  Lewis 

i.  560 

V.  Stewart 

i.  140 

V.  Wcatherhead 

i.  530 

Bryant,  Ex  parte 

iii.  470 

V.  Am.  Tel.  Co.            ii. 

288 

291,  301 

V.  Booze 

i.  515 

V.  Christie 

iii.  477 

V.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  418, 

478 

505,  676 

V.  Craig 

i.  136 

V.  Eastman 

i.  274 

V.  Flight 

ii.»59 

V.  Goodnow 

i 

474,  483 

V.  Hambrick 

iii 

238,  247 

V.  Jackson 

i.  434 

V.  Kelton 

i.  569 

t'.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

ii 

523,  524 

V.  Pottinger 

i.  361 

V.  Pouglikeepsie  Ins.  Co 

ii.  545 

V.  Proctor 

ii.  818 

V.  Sears 

iii.  224 

V.  Whitcher 

i.  556 

V.  Young 

iii.  403 

Bryce  v.  Brooks 

i.  107 

Bryden  v.  Taylor 

i.  325 

Bryer  v.  Weston 

i.  198 

Bryraer  v.  Atkins 

iii.  425 

Bryson  v.  Browning 

i.  263 

V.  Rayner 

ii.  1.30 

V.  Whitehead        ii.  889 

iii. 

823,  374 

Buchan  v.  Sumner 

i. 

168, 171 

Buchanan  v.  Curry 

i.  216 

V.  Howland 

ii.  325 

V.  Marshall 

i.  315 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  505 

V.  Rucker 

ii. 

740,  872 

Buchans  v.  Harwell 

ii.  941 

Buck  V.  Albee 

i.  486 

V.  Buck 

i.  Ill 

V.  Chesapeake  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  524 

V.  Fisher 

iii.  Ill 

V.  Hermance 

ii. 

307,  327 

V.  Lane 

ii.  465 

V.  McCaughtry 

i.  526 

V,  Mosley 

i.  208 

V.  Rawlinson 

ii.  458 

V.  Smiley 

ii.  28 

V.  Smith 

iii.  321 

V.  Winn 

i.  168 

Buckbee  r.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  614 

Bucker  v.  Klerkgeter 

ii.  466 

Buckbause,  Re 

iii.  475 

Buckingham  v.  Burgess 

i.  196 

V.  McLean 

iii.  145 

V.  Smith 

iii.  76 

Buckland  v.  Butterfield 

i. 

546,  547 

V.  Conway 

ii. 

825,  833 

V.  Hall 

iii. 

364,  454 

Buckle  V.  Mitchell 

ii.  317 

Buckley,  Ex  parte 

i.  136 

V.  Artcher 

ii.  915 

V.  Barber 

i. 

147,  227 

V.  Bentley 

i.  315 

INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Buckley  v.  Buckley 

V.  Cater 

V.  Furniss 

V.  Guildbank 

V.  AVells 
Bucklin  v.  Thompson 

V.  Ward 
Buckinan  v.  Levi 
Buckmaster  ;'.  Ilarrop 

I'.  Smyth 
Buckmyr  i'.  Darnall 
Bucknam  v.  Barnum 

V.  Goildard 
Buckner  v.  Finley 

V.  Smyth 
Budd  V.  Biisti 

V.  Fairmaner 
Buel  V.  Gordon 
Buell  I'.  Buckingham 
Bufo  V.  Turner 
Buffalo  V.  Holloway 
Buffalo  Bank  v.  Fiske 


i.  1G8,  170 

i.  230 

i.  645,  G4y,  053 

ii.  644;  iii.  138 

1.387 

i.  612 

i.  254 

i.  574;  iii.  193 

iii.  12,  66,  349 

i.  578 

ii.  4 

i.  176,  108 

i.  616 

i.  320 

i.  383 

iii.  297 

i.  622 

iii.  464 

i.  95 

ii.  558,  919 

i.  120 

i.  651 


Buffalo  Steam  Engine  Works  i'.  Sun 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  475,  577 

Buffam  V.  Merry  ii.  143 

Buffett  V.  Trov,  &c.  K.  R.  Co.  ii.  237 

Buffington  v.  Curtis  i.  329;  ii.  411 

V.  Quantin  i.  630 

Buffinton  v.  Uien  i.  568 

Buffurd  r.  Caldwell  ii.  917,  927 

V.  McNeely  i.  222 

Buffum  V.  Buffum  i.  168 

V.  Fayette  Ins.  Co.  ii.  541 

V.  Green  iii.  381,  382 

Building,  &c.  Assoc,  v.  Dorsey        iii.  117 

Bulger  V.  Roche  ii.  721 

Bulkley  v.  Barber  ii.  387 

V.  Dayton  i.  26 

V.  Derby  Fishing  Co.  i.  157;  ii.  521 

V.  Ilonold  ii.  393 

V.  Morgan  ,  ii.  923 

Bull  V.  Bull  ii.  824 

V.  Parker  ii.  779 

V.  Robison  i.  573,  631 

Bullard,  Ex  parte  iii.  417 

V.  Roger  Williams  Ins.  Co.       ii.  506, 

511,  629 

V.  Young  ii.  212 

Bullen  V.  Denning  ii.  639 

V.  Sharp  i.  183 

Buller  V.  Fisher  ii.  183,  434 

V.  Harrison  i.  85,  86 

Bullett  V.  Bank  of  Penn.  i.  331,  3;]2 

Bullitt  t'.  Musgrave  ii.  843 

Bullock  V.  Babcock  i.  356 

V.  Boyd  iii.  143,  1.57 

V.  Bullock  ii.  92 

V.  Campbell  iii.  98 

V.  Dominitt  i,  536;  ii.  BOo 

V.  Lamar,  The  ii.  431 

V.  Sinitli  iii.  76 

V.  Taylor  i.  279 

V.  Wilson  iii.  237 

Bulwer  v.  Home  ii.  772 

Bumgardner  v.  Circuit  Ct.  iii.  506 


Bunger  v.  Koop 
Bunker  v.  Athcam 

V.  Miles 
Bunn  V.  Guy 
V.  Ricker 
V.  Thomas 
V-  Winthrop 


ii.  823 

i.  279 

i.  94 

i.  459,  ii.  889 

ii.  761,  896,  897 

ii.  644 

i.  377;  iii.  315,  318 


Bunney  v.  Poyntz  i.  529,  645;  iii.  26.3,  274 

Buntin  v.  French  iii.  294 

Burbank  v.  Beach  i.  319 

V.  Rockingham  Ins.  Co.    ii.  477,  677, 

583 

Burbridge  v.  Manners  i.  318 

Burch  V.  Breckinridge  i.  408 

Burchard  v.  Tapscott  ii.  394 

Burchell  v.  Marsh  ii.  840 

Burchfield  v.  Moore  ii.  854 

Burcle  v.  Eckart  i.  180 

Burd  V.  Smith  iii.  382,  383 

Burden  v.  Denig  ii.  828 

Burden  v.  Corning  ii.  317 

V.  Ferrers  i.  12 

V.  M'Ellienny  iii.  69 

Burdeno  v.  Amperse  ii.  79 

Burdett  v.  Willett  iii.  438 

V.  Withers  i.  536;  iii.  249 

Burdick  v.  Green  ii.  757 

V.  Post  iii.  403 

Burgan  v.  Lyell  i.  192 

Burge  V.  Cedar  Rapids,  &c.  R.  Co.    ii.  815 

V.  Coul  i.  570 

Burgess,  Ex  parte  iii.  414 

V.  Atkins  i.  234 

V.  Burgess  ii.  372,  373 

V.  Clements  ii.  158,  169 

V.  Equitable  Ins.  Co.  ii.  532 

V.  Eve  ii.  33 

V.  Gray  i.  118,  120 

V.  Gun  ii.  407 

V.  Hately  ii.  377 

V.  Hills  ii.  373,  375,  377 

V.  Pollock  i.  433 

r.  Tucker  ii.  875 

V.  Vreeland  i.  318 

V.  Wheate  iii.  295,  312 

Burghart  v.  Angerstein       i.  836,  337,  353 

V.  Gardner  i.  120,  128 

V.  Hall  i.  330 

Burgoyne  v.  Showier  ii.  860 

Burk  V.  Baxter  i.  548 

t'.  McClain  iii.  409,  436 

V.  Serrill  iii.  369 

Burk's  Appeal  iii.  370 

Burke  v.  Cruger  ii.  28 

V.  Haley  iii.  12,  14 

V.  McKay  i.  325 

i;.  Noble  i.  27 

V.  Norwich  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 

V.  Winkle  i.  407 

Burkett  v.  Trowbridge  i.  887 

Burklialter  v.  Second  Bank  ii.  767 

Biirkholder  v.  Plank  i.  467 

Burks  v.  Sliain  ii.  74 

Burleigli  v.  Gebhard  Ins.  Co.  ii.  552 

V.  Parton  i.  208 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


li 


Burleigh  v.  Stott 
Burlen  v.  Shannon 
Burleson  v.  Burleson 
Burley  i\  Russell 
Burliner  v.  Koyle 
Burliiifjame  v.  Brewster 

V.  Burlingame 
Buriinghanie  v.  Bobbins 


iii.  87,  88,  90 
ii.  931 
ii.  939 
i.  357 
iii.  411 
ii.  853 
i.  349  ;  iii.  247 
iii.  293 


Burlington  Mat.  Loan  Assoc,  v.  Hei- 

dcr  _      iii.  117 

Burniester  v.  Barrow  i.  316,  320 

Burn  r.  Boulton  iii-  83 

V.  Miller  ii.  655 

V.  Morris  i.  52 

Burnaby's  case  ii.  874 

Burnand  v.  Rodocanachi  ii.  563 

Burnby  v.  Bollett  i.  632 

Burnell  v.  Minot  i.  34 

Burness  v.  Fennel  i.  48,  163,  193 

Burnet  v.  Bisco  i.  458 

Burnett  v.  Clietwood  ii.  337,  342,  347 

V.  Eufaula  Ins.  Co.  ii.  576 

V.  Phalon  ii.  353,  371,  376 

V.  Scribner  ii.940 

V.  Snyder  i.  183 

Burnham  v.  Allen  ii.  625 

V.  Dorr  ii.  762 

V.  Gentrys  iii.  118 

V.  Noyes  iii.  441,  478 

V.  Tucker  i.  290 

V.  Webster  i.  290 

V.  Wood  i.  290 

Burns  v.  Bryant  i.  549 

V.  Fletcher  i  632 

V.  Pilsbury  i.  Ill 

V.  Poulson  i   113 

V.  Rowland  i.  304 

V.  Thornburgh  ii.  874 

Burnside  v.  Merrick  i.  170  ;  iii.  42(i 

Buron  v.  Denman  i.  53,  549 

Burpee  v.  Sparhawk  iii.  411 

Burr  V.  Cowperthwaite  ii.  311 

V.  Duryea  ii.  311 

V.  Foster  ii.  524 

V.  Sim  ii.  613 

V.  Stenton  i.  531 

V.  Wilcox  i.  474;  iii.  23 

V.  Williams  i.  566 

Burrall  v.  Acker  i.  234 

V.  Jacob  i.  667 

V.  Rice  iii.  396,  508 

Burrell  v.  Jones  i.  129 ;  ii.  32 

V.  North  ii.  194 

Burridge  v.  Fortescue  iii.  167 

V.  Row  ii.  610 

Burrill  v.  Stevens  ii.  914 

Burritt  v.  Belfy  iii.  203 

V.  Saratoga  Co.  Ins.  Co.     ii.  523,  542. 

653,  554,  555,  556,  557,  558,  560 

Burrough  v.  Moss  i.  290  ;  ii.  877 

Burroughes  v-  Clarke  ii.  59 

Burroughs  v.  Hanegan  i.  308 

V.  Richmond  i.  4.'j5 

Burrows  ;;.  Jeraino  ii.  700,  737 

V.  Pierce  iii.  238,  242 


Burrows  v.  Trieber 

V.  Whitaker 
Burrus  v.  Kyle 

V.  Roulhac 
Burschalter  r.  Erie  Bank 
Burson  v.  Edwards 

V.  Kincaid 
Burt  V.  Dutclier 

i\  Sternburgh 
Burtis  V.  Thompson 
Burton,  Ex  parte 

V.  Blin 

V.  Chinn 

V.  G.  N.  R.  Co. 

V.  Griffiths 

V.  Hughes 

V.  Issit 

V.  Lockhert 


ii.  156 

i.  564,  566 
i.  108;  iii.  275 

iii.  294 
i.  296 

iii.  180 
i.  210 
i.  568 
ii.  867 

ii.  810 
i.  403 

ii.  676 

ii.  877 
i.  479 
i.  140 

ii.  103 
i.  211 

iii.  452 


V.  Philadelphia,  &c.  Railroad      i.  154 

V.  Schermerhorn  i.  495 

V.  Stewart  ii.  922 

V.  Wilkinson  ii.  152 

Burton's  case  iii.  116,  125,  149 

Burwell  v.  Mandeville's  Ex'r      i.  223,  226 

V.  Knight  ii.  871 

Bury  V.  Bradford  ii.  368 

V.  Philpot  i.  377 

Busby  V.  Chenault  i.  228 

V.  North  Amer.  Ins.  Co.              ii.  616 

Buschman  v.  Wilson  i.  536 

^\i&h,  Ex  parte  [iii.  287 

V.  Barnard  i.  464 

V.  Canfield  iii.  220 

V.  Clark  i.  228 

V.  Davies  i.  563 

V.  Dutcher  iii.  212 

V.  Lathrop  _  i.  2-55,  258 

V.  Livingston  iii.  125,  127 

V.  Marshall  ii.  933 

r.^Miller  ii.  135 

v.'Pettibone  i-  4.34 

V.  Sliipman  iii.  483 

V.  Steinman  i.  120 

V.  Stevens  iii-  31 

Bushee  v.  Allen  iii-  23 

Bushell  V.  Beavan  iii-  24 

V.  Wheeler  iii-  54 

Busk  v.  Davies  1.  563,  566 

V.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.  ii.  527 

Buskirk  v.  Purin  iii-  269 

Biison  V.  Dougherty  i-  578,  579 

Bu<s  V.  Gilbert  _      iii.  470,  478 

Bussard  v.  Levering  i.  313,  318,  321 

Bussfieid  v.  Bussfield  ii-  836 

Bussman  v.  Ganster  i-  537 

Bustard's  case  iii-  243 

Butcher  v.  Dresser  i.  227 

V.  Easto  iii.  441 

V.  Forman  ii.  463 

V.  London  &  Southwestern  Ry. 

Co.  ii.  188,  203 

V.  Stewart  ii.  694  ;  iii.  25 
Butcher's    and    Drover's    Bank    v. 

Brown  i-  271 

Butler,  Ex  parte  iii-  424 


lii 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Butler  I'.  American 

Toy  Co. 

i.  16G 

V.  Arrow,  The 

ii.  410 

V.  Basing 

ii.  194 

V.  Brock 

i.  337,  383 

V.  Buckingham 

1.400 

r.  Carver 

iii.  435 

V.  Chariton  County  Court         iii.  481 

V.  Heane  ii.  273 

V.  Hicks  iii.  211 

r.  Hildreth  iii.  441 

V.  Howe  iii.  102 

r.  Hunter  i.  116 

V.  Inneys  ii.  875 

V.  Knight  i.  130 

V.  Lee  ii.  900,  905 

V.  Northumberland  iii.  219 

V.  Paine  i.  280 

V.  Palmer  iii.  486,  511 

r.  Pennsylvania  iii.  483 

V.  Powis  iii.  309,  351 

V.  Rhodes  iii.  477 

V.  Stocking  i.  208 

V.  Thompson  i.  583 

V.  Tufts  i.  616 

V.  Wijige  i.  487 

V.  Wildman  ii.  497 

r.  Winters  iii.  72 

Butman  v.  Monmouth  Ins.  Co.  ii.  573 

Butnam  ;•.  Abbot  ii.  59 

Butt  V.  Ellett  iii.  302 

V.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co.       ii.  134 

Butterfiekl  v.  Forrester  ii.  250 

V.  Hartshorn  i.  246,  248 

V.  Hemsley  i.  210 

V.  Jacobs  iii,  72,  76 

?-.  Kidder  iii.  121 

Butterfill,  Ex  parte  iii.  470 

Butters  v.  Ilaughwout  i.  557 

Butterworth  i'.  McKinley  i.  566 

V.  Robinson  ii.  327,  345 

Button  V.  Downliam  iiil  150 

V.  Great  Western  Cotton  Co.      ii.  45 

Buttrick  v.  Ilolden  iii.  313 

Butts  V.  Cuthbertson  ii.  3i)2 

V.  Dean  ii.  756 

V.  Newton  i.  387 

Buxton,  Ex  parte  iii.  422 

V.  Boughan  iii.  285 

V.  James  ii.  .348 

V.  Jones  i.  76,  311 

V.  Lister  iii.  321,  325,  328,  329 

Buzzell  V.  Laconia  Man.  Co.  ii.  45 

Byam  v.  Farr  ii.  317 

Byars  v.  Doores  i.  09 

Byassee  i*.  Reese  iii.  35 

Byers  v.  Cliapin  i.  630 

V.  Dobey  i.  12 

V.  Farmers  Ins.  Co.  ii.  470,  554 

V.  Ilussey  ii.  28 

V.  McClanahan  i.  37,  123 

V.  Van  ])eu.sea  ii.  828 

Byme  v.  Doughty  i.  51 

Byrd  v.  lioyd  ii.  37,  39 

V.  Fox  i.  185 

V.  Odem  ii.  908 


Byrne  v.  Crowninshield      ii.  722;  iii.  103, 

105 

V.  Fitzhugh  i.  13,  19,  22 

V.  Jansen  i.  617,  618 

V.  La.  State  Ins.  Co.  ii.  532 

V.  Van  Tienhoven  i.  515 

Byrnes  r.  National  Ins.  Co.  ii.  516 

Byrnside  v.  Burdett  i.  616 

Byron  v.  N.  Y.  State  Printing  Tel. 

Co.  ii.  292 

Bywater  v.  Richardson  i.  633 


C. 


C.  &  X.  &  L.  M.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Webb    ii.  46 

Cabarga  v.  Seeg  ii.  686,  687 

Cabeen  v.  Buckenridge  i.  523 

Cabell  V.  Vaughan  i.  12 

Cabellaro  v.  Slater  i.  480 

Cable  V.  Dakin  iii.  218 

V.  Ellis  iii.  223 

V.  Rogers  ii.  836,  837 

Cabot  V.  Haskins  i.  467,  498  ;  iii.  8 

V.  Winsor  i.  584,  589 

Cadens  v.  Teasdale  i.  248 

Cadman  i\  Horner  i.  522;  iii.  371 

V.  Lubbock  ii.  775 

Cadmus,  The  ii.  467 

V.  Matthews  ii.  466,  467 

Cadogan  v.  Kennett  i.  569 

Cadwallader  v.  Howell  ii.  709,  710 

V.  Kroesen  i.  216 

Cady  I'.  Goodnow  iii.  132 

V.  Shepherd  i.  122 

Cage  V.  Acton  ii.  852 

V.  Phillips  ii.  880 

V.  Wilkinson  iii.  285 

Cagger  v.  Lansing  iii.  38 

Cahen  v.  Piatt  iii.  219 

Cahill  V.  Bigelow  ii.  11 ;  iii.  64 

Gaboon  v.  Ring  ii.  304,  314,  317 

Cailiff  i".  Danvers  ii.  149 

Cain  V.  Spann  i.  290 

Caine  i-.  Horsefall  ii.  633 

Gaines  v.  Smith  ii.  69,  809 

Cairnes  v.  Bleecker  i.  62  ;  ii.  827 

Cairns  r.  Cairns  ii.  93 

Cairo  Bank  v.  Crocker  i.  574 

Calahan  v.  Babcock  i.  645 

Calais  Co.  v.  Van  Pelt  i.  80 

Calbreath  v.  Gracy  ii.  519 

Calcraft  v.  Harborough  iii.  191 

Cahlecott  v.  Smythies  i.  544 

Calder  r.  Bull  iii.  506 

V.  Dobell  i.  66 

V.  Rutherford  i.  129 

Caldwell  v.  Alton  i.  160 

V.  Ball  i.  594 

V.  Bartlett  i.  557 ;  iii.  290,  337 

V.  Brown  iii.  177 

V.  Carrington's  Heirs  iii.  347 

V.  Cassidy  i.  309 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


liii 


Caldwell  r.  Drake 

V.  Murphy 

17.  Kew  Jersey  Steamboat  Co. 

V.  Scott 

V.  Sliepherd 

V.  St.  Louis  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Tutt 

V.  Van  Vliessingen 

V.  Wentworth 

V.  AVest 
Calhoun  v.  Richardson 

V.  Vechio 
Caliot  V.  Waliier 
Calisto,  The 
Calkins  v.  Chandler 


i.  404 


V.  Lockvvood 
Call  V.  Calef 
V.  Hagger 
V.  Scott 
V.  Ward 


ii.  IbU 
i.  208 
i.  128 
ii.  497 
iii.  266 
ii.  324,  320 
ii.  703 
iii.  217 
ii.  930 
i.  620 
iii.  141,  143,  150 
ii.  384,  385 
i.  472;  ii.  7.  10; 
iii.  27 
iii.  49 
ii.  907 
iii.  511 
iii.  126 
i.  343 


Callaghan  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  521 

V.  Callaghan  iii.  314,  316 

V.  Hallett 

?,'.  Myers 
Callahan  v.  Caparata 

V.  McAlexander 

V.  Shaw 
Call  en  v.  Thompson 
Callender  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Callisher  v.  Bischoffsheim 
Callo  V.  Brouncker 
Callow  V.  Lawrence 
Calton  V.  Bragg 
Calvert  v.  Carter 

V.  Gordon 

V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co. 
Calvin's  case 
Calvo  V.  Davies 

Calye's  case  ii.  158,  159,  160,  106 

Camarillo  r.  Fenlon  i.  540 

Cambell  v.  Galbreath 
Cambioso  r.  Maffett 
Cambridge,  The 

V.  Anderton  ii  505,  506 

Cambridge  Ins.  for  Savings  v.  Lit- 

tlefield  i.  463  ;  ii.  936,  938 

Cambridge  University  v.  Bryer        ii.  330 
Camden  v.  McKoy  i.  284 

V.  Vail  iii.  294 

Camden  &  Amboy  Railroad  Co.  v. 

Baldauf         ii.  256,  259,  268,  273 


i.  407  ;  ii.  439 
i.  561 
iii.  184 
ii.  830 
iii.  190 
ii.  569 
ii.  419 
i.  468 
ii.  38 
i.  297 
iii.  112 
ii.  829 
ii.  34 
ii.  550,  557 
i.  448 
i.  245;  ii.  18,28 


i.  384 
ii.  894 
ii.  466 


V.  Belknap 

ii.  192 

V.  Burke 

ii.  234 

Cameron  v.  Baker 

i.  351 

V.  Boyle 

iii.  176 

t'.  Francisco 

i.  228 

r.  Little 

i.  550 

V.  Montgomery 

iii.  382 

V.  Scudder 

iii.  382 

V.  Wynch 

iii.  210 

Camidge  v.  Allenby 

i.  298,  306  ;  iii.  263 

Cammack  v.  Jobnson 

i.  233,  235 

Cammer  v.  Harrison 

i.  313 

Camp  V.  Bates 

iii.  159 

Camp  V.  Camp 
V.  Grant 
V.  Hamlin 
V.  Meyer 
V.  Pulver 
V.  Scott 


1.613 

L  228, 238 

iii.  224 

iii.  440 

ii.911 

i.  296 


t:  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.        ii.  280, 
287,  288 

Camp's  Appeal  i.  263 

Campaiiari  v.  Woodburn  i.  76 

Camparree  v.  Brockway  i.  284 

Campbell,  Ex  parte  iii.  471 

V.  Baker  ii.  28 

V.  Boggs  iii.  99 

V.  Bowen  i.  199 

V.  Butler  i.  274,  284 

V.  Butts  ii.  866 

r.  Colhoun  i.  167 

V.  Dearborn  iii.  432 

V.  Fleming  ii.  923 

V.  Galbreath  ii.  78 

V.  Gittings  ii.  663 

V.  Gullatt  ii.  85 

V.  Hall  i.  8G 

V.  Hamilton               i.  22  ;  ii.  878,  884 

V.  Hicks  i.  41,  57 

V.  Innes  ii.  525 

V.  Jones  ii.  662 

V.  Knapp  i.  317  ;  ii.  8 

V.  Leach  i.  88 

V.  Lewis  L  259,  261 

V.  Mesier  i.  32 

V.  Morris  iii.  15 

V.  Morse  ii.  172 
V.  New  England  Ins.  Co.     ii.  556, 592, 

607 

V.  Parker  ii.  122 

V.  Perkins  iii.  466 

V.  Read  iii.  127 

V.  Scott  ii.  341 

I'.  Shields  iii.  126 

V.  Shipley  i.  540 

V.  Smith  i.  245 

V.  Stakes  i.  356 

V.  Walker  iii.  422 

Campion  v.  Kille  ii.  702 

Camus  V.  Citizens  Co.  i.  117 

Can  V.  Read  ii.  748 ;  iii.  425 

Canaan  v.  Hartley  iii.  447 

Canal  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Albany        i.  298, 

300,  301 

V.  Cox  iii.  382 

Canal  Fund  v.  Perry  i.  483 
Candee  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 

ii.  278 

Candler  v.  Fuller  ii.  835 

Candor's  Appeal  ii.  52 

Candy,  Ex  parte  iii.  419,  420 

Cane  v.  Com.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  580 

Canfield  v.  Hard  i.  223 

V.  Vaughan  ii.  3 

V.  Watertown  Ins.  Co.  ii.  588 

Canfranque  v.  Burnell  iii.  391 

Canham  v.  Barry  ii.  913 

V.  Jones  ii.  362,  366,  372 


liv 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Canizares  v.  The  Santissima  Trinidad 

ii.  404 

Cannan  v.  Denew  iii.  41G 

V.  Meaburn  ii.  396,  454 
Cannel  v.  Buckie           ii.  852 ;  iii.  307,  310 

Cannell  v.  M'Clean  iii.  247 

Cannon  v.  Alsbury  i.  370,  481 

V.  Mitchell  i.  524 

Canover  v.  Cooper  i.  349 

Canter  v.  Anier.  &  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  iii.  175 

Cantrel  r.  Graham  iii.  449 

Cany  v.  Tatton  i.  394,  395,  401 

Cape  Ann  Bank  v.  Burns  ii.  862 

Cape  Fear  Bank  v.  Stinemetz  i.  325 
Cape  Fear  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Conner 

ii.  386 

Capel  V.  Thornton  i.  629 ;  ii.  745 

Capen  v.  Alden  ii.  766 

V.  Barrows  i.  26,  184 

V.  Crowell  iii.  113 

V.  Glover  iii.  498 
V.  Washington  Ins.  Co.       ii.  530,  531 

Capper  v.  Dando  iii.  414 

V.  Spottiswoode  iii-  295 

Capron  v.  Johnson  iii.  396,  508 

Carbonel  v.  Davies  ii.  644 

Card  V.  Hope  ii.  388 

Cardoll  i;.  Bridge  ii.  873 
Carden  v.  General  Cemetery  Co.       i.  1G4 

Cardigan  v.  Armitage  ii.  639 

Cardinell  v.  Bennett  i.  567 

Careless  v.  Careless  ii.  689,  692 

Carew  v.  Northrup  ii.  882 
Carey  v.  Berkshire  R.  R.  Co.  i.  352 ;  ii.  247 

V.  Brown  iii.  258 

Cargey  v.  Aitcheson  ii.  831 

Carhart  v.  Austin  ii.  308 

Cariss  v.  Tattersall  ii.  860 

Carle  v.  Hall  i.  120 

Carleton  v.  Leighton  i.  560;  iii.  431 

V.  Woods  ii.  649 

Carley  v.  Green  i  397 

V.  Jenkins  i.  200 

V.  Vance  i.  309;  ii.  773 

V.  Wilkins  i.  623,  626 

Carlisle  r.  Fleming  iii.  362 

Carliss  v.  McLaughlin  iii.  116 

Carl  Joiian,  The  ii.  454 

Carlton  v.  liailey  i.  296,  486 

V.  Cummins  i.  219 

V.  Mays  i.  228 

Carman  v.  Beach  i.  94 

r.  Eiledge  ii.  14 

Carmichael  v.  Hughes  i.  347 

Carmichel  r.  Latimer  i.  172 

Caman  v.  Bowles  ii.  336,  3.39,  341 

Carne  v.  Brice  iii-  456 

Carnegie  v.  Morrison  i.  303,  497,  498 ; 

iii.  429 

Carnes  v.  Field  ii.  943 

Carnochan  v.  Christie  ii.  833 

V.  Gould  i.  627 

Carolan  v.  Hrabazon  iii.  375 

(Carolina,  The  ii.  51!) 

Carolua,  The  ii  468,  469 


Carpenter  v.  American  Ins.  Co.         i.  80 ; 

ii.  556 
V.  Butterfield  ii.  873,  882 

V.  Carpenter  i.  361 

V.  Dodge  i.  263,  460 

V.  Graham  i.  566 

t'.  Lockhart  iii.  173 

V.  Marnell  iii.  435 

V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540;  iii.  329,  330 
V.  Oaks  i.  283 

V.  Providence  Ins.  Co.        ii.  493,  563,  , 

664,  675,  577,  583 

V.  Schermerhorn  ii.  933 

V.  Simmons  ii.  934 

V.  State  iii.  74 

V.  Stevens  iii.  217 

V.  Stilwell  ii.  939 

V.  Thompson  i.  540 ;  ii.  929 

V.  Washington  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559 

V.  Woods  i.  274 

Carpentier  v.  Gardiner  iii.  189 

I'.  Mitchell  iii.  68 

Carprew  v.  Canavan  ii.  882 

Carpue  v.  L.  &  B.  Railway  Co.       ii.  239, 

244 
Carr,  Ex  parte  iii.  427 

V.  Barllett  i.  483 

V.  Burdiss  iii.  441 

V.  Clough  i.  334,  361,  362 

V.  Ellison  i.  632  ;  iii.  368 

V.  llinchlifE  ii.  882,  884 

V.  Jackson  i.  69,  71 

V.  King  i.  404 

V.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  934 

V.  Rice  ii.  314 

V.  Roberts  i.  144 

V.  Rowland  i.  284 

V.  Security  Bank  i.  303 

V.  The  L.  &  Y.  Railway  Com- 
pany ii.  256,  264,  268 
V.  Welch  ii.  858 
Carradine  v.  Collins  i.  204 
Carraway  v.  Odcneal                        ,    i.  470 
Carrier  v.  Brannan                               ii.  896 
Carrington,  Ex  parte  .                        iii.  415 
V.  Brents                                       iii.  300 
V.  Cantillon  i.  211 
V.  Ficklin                                        ii  108 
r.  Manning                                     iii.  76 
V.  I'ratt                                  ii.  403,  404 
V.  Roots                                   iii.  37,  64 
Carrol  v.  Blencow  i.  407 
Carroll  v.  Boston  Ins.  Co.           ii.  574,  577 
V.  New  York  &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  250 
V.  St.  John's  Society  i.  66 
V.  Upton                                          i.  320 
V.  Weld                          i,  274,  275,  284 
V.  Wiggins                                       J.  579 
Carruth  r.  Faige                                  iii.  72 
V.  Walker                                      i.  279 
Carruthers  v.  Slieddon                        ii.  689 
I'.  Sydebotham                              ii.  469 
V.  West                   i.  290,  293  ;  iii.  451 
Carshore  v.  Iluych                                iii.  92 
Carsley  v.  White                         ii.  430,  431 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Iv 


Carson  v.  Baillie 

i.  625 

Case  V.  Barber 

ii.  818 

V.  Blazer 

i.  544 

V.  Beauregard 

i.  240 

V.  Carson 

iii.  499 

V.  Boughton 

i.  457 

V.  Percy 

iii.  373 

r.  Brown 

ii.  327 

Carstairs  v.  Stein 

iii. 

119, 

145,  469 

V.  Ferris 

ii.  831 

Carter  v.  Abbott 

iii.  426 

V.  Green 

ii.  787 

V.  Boehm 

ii. 

481, 

524,  5'J8 

V.  Hart 

i.  183 

V.  Bradley 

i.  323 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co. 

ii 

569,  571 

V.  Brick 

i.  621 

V.  Howard 

ii.  14 

V.  Burley 

i. 

319,  326 

V.  Mechanics    Banking 

Associa- 

V.  Burris 

i.  611 

tion 

i.  273 

i;.  Carter 

i.  399 

V.  Northern,  &c.  R 

.  R.  Co. 

ii.  186 

V.  Crick 

i.  629 

V.  Winship 

i.  613 

V.  Dean 

iii.  416 

Casell,  In  re 

ii.  844 

V.  Flower 

i.  307 

Casey  v.  Brush 

i.  185 

V.  Hamilton 

ii.  596 

V.  Harrison 

ii.  803 

V.  Hobbs 

ii.  163 

V.  Inloes 

ii.  939 

V.  Jolin  Hancock  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  618 

Cash  V.  Gilles 

i.  638 

V.  Kungstead 

ii. 

644,  645 

V.  Young 

iii.  458 

V.  Lewiston  Bank 

i.  141 

Cashaw  v.  North  Western  Ins.  Co.  ii.  494 

t;.  Rockett 

ii.  565 

Cason  V.  Cheely 

iii.  60,  62 

V.  Bollard 

i.  347 

Cassedy  v.  La.  St.  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  511 

V.  Royal  Exch.  Ass. 

Co. 

ii.  533 

Cassel  V.  Cassel 

iii.  348 

V.  Scargill 

ii.  809 

V.  Dowes 

i.  303 

V.  Smith 

i.  309 

Cassiday  v.  McKenzie 

i.  76 

V.  Southall 

i.  211 

Castalia,  The 

ii.  466 

i;.  Stennel 

i.  636 

Castellain  v.  Preston 

ii.  564 

V.  Talcott 

ii.  746 

Castelli  v.  Boddington 

ii. 

480,  87t) 

V.  Toussaint 

i.  57 

1 ;  iii.  46 

Casteilo  V.  Bank  of  Albany 

ii.  129 

V.  United  Ins.  Co. 

i.  251 

Castle  V.  Candee 

i.  285 

V.  Walker 

.63^ 

;  ii.  922 

l:  Sworder 

iii.  262 

V.  Whalley 

i.  189 

Castledon  v.  Turner 

ii.  693 

V.  Willard 

iii.  444 

Castleman  v.  Holmes 

ii.  20 

V.  Wormald 

ii.  819 

Castling  v.  Aubert 

ii.  29,  30 

Carteret  v.  Paschal 

i.  381 

Caswell  V.  Coare 

i 

.636 

;  iii.  227 

Carthrae  v.  Brown 

i.  26 

V.  Davis 

ii.  353 

Cartier  v.  Carlisle        ii. 

355, 

357, 

373,  376 

V.  Districh 

i.  183 

Cartland  v.  Morrison 

i.  563 

V.  Fellows 

i.  246 

Cartwell  v.  The  John  Tyler 

ii.  461 

V.  Ware 

i.  263 

Cartwriglit  v.  Cooke 

1 

.478 

;  ii.  819 

V.  Wendell 

iii.  240 

V.  Green 

ii.  719 

Catawissa  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Armstrong     ii.  47 

V.  Rowley 

ii.  185 

Gate  V.  Gate 

iii.  219 

Carvalho  v.  Burn 

iii.  435 

Cater  v.  Startute 

ii.  834 

Carver  v.  Braintree  Man 

.Co 

ii.  315 

Gates  V.  McKinney 

ii.  75 

V.  Hyde 

ii.  311 

Gathcart  r.  Robinson 

iii.  371 

V.  Jackson 

ii.  931 

Catherine,  The 

ii.  396 

Carville  v.  Crane 

ii.  12;  iii.  25 

V.  Dickinson 

ii 

429,  430 

Carwick  v.  Vickery 

i.  213 

Catherine,  of  Dover,  The 

ii.  429 

Gary  v.  Bancroft 

ii.  885 

Catlett  V.  Pacific  Ins. 

Co. 

ii. 

513,  519. 

V.  Crisp 

iii.  434 

567 

V.  Curtis 

i.  85 

Catley  v.  Wintringharr 

1 

ii.  204 

V.  Faden 

ii.  .342 

Catlin  V.  Barnard 

i.  25 

V.  Gruman               i. 

636, 

637 

;  iii.  227 

V.  Bell                  i. 

88,  89.  109  :  ii.  894 

V.  Hotailing 

ii.  914 

V.  Hansen 

i.  329 

V.  Kearsley 

ii. 

342,  344 

V.  Hills 

ii.  250 

V.  Longman 

ii. 

336,  .344 

V.  Martin 

i.  386 

V  Matthews 

i.  153 

V.  Springfield  Ins. 

Co. 

ii. 

546,  554, 

V.  Whiting 

i.  538 

573,  586 

Caryl  v.  Russell 

iii.  477 

V.  Ware 

i 

.406 

:  iii.  239 

Casamajor  v.  Strode 

1. 

525,  526 

Catling  V.  Skoulding 

iii. 

69,  78.  79.  96 

Casborne  v.  Button 

i.  280 

Gatoir  v.  American  Ins 

.Co. 

ii. 

615,  616 

Casco,  The  Brig 

ii. 

171, 

183,  423 

Caton  V.  Rumney 

ii.  181 

Casco  Bank  v.  Keen 

ii.  941 

V.  Shaw 

i.  13 

;  iii.  118 

Case  V.  Arnett 

i.  546 

Gator  V.  Great  Western  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  497 

V.  Bank 

ii 

113 

;  iii.  281 

Catron  v.  Tenn.  Ins.  Co. 

ii. 

491,  559 

Ivi 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Catskill  Bank  v.  Gray 

i.  17G 

Chamberlin  v.  Collinson 

i.  49 

V.  Messenger 

i.  211 

V.  Griggs 

iii.  477 

Catt  r.  How  aril 

i.  215 

r.  Ingalls 

iii.  28 

Caudell  v.  Shaw 

i.  406 

V.  Perkins 

ii.  757 

CaujoUe  v.  Ferrie 

i.  377 

V.  Shaw 

iii.  210 

Caul  V.  Gibson 

i.  484 

Chambers  v.  Crawford 

i.  630 

Caunt  V.  Ward 

iii.  455 

V.  Davidson 

iii.  273 

Causten  r.  Burke 

i.  184 

V.  Goldwin 

iii.  159 

Cavander  r.  Bulteel 

1.  172 

V.  Griffiths 

i.  525 

Cave  V.  Coleman 

i.  G23 

V.  Jaynes 

ii.  793 

V.  Hastings 

iii.  18 

V.  Masterson 

ii.  163 

ii.  832 
i.  227 

V.  Miller 
V.  Minchin 

i.  496 
i.  29 

Cavitt  V.  James 

Cavode  v.  McKelvy 

i.  468 

V.  Robinson 

iii.  188 

Cawley  v.  Furnell 

iii.  72 

V.  Snooks 

iii.  96 

Cayme  v.  Watts 

ii.  831 

V.  Winn 

ii.  783 

Cayuga,  Tiie 

ii.  435 

Champant  v.  Ranelagh 

ii.  716 

Cayuga  Bank  r.  Hunt           i. 

803;  iii.  145 

Champenois  v.  Fort 

ii.  762 

Cayuga  County  Bank  v.  Warden       i.  322 

Champion  v.  Bostick 

i.  181 

;  ii.  246 

Caze  r.  Baltimore  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  413,  419 

V.  Brown 

iii. 

308,  313 

r.  Reilly 

ii.  446 

V.  Griffith 

i.  284 

V.  Richards 

ii.  440 

1-.  Plummer 

iii.  14 

Cazenove  v.  British  Ass.  Co. 

ii.  592 

V.  Short 

ii.  791 

C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  E.  V.  Payne 

ii.  810 

V.  White 

ii.  663 

Cecil  V.  Mix 

i.  274,  284 

Champion,  The,  v.  Jantzen 

ii.  392 

1-.  Plaistow 

iii.  477 

Champlin  v.  Butler 

ii.  400 

Celt,  The 

ii.  429,  434 

r.  Laytin 

iii.  355 

Center  v.  American  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  505,  507, 

V.  Parish 

iii.  10 

508,  515 

V.  Rowley 

ii. 

655,  792 

V.  McQuesten 

ii.  11 

Champney  r.  Blanchard 

i.  265 

Central  Bank  v.  Allen 

i.  308,  313 

Chancellor  v.  Poole 

iii.  448 

V.  Lang 

i.  278 

V.  Wiggins 

i.  616 

V.  Pindar 

ii.  815 

Chandelor  v.  Lopus 

i. 

622,  625 

V.  Richards 

i.  303 

Chandler,  Ex  parte 

iii.  417 

V.  Sliine 

ii.  16,  31 

Be 

iii.  416 

Central,  &c.  Corp.  v.  Lowell 

iii.  484 

V.  Belden 

i.  328 ;  ii.  413 

Centurion,  Tiie 

ii.  438 

V.  Brainard 

i.  213 

Chace  r.  Brooks 

ii.  28 

r.  Coe 

i.  56,  65 

Ciiadbourn  i-.  Watts          iii. 

127,  130,  135 

V.  Drew 

i.  290 

Cliaddock  v.  Vanness 

i.  275 

V.  Fulton 

i. 

640,  643 

Chadwick  r.  The  Dublin  S. 

P.  Co.  ii.  432 

V.  Herrick 

ii.  850 

r.  Maddon 

i.  68 

I.  Sanger 

i.  446 

Chaffee  v.  Boston  Belting  Co 

.  ii.  319,  320, 

V.  Siddle 

iii.  400 

321 

V.  Sprague 

ii.  411 

V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  E.  Co. 

ii.  817 

V.  Worcester  Ins.  Co. 

ii. 

495,  574 

r.  Jones 

i.  32,  34,  36 

Chandos  r.  Talbot 

iii.  437 

V.  Memphis 

i.  275 

Channel  )'.  Fassitt 

i.  174 

Cliaffraix  r.  Harper 

i.  108 

Channell  v.  Ditchburn 

ii.  87,  90 

Chalmers,  Ex  parte 

ii.  813 

Chanoine  v.  Fowler 

i.  323 

V.  Lanior 

i.  287,  289 

Chanter  v.  Hopkins 

i. 

603,  631 

Chamberlain  v.  Bagley 

iii.  168 

V.  Leese 

i.  19,  23 

r.  Carlisle 

ii.  866 

Chapel  V.  Bull 

iii.  245 

V.  Chamberlain 

i.  157 

V.  Ilickes 

1.494;  ii.  G55 

V.  Chandler 

ii.  242 

Chapin  v.  Cleraitson 

ii.  634 

V.  Cnyler 

iii.  79 

V.  Dobson 

ii.  084 

r.  Farr 

i.  570 

V.  Lapliam 

i.  474 

V.  Harrod 

ii.  475 

I'.  Merrill 

iii.  24 

V.  Mill.  &  Miss.  R.  R.  Cc 

».             ii.  40 

r.  Thompson 

iii.  127 

V.  N.  H.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  580 

r.  Warden 

iii.  75 

V.  Reed 

ii.  452 

Chaplin  v.  Hawes 

ii.  250 

V.  Walker 

i.  186 

r.  Rogers 

iii.  46,  47 

V.  Ward 

ii.  431 

Chapline  v.  Moore 

i.  383 

V.  Western  Transp.  Co. 

ii.  181) 

Chapman  ?•.  Black             ii 

1.127 

128,  129 

V.  Williamson 

i.  145  ;  ii.  74 

v.  Chapman 

iii.  297 

Chamberlaine  i-.  Turner 

ii.  681 

V.  C;ollin8 

ii.  6 

INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Ivii 


Chapman  i'.  Crane 
V.  Dalton 
V.  Derby 
V.  Earaes 
r.  Erie  R.  Co. 
V.  Forsyth 


ii.  56 
ii.  637,  640,  806 

iii.  439 
i.  174 
ii.  46 

iii.  478 


V.  Great  Western  R.  Co.  ii.  152 

V.  Ingram  iii.  224 

V.  Keane  i-  322 

t'.  Koops  iii.  2il8 

V.  Lamphire  iii-  416 

V.  Lemon  i.  407 

V.  Murch  i.  623 

V.  Partridge  iii.  12,  13 

V.  Robertson  ii.  714,  715;  iii.  123 

V.  Searle  i.  645;  iii.  263 

V.  Secorab  ii.  633 

V.  Shepard  i.  565 

V.  Speller  i.  615 

V.  Sutton  ii.  24;  iii.  17 

V.  Thames  Manuf.  Co.  iii.  234 

V.  Walton  i.  91 

Chappel  I'.  Brockway  ii.  891 

V.  Marvin  i.  570 ;  iii.  48 

Chappell  V.  Purday  ii.  349 

Chappie  V.  Cooper  i.  337 

I'.  Durstor  ii.  881 ;  iii.  108 

Chard  v.  Fox  i.  322 

Charles,  Ex  parte  iii.  478 

V.  Andrews  iii.  293 

V.  Branker  ii.  772 

V.  Marsden  i.  293 ;  iii.  451 

Charles    River    Bridge    v.    Warren 

Bridge  ii.  638  ;  iii.  488,  490,  506 

Charleston  S.  B.  Co.  v.  I3ason  ii.  173 

Charlestown  v.  Hubbard  i.  500 

Charleton  v.  Cotesworth  ii.  453 

Charlotte,  The  ii.  436 

Charlton  v.  Lay  i.  492 

V.  Wood  i.  110 

Charnley  v.  Winstanley         i.  76 ;  ii.  848 
Charter  i'.  Trevclyan  i.  94;  iii.  107 

Chartered  Bank  v.  Dickson  i.  295 

Chartered  Mercantile  Bank  v.  Nether- 
lands, &c.  Co.  ii.  434 
Charters  v.  Bayntun  i.  338 
Chase  v.  Bradley                                ii.  633 
V.  Debolt  i.  69 
V.  Denny                                       iii.  .302 
V.  Dow                                          iii.  71.6 
V.  Dwinal                                      i.  446 
V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.        ii.  527,  528,  530, 

534 
V.  Garvin  i.  184, 186 

V.  Goble  iii.  441 

V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.  ii.  557 

V.  Ostrom  i.  90 

V.  PhcEnix  lus.  Co.  ii.  618 

V.  Stevens  i.  182 

V.  Strain  ii.  885 

V.  Walker  ii.  319 

V.  Washburn  ii.  143,  147 

V.  Wash.  Ins.  Co.        ii.  169,  485,  526, 

566 
V.  Westmore         ii.  148  ;  iii.  262,  266 


Chase  v.  Wingate  i.  546 

Chase's  Ex'r  v.  Burkholder  i.  487 

V.  Washington  Ins.  Co.  ii.  169 

Chaseniore  v.  Turner  iii.  76 

Chastain  v.  Smith  iii.  347 

Chater  v.  Beckett  i.  486;  iii.  19 

Chattahoochee  Bank  v.  Schley  ii.  99 

Chattock  V.  Shawe  ii.  598 

Cliatzel  V.  Bolton  ii.  864 

Chauncey  v.  Jackson  ii.  392 

Chaurand  v.  Augerstein  ii.  666 

Cheddick  v.  Marsh  iii.  168,  173 

Ciiedworth  v.  Edwards  i.  96 

Cheek  v.  Roper  i.  302 

Cheesman  v.  Excell  ii.  156 

V.  Ramby  ii.  889 

Cheetham  v.  Hampson  ii.  1.36 

V.  Ward  ii.  852 

Cheever  v.  Wilson  ii.  737 

Cheminant  v.  Thornton  ii.  779 

Cheney,  In  re  iii.  425,  429 

V.  Arnold  ii.  85 

V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  273 

Chenot  v.  Lefevre  iii.  106 

Chenowith  v.  Dickinson  ii.  149 

Cheriot  v.  Foussat  ii.  742 

Cherry  v.  Boultbee  iii.  429,  469 

V.  Clements  i.  408 

V.  Heming  i.  124;  ii.  50;  iii.  44 

Chesapeake,  The  ii.  435 

Chesapeake  Co.  v.  Blair  i.  330 

Chesapeake  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allegre         ii.  484 

Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Canal  v.  Knapp 

ii.  61 
Cheshire  v.  Barrett  i.  361,  367 

V.  Taylor  i.  315 

Cheshire  Bank  v.  Robinson  ii.  828 

Chessman  v.  Whittemore  .  ii.  862 

Chester  v.  Dickerson  i.  167 

Chester  Glass  Company  v.  Dewey  i.  482; 

ii.  941 
Chesterfield  v.  Jansen  iii.  116 

Chesterfield  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Dehon   iii.  439, 

441 
Chesterman  v.  Lamb  i.  636;  iii.  227 

Chestnut  Hill  Turnpike  v.  Rutter     i.  154 
Chevalier  v.  Lynch  iii.  406 

Chevallier  v.  Patton  ii.  173 

V.  Straham  ii.  169,  172,  177 

Chew  V.  Morton  ii.  939 

Cheyney's  case  ii.  690 

Chicago  V.  Sheldon  ii.  625 

Chicago  Bank  v.  Bayley  i.  579 

Chicago  Marine  Bank  r.  Wright        i.  579 
Chicago  Packing  Co.  r.  Tilton  i.  630 

Chicago,  Burlington,  &  Quincy  R.  R. 

Co.  V.  Dewey  ii.  250 

Chicago,  &c.  Dock  Co.  v.  Dunlap     ii.  881 
V.  Kinzie  iii.  65 

Chicago,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bensley    ii.  203 
V.  Dana  i.  511 

V.  Flagg  iii.  186 

V.  Flexman  ii.  244 

V.  Iowa  ii.  184 

V.  Merrill  ii.  188 


VI 11 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Chicago.  &c.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Montfort  ii.  227 

r.  Nortliern  Illinois,  &.c.  Co.      iii.  106 

t'.  Pondrom  ii.  817 

r.  Sawder  ii.  20o 

V.  Schoeuemau  iii.  37.S 

V.  Shea  ii.  213 

V.  Swett  iii.  235 

Chichester  r.  M'Intire  iii.  333 

Cliick  V.  Pillsbiiry  i.  318 

CliickcTiiig  V.  Fowler  ii.  205,  207,  208,  41(J 

r.  Globe  Ins.  Co.  ii.  610 

Chicopce  Bank  v.  Chapin  i.  292 

V.  Eager  ii.  609 

Chilcott  V.  Trinkle  i.  344 

Child  V.  Comber  iii.  350 

V.  Eureka  Works  i.  131 

V.  Godoipliin  iii.  346 

I".  Hardy  man  i.  394 

r.  Horden  ii.  801 

V.  Morley  i.  32 

V.  Sun  Mutual  Ins.  Co.     ii.  531,  606, 

672 

Cliilde  Harold,  The  ii.  402 

Cliilders  v.  Deane  iii.  139,  159,  161 

Cliiids,  In  re  iii.  440 

I'.  Barnum  iii.  18 

V.  Cliilds  ii.  91 

f.  Monins  i.  185,  142 

V.  Wyman  i.  283 

Chiles  V.  Drake  iii.  184 

V.  Nelson  i.  514 

V.  Smith  ii.  480 

Chilson  V.  Philips  i.  349 

Chilton  V.  Brarden  iii.  294 

China,  Tlie  ii.  435 

Ciiinn  r.  Hamilton  iii.  113 

Chion,  ^T/jaz/e  iii.  435,  439 

Chipman  v.  Foster  i.  55 

r.  Morrill  i.  32 

Chippendale  r.  L.  &  Y.  Railway  Co.  ii.  204 

r.  Thurston  ii.  791;  iii.  121,  149 

V.  Tomlinson  iii.  454 

Chisliolm  V.  Gadsden  ii.  918 

Cliism  1-.  Woods  i.  010 

Chiswell  V.  Gray  i.  238 

Chitty  V.  Naish  ii.  762,  705 

V.  Selwyn  ii.  532 

Choen  v.  l^orter  i.  408 

Clioice  V.  Moseley  ii.  790 

Cholmondeley  v.  Clinton     i.  127;  ii.  634; 

iii.  354 

Cliomqua  v.  Mason  iii.  104 
Choppin  V.  New  Orleans,  &,c.  R.  R. 

Co.  iii.  184 

V.  Wilson  i.  220 

Choriey  v.  Bolcot  ii.  60 

Chouteau  v.  Allen  i.  80 

V.  Eeacli  i.  59;  ii.  173 

v.  Merry  i.  407 

V.  Steamboat  ii.  194 

Choynski  v.  Cohen  ii.  .353 

Chrisman  l-.  I'arlee  iii.  369 

Cliristian  v.  Clark  iii.  .334 

V.  Coombe  ii.  530 

Christiana,  The  ii.  408 


Christie  v.  Griggs        ii.  234, 

239,  242,  243 

V.  Lewis 

ii.  421 

I.'.  Sawyer 

i.  130 

V.  Simpson 

iii.  12 

i:  Trott 

ii.  423 

Christman  v.  Moran 

ii.  844 

Christoffersen  v.  Hansen 

'.66,68 

Christophers  v.  Garr 

iii.  104 

V.  Sparke 

iii.  67 

Christy  v.  Barnhart 

iii.  349 

V.  Douglas 

.  128;  iii.  285 

V.  Flemington 

iii.  72,  77,  92 

i\  Murphy 

ii.  361,  378 

I'.  Row 

ii.  414 

I'.  Smith 

ii.  155 

Chrysler  ;•.  Renois 

i.  279 

Chudleigh's  case 

i.  133 

Chumar  f.  Wood 

i.  569 

Church  r.  Barlow 

i.  294,  321 

V.  Brown 

i.  538 

V.  Clark 

i.  303 

V.  Feterow 

ii.  785 

V.  Hubbart 

ii.  496 

V.  Imperial  Gas  Co. 

i.  154 

V.  Knox 

i.  233,  234 

V.  Landers 

i.  386 

V.  IMar.  Ins.  Co. 

i.  93,  150 

V.  Roper 

ii.  834 

V.  Sparrow 

i.  205 

Churchill  V.  Hulbert 

ii.  665 

V.  Hunt 

iii.  200 

V.  Palmer 

i.  62 

V.  Rosebeck 

ii.  250 

V.  Suter 

iii.  153 

Churchwardens  of  St.  Saviour         i.  260 ; 

ii.  632,  636,  638 

Churton  v.  Douglas  ii.  368,  369 

Chusan,  The  ii.  385 

Chute  V.  Pattee  ii.  19 

Cicero  r.  Clifford  i.  330 

Cincinnati  v.  Marcus  ii.  213 

V.  Rice  ii.  901 

V.  Si)ratt  ii.  226 

Cincinnati  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bakewell        ii.  508 

V.  ]\Iay  ii.  527 

Cincinnati,  &c,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McCooI 

ii.  197 

Citizens  Bank  v.  Culver  iii.  285 

V.  Howell  i.  327 

V.  Nantucket  Steamboat  Co.     ii.  181, 

187,  190,  194 

V.  Payne  i.  292 

V.  Richmond  ii.  853 

Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Doll  i.  176 

Citizens  Security  Co.  v.  Uhler        iii.  117 

City  Bank  v.  Barrow  i.  102 

i;.  Cutter  ii.  669,  771,  776 

i;.  First  Bank  ii.  853 

V.  Phelps  ii.  27 

City  Bank  of  Brooklyn  v.  McChes- 

ncy  i.  191 

City  Council  v.  Benjamin  ii.  905 

City  Discount  Co.  v.  McLean  ii.  706 

City  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corliea  ii-  571 

City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bricker  ii.  470 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Hx 


City  of  Buffalo  v.  Holloway               i.  120 

City  of  Cincinnati  v.  Rice 

ii.  DOI 

City  of  Ediiiburgli,  Tlie 

ii.  4oi) 

Citj-  of  London  v.  Mitford 

iii.  32:] 

V.  Pugli 

iii.  328 

City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  553 

Civilita  and  The  Restless,  The         ii.  4:3:3 

Ciafflin  V.  Lenheim 

i.  75 

Claflin  V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  R. 

Co.        ii.  197 

V.  Meyer 

ii.  134 

V.  Ostrom 

ii.  3 

Clagett  V.  Kilbourue 

i.  167 

V.  Salmon 

i.  210,  325 

Claghorn  v.  CuUen 

iii.  486 

Glamorgan  v.  Lane 

i.  363,  366 

Clancey  v.  Robertson 

ii.  37 

Clancy  v.  Piggott 

iii.  16,  17 

Clanrickard  v.  Sidney 

ii.  637 

Clap,  Re 

ii.  756 

Clapliam  v.  Cologan 

ii.  484,  518 

V.  Moyle 

ii.  642 

V.  Shillits 

iii.  370 

Clapp  V.  Hale 

ii.  903 

V.  Rogers 

i.  230 

V.  Smith 

ii.  903 

V.  Thomas 

iii.  453 

V.  Young 

ii.  4:30 

Clara,  Tlie 

ii.  430,  431 

Clare  v.  Maynard 

iii.  227 

Clarence  v.  Marshall 

ii.  870 

Clarence  Railway  Co.  v.  Great  North 

of  England  Railway  Co. 

ii.  604 

Claridge  v.  Mackenzie 

i.  541;  ii.  910 

Clarion  Bank  v.  Gruber 

iii.  124 

Clarisse,  The 

ii.  437,  440 

Clark,  Ex  parte 

ii.  454 

V.  Allen 

ii.  600 

i;.  Babcock 

i.  5:30 

V.  Badgley 

iii.  121,  i:32 

V.  Baker 

ii.  650,  676 

V.  Barlow 

iii.  Ill 

V.  Barnwell  ii.  172, 173 

183,  216,  407, 

410,  412,  414 

V.  Bayer 

i.  407 

V.  Bigelow 

i.  316 

V.  Bowen 

i.  216;  ii.  872 

V.  Boyd 

i.  272,  285 

V.  Bradshaw 

iii.  6!) 

V.  Burdett 

ii.  23 

V.  Burns 

ii.  188 

V.  Burt 

ii.  829 

V.  Bush 

ii.  IG,  850 

V.  Chamberlin 

iii.  15 

V.  Caldwell 

iii.  373 

V.  Calvert 

iii.  427,  4-54 

V.  Clark              ii.  357, 

371,  372,  375, 

736 ;  iii.  500 

V.  Cox 

i.  386 

V.  Crabtree 

ii.  423 

V.  Cushing 

i.  232 

V.  Dales 

.514;  iii.  220 

V.  Depew 

i.  264 

r.  Des  Moines 

i.  160 

V.  Dibble 

i.  186 

Clark 


V.  Dignum 

1.89 

Dinsmore 

i.  29 

Dutclier 

iii.  76 

Ely 

i 

292 

Farmers  Man. 

Co. 

i 

331 

Faxton 

ii 

179 

259 

Flint 

iii 

313 

Fo.\'croft 

ii.  5 

Gam  well 

i 

408 

Garfield 

i 

151 

Gordon 

i 

154 

Graham 

i 

123 

Guardians  of  Cuckfield  Union 

i 

.  154 

Hamilton  Ins. 

Co. 

ii 

558 

585 

Hatch 

iii 

897 

Hayward 

i 

579 

Hougliam 

i.  146 ; 

iii. 

(59,  70,  92 

Houghton 

i 

207 

Iselin 

iii 

421 

Jones 

iii 

201 

Kelilier 

i 

548 

King 

i 

279 

Kingsley 

iii 

293 

Lyman 

i 

231 

234 

Man.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  473 

,524 

,554 

557 

Marsiglia 

ii 

919 

Massachusetts 

F.  & 

M. 

Ins. 

Co. 

ii 

418 

510 

Mauran 

i 

615 

McDonald 

ii. 

235 

Meriam 

i. 

284 

Moody 

iii.  98 

Morse 

i 

569 

Needles 

ii. 

192 

New  Eng.  Ins. 

Co. 

ii. 

493, 

575, 

583, 

586, 

587 

Nichols 

ii 

i.  60 

Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

ii 

490, 

491 

Parr 

iii. 

240, 

212 

Pendleton 

iii.  32.  43, 

188 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co. 

ii. 

588 

Pinney     ii.  632,  789 ; 

iii. 

211, 

212, 

220, 

231 

Ralls 

617 

Reed 

213 

Roberts 

.  87 

Rochester,  &,c. 

R.  R.  Co. 

iii. 

306 

Rogers 

ii. 

860 

Russel 

i 

.472 

;  ii. 

849 

Schneider 

282 

Shee 

i. 

329 

;  iii. 

137 

Sickler 

.28 

Sigourney 

i.  272 

,  285  :  iii 

.88 

Small 

i.  458  ; 

ii.  6 

Smith 

ii 

.60, 

745, 

747 

Spence 

ii.  134, 

153, 

277, 

280 

Swift 

i. 

144 

Tarbell 

ii. 

702 

United  Ins.  Co 

ii. 

487 

Whitaker 

iii. 

211 

White 

iii. 

381, 

382 

Woodruff 

ii. 

647 

Wright 

iii 

.14 

Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Van  Riemsdyk  i.  49 


Ix 


INDEX   TO   CASES   CITED. 


Clarke,  Ex  parte  iii.  414 

V.  Courtney  i-  55 

r.  Dodge  Healy,  The  ii.  437,  438 

V.  Fell  iii-  46!) 

r.  Gordon  _  i-  304 

I'.  Grant  iii-  354,  371 

r.  Henty  i.  323 

V.  Ilogeman  i-  200 

V.  riutchins  i.  574 

V.  Leslie  i-  338 

I'.  .Mayor  of  N.  Y.  ii.  63 

V.  Minot  iii.  429,  458 

r.  Morey  i.  450 

r.  I'errier  i-  88 

V.  Trice  iii-  360 

I'.  Remington  ii.  15,  7U5 
V.  Rochester,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.      iii.  307, 

359 

V.  Spence  ii.  134,  649 

V.  Thompson  i.  2-54 

Clarkson  r.  Ue  Teyster  i.  137 

V.  Edes  ii.  423 

V.  Garland  iii.  116,  136 

V.  Ilanway  i.  458 

V.  Parker  iii.  454 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  447,  509 

Clason  V.  Bailey  iii.  7,  9,  365 

V.  Simnionds  ii.  534,  535 

V.  Smitli  ii.  523 

Clawson  v.  Clawson  ii.  78 

Clay,  Ex  parte  i.  238 

r.  Cottrell  i.  208,  290 

i".  Crowe  i.  381 

V.  Edgerton  ii-  31 

V.  Harrison  i.  642,  644 

V.  Huston  iii.  233 

V.  Rufford  iii.  333,  345,  308 

V.  Smith  iii.  394,  397,  508 

V.  Wood  ii.  248,  250 

Clay  Ins.  Co.  v.  Beck  ii.  559 

r.  Huron,  &c.  Co.  ii.  556 

Clayards  ?'.  Dethick  ii.  2.50 

Clayton  v.  Adams  i.  407 

V.  Andrews  iii.  59 

V.  Brown  ii-  78 

r.  Gosling  iii.  402 

V.  Grogson  ii.  667,  G72,  675 

V.  Harmony,  The  ii-  4-'!8 

V.  Hunt  ii.  273 

V.  Kynaston  i-  27 

V.  Lord  Nugent  ii.  680,  681 

V.  Phipps  i-  316 

V.  Stone  ii.  330,  334,  335 

V.  Warden  ii.  83,  85 

Clayton's  case  ii.  766;  iii.  150 

Cleave  v.  Jones  iii.  84 

Cleaves  v.  Foss  iii-  12 

r.  Stookwell  i- 91 

Cleem  v.  Brewer  ii.  318 

Clegg  V.  Levy  ii.  700 

Cleghorn  v.  Ins.  Bank  of  Columbus 

i.  2.^8 

»;.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  Co.  i.  113 

Clemens. /h  re  iii.  41 G 

Clement,  The  ii.  431,  432 


Clement  ;-.  Clement 
V.  Durgin 
I".  Henley 
V.  Maddicks 
V.  Mattison 
V.  Reid 
V.  Repard 


i.  248,  256 ;  ii.  785 

ii.  827,  835 

i.  22 

ii.  361 

i.  393,  396 

i.  522 

i.  290 


Clement  &  Co.  v.  Meserole  iii.  219 

Clementi  v.  Goulding  ii.  334 

Clements  v.  Smith's  Adm'rs  i.  638 

V.  Wells  i.  53!) 

V.  Williams  i.  340 

Clemontson  c.  Blessig  ii.  425 

Clemson  v.  Davidson  ii.  407,  417 

Clendaniel  r.  Tuckerman  ii.  415,  425 

Clenes  v.  Willougliby  i.  532 

Clerk  V.  Blackstock  i.  11 

V.  Tailors  of  Exeter  ii.  888 


Clerment  v.  Tasburgh 

Cleu  V.  JNIcPherson 

Cleve  V.  ]\Iills 

Cleveland  v.  Covington 
V.  State  Bank 
V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Williams 


i.  522  ;  iii.  371 

i.  687,  602 

iii.  406 

i.  33 

ii.  130 

ii.  485 

i.  76 


Cleveland,  Col.   &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Kearny  •  ii.  46 

Cleveland,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Curran    ii.  271 

Clevenger  v.  Dunaway  iii.  181,  183 

Cleworth  r.  Pickford  ii.  880 

Clews  V.  Bank  of  New  York  ii.  944 

I'.  Traer  ii.  922 

Clifford  r.  Burton  i.  .31*1 

V.  Hunter  ii.  527,  528 

V.  Laton  i.  387,  394 

V.  Luhring  iii.  29 

V.  Parker  ii.  860 

V.  Reilly  _  i.  539 

V.  Richardson  iii.  199 

r.  Turrell      ii.  G85,  686 ;  iii.  311,  344 

Clift  V.  Schwabe  ii.  604 

Clinan  v.  Cooke    iii.  13,  18,  343,  350,  354, 

359 

Cline  V.  Myers  iii.  219 

V.  Templeton  i.  470 

Clinen  v.  Cooke  i.  46,  123 

Clinton  v.  Ed<ly  ii.  881 

V.  Hope  Ins.  Co.  ii.  562 

V.  York  i.  349 

Clinton  Wire  Cloth  Co. !'.  Gardner     i.  5-35 

Clippinger  v.  Ilcpbaugh  ii.  895 

Clivc  V.  Beaumont  iii.  334 

Clodfelter  v.  Cox  i.  258 

Clopham  v.  Gallant  iii.  424,  435 

Clopper  V.  Poland  ii.  11 

V.  Union  Bank  of  Maryland      i.  294  ; 

ii.  850 

Ciopton  V  Cozart  ii.  915 

V.  Hall  ii.  7,  8 

Close  V.  Close  ii.  91 

Clothier  v.  Webster  i.  98 

Cloud  V.  Hamilton  i.  349 

V.  Whiting  ii.  944 

Clough  V.  Davis  ii.  905 

Clouscr  V.  Clapper  ii.  93 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixi 


Clouston  V.  Barbiere 

5.284 

Cloutman  v.  Tunison 

ii. 

466,  467 

Clowes  V.  Brooke 

i.  338 

V.  Clowes 

ii.  1)0 

V.  Higginson 

iii.  344 

V.  Van  Antwerp 

i.  150 

Clubb  V.  Ilutson 

i.  273 

Clugas  V.  Penaluna 

ii.  700 

Cluni  V.  Brewer 

ii.  319 

Clute  i;.  Biirron 

i.  95 

V.  Carr 

iii.  40 

V.  Robinson 

ii.  790 

V.  Wiggins 

ii 

166,  167 

Coakley  v.  Weil 

iii.  298 

Coaiter  v.  Coalter 

ii.  95,  96 

Coates  V.  Chaplin 

iii.  54 

V.  Gealach 

i.  410 

V.  Holbrook 

ii.  357, 

373,  375 

V.  Lewis 

ii. 

745,  938 

V.  Sangston 

ii.  684 

j;.  Stephens 

i.  635 

V.  The  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York 

ii.  510 

V.  Williams  i.  174 

V.  Wilson  i.  337 

Coats  V.  Holbrook  i.  449 

Cobb,  Ex  parte  iii.  452 

V.  Abbot  ii.  246 

V.  Becke  i.  90 

V.  Blanchard  ii.  410 

V.  Doyle  i.  292 

,             V.  Hall  i.  47 

'             V.  Hatfield  ii.  923 

V.  Haydock  ii.  875 

V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  i.  579 

V.  Knapp  i.  68 

V.  New  England  Ins.  Co.  ii.  482,  486, 

528,  847 

V.  Rice  iii.  403 

V.  Selby  ii.  665 

V.  Symonds  iii.  416 

i;.  Titus  iii.  158 

V.  Wood  ii.  843 

Cobban  v.  Downe  ii.  190 

Cobbett  V.  Hudson  i.  386 

Cobble  V.  Tomlinson  i.  222 

Cobden  v.  Bolton  ii.  273 

Cobham,  Ex  parte  i.  237 

Coburn  v.  Pickering  i.  569 

V.  Ware  i.  495 

V.  Webb  i.  65 ;  ii.  853,  861 

Cocheco  Bank  v.  Haskell  ii.  113 

Cocheco  Manuf.  Co.  i'.  Whittier        ii.  638 

Cochran  v.  Fisher  ii.  520 

V.  Nebeker  ii.  853 

V.  Perry  i.  222 

V.  Retberg  ii.  424,  666 

Cock  V.  Bunn  ii.  799 

V.  Goodfellow               iii.  381,  382,  383 

V.  Honychurch  ii.  818 

Cockburn  v.  Alexander  iii.  165 

V.  Asliland  Lumber  Co.  iii.  199 

Cocke  V.  Bank  of  Tennessee  i.  212 

V.  Chaney  ii.  128 

Cockell  V.  Taylor  i.  466 


Cofiker  v.  Franklin  Hemp  &  Flax 

Manuf.  Co.  i.  581 ;  ii.  794 

Cockerill  r.  Cincinnati  Ins.  Co.         ii.  471 

Cocking  V.  Fraser  ii.  505,  509 

V.  Ward  iii.  38 

Cockle  V.  London,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.        ii.  251 

Cockran  v.  Irlam  i.  89,  109 

Cockroft  V.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  219 

Cockshott  V.  Bennett  ii.  477 

Cockson  V.  Ogle  ii.  828,  829 

Cocrill  V.  Sparkes  iii.  74 

Coddington  v.  Davis  i.  308,  315 

V.  Goddard  ii.  683 

V.  Idell  i.  187 

Coder  r.  Huling  i.  168 

Codman  v.  Hall  i.  534 

V.  Rogers  iii.  95 

Coe  V.  Clay  i.  631 

V.  Smith  ii.  36 

V.  Vogdes  i.  532 

Cofer  V.  Flanagan  ii.  612 

Coffee  V.  RufBn  ii.  815 

Coffeen  v.  Brunton    ii.  335,  370,  371,  373, 

378 

Coffin  V.  Coffin  iii.  98 

V.  Dunham         '  i.  403 

V.  Jenkins         i.  196,  442  ;  ii.  466,  4(i7 

V.  Lunt  i.  549 

V.  Newburyport  Ins.  Co.     ii.  531,  532 

V.  Ogden  ii.  304 

V.  Storer  ii.  420,  424 

Coffman  v.  Winslow  ii.  10 

Cofield  V.  Clark  i.  568 

Coggeshall  v.  Am.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  487 

Coggs  V.  Bernard   i.  476 ;  ii.  97, 98,  99, 109, 

110,  120,  169, 171,  172,  237  ;  iii.  253 

Cogill  V.  H.  &  N.  H.  R.  R.  Co.  i.  579 

Cognac,  The  ii.  402 

Cogswell,  Ex  parte  iii.  419 

V.  Dolliver  iii.  79 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 

Cohea  v.  Hunt  i.  303 

Cohen  v.  Dry  Dock  i.  113 

V.  Dupont  i.  542 

V.  Frost  ii.  180 

V.  Hume  ii.  181 

V.  New  York  Ins.  Co.  ii.  601 

V.  New  York  Mutual  Ins.  Co.     ii.  615 

V.  Wright  i.  125 

Coit  V.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.  ii-  667 

V.  Houston  ii.  773,  818 

V.  Smith  ii.  484 

V.  Starkweather  ii.  690 

V.  Tracy  iii.  88 

Coit  &  al.  V.  Houston  ii.  780 

Coke  V.  Whorwood  ii.  826  ;  iii.  188 

Colbeck  v.  Girdler's  Co.  i.  536 

Colbourn  v.  Dawson  ii.  684,  694 

V.  Duncomb  ii.  348 

V.  Morrill  i.  541,  542 

V.  Simms  ii.  349 

Colby  V.  Colby  ii.  877 

V.  Hunter  ii.  521 

V.  Norton  ii.  939 

V.  Reed  ii.  802 


Ixii 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Colcock  V.  Ferguson 

t'.  Goode 
Colcord  V.  Swan 
Coldliani  v.  Showier 
Coldren  i'.  Miller 
Cole  V.  Albers 
V.  Berry 
V.  Blake 
V.  Bolard 
V.  Cheshire 
f.  Cottingham 
V.  Davies 
V.  Dyer 
V.  Goodwin 

r.  Green 
t;.  Hawes 
V.  Hills 
t'.  Jessup 
V.  Kernot 
V.  Kerr 
t'.  Lockhart 
V.  i\Ioxley 


i.  335,  353 
i.  Gl() 
i.  4()G 
ii.  634 
iii.  233 
iii.  382 
i.  57'J 
ii.  770 
ii.  937 
ii.  70'J 
ii.  67,  68 
i.  56'.» 
iii.  16 
ii.  212,  253,  254,  255, 
256,  258,  259,  263 
ii.  930 
ii.  634 
ii.  861 
i.  286;  iii.  104,  105 
iii.  324 
i.  576 
iii.  123,  143 
i.  220 
I'.  Korthwestern  Bank     i.  102;  ii.  153 
V.  O'Xeill  i.  400 

V.  Pennoyer  i.  335 

V.  Robbins  i.  435 

r.  Koss  iii.  231,  232 

V.  Sackett  ii.  757 

V.  Saxby  i.  364 

V.  Taylor  ii.  686 

V.  Trull  ii.  764 

V.  Turner  i.  20 

V.  Tyng  ii.  153 

V.  Wade  i.  134 

V.  White  iii.  349 

Colegate  v.  Bacheler  ii.  888 

Coleman  v.  Carpenter  i.  318 

V.  Chester  iii.  39 

V.  Eyre  iii.  39 

V.  Fobes  iii.  88 

V.  Frazer  i.  433 

V.  Garrigues  iii.  11 

V.  Harriet,  The  ii.  4(!2 

V.  Lansing  ii.  766 

V.  Meade  i.  109 

V.  Pearce  i.  96 

V.  Riches  i.  44;  ii.  190,  409 

V.  Slierwin  i.  12 

V.  Waltliam  ii.  333 

Coles  1-.  Bank  of  England  ii.  942 

f.  Bowne  iii.  10,  354 

V.  Coles  i.  169,  207 

V.  Gurney  i.  211 

V.  Iliilme  ii.  634 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.        ii.  496,  532,  535 
i;.  Robins  iii.  458 

V.  Soulsby  ii.  824 

V.  Trecotliick      i.  46,  93,  95,  123,  466, 
522,  523  ;  iii.  b,  12,  13,  316,  429 
V.  Turner  ii.  658 

V.  Wight  iii.  458 

V.  Wright  iii.  434 

Colgin  V.  Henley  i.  470 

Colgrove  v.  N.  Y.  &  II.  R.  R.  Co.      ii.  233 


Colgrove  v.  Tallman 
Collamer  v.  Day 
Collard  v.  Groom 

V.  Sampson 
CoUedgf  V.  llarty 

r.  Horn 
Collen  r.  Wright 
Colk'uburg,  The 
Collet  V.  Podwell 
Collett  r.  Morrison 


ii.  28 

ii.  896 

i.  526 

iii.  335 

ii.  520 

iii.  69,  75 

i.  69 

ii.  418 

ii.  834 

ii.  475,  599 


Collier  v.  Baptist  Educational  Society 

i.  483,  484 

V.  Jenkins  iii.  357 

?•.  Nevill  iii.  125,  128 

Collingburne  v.  Mantell  ii.  819 

CoUinge  v.  Hcywood  iii.  98 

CoUingridge  v.  Royal  Exchange  Ass. 

Co.  ii.  562 

Collingwood  v.  Pace  i.  448 

Collins,  In  re  iii.  415 

V.  B.  &  E.  R.  Ry.  Co.                  ii.  226 

V.  Barrows  i.  532,  633 

V.  Bhmtern  i.  486 ;  ii.  685 

V.  Bradbury  i.  281 

V.  Burns  ii.  151 

r.  Butler  i.  311 

V.  Canty  i.  550 

V.  Champ  i.  150 
V.  Charlestown  Ins.  Co.       ii.  549,  556 

V.  Collins  i.  397  ;  ii.  92 

V.  Decker  i.  167 

V.  Denison  ii.  917 

V.  Evans  i.  71 ;  ii-  916 

V.  Everett  i.  274 

V.  Forbes  ii.  144 ;  iii.  435 

V.  Godefroy  i.  467 

V.  Hathaway  iii.  286 

V.  Lemasters  i.  12 

V.  Locke  ii.  893 

V.  Martin  i.  103,  272,  286,  292 

V.  Merrill  i.  486 

V.  Myers  i.  613 

V.  Owens  iii.  298 

V.  Pellcrin  i.  569 

V.  Powell  ii.  838 

V.  Prentice  ii.  664 

V.  Price  ii.  44 

V.  Prosser  i.  12,  210 

V.  Roberts  iii.  129 

V.  Rudolph  i.  408 

V.  Secreh  iii.  118 

V.  Suau  i.  49,  257 

V.  The  A.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  iii.  188 

V.  Tillou  ii.  940 

V.  Trist  i.  275 

V.  Wallis  ii.  879 

V.  Westbury  i.  445 

V.  Wheeler  ii.  462 

V.  Woodruff  ii.  138 

Collins  Co  ,  The,  v.  Brown  ii.  357 

V.  Cowen  ii.  357 

V.  Walker  ii.  377 

CoUinson  v.  Owens  iii.  298 

CoUis  V.  Emett  i.  283 

V.  Stack  iii.  75 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixiii 


Collman  v.  Collins 
Collumer  v.  Foster 
Collund  V.  Head 
Collycr  i;.  Fallon 
Colman  v.  Upcot 
Colonel  Letlyard,  TliQ 
Colpoys  V.  Colpoys 
Colson  i\  Bonzcy 

V.  Tliompson 

V.  Welsh 
Colt  V.  Clapp 

V.  Mass.  Arms  Co. 

V.  McMeelien 

V.  Netterville 

I'.  Partridge 
Col.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Ashby 

V.  Catlett 


ii.  223 
i.  185 

i.  im 

i.  253 

iii.  9 

ii.  41G 

ii.  691 

ii.  396 

iii.  309 

iii.  452 

i.  97 

ii.  314 

ii.  171 

iii.  56,  416 

ii.  863,  86G 

ii.  446,  448,  450 

ii.  419 


V.  Lawrence         ii.  556,  558,  559,  5G2, 

565,  573,  586,  587 

V.  Lynch  ii.  480 

Columbia  v.  Patterson  ii.  57 

Columbian  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bean  ii.  877 

Columbo,  The  ii.  412 

Columbus  V.  Howard  ii.  131,  137 

V.  Jaques  i.  IGO 

Columbus  &  Indiana  Central  R.  R. 

Co.  V.  Arnold  ii.  47 

V.  Farrell  ii.  251 

Columbus,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Troesch.  ii.  46 

V.  Watson  iii.  304 

Colvil  V.  Bcsley  i.  492 

Colvin  V.  Corwin  iii.  202 

V.  Holbrook  i.  70 

V.  Williams  iii.  57 

Colwell  V.  Child  .         ii.  831 

V.  Lawrence  iii.  167 

Colwill  V.  Reeves  iii.  214 

Colyear  v.  Countess  of  Mulgrave   iii.  308, 

316 
Coman  v.  State  ii.  28 

Combe  v.  Greene  ii.  663 

Combe's  case  1.  89,  156 

Combes  r.  Chandler  i.  252 

Combs  V.  Tarlton  iii.  245 

Comegys  v.  Vasse  i.  253 

Comer  v.  Cunningham  i.  580 

Comfort  V.  Duncan  i.  544 

V.  Eisenbeis  iii.  464 

Coming,  Ex  parte  iii.  297 

Commander-in-chief  ii.  181 

Commerce,  The  ii.  433 

Commercial  Bank  v.  Bobo  ii.  757 

V.  Colt  i.  254 

V.  Cunningham  i.  294  ;  ii.  768 

V.  Gorham  i.  12 

V.  Hamcr  i.  303 

V.  Kortright  i.  59 

V.  Lum  ii.  860 

V.  Martin  ii.  119 

V.  Nolan  i.  479  ;  iii.  145 

V.  Wilkins  i.  231,  2-32,  234 

Commercial  Bank  of  Buffalo  v.  Kort- 
right i.  154;  iii.  220,  221 
Com.  Bank  of  Natchez  v.  The  State 
of  Miss.  iii.  486 


Commercial  Bank  of  Pa.  v.  Union 

Bank  of  N.  Y.  i.  89 

Commercial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Union  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  470 

I'.  Whitney  ii.  479 

Commercial  Steamship  Co.  v.  Boul- 

ton  ii.  424 

Commercial  Union  Ass.  Co.  v.  Scam- 

mon  ii.  575 

Commins  v.  Scott  iii.  4 

Commissioners  v.  Perry  i.  482 

Commonwealth  v.  Bacon  iii.  483 

V.  Cheney  ii.  8G5 
V.  Churcliill                           ii.  865,  866 

V.  Collins  i.  407 

V.  Cooper  i.  Ill 

V.  Courow  ii.  55 

V.  Crevor  iii.  112 

V.  Curtis  i.  160 

V.  Dorchester  Ins.  Co.  ii.  539 

V.  Emigrant,  &c.  Bank  ii.  858 

V.  Frost  iii.  134 

t'.  Gamble  i.  355 

V.  Green  ii.  741 

V.  Hantz  i.  355 

V.  Hemperly  ii.  55 
V.  Hide  &  Leather  Ins.  Co.         ii.  561 

V.  Holmes  i.  47 

V.  Hunt  ii.  724 
V.  Kendig                              ii.  900,  907 

V.  Knox  ii.  901 

V.  Lane  ii.  92 

V.  Manley  i.  285 

V.  Mann  iii.  483 

V.  Munson  ii.  85,  86 
V.  Murray                              1.  348,  355 

V.  Nesbit         ,  ii.  902 

V.  Pash  ii.  897 

V.  Power  ii.  241 

I'.  Proprietors  ii.  831 

V.  Ricketson  ii.  468 

V.  Sessions  of  Norfolk  iii.  187 

V.  Shepherd  i.  377 

V.  Shuman  ii.  938 

V.  Stamp  ii.  85 

r.  Stone  ii.  754 

V.  Wentz  i.  377 

V.  Wolf  ii.  905 

V.  Worcester  T.  Co.  ii.  941 

Commonwealth  Bank  v.  Law    i.  208,  210, 

283 

V.  Mechanics  Bank  ii.  762 

V.  Mudgett  i.  319 

Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chase      ii.  508 

V.  Globe  Ins.  Co.  iii.  585 

Comp  V.  Henchman  i.  95 

Compta,  The  iii.  207 

Compton  V.  Bearcrofl  ii.  723 

V.  Bedford  iii.  441 

V.  Martin  iii.  44 

Comstock,  Ex  parte  iii.  467 

Matter  of  iii.  471 

V.  Farnum  i.  2-54 

V.  Grout  iii.  465 

V.  Hannah  i.  289 


Ixiv 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Comstock  V.  ITowk 

V.  Hutchinson 

V.  Moore 

V.  Norton 

t'.  Ray  ford 

V.  Smith 
Comus,  Tiie 
Coiuyns  v.  Boyer 
Conant,  Matter  of 

V.  Frary 

i:  Kayniond 

Seneca  County  Bank 


/,i.482 
..^^^,  iii.  227 

ii.  364 
iii.  23 
i.  569 

ii.  757 

ii.  441 
i.  488 

iii.  428 
i.  231 
ii.  57 
i.  258 


Conard  i-.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.      ii.  395,  405  ; 

iii.  292,  443,  444 

r.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.  iii.  185 

Conderman  v.  Smith  i.  613 

Cone  V.  Baldwin  i.  289 

V.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.  ii.  561 

Conger  v.  Ring  i.  95 

Congress  Spring  Co.  v.  High  Rock 

Spring  Co.  ii.  351 

Congress  and  Empire  Spring  Co.  v. 
High  Rock  Congress  Spring  Co.  ii.  351, 

361 
Congress,  &c.  Co.  v.  High  Rock,  &c 


Co. 

Congreve  v.  Evetts 
Coningham  v.  Plunkett 
Conkey  c.  Hopkins 
Conklin  v.  Barton 

V.  Underhill 
Conklin  g  r.  Carson 
Conlin  v.  Cantrell 
Conn  V.  Coburn 

V.  Conn 

V.  Wilson 
Connecticut  v.  Jackson 


351 

i.  660 

iii.  315 

ii.  8 

i.  182 

iii.  127 

iii.  403 

i.  409 

i.  338;  ii.  4 

i.  408 

ii.  75 

ii.  769;  iii.  159, 

101,  168 

Connecticut  Ins.  Co.  v.  Groom  ii.  603 

V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  Haven  R.  Co.        ii.  608 

V.  Schwenk  ii.  586 

Conn.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schaefer        ii.  606 

Connelly  i'.  Cheever  i.  227 

Conner  v.  City  of  New  York  iii.  483 

V.  CofRn  i.  545 

V.  Henderson  i.  622 

r.  Robinson  ii.  668,  676 

V.  Trawick  i.  263 

Connerat  v.  Goldsmith  ii.  4 

Conners  v.  Hennessey  i.  116 

Connersville  r.  Wadleigh  ii.  915 

Connolly  v.  Warren  ii.  275 

Connor  v.  Bellamont  ii.  716 

Connory  r.  Kendall  i.  290,  297 

ConoUy  v.  Kettlewell  ii.  12 

V.  Pardon  ii.  681,  603 

Conover  v.  Mass.  Life  Ins.  Co.  ii.  692 

V.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  675 

V.  Stillwell  i.  459 

Conro  f.  Pt.  Henry  I.  Co.  i.  230 

Conroe  r.  Birdsall  i.  353,  857,  360 

Conroy  v.  Warren  i.  273 

Conroy  v.  Woods  i.  232 

Consoiidnted  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cashaw      ii.  494 

Const  V.  Harris  i.  217 


Constable  v.  Clobery  i.  12 

v.  Noble  ii.  475,  487 

Constantia,  The  i.  640 

Constantine  v.  Constantine  ii.  645 

Constitution,  The,  v.  Woodworth     ii.  392 
Contee  v.  Dawson  ii.  844 

Continental  Bank  v.  Commonwealth 

Bank  i.  279 

V.  Townsend  i.  292 

Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hulman       ii.  476. 

577 
V.  Palmer  ii.  608 

Converse  v.  Boston  &,  Maine  R.  Co. 

ii.  197 
V.  Bradley  iii.  894 

V.  Citizens  Ins.  Co.  ii.  562 

V.  Converse  i-  438 

V.  McKee  i.  237 

V.  Norwich,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  231 

Converseville  Co.  v.  Chambersburg 

Co.  i.  558 

Convoy's  Wheat,  The  ii.  298 

Conway,  Ex  parte  iii.  381 

V.  Beazley  ii.  723,  735,  736 

V.  Bush  i.  575 

V.  Edwards  i.  568 

V.  Gray  ii.  425 

V.  Kinsworthy  iii.  311 

Conway  Tool  Co.  v.  Hudson  River 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  583,  584 

Conwell  V.  Sandridge  i-  222 

Conyers  v.  Ennis  ii.  915 

V.  Kenans  iii.  107 

Coocli  V.  Goodman  i.  485 

Cook  V.  Bank  of  Louisiana  i.  62 

V.  Black  ii.  010 

V.  Bradley        i.  7,  351,  457,  462,  463, 

464,  474 

V.  Caldecott  iii.  441 

Champlain  Trans.  Co.    ii.  247,  248 


V.  CoUingridge 

V.  Comni.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Continental  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Cook 

V.  Creswell 

V.  Darling 

V.  Ellis 

V.  Field 

V.  Fiske 

V.  Fowler 

V.  Genesee  Mut.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Ilartle 

V.  Hill 

V.  Husted 

V.  Jennings 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Litchfield 

V.  Molfat 

V.  Moseley 

V.  Newman 

V.  Pritchard 

V.  Satterlee 

r.  Southwick 

V.  State  Bank 

V.  Stearns 


ii.  369 

ii.  600 

ii.  646 

ii.  91 

i.  548 

i.  313 

iii.  185 

ii.  605 

i.  110 

iii.  112 

ii.  751 

ii.  773 

iii.  187 

ii.  60 

ii.  419,  647 

ii.  893 

i.  314,  322 

iii.  396,  607 

i.  623 

i.  145,  253 

iii.  881,  477 

i.  280 

i.  274,  284 

ii.  118 

ii.  642 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Ixr 


Cook  I'.  Warren 

V.  Welch 

V.  Wot  ton 
Cooke,  Ex  parte 

V.  Booth 

V.  Callaway 

V.  Clayworth 

»'.  Colehan 

V.  French 

V.  Millard 

V.  Nathan 

V.  Orne 

I'.  Oxley 

V.  Tombs 

V.  Whorwood 
Cooke's  Appeal 
Cooke's  case 
Cookenderfer  r.  Preston 
Cookes  V.  ilascall 


ii.  683 

i.  110 

i.  18 

iii.  440 

i.  532 

i.  311 

i.  435 ;  iii.  373 

i.  280 

i.  322 

iii.  46 

i.  285 

ii.  16 

i.  514 

iii.  19 

iii.  202 

i.  150 

i.  540 

ii.  G69,  675 

ii.  77 


Cooley-  V.  Board  of  Wardens  of  the 

Port  of  Philadelphia  iii.  511 

V.  Broad  i.  174 

r.  Cook  iii.  460 

V.  Perrine  i.  62 

V.  Rose  ii.  769 

V.  Vansvcle  i.  147 

V.  Willard  i.  41 

Coolidge  V.  Bridgham  i.  616;  ii.  815; 

iii.  227,  229 

V.  Gloucester  Ins.  Co.  ii.  490,  506, 

510 

V.  Gray  ii.  487 

t'.  Neat  ii.  70,  72,  73 

V.  Payson  1.  202,  303 

V.  Ruggles  i.  254 

V.  Smith  i.  387 

V.  Miles  iii.  118 

Coombs  V.  Emery  i.  489 

V.  Gorden  i.  556 

V.  Scott  i.  53 

Coomer  v.  Bromley  i.  209 

Coon  V.  Plymouth  Plank  Road        iii.  285 

V.  Syracuse  &  Utica  R.  R.  ii.  46 

Coope  V.  Bowles  i.  201 

V.  Eyre  i.  196 

Cooper  v.  — — —  i.  582;  ii.  832 

V.  Bigalow  ii.  874 

V.  Blandy  ii.  940 

V.  Beckett  ii.  860 

V.  Burr  i.  264 

V.  Chitty  iii.  426,  434 

V.  Dedrick  iii.  18 

V.  Hamilton  Man.  Co.  ii.  47 

V.  Elston  iii.  60 

V.  Johnson  ii.  848 

V.  Martin  i.  348,  460 

V.  Matthews  ii.  324 

V.  MuUins  ii.  47  ;  iii.  178 

V.  Mass.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  605 

V.  Newman  i.  619 

V.  Parker  ii.  750;  iii.  72 

V.  Pena  iii.  306 

V.  Phillips  i.  339  ;  ii.  44 

V.  Rankin  i.  46 

V.  Robinson  ii.  879 


Cooper  n.  .Smith 
V.  S6uth 
V.  Stevenson 
V.  Turner 
V.  Twibill 
V.  Willomatt 
V.  Wyatt 


ii.  940  ;  iii.  5 
ii.  396 
i.  126 
iii.  67 
i.  632 
ii.  134 
iii.  449 


Cooperative  Ass.  v.  Leflore  ii.  556 

Coopwood  V.  Wallace      i.  128,  129 ;  ii.  60 

Coosa,  The  ii.  520 

Cooth  V.  Jackson  iii.  66,  333,  345,  3-50 

Cope  V.  Albinson  i.  506 

V.  Alden  ii.  716 

V.  Burt  ii.  89 

V.  Cope  ii.  645 

V.  Cordova  ii.  204,  207,  415 

V.  Dodd  ii.  669,  672,  674 

V.  Joseph  ii.  879 

V.  Rowlands  i.  489  ;  ii.  894 

V.  Smith  ii.  24 

Copeland,  Ex  parte  iii.  420,  424 

r.  Copeland  ii.  936,  9.37 

V.  Mercantile  Ins.  Co.       i.  51 ;  ii.  474 

V.  New  England  Ins.  Co.  ii.  527,  529, 

573 

V.  Stein  iii.  273,  458 

i\  Stephenson  iii.  424 

r.  Stevens  iii.  446 

V.  Watts  i.  544 

Copelin  w.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  512 

Copeman  v.  Gallant  iii.  435 

Copis  V.  Middleton  ii.  6 

Copland,  Ex  parte  i.  238 

V.  Bosquet  i.  579 

Copp  V.  McDugall  i.  307 

Copper  V.  Wells  ii.  845 

Copper,  &c.  Co.  v.  Spencer  iii.  39 

Coppin  V.  Braithwaite        ii.  242 ;  iii.  178, 

180,  194 

V.  Coppin  ii.  701 

V.  Craig  i.  107,  497,  528 ;  ii.  883 

V.  Walker  ii.  883 

Coppock  V.  Bower  i.  469 ;  ii.  895 

Corbett  v.  Brown  ii.  913,  914,  916 

V.  Schumacker  i.  91 

Corbin  v.  Am.  Mills  i.  114 

Corcoran  i-.  Allen  i.  150 

V.  Harran  iii.  177 

Core's  case  ii.  643 

Corey  v.  James  ii.  875 

V.  Ripley  iii.  476 

Cork  V.  Baker  ii.  68 

Cork   &  Bandon    Railway  v.    Caze- 

nove  i.  374,  375 

Codies  V.  Cumming  i.  104 

V.  Elemming  iii.  90 

Cornelius  v.  Vanarsdallen  ii.  863 

Cornell  v.  Andrews  iii.  334 

V.  Green  ii.  773 

V.  Jackson  iii.  240,  243 

V.  Moulton  ii.  797 

V.  Nebeker  ii.  862 

V.  Todd  ii.  636 

Corney  v.  DaCosta  i.  317 

Cornfoot  v.  Fowke  i.  64 ;  ii.  522,  921 


Ixvi 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Corninfr  r.  Abbott 

I'.  Burden 

V.  Lewis 
Cornisli  v.  Abington 

r.  Stubbs 

V.  Upton 
Cornwall  r.  Haight 

V.  Hoyt 

V.  Wilson 
Cornwell  v.  Voorhees 
Cornwell's  Appeal 
Coromandcl,  The 
Corp  V.  McCJonib 
Corps  V.  Robinson 
Corrie  v.  Onslow 
Corsbie  v.  Free 
Corson  v.  Mulvany 


i.  199 

ii.  311,  312 

i.  411 

ii.  912 

i.  548 ;  ii.  6G5 

ii.  344 

i.  5G3 

i.  407 

i.  88,  104 

ii.  154 

iii.  426 

ii.  437,  440 

1.313,  318 

i.  211 

iii.  449 

iii.  424 

iii.  311 


Cort  V.  Ambergate,  &c.  Railway  Com- 
pany ii.  809 
Cortclyou  v.  Lansing  ii.  121 
Corwin  v.  Benham  iii.  292 
V.  Daly  ii.  352,  353,  354 
V.  Hood  ii.  646 
Corwitli  r.  Colter  i.  572 
Cory  V.  Boylston  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 
V.  Bretton  iii.  72 
V.  Burr  ii.  501 
V.  Cory  i.  435 
V.  Tatton  ii.  52G 
Coslake  v.  Till  iii.  323,  340 
Cosmopolite,  The  ii.  481 
Cossens,  ^.r  ;)arte  iii.  473 
Costa  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Moss  iii.  185 
Coster  r.  Murray  iii.  95,  98 
V.  Thomason  i.  212 
V.  Turner  iii.  386 
Costigan  v.  Newland  i.  85 
V.  The  Mohawk  &  Hudson  Rail- 
way Co.             ii.  37,  38;  iii.  208 
Costley  V.  Wilkerson  i.  '22S 
Cotes  V.  Davis  i.  392 
Cothay  r.  Fennell  i.  57,  05,  60 
V.  Murray  iii-  4(52 
V.  Tute  i-  574 
Cother  v.  Merrick  ii-  614 
Cottage  St.  Church  v.  Kendall  i.  483 
Cottani  V.  Partridge          iii.  79,  80,  94,  96 
V.  Smitli  i.  200 
Cotteen  v.  Missing  i.  263 
Cotterel  v.  Harrington  iii.  H9 
Cotterill,  Ex  parte  iii.  435 
V.  Starkey  ii-  247 
Cottington's  case  ii.  739 
Cotton,  In  re  iii.  415 
V.  Blane  _  ii.  6 
I'.  Goodwin  ii.  779 
V.  Thomas  ii.  370 
V.  Tlnirland  ii.  759,  887 
Cottrell,  Iir  parte  iii.  464 
I'.  Conklin  i.  274,  283,  284 
Cottrill  V.  Van  Duzen  i.  178,  196,  198 
Coty  u.  Barnes  i.  611,  013 
Cotzhausen  v.  Judd  i-  2()8 
Couch  V.  Mills  i-  28 
V.  Watson  Coal  Co.  ii.  40 


Cougar  V.  Galena  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  174 

Coughlin  V.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  908 

Coulter  V.  Richmond  i.  275 

V.  Robertson  i.  486 

Coulon  V.  Bowne  ii.  524 

Coulston  V.  Carr  i.  48.5 

Coulter's  case  iii.  238 

Coulthart  v.  Clementson  ii.  22 
Council  Bluff  Works  v.  Cuppey     i.  279 ; 

ii.  78« 

Counden  v.  Gierke  ii.  689 

Countess  of  Durham,  The  ii.  434 
Countess  of  Portsmouth  v.  Earl  of 

Portsmouth  iii.  414 

Countess  of  Rutland's  case  ii.  679 

Couradt  v.  Sullivan  ii.  10 

Courcier  v.  Ritter  i.  87 

Coursen  v.  Hamlin  i.  229 

Courtis  V.  Cane  iii.  210 

Courtnay  v.  Miss.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  471 
Courtney  v.  N.  Y.  City  Ins.  Co.       ii.  477, 

576 

Courtwright  v.  Stewart  iii.  62 

Couston  V.  Chapman  i.  628 

Coutourier  v.  Hastie        i.  101,  559,  610; 

ii.  13  ;  iii.  29 

Covas  r.  Bingham  i.  495 

Coventry  v.  Atherton  iii.  102 

Covin  V.  Hill  iii.  270 

Cowan,  Ex  parte  iii.  425 

I'.  Braidwood  ii.  738 

V.  Iowa  Ins.  Co.  ii.  576 

I'.  Milbourn  ii.  337 

Cowas-jee  v.  Thompson  i.  660 

Cowdin  V.  Gottgetreu  iii.  26 

Cowdrcy  v.  Vandenburgh  i.  252 

Cowell  V.  Batterley  iii.  286 

V.  Betteley  ii.  838;  iii.  286 

V.  Brothers,  The  ii.  439 

V.  Edwards  i.  33,  34 

V.  Simpson      i.  107;  iii.  259,  263,  264, 

275 

V.  Watts  i.  143 

Cowie  V.  Harris  iii.  459 

I'.  Rcmfry  iii.  8 

r.  Stirling  i.  282 

Cowing  V.  Snow  ii.  407 

Cowles  I'.  Harts  i.  322 

V.  Marble  iii.  39 

V.  Whitman  iii.  330 

Cowling  V.  Beachum  ii.  761 

Cowsar  v.  Wade  ii.  885 

Cox,  Ex  parte  iii.  427 

V.  Adams  ii.  37 

V.  Bodfish  i.  240 

V.  Brain  ii.  771,  772 

V.  Buck  ii.  938 

I'.  Cooper  ii.  882 

V.  Cox  ii.  92 

V.  Fay  ii.  827 

V.  Hickman  i.  174 

V.  Jagger  ii-  827 

V.  Kitchin  i.  407 

V.  McBurney  i.  168,  171 

c.  Midland  Railway  Co.  i.  48 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixvii 


Cox  V.  Murray 

i;.  Prentice 

V.  Russell 

V.  Smith 

V.  Sprigg 

V.  Strode 

V.  United  States 
Coxe  V.  Gent 

V.  Hale 

V.  Harden 

V.  Lundy 

V.  State  Bank 
Coxhcad  v.  Mullis 
Coxon  V.  Great  Western 

Cox  well  V.  De  Vaughn 
Coye  V.  Leach 
Coyle  V.  Fowler 
Coysegame,  Ex  parte 
Cozzins  V.  Whitaker 
Crab  ill  v.  Marsh 
Crabton  v.  Kile 
Crabtree  v.  Clapham 

V.  Clark 
Craddock  v.  Aldridge 

V.  Riddlesbarger 
Craft  V.  Isliara 

V.  McConoughy 
Crafts  V.  Mott 
Craiig  V.  Bowman 
Craggin  v.  Bailey 
Cragoe  v.  Jones 
Craig  r.  Blow 

V.  Childress 

V.  Hawkins 

V.  Hewitt 

V.  Kittredge 

V.  Leslie 

V.  Miller 

V.  Murgatroyd 

V.  Parkis 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Wells 
Craigliead  v.  The  Bank 
Crain  v.  Beech 

V.  Petrie 
Craine  v.  Hubbel 
Craker  v.  Railway  Co. 
Cram  v.  Aiken 

V.  Cadwell 

V.  Hendricks 
Cramer  v.  Bachmann 

V.  Bradshaw 

V.  Lepper 
Crimp  V.  Symons 
Crane  v.  Conklin 

V.  Dygert 

V.  French 

V.  Gough 

V.  Pratt 

V.  Price 

V.  Roberts 
Cranley  v.  Hillary 
Crans  v.  Hunter 
Cranson  v.  Gosa 


ii.  385 

i.  185,  4!)(> 

i.  232 

iii.  IIJ] 

iii.  314 

iii.  240,  242 

ii.  713 

il.  831 

iii.  420 

i.649;  ii.  412 

ii.  831 

ii.  753,  874 

ii.  65 

Railway  Co. 

ii.  227,  232 

ii.  762 

ii.  613 

i.  457,  459 

iii.  455 

i.  616,  627,  636 

iii.  350 

i.  636 

i.  185 

ii.  423 

ii.  660 

i.  553 

ii.  15,  16,  795 

ii.  888 

iii.  463,  404 

i.  394 

iii.  464 

ii.  16 

ii.  917 

ii.  177 

ii.  842 

iii.  116 

i.  263 

i.  150 

ii.  762 

ii.  582,  607 

ii.  3,  31 

ii.  529 

ii.  635 

iii.  79 

iii.  201 

iii.  194 

iii.  125 

iii.  187 

ii.  448 

i.  210 

291 ;  iii.  153,  156 

i.  187  I 

i.  624  I 

iii.  1.32 

ii.  840 

i.  435 

iii.  112 

i.  234,  236 

iii.  63,  352 

ii.  753 

ii.  309,  312 

ii.  789 

ii.  770 

i.  52 

ii.  904,  907 


Cranston  v.  Clarke  i.  534 

V.  Marshall  ii.  408 

V.  Phila.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  474 

Crantz  v.  Gill  i.  339 

Cranwell  v.  Ship  Fanny  Fosdick     iii.  208 
Cranz  v.  Kroger  i.  263 

Crapo  V.  Allen  ii.  463,  464 

Craufurd  v.  Blackburn  ii.  82 

V.  Hunter  ii.  484,  489 

Craven  v.  Craven  ii.  833 

V.  Ryder  i.  653 

Crawford  v.  Chute  ii.  865 

V.  Clark  ii.  204 

V.  Forristall  i.  568 

V.  Louisiana  State  Bank  i.  91 

V.  Slade  ii.  865 

V.  Smith  i.  564,  566 

V.  Stirling  i.  210;  ii.  870 

V.  Willing  iii.  Ill 

i;.  Wilson  ii.  708,  709,  710 

Crawley  v.  Mullins  i.  548 

Crawshay  v.  Collins    i.  173,  219,  224,  227, 

229,  230  ;  ii.  369,  845 

V.  Fades  i.  646 

V.  Maule        i.  169,  174,  220,  221,  226, 
229,  230 ;  iii.  321 

r.  Thompson  ii.  37.3,  374 

Craythorne  i'.  Swinburne     i.  32,  36 ;  ii.  6 
Creamer  v.  Perry 
Creed,  In  re 

V.  Hartman 

V.  Mallet 

V.  Penn.  R.  Co. 

V.  Stevens 
Creery  v.  Hollis 
Creighton  v.  Ingersoll 
Cremer  v.  Higginson  i.  210 ; 

Cressinger  v.  Lessee  of  Welch 

368: 
Cresson  v.  Stout 
Creswell  v.  Blank 
Creuse  v.  Defiganiere 
Crill  I).  Doyle 
Cripps  V.  Davis 

V.  Golding 
Crisdee  ;;.  Bolton 
Crisp  V.  Ciiurchill 

V.  Gam  el 
Crist  V.  Brindle 
Crittenden  v.  Fiske 

V.  Jones 

V.  PhcEnix  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Schermerhorn 
Crocker  v.  Coiweli 

V.  Crocker 

V.  Franklin  H.  &  F.  Man.  Co. 

V,  Higgins 

V.  Jackson 

f.  Lewis 

V.  Orpen 

V.  People's  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Whitney 
Crockett  v.  Dodge 
Crockett  v.  Newton 
Crockford  v.  Winter 


i.  317 

ii.  612,  613 

i.  117 

ii.  459 

ii.  245 

iii.  127 

ii.  448 

iii.  286 

ii.  14,  23 

i.  366, 

ii.  909 

i.  547 

i.  228 

iii.  74 

i.  562 

iii.  77,  92 

i.  485 

iii.  168,  172 

i.  337 

i.  485 

ii.  878 

ii.  14 

iii.  393 

i.  262 

i.  393 

i.  205 

i.  557 

ii.  666 

i.  498 

ii.  439,  448 

ii.  921 

iii.  328 

ii.  524,  553 

i.  254,  255,  258 

ii.  450 

u.  433 

i.  79 


Ixviii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Crofoot  V.  Bennett  i.  56G 

Croft  V.  Alison  i.  H-t 

V.  Day  ii.  362,  36G,  369,  372,  373 

Crofts  V.  Beale  i-  2n2 

V.  Marshall  ii.  496,  674 

V.  AVaterhouse  ii.  234,  236,  242 

Croker  v.  Lauder  i-  648 

V.  Orpen  iii-  812 

Crompton  v.  Pratt  ii.  766 

CTomwL'W,  Ex  parte  iii.  411 

V.  Benjamin  i-  388 

V.  Lovett  ii.  755 

V.  Owings  ii-  827 

V.  Sac  County        i.  289,330;  iii.  113 

Croninger  v.  Crocker  i.  572,  573 

Cronise  v.  Clark  i.  335 

V.  Cronise  iii.  409 

Crook  r.  Jadis  i.  289 

V.  Stephen  ii._8.32 

V.  Williams  i.  93 

Crooke  v.  Slack  ii.  383 

Crooker  v.  Crooker  i.  192,  231 

Crookewit  v.  Fletcher  ii.  420 

Crooks  V.  Crooks  ii.  78 

V.  Moore  i.  575 

Crookshank  v.  Burrell  iii.  61,  62 

Croom  V.  Shaw  i.  62 

Croome  v.  Lediard  iii.  312,  345,  361 

Cropp  V.  Ilambleton  ii.  773 

Crosbie  v.  McDoual  iii.  314 

Crosby  »;.  Berger  ii.  7-30 

V.  Fitch  ii.  181,  406 

t;.  Grant  i.  289,  292 

17.  Jerolonian  i.  11 

V.  Loop  i.  551 

V.  Mason  iii.  112 

V.  Wadsworth  iii.  35,  64 

V.  Wyatt  ii.  29 

Crosley  v.  Arkwright  i.  488 

Cross  r.  Andrews  i.  433 ;  ii.  1-58 

V.  Bryant  iii.  382 

V.  Burlington  Bank  i.  215 

V.  Cross  i.  377 

V.  DeVille  i.  448 

V.  Hopkins  iii.  321 

V.  O'Donnell  i.  642 

V.  Peters  ii.  915 

V.  Sackett  ii.  921 

V.  Shutliff  ii.  534,  535 

Crosse  v.  Androes  i.  355 

V.  Gardner  i.  614 

V.  Lawrence  iii.  349 

V.  Smith  i.  316 

Crossing  v.  Scudamore  ii.  637 

Crosswell  v.  Lehman  i.  200 

Crouch  V.  Credit  Foncier  of  Fng.      i.  278, 

330 
V.  Great  Western  Railway  Co.     ii.  232 

V.  Gridley  iii.  471,  478 

V.  Koemer  ii.  309 
r.  The  London,  &c.  Railway  Co. 

ii.  185,  187,  224,  2-59 

Croucher  i'.  Oakman  ii.  463 

Croughton  v.  Forrest  i.  208 

Croukite  v.  Wells  u.  190 


Crousillat  v.  Ball  ii.  511 

Crout  V.  DeWolf  ii.  941 

Crow  r.  Crow  ii.  91 

V.  Rogers  i.  496,  497 

Crowder  v.  Austin  i.  526 

Crowdus  V.  Shelby  i.  34 

Crowe  r.  Aikin  ii.  334,  338 

V.  Clay  ii.  757 

Crowell  V.  Beebe  ii.  939 

V.  Currier  i.  498 

V.  Davis  ii.  842 

c.  Gleason  i.  444 

Crowfoot  V.  Gurney  i.  245 

Crowhurst  v.  Laverack  i.  467 

Crowie  v.  Hoover  i.  546 

Crowley  v.  Vitty  i.  543 

Crowly  V.  Cohens  ii.  485,  566 

Crowther  i'.  Rowlandson  iii.  100 
Croydon  Gas  Co.  v.  Dickinson         i.  315; 

ii.  28 

Crozer  v.  Chambers  i.  275 

V.  Pilling  ii.  774 

Crozier  v.  Carr  i.  52 

Cruder  v.  Penn.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  527 

V.  Phil.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  527,  528 

Cruger  v.  Armstrong  i.  272 

V.  Jones  i.  409 

Cruickshanks  v.  Rose  ii.  763 

Cruikshank  v.  Janson  ii.  521 

Crumbacker  v.  Tucker  iii.  253 

Crumless  v.  Sturgess  i.  225 

Crump  V.  U.  S.  Mining  Co.  i.  64 


Crusader,  The 
Crusoe  v.  Bugby 
Cruttwell  ('.  Lye 
Cruzan  v.  Smith 
Cryme  v.  Day 
Cubberly  v.  Scott 
Cud  V.  Rutter 
Cuff  V.  Dorland 

V.  Penn 
Culbertson  v.  Shaw 
Culbreath  v.  Culbreath 
CuUam  V.  Guillot 

V.  Valentine 
CuUen  V.  Butler 


ii.  357,  369 

i.  538 

ii.  369 

i.  40 

i.  360 

i.  387 

i.  522  ;  iii.  325 

iii.  372 

ii.  685 

ii.  431 

iii.  354 

i.  568 

ii.  850 

ii.  497 


V.  Duke  of  Quecnsbury  i.  139 

Cullough  V.  Wainwright  ii.  680 

C\i\nes,  Ex  parte  iii.  446 

Culter  V.  Reynolds  i.  313 

Culver  V.  Ashley  i.  51  ;  ii.  827 

Cumber  i-.  Wane  i.  249 ;  ii.  749,  751 

Cumberland,  The  ii.  4^9 

Cumberland  Bank  v.  Hall  ii.  859 

V.  Hann  i.  290 

Cumberland   Coal   and   Iron  Co.  v. 

Sherman  i.  95 

Cumberland,  Inhab.  of,  v.  Inhab.  of 

North  Yarmouth  ii.  847 

Cumberland    Valley    Prot.    Co.    v. 

Schell  ii.  558,  580 

Cumberland,  &c.  Co.  v.  Andes  Ins. 

Co.  i.  565;  ii.  561 

Cumberland,  &c.  Co.  v.  Douglas  ii.  546 
Cuming  c.  Hill  ii.  54,  66 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Ixix 


Cummer  v.  Milton 

ii.  712 

Curtis  t'.  Parks 

i.  501 

Cumiiiiiig  V.  Forrester 

ii.  87'J 

V.  Pugh 

iii.  51 

V.  Roebuck 

i.  585;  iii.  13 

V.  R.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  234 

Cummings  v.  Arnold 

ii.  425 

V.  Sage 

iii.  38 

V.  Banks 

ii.  740 

V.  Vernon 

i.  147 

V.  Dennett 

i.  458 

V.  Ward 

iii.  210 

V.  Griggs 

i.  5GG 

V.  Williamson 

i.  66 

V.  Harris 

iii.  267,  268 

Curtis's  Ex.  ;;.  Bank  of  Somerset 

i.  142 

V.  Powell 

i.  335,  300,  3(!2 

Curtiss  V.  Greenbanks 

ii.  787 

V.  Spruance 

iii.  184,  196 

I'.  Howell 

ii.  683 

V.  Williams 

ii.  877 

V.  Lawrence 

iii.  176 

Cummings'  Appeal 

i.  460 

V.  IVIarten 

1.315 

Cummins  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.     ii.  546 

V.  Wise  iii.  126,  130 

Cunard  v.  Hyde  ii.  485 

Cundell  v.  Dawson  i.  489 

Cunliffe  V.  Booth  i.  289 

V.  Harrison  iii.  151 
Cunningham  f.  Ashbrook         i.  561,  560; 

iii.  40 

V.  Bragg  i.  225 

V.  Dunn  ii.  805 

V.  Freeborn  iii.  383 

V.  Hall  ii.  393 

I'.  Holton  i.  535 

V.  Irwin  i.  396 

V.  Knight  i.  355 

V.  Lamar  i.  212 

V.  Morrell  ii.  649,  660 

V.  Pattee  i.  532 

V.  Reardon  i.  393 

V.  Smith  ii.  913 

Cupples  v.  Whelan  i.  47 

Curley  v.  Harris  ii.  852 

Curling  v.  Chalklen  ii.  16 

V.  Long  ii.  407 

Curran  v.  Holyoke  Water  Co.  iii.  351 

Currie  v.  Misa  i.  292  ;  ii.  756 

Currier  v.  Barker  i.  549 

V.  Continental  Ins.  Co.        ii.  614,  752 

V.  Currier  i.  570 

V.  Fellows  i.  34 

V.  Hodgdon  i.  254 

V.  Knapp  i.  578 

V.  Rowe  i.  186 

V.  Webster  i.  180 

Curry  i?.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.     ii.  523, 

545,  558,  586 

V.  Larer  iii.  173 

V.  Powers  i.  263 

V.  Rogers  i.  483 

V.  White  i.  225 

Curtin  v.  Patton  i.  364,  369 

Curtis  V.  Aspinwall  i.  527 

V.  Barcley  iii.  278 

V.  Brown  iii.  24,  25 

I'.  Bryan  ii.  363,  364 

I'.  Drinkwater  ii.  242 

V.  Gibbs  ii.  740 

r.  Groat  iii.  215 

V.  Hall  i.  435 

V.  Hannay  iii.  227 

V.  Hubbard  ii.  756 

V.  Hunton  iii.  409 

V.  Mohr  i.  292 


Curts  V.  Cisna  i.  93 

Cushing  V.  Arnold  iii.  459 

V.  Breed  i.  565 

V.  Drew  iii.  174 
V.  John  Frazer,  The    ii.  429,  430,  431 

V.  Smith  i.  193 

V.  Thompson  ii.  564 

Cushman  v.  Bailey  i.  170 

V.  Blanchard  iii.  242 

V.  Dement  i.  284 

V.  Holyoke  i.  566 
V.  North-western  Ins.  Co.        ii.  580, 

648 
V.  United  States  Ins.  Co.   ii.  554,  593, 

597 

Cusic  V.  Douglas  iii.  511 

Cussons  V.  Skinner  ii.  48 

Cuthbert  v.  Cummings  ii.  667,  676 

V.  Haley  iii.  129 

Cutler  V.  Ashland  i.  55 

V.  Bonney  ii.  157 

V.  Close  i.  494 

V.  Everett  ii.  7 

V.  Hinton  ii.  12 

I'.  How  i.  466;  iii.  126,  171 

V.  Johnson  i.  466 

V.  Rand  ii.  607 

V.  Rose  ii.  861 

V.  Southern  iii.  200 

V.  Thurlo  ii.  400 

V.  Windsor  i.  180;  ii.  421,  422 

Cutter  V.  Cochrane  i.  473 

V.  Copeland  i.  569 

V.  Davenport  ii.  701 

V.  Evans  iii.  471 

V.  Powell        ii.  39,  458,  653,  669,  792 

V.  Reynolds  i.  458 

Cutting  V.  Dana  iii.  324 

Cutts  V.  Perkins  i.  255 

V.  Salmon  i.  93  ' 

Cuxon  V.  Chadley  i.  246 

Cuyler  v.  Cuyler  ii.  849 

V.  Sanford  iii.  145 

V.  Stevens  i.  321 

Cynthia,  The  ii.  453 

Cypress,  The  ii.  458 


D. 


Dabney  v.  Stidger 
Daby  v.  Ericson 


L  211,  212 
i.  228 


Ixx 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Dadmun  Man.  Co.  v.  Worcester  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  477,  502,  576 

Dacosta  v.  Davis  ii.  713 

Da  Costa  v.  Edmunds  ii.  485 

V.  Firth  ii.  484 

I".  Newnham  ii.  447 

Daejjiing  v.  Gilmore  i.  115 

Daj^lish  i.'.  Davidson  ii.  452 

Dahlnian  v.  Forster  ii.  930 

Dailey  r.  Coons  i.  1!)3 

Dails  V.  Lloyd  i.  96,  490 

Dain  v.  Wycoff  ii.  76 

Dakin  v.  Williams  ii.  603 ;  iii.  174 

Dalby  v.  Hirst  i.  537 

V.  India  Ass.  Co.  ii.  GOG 

V.  Fallen  i.  526 ;  iii.  337 

Dale  I".  Cook  ii.  877 

V.  Hall  ii.  182,  428 

V.  Robinson  i.  408 

i;.  Smitlison  ii.  355,  364,  373 

V.  Sollet  ii.  880 

Dalgleish  v.  Brooke  ii.  481 

Dalglish  V.  Jarvie  ii.  598 

Dally  V.  Smith  iii.  416 

D'Almaine  v.  Boosey  ii.  316 

Dalrymple  v.  Dalrymple       ii.  81,  88,  729 

Dalton  V.  Irvin  i.  109 

i;.  Laudahu  i.  552 

Dalton  City  Co.  v.  Dalton  Mfg.  Co.  i.  16G 

Daly  V.  Duggan  iii.  374 

V.  Palmer  ii.  335 

Daly  ell  v.  Tyrer  i.  119 

Dalzell  V.  Crawford  iii.  335 

Dame  r.  Baldwin  i.  556 

V.  Wingate  ii.  869 

Damon,  In  re  iii.  400 

r.  Inhabitants  of  Granby  i.  22 

V.  Osborne  i-  566 

Damont  v.  N.  O.  &  CaroUton  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  248 

Dana  v.  Coombs  i.  368 

V.  Fiedler      ■         ii.  687  ;  iii.  111,220 

V.  Hancock  iii.  20 

V.  Lull  i.  201,  222 

V.  Sawyer  i.  303 

Danaher  v.  Garlock  i.  54 

Danhury  Band  v.  Bean  i.  185 

Dance  v.  (iirdler  ii.  21 

Daiid  V.  Kingscote  ii.  664 

Dandridge  v.  Harris  ii.  783 

Dane  r.  Kirkwall  i.  437 

Danfortli  ;•.  Adams  ii.  937 

V.  Culver  iii.  76 

V.  Scoharie  Turnpike  Co.  i.  154 

Dangerfield  v.  Thomas  iii.  435 

Daniel  v.  Adams  i.  41,  GO 

V.  Ballard  i.  .33,  37 

V.  Bowles  ii.  67,  09 

V.  Cartony  iii.  125,  127 

V.  Frazor  iii.  30.5 

V.  Mitchell  i.  621 

V.  Swift  i.  107;  iii.  275 

Daniell  v.  GrifTm  i.  51 

Daniels,  Ex  jjurle  iii.  465 

V.  Harris  ii.  527 


Daniels  i-.  Hatch  ii.  823 

V.  Hudson  River  Ins.  Co.  ii.  542,  554, 

557 

i;.  Newton  ii.  810 

V.  Pond  i.  544,  547 

V.  Tearney  ii.  943 

D'Aiijou  V.  Deagle  ii.  194 

Danley  v.  Rector  ii.  239 

Dann  v.  Dolman  i.  488 

V.  Spurrier               i.  540 ;  ii.  637,  939 

Danolds  v.  State  iii.  480 

l^ansey  v.  Richardson  ii.  155,  162,  164 

Dante,  The  ii.  404 

Dantzic,  The  ii.  43 

D'Aquila  v.  Lambert  i.  642 

Darby  v.  Baines  ii.  389 

V.  Boucher  i.  338,  392 

V.  Majer  ii.  701 

Darbyshire  v.  Parker  i.  320 

Darcy  v.  Askwith  ii.  665 

D'Arcy  v.  Ketchum  ii.  742 

Darden  v.  Lovelace  i.  564 

Dardier  v.  Chapman  i.  382 

Darling  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.       ii.  231 

V.  Lewis  i.  78 

V.  March  i.  210,  212 

Darmstaetter  r.  Moynahan  i.  116 

Darrell  v.  Tibbitts  ii.  563 

Darrol  v.  Quimby  i.  76 

Darst  I'.  Bates  iii.  28 

V.  Gale  i.  155 

V.  Roth  i.  122 

Dart  V.  Dart  ii.  933 

Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward  iii.  480, 

481,  482,  483,  485,  486,  500,  501,  502 

Dartnall  v.  Howard  i.  91,  92,  476 

Dashiell  v.  Attorney-General  ii.  689 

Daubigny  v.  Davallon  i.  450 

v.'Duval  i.  60,  102;  iii.  290 

Davenport  v.  Bishopp  iii.  316 

V.  Gear  i.  184 

V.  Karnes  ii.  730 

v.  INIason  iii.  66 

V.  Peoria  Ins.  Co.  i.  42 

V.  Rackstrow  i.  24 

V.  Woodbridgo  i.  258 

Davenport  Nat.  Bank  v.  Homeyer     i.  276 

Davey  i-.  Chamberlain  ii.  131 

V.  Mason  ii.  194 

David  V.  Ransom  ii.  897 

David  Howes,  Matter  of  iii.  460 

Davidson  v.  Bridgeport  ii.  757 

V.  Cooper  ii.  853,  858,  862 

V.  Delano  iii.  82 

V.  Geoghagan  ii.  874 

V.  Goodall  ii.  76 

V.  Graham  ii.  259 

V.  Little  i.  406 

V.  Wcems  i.  228 

V.  Young  ii.  944 

Davie  v.  Briggs  ii.  612 

Davies  v.  Davies  ii.  68 

V.  Edwards  iii.  82 

V.  Games  i.  167 

V.  Humphreys      i.  32,  36,  500  ;  iii.  98 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxi 


Davies  v.  Mann 
V.  Penton 

Davis  V.  Allen 
V.  Anderson 
V.  Bean 
V.  Bechsteln 
V.  Boardnian 
V.  Bradford 
r.  Bradley 
V.  Brown 
V.  Browslier 
V.  Caldwell 
V.  Carlisle 
I'.  Child 
V.  Cilley 
V.  Clemson 
V.  Coburn 
V.  Connop 
V.  Cook 
V.  Davis 


u.  248,  250,  430 
iil.  1G8 

i.  192 
iii.  362 
ii.  880 

i.  252 
i.  65;  ii.  474 

i.  500 
i.  579 ;  ii.  938 ;  iii.  280 

ii.  84 
iii.  281 

i.  336 
ii.  856 
ii.  385 
ii.  836 
ii.  713 

i.  256 

i.  544 

1.208 
ii.  871,  944 


V.  Detroit,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  48 

V.  Dodd  i.  331 

V.  Dudley  i.  367 

V.  Duke  of  Marlborough  i.  253 

V.  Emerson  i.  33 


V.  Fish 
V.  Freeman 
V.  Garr 
V.  Garrett 
V.  Gillett 
V.  Goodenow 
I'.  Gowen 
V.  Grow 
V.  Hanly 
V.  Hardacre 
V.  Hedges 
V.  Higgins 
V.  Hill 
r.  Holbrook 
V.  Hone 
V.  Hubbard 
V.  Huggins 
V.  Hunt 
V.  Jacquin 
V.  Jenny 
t;.  Jones 
V.  Kendall 
r.  Lane 
V.  Leslie 
V.  Lyman 
r.  Mason 
V.  Maxwell 
V.  McCurdy 
V.  Meeker 
V.  Moore 
V.  Morgan 
V.  Morris 


ii.  898  ;  iii.  190 

iii.  169 

iii.  104,  123 

i.  92;  ii.  406 

iii.  167 

ii.  52 

i.  204 

iii.  218 

i.  818 

iii.  118 

iii.  219 

ii.  24 

i.  566 

ii.  897 

iii.  306,  373 

ii.  812 

ii.  27 

i.  615 ;  ii.  863 

i.  334 

ii.  858 

i.  547  ;  ii.  685 

ii.  353,  355,  371 

i.  76,  223,  298 

ii.  458 

iii.  244 

ii.  889 

i.  36,  89,  650,  657 

iii.  463 

i.  622 

iii.  49 

i.  473 

i.  538 


V.  M.  S.  &  N.  J.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  276 

V.  Newton  iii.  437 

«-•■  Ney  i.  263 

V.  Noaks  ii.  823 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.  i.  158 

V.  Oswell  iii.  215 
V.  Palmer                              ii.  307,  314 

V.  Pet  way  i.  526 


avis  V.  Quincy  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  564 

I'.  Rowell 

iii.  12 

V.  Russell 

iii.  274 

V.  Sanders 

ii.  937 

V.  Seneca,  The 

ii.  388 

V.  Sliapley 

iii.  478 

V.  Shields  i.  583,  588 ;  iii.  8,  220 

V.  Smith  i.  364  ;  iii.  79,  242 

V.  Smith  Organ  Co.  i.  158,  483 

V.  Steiner  iii.  75 

V.  Symonds     i.  522  ;  iii.  3.37,  344,  345 
V.  Tallcot       ii.  685,  794,  866 ;  iii.  196 

V.  Thomas  ii.  941 

1-.  Wells  ii.  14 

V.  West  iii.  327 

V.  WiUan  ii.  273 

V.  Windsor  Bank  i.  76 
Davis  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Mills   ii.  31 

Davis,  &c.  Co.  v.  Buckles  ii.  762 

V.  Maginnis  i.  576 

Davison  v.  Seymour  ii.  895 

DavoU  V.  Brown  ii.  315 

Davoue  v.  Fanning  i.  94,  95,  150 

Davy's  case  iii.  425 

Dawes  v.  Boylston  i.  255  ;  iii.  409 

V.  Cope  i.  568 

V.  Head  iii.  409 

V.  Howard  i.  843,  347,  348 

V.  Peck  i.  574 

V.  Pinner  iii.  159 

Dawkes  v.  Lord  De  Loraine  i.  280 

Dawn,  The  ii.  398,  461,  464 

Dawson  ;;.  Atty  ii.  524 

V.  Chaiuney  ii,  156,  157 

V.  Collis  i.  637 

V.  Ewing  ii.  774 

V.  Godfrey  iii.  485 

V.  King  iii.  75 

V.  Lawes  ii.  25 

V.  Morrison  i.  48 

V.  Real  Estate  Bank  ii.  28 

V.  Wilson  ii.  705 

Day,  Ex  parte  iii.  486 

V.  Bassett  i.  578 

V.  Berkshire  Woollen  Co.           ii.  176 

I'.  Binning  ii.  362,  372 

V.  Candee  ii.  325 

V.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.  ii.  557 

V.  Cloe  iii.  26 

V.  Cummings  iii.  130,  136 

V.  Elmore  ii.  32 ;  iii.  18 

V.  Lafferty  ii.  776 

V.  Laflin  iii.  426 

V.  Lock  wood  i.  229 

V.  Newman  i.  523;  iii.  316 

V.  Noble  ii.  456 

V.  Pool  iii.  223 

V.  Raguet  i.  628 

V.  Ridgway  ii.  27 

V.  Trig  ii.  680 

V.  Union  Rubber  Co.  ii.  319 

V.  Wamsley  i.  80 

V.  Wood  worth  iii.  176,  184 

Dayton  v.  Monroe  ii.  922 

V.  Wilkes  ii.  361,  369 


Ixxii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Dayton  Ins.  Co.  v.  McGookey  ii.  543 

Deacon  ;;.  Gridley  i.  474 

Deal  r.  Rojrue  i.  23ti 

V.  Maxwell  iii.  60 

Dean  v.  AUalley  i.  547 

V.  Allen  ii.  873 

i;.  Am.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  G04 

V.  Anderson  iii.  314 

V.  Emerson  ii.  892 

V.  Hall  i.  274 

V.  Hewitt  iii.  89,  92 

V.  Iloiiiby  ii.  499 

V.  James  ii.  775 

V.  Keate  ii.  131 

V.  Mason    i.  492, 618, 627, 633 ;  ii.  328 

V.  M'Gliie  ii.  400 

V.  Morey  i-  635 

V  Munroe  iii.  101 

V.  Kewliail  i.  27,  28 

V.  Riclimond  ii.  93 

V.  Skiff  ii.  71 

V.  Williams  ii.  769 

Dean  &Cliapter  of  Windsor  y.  Gover  i.  153 

Deane  v.  Annis  i.  342 

Dearborn  v.  Bowman  i.  501 

V.  Cross  ii.  685 

V.  Dearborn  i.  126 

V.  Turner  i.  581 

Dearie  v.  Barrett  ii.  771,  772 

Dease  v.  Jones  iii.  103 

Deason  v.  Boyd  i.  301,  368 

De  Barante  ;;.  Gott  ii.  730 

De  Barnales  v.  Fuller  iii.  112 

De  Begnis  v.  Armistead  i.  489  ;  ii.  887 

De  Beil  v.  Thompson  iii.  4,  32 

Debenham  v.  Mellon  i.  38G 

De  Berdt  v.  Atkinson  i.  307,  31G 

De  Berkom  v.  Smith  i.  213 

Deblois  v.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.     ii.  504,  507,  527, 

529,  535 
De  Bolle  v.  Pennsylvania  Ins.  Co.    ii.  541, 

567 
Debolt  V.  The   Ohio   Life   Ins.   & 

Trust  Co.  iii.  497,  498 

De  Boom  v.  Priestly  ii.  02 

De  Bouciiout  V.  Goldsmid  i.  60,  102 

De  Bras  v.  Forbes  i.  290 

De  liriar  v.  Minturn  ii.  37 

De  Bussche  >:  Alt  i.  97 

Decamp  v.  Feay  iii.  342,  356 

De  Camp  c.  Stevens  ii.  41 
J)ecatur  Bank  v.  St.  Louis  Bank       ii.  028 

Decell  V.  Lewentlial  i.  338 

Deciiapeaiirou<;e,  Kx  parte  iii.  419,  420 

Decharms  r.  Horwood  i.  23 

Deckard  ».  Case  i.  200 

Decker  v.  Judson  ii.  931 

V.  Livingston  i.  26 

V.  Shaffer  iii.  25 

Deckert,  Re  iii.  500 

De  Cosse  Brissac  v.  Rathbone  ii.  872 

De  Costa  v.  Jones  ii.  897 

V.  Mass.  Mining  Co.  iii.  170 
Decouclie  v.  Savetier    ii.  721,  730 ;  iii.  393 

Decreet  v.  Burt  i.  35 


Dederick  ;•.  Leman  ii.  749 

Dediiam  Bank  v.  Chickering  i.  486 

Dee  V.  Downs  iii.  21 

Deeks  v.  Strutt  i.  141 

Deerinfi  r.  Chapman  i.  486 

V.  Winclielsca  i.  36 

Deer  Isle  v.  Eaton  i.  500 

Deerly  v.  Mazarine  i.  407 

l^eey.  Ex  parte  iii.  452 

Deeze,  Ex  parte  iii.  239,  269,  270,  272 

Defenbaugh  v.  Weaver  iii.  222 

De  Figaniere  v.  Young  i.  129 

Deford  v.  Keynolds  i.  189 

De  Forest  v.  Fulton  Ins.  Co.     ii.  474,  482, 

541,  665,  566,  876 

V.  Oder  ii.  876 

V.  Tlie  Fire  Ins.  Co.  i.  103 

De  Forrest  v.  Bacon  iii.  3h2 

V.  Hunt  iii.  69 

V.  Leete  iii.  244 

I'.  Strong  iii.  145 

V.  Wright  i.  116,  120 

Defrance  v.  Austin  ii.  52 

Defreeze  v.  Trumper  i.  616 

De  Gaillon  v.  L'Aigle  i.  407 

Degg  V.  M.  Rigg  Co.  ii.  46 

Degiietoft  V.  London  Ass.  Co.  i.  251 

De  Gogorza   v.  Knickerbocker  Life 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  603 

De  Graff  t'.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 

De  Hahn  v.  Hartley  ii.  473,  518,  526 

De  Ilavilland  v.  Bowerbank  iii.  112 

De  La  Chaumette  v.  Bank  of  Eng- 
land i.  292 
Delafield  v.  Illinois             i.  51,  60,  61,  331 
Delahay  t'.  Memphis  Ins.  Co.            ii.  559 
Dehmiatyr  v.  Milwaukee,  &c.  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  251 

Delameter  v.  Miller  i.  321 

Delano  v.  Bartlett  i.  282 

V.  Blake  i.  308 

V.  Rood  iii.  116,  117 

V.  Scott  ii.  316 

Delavan  Bank  v.  Cotton  iii.  91 

De  La  Vega  v.  Vienna  ii.  719 

Delavcrgne  v.  Norris  iii.  244,  246 

Delaware,  The,  v.  The  Ospray  ii.  431 

Del.  Bank  v.  Jarvis  i.  299 

V.  Smith  ii.  110 

Delaware  Canal  Co.  v.  Westchester 

Bank  i.  498 

Delaware,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Napheys        ii.  240 
Delliasse,  Ex  parte  i.  176 

De  Lisle  v.  Priestinan  ii.  129 

Delmonico  v.  Guillaume  i.  108 

Deloach  v.  Turner  iii.  72 

Delondre  v.  Shaw  ii.  357 

Deloney  r,  Hutcheson  i.  109 

De  Long  v.  Stanton  ii.  828 

De  Longuemere  v,  N.  Y.  Fire  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  487,  688 

V.  Tradesmen's  Ins.  Co.      ii.  512,  554 

Deloret  v.  Rotiischild  iii.  320 

De  Lovio  v.  Boit  ii.  470 

Delver  v.  Barnes  ii.  840,  842 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxiii 


Demainbray  i'.  Metcalf     iii.  250,  288,  291 

Demaix'st  v.  Willard  iii.  421 

V.  VVynkoop  iii.  102,  103 

De  Mcdeiros  v.  Hill  i.  574,  607 

Denieritt  v.  Exchange  Bank  iii.  508 

Demi  c.  Bossier  i.  544 

Deming  v.  Grand  Trunk  K.  Co.      iii.  207 

V.  Kemp  iii.  20G 

Demmon  v.  Boylston  Bank  iii.  431) 

De  Mott  ;;.  Laraway  ii.  181,  1!)7 

V.  McMiillen  i.  411 

Demott  V.  Swain  i.  211 

Dempsey  ;;.  Gardner  i.  508;  ii.  395 

Demuth  v.  American  Institute     i.  505,  500 

Den  V.  Ashmore  i.  540 

V.  Demarest  ii.  933 

V.  Farlee  ii.  859 

V.  Hammel  i.  95 

d.  University  of  North  Carolina 

V.  Foy  iii.  481 

d.  Wright  u.  Wright  ii.  856 

Dendy  v.  Powell  ii.  882 

Denegre  v.  Hiriart  i.  322 

Denew  v.  Daverell  i.  92, 110  ;  ii.  879 

Denison  v.  Denison  ii.  85 

V.  Lee  iii.  Ill 

V.  Seymour  ii.  408 

Denman  v.  Bloomer  i.  59 

Denraead  v.  Glass  iii.  50 

Denn  v.  Chubb  iii.  230 

V.  Cornell  ii.  940 

d.  Burne  v.  Rawlins  i.  549 

Dennett  v.  Atherton  i.  631 

V.  Cutts  i.  129;  ii.  60;  iii.  285 

V.  Dennett  i.  433 

V.  Short  ii.  789 

V.  Wyman  i.  290 

Dennie  v.  Elliott  ii.  874,  875 

V.  Walker  i.  306 

Dennis  w.  Alexander  i.  560 

V.  Barber  iii.  212 

V.  Clark  i.  343,  352 

V.  Ludlow  ii.  473 

V.  Morrice  i.  310 

V.  Sherman  ii.  903 

Dennison  v.  Thomaston  Ins.  Co.      ii.  523 

Denniston  v.  Cook  ii.  897 

V.  Imbrie  iii.  101 

V.  Stewart  i.  322 

Dennistoun  v.  Lillie  ii  524 

Denny  v.  Cabot  i.  180 

V.  Conway  Ins.  Co.  ii.  542 

V.  Oilman  ii.  914 

V.  Lincoln  i.  012 

V.  Manhattan  Co.  i.  70 ;  ii.  033 

V.  Merrifield  iii.  411 

r.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  iii.  194 

V.  Palmer  i.  306,  317 

V.  Williams  iii.  48 

Denoon  v.  Home,  &c.  Ass.  Co.     ii.  483,  491 

Densmore  Oil  Co.  v.  Densmore         i.  187 

Denston  v.  Henderson  i.  327 

V.  Perkins  iii.  439,  441 

Dent  V.  Turpin  ii.  358 

Denton  v.  East  Anglian  Railway       i.  154 


Denton  v.  Embury 

V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co. 

V.  Noyes 

V.  Stewart 
Denver  v.  Roane 
Denys  v.  Shuckburgh 
Depau  V.  Humphreys 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 
Do  Pau  V.  Jones 
De  Peau  v.  Russell 
Depeyster  v.  Clarkson 

V.  Col.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Sun  Ins.  Co. 
Depuy  V.  Swart 
Deraughn  v.  Heath 
Derby,  In  re 

V.  Jacques 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Phelps 

V.  Thrall 
De  Ridder  v.  McKnight 

V.  Schermerhorn 
De  Rivafinoli  v.  Corsetti 


iii.  98.  99 

ii.  260,  408 

i.  125 

iii.  359 

i.  228 

iii.  354 

ii.  714,  710 

ii.  508,  537 

ii.  527 

ii.  497 

i.  137 

ii.  500 

ii.  505,  509,  532 

i.  403,  464 

iii.  183 

iii.  414 

ii.  870 

ii.  654 

ii.  OS;  iii.  41 

ii.  853 

i.  567 

i.  11 ;  ii.  064 

iii.  360 


Derocher  v.  Continental  Mills  i.  355 

De  Rothschild  v.  R.  M.  Steam  Packet 

Co.  ii.  184,  409 

De  Rouge  v.  ElUott  ii.  60S 

Derrickson  v.  Quimby  i.  110 

Derry  v.  Derry  i.  460 

De  Rutte  v.  N.  Y.,  Alb.  &  Buf.  Tel. 

Co.  ii.  279,  280,  281,  285,  290,  293 

Derwort  v.  Loonier  ii.  233,  234,  230 

Descadillas  v.  Harris  ii.  750 

Descharms,  Ex  parte  iii.  464 

Deschler  v.  Beers  ii.  675 

Desha  v.  Holland  i.  188 

V.  Pope  iii.  279 

V.  Sheppard  i.  22.) 

Deshon  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  527, 

529,  684 
Des  Moines  Univ.  v.  Livingston  i.  483 
De  Sobry  v.  De  Laistre  ii.  700 

Despatch  Line  i,  Bellamy  Man.  Co.    i.  52, 

on 

De  Svlva  v.  Henry  ii.  881 

De  Tasted,  Ex  parte  iii.  419,  420,  468 

De  Tastet  )'.  Baring  i.  327 

V.  Sharpe  iii.  406 

De  Tastett  v.  Crousillat  i.  93 

Detmold  v.  Reeves  ii.  311 

De  ToUenere  v.  Fuller  ii.  137 

Detroit  Bank  v.  Burkham  i.  301 

Detroit,  &c.    R.  R.    Co.  v.  Farmers 

Bank  ii.  231 

V.  McKenzie  ii.  226 

Detwiler  v.  Cox  i.  552 

Deux  i>.  Jefferies  ii.  849,  850 

Devaux  v.  I'Anson  ii.  483,  497 

De  Vaux  v.  I'Anson  ii.  483 

De  Vaux  v.  Salvador    ii.  447,  499 ;  iii.  192 

Devaynes  v.  Noble  i.  228;  ii.  706 

Devens  v.  Mechanics,  &c.  Co.  ii.  587 

Deverell  v.  Bolton  iii.  334 

Devereux  v.  Buckley  iii.  207 

Deveron,  The  ii.  439 


Ixxiv 


INDEX  TO    CASES    CITED. 


Devin  v.  Harris  i.  230 

Devine  v.  Edwards  i.  575 

Devlin  v.  Clark  i.  331 

V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  N.  Y.  i.  250 

Devon  v.  Tawlelt  i.  145 

Devonshire  v.  Eglin  iii.  327,  352 

Dewar  v.  Span  ii.  71(3 

Dewart  v.  Clement  i.  570 

Dewdney,  Ex  parte  iii.  467 

Dewees  v.  Morgan  i.  G27 

Dewey  v.  Alpena  School  District     ii.  805 

V.  Bell  ii.  042 

V.  Dewey  i.  108 

V.  Field  ii.  936,  t'Sy 

V.  Humphrey  ii.  771,  776 

V.  Osborn  iii.  237 

V.  School  District  ii.  170 

V.  Watson  iii.  310 

Dewint  v.  Wilste  iii.  248 

De  Witt  V.  Morris  iii.  218 

V.  Pierson  i.  542 

V.  The  St.  Lawrence  ii.  392 

V.  Walton  i.  288 

Dewolf  V.  Pratt  iii.  337 

De  Wolf  V.  Archangel  Lis.  Co.  ii.  532 

V.  Johnson  iii.  123,  130 

V.  Murray  i.  322 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524 

V.  Strader  i.  127 

D'Wolfi;.  Harris  ii.  395 

Dexter  r.  Blancliard  iii.  31 

V.  The  Richmond  ii.  439 

Dey  V.  Dox  iii.  220 

V.  Dunham  iii.  157 

V.  Poughkeepsie  Ins.  Co.    ii.  477,  575 

Dezell  V.  Odell  ii.  930,  939 

Diamond  v.  Harris  i.  537 

Dias  r.  The  Revenge  ii.  454 

Dibbin  v.  Marquis  of  Anglesea        ii.  833 

Dibble  v.  Brown  ii.  277 

V.  Rogers  ii.  939 

Diblin  v.  Murphy  iii.  188 

Dicheno  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.     ii.  247 

Dickens  v.  Lee  ii.  346 

V.  Shepperd  iii.  243 

Dickenson  v.  Conway  12 

t'.  Hall  ii.  30'J 

V.  Lilwal  i.  585 

V.  Naule  i.  145,  528 

Dickerman  v.  Miner  ii.  853 

Dickerson  r.  Brown  ii.  84 

V.  Derickson  ii.  10 

V.  Selyee  ii.  410 

Dickey  r.  Am.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  508 

V.  Brown  iii.  144 

V.  Linscott  ii.  41,  792 

V.  United  Ins.  Co.  ii.  488 

Dickinson  v.  Boyle  iii.  195,  289 

V.  Follett  i.  035 

V.  Gay  i.  628 

V.  Grand  Junction  Canal  Co.    iii.  234 

V.  Hatfield  iii.  75 

V.  Legare  i.  201 

V.  Shee  ii.  776 

V.  Survivors  of  Bolds  «S;  Rhodes  i.  177 


Dickinson  v.  Valpy 
V.  Winchester 

Dickson,  Ex  parte 
V.  Dickson 
V.  Indianapolis 
V.  Jordan 
V.  Miller 


i.  163,  165.  215 

ii.  101 

iii.  468 

ii.  725 

i.  218 

i.  562,  631,  632 
i.  409 


V.  Renter's  Telegraph  Co.  ii.  294 

V.  Thompson  iii.  68 

V.  Zizinia  i.  034 

Didier  v.  Davison  iii.  95,  96,  104 

Diehl  V.  Adams  County  Ins.  Co.       ii.  551 
IMetrich  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  ii.  238,  273 

Dietrichsen  v.  Cabburn  iii.  367 

Dietterich  v.  Heft  i.  137,  151 

Dietz  V.  Mound  City  Ins.  Co.  ii.  582 

Differdorter  v.  Jones  i.  544 

Digby  V.  Atkinson  iii.  248 

Diggle  V.  London  &  Blackwall  R.  R. 

Co.  i.  154 

Dilk  V.  Keigliley  i.  353 

Dill  V.  OTerrell  ii.  814 

V.  South  Carolina  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  212,  277 
Dillard  ;■.  Manhattan  Ins.  Co.  ii.  601 

V.  Moore  i.  017 

Dillaye  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  245, 

251 

Dilleber  v.  Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.  ii.  617 

Diller  v.  Brubacker  ii.  120,  941 

Dillon  V.  Coppin  iii.  315,  318 

V.  Union  Pacific,  &c.  R.  Co.         ii.  45 

Dilworth  v.  Sinderling  iii.  Ill 

Dinimick  v.  Lockwood  iii.  244 

Dimsdale  v.  Robertson        ii.  845;  iii.  333 

Dingle  v.  Hare  iii.  227 

Dingley  v.  Buffum  i.  545 

Dinn  v.  Blake  ii.  841 

Dinsman  v.  Bradley  iii.  398 

Dinsmore  v.  Bradley  iii.  508 

V.  Dinsmore  iii.  75,  88 

V.  Duncan  i.  330 

Diplock  V.  Blackburn  i.  93,  97 

Directors  B.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Collins   ii.  227 

Disborough  i\  Keilson  ii.  791 

Ditcham  v.  Worrall  ii.  65 

Ditchburn  v.  Goldsmith  ii.  897 

Dittmar  v.  Norman  i.  558 

Ditts  V.  Lonsdale  i.  200 

Diversey  v.  Johnson  i.  229 ;  ii.  146 

Diversy  v.  Kellogg  i.  573 

Divine  v.  McCorniick  i.  032 

DivoU  V.  Leadbetter  ii.  941 

Dix  V.  Cobb  i.  251,  254,  255 

V.  Otis  i.  165 

Dixon,  Ex  parte  ii.  882 

V.  Bell  ii.  52 

V.  Broomfield  iii.  10 

V.  Buck  i.  572 

V.  Clark  u.  773,  774,  779,  780 

r.  Cyrus,  The  ii.  401,  466 

V.  Di.x-on  ii.  757,  820 

V.  Dunham  ii.  204,  209 

V.  Green  ii.  939 

I'.  Hammond  ii.  218 

V.  Ilurrell  I  402 


INDEX  TO   CASES  CITED. 


Ixxr 


Dixon  V.  Johnson 
V.  Moyer 
V.  Myers 
V.  Olmstead 
V.  Ramsay 
V.  Kanken 
V.  Sadler 
i;   Sinclair 
V.  Stansfield 
V.  Yates         i 


i.  317 

ii.  307,  314,  315 

i.  50G 


iii.  391 
ii.  4G 
ii.  495,  527,  529 
ii.  871 
i.  107,  108 
562,563,640,640,  051, 
653 
Dixon  Crucible  Co.  v.   Guggenheim 

ii.  352,  358 


Doak  V.  Snapp 
Doake  v.  Dods worth 
Doane  v.  Eddy 

V.  llussell 

V.  Walker 

V.  Willcutt 
Dob  V.  Halsey 
Dobell  V.  Hutchinson 

V.  Stevens 
D'Obree,  Ex  parte 
Dobree  v.  Schroder 
Dobson  V.  CoUis 

V.  Harris 

V.  Land 

V.  Lockhart 

V.  Pearce 

V.  Sotheby 
Dockray  v.  Dockray 

V.  Dunn 
Dod  V.  Herring 
Dodd  V.  Acklom 

V.  Bishop 

V.  Seymour 

V.  Wakeman 
Doddhigton  v.  Hallet 
Dodge  V.  Adams 

V.  Bank  of  Kentucky 

V.  Brown 

V.  Burdell 

r.  Card 

V.  Emerson 

V.  Exchange  Bank 

V.  Lean 

V.  Perkins  1.  97 

V.  Tileston 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 
Dodgson  V.  Bell 
Dodsley  v.  Kinnersley 

V.  Varley 
Dodson  V.  Harris 

V.  Kayes 
Dodsworth  v.  Jones 
Doe  V.  Abernathy 

I'.  Acklom 

V.  Adams 

V.  Allen 

V.  Barnard 

V.  Barton 

V.  Baytup 

V.  Bevan 

V.  Bcynon 

V.  Biggs 


123 

i.  172 

iii.  428 

iii.  253,  271 

ii.  873 

ii.  932 

i.  23,  208 

i.  525,  582 ;  iii.  5 

il.  920 

iii.  406,  460 

ii.  454 

iii.  43 

ii.  906 

ii.  564 

ii.  880 

ii.  741 

ii.  647,  548,  551 

iii.  382 

i.  309,  470 

iii.  427 

i.  544;  ii.  940 

i.  193 

iii.  309 

i.  91 

ii.  387,  391 

i.  464 

i.  318 

i.  298 

i.  457;  ii.  6 

ii.  315 

.  i.  280 

i.  300 

iii.  19 

iii.  110,  112 

i.  110;  iii.  206 

ii.  317,  446,  464 

i.  383 

ii.  346 

iii.  46 

ii.  900 

ii.  643 

iii.  272 

i.  366 

ii.  940 

ii.  636 

ii.  689 

iii.  117 

i.  540,  541 ;  ii.  940 

ii.  940 

iii.  449 

ii.  692 

ii.  644,  645 


Doe  r.  Birch 
V.  Bliss 
V.  Bower 
V.  Brown 
V.  Burt 
V.  Carew 
V.  Carpenter 
V.  Carter 
V.  Catamore 
V.  Cawdor 
V.  Ciiamberlaine 
V.  Childress 
V.  Clark 
V.  Clarke 
V.  Cooper 
V.  Cox 

V.  Cranstoun 
V.  Crick 
V.  Cuthell 
V.  Davis 
V.  Dixon 
V.  Dodd 
V.  Dunbar 
V.  Eason 
V.  Edgar 
V.  Errington 
V.  Evans 
V.  Filliter 
V.  Fleming 
V.  Ford 
17.  Foster 
V.  Frowd 
V.  Galloway 
V.  Glenn 
V.  Goldsmith 
V.  Goldwin 
V.  Gooch 
V.  Grafton 
V.  Green 
V.  Groves 
V.  Grubb 
V.  Guy 
V.  Hamilton 
V.  Hare 
V.  Hawke 
r.  Heath 
V.  Hiscocks 
V.  Home 
V.  Howells 
V.  Hubbard 
V.  Huddart 
V.  Hughes 
V.  Hulme 
V.  Jesson 
V.  Johnston 
V.  Lambley 
V.  Laming 
V.  Lawder 
V.  Lock 
V.  Long 
V.  Lucas 
V.  Martin 
V.  Meyrick 
V.  Mills 
V.  Morgan 


i.  539 

i.  539 

ii.  683 

1.541;  iii.  116,  119 

i.  530;  ii.  680 

ii.  689 

ii.  682 

i.  538;  iii.  419 

ii.  859,  860 

i.  451 

i.  549 

iii.  471 

m.  432,  449 

i.  538,  549 

i.  541 

i.  594 

ii.  680 

i.  549 

i.  549 

iii.  206 

ii.  638 

ii.  639,  644 

i.  550 

ii.  669 

ii.  940 

ii.  929 

i.  540,  549 

iii.  175,  183 

ii.  645 

ii.  932 

ii.  940 

i.  540,  .519 

i.  531;  ii.  681,  082 

i.  147 

ii.  630 

i.  49,  549 

iii.  149 

i.  549 

i.  548 

ii.  936 

i.  549 

i.  141 

i.  22 

iii.  238 

i.  530 

i.  545 

ii.  681,  691,  691 

ii.  932 

ii.  933 

ii.  687 

iii.  239 

i.  549 

i.  211,  542 

ii.  618 

i.  543 

ii.  945 

i.  538 ;  ii.  155,  549 

i.  542 

ii.  645 

1.540;  ii.  620 

i.  551 

i.  79;  ii.  694 

ii.  630 

ii.  949 

ii.087 


Ixxvi 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


V.  Needs 

ii.  G89 

V.  Palmer 

ii.  8(30 

V.  Parkin 

ii.  682 

V.  Parry 

ii.  G81 

r.  Pasquali 

i.  5il,  549 

V.  Pierce 

i.  54!) 

V.  Pi  teller 

■  1.  488 

V.  Pittman 

i.  540 

.'.  Pole 

i.  543;  ii.  941 

r.  Porter 

i.  548 

V.  Powell 

ii.  940 

V.  Quigley 

i.  549 

r.  Pees 

i.  539 

V.  Kicliardson 

ii.  831 

V.  Poberts 

iii.  335 

V.  Pobinson 

i.  89,  90 

V.  Eoilings 

i.  549 

V.  Salkeld 

ii.  635,  637,  686 

V.  Sayer 

i.  549 

V.  Seaton 

ii.  929 

r.  Smith    i.  548;  ii.  794;  iii.  430,  448 

r.  Smythe  i.  540;  ii.  940 

V.  Sommcrsett  i.  549 

V.  Stanion  i.  541 

V.  Taniere  i.  499 

V.  Tiiorp  iii.  103 

V.  Vardill  ii.  730,  731 

f.  Vickers  ii.  940 

V.  Walters  i.  549 

J-.  Warren              ii.  7G9;  iii.  159,  IGl 

V.  Watkins  i.  550 

V.  Watts  i.  549 

V.  Webster  ii.  680 

V.  Westlake  ii.  690 

f.  Whittick  i.  540 

V.  Wiggins  ii.  940 

V.  Williams  ii.  638 

r.  Wood  i.  543;  ii.  940 

V.  Woodbridge  i.  539 

Dogge  r.  Nortii  Western  Ins.  Co.     ii.  477 

Dogget  V.  Vowell  i.  475 

Doggett  V.  Emerson  i.  621 ;  ii.  927 

Doig  V.  Barkley  iii.  IGl 

Dolan  V.  Scanlan  i.  109 

r.  Thompson  i.  109 

Dold  V.  Geiger  i.  382 

Dole  V.  Gold  1.  322 

V.  Lincoln  i.  263,  265 

V.  Stimpson  i.  571 ;  iii.  4G 

V.  Weeks  i.  272,  298 

DoUiver  r.  St.  Joseph  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559 

Dolman  r.  Coi/k  ii.  702 

Dolorct  V.  Uothschild  iii.  320,  325 

Dolph  V.  Wiiite  i.  497 

Dolubdass  v.  RamloU  i.  49 

Domestic,  &c.  Co.  v.  Artlmrliultz       i.  579 

Dominick  r.  Michael  iii.  3:!'.t 

Domnutt  r.  Bedford  iii.  431,  449 

Don  i\  Lit)j)man  ii.  719,  721,  740 

Donahoc  v.  Kmery  iii.  244 

Donahue  v.  Cromartie  i.  5G4 

Donaldson  v.  Beckett  ii.  330 

V.  Benton  ii.  753 

V.  Mississippi  R.  R.  Co.                 ii.  47 

Donailen  v.  Lennox  i.  486 


Donally  v.  Wilson  ii.  768 

Donath  v.  Broomhead  i.  645,  647 

V.  N.  A.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  480 

Donnee  v.  Dow  iii.  222 

Donnell  v.  Columbian  Ins.  Co.  ii.  639,  773 

r.  Donnell  i.  2G4 

V.  Jones  iii.  183,  186,  197 

Donellan  v.  Read  ii.  50;  iii.  37,  43 

Donelly  v.  Corbett  iii.  395,  396,  508 

V.  Harris  iii.  185 

Donelson  v.  Colerain  ii.  878 

V.  Posey  ii.  229,  231 

Doner  v.  Stauffer  i.  234 

Donnington  v.  Mitchell  i.  380,  383 

Donohoe  v.  Gamble  ii.  129 

Doolan,  7?i  re  iii.  323 

Dooley  v.  Gallagher  i.  618 

Doolittle  V.  Malcom  ii.  831,  833 

Doolubdass  v.  Ramloll    i.  526  ;  ii.  896,  897 

Doorman  v.  Jenkins        i.  91,  476;  ii.  100, 

101,  110,  168 

Doran  v.  Smith  i.  356 

Dorchester  r.  Coventry  iii.  239 

V.  Webb  ii.  852 

Dorchester  &  Milton  Bank  v.  New 

England  Bank    i.  327  ;  ii.  113,  669,  672 

Dore  v.  Sellers  iii.  293 

Doremus  v.  McCormick  i.  209 

Dorian  v.  Sammis  ii.  925 

Dorman  r.  Bigelow  ii.  28 

Dormer  r.  WilUams  ii.  90 

V.  Knight  ii.  633 

Dorothy  Foster,  The  ii.  441 
Dorr  r.'N.  J.  Steam  Nav.  Co.  ii.  254,  256, 

259,  267 

V.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.  ii.  398 

V.  Swartwout  iii.  103,  106 

Dorrs  i\  ]\lorewood  ii.  221 

Dorsey  v.  Abrams  ii.  113 

V.  Dorsey  ii.  736 

V.  Gassaway  ii.  765 

V.  Gilbert  i.  149 

V.  Goodenow  i.  403 

V.  Jackman  i.  616 

V.  Rock  wood  i.  479 

V.  Watson  i.  308 

V.  Waymau  iii.  343 

Dorwin  v.  Potter  iii.  190 

Dostal  V.  McCaddon  i.  545 

Doty  V.  Brown  ii.  868,  870 

V.  Miller  i.  110 

r.  I\lilcliell  i.  409 

r.  Wilder  iii.  12 

V.  Wilson  i.  501 

Doub  V.  Mason  ii.  941 

Doubleday  ;;.  Muskett  i.  163,  164 

Dongal  V.  Cowles  i.  207 

Dougherty  ;•.  Stamps  ii.  881 

V   Van  Nostrand  i.  173;  ii.  369 

V.  Western  Bank  of  Georgia       i.  309 

Doughty  V.  Doughty  ii.  737 

V.  West  ii.  324 

Douglas,  Ax  parte  iii.  256 

V.  Forrest  iii.  104 

V.  McAllister  iii.  220 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED, 


Ixxvii 


Douglas  V.  Moody       ii.  424,  447,  451,  45G 

V.  Neil  i.  186 

V.  Oldliain  ii.  719 

V.  Patrick  ii.  774,  775 

V.  Scougal  ii.  527 

V.  Vincent  ii.  77;  iii.  3.S 

Douglass  V.  Elkins  iii.  76 
V.  Howiand            ii.  16,  31 ;  iii.  18,  31 

V.  Mayor  of  New  York  ii.  708 

V.  McChesney  iii.  116,  118 

i;.  Reynolds  ii.  32 

V.  Spears  iii.  9 

V.  White  ii.  751,  823 

V.  Winslow  i.  231,  232 

Dounce  v.  Dow  i.  627,  631 

Douville  V.  Sun  Ins.  Co.  ii.  490 

Dove,  The  ii.  442 

Dow  V.  Drew  .      iii.  160 

V.  Eyster                '  i.  388 

V.  Greene  iii.  279 

V.  Humbert  iii.  235 

V.  Kansas,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  47 

V.  Moore  i.  200 

V.  Sayward  i.  232,  236 

V.  Smith  ii.  527,  536 

V.  Tattle  ii.  850 
Dowd  V.  Faucett                  ii.  879;  iii.  238 

Dowdall  V.  Lenox  iii.  116 

Dovvdle  V.  Camp  iii.  63 

Do  well  V.  Dew  iii.  363,  365 

V.  Gen.  S.  N.  Co.  ii.  429 

Dowley  v.  Camp  ii.  31 

Dowling  V.  Eggemann  iii.  285 

V.  Eord  iii.  90 

V.  McKenney  iii.  19,  46 

Dowman,  Ex  parte  iii.  4G2 

Down  V.  Hailing  1.  293,  296 

V.  Hatcher  ii.  749 

V.  Pinto  ii.  37 
Downer  v.  Brackett           iii.  459,  461,  478 

V.  Garland  ii.  865 

V.  Rowell  ii.  144 

V.  Shaw  ii.  740 

V.  Sinclair  ii.  781 

V.  Smith  ii.  815 

Downes  v.  Back  iii.  220 

Downey  v.  Andrus  ii.  747 

Downing  v.  Funk  i.  471 
Downs  V.  Collins               iii.  821,  361,  369 
V.  Cooper                      ii.  826,  936,  944 

V.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  246 

V.  Planters  Bank  i.  318 

V.  Ross  iii.  60 
Dows  V.  Cobb  i.  328,  651 ;  ii.  198, 199,  410 

V.  Greene  i.  47 

V.  Griswold  iii.  461 

Dowse  V.  Coxe  ii.  849 

Dowset  V.  Sweet  ii.  681 

Dowsland  v.  Thompson  ii.  873 

Dowthwaite  v.  Tibbul  iii.  69,  70 

Dowzelot  V.  Rawlings  i.  225 

Dox  V.  Dey  iii.  113 

Doyle  V.  Bailey  i.  174 

V.  Callow  iii.  336 

V.  Harris  iii.  332 


Doyle  V.  Jessup 

V.  Kiser 

V.  Lord 
Doyley  v.  Burton 
Draco,  The 
Drain  v.  Doggett 
Drais  v.  Ilogan 
Drake  v.  Baker 

V.  Beckham 

V.  Elwyn 

V.  Hill 


ii.  7fi 

ii.  277 

i.  581 

ii.  827 

ii.  401,  402,  408,  404 

ii.  747 

i.  388 

iii.  24fi 

iii.  45-5 

i.  175,  213 

i.  248 


V.  Mayor  of  Exeter 

V.  Mayor  of  Exon 

V.  Mitchell 

V.  Ramey 

V.  Ramsey 

V.  Sear 

V.  Taylor 

V.  White 
Drakely  v.  Deforest 
Draper  v.  Charter-Oak  Ins.  Co 


V.  Com.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Glassop 

V.  Pattina 

V.  Romeyn 

V.  Weld 

V.  Wood 
Draughan  v.  Buntin 
Draxel  v.  Man 
Drayton  v.  Dale 
Drennen  v.  House 

V.  Walker 
Dresser  v.  Ainsworth 

V.  Brooks 

V.  Dresser 


iii.  435 

iii.  454 

ii.  852 

i.  180 

i.  177,  306 

iii.  219 

iii.  440 

ii.  791 

iii.  30 

ii.  542, 

557 

ii.  527 

iii.  108 

iii.  9 

ii.  30 

i.  288 

ii.  853 

iii.  25 

iii.  2o7 

i.  300  ;  iii.  458 

i.  178,  213 

i.  51 

i.  616 

iii.  388,  461 

i.  265 

Dresser  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Waterston    iii.  215 

Drew  V.  Drew  iii.  106 

V.  Nunn  i.  76 

V.  Power  iii.  116 

V.  Towle  i.  495  ;  ii.  875 

V.  Woolcock  ii.  833 

Drewe  v.  Corp  iii.  367 

V.  Hanson  i.  525 

Driesbach  v.  National  Bank  iii.  124 

Driggs  V.  Dwight  iii.  195,  246 

Drinan  v.  Nichols  ii.  745 

Drinkwater  v.  Goodwin       i.  107  ;  ii.  745, 

883 ;  iii.  275,  276 

V.  Tebbetts  i.  315 

V.  The  Spartan  ii.  407 

Driscol  V.  Passmore  ii.  524,  532 

DriscoU  V.  Bovil  ii.  533 

Drover's  Bank  v.  Brown  i.  271 

Drue  V.  Thorne  ii.  731 

Druid,  The  i.  114 

Drummond  v.  Burrell  ii.  49;  iii.  41 

V.  Hopper  i.  435 

V.  Irish  ii.  88 

V.  Wood  i.  108 

Drumright  v.  Philpot  i.  122 

Drury  v.  Connor  iii.  309,  310,  349 

V.  Defontaine  i.  488  ;  ii.  898,  899 

V.  Drury  i.  371 

V.  Poster  ii.  861 


Ixxviii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Drury  v.  Hervey 
V.  Ilooke 
t'.  Maoale 
r.  JMolius 
V.  Sliuiuway 
V  Smith 

Dry  r.  Davy 


i.  579 
ii.  08 
iii.  310 
iii.  328 
iii.  242 
i.  2d5 
ii.  5,  21 


Dryburg  v.  N.  Y.  &  Wash  Pr.  Tel.  Co. 

ii.  289,  290 
Dry  Dock  Bank  v.  Amer.  Life  Ins. 

&  Trust  Co.  iii.  117,  158 

Drvsdale  v.  Mace  iii.  338,  371 

Dublin  i;.  Wicklow  R.  R.  v.  Black      i.  365, 

375 

Dubois,  Ex  parte  iii.  472 

V.  BauMi  iii.  311 

V.  Del.  &  Hud.  Canal  Co.     ii.  G2,  813 

V.  Hull  iii.  2'J3 

V.  Kelly  i.  545,  547 ;  iii.  37 

V.  Mason  i.  283 

Dubois'  Appeal  i.  128 

Dubose  V.  Wheddon  i.  853 

Dubuisson  v.  Folkes  ii.  27,  30 

Dubuque  Bank  i'.  Carpenter  i.  210 

Ducat  V.  Chicago  i.  155 

Duchess  de  Brabant,  The  ii.  454 

Duchess  of  Kingston's  case  ii.  860 

Duckett  V.  Williams  ii.  590 

Duckwortli  V.  Alison  ii.  870 

Dudgeon  v.  Pembroke       ii.  495,  498,  530 

V.  Teass  ii.  138 

Dudley  v.  Mallery  ii.  820 

V.  Mayhew  ii.  330 

V.  Nettlefold  ii.  830 

V.  Smith  ii.  230,  242 

V.  Thomas  ii-  831 

V.  Warde  i.  547 

Dufaurv.  Professional  Life  Ass.  Co.  ii.  604 

Duff  V.  Budd  ii.  224,  201,  263,  272 

V.  Gardner  i.  12 

V.  Lawrence  ii.  425 

f.  Snider  iii.  40 

V.  The  East  India  Co.  ii.  740 

V.  Wilson  i.  541 

Duffee  V.  Mason  i.  623 

Duflell  V.  Wilson  ii.  481 

Duflie  v.  Hayes  ii.  423 

Duflield  c.  Brainerd  i.  222 

V.  Creed  iii.  67 

Duffy  I'.  Ins.  Co.  i.  410 

V.  Patten  ii.  770;  iii.  41 

Dufolt  V.  Gorman  ii.  221 

Dufour  r.  IMorse  i.  317 

Dugan  V.  Gittings  iii.  102,  372 

f.  Nichols  i.  567  ;  iii.  441 

Dugdale  v.  Lovcring  i.  36 

Duguet  V.  Kiiinelander  ii.  479 

Duhring  v.  Duliring  i.  168 

Duignan  /■.  Walker  ii.  890 

Duke  of  Beaufort  ;■.  Neeld  i.  41 

Duke  of  Bedford,  The  ii.  403,  404 

Duke  of  Manchester,  The  ii.  408 

Duke  of  Dorset  i;.  Lord  Ilawarden    ii.  681 

Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Worthy      i.  65,  52.j, 

682 


Duke  of  Northumberland  v.  Erring- 
ton  ii.  033,  642 
Duke  of  Queensbury  v.  Shebbeare   ii.  330 
Duke  of  St.  Albans  v.  Shore  ii.  602,  663 
Duker  v.  Franz  ii.  853 
I^ula  V.  Cowles  ii.  651 
Dulaney  v.  Payne  ii.  769 
V.  Tlie  Peragio  ii.  439 
Dulany  r.  Rogers  iii.  353 
Dullaghan  v.  Fitch  iii.  172 
Dulles  V.  De  Forest  ii.  766 
Dulty  V.  Brownfield  i.  361,  370 
Dumaresly  r.  Fishly  ii.  726 
Dumas  v.  Jones  ii.  491 
Dumont  v.  Rueppreclit  i.  221 
Dumper  v.  Symms  i.  153 
Dunbar  v.  Bonesteel  ii.  917 
V.  Brown  ii.  81 
V.  Garrity  ii.  764 
V.  Glenn  ii.  353 
V.  Marden  ii.  809 
V.  McFall  ii.  909 
V.  Tredennick  i.  93 
V.  Tyler  i.  808 
V.  Williams  ii.  44 
Duncan  v.  Benson  ii.  404 
V.  Bloomstock  ii.  874 
V  Cafe  ii.  760,  761 
V.  Clark  i.  207 
V.  Course  i.  825 
V.  Cannan  ii.  713 
V.  Duncan  ii.  829 
V.  Hodges  ii.  861 
V.  Holcomb  ii.  869 
V.  Kock  ii.  512 
V.  Lewis  i.  556 
V.  Maryland  Savings  Institution 

iii.  139,  143 

V.  McCullough       i.  308,  435 ;  iii.  373 

V.  Railroad  Co.  ii.  137 

V.  Stone  i.  578,  579 

I'.  Sun  Ins.  Co.     ii.  482,  517,  542,  547 

V.  Tombeckbee  Bank  i.  211 

V.  To])ham  i.  515,  516 

Duncan's  Appeal  i.  410 

Duncklee  v.  Locke  i.  129 ;  ii.  60,  875 

Duncomb  v.  Tickridge  i.  350 

Duncuft  V.  Albrecht      i.  522 ;  iii.  56,  324, 

325 

Dundas  v.  Dimdas  ii.  701 

V.  Dutens  ii.  77 

Dundee,  The  ii.  454 

Dunham  v.  Dodge  iii.  89 

V.  Gould  iii.  158 

i;.  Pet  tee  ii.  668 

V.  Presby  i.  176 

V.  Rogers  i.  180 

V.  Greenfield  Steam  Mills  Co.     i.  255 

Dunkley  v.  Farris  i.  79 

Dunlap  f.  Hales  i.  364,  365 

V.  Hunting  ii.  103,  786 

V.  International,  &,c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  276 

?;.  Thompson  i.  319 

V.  Watson  i.  187,  228 

Duulevy  v.  Talmadge  iii.  292 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxix 


Dunlop  V.  Gregory  ii.  893 

V.  Grote  iii.  225 

V.  Higgins       i.  514,  516;  iii.  212,  221 


V.  Miinroe 

r.  Waugh 
Dunman  v.  Strother 
Dunn  V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co. 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Murray 

V.  Sayles 

V.  Slee 

V.  Smith 

V.  Snell 

V.  Sparks 

r.  Wade 

V.  West 
Dunnage  v.  JolifEe 
Dunne  v.  Deery 

V.  English 

V.  Ferguson 
Dunnell  v.  Mason 
Dunning  v.  Chamberlain 

V.  Merrill 

V.  Roberts 
Dunning's  Appeal 
Dunscomb  v.  Dunscomb 
Dunsetli  v.  Bank  of  United  States   iii.  289 
Dunton  v.  Brown  i.  361 

Dupee  V.  Boston  Water  Power  Co.  i.  158 
Dupeyre  v.  Western  Ins.  Co.  ii.  496,  529 
Duplanty  v.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.  ii.  484 
Dupont  V.  McLaran  i.  220 

Dupont  de  Nemours  v.  Vance   ii.  442,  448 


154 

i.  622 

ii.  896 

ii.  245 

ji.  198 

ii.  836 

ii.  49 

i.  33 

i.  301 

i.  255,  257 

iii.  463 

i.  35 

ii.  838 ;  iii.  24 

ii.  204 

i.  142 

93,  187 

iii.  35 

i.  101 

iii.  104 

iii.  129 

ii.  298 

i.  243 

i.  137 


1. 


Diiport  V.  Wildgoose 

ii.  829 

Du  l^ratt  V.  Lick 

i.  115 

Dupuy  V.  United  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  515 

Durand  v.  Carrington 

ii.  866 

V.  Thouron 

ii.  567 

Durant  v.  Essex  Co. 

ii.  870 

V.  Mass.  Hospital  Ins.  Co. 

iii.  429 

V.  Rogers 

i.  208 

V.  Titley 

i.  399 

Durborrow's  Appeal 

i.  232 

Durell  V.  Wendell 

i.  28 

Durfee  v.  Jones 

ii.  106 

Durgy,  &c.  Co.  v.  O'Brien  i.  640, 

641,  645 

Durham  i'.  Arledge 

ii.  11 

V.  Bischoif 

i.  248 

V.  Carbon  Coal  Co. 

i.  155 

V.  Manrow 

iii.  28 

V.  Price 

i.  308 

V.  Wadlington 

i.  468 

Durkee  v.  Vt.  Central  R.  R. 

ii.  299 

Durnford  t'.  Lane 

i.  481 

Durrell  v.  Bederly 

ii.  624 

V.  Evans 

i.  593 

Durrum  v.  Hendrick 

1.307 

Duryea  i'.  Burt 

i.  106 

Duryeas  v.  Whitcomb                 i. 

176,  184 

Dusar  v.  Murgatroyd 

ii.  454 

Dusenberry  v.  Ellis 

i.  69,  72 

Dustan  v.  M'Andrew 

iii.  225 

Dutclier  n.  Dutcher 

ii.  737 

V.  Marine  Bank 

iii.  440 

i;.  Wright                      ii.  797 

;  iii.  460 

Dutchess  Co.  v.  Davis 
Dutton  V.  Dutton 

V.  Gerrish 

V.  Hutchinson 

V.  Marsh 

0.  Morrison    i.  224, 

V.  Poole  i. 

V.  Solomonson 

V.  Tilden 

V.  Willner 
Duvall  V.  Craig 

V.  Farmers  Bank    i. 

V.  Farmers  Bank  of 
Dwight  V.  Ames 

V.  Appletons 

V.  Blackmar 

V.  Brewster  ii. 

V.  Emerson 

V.  Newell 

V.  Pease 
Dwyer  v.  Edie 
Dye  V.  Kerr 
Dyer  v.  Brannock 

V.  Burnhara 

V.  Cady 

V.  Clark 

V.  Covington 

j;.  Dorsey 

V.  Gibson 

V.  Hargrave 

V.  Hunt 

V.  Lewis 

V.  Libby 

V.  Pearson 

V.  Rich 

V.  Shurtleff 
Dykers  v.  Allen 
Dykes  v.  Blake 

V.  Leather  M.  Bank 
Dyott  V.  Letcher 
Dyster,  Ex  parte 


E. 


234,  237 


ii.  942 
i.  411 
1.633 
iii.  95 
i.  58 

iii.  441 


496,  498 ;  iii.  353 

i.  573 ;  iii.  226 

ii.  686 

i.  97 

i.  68 

308,  .382 ;  iii.  139 

Maryland  ii.  674 

iii.  411,  421 

ii.  335 

i.  95 

175,  179,  246,  275 

i.  290,  315 

i.  272 

1.273 

ii.  605 

ii.  52 

ii.  84 

i.  69 

ii.  936 

i.  168,  170,  223 

i.  280 

iii.  246 

ii.  28,  iii.  26 

iii.  356 

ii.  700 

ii.  394 

i.  564,  567 

ii.  938 

ii.  802 

i.  93 

ii.  126,  128 

i.  523,  525,  582 

i.  297 

iii.  96 

iii.  465 


Eaden  v.  Titchmarsh  i.  12 

Eades  v.  Booth  _    i.  352 

Eadie  v.  Ashbaugh  i.  62,  75 

Eads  V.  H.  D.  Bacon,  The  ii.  442 

V.  Williams  ii.  843 

Eager  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  ii.  516 

V.  The  Commonwealth  iii.  103 

Eagle  )'.  Swayze  i-  533 

V.  White  ii.  196,  212 

Eagle  Bank  v.  Chapin  i.  321 

V.  Smith  i.  298,  301,  ii.  753 

Eagle  Fire  Co.  v.  Lent  i.  368 

Eagle,  &c.  Co.  v.  Shattuck  iii.  28 

Eagleson  v.  Shotwell  iii-  H8 

Eaken  ;-.  Thom  ii.  461 

Fames,  Ex  parte  iii.  400 

V.  Godfrey  ii-  315 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540,  543 

Eardley  v.  Price  ii-  44 


Ixxx 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Earl  V.  Peck  ..  i-  466 

V.  Shaw  n.  475,  479,  532 

V.  Stockcr  "•  O'-'^ 

Earl  of  Bedford  v.  Bishop  of  Exeter 

11.  boo 
Earl  of  Bristol  i'.  Wilsmore  i.  564 ;  ii.  9U 
Earl  of  Buckiii<;liamsliire  v.  Drury  i.  3/1 
Earl  of  Chesterfield  i'.  Janssen  in.  147^  loU 
Earl  of  Falmoutli  r.  Tlionias  ui.  3o,^oO 
Earl  of  Granard  v.  Dunkin  __  n-  ^ob 
Earl  of  Litchfield,  In  re  m.  421,  42o 

Earl  of  Mansfield  r.  Ogle 
Earl  of  Shrewsbury  v.  Gould 
Earle  v.  Dickson 


Eaton  u.  Lyon 

V.  McKown 
V.  Smith 
V.  Whitaker 

Ebenezer,  The 

Eberman  v.  Keitzell 


ii.  625 

i.  297 

ii.  624,  625 

iii.  347 

ii.  440,  519 

i.  489 


V. 


Harris 

Peale 

V.  Reed 

V.  Kowcroft 

V.  Sawyer 

Early  v.  Flannery 

V.  Garrett 
Earnest  v.  Parke 


149 
ii.  040 
iii.  107 
ii.  520 
i.  338 
i.  353 
ii.  500 
u.  311,  315,  327 
ii.  765 
i.  615,  6.35 
i.  463 


Ebert's  Executors  v.  Ebert's  Admin 


istrators 
Eccleston  v.  Clipsham 
Ecliols  V.  Cheney 
Ecker  v.  Bohn 

Eclectic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fahrenkrg 
Eclipse  Windmill  Co.  v.  Thorson 


East  Carver  Co.  r.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  490 
East  St.  Louis  r.  St.  Louis  Gas,  &c. 

Co.  "•  ^^^ 

East  Tennessee  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nelson  ii.  185 
Easterlin  v.  Rylander  i-  '^'^] 

Easterly  r.  Cole  i"-  HO'  ^ 

Eastern     Counties    Railway    Co.    v. 

Broom  }/  I'^j^ 

r.  Philipson  V.-.^,^ 

Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Benedict  }n-fi 

V.  Relief  Ins.  Co.  »•  587 

Eastern  Star,  The  ".-.^-^J 

Eastern  Union  R.R.  Co.  v.  Cochrane  n.  18 
East  Haddam  Bank  v.  Scovil  i.  91,  n.  Hrf 
Eastham  v.  Anderson  iH'  ^° 

East   Hartford  v.  Hartford   Bridge 


Company 
East  India  Co.,  Ex  parte 

V.  Henchman 

V   Hensley 

V.  Prince 

V.  Pullen 

V.  Vincent 
Eastman  v.  (lark 

V.  Coos  Bank 

V.  Foster 

V.  McAlpin 

V.  Rapids 

V.  Wripht 
Easton  Bank  v.  Commonwealth 

V.  Worthington 


iii.  483 

iii.  401 

i.  95 

i.  41 

iii.  69 

ii.  189 

ii.  939 

i.  183 

i.  126 

iii.  468 

382 

770 

i.  254,  ii.  852 

iii.  498 

i.  556 


Edan  v.  Dudfield 
Eddie  i-.  Davidson 
Eddins  V.  Buck 
Eddowes  v.  Hopkins 
Eddy,  The 
V.  Badger 
V.  Clement 
V.  Herrin 
V.  Livingston 
Edelen  v.  Gough 
Edelston  v.  Edelston 
Eden  v.  Parkinson 
Edens  v.  Williams 
Edes  V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co. 
Edgar  v.  Boies 

r.  Knapp 
Edgell  V.  Hart 

V.  McLaughlin 
V.  Stanford 
Edgerly  r.  Emerson 
V.  Farmers  Ins.  Co. 
I'.  Whalan 
Edgerton  r.  Clark 

'  V.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  R.  Co 
Edick  r.  Crim  „^^   ..  ^.^^ 

Edie  V.  East  India  Co.     i.  278,  286,  ii.  6< 4 
Edinboro  Acad.  v.  Dobinson  i-  482 

Edington  1-.  Pickle  ]]■  f'^ 

Edis  V.  Bury  ..       V"  "^O 

Edleston  v.  Edleston  "•  '^5,  61-j 

r  Vick  ii.  364.  367,  369,  374 


835 
14,  15 
i.  40 
iii.  463 
ii.  543 
ii.  745, 
747 
ii.  772 
i.  234 
ii.  79 
iii.  112 
ii.  407 
iii.  144 
ii.  880 
i.  444 
ii.  110 
iii.  17,  18,  31 
ii.  376 
ii.  519 
i.  222 
ii.  575,  577 
ii.  060,  iii.  231 
i.  31,  34 
i.  613 


ill. 


ii.  896 

iii.  125 

ii.  6 

ii.  586 

i.  387 

iii.  236 

ii.  245 

i.  616 


East^RivcT  Bank  v.  Kennedy  i.  132 

Eastwood  V.  Brown  i- <^/^ 

t,.  Kenvon      i.  460,  465,  iii.  21,  2.3,  28 

Eaton  »'.  Bell  i.  136,  in.  141,  159 

V.  Benton 
V.  Boissonnault 
V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Eaton 
V.  Hill 
V.  Jacques 
t;.  Lincoln 


52 
iii.  13 
ii.  248 
ii.  7.37 
i.  356 
iii.  424 
ii.  761 


Edmands  v.  Mutual  Ins.  Co 
Edmiston  v.  Wright 
Edmond  r.  Caldwell 
Edmonson  v.  Davis 

r.  Dyson 

V.  Stephenson 
Edmunds  v.  Bushell 

V.  Downes 
Edson  V.  F\Uler 


575 

iii.  206 

ii.  757 

i.  209 

i.  376 

ii.  48 

i.  41 

iii.  77 

i.  804,  474 


Edwards.  Fx  parte  iii.  416,  419,  420 

V.  Aberayon  Ins.  Co.  ij-  s^» 

V.  Baltimore  Ins.  Co.  ]]■  »»' 

V.  Barrow  "• 

V.  Baugh 

V.  Beaird  .   „■!"■  ^ic 

V.  Brewer  ^  642,  645 

I.  466 


698 
472 
292 


V.  Burt 
V.  Chapman 
V.  Cliild 
i;.  Coleman 


ii.  815 
ii.  458 
iii.  426 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxi 


Edwards  v.  Coombe 
V.  Cottrell 
V.  Davis 
V.  Etherington 
V.  Footner 
V.  Goldsmith 


iii.  411 

i.  557 

i.  343,  351 

i.  532,  633 

i.  79;  ii.  524 

ii.  625,  684 


V.  Grand  Junction  R.  Co. 
V.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co 


iii.  315 


V.  Harben 

V.  Hart 

V.  Hodding 

V.  Kearzey 

V.  Kelly 

V.  Lord 

V.  Martin 

V.  McCaddon 

V.  McFall 

V.  McLeay 

V.  Owen 

V.  Parkhurst 

V.  Remington 

V.  R.  F.  Stockton,  The 

V.  Sherratt 

V.  Skirving 

V.  St.  Louis  Ins.  Co. 

V.  State,  &c. 

V.  Temple 

V.  Todd 

V.  Towels 

V.  Varick 

V.  Williams 
Edwin,  The 
Eeles,  In  re 


ii.  185, 

187 

i.  569 

ii.  783 

i.  85;  ii.  761 

iii.  506 

iii.  31 

ii  236 

iii.  242 

iii.  511 

i.  189 

iii.  -371 

ii.  912 

ii.  909 

i.  185 

ii.  434 

ii.  186,  217 

iii.  129 

ii.  400 

ii.  934 

ii.  882 

ii.  414 

i.  394 

ii.  932 

iii,  172 

ii.  409 

iii.  417 


Egan  V.  Mat.  F.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  542,  554,  557 

Egbert  v.  Lippman  ii.  306 

Egberts  v.  Wood  i.  201,  238 

Egerton  v.  Furzeman  ii.  897 

V.  Mathews  iii.  9,  16 

Eggleston  v.  Boardman  i.  128 

Egleston  v.  Knickerbacker  ii.  686 

Egremont  v.  Langdon  ii.  940 

Ehle  V.  Judson  i.  464 

V.  Purdy  i.  11 

Ehringhaus  v.  Ford  iii.  118 

E.  I.  Comp.  V.  Henchman  i.  95 

Eichelberger  v.  Barnitz  i.  620;  ii.  918 

Eicke  V.  Nokes  iii.  77 

Eighth  Bulk  v.  Fitch  i.  232 

Eilenberger  v.  Protective  Ins.  Co.     i.  79 ; 

ii.  543 

Eisdell  V.  Coningham  iii.  286 

Ekins  V.  East  India  Co.  ii.  716 

V.  Marklish  i.  103 

Ela  V.  Card  i.  406 

Elam  V.  Carruth  i.  52 

Eland  v.  Karr  ii.  882 

Fibers  v.  United  Ins.  Co.  ii.  479 

Elbinger  Co.  v.  Armstrong  iii.  223 

i;.  Clave  i.  105 

Elcox  V.  Hill  ii.  158 

Elder,  Ex  parte  iii.  471 

V.  Littler  i.  147 

V.  True  iii.  242,  244 

V.  Warfield  ii.  8 


Elderkin  r.  Elderkin  iii.  426 

Elderton  v.  Emniens  ii.  4y,  801 

Eldred  v.  Havves  i.  309 

Eldridge  v.  Benson  i.  581 

V.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  236 

V.  Rovve  ii.  37,  657 

V.  Wadleigh  i.  616 

Electra,  The  ii.  435 

Elephanta,  The  ii.  404 

Elfe  V.  Gadsden  iii.  12 

Elford  V.  Teed  i.  303 

Elgar,  Ex  parte  iii.  462 

V.  Watson  ii.  773 

Eliason  v.  Henshaw  i.  505,  514 

Eliott  V.  Giese  ii.  471 

Eliver  v.  Beste  iii.  409 

Eli  Whitney,  The  ii.  420 

Elizabeth,  The  ii.  439 

V.  Rickers  ii.  462 

Elizabeth  &  Jane,  The  ii.  442 

Eliza  Jane,  The  ii.  383 

Elkin  ?'.  Janson  ii.  522,  525 

V.  Moore  iii.  Ill 

Elkington  r.  Holland  i.  126 

Elkins  V.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.       ii.  175, 

184 
V.  Parkhurst  i.  489 ;  ii.  785,  789 

Ellen  V.  Topp  ii.  56 
Ellershaw  v.  Magniac            i.  650;  ii.  411 

Ellery  v.  Cunningham  iii.  112 

V.  New  Eng.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 

Ellett  V.  Tyler  iii.  295 
EUicott  V.  Alliance  Ins.  Co.      ii.  507,  508, 

512 

V.  Martin  i.  273 

V.  Nichols  iii.  72 

V.  Peterson  iii.  43 

V.  White  iii.  357 

Elliot  V.  Bradley  i.  108 

V.  Collier  i.  380 

V.  Cooper  i.  279 

V.  Davis  i.  122,  124 

i\  Hamilton  Ins.  Co,  ii.  545,  557 

V.  Wilson  ii.  5.32 

Elliott  V.  Bishop  i.  545 

V.  Bradbury  iii.  275 

V.  Cordell  iii.  438 

V.  Giese  ii.  7 ;  iii.  17 

V.  Gurr  ii.  87,  727 

V.  Horn  i.  355 

V.  Minott  iii.  Ill 

V.  Rossell  ii.  181 

V.  Sleeper  ii.  757 

V.  Smith  i.  541 

i\  Swartwout  i.  85 

V.  Thomas  iii.  49 

Ellis,  Ex  parte  iii.  474 
V.  Am.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  280,  281,  282,  286, 
287,  294 

V.  Brown  i.  274,  284 

V.  Chinnock  iii.  227 

V.  Commercial  Bank  i.  306,  311 

V.  Emmanuel  ii.  6 
V.  Essex  Merrimack  Bridge  i.  149 
V.  Hamlen                  i.  494;  ii.  39,  655 


/ 


Ixxxii 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Ellis  t'.  Higgins 
i\  Hunt 
V.  Jiinies 
r.  M'llenry 
r.  >.'iiiuiio 
V.  I'aige 
V.  Sclunoeck 
V.  Secor 


1.489 

i.  675,  G48 

ii.  220 

ii.  7Ij7 

iii.  318 

i.  549;  ii.  794 

i.  16:j 

i.  2G5 


v.  Sheffield  Gas  Consumers  Co.  i.  116 

V.  Sisson  i.  257 

V.  Thompson  i.  581 ;  ii.  666,  794 

V.  Turner  i.  114;  ii.  258 

V.  AVarnes  iii.  129 

V.  Wild  i.  302 

V.  WiUard  ii.  412,  418 

Ellison  c.  Chapman  i.  184 

V.  Collingridge  i.  281 

V.  Ellison  iii.  315 

V.  Ehvin  iii.  438 

Ellsworth  V.  Lockwood  ii.  6 

V.  Tartt  i.  176 

Elmendorf  v.  Harris  ii.  843 

Elmore  v.  Kingscote  iii.  14 

V.  Naugatuck  R.  R.  Co.  ii  231 

V.  Sands  ii.  24G 

V.  Stone  i.  571 ;  iii.  46,  47 

Elpliick  V.  Barnes  i.  581 

Elsee  V.  Gatward  ii.  Ill 

Elston  V.  Jasper  i.  434 

Eltliam  V.  Kingsman  i.  74 ;  ii.  759 

Elting  i\  Scott  ii.  524 

V.  Vanderlyn  i.  470 

Elton,  Ex  parte  i.  238 

V.  Brogden  i.  635 ;  ii.  500 

V.  Jordan  i.  635 

V.  Larkins  ii.  912 

Elvvell  V.  Chaniberlin  i.  60 

Grove.  TJie  ii.  440 

Elwes  1-.  Maw  i.  546,  547 

Ely  r.  Ely  i.  537 ;  ii.  589,  860 

V.  James  ii.  756 

V.  MoClung  iii.  IIG 

V.  Webster  ii.  894 

Elysville  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Okisko  Co. 

i.  154;  iii.  295 

Emancipation,  The  ii.  402,  403 

Emanuel  ;-.  Bird  i.  238 

Emblem,  The  ii.  440,  441 

Eniblin  v.  Dartnell  i.  309 

Embree  v.  Ilanna  ii.  738 

Enulin  v.  Darley  ii.  875 

Emerick  v.  Sanders  iii.  25 

Emerson  v.  Baylies  ii.  877 

V.  Brigham  i.  632 
V.  Davies     ii.  334,  335,  336,  341,  342, 

343 

v.  Harmon  i.  205 

V.  Hcelis  i.  525 

V.  Hogg  ii.  314,  315 

V.  Howland  ii.  38,  404 

V.  Knower  i.  210 

V.  Partridge  ii.  713 

V.  Slater  ii.  685;  iii.  29 

Emery  i-.  Chase  i.  458 

r.  Emery  i.  393;  ii.  834 


Emery  ;■.  Horsey 
V.  Hitchcock 
1-.  Irving  Bank 
V.  Kempton 
V.  Neighbour 
V.  Owings 
V.  Smith 
V.  Wase 
Emes  V.  Widowson 
Emily,  The 
Einly  r.  hye 
Emma  Johnson,  The 
Emmanuel,  The 
Emmens  v.  Elderton 
Emmerson  v.  Helis 
Emmett  v.  Norton 

i\  Tottenham 
Emmons  r.  Littlefield 

V.  Lord 

V.  Murray 

r.  Wcstfield  Bank 
Emmott  V.  Kearns 
Emory  v.  Grecnough 


ii.  195,  225,  456 

ii.  828 

i.  578 

i.  349 

i  402 

ii.  843 

iii.  43 

ii.  834 ;  iii.  369 

ii.  821 

ii.  432 

i.  194,  203 

ii.  414 

ii.  519 

ii.  36 

i.  125  ;  iii.  12,  35 

i.  43,  47,  393,  401, 

402 

i.  270 

i.  458 

ii.  44 

i.  364 

i.  177 

i.  472 

ii.  737  ;  iii.  396, 

397 

Empire  State,  The  ii.  435 

Empire  Trans.  Co.  v.  Wamsutta  Oil 

Co.  ii.  172,  270 

Empson  v.  Soden  i.  546,  547 

Emulous,  Schooner,  and  Cargo        ii.  437 
Ender  v.  Scott  i.  623 

Enderby  v.  Gilpin  iii.  152 

Enfield  Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Hartford 
&  New  Haven  R.  R.  Co.      iii.  490,  492, 

494,  495 

England  v.  Curling  iii.  321 

V.  Davison  ii.  831 

?'.  Lewis  iii.  292 

English  V.  Blundell  i.  11,  14,  23 

r.  Harvey  i.  137 

V.  New  Haven,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.     iii.  484 

Enicks  v.  Powell  i.  36 

Enlow  V.  Klein  i.  578 

Ennis  r.  Walker  iii.  12 

V.  Williams  i.  190 

Eno  V.  Crooke  i.  259 

Enoch  Morgan's  Sons'  Co.  v.  Troxell 

ii.  353 
Ensminger  ;-.  Marvin  i.  204 

Enterprise,  The  ii.  458 

Enterprise  Ins.  Co.  i'.  Parisot  ii.  573 

Entwistle  r.  Ellis  ii.  474,  490 

Kntz  r.  ]\Iills  iii.  12 

En^'s  r.  DoMnithornc  i.  12,  15,  30 

Episcopal  Charitable  Society  v.  Epis- 

coj)al  Church  i.  154 

Epler  V.  Funk  i.  299 

Epley  V.  Witlierow  ii.  939 

Eppes  V.  Tucker  ii.  446 

Epps  V.  Hinds  ii.  159 

Equitable  Ins.  Co.  v.  Patcrson         ii.  698, 

605 
Erie  Bank  v.  Gibson  ii.  24 

Erie,  &c.  Trans.  Co.  v.  Dater  ii  265 

Erie  Railway  i-.  Union,  lic.  Co.  i.  485 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxiii 


Erie  Tl.  Co.  v.  Wilcox 

ii.  257 

Ernst  V.  Bartle 

i.  12 

V.  Steckman 

1.281 

Krrington  v.  Aynesley 

iii.  324 

Er;.kine  v.  Adeane 

1.532 

V.  PI II miner 

iii.  35 

Erwin  r.  Bank  of  Kentucky 

i.  569 

V.  Blake                     i.  11,  131 

;  ii.  746 

V.  Maxwell 

i.  623 

V.  Parham 

iii.  316 

V.  Saunders                      i.  46c 

;  ii.  685 

r.  United  States 

iii.  434 

Esdaile  v.  La  Nauze 

i.  42 

Eshleman  v.  Harnish 

iii.  26 

Eskridge  v.  Glover 

i.  506 

Esniay  v.  Fanning 

ii.  137 

Esposito  V.  Bowden 

ii.  425 

Espy  V.  Cincinnati  Bank 

i.  301 

t'.  Jones 

ii.  75 

Ess  r.  Truscott 

i.  89 

Essex  Co.  V.  Edwards          i.  274, 

275,  285 

Estep  i>.  Estep 

i.  532 

Estes  V.  Power 

i.  322 

Estis  V.  Rawlins 

iii.  104 

Estwick  !7.  Caillaud 

iii.  382 

Esty  I'.  Aldrich 

iii.  43 

Eten  V.  Luyster 

i.  538 

Etheridge  v.  Binney 

i.  204 

Etherington  v.  Parrot          i.  387, 

389,  394 

Etlierinton  v.  Prospect  Park,  &c.  R. 

Co.  iii.  209 

Etting  V.  Schuylkill  Bank  i.  306 

Eubanks  v.  Banks  ii.  699 

V.  Peak  i.  370 

Eureka  Co.  v.  Bailey  i.  155 

Europa,  The  ii.  433 

Evans  v.  Ashley  iii.  12 

V.  Atlantic  R.  Co.  ii.  47 

V.  Bell  ii.  3,  908 

V.  Bidwell  i.  540 

V.  Birch  ii.  53 

V.  Bremmer  i.  273 

V.  Davies  iii.  83 

V.  Drumniond  i.  189,  192 
V.  Eaton             ii.  307,  311,  315,  322  ; 
iii.  480 

V.  Evans  i.  68,  397 

V.  Harris  i.  570 

V.  Hutton  ii.  415 

V.  Jones  ii.  897 

V.  Keeland  ii.  9 

V.  Lipscomb  i.  263 

V.  Llewellyn  i.  523 

V.  Mann  iii.  426 

V.  Marlett  ii.  410 

V.  Montgomery  iii.  506 

V.  Negley  iii.  116 

V.  Powis  ii.  819 

V.  Pratt  ii.  666 

V.  Prosser  ii.  882 

V.  Roberts  iii.  35 

V.  Sanders  ii.  636 

V.  Soule  ii.  258 

V.  Spriggs  iii.  397 

V.  The  Charles  ii.  439 


Evans  i\  Tweedy  iii.  75 

V.  Underwood  i.  280 

V.  Walshe  iii.  323 

V.  Wells  i.  55 

Evansville,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Baum    i.  114 

V.  Lowdermilk  iii.  191 

V.  Young  ii.  270 

Eve  V.  Moseley  ii.  823 

Evelyn  i\  Chichester  i.  374 

V.  Radish  iii.  248 

Everard  v.  Watson  i.  322 

Everett  v.  Collins  ii.  755 

V.  Desborough  i.  62  ;  ii.  597,  598, 

912 

V.  Hall  i.  579 

V.  London  Ins.  Co.  ii.  570 

V.  Stone  iii.  380 

Everhart  v.  Puckett  ii.  93 

Everitt  v.  Chapman      i.  175, 176,  198,  213 

Everman  v.  Robb  iii.  302 

Evernghim  v.  Ensworth        i.  208;  ii.  878 

Everson  v.  Carpenter  i.  364 

Everth  v.  Hannam  ii.  500 

Evertson  v.  Newport  Bank  i.  330 

V.  Tappen  i.  136 

Ewart  V.  Nagel  i.  407 

V.  Stark  ii.  162 

V.  Street  ii.  171 

Ewbank  v.  Nutting  ii.  456 

Ewen  V.  Terry  ii.  874 

Ewer  V.  Coffin  ii.  743 

V.  Jones  1.  141 

V.  Washington  Ins.  Co.       ii.  473,  475 

Ewers  v.  Hutton  i.  402 

Ewin,  In  re  ii.  701 

Ewing  r.  Bailey  ii.  797 

V.  Blount  iii.  210,  212 

I'.  Ewing  i.  460 

V.  French  ii.  142 

V.  Howard  iii.  124 

V.  Osbaldiston  i.  175 

V.  Tees  i.  46 

Exall  V.  Partridge  i.  12,  500 

Excelsior  Ins.  Co.  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co. 

i.  49;  ii.  471,504 

Exchange  Bank  v.  Hartford  i.  330 

V.  Rice  i.  303,  497 

Exeter  Bank  v.  Gordon  ii.  119 

V.  Rogers  ii.  17 

V.  Sullivan  iii.  90 

Exeter,  The  ii.  403 

Exon  V.  Russell  i.  309,  310 

Exposito  V.  Bowden  ii.  806 

Extont'.  Scott  iii.  315 

Eyles  V.  Ellis  ii.  758 

Eyre,  Ex  parte  iii.  462 

V.  Eyre  iii.  348 

V.  Glover  ii.  480,  483 

V.  Jackson  iii.  425 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  488,  667 

Fabens  v.  Mercantile  Bank    i.  74;  ii.  113 

Faber  v.  Faber  ii.  373,  375 

Fackler  v.  Fackler  iii.  107 

Fa  gin  v.  Coggin  i.  355 

Fahnestock  v.  Bailey  i.  103 


Ixxxiv 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Faliy  V.  North  ii.  41 

Fair  v.  M'lver  iii.  409 

Fairbank  v.  Lcary  ii.  888 

Fairburn  v.  Eastwood  iii.  448 
Fairchild  v.  Cal.  Stage  Co.  ii.  240;  iii.  178 

V.  Fairchild  i.  167 

V.  Holly  ii.  706 

V.  Slocum  ii.  220 

Faircloiigh  v.  Pavia  i.  273 

Fairfax  v.  Hunter  i.  448 

Fairlee  v.  Herring  i.  304 

Fairlie,  Ex  parte  iii.  402 

I'.  Christie  ii.  474 

V.  Fenton  i.  107 
Fairniount  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Stutler         ii.  245 

Fairtitle  v.  Gilbert  ii.  931 

Faithorne  v.  Blaquire  i.  407 

Fake  v.  Smith  iii.  158 

Falconer  v.  Montgomery  ii.  842 

Faler  v.  Jordan  i.  200 

Fales  V.  Russel  i.  332 

Falk,  Ex  parte  \.  641 

Falkenburg  v.  Lucy  ii.  352 

Falkland  v.  Cheney  i.  217 

Falkner  v.  Case  iii.  288 

Faller  v.  Faller  ii.  91 

Falley  v.  Giles  i.  532 

Fallowes  v.  Taylor  i.  4.50 
Fall  River  Iron  Works  v.  Croade 

iii.  409,  436 

Fall  River  Union  Bank  Co.  v.  Stur- 

tevant  i.  210 

Fall  River  Wh.  Co.  v.  Borden  i.  107 

Falls  V.  Gaither  i.  505,  514 

Falmouth  v.  Roberts  ii.  857 

Falton  V.  Hood  ii.  915 

Falvey  v.  Northern  Co.  ii.  233 

Fannin  v.  Anderson  iii.  106 

Fanning  v.  Chadwick  i.  184,  185,  186 

V  t/onsequa  ii.  713,  710 

V.  Dunham  iii.  13G,  157 

Fanny,  The  ii.  383 

Fanny  &  Elmira,  The  ii.  396 

Fanton  v.  P'airfield  Co.  Bank  i.  258 

Farebrother  v.  Ansley  i.  36 

V.  Simmons  iii.  11 

Fareira  v.  Gabell  i.  Ill;  ii.  896 

Fargo  V.  Ames  i.  232 

Farina  r.  Hone  iii.  48 

V.  Silverlock  ii.  357,  373,  375 

Faris  v.  King  iii.  127 

V.  Newburyport  Ins.  Co.              ii.  484 

Farish  v.  Rcigle  ii.  234,  239 

Farlow,  Ex  parte  i.  238 

Farmeloe  v.  Bain  i.  639;  iii.  273 

Farmer  v.  Francis  ii.  02 

V.  Legg  ii.  490 

r.  Sewall  iii.  153,  156 

V.  Stewart  i.  473  :  ii.  843 

r.  Willard  i.  80 

Farmers  Bank  v.  Bowie  i.  322 

V.  Detroit,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  216 

V.  Duvall  i.  306,  318 

V.  Ellis  i.  158 

V.  Green  i.  191 


Farmers  Bank  v.  Gunnell  i.  318 

V.  Ma.xwell  i.  158 

V.  McKee  iii.  215 

V.  Reynolds  ii.  26,  28 

V.  Waples  i.  315 

V.  Watson  i.  158 

Farmers,'  &c.  Bank  v.  Erie  R.  Co.     i.  651 
V.  Logan  i.  578 

Farmers  &  Mechanics  Bank  v.  Cham- 
plain  Trans.  Co.  ii.  194,  200, 
•203,  228,  230,  231,  256,  259,  263 


V.  Kercheval 

V.  Planters  Bank 

V.  Rathbone 

V.  Smith 

V.  Wilson 
Farmers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Archer 

V.  Chase 

V.  Curry 

V.  Fogelman 

r.  Graybill 

V.  Ross 

V.  Snyder 

V.  Taylor 
Farmers  Loan  Co.  v.  Walworth 
Farmington  Academy  v.  Allen 

Farnham  v.  Camden  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Farnham 

V.  Gilman 
Farnsworth  v.  Boardman 

V.  Garrard 

V.  Shepard 

V.  Storrs 
Farnum  v.  Perry 
Earn  worth  v.  Pack  wood 
Farquhar,  Ex  parte 
Farr  v.  Pearce 

V.  Sunmer 
Farrand  v.  Bouchell 
Farrar  v.  Adams 

V.  Alston 

V.  Beswick 
Farrell  r.  French 

V.  Iligley 
Farrer  v.  Granard 

V.  Xightingal 
Farrington  v.  Lee 

V.  Payne 

V.  Tennessee 

V.  Woodward 
Farrow  v.  Respess 

V.  Turner 


ii.  15,  20,  24,  31 
iii.  95 

i.  294 
iii.  394,  397 

iii.  92 
ii.  476 
ii.  539 
ii.  556 
ii.  559 
ii.  575 

i.  183 

ii.  542,  544 

ii.  543 

i.  51 

i.  483  ; 

ii.  50 
ii.  270 

ii.  93 
iii.  464 

i.  458 


i.  494;  ii.  879 

i.  569 

i.  452 

i.  564 

ii.  159 

iii.  460 

i.  173 

i.  301,  362 

iii.  187 

ii.  173,  174,  216 

ii.  913,  915 

i.  177 

ii.  464 

ii.  936 

i.  407 

ii.  522,  559 

iii.  94,  96 

ii.  751;  iii.  426 

iii.  480 

i.  81 

ii.  31 

i.  498 


Farwell  r.  Boston  &  Worcester  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  46 

I'.  Mather  iii.  15 

V.  Rogers  ii.  797 

V.  Suily  ii.  14 

Fash  V.  Ross  __i.  08 

Fassett  v.  Traher  iii.  382 

Fatman  r.  Leet  i-  40 

Faugier  r.  Hallett  ii.  53(i 

Fauldcr  c.  Silk  i-  438 

Faulkner  v.  Bailey  iii.  90 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxx 


Faulkner  i-.  Delaware  &  Hudson  Canal 

Co.  iii.  105 

V.  Hart  ii.  210,  698 

V.  Hunt  i-  17G 

V.  Lowe  ii-  H07 

V.  Wright  ii.  172 

Faull  i\  Tinsman  i.  254 

Fauntleroy's  Case  i.  209 

Favenc  v.  Bennett  ii.  745 

Faviell  v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co. 

i.  131 ;  ii.  840 

Favor  v.  Philbrick  Co.  ii.  196 

Favorita,  The  ii.  435 

Fawcett  v.  Bigley  i.  79 

V.  Cash  ii.  35 

V.  Osborn  i.  176 

V.  Whitehouse  i.  187 

Fawcus  V.  Sarsfield  ii.  531 

Faxon  u.  Mansfield  ii.  39 

Fay  V.  Bradley  ii.  769 

V.  Howe  i.  137 

V.  Jones  i.  258 

V.  Lovejoy  iii.  128 

V.  Parker  iii.  183 

V.  Richmond  i.  62 

V.  Steamer  New  World  ii.  238 

V.  Strawn  ii.  677 

Fayle  v.  Bird  i.  309 

Fear  v.  Dunlap  i.  284 

Fearn  v.  Lewis  iii.  72 

V.  Mayers  iii.  301 

Featherstonaugh  v.  Fenwick  i.  229 

Feaubert  v.  Turst  ii.  730 

Feeter  v.  Heath  i.  67,  73 

Feigler  v.  Sponeberger  i.  202 

Feigley  v.  Whitaker  i.  225 

Feise  v.  Aguilar  ii.  490,  491 

V.  Parkinson  ii.  481,  524 

V.  Randall  iii.  477 

V.  Wray  i.  644,  645;  iii.  262 

Fejavary  v.  Broesch  iii.  302 

Felch  V.  Allen  ii.  47 

V.  Bugbee  iii.  396,  508 

Felichy  v.  Hamilton  i.  199 

Felker  v.  Emerson  i.  386 

Fell  V.  Goslin  i.  12 

V.  Knight  ii.  161 

Fellowes  v.  Gordon  ii.  114,  116 

V.  Lord  Gwyder  iii.  308,  319 

Fellows  V.  Fellows  ii.  91,  736 

I'.  Hartford  i.  75 

V.  Longyor  iii.  116 

V.  Mitchell  i.  29 

V.  Prentiss  ii  24 

V.  Wyman  i.  218 

Fells  V.  Read  iii.  329 

Felt  V.  School  District  ii.  140 

Feltham  v.  England  ii.  47 

Felthouse  v.  Bindley  i.  515 

Felton  V.  Dickinson  i.  497 

V.  Fuller  i.  563 

V.  Minot  iii.  293 

Fenby  v.  Pritcbard  i.  292 

Fenelon  v.  Butts  iii.  177 

Fenly  v.  Stewart  i.  56;  iii.  10 


Fenn  v.  Harrison  i.  63,  68,  271 

Fennell  v.  Ridler  ii.  899,  907 

Fenner  v.  Buffalo,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  197, 210 

V.  Duplock  i.  508;  ii.  940 

V.  Taylor  i.  409 

Fenno  v.  Sayre  iii.  127 

Fenton  c  Browne  i.  522 

V.  Clark  ii.  41,  792 

V.  Dublin  Steam  Packet  Co.       i.  116 


V.  Emblers 

iii.  42,  97 

V.  HoUoway 

i.  435 

V.  Reed 

ii.  82,  83,  88 

V.  White 

i.  353 

Fentum  v.  Pocock 

i.  294 ;  iii.  451 

Fenwick  v.  Sears 

iii.  391 

Ferax,  The 

ii.  383 

Fereby  v.  Gordon 

i.  621 

Fereday  v.  Hordern 

iii.  151,  152 

Feret  v.  Hill 

ii.  913 

Ferguson  v. 

i.  535;  ii.  1-36 

V.  Bell 

i.  365 

V.  Brooks 

i.  407 

V.  Cappeau 

iii.  270 

V.  Carrington 

ii.  914,  923 

V.  Davol  Mills 

ii.  352 

V.  Hosier 

iii.  223 

V.  Lothrop 

ii.  877 

r.  Mali  on 

ii.  738 

V.  Northern  Bank 

i.  565 

V.  Oliver 

i.  636 

V.  Porter 

i.  87;  ii.  116 

V.  Thomas 

i.  613 

V.  Tucker 

ii.  57 

Fergusson  v.  Fyffe 

ii.  716 

V.  Norman 

i.  489 ;  iii.  261 

Ferrall  v.  Shaen 

iii.  125,  126 

Ferrara  v.  Tallent,  The 

ii.  462 

Ferree  v.  Oxford  Ins.  Co 

ii.  575 

Ferrell  v.  Maxwell 

ii.  10 

Ferris  v.  Comstock 

iii.  228 

r.  Irving 

i.  76 

V.  Saxton 

i.  318 

Ferry  r.  Ferry 

ii.  769;  iii.  161 

Person  v.  Monroe 

i.  231,  240 

Fessler  v.  Low 

iii  221 

Fetridge  v.  Merchant 

ii.  363 

V.  Wells                ii.  352,  353,  363,  371 

Fetrow  v.  Wiseman 

i.  335 

Fettrech  v.  Leamy 

iii.  242 

Fewell  V.  Kessler 

i.  523 

Fe wings  v.  Tisdall 

ii.  37,  44 

Fidgeon  v.  Sharpe 

iii.  441,  442 

Fiedler  v.  New  York  Ins. 

Co.    ii.  505,  507, 

510,  515 

Field  V.  Poland 

iii.  365,  366 

V.  Chase 

ii.  424 

V.  Dickinson 

iii.  106 

V.  Field 

i.  160 

V.  Herrick 

i.  531 

V.  Holland 

ii.  765 

V.  Maghee 

i.  252 

V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York       ii.  751 

V.  Mills 

i.  538 

V.  Nickerson 

i.  290,  306 

V.  Runk 

iii.  49 

Ixxxvi 


INDEX   TO   CASES   CITED. 


Field  V.  Schieffelin 

V.  Sinico 
Fielden  v.  Lahens 

V.  Starkin 
Fielding  v.  Kymer 

V.  Mills 
Fields  V.  Mallett 
Fifield  V.  Elmer 


i.  149 
i.  569 
i.  208 ;  ii.  16 
i.  636 
i.  102 
iii.  264,  271 
i.  311 
i.  578,  579 


Fiftii  iS'ational  Bank  of  Chicago  v. 

Bayley  i.  570 

Figes  V.  Cutler  i.  175,  176 

Figgins  V.  AVard  i.  211 

Filby  V.  Lawford  iii.  462 

Fildes  V.  Hooker  iii.  334,  357,  363 

Filer  v.  Peebles  ii.  53 

Files  V.  McLeod  iii.  29 

Filkins  v.  Blackman  ii.  368 

Fillebrowu  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.R.  Co. 

ii.  160 

V.  Hoar  iii.  178 

Filley  v.  Fassett  ii.  352,  370 

I'.  Phelps  i.  231 

Fillleul  V.  Armstrong  ii.  38 

Fillmer  v.  Delber  i.  131 ;  ii.  825 

V.  Gott  i.  458 

Fillyan  v.  Laverty  i.  228 

Filsom  V.  Himes  i.  486 

Finch  V.  Boning  ii.  778 

V.  Brook  ii.  776,  777 

V.  Brown  iii.  196 

V.  Finch  i.  343,  347 

Findlay  v.  Smith  i.  137 

'E'lnAon,  Ex  parte  iii.  463 

V.  Parker  ii.  907 

Fink  V.  Hake  ii.  877 

Finley  v.  Quirk  ii.  901 

Finn  v.  Donahue  ii.  904 

V.  Western  R.  Co.  i.  674 

Finney  v.  Apgar  iii.  48 

V.  Bedford  Coram.  Ins.  Co.     i.  56,  57 

1-.  Fairhaven  Ins.  Co.  i.  49;  ii.  474,480 

V.  Warren  Ins.  Co.      ii.  473,  485,  525 

Finnucane  v.  Small  ii.  134 

Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Loomis  i.  527 

Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crandall  ii.  587 

V.  Holt  ii.  493 

V.  Powell  ii.  489 

Firemen's  Ins.  Co.,  In  re  iii.  421 

V.  Congregation,  &c.  ii.  569 

V.  Ely  iii.  123 

V.  Sturges  iii.  123 

Firman  v.  Blood  i.  284 

First  Bank  v.  Carpenter  ii.  3 

r.  Fourth  Bank  ii.  755 

V.  GoodsfU  i.  289 

r.  Leach  ii.  755 

V.  Marshall  ii.  850 

V.  Whitman  i.  300,  303 

First  Mass.  Turnpike  Corp.  v.  Field 

iii.  107 

First  National  Bank  v.  Bennett  ii.  10 

V.  Pettit  i.  565 

Fischel  v.  Scott  i.  699 

fc^ish  V.  Chapman  ii.  170, 171, 178,  2.54, 259 

V.  Dodge  i.  120 ;  iii.  176 


Fish  V.  Kempton  ii.  882 

V.  Thomas  ii.  400 

Fisher  v.  Beasley  iii.  132 

V.  Clisbee  ii.  181 

V.  Cochran  ii.  520 

V.  Currier  iii.  478 

V.  Cutter  ii.  5,  11 

I'.  Dynes  i.  110 

V.  Ellis  i.  484 

V.  Evans  i.  311 

V.  Hildreth  ii.  759 

V.  Johnson  iii.  296 

V.  Kay  iii.  246 

V.  Kulin  iii.  15 

V.  Lackey  iii.  504 

V.  Lane  ii.  718 

V.  Leland  i.  290 

V.  May  i.  468 

V.  Miller  iii.  278 

V.  Morris  Canal  &  B.  Co.  i.  331 

V.  Mowbray  i.  353 

V.  Murray  i.  201 

V.  Price  i.  315 

V.  Prince  iii.  220 

I'.  Pyne  i.  503 
V.  Salmon                          i.  290;  ii.  16 

V.  Seltzer  i.  510 

V.  Shattuck  i.  444,  446 

V.  Tayler  i.  203 
V.  Val  De  Travers  Asphalts  Co. 

iii.  175 

V.  Waltham  ii.  896 

Fishli  V.  Fishli  ii.  91 

Fishmonger's    Company    v.   Robert- 
son i.  479,  499 ;  ii.  663 

Fisk  V.  Comm.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  496 


V.  Copeland 
V.  Cushman 
V.  Gray 
V.  Herrick 
V.  Masterman 
V.  Newton 
V.  Tank 

Fiske  V.  Eldridge 
V.  Foster 

Fitch  V.  Burk 
V.  Hamlin 
V.  Jones 
V.  Livingston 


i.  211 

i.  410 

iii.  169 

i.  233 

ii.  480 

ii.  196,  198,  416 

i.  630 

i.  282 

iii.  397 

i.  666 

iii.  121 

i.  27.3,  329 ;  ii.  857 

ii.  431;  iii.  196 


i;.  Newbury    ii.  222,  223 ;  iii.  268,  269 
V.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  249 

V.  Peckhara  ii.  51 

V.  Reading  i.  282,  307 

V.  Sutton  i.  249 ;  ii.  749 

Fitchburg  Iiis.  Co.  v.  Davis  i.  316 

Fitchburg  Sav.  Bank  v.  Amazon 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  476 

Fits  V.  Cook  ii.  940 

Fitt  I'.  Cassanet  ii.  812,  815 

Fitts  V.  Hall  i.  357,  360 

Fitzgerald  v.  Lord  Portarlington     iii.  314 
V.  Reed  i.  434 

V.  Vicars  iii.  309 

Fitzherbert  v.  Mather  i.  62,  78,  80 ; 

ii.  625 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxvii 


Fitzlierbcrt  v.  Shaw  i.  547 

Fitzhugli  '.'.  Wilcox  i.  4o7 

Fitzpatrick  v.  Apperson  iii.  lliO 

V.  Scliool  Comm.  i.  oOl 

Fitzroy  r.  Gwillim        ii.  887;  iii.  137,  2y0 

Fitzsimmons  v.  Joslin  i.  64,  78,  (JJJ!) ; 

ii.  920,  '.m 

Fivaz  V.  Nichols  ii.  88G 

Flad  Oyen,  Tlie  ii.  399 

Flagg  r.  Dryden  ii.  783 

V.  Ely  i.  136 

V.  Mann  i.  5G1 

I'.  Millbury  ii.  901 

V.  Stowe  i.  176 

Flanagan  v.  Meyer  ii.  903 

Flanagin  v.  Hambleton  i.  248 

Flanders  v.  Barstow  i.  611 

?'.  C'larke  i.  146 

V.  Crolius  ii.  12 

V.  Maynard  i.  564 

V.  Sherman  i.  132 

Flanigan  v.  Lampman  i.  252 

Flanigen  v.  Turner  ii.  930 

V.  Wash.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  527 

Flannagan  v.  Kilcome  i.  468 

Flarty  <;.  Odium  i.  253 

Flavel  V.  Harrison       ii.  363,  364,  372,  377 

Fleckner  v.  U.  S.  Bank  i.  49;  iii.  127, 

143 

Fleece,  The  ii.  430 

Fleet  V.  Murton  i.  58;  ii.  668 

Fleetwood  v.  Green  iii.  334 

V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  N.  Y.  i.  446 

Fleming  v.  Beck  iii.  199 

Flemming  i\  Gilbert  ii.  685 

V.  Gooding  i.  540;  ii.  940 

V.  Hayne  i.  463,  464 

V.  Potter  ii.  785 

V.  Slocura  ii.  918 

V.  Smith  ii.  506 

Flemington  v.  Smithers  iii.  177 

Flemyng  v.  Hector  i.  41,  47,  63 

Fletcher  v.  Bowsher  i.  634;  ii.  394 

V.  Braddick  ii.  422,  430 

V.  Button        ii.  790;  iii.  245,  246,  247 

V.  Cole  i.  572 

V.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.        ii.  555, 

556,  559,  561,  565,  919 

V.  Daingerfield  i.  125 

V.  Davis  iii.  476 

V.  Dyclie  ii.  876 ;  iii.  168,  174 

V.  Fletcher  iii.  315 

V.  Grover  i.  32,  34 

V.  Gushee  i.  288 

j;.  Harcot  ii.  886 

V.  Herring  i.  545 

V.  Howard  i.  568 

V.  Inglis  ii.  497 

V.  Jackson  i.  33,  34,  35 

V.  Morey  iii.  424 

V.  Peck  iii.  481,  502 

V.  Pynsett  ii.  804 

V.  Reed  i.  219 

V.  Rutland,  &c.  R.  R.  iii.  481 

V.  Webster  ii.  830 


Flewellin  v.  Rave 

ii.  119 

Fliglit  r.  BoUand 

iii.  9,  364 

V.  Booth 

i.  582 

V.  Lenian 

ii.  907 

V.  McLean 

i.  277 

Flindt  V.  Waters 

ii.  481 

Flinn  v.  Ileadlam 

ii.  523,  524 

V.  Philadelphia  R.  R. 

ii.  238,  246 

Flint  V.  Brandon                 iii. 

306,  319,  326 

V.  Clark 

iii.  236 

V.  Day 

i.  274,  284 

V.  Flemyng 

ii.  483 

V.  Lyon 

i.  587 

V.  Norwich  Transportation  Co.  ii.  246 
V.  Ohio  Ins.  Co.  ii.  471,  541 

V.  Pattee  i.  266 

V.  Rogers  i.  303 

V.  Steadman  iii.  242 

V.  Woodin  i.  526 

Flint  River  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Rob- 
erts ii.  392 
Flintum,  Ex  parte  i.  238 
Flood  V.  Finlay                  iii.  429,  435,  454 
Flook  V.  Jones                                      iii.  442 
Florence,  The                               ii.  438,  440 
Flory  V.  Denny                        i.  611 ;  ii.  128 
Flower,  Ex  parte                                 iii.  424 
V.  Young                                        ii.  395 
Floyd  V.  Calvert  ii.  85 
V.  Miller                                           i.  225 
Floyer  v.  Edwards     iii.  116,  126,  135,  142, 

171 

V.  Sherard  i.  466;  iii.  149 

Fluck  V.  Tollemache  i.  340 

Flureau  v.  Thornhill  iii.  245,  246 

Flynn  v.  Allen  i.  257 

V.  No.  American  Ins.  Co.  i.  498 

V.  Williams  ii.  923 

Foard  v.  Womack  i.  307 

Fobes  V.  Cantfield  iii.  189 

Foden  v.  Sharp  i.  309 ;  ii.  716 

Fogerty  v.  Jordan  ii.  909 

Fogg  V.  Johnston  i.  230 

V.  Middlesex  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475,  476 

V.  Sawyer  i.  302;  ii.  754 

Foggart  V.  Blackweller  i.  623 

Poland  V.  Boyd  i.  323 

Foley  V.  Addenbrooke  i.  14,  16,  23 

V.  Cowgill  ii.  920 

V.  Mason  i.  563;  ii.  677,  777 

V.  Moline  ii.  525 

V.  Robards  i.  168,  174,  204 

Folk  V.  Russell  i.  225 

Follansbee  v.  Adams  iii.  224 

Foil's  Appeal  iii.  374 

Folsom  V.  Belknap  Co.  Ins.  Co.         ii.  475 

V.  Marsh        ii.  336,  341,  344,  345,  349 

V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  485,  532 

Foltz  V.  Mey  iii.  127 

Fonda  v.  Van  Home  i.  335 

Fonner  v.  Duplock  i.  541 

Fontaine  v.  Col.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  404,  456 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.       ii.  397,  507,  527 

Fooks  V.  Waples  ii.  917 

Foorde  v.  Hoskins  i.  133 


Ixxxviii 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Foot,  In  re  iii.  421 

V.  N.  H.  &  Northampton  Co.      iii.  37 

y.  Tewksbury  i.  435;  iii.  28(3 

Foote  V.  lilancliard  iii.  Ill 

V.  Burnet  i.  144;  iii.  242,  244 

V.  Emerson  ii.  887  ;  iii.  41 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii.  57-5 

r.  Sabin  i.  210 

V.  Silsby  ii.  .304,  307,  311 

V.  Storrs  ii.  134,  149,  153 

Foquet  v.  Moore  i.  480 

Forbes  v.  Appleton  i.  496 

1-.  Aspinall  ii.  480,  491 

V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  206 

V.  Church  ii.  479 

t'.  Davison  i.  198 

V.  Foot  iii.  106 

V.  Hannah,  The  ii.  401 

V.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co.        ii.  502,  508,  509 

i;.  Parker  i.  612,  613 

V.  Parsons  ii.  405 

V.  Pliipps  iii.  437 

V.  Eice  ii.  419 

V.  Skelton  iii.  95 

Forbush  ;;.  Bradford  ii.  325 

Force  v.  Dutcher  i.  62 

V.  Elizabeth  i.  330 

Ford  V.  Adams  i.  247,  254 

V.  Bronaugh  i.  13 

V.  Cliambers  i.  560 

V.  Cotesworth  ii.  805 

V.  Ford  ii.  7-30 

V.  Jones  ii.  844 

V.  Mitchell  ii.  194 

V.  Monroe  i.  352 

V.  Phillips  i.  363,  364,  365 

V.  Rehman  i.  470 

V.  Stuart  i.  257 ;  iii.  308,  310 

V.  Tiley  ii.  800,  809 

V.  Williams  iii.  381,  382 

V.  Yates  ii.  675 

Forde  v.  Ilerron  i.  172 

Fordley's  Case  ii.  776 

Foreign  Mercliants  v.  British,  &c. 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  534 

Foreman  v.  Hard  wick  ii.  897 

Fores  v.  Jolmes  ii.  337 

Forkner  v.  Stuart  i.  202 

Forman  ?■  Marsh  i.  150 

V.  Walker  i.  41 

Fornsliill  r.  Murray  ii.  726 

Forrer  v.  Forrer  i.  187 

Forrest,  Tlie  ii.  463 

V.  Elwes  iii.  120 

V.  Warrington  iii.  437 

Forrestier  v.  Boardman  i.  87,  103 

Forsaith  v.  Clogston  ii.  860 

Forshaw  r.  Cliabert  ii.  474,  527 

Forster  v.  Fuller     i.  08,  142,  152,  282,  459 

V.  Hale  iii.  66,  343 

V.  Macreth  i.  204 

V.  Surtees  iii.  466 

V.  Taylor  i.  12 

V.  Wilson  iii.  439,  469 

Forsyth  v.  Day  i.  64 ;  ii.  942 


Forsytli  v.  Milne 
Forsythe  v.  Ellis 
Fort  (-.  Coker 

V.  Cortes 
Fortescue  r.  Barnett 

V.  Hannah 
Forth  V.  Simpson 
Fortitude,  The 
Forward  v.  Dehoney 


i.  342 

i.  615 

i.  49 

i.  307 

ii.  610;  iii.  315 

iii.  362,  473 

ii.  148,  221 

i.  78 ;  ii.  404,  453 

i.  255 


V.  Pittard  ii.  150, 169,  170,  172 

Forwood  V.  No.  Wales  Ins.  Co.         ii.  504 

Fosdick  V.  Car  Co.  i.  579 

V.  Van  Husen  ii.  753 

Foshay  v.  Ferguson  i.  445 

Foss  V.  Crisp  i.  448 

Foster,  Ex  parte,    i.  251  ;  iii.  292,  410,  431 

In  re  iii.  463 

r.  Bates  i.  49,  146 

V.  Boston  i.  82 

V.  Caldwell  i.  623 

V.  Charles  ii.  916 

V.  Dawber  iii.  80 

V.  Drew  ii.  779 

V.  Elliott  iii.  233 

V.  Equitable  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475,  577 
V.  Essex  Bank   i.  114,  155 ;  ii.  99,  134 

V.  Frampton  i.  648 

V.  Gile  ii.  608 

V.  Hale  iii.  18 

V.  Hall  iii.  297 

V.  Hilliard  i.  150 

V.  Hodgson  iii.  ^ 

V.  Hooper  i.  29 

V.  Hudson  iii.  431 

V.  Jack  iii.  101 

V.  Jackson  ii.  874 

V.  Jolly  ii.  685 

V.  Julien  i.  308 

r.  McDivit  ii.  870 

V.  McGraw  ii.  765 

I'.  McO'Blenis  iii.  43 

V.  Mentor  Life  Ins.  Co.  ii.  611 

V,  Minnesota,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 

V.  Miranda,  The  ii.  431 
r.  Moore                ii.  314,  317,  324,  825 

V.  Paulk  i.  296,  297 

V.  Pettibone  ii.  143 

V.  Peyser  i.  633 

V.  Pugh  i.  670 

V.  Reniick  iii.  472 

V.  Ropes  i.  563,  564,  567 

V.  Saco  Manuf.  Co.  iii.  382 

V.  Sampson  ii.  462 

V.  Schoffield  ii.  76 

V.  Sineath  i.  319 

V.  Stewart  ii.  56 

V.  Swasey  i.  626 

V.  Trull  ii.  821 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  389,  473,  474 
480,  567 

V.  Warner  i.  678 

V.  Wilcox  i.  406 

V.  Wilmer  ii.  633 

Fothergill  r.  Fothergill  iii.  329 

V.  Walton  ii.  663 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxix 


Foubert  v.  Turst  iii.  309 

Fouch  V.  Wilson  i.  52 

Fouldes  V.  Willoughby  ii.  136 

Foulkes  V.  Sellway  ii.  70 

Fountain  v.  Grymes  iii.  149 

Fournier  v.  Faggott  iii.  17(J 

Fourtli  Bank,  &c.  v.  Henschen           i.  225 
Fourtli  Scliool  District  in  Rumford  v. 

Wood  i.  154 

Fowke  V.  Bowie  ii.  763,  764 

Fowle  V.  Freeman  iii.  0 

V.  Harrington  i.  218 

V.  Spear  ii.  363 
V.  Springfield  Ins.  Co.        ii.  559,  561 

Fowler  v.  JStna  Ins.  Co.  ii.  544 

V.  Bott  1.  536,  537 

V.  Brooks  ii.  20 

V.  Down  iii.  424,  446 

V.  Garlike  ii.  689 

V.  Garret  iii.  130 

V.  Gilman  iii.  210 

V.  Hollenbeck  ii.  54 

V.  Hunt  iii.  103 

V.  Kymer  i.  650 

V.  Lock  ii.  45,  135 

V.  Ludwig  ii.  757 

V.  Morrill  iii.  286 

V.  Poling  i.  260 

V.  Richardson  i.  219 

V.  Shearer  i.  406  ;  ii.  933 

V.  Stuart  i.  460 

V.  Trebein  ii.  79 
Fowles  V.   Great   Western  Railway 

Co.  ii.  231 

Fox  V.  Abel  ii.  905 

V.  Adams  iii.  409,  436 

V.  Clifton  i.  63,  162,  213 

V.  Davis  i.  399 

V.  Fisk  iii.  95 

V.  Glastenbury  ii.  248,  250 

V.  Hanbury  i.  224,  225,  234 

V.  Harding  iii.  198 

r.  Mackreth  i.  95,  631;  iii.  422 

V.  McGregor  ii.  167,  221 ;  iii.  2-53, 

266 

V.  Mensch  ii.  900 

V.  Smith  ii.  827,  831,  835,  836 

V.  Southack  i.  448 

V.  Wilcocks  i.  137 

V.  Woodruff  iii.  478 

Foxcroft  V.  Devonshire  iii.  276 

Foxcroft  Academy  i-.  Favor  i.  482 

Fraley  v.  Bisphara  i.  024 

Frame  v.  Dawson  iii.  66,  348,  849,  350 

Frances,  The  ii.  519 

Franchot  v.  Leach  iii.  248 

Francis,  The  ii.  519 

V.  Dodsworth  ii.  881 

V.  Felmit  i.  355 

V.  Francis  iii.  287 

V.  Kerker  i.  49 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  ii.  525, 587 

V.  Wigzell  iii.  368,  369 

Franco  r.  Bolton  iii.  465 

Frank  v.  Edwards  ii.  18 


Frank  v.  Wessels 
Frankland  v.  Nicholson 
Franklin,  The 

V.  Beatty 

V.  Ezell 

r.  Lord  Brownlow 


i.279 

ii.  89 

i.  226 

i.  463,  465 

i.  59,  02,  80 

iii.  364 


v.  Miller  i.  493;  ii.  663,  813 

V.  Neate  i.  253 ;  ii.  127 

V.  Osgood  iii.  .378 

V.  Vanderpool  ii.  755 

Franklin  Bank  r.  Cooper  ii.  9 

r.  Hooper  ii.  762 
Franklin  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chicago  In.?.  Co. 

ii.  551 
V.  Coates  ii.  556,  566,  587 
V.  Hazzard  ii.  609 
r.  Hewitt  ii.  471 
V.  Lord  ii.  404 
V.  Martin  ii.  547 
V.  Sefton  ii.  609 
V.  Taylor  ii.  471 
Franklin  Savings  Institution  v.  Cen- 
tral Ins.  Co.  ii.  577 
Franklyn  v.  Lamond  i.  68,  527 
V.  Tuton  iii.  331 
Franks,  Ex  parte  i.  407,  409,  415 
V.  Weaver  ii.  370,  371,  372 
Frary  v.  Booth  i.  392 
V.  Frary  ii.  732,  736 
Fraser  v.  Berkeley  iii.  191 
V.  Hopkins  ii.  396 
V.  Pendleberry  i.  446 
V.  Pigott  ii.  633 
V.  W>ckoff  i.  109 
Frasher  v.  State  iii.  499 
Fraternal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Applegate         ii.  608 
Fray  v.  Voules  i.  130 
Frazer  v.  Boss  ii.  756 
V.  Bunn  ii.  764 
V.  Gervais  ii.  918 
V.  Hilliard  i.  648 
V.  Marsh  ii.  195 
V.  Ross  i.  558 
Frazier  v.  Dick  i.  323 
V.  Rowan  i.  354 
Freake  v.  Cranefeldt  iii.  75 
Freakeley  v.  Fox  ii.  852 
Frear  v.  Evertson  ii.  577 
V.  Hardenbergh        i.  462,  475  ;  iii.  36 
Fredd  v.  Eves  i.  393,  394 
Frederick  v.  Coxwell  iii.  361,  .369 
Fredericks  v.  Fasnacht  i.  506 
Free  v.  Hawkins  i.  315 
Freeborn  v.  Denman  ii.  847,  849 
Freely  v.  Barnhast  iii.  334 
Freeman  v.  Baker  i.  635 ;  ii.  408, 
463,  466,  916 
V.  Baldwin  i.  611 
V.  Baspoule  ii.  828,  831 
V.  Bass  ii.  870 
V  Boynton  i.  467 
V.  Brittin  iii.  127,  156 
V.  Buckingham  ii.  409 
V.  Cashart  i.  212 
I'.  Chute  i.  637 


xc 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Freeman  r.  Clute 
V.  Cooke 
V.  East  India  Co. 
r.  Fenton 
r.  Freeman 
V.  Holmes 
V.  Hyett 
V.  Nichols 
r.  Perry 
V.  Robinson 
V.  Kosher 
V.  Taylor 


iii.  196,  227 

ii.  936,  938 

ii.  450 

i.  41)3 

ii.  736;  iii.  314 

i.  388 

ii.  873 

1.  568,  580 

i.  254 

i.  460 

i.  51 

ii.  406 


Freeman's  Bank  r.  Rollins       i.  823 ;  ii.  28 

Freemoult  v.  Dedire  ii.  730;  iii.  299 

Freer  v.  Hesse  iii.  335 

Freese  r.  Brownell  ii.  714 

V.  Tripp  ■           iii.  184 

Freestone  v.  Butcher  i.  388 

Freeth  v.  Burr  iii.  224 

Freiberg  v.  Branigan  i.  387 

Freleigh  v.  The  State  iii.  511 

Freme  v.  Wright  iii.  334 

French  v.  Andrade  iii.  469 

V.  Backhouse  ii.  389,  473 

V.  Carr  iii.  429,  431,  436 

V.  Chase  i.  233 

V.  French  i.  245,  247 

V.  Grindle  iii.  153,  156 

V.  Kennedy  ii.  7B9 

V.  Macale  iii.  304,  305,  328 

I'.  IVIarsli  ii.  32 

V.  Merrill  iii.  426 

V.  New  ii.  837 

V.  Price  ii.  387 

r.  Reed  ii.  108 

V.  Rogers  ii.  312 

V.  Styring  i.  180 

V.  Teschemaker  i.  161 

Frentress  ;•.  Markle  ii.  818 

Frcto  V.  Brown  i.  348,  349 

Fretz  r.  Stover  i.  78 

Freund  v.  Importers    and    Traders 

Bank  i.  297 

Freundschaft,  The  i.  220 

Frey  ?■.  Kirk  iii.  394 

Freyraan  v.  Knecht  iii.  223 

Frichette  r.  State  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 

Frick  V.  Trustees  of  Schools  ii.  941 

Fricker  r.  Thomliiison  iii.  6 

Fridge  v.  The  State  i.  3.35 

Fridley  v.  Bowen  ii.  767 

Friedly  i\  Scheetz  i.  015 

Friend  v.  Woods  ii.  109,  172 

Friends,  The  ii.  433 

Friiik  ;•.  King  ii.  392 

r.  Potter  ii.  234 

V.  Tatman  iii.  221 

Frisbie  v.  Fayette  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524 

V.  Lamed  ii.  757 

V.  McCarty  i.  400 

Fris.«('l  V.  Haile  iii.  287 

Frilchcy  v.  Bosley  i.  I'M) 

Frith  V.  Barker  ii.  409,  414 

V.  Sprague  i.  32 

Frizzle  v.  Veach  ii.  909 


Fromont  r.  Coupland 

Frontier  Bank  v.  Morse 
P'rontin  v.  Small 
Frost  V.  Bengough 

V.  Brisbin 

V.  Carter 

V.  Hill 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Kellogg 

V.  Knight 

V.  Koon 

V.  Lowry 

V.  Saratoga  Ins.  Co. 

I'.  Tarr 

V.  Vought 

V.  Willis 
Frothingham  v.  Everton 

V.  Haley 

V.  Jenkins 

r.  Seymour 
Frow,  &c.  Co.'s  Appeal 
Fry  V.  Evans 

V.  Hill 

V.  Rousseau 
Fryatt  v.  The  Sullivan  Co. 
Frye  v.  Barker 

!'.  Shepler 
Fryer  v.  Roe 
Fulham  i'.  Down 
Fullam  r.  Valentine 

V.  W^est  Brookfield 
Fuller,  Ex  parte 

V.  Abbott 

V.  Abrahams 

V.  Bennett 

V.  Boston  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Bradley 

V.  Brown 

V.  Crittenden 

r.  Dame 

V.  Dingman 

V.  Fenwick 

V.  Hodgdon 

r.  Joceiyn 

V.  Kennebec  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Little 

V.  McDonald 

V.  M'Call 

V.  Milford 


i.  184,  185,  186  ; 

ii.  220,  246 

i.  302  ;  ii.  754 

i.  65,  156 

iii.  69,  75 

ii.  710 

iii.  464 

iii.  12 

ii.  818 

i.  183 

ii.  809,  810 

ii.  941 

ii.  922 

ii.  553 

iii.  41 

ii.  66 

i.  391,  401 

i.  74,  92,  108  ; 

ui.  204,  205,  235 

ii.  827 

ii.  413 

ii.  791 

iii.  440 

ii.  877 

i.  302 

i.  280 

ii.  ].?8,  145 

iii.  88,  125 

iii.  348 

iii.  97 

i.  496 

ii.  30 

i.  135 

iii.  424,  430 

i.  488 

i.  527 

i.  81,  82 

ii.  580 

ii.  220 

ii.  41,  792 

ii.  686 

ii.  895 

i.  310 

ii.  840 

ii.  913 

i.  77 

ii.  500 

ii.  776 

i.  315 

ii  511 

ii.  28 


r.  Naugatuck  Railroad  Co.  ii.  233, 2.34 

V.  Ruby  i.  532 

i\  Russell  ii.  480 

V.  Smith  i.  298 

V.  Wilson  i.  04,  80  ;  ii.  921 

V.  Wright  ii.  878 

Fuller's  Case  iii.  149 

FuUerton  v.  Sturges  i.  272 

Kulmer  i-.  Scitz  ii.  19 

Fulton  r.  Fulton  ii.  91 

Fulton's  Case  ii.  801 

Fulton  Bank  r.  Beach  iii.  130 

V.  N.  Y.  &  S.  Canal  Co.                 i.  83 

V.  Phoenix  Bank  i.  296 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


XCl 


Funk's  Lessee  v.  Kincaid 
Furber  v.  Carter 
Furillio  v.  Crowther 
Furlong  v.  Hysooi 

V.  Polleys 
Furnian  v.  Elmore 

u.  Haskin 
Furneaux  v.  Bradley 
Furnes  v.  Smith 
Furnis  v.  Hallon 
Furniss  v.  Gilchrist 

V.  Magoun,  The 
Furnival  i'.  Crew 

V.  Prowd 

V.  Weston 
Furtado  r.  Rogers 
Furze  v.  Sherwood 
Fussel  r.  Daniel 
Fusselman  v.  Worthington 
Fussil  V.  Brookes 
Futrell  V.  Vann 
Fyson  v.  Kitton 


111. 


i.  540 
i.  178 
i.  351 
i.  387 
188 

iii.  242 
i.  295 

ii.  489 

i.  358 

ii.  831,  834 

i.  288 

ii.  403 
i.  532 ;  iii.  323 

ii.  834 
i.  210  ;  ii.  852 

ii.  481 
i.  322 

iii.  143 
i.  540 

iii.  120 
ii.  55 
iii.  5 


G. 

Gaar  v.  Louisville  Bank 
Gabarron  v.  Kreeft 
Gab  ay  v.  Lloyd 
Gabriel  v.  Dresser 
Gaby  v.  Griver 
Gadd  V.  Houghton 
Gaddis  v.  Leeson 
Gaff  V.  Sims 
GafReld  v.  Hapgood 
Gaffney  ;;.  Hayden 
Gage  V.  Gage 

V.  Lewis 

V.  Mechanics'  Bank 

V.  Stimson 

V.  Tirrell 
Gahn  v.  Niemcewicz 
Gaillard  v.  Le  Seigneur 
Gaillon  v.  L'.\igle 
Gails  V.  The  Osceola 
Gaines  v.  Dorsett 

V.  McKinley 

V.  Union  Trans.  Co. 
Gainsford  i-.  Carroll 

V.  Grammar 
Gairdner  v.  Senhouse 
Gaither   v.   Farmers    & 
Bank 

V.  My  rick 
Galbraith  v.  Gedge 

V.  Neville 
Galbreath  v.  Galbreath 
Gale  V.  Capern 

V.  Eastman 

V.  Halfknight 

V.  Kemper's  Heirs 

V.  Laurie 

V.  Leckie 

V.  Lindo 

V.  Mottram 


i.  279 
i.  574  i 
ii.  672,  675  j 
il.  815  I 
i.  527  i 
i.  55,  58,  590  i 
iii.  58  I 
ii.  31 
i.  547 
i.  355 
i.  123 
ii.  31 
ii.  31,  32 
i.  65 
ii.  427 
i.  323 
iii.  127 
i.  105 
i.  247 
i.  281 
i.  62 
ii.  257 
iii.  220 
iii.  69 
ii.  535 
Mechanics 

iii.  125,  127 

ii.  535 

i.  168 

ii.  739,  740 

iii.  349 

iii.  92 

iii.  123 

iii.  416 

i.  310 

ii.  454,  483 

i.  184 

ii.  78 

ii.  826 


Gale  V.  Nixon 

V.  Parrott 

V.  l\eed 

V.  Walsh 

V.  AVard 

V.  Wells 
Galena  &  Chicago  Union  R.  Co 

Yarwood 
Gall  V.  Comber 
Gallagher  v.  Fayette  Co.  R.  R. 

V.  Nichols 

V.  Waring 
Gallaher  v.  Thompson 
Gallego  V.  Gallego 
Gallin  v.  London,  &c.  R.  Co. 
Gallini  v.  Laborie 
Gallison,  Re 
Galloway  v.  Garland 

V.  Hughes 

V.  Webb 
Galjjin  v.  Hard 
Galsworthy  v.  Strutt 
Gait's  Ex'rs  v.  Swain 
Galusha  v.  Cobleigh 
Galvin  i\  Thompson 
Galway  v.  Matthew 
Gambart  v.  Sumner 
Gamble  v.  Grimes 
Gambling  v.  Read 
Gambril  v.  Rose 

Gambs  v.  Covenant  Life  Ins.  Co 
Game  v.  Harvie 
Games  v.  Manning         i.  309  ;  ii.  785,  787 
Gammel  v.  Skinner  iii.  Ill 

Gammell  v.  Parramore  ii.  32 

Gammon  v.  Chandler  i.  129  ;  ii.  60  ;  iii.  288 

V.  Freeman 

V.  Howe 
Gam  well  v.  Merch.  Ins.  Co 
Gandell  v.  Pontigny 
Gandy  v.  Adelaide  Ins.  Co. 
Ganguere's  Estate,  In  re 
Ganly  v.  Ledwidge 
Gannard  v.  Eslava 
Gansevoort  v.  Williams 
Garbutt  v.  Watson 
Garcelon  v.  Hampden  Ins.  Co. 
Gardiner  v.  Childs 

V.  Davis 

V.  Gray 

V.  Hopkins 

V.  Shannon 
Gardner,  Ex  parte 

V.  Adams 

V.  Allen 

V.  Baillie 

V.  Bibbins 

V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co 

V.  Buckbee 

V.  Col.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Flagg 


iii.  4 
i.  349 
ii.  889 
i.  325 
i.  547 
i.  151 

ii.  248 
i.  101 

iii.  a07 
iii.  23 
i.  626,  628 
ii.  GO 
i.  382;  iii.  437 
ii.  238 
ii.  887 

in.  471 

iii.  348 
ii.  416 
ii.  834 
i.  306 
iii.  170,  172 
i.  482 

iii.  106 
ii.  827 
i.  202 
ii.  342 
i.  486 
i.  578 

iii.  126 
ii.  006 
ii.  109 


i.  437 


V.  Gardner 
V.  Grout 
V.  Hazelton 
V.  Heartt 


ii.  685 
iii.  174 
ii.  556 
ii.  37,  44 
ii.  526 
ii.  902 
i.  556 
i.  264 
i.  208 
iii.  60,  61 
ii.  522 
i.  196 
ii.  745 
i.  626 
ii.  812 
iii  460 
iii.  471 
i.  253 
ii.  883 
i.  42 
ii.  465,  466 
i.  48 
ii.  806 
ii.  487,  491,  512 
iii.  125,  135 
1.  124,  388,  409 
iii.  49 
iii.  15 
i.  120 


XCll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Gardner  r.  Rowland 

i.  594 ; 

ii.  395 

V.  Joy 
r.  Lane 

iii 

.  60,  61 
i.  504 

V.  McCutcheon 

i.  Ill 

V.  jNI'Mahon 

iii 

.  75,  77 

V.  New  Jersey,  The 
V.  Nolen 

ii.  461 
ii.  897 

V.  Howe 

iii.  435 

V.  Salvador 

ii.  506 

V.  Walsh 

ii.  854 

V.  Watson 

ii.  29 

Gardoni,  Ex  parte 

i.  209, 

iii.  15 

(Tarfield  v.  Paris 

in.  49 

Gariss  v.  Gariss 

in.  372 

Garland,  Ex  parte 
V.  Chambers 

i.  226 
i.  570 

V.  Jacomb 

i.  204 

r.  Noble 

ii.  828 

V.  Pamplin 
Garlick  v.  Ward 

i.  408 
ii.  895 

Garlinghouse  v.  Whitwell 

ii.  944 

Garment  v.  Barrs 

i.  635 

Garner  v.  Garner 

i.  129 

Garnett  v.  Garnett 

ii.  93 

V.  Macon        ii.  849 ;  iii.  335,  336,  340 
V.  Willan  ii.  261,  263,  272 
V.  Woodcock  i.  303 
Garnham  v.  Finney  i.  539 
Garnier  v.  Poydras  ii.  731 
Garrard  v.  Frankol  ii.  928 
V.  Grinling  iii.  344 
V.  Haddan  ii.  862 
V.  Hardey  i.  162 
V.  Zachariah  ii.  787 
Garrells  '•.  Kensington  ii.  520 
Garret  v.  Malone  i.  478 
V.  Taylor  ii.  748 
Garretson  v.  Selby  i.  574 
Garrett  c.  Foot  iii.  126,  147 
V.  Handley  i.  65 
V.  Malone  iii.  36 
V.  Muller  i.  189 
Garrigues  v.  Coxe  ii.  428,  486 
Garrison  v.  Mcmpliis  Ins.  Co.            ii-  427 
Garron  v.  Galbraith  ii.  536 
Garrow  v.  Carpenter  ii.  881 
Garside  v.  Trent  &  Mersey  Naviga- 
tion ii.  150,  227,  230 
Garton  v.  Bristol  &  Exeter  R.  R.  Co.  i.  446 
Garvin  v.  Williams  i.  263 
Garwood  r.  Garwood  ii.  8G8 
Gascoyne  v.  Smith  i.  295 
Gashwiler  v.  Willis  i.  157 
Gaskarth  v.  Lowther  iii.  366 
Gaskell  ;..  King  i.  488 
V.  Morris  iii.  225 
Gaskill  V.  Dudley  i.  161 
Gaslight  Co.  v.  Turner  ii.  &8() 
Gasque  '-.  Small  i.  466 
Gass  V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.      ii.  231 
V.  Stinson  ii.  766 
Gassett  v.  Godfrey  i.  573  ;   ii.  700 
V.  Grout  iii.  437 
Gaston  r.  Am.  Exchange  Bank         i.  329 
I".  Frank um  iii.  334,  369 


GatehiU's  case  i.  161 

Gatehouse  v.  Gatehouse  ii.  92 

Gates  V.  Beecher  i.  224,  225 

V.  Madeley  i.  382 

V.  Madison  Ins.  Co.    ii.  542,  546.  553, 

556,  558,  559,  560,  573 

Gathings  v.  Williams  ii.  727 

GatlifEe  v.  Bourne  ii.  208 

Gauger  v.  Pautz  i.  185 

Gaulden  i'.  McPhaul  in.  184 

Gault  V.  Brown  iii.  40 

Gaunt  V.  Hill  i.  509 

Gauntlet,  The  ii.  404 

Gauss  V.  Hobbs  i.  193 

Gaussen  v.  Morton  1.  74,  77 

Gavigan  v.  Evans  ii.  685 

Gawtry  v.  Doane  i.  819 

Gay  V.  Lander  i.  278 

V.  Parpart  ii.  76 

V.  Rainey  ii.  716 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  603 

V.  Waltman  i.  206 

Gay  ford  v.  Nicholls  i.  116 

Gayler  v.  Wilder  ii.  304,  318 

Gaylord  Man.  Co.  v.  Allen  i.  624,  626,  628 

Gaylord  v.  Gaylord  ii.  832 

Gayner  v.  Wilkinson  iii.  437 

Gaynor  w.  Old  Colony,  &c.  R.R.  Co.  ii.  251 

Gazelle,  The  ii.  431,  458 

Gazinsky  et  ux.  v.  Colburn  i.  20 

Gazley  v.  Price  ii.  663,  790 

Gazrara  v.  Ohio  Ins.  Co.  ii.  532 

Geach  v.  Ingall  ii.  595 

Geary  v.  Physic  iii.  9 

Geddes  v.  Pennington  ii.  911 

Gee  V.  Cheshire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  493,  583 

I'.  Pearse  iii.  339,  342 

V.  Pritchard  ii.  330,  335,  336 

Gear  v.  Archer  i.  464 

V.  Putnam  ii.  900 

Geiger  v.  Eiglith,  &c.  Assoc.  iii.  117 

V.  Green  iii.  367 

Geill  V.  Jeremy  i.  320 

Geiser  v.  Kershner  ii.  749 

Gelley  v.  Clerk  ii.  165 

Gelston  v.  Hoyt  ii.  931 

Gem,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

Gen.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  i'.  Sherwood 

ii.  499  ;   iii.  192 

General  Smith,  The  ii.  381,  382,  385 

Gen.  Steam  Nav.  v.  Gillon  ii.  434 

Gen.  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Mann  ii.  429 

V.  Bolt  ii.  19 

r.  Tonkin  ii.  429 

General  Trust  Co.  v.  Chapman  i.  129 

General  Worth,  The  i'.  Hopkins        ii.  392 

Geimings  v.  Lake  i.  520 

Gentleman,  The  ii.  423 

George,  The  •  ii.  463 

V.  Clagett  i.  66 ;  ii.  883,  884,  938 

I'.  Elliott  ii.  138 

V.  Gillespie  ii.  867 

V.  Harris  i.  482,  484 

V.  Johnson  ii.  918 

V.  Norris  i.  669 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


XClll 


George  v.  Sandel 

i.  47 

Gibson  ?•.  Minet 

i.  248 ;  ii.  627 

V.  Skeates 

ii.  3'J2 

V.  Moore 

i.  185,  186 

V.  Skivington 

iii.  211) 

V.  Norway  Bank 

i.  48 

V.  Tate 

i.  205  ;  ii.  875 

t'.  Overbury 

ii.  610 

V.  Van  Horn 

ii.  76 

V.  Powell 

ii.  832 

George  Dean,  The 

ii.  441 

V.  Small 

ii.  527,  531 

George  Home,  Tlie 

i.  442 

V.  Spurrier 

i.  525 

Geralopulo  v.  VVieler 

i.  326 

V.  Stearns 

iii.  129,  138 

Gerliard  v.  Bates 

ii.  921 

V.  Stevens 

i.  235  ;  iii.  4U 

Gerhauser  v.  No.  Brit.  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  502 

V.  Stone 

i.  178 

Germain  v.  The  Indiana 

ii.  .392 

I'.  Van  Dresar 

ii.  325 

Germaine  v.  Burton 

i.  636 

V.  Wells 

i.  535 

German  Lutheran  Trustees 

V.  Heise  ii.  766 

V.  Winter 

i.  26;  ii.  748 

German  Mining  Co.,  In  re 

i.  229 

Giddens  v.  Byers  Heirs 

i.  55 

Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  McKee 

ii.  543 

Giddings  v.  Coleman 

i.  246 

V.  Sherlock 

ii.  573 

Giese  v.  Schultz 

ii.  74 ;  iii.  193 

Gerrish  v.  Glines 

ii.  853 

Giffert  v.  West 

i.  272 

Gerst  V.  Jones 

i. 

627,  631 

GifFord,  Ex  parte 

i.  36,  326 

Gervais  v.  Edwards 

iii 

360,  3()6 

V.  Allen 

ii.29 

Getcheil  V.  Clark 

iii.  286 

V.  Carvill 

i.  622 

V.  Heald 

iii.  88 

V.  Ivolsch 

ii.  467 

Gether  v.  Capper 

i.  508 

V.  Thompson 

i.  159 

Getty  r.  Rountree 

i.  631 

V.  Whitaker 

ii.  819 

V.  Shearer 

ii.  861 

Gihon  V.  Fryatt 

ii.  875 

Gettys  V.  Gettys 

ii.  737 

Gilbach's  Appeal 

i.  355 

Gheen  v.  Johnson 

1.91 

Gilbert  v.  Danforth 

ii.  784 

V.  Osborn 

i.  551 

V.  Dennis 

i.  308,  322 

Gibbens  v.  Buisson 

ii.  424 

V.  Guptill 

i.  151 

Gibhes  V.  Mitchell 

ii.  873 

V.  Holmes 

i.  75 

Gibbins  r.  Phillips 

iii.  442 

V.  Lynes 

i.  351 

Gibbon  v.  Baddall 

iii.  295 

V.  McEachen 

i.  151 

i'.  Paynton 

ii.  274 

V.  N.  Amer.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  586 

Gibbons  v.  Hoag 

iii.  338 

V.  Schwencle 

i.  152 

Gibbs  V.  Benjamin 

i.  564 

V.  Sykes 

ii.  897  ;  iii.  43 

V.  Bryant 

iii.  Ill 

V.  Whidden 

i.  198 

V.  Chisholm 

iii.  161 

V.  Wiman 

ii.  200 

V.  Fremont                     i 

.314 

;  iii.  113 

Gilbertson  v.  Richardson 

iii.  195 

V.  Gray 

ii. 

417,  418 

Gilby  v.  Singleton 

i.  211 

V.  Guild 

iii.  107 

Gilchrist  v.  Donwell 

i.  319 

V.  Merrill 

i.  369 

V.  Leonard 

ii.  873 

V.  Potter 

ii.  454 

V.  McGee 

ii.  939 

V.  Smith 

ii.  886 

V.  Williams 

ii.  881 

Gibert  v.  Fetcher 

iii.  295 

Gildart  r.  Gladstone 

ii.  638 

Gibson  v.  Bell 

iii. 

439,  469 

Gildersleeve  v.  U.  S.  Tel. 

Co.  ii.  286,  288, 

V.  Boyd 

ii.  119 

301 

V.  Bruce 

iii.  477 

Giles  V.  Ackles 

i.  470 

V.  Carruthers        i.  639, 

642; 

iii.  426, 

V.  Cynthia,  The 

ii.  460 

429,  435 

V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  447 

V.  Colt 

i.  62 

V.  Grover 

ii.  103 

V.  Connor 

i.  292 

V.  Hart 

ii.  771,  772 

V.  Cook 

ii.  319 

V.  O'Toole 

iii.  195,  196 

V.  Cooke                        i 

245, 

248,  249 

V.  Perkins 

i.  571  ;  iii.  451 

V.  Courthorpe 

iii.  447 

Gilfert  v.  Hallet 

ii.  534 

V.  Cranage 

ii.  63 

Gilliam  v.  Locke 

iii.  465 

V.  Culver                      ii 

196, 

199,  203 

Gilhooley  v.  Washington 

i.  541 

V.  Dickie 

ii.  79 

Gilkyson  v.  Larue 

iii  72 

V.  East  India  Co. 

i.  154 

Gill  V.  Cole 

iii.  236 

V.  Erie  R.  Co. 

ii.  46 

V.  Cubitt 

i.  288,  289 

V.  Gibson 

ii.  8.50 

V.  Kuhn 

i.  178 

V.  Goldsmid 

iii.  306 

V.  Kymer 

iii.  258 

V.  Ingo 

ii.  454 

V.  McAttee 

iii.  309 

V.  King 

iii.  416 

V.  Shelley 

ii.  633 

V.  Livesey 

iii.  143 

V.  Wells 

Tii.  335 

V.  Love 

i.  570 

V.  Woods 

i.  380 

V.  Lupton 

i.  12,  212 

Gillespie  v.  Battle 

iii.  38 

XCIV 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Gillespie  v.  Carpenter 

IK  Cresswell 

V.  Edmonston 

I'.  Forsyth 

V.  Hamilton 

V.  Hanuahan 

V.  Moon 

V.  Thompson 
Gillet,  Er  j/urte 

r.  Averill 
Gillett  V.  Bowman 

V.  Faircluld 

V.  Ellis 

V.  Hill 

V.  Mawman 

V.  Phelps 

r.  Kippon 
Gilligan  v.  Boardraan 
Gillingham  v.  Gillingham 

V.  Waskett 
Gillis  I'.  Bailey 

V.  Hall 
Gillott  r.  Esterbrook 


ii.  944 

iii.  98 

i.  514 

ii.  527,  5-28 

i.  226 

i.  311 

iii.  354 

ii.  416 

iii.  435 

i.  307 

ii.  802 

i.  250 

ii.  216,  448,  451,  456 

i.  5G6 


ii.  7; 


V.  Kettle 
Gilman  r.  Brown 

V.  Cutts 

V.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co 

V.  Hall 

V.  Hunnewell 

V.  Kibler 

V.  Moore 

V.  Peck 
Gilmore  v.  Black 

V.  Bussey 

V.  Carman 

u.  Holt 

V.  Spies 
Gilpin  1-.  Enderby 

V.  Temple 
Gilpins  V.  Consequa     i. 


ii.  140 

ii.  913 

i.  33 

iii.  17 

iii.  72,  92 

ii.  879 

i.  53,  90 

iii.  309 

ii.  353,  355,  357, 

371,  372,  376,  378 

ii.  375 

iii.  293,  297 

iii.  106 

ii.  46 

ii.  43,  793 

ii.  35.3,  362,  370 

i.  470  ;  iii.  17 

ii.  785 

i.  302  ;  ii.  754 

i.  173 

ii.  757 

ii.  172 

ii.  777,  780 

i.  311,  312 

i.  188 

i.  175,  178,  198 

490,574;  ii.  806; 

iii.  220 


Gilreath  r.  Allen 
Gilson  V.  Bingham 

V.  Gwinn 

V.  Spear 
Ginesi  r.  Cooper 
Girard  r.  Taggart 
Girard  Ins  Co.  r.  Marr 
Giraud  v.  Richmond 
Gisbourn  )■.  Hurst 
Gist  !•.  Lybrand 
Gittings  r.  Mahew 

V.  Nelson 
Givens  v.  Calder 
Gladding  r.  Constant 
Glade  v.  Germania  Ins.  Co. 
Gladwell  r.  Turner 
Glaiiolin  V.  Hays 
Glaholme  '•.  Rowntree 
Glaister  v.  Hewer 
Glascock  V.  Glascock 
Glasfurd  v.  T>aing 
Glasgow,  'i"he 

r.  bands 


i.  172 


iii.  184 
i.  638 

iii.  258 
i.  356 

ii.  893 


i.  574  ;  iii.  224 

ii.  127 

iii.  41 

ii.  175 

i.  308 

i.  482 

i.  560,  613 

iii.  340,  347 

ii.  457 

ii.  554 

i.  318 

ii.  408,  657 

iii.  260 

ii.  875 

iii.  298,  299 

iii.  138 

ii.  390 

i.  380 


Glass  V.  Glass  ii.  88 

Glasscock  v.  Nelson  iii.  372 

r.  Smith  i.  21  h 

Glasscott  V.  Day  ii.  776,  778 

Glassington  v.  Rawlins  ii.  797 

(ilazebrook  ?'.  Woodrow  iii.  247 

Gleason  v.  Dodd  ii.  742 

V.  Dyke  i.  501 

V.  Gleason  ii.  92 

V.  Goodrich  Trans.  Co.       ii.  212,  213 

V.  Sykes  i.  507 

Gleim  v.  Belmont,  The  ii.  384 

Glen  V   Hope  Ins.  Co.  ii.  494 

V.  Lewis  ii.  548 

V.  Whitaker  i.  573 

Glen  Cove  Mat.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ilarrold 

i.  458 
Glendale  Woollen  Co  v.  Protection 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  521,  546,  553 

Glendenning,  £"3: /3a)ie  i.  325 

Glenn  v.  Gill  i.  231 

V.  McCuUough  iii.  09 

i:  Thompson  i.  548 

Glenny  v.  Smith  ii.  372 

Glezen  v.  Rood  iii.  235 

Globe  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cleveland  Ins.  Co. 

iii.  442 
Glory,  The  ii.  439 

Glossop  V.  Colman  i.  24 

Gloucester  Bank  v.  Salem  Bank      i.  301  ; 

ii.  754 

Gloucester  Ins.  Co.  v.  Younger        ii.  508 

Glover  v.  Austin  ii.  380,  387 

V.  Barrie  ii.  834 

V.  Dowagic  Universalist  Parish  ii.  791 

V.  Glover  i.  151 

V.  Ott  i.  338 

V.  Proprietors  of  Drury  Lane      i.  385 

V.  Robbins  ii.  853 

Glyn  V.  East  &  West  India  Dock  Co. 

iii.  274 
Glvn  Mills  &  Co.  v.  East,  &c.  Dock 

Co.  ii.  411 

Glynn  v.  Baker  i.  .330 

Goate  V.  Goate  iii.  77 

Goblet  V.  Becchey  ii.  686 

Godard  v.  Benjamin  ii.  749 

V.  Gray  ii.  738 

Godchau.x  v.  Mulford  iii.  49 

Goddard  v.  Binncy         i.  563,  564;  iii.  60 

V.  Cox  ii.  762,  764 

r.  Hodges  i.  184;  ii.  7()4 

V.  Ingram  iii.  90 

V.  Mercliants  Bank  i.  300 

V.  O'Brien  ii.  824 

V.  Pratt  i.  189 

V.  Sawyer  ii.  702 

V.  Tangier,  The  ii.  410 

V.  Vanderheyden  iii.  464 

Godefroy  v.  Dalton  i.  126 

Godfrey  r.  Forrest  ii.  883 

V.  Furzo  i.  573 ;  iii.  438 

Godiilot  1:  Harris  ii.  352 

Godin  V.  Lond.  Ass.  Co.  i.  107;  iii.  200,  276 

V.  Royal  Ass.  Co.  ii.  493 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


XCV 


Godwin  i\  Francis 
Goetle  Hoope,  The 
Godts  ».  Rose 
Goesele  i\  Briineler 
Goetz  V.  Foos 
Goff  r.  Clinkard 
V.  Rehoboth 


iii.  14 
ii.  481 
i.  589;  iii.  49 
i.  165 
ii.  11;  iii.  23 
ii.  182 
ii.  773;  iii.  Ill 


Goicoecliea  v.  La.  State  Ins.  Co.      ii.  518, 

648 
ii.  749 
ii.  575 
ii.  495.  497 
ii.  495,  648,  739 
ii.  477 
ii.  85 
ii.  196,  415 
iii.  391,  502 
i.  556 
ii.  407 


Goings  V.  Mills 

Goit  V.  National  Ins.  Co. 

Goix  V.  Knox 

V.  Low 

V.  National  Ins.  Co. 
Goldbeck  v.  Goldbeck 
Golden  r.  Manning 

;;.  Prince 
Golder  v.  Ogden 
Gold  Hunter,  The 


Golding,  Davis,  &  Co.,  Ex  parte         i.  645 

Goldman  i'.  Davis  i.  315 
Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  National   Bank 

i.  51 
Goldney,  Ex  parte  iii.  431 
Goldsborough  v.  Orr  ii.  660 
Goldsbury  v.  May  i.  569 
Gold-Separating  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Disin- 
tegrating Ore  Co.  ii.  313 
Goldshede  v.  Swan                 ii.  694;  iii.  17 
Goldsmith  v.  Guild  iii.  340 
Goldstone  v.  Osborn  ii.  844 
Golightly  V.  Jeliicoe  ii.  836 
Gomez  v.  Garr  ii.  827 
Gorapertz  v.  Bartlett  i.  298 
V.  Denton  i.  637 
Gondolier,  The  ii.  458 
Gonzales  i-.  Broad  i.  110 
V.  Minor  ii.  458 
V.  Sladen  i.  105 
Gooch  V.  Bryant  ii.  859 
V.  Sullivan  iii.  66 
Good,  Ex  parte  i.  210 
V.  Cheeseman  ii.  819 
V.  Elliott  ii.  896 
V.  Good  ii.  885 
V.  Martin  ii.  8 
V.  Mylin  iii.  176 
Goodall,  Ex  parte  iii.  435 
V.  Marshall  iii.  409 
V.  New  England  Ins.  Co.     ii.  565,  584 
V.  Polliill  i.  326 
V.  Richardson  ii.  119 
V.  Thurman  ii.  74,  75 
Goodall's  case  ii.  646 
Goodburn  i'.  Stevens  i.  168,  170 
Goode  r.  Harrison  i.  354 
I'.  Jones  i.  274 
V.  M'Cartney  i.  180 
V.  Waters  ii.  833 
Goodenow  v.  Buttrick  ii.  874 
V.  Dunn  i.  612 
V.  Tyler  i.  104,  105 
Gooding  V.  Morgan  ii.  757 
Goodinge  v.  Goodinge  ii.  692 
Goodisson  v.  Nunn  iii.  247 


Goodlcad  v.  Blewith 
Goodloe  V.  Clay 

V.  Rogers 
Goodman,  Ex  parte 

In  re 

V.  Chase 

V.  Griffin 

V.  Hannibal 

I'.  Harvey 

V.  Kennell 

I'.  Pocock 

r.  White 
Goodnow  V.  Parsons 

V.  Smith 

V.  Warren 
Goodrich  v.  City,  &c. 

V.  Downs 

V.  Gordon 

r.  Jones 

V.  Lafflin 

V.  Norris 

V.  Reynolds 

V.  Rogers 

V.  Willard 
Goodridge  v.  Lord 

V.  Ross 


ii.  773 

iii.  Ill 

iii.  198 

iii.  468 

iii.  415 

iii.  25 

ii.  26 

i.  515 

i.  289 ;  ii.  97 

i.  114 

ii.  38,  44,  634 

i.  207 

ii.  675,  823 

i.  210 

i.  316 

ii.  867 

iii.  403 

i.  303 

i.  545 

ii.  812 

ii.  410 

i.  161 

iii.  152 

iii.  267 

ii.  422 

i.  365 


Goodright  d.  Hall  v.  Richardson  i.  040 
(I.  Walter  i'.  Davids  i.  539 

Goodsall  V.  Boldero  ii.  606,  607 

V.  Webb  ii.  609 

Goodsell  V.  Benson  ii.  712 

V.  Myers  i.  363 

Goodson  V.  Brooke  i.  59 

Goodspeed  v.  East  Haddam  Bank      i.  164 

Goodtitle  v.  Bailey  ii.  635,  931 

V.  Nortli  iii.  237,  465 

V.  Southern  i.  531 ;  ii.  680,  681 

V.  Toombs  iii.  237 

V.  Woodward  i.  211 

Goodwin  v.  Blackburne  ii.  109 

V.  Clark  i.  487 

V.  Cremer  ii.  749,  750 

V.  Cunningham  i.  258 

V.  Davenport  i.  305 

V.  Hardy  i.  158 

V.  Holbrook  i.  675,  786,  810 

V.  Jones  iii.  407,  409 

V.  Lightbody  iii.  366,  429,  435 

V.  Mass.  Life  Ins.  Co.  ii.  606,  618 

V.  Richardson  i   168 

V.  Robarts  i.  276,  330;  ii.  936 

V.  Willoughby  i.  471 

Goodyear  v.  Bishop  ii.  327,  328 

V.  Day  ii.  304,  325 

V.  Housinger  ii.  324 

V.  Mullee  ii.  324 

V.  N.  J.  Cent.  R.  R.  ii.  324 

V.  Providence  Rubber  Co.  ii.  316 

V.  Railroads  ii.  312,  316 

V.  Wait  ii.  312 

V.  Watson  ii-  6 

Gookin  V.  Graham  i.  616 

V.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  488 

Goold  V.  Chapin  ii.  211,  213,  232 

Goom  V.  Aflala  i.  585,  586;  iii.  13 


xcvi 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Gordon  r.  Appeal  Tax  Court 
V.  Baltimore 
V.  Bankard 
r.  Bowne 
V.  Brewster 
V.  Buchanan  i- '' 

V.  Bulkeley 
V.  Cannon 
V.  Church 
V.  Dalby 
V.  East  India  Co. 
V.  Freeman 
V.  Gordon 

V.  Grand  St.  R.  E.  Co. 
V.  Haywood 
V.  Hutchinson 
V.  Jenney 
V.  Jones 

V.  Mass.  Ins.  Co 
V.  Norris 
V.  Parker 
V.  Potter 
V.  Price 
V.  Rimmington 
V.  Rolt 
V.  Strange 
V.  Torrey 
V.  Tucker 
G«»re  V.  Brazier 
V.  Gibson 
V.  Wliite 
V.  Wright 
Gorgier  v.  Mieville 
Gorham  v.  Steams 
Gorrison  v.  Perrin 


ii.  428,  498,  505,  871) 
iii.  187 
i.  88;  ii.  181, 183 
i.  40 
iii.  440 
ii.  882 
i.  4.39 
ii.  380 
i.  221 
iii.  3(5 
ii.  238 
i.  406 
ii.  179 
iii.  217 
iii.  184 
ii.  476,  505,  506 
ui.  219,  224 
iii.  233 
i.  344,  351 
i.  326 
ii.  498,  571 
i.  114 
ii.  753 
iii.  293 
ii.  827,  832,  835 
iii.  239,  242 
i  434,  436;  iii.  373,414 
ii.  945 
ii.  941 
i.  329,  330 
iii.  441,  442 
599,  603,  604,  606, 
673 


iii.  497  I  Gould  v.  Webb 
iii.  498    Gouldsworth  r.  Knights 
i.  194  I  Goupy  v.  Harden 

Gourdine  v.  Graham 

Gourdon  v.  Ins.  Co. 

Gourlay  v.  Duke  of  Somerset 


ii.  GC3,  738 

i.  541 ;  ii.  940 

i.  299 

iii.  102 

ii.  475,  476 

ii.  845; 

310,  360 

19.J-198 

i.  315 

i.  251 

ii.  533 

iii.  99 


ui. 
i. 


Gorst  i:  Lowndes 
Gorton  v.  Dyson 
Gosbell  V.  Archer 
Goslin  V.  Hodson 
Gosling  V.  Birnie 

V.  Higgins 
Gosman  r.  Cruger 
Goss  V.  Lord  Nugent 
V.  Turner 
V.  Whitney 
Goswiler's  Estate 
Gott  V.  Gandy 
Gottsman  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Goudy  V.  Gebliart 

V.  Gillam 
Gough,  In  re 
V.  Crane 
V.  Farr 
V.  Findon 
V.  Howard 
V.  Staats 
Gould  '•.  Armstrong 
V.  Banks 
V.  Emerson 
r.  Gould 
V.  Hill 
V.  Oliver 
f.  Parlin 
V.  Stanton 


ii.  797 
i.  141 
iii.  8 
ii.  58 
ii.  152 
ii.  215,  415 
i.  408 
ii.  425,  685 
•  ii.  789 
ii.  905 
ii.  797 
i.  532 
ii.  557 
ii.  924 
iii.  88 
iii.  448 
iii.  354  I 
ii.  74 
i.  265 
i.  537 
ii.  755 
i.  470 
ii.  776 
ii.  608 
i.  35,  177,  229 
ii.  253,  254,  255,  256 
ii.  448 
ii.  874 
u.  888,  389.  391 


Gouthwaite  v.  Duckworth 

Gove  V.  Wining 

Gover  v.  Christie 

Governeur  v.  United  Ins.  Co.  i 

Governor,  The  r.  Gordon 

Governor  &  Company  of  the  Cast 

Plate  Manufacturers  v.  Meredith  ui.  493 
Governor,  &c.  of  Copper  Mines  v 

Fox 
Governor,  &c.  v.  Fetch 
Govett  r.  Richmond 
Govier  v.  Hancock 
Gowan  r.  Jackson 
V.  Jeffries 
V.  Forster 
Gower  v.  Capper 
r.  Mainwaring 
V.  Moore 
1).  Saltmarsh 
Gowing  V.  Knowles 
Grabenhorst  v.  Nicodemus 
Grable  v.  Margrave 
Grabtree  v.  May 
Grace  v.  American  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Denison 
V.  Hale 
V.  ]\Iorgan 
V.  Smitii 
Graddon  v.  Price 
t  Gradv  v.  Am.  Cent.  Ins.  Co 


Graeff  >:  Hitchman 
Graff  r.  Bloomer 

V.  Foster 
Grafton,  The 
Graham  v.  Ackroyd 
V.  Barras 
V.  Bickham 
V.  Brettle 
V.  Chapman 
V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co. 
V.  Dyster 

V.  Fireman's  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Gracie 
V.  Graham 

V.  Hailoway 

V.  Heiulren 

V.  Hope 

V.  Hoskins 

V.  Hunt 

V.  Jackson 

V.  Kinder 

V.  Martin 

I'.  Mayer 

V.  Musson 

V.  O'Ncil 

V.  Pacific  R.  Co 

V.  Pierson 

V.  RobeVtson 


i.  158,  479 
i.  506 
ii.  826 
i.  395 
i.  212 
i.  224 
iii.  80 
i.  478 
i.  134 
i.  306,  307 
iii.  173 
i.  505 
i.  542 
iii.  184 
i.  354 
i.  54 
iii.  344 
i.  336,  338 
iii.  175 
i.  178 
ii.  804 
i.  90 
194,  203,  206 
ii.  197 
i.  629 
ii.  209,  407 
i.  101 
ii.  521 
iii.  174 
i.  404 
iii.  441 
ii.  220 
iii.  258,  278 
ii.  555 
i.  254,  474 
ii.  843 
ii.  8111 
iii.  371 
i.  75,  192 
ii.  459 
i.  463,  4()4 
iii.  225 
i.  256 
ii.  65 
i.  209 
i.  123;  iii.  10,  14 
ii.  8,  12 
iii.  181 
iii.  478 
i.  25,  34 


INDEX    TO    CASES   CITED. 


XCVll 


Graham  v.  Sangston                   i.  322,  326 

Graves  v.  Woodbury 

ii.  874 

V.  Tliompson                                 ii.  700 

Gravett  v.  Mugge 

1.564 

V.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  280,  282,  288 

Gray  v.  Agnew 

i.  102 

V.  Whichelo                                  i.  543 

V.  Bartlett 

ii.  939 

Gram  v.  Cadwell                                    i.  26 

V.  Belden 

iii.  116 

V.  Seton                                  i.  122,  212 

V.  Bell 

i.  317 

Grammar  School  v.  Burt                  iii.  48G 

V.  Bennett 

iii.  426,  429,  437 

Granby  v.  Amherst                i.  149;  ii.  709 

V.  Bompas 

i.  642 

Grandy  v.  McCleese                            ii.  810 

I'.  Brackenridge 

i.  128 

Grand  Bank  v.  Blanchard        *          i.  318 

V.  Briscoe 

iii.  241,  243 

Grandin  v.  Le  Koy                              i.  292 

V.  Brown 

ii.  28;  iii.  12,  132 

Grand  Turk,  The                                 ii.  454 

V.  Clark 

ii.  633,  614 

Granger,  Ex  parte                               iii.  471 

V.  Coffin 

i.  161 

V.  Collins                               i.  502,  536 

V.  Cox 

i.  632 

V.  George                                      iii.  99 

V.  Crosby 

iii.  170 

V.  Howard  Ins.  Co,                      ii.  574 

V.  Davis 

iii.  48 

Grangiac  v.  Arden                              i.  460 

V.  Donahoe 

i.  280 

Granite  Railway  Co.  v.  Bacon          ii.  857 

V.  Fowler 

iii.  125 

Grant,  ^x  parte                                       418 

V.  Gardner 

ii.  488 

In  re                        i.  345 ;  iii.  456,  468 

V.  Gutteridge 

ii.  761 

V.  Cole                                             i.  82 

V.  Handkinsoa 

i.  457 

V.  Da  Costa                                   i.  281 

V.  Holdship 

i.  547 

t;.  Ellicott               i.  293,  294;  iii.  451 

V.  James 

ii.  315 

V.  Fletcher        iii.  13;  i.  583,  585,  586 

V.  Mendez 

iii.  102 

V.  Green                                         i.  390 

V.  Munroe 

iii.  504 

V.  Hamilton                                  ii.  896 

V.  l^ortland  Bank 

iii.  212,  220 

V.  Healey                                       i.  328 

V.  Russell              ii. 

336,  337,  344,  ,346 

V.  Howard  Ins.  Co.      ii.  545,  551,  556 

V.  Sims 

ii.  496 

V.  Johnson                            ii.  661,  663 

V.  Thomas 

i.  255 

V.  King                                         ii.  144 

V.  Wain 

ii.  419,  445,  451 

V.  Law                                          ii.  813 

V.  Wass 

ii.  746 

V.  Maddox                            ii.  667,  677 

V.  Waterman 

iii.  195 

V.  M'Lachlin                                ii.  398 

V.  AVhite 

ii.  756 

V.  Mills                                          iii.  424 

V.  Wilson 

ii.  844 

V.  Nat.  Bank               *                iii.  421 

Gray  De  Wilton  v.  Saxon                iii.  328 

V.  Nay  lor                                            ii.  4 

Gray's  Ex'rs  v.  Brown 

ii.  28 

V.  Norway                  i.  44 ;  ii.  190,  409 

Graysbrook  v.  Fox 

i.  147 

I'.  Paxton                                       ii.  484 

Greathead  v.  Walton 

ii.  907 

V.  Raymond                  ii.  303,  315,  322 

Great  Northern  R.  Co.  v. 

Shepherd  ii.  275, 

V.  Ridsdale                                       ii.  23 

277 

V.  Royal  Exchange  Company   ii.  877, 

V.  Witham 

i.  479 

879 

Great  Western  R.  R.  Co 

V.  McComas 

V.  Smith                                 ii.  16,  18 

ii.  217 

V.  Thompson                         i.  434,  438 

Greaves  v.  Ashlin 

i.  564  ;  ii.  666 

V.  Vaughan                           i.  272,  330 

V.  Key 

ii.  936 

Grantham  v.  Hawley                   i.  568,  560 

GrebiU's  Appeal 

i.  382 

Grasselli  v.  Lowden                            ii.  891 

Greeley  v.  Stilson 

iii.  37 

Gratitudine,  The      i.  78;  ii.  404,  405,  456 

Greely  v.  Bartlett 

i.  60 

Gratz  V.  Bayard                                   i.  226 

V.  Dow 

i.  324 ;  ii.  28 

V.  Gratz                                        ii.  829 

V.  Hunt 

i.  315 

V.  Redd                                       iii.  354 

V.  Smith 

ii.  871 

Gravenor  ?.'.  Woodhouse                     i.  540 

V.  Tremont  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  444,  447,  506 

Graves  v.  Bemis                                iii.  293 

V.  AVaterhouse 

ii.  402,  404 

V.  Berdan                                      i.  537 

Green,  Ex  parte 

i.  347 

V.  Boston  Mar.  Ins.  Co.  i.  56 ;  ii.  475, 

Li  re 

ii.  896 

478,  479 

V.  Armstrong 

iii.  35 

V.  Dale                                         ii.  863 

V.  Barrett 

i.  229 

V.  Dash                                            i.  .327 

V.  Beatty 

ii.  749 

V.  Hartford,  &c.  Co.                     ii.  210 

V.  Beesley 

ii.  246 

V.  Harwood                                  ii.  686 

V.  Bicknell 

iii.  462,  465 

V.  Legg                                         ii.  663 

V.  Biddle 

iii.  238,  502,  505 

V.  Merry                                        i.  191 

V.  Bradfield 

iii.  381 

V.  Sawcer                                     ii.  387 

V.  Briggs 

ii.  387 

V.  Tucker                                         ii.  9 

V.  Brown 

ii.  498 

V.  Weeks                                   iii.  104 

V.  Button 

iu.  194 

VOL.    I.                                                                0 

XCVlll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Green  v.  Clark 
V.  Clarke 
V.  Cope 
V.  Cresswell 
V.  Disbrow 
V.  Eales 
V.  Farley 
V.  Farmer 
V.  Fouley 
V.  Fox 
I'.  Goings 
V.  Gonzales 
V.  Gosden 
V.  Green 
V.  Hatch 
V.  Hinkley 


u.  866,  871 

iii.  207 

i.  67 

iii.  24 

iii.  93 

iii.  249 

i.  319,  320 

iii.  210,  215,  272 

i.  319 

iii.  293 

i.  309 

i.  80 

ii.  912 

ii.  935 

i.  258 

i.  47 


V.  Homestead  Ins.  Co.  ii.  552 

V.  Home  i.  65 

V.  Hulett  ii.  38 

V.  Kemp  iii.  132 

V.  Kopka  i.  105 

V.  Lowell  ii.  746 

V.  Mann  ii.  191,  199,  249 

V.  Milwaukee,  &c.  E.  Co.  ii.  188 

V.  Pole  ii.  847 

V.  Price  ii.  890 

V.  Rivett  iii.  70 

I'.  Sargeant  i.  95 

V.  Sarmiento  iii.  391,  398 

V.  Slmrtliff  ii.  772 

V.  Sperry  i.  350,  385 

V.  State  iii.  499 

V.  Stuart  ii.  814 

V.  Tanner  i.  69,  194,  206 

V.  VanBuskirk  ii.  699 

V.  Winter  i.  1-36,  150 

V.  Young  ii.  501,  531 

Greenaway  v.  Adams  i.  538 ;  iii.  359 

Green  Bay  Bank  v.  Dearborn   i.  565,  568, 

570 

Grecnby  v.  Wilcocks  i.  144,  260 

Greene  v.  Bateman  i  505 ;  iii.  224 

V.  Bishop      ii.  335,  836,  341,  344,  349 

V.  Brookins  ii.  11;  iii.  21,  5G 

V.  Darling  i.  254 

V.  Dingley  ii.  794 

V.  Dodge  ii.  32 

V.  First  Parish  in  Maiden  i.  547 

V.  Greene  i.  168,  170 

I'.  Harris  iii.  41 

V.  Lycoming  Ins.  Co.  ii.  616 

Greenfield  Bank  ?•.  Leavitt  iii.  210 

Greenfield  Savings  Bank  v.  Stowell  ii.  862 

Greenhow's  Adm's  v.  Harris  iii.  117 

Greening,  Ex  parte  iii.  427,  452 

I'.  Wilkinson  ii.  212,  220 

Greenland  v.  Cliaplin  ii,  250;  iii.  192 

Greenlaw  v.  Greenlaw  ii.  736 

Greenleaf  j,-.  Kellogg  ii.  769 

V.  Qiiiiicy  iii.  88 

Greeno  v.  Munson  i.  540 

Grecnough  v.  llolfe  ii.  840 

V.  Smead  i.  274,  284 

V.  Wigginton  i.  409 

Greenslade  v.  Dower  i.  203 


Greentree  v.  Rosenstock 
Greenup  v.  Vernon 
Greenville  R.  R.  Co.  v 
Greenwald  v.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Kaster 
Greenway,  Ex  parte 

V.  Fisher 
Greenwood,  In  re 

V.  Bishop  of  London 

V.  Brodhead 

V.  Curtis 

V.  Freight  Co. 

V.  Lidbetter 
Gregg  V.  George 

V.  James 

V.  Wells 

r.  Wyman 
Gregg's  case 
Gregory  v.  Christie 

V.  Frazer 

t'.  Harman 

V.  Hurrill 

V.  King 

V.  McDowell 

V.  Mighill 

V.  Morris 

V.  Pierce 

V.  Piper 

V.  Stryker 

V.  Tiiomas 

V.  Wendell 


i.  81 

i.  552 

Partlow      iii.  184 

ii.  572 

i.  210 

i.  331 

iii.  478 

ii.  844 

i.  488 

i.  240 

ii.  726,  727 

iii.  486,  491 

ii.  823 

i.  296 

ii.  746 

ii.  936,  938 

ii.  902,  904 

iii.  167 

ii.  532,  534 

i.  435 

i.  141 

iii.  103 

ii.  897 

iii.  222 

iii.  310,  349,  352,  360 

iii.  273 


i.  407 
i.  114,  115 
ii.  141 
i.  612 
i.  569 ;  ii.  886 
V.  West  Midland  R.  Co.  ii.  272 

V.  Wilson  iii.  363 

Gregson  v.  Ruck  i.  586;  iii.  13 

Greignier,  Ex  parte  iii.  418,  419 

Gremere  v.  Le  Clerk  Bois  Valon       i.  488 
Grendell  v.  Godmond  i.  392 

Greneaux  r.  Wheeler  i.  289,  292 

Grenfell  v.  Dean  and  Canons  of 


Windsor 

i.  253 

I'.  Girdlestone 

iii.  92 

Grew  V.  Burditt  • 

ii.  877 

Grey,  Ex  parte 

iii.  420 

V.  Cooper 

i.  370 

I'.  Frier 

ii.  663 

Grice  v.  Richardson 

i.  575 

Gridley  v.  Dole 

1.  184 

Gricff  V.  Bondousquie 

i.  178 

Grier  v.  Grier 

ii.  831 

V.  Hood 

i.  216 

Grierson  v.  Eyre 

ii.  349 

Griffin  v.  Banks 

1.397 

V.  Doe 

i.  175 

V.  Eyles 

iii.  286 

V.  Hadiey 

ii.  827 

V.  Kemp 

i.  296 

t".  Macaulay 

i.  29 

V.  McKenzie 

iii.  511 

1'.  Ransdell 

i.  387 

Griffith  V.  BufEum 

i.  176 

V.  Burden 

i.  830 

V.  Cave 

ii.  181 

V.  Griffith 

iii.  300 

V.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A. 

ii.  519 

V.  Wells 

i.489 

INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


XCIX 


Griffiths  V.  Owen  ii.  819,  820  ;  iii.  81 

V.  Puleston  i.  544 

Griggs  V.  State  ii.  lOG 

Grill  /•.  Iron  Screw  Steamer  Co.       ii.  428 
Grim  v.  Plicenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  569,  573 

Grimaldi  v.  Wliite  i-  6.38 

Grimes  v.  Hamilton  Co.  iii.  15 

V.  Reese  ii-  876 

Grimman  v.  Legge         i.  543  ;  ii.  792,  940 
Grimshaw  v.  Bender  i-  327 

V.  Walker  iii.  403 

Grindell  v.  Godmond  i.  403 

Grinnan  v.  Baton  Rouge  Mills  Co. 

i.  191 
Grinnell  v.  Cook  ii.  156,  164,  165,  167 

V.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  287 


Grinoldby  v.  Wells 

i.  628 

Grisby  v.  Nance 

i.  186 

Grissell  v.  Robinson 

i.  500 

Griswold  v.  McMillan 

iii.  424 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.           ii 

418 

510,  513 

V.  Pratt 

iii 

401,  434 

V.  Sabin 

iii.  224 

V.  Sheldon 

i.  569 

V.  Waddington     i.  173, 

219, 

22.3,  224, 
226,  316 

Groat  V.  Gile 

i.  564 

Grocer's  Bank  v.  Kingman 

ii.  20 

V.  Penfield 

i.  292 

Groffy.  Belche 

i.  565 

Grome,  Ex  parte 

iii.  462 

Groning  v.  Mendham 

i.  638 

Groom  v.  Mealey 

iii.  469 

V.  Thomas 

iii.  414 

V.  West 

iii 

439,  469 

Gross  V.  Crisg 

ii.  668 

V.  Kierski 

i.  616 

Grosvenor  v.  Atl.  F.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  475, 

577 

V.  Flax  &  Hemp  Manuf. 

Co. 

iii.  117, 
118 

V.  Henry 

i.  548 

I'.  Lloyd 

i.  189 

V.  N.  Y.  &c.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  190 

Grote  V.  The  C.  &  II.  R.  Co. 

ii. 

243,  245 

Groton  v.  Dalheim 

i.  300 

Groton  Co.  v.  Gardner 

i.  552 

Grove  v.  Bastard 

iii. 

334,  335 

V.  Brien 

ii.  6 

V.  Dubois 

i.  100 

Grovcr  v.  Wakeman 

iii.  382 

Grover,  &c.  Co.  v.  Clinton 

iii.  433 

Grover  &  Baker  S.  M.  Co. 

V.  Wil-           1 

lianis 

ii.  324 

Groves  v.  Buck 

iii.  62 

V   Graves 

iii.  126 

V.  Perkins 

i.  523 

V.  Smith 

i.  176 

Grow  V.  Seligman 

ii.  370 

Grubb  V.  Suit 

ii.  74 

Grugeon  i\  Smith 

i.  322 

Grymes  v.  Boweren 

i.  547 

Grysiel  v.  Whichcott 

iii.  141 

Guaranty  Co.  v.  Board  of  Liquida- 
tion iii.  506 


Guard  v.  Whiteside  ii.  850 
Guardian  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hogan  ii.  606,  609 
Guardians  of  the  Poor  v.  JMathans       ii.  85 

Guardians,  &c.  v.  Franklin  i.  153 

Guerlain  v.  Col.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  473 

Guernsey  v.  Carver  iii.  202 

V.  Cook  i.  G8 

Guerreiro  v.  Peile  i.  60,  102,  529 

Guerry  v.  Ferryman  i.  254 

Guest  V.  Smythe  i.  93 

Guggenheimer  v.  Geiszler  iii.  123 

Guichard  i\  Superveile  iii.  96 

Guidon  v.  Robson  i.  22 

Guier  v.  O'Daniel  ii.  712 

Guier's  case  ii.  644 

Guild  V.  Belcher  i.  215 
V.  Butler                i.  324;  ii.  6;  iii.  411 

V.  Guild  ii.  51 

V.  Rogers  i.  554 

Guille  V.  Swan  iii.  195 

Guiilod  i;.  Nock  ii.  772 
Gulick  y.  Gulick                i.l85,  186;  ii.  71 

V.  Grover  i.  46,  411 

Gulledge  v.  Howard  ii.  99 

Gullett  V.  Lamberton  i.  370 

V.  Lewis  ii.  746 

Gulliver  v.  Drinkwater  iii.  466 

Gully  V.  Bisliop  of  Exeter  i.  460 

V.  Gully  ii.  645 

Gunderson  v.  Richardson  ii.  904 

Gunn  V.  Barry  iii.  50-5 
V.  Bolckow                      i.  639  ;  iii.  274 

Gunnis  i\  Erhart  i.  524 

Gunter  v.  Astor  ii.  52 

V.  Halsey  iii.  66 

Gunther  v.  At  will  i.  628 
Gurley  v.  Hiteshue            iii.  314,  330,  371 

Gurney  v.  Atlantic  R.  Co.  iii.  222 

V.  Behrend  i.  652 

V.  Crockett  ii.  385 

V.  Sharp  iii.  276 

V.  Womersley  i.  272,  298 

Gurnsey  v.  Gardner  i.  257 

Gustavia,  The  ii.  385 

Guth  V.  Guth  i.  397 

Guthrie  v.  Jones  i.  546 

V.  Murphy  i.  350 

V.  Piigsley  iii.  243 

Gutteridge  v.  Munyard  iii.  249 

Guy  V.  Butler  1.  254 

V.  Sharp  ii.  691 

u.  Tams  iii.  75 

Gwathney  v.  Cason  iii.  10,  15 

G William  v.  Daniel  ii.  422 

V.  Stone  iii.  359 
Gwin  V.  Whitaker                ii.  765;  iii.  Ill 

Gwinnell  r.  Herbert  i.  299 

Gvvynn,  Ex  parte  iii.  143,  274 

V.  McCauley  iii.  314 

V.  Lee  i.  288 

Gwynne,  Ex  parte  i.  643 

V.  Heaton  i.  523 
Gylbert  v.  Fletcher                i.  354  ;  ii.  54 

Gyles  V.  Wilcox  ii.  345 

Gynes  v.  Kemsley  ii.  681 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


H. 

Hale,  Ex  parte 

iii.  469 

V.  Baldwin 

iii.  508 

Haak  v.  Linderraann 

i.  5G8 

V.  City  of  London,  &c.  Co. 

i.  531 

Haas  V.  Flint 

iii.  143 

V.  Gerrish                               i. 

364,  365 

Hacker  v.  Jolinson 

i.  232 

V.  Hale 

iii.  161 

V.  Storer 

i.  144 

V.  Henderson 

i.  489 

Hacket  r.  Glover 

i.  631 

V.  Huse 

ii.  828 

V.  Tilley 

i.  487 

V.  James 

iii.  239 

Hackett  r.  B.  C  &  M.  Kd.  Co. 

ii.  188 

V.  Lawrence 

ii.  722 

V.  King 

i.  444 

V.  Mechanics  Ins.  Co.  ii.475. 

493,  577, 

V.  Martin                  i.  254  ;  ii. 

188,  577 

583 

V.  McNamara               iii. 

312, 

323,  867 

?'.  Mercantile  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  535 

Hackitt  V.  Reynolds 

iii.  297 

V.  Milwaukee  Dock  Co. 

i.  328 

Hackley  r.  Headley 

i.  443 

V.  Morse 

iii.  81 

r.  Hoskins 

ii.  52 

V.  N.  J.  Steam  Nav.  Co. 

ii.  172 

V.  Sprague 

iii. 

127,  128 

V.  Omaha  Bank 

i.  552 

Hackwood  v.  Lyall 

ii. 

39(5,  400 

V.  Rawson 

i.  605 

Hadd  V.  U.  S.,  &c.  Co. 

ii.  227 

V.  Rice 

i.  463 

Hadden  r.  Knickerbocker 

i.  552 

V.  Small 

iii.  416 

Haddock  v.  Bury 

i.  308 

V.  Smith 

i.  616 

V.  Murray 

i.  318 

V.  Wasliington  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  499 

V.  Woods 

i.  279 

Kale's  Exec.  v.  Ard's  Exec. 

iii.  101 

Haddon  v.  Chambers 

iii.  401 

Haley  v.  Dorchester  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  580 

Hadduck  v.  Wilmarth 

ii.  909 

V.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  562 

Hadfield  v.  Mayor,  &c.  New  York 

iii.  484 

Halfhed  v.  Jenning 

ii.  845 

Hadley  v.  Baxendale           ii 

198 

;  iii.  196 

Half  liide  r.  Penning 

ii.  845 

V.  Clarke               ii.  198, 

415, 

425,  808 

Halford  v.  Kymer 

ii.  606 

V.  N.  H.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  543 

Halhead  r.  Young 

ii.  483 

V.  Pratlicr 

i.  618 

Haliday,  Ex  parte 

iii.  420 

Haffey  v.  Birchetts 

iii.  242 

Halifax  v.  Chambers 

i.  537 

Hafford  v.  New  Bedford 

i.  118 

Halifax  Union  v.  Wheelwright 

ii.  861 

Hafner  v.  Irwin 

iii.  382 

Hall,  Ex  parte                               iii. 

427,  452 

Hagard  v.  Raymond 

iii.  464 

V.  Ashhurst                        i.  129 ;  ii.  32 

Hagedorn  v.  Bell 

ii.  482 

V.  Barrows            ii.  355,  360, 

367,  368 

V.  Oliverson      i.  49 ;  ii. 

389, 

474,  480 

V.  Barnard 

iii.  450 

Hagar  r.  Hagar 

iii.  352 

V.  Belknap 

iii.  219 

Hager  v.  Nolan 

ii.  58 

V.  Bird 

ii.  305 

Hagebush  v.  Ragland 

ii.  117 

V.  Boardman 

iii.  439 

Hagey  v.  Hill 

i.  323 

r.  Brinkley 

iii.  287 

Haggart  r.  INIorgan 

ii.  844 

?■.  Buffalo,  The 

ii.  431 

Haggcrtston  v.  Hanbury 

ii.  635 

V.  Campbell 

ii.  698 

Haggerty  v.  Palmer 

i.  579 

V.  Cannon 

ii.  58 

V.  Porter 

i.  242 

V.  Cazenove 

ii.  685 

Hahn  v.  Doolittle 

i.  621 

V.  Clagett                       i.  231 

;  iii.  354 

V.  Fredericks 

i.  505 

V.  Conn.  River  Steam  Co. 

ii.  234 

V.  Horstman 

iii.  172 

V.  Cook 

ii.  885 

Haigh  V.  Brooks        i.  473;  ii.  69' 

h  iii.  17 

V.  Crowley 

iii.  174 

V.  De  La  Cour 

ii. 

491,  536 

V.  Cushing 

iii.  127 

Haiglit  r.  Badgeley 

ii.  52 

V.  Daggett 

iii.  143 

Hailey  v.  Franks 

ii.  944 

V.  Dean 

iii.  244 

Haille  r.  Smith                     ii 

411 

,  iii.  278 

1-.  De  Cuir 

ii.  242 

Haine  v.  Tarrant 

i.  338 

V.  Denison 

iii.  382 

Haines  v.  Busk 

i.  Ill 

V.  Dewey 

i.  540 

V.  Corliss 

i.  383 

?•.  Dyson 

i.  486 

i\  Dubois 

i.  271 

V.  Farmer 

ii.  12 

V.  East  Tennessee  R.  R. 

Co. 

ii.  47 

V.  Fisher 

ii.  939 

V.  Haines                i.  459 

;  iii. 

314,  310 

V.  Flockton 

ii.  325 

V.  Pearce 

ii.  756 

V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.            ii. 

397,  398, 

V.  Tucker                     ii. 

810 

;  iii.  224 

508,  532 

Hains  v.  .loffel 

i.  377 

V.  Fuller 

i.  300 

Hair  r.  Bell 

ii 

.41,  792 

X'.  Gardner 

i.  256 

Hairston  r.  Ilairston 

ii.  709 

V.  Gavlor 

i.  674 

Hakes  v.  Hotchkiss 

.  471 

;  ii.  679 

r.  Hale 

i.289 

Ilaldane  v.  Johnson 

1.534 

;  ii.  770 

r.  Hall            i.  221,  238,  395 

;  iii.  347 

Haldeman  v,  Michael 

iii.  442 

V.  Hardy                              iii. 

310,  369 

INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


CI 


Hall  V.  TliU 

V.  Ilinks 

V.  Iloxsie 

V.  Huffam 

V.  Janson 

V.  Lanning 

i\  Law 

V.  Leigh 

V.  Little 

V.  Marston 

I'.  Mayhew 

V.  McDuff 

V.  Mollineaux 

V.  North  Eastern  R.  Co 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

i\  Odber 

V.  Ody 

V.  Parker 

V.  People's  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Potter 

V.  Power 

V.  Reed 

V.  Renfro 

V.  Richardson 

V.  Robinson 

V.  Rupley 

V.  Savage 

V.  Seabright 

V.  Smallwood 

V.  Smith 

V.  Snowhill 

V.  Southmayd 

V.  Surtees 

V.  Timmons 

V.  Tuttle 

V.  Warren 

V.  Whittier 

V.  Wiles 

V.  Williams 

V.  Wilson 

V.  Wisconsin 

V.  Wright 
Hall  and  Hinds,  In  re 
Hallon  V.  Runder 
Haller  v.  Williamowitz 
Hallett  V.  Dowdall 
Halley  v.  Troester 

V.  Wigram 
Halliday  v.  McDougall 

V.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co 

V.  Ward 
Halloek  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Halloway  v.  Davis 
Hallowell  v.  Curry 

V.  Fawcett 

V.  Howard 

V.  Saco 
Hallowell  Bank  v.  Howard 
Halscy  v.  Brown 

V.  Grant 

V.  Norton 

r.  Whitney 

V.  Woodruff 
Halstead  v.  Seamen 

V.  Sliepard 


ii.  684 

i.  557 

ii.  G 

i.  30 

ii.  447,  677 

i.  206 

iii.  99 

i.  24 

in.  104 

i.  248,  497 

ii.  634 

iii.  297 

ii.  484 

ii.  238 

ii.  48.3,  507 

ii.  740,  743 

ii.  874,  875 

ii.  903 

ii.  472,  560 


126 


ii.  246 

iii.  355 

ii   174 

ii.  197 

i.  250,  253,  563 

ii.  G54 

i.  400 

ii.  818 

ii.  824 

i.  11 ;  ii.  819 

i.  612 

i.  552 

ii.  940 

i.  358 

iii.  265 

iii.  305,  414 

ii.  783 ;  iii.  332 

ii.  308,  327 

ii.  740 

i.  271,  288;  ii.  71 

iii.  483 

ii.  71 

ii.  97 

i.  545;  iii.  36 

i.  186,  187 

i.  216 

i.  437 

ii.  447 

i.  326 

ii.  227 

iii.  92 

ii.  567 

ii.  663 

i.  311 

i.  108 

ii.  779 

ii.  709 

ii.  879 

ii.  669 

iii.  357,  358 

i.  224 

i.  210 ;  iii.  382 

i.  28 

ii.  843 

i.  201,  208 


Halwerson  v.  Cole 
Haly  r.  Lane 
Ham  I'.  Goodrich 

V.  Ham 

V.  Hamburgh,  The 

V.  Van  Orden 
Hamaker  v.  Blancliard 

V.  Eberley  i.  470, 

Hamar  v.  Medsker 
Hambidge  v.  De  la  Croute 
Hambleton  v.  Veere 
Hamer  v.  Dipple 
Hamil  v.  Stokes 
Hamill  v.  Purvis 
Hamilton  v.  Benbury 

V.  Cunningham 

V.  Denny 

V.  Hamilton 

r.  Hooper 

V.  Lycoming  Mutual  Ins. 

V.  Marsden 

V.  McDonald 

V.  McPherson 

V.  Mendes 

?;.  Mutual  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Pearson 

V.  Phcenix  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Royse 

V.  Russell 

V.  Seaman 

V.  Sheddon 

V.  Summers 

V.  Terry 

V.  Watson 
Hamilton  College  v.  Stewart 
Hamlin,  Ex  parte 

V.  Stevenson 
Hammat  v.  Emerson  i. 

Hammer  v.  McEldowney 
Hammersley  v.  De  Beil 

V.  Knowlys 
Hammett  v.  Linneman 

V.  Yea 
Ham m on  v.  Roll 
Hammond,  Ex  parte 

V.  Allen 

V.  Am.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Anderson 

V.  Chamberlin 

V.  Douglas  1.  173, 

V.  Essex  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Hopping 

V.  Hussey 

V.  McClures 

V.  Messenger 

V.  Reid 

V.  Rogers 

V.  Roll 

V.  Smith 

V.  Toulmin 
Hammonds  v.  Barkley 
Hamond  v.  Holiday 


ii.  216 

i.  287 

iii.  38 

ii.  932 

ii.  392 

i.  263 

ii.  106 

471;  ii.  849 

i.  406 

i.  21G 

iii.  201 

i.  335 

i.  229 

i.  210 

ii.  762 

i.  91,  92 

iii.  299 

ii.  939 

ii.  18 

Co.     i.  514; 

ii.  470,  540 

i.  540 

i.  252 

iii.  199,  209 

ii.  504 

ii.  601 

i.  300 

ii.  389 

i.  89 

i.  569 

i.  219 

ii.  532 

i.  204 

i.  505 

ii.  9 

i.  482 

hi.  411 

i.  334 

495;  h.  919 

in.  310 

iii.  32 

ii.  765 

i.  580 

iii.  116,  143 

i.  210 

iii.  416 

ii.  486 

ii.  016. 

799 

i.  564,  646 ; 

iii.  49,  273 

i.  274 

229 ;  ii.  369 

ii.  513 

iii.  121,  130 

i.  476 

ii.  217,  414 

i.  251,  252 

ii.  535 

ii.  468 

i.  471 

iii.  125,  126 

iii.  462,  466 

iii.  275,  288 

i.  109,  110 


cu 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Hampden  v.  Walsh  ii.  760 

Hail. per,  Ex  parte  i.  170,  180 

Hampshire  v.  Peirce  ii.  695 

Hampstead  v.  Plaistow  ii.  88 

Hampton  i'.  M'Connell  ii.  740,  741 

Hamson  v.  Harrison  iii.  41G 

Hamrick  v.  Hogg  ii.  U18 

Hanauer  v.  Bartels  i.  003 

V.  Doane  i.  486 

Hanbury  v.  Hanbury  ii.  91 

Hanchet  i'.  "SVliitney  i.  548 

Hancock  v.  American  In8.  Co.  ii.  012 

V.  Caffyn  iii.  420,  454 

V.  Entwisle  iii.  402 

V.  Fairfield  i.  55,  68 

V.  Hodgson  i.  69 ;  iii.  110 

i;.  New  York  Ins.  Co.  ii.  601 

V.  Keede  ii.  833 

V.  Wilhoite  iii.  100 

Hancock's  Appeal  ii.  925 

Hancox  v.  Dunning  ii.  383 

V.  Fishing  Ins.  Co.  ii.  489 

Hand  v.  Armstrong  iii.  113 

V.  Baynes  ii.  196,  199,  406 

V.  Elvira,  The  ii.  436,  489 

Handtord  v.  Palmer  ii.  130 

V.  Rogers  ii.  085 

Handley  v.  Chambers  iii.  246 

Hands  v.  London,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.       ii.  249 

V.  Slaney  i.  337 

Handy  v.  Foley  i.  407 

Hanford  v.  Robertson  ii.  767 

V.  Rogers  iii.  18 

Hanham  i;.  Sherman  i.  543 

Hankey  v.  Beclit  i.  170 

f.  Garratt  i.  234 

V.  Jones  iii.  410 

Hankins  v.  Shoup  i.  290 

Hankinson  v.  Hankinson  ii.  92 

V.  Sandilaus  i.  12 

Hanks  r.  Deal  i.  353,  356 

V.  ]\IcKee  i-  026 

V.  Naslee  ii.  72 

V.  Palling  i.  581 

Hanna  v.  Flint  i.  182 

V.  Harter  iii.  221 

V.  I\Iills  iii.  226 

r.  Phelps  iii.  221,270 

V.  Wilson  iii.  313 

Hannah  ?•.  Carrington  iii.  370,  378 

V.  Fife  ii.  886 

Hannan  v.  Ilannan  i.  458 

V.  Johnson  i.  207 

Hannay  v.  Eve  ii.  894 

Hannibal  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Swift  ii.  213 

Hanover  r.  Turner  ii.  73(') 

Hansard  v.  Robinson  i.  331 

Hansbrough  v.  Baylor  iii.  153,  154 

V.  Gray  i.  294 

Hansel!  i-.  Erickson  ii.  40,  057 

Hansen  v.  Rounsavell  ii-  707 

Hanson,  Er  parte  iii.  424 

V.  Armitage  iii.  51,  53,  55 

V.  Hiickner  i.  204;  iii.  242 

V.  Crawley  ii.  853 


Hanson  v.  Meyer  i.  564,  575,  645 ;  iii.  273 

V.  Roberdeau  i.  527 

V.  Rowe  1.124;  iii.  10 

V.  Rowell  ii.  466 

V.  Stetson  i.  482 

V.  Stevenson  iii.  447 

Hantz  V.  The  York  Bank  iii.  Ill 

Ilapgood,  Re  iii.  421 

Harbeck  v.  Southwell  iii.  293 

Ilarbert's  case  1.  31 ;  iii.  379 

Harbin  v.  Levi  ii.  877 

Harbold  v.  Kuntz  iii.  75 

Harcourt  v.  Ramsbottom  iii.  333 

Hard  i'.  Seeley  ii.  816 

V.  Vt.  &  Canada  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 

Hardcastle  v.  Netherwood  ii.  879 

Harden  i;.  McClure  .}}^-^^ 

Harden,  'Ex  parte  iii.  467 

V.  Gordon  i.  441 ;  ii.  463 

V.  Harden  ii.  831 

Hardenburg  v.  Hardenburg  ii.  92 

Harder  v.  Harder  iii.  362 

Hardesty  v.  Richardson  iii-  352 

Hardcy  v.  Coe  ii.  823 

Hardie  v.  Grant  i.  894,  395 

Hardin  v.  Forsyth  i.  540 

V.  Ho-yo-po-Nubby's  Lessee        i.  125 

Harding,  Ex  parte  i.  205 

V.  Alden  ii.  782,  736 

V.  Ambler  ii.  931 

V.  Commercial  Loan  Co.  ii.  753 

V.  Davies  ii.  773,  777 

V.  Foxcroft  i.  176,  184  ;  ii.  387 

V.  Souther  ii.  421 

V.  Tifft  ii.  7G2,  767 

V.  Wilson  i.  531 

Hardman  v.  Bellhouse  ii.  822 

V.  Hardman  ii.  645 

V.  Wilcock                   .  ii.  218 

Hardtmann  v.  Tegart  i.  396 

Ilardwicke  i'.  Vernon  i.  96 

Hardy  v.  Carolina  R.  Co.  ii-  46 

V.  Coe  ii.  823 

V.  Corlis  ii.  882 

V.  Innes  ii.  516,  832 

V.  Jandon  ii.  126 

V.  Mitchell  iii.  440 

V.  Nelson  iu.  175,  242 

V.  Ryle  ii.  797 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co.        ii.  493,  557,  583 

V.  Waltham  iii.  499 

Hare  i;.  Henty  i.  306 

V.  Horton  ii.  646,  647 

V.  Travis  ii.  631,  533 

Harford  v.  Morris  ii.  729 

Harger  v.  M'Mains  iii.  212 

Ilargous  V.  Ablon  iii-  li^4 

I'.  Stone  i.  603,  628 

Hargrave  v.  Dusenbury  ii-  753 

V.  Hargrave  iii-  364 

V.  Smee  ii.  626,  641 

Hargreaves  v.  Hutchinson  iii.  118,  137 

V.  Parsons  iii.  23,  24,  28 

V.  Rothwell  i.  81 

Hargroves  v.  Cooke  ii.  762 ;  iii.  17 


INDEX  TO   CASES  CITED. 


cm 


Harker  v.  Dement  ii.  127 
Harkins  v.  Standard  Sugar  Refinery 

ii.  47 

Harlan  v.  Harlan  i.  466 

Harland's  case  ii.  137 

Harless  v.  Petty  iii.  332,  3-52 

Harlej'  v.  Iving  iii.  424 

V.  State  i.  448 

Harlow  v.  Curtis  i.  505 

V.  Putnam  ii.  320 

V.  Thomas  iii.  244 

Harman  v.  Anderson  i.  648  ;  ii.  152  ; 

iii.  48,  444 

V.  Fislier  i.  654 ;  iii.  441 

V.  Gandolph  ii.  425 

I'.  Goodrich  iii.  218 

V.  Johnson  i.  203 

V.  Kingston  ii.  484 

V.  Reeve  iii.  19 

I'.  Vanhatton  ii.  403 

Harmer  v.  Bell  ii.  484 

V.  Killing  i.  364 

Harmony  v.  Bingham  i.  446 ;  ii.  198, 

805,  806 

Harn  v.  Kielil  ii.  822 

Harnett  v.  Yielding  iii.  305,  309,  361 

Harney  v.  Owen  i.  355,  360 

Harnor  v.  Groves  ii.  679 

Harper  v.  Albany  Ins.  Co.         ii.  545,  648 

V.  Calhoun  ii.  879 

V.  Dotson  i.  616 

V.  Fairley  iii.  86 

V.  Gilbert  i.  355 ;  ii.  54 

V.  Hampton  ii.  824 

V.  Little  i.  72 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  602 

Harratt  v.  Wise  ii.  520 

Harrell  v.  Kelly  iii.  107 

V.  Owens  ii.  198 

Harrencourt  v.  Merritt  iii.  82 

Harriman  *-•.  Harriman  ii.  823 

V.  Queen  Ins.  Co.  i.  83;  ii.  587 

Harrington  r.  Brown  i.  95 

V.  Hingham  i.  216 

V.  Kloprogee  ii.  632 

V.  Long  ii.  907 

V.  Lyles  ii.  182 

V.  McShane  ii.  225 

V.  Snyder  ii.  131,  134,  137,  138 

V.  Stratton  i.  495 

V.  Victoria  Graving  Dock  Co.    ii.  886 

Harriot,  The  ii.  441 

Harris's  case  ii.  540 

Harris  v.  Boston  iiL  143,  144 

V.  Campbell  i.  12 

V.  Carmody  i.  446 

V.  Carter  ii.  467 

V.  Clark  i.  312 

V.  Clarke  i.  266,  312,  321 

V.  Costar  ii.  234 

V.  Curnow  ii.  832 

V.  Delamar  ii.  921 

V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  ii.  473,  578 

V.  Farwell  i.  192 

V.  Fawcett  ii.  33 


Harris  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.        ii.  257 

V.  Harris  i.  409;  ii.  91 

V.  Hillegass  i.  176 

V.  Huntbach  ii.  4 

V.  Jones  iii.  240 

V.  Knickerbocker  iii.  309 

V.  Lee  i.  .392 

V.  McGovern  iii.  102 

V.  Mills  iii.  108 

V.  Mitchell  ii.  844 

V.  Moody  ii.  448 

V.  Morris  i,  393,  395 

V.  Mott  iii.  369 

V.  Mullins  i.  622 

V.  Murray  1.  243 

V.  Newell  ii.  24,  31 

V.  Nickerson  i,  510,  527 

V.  Ohio  Ins.  Co.  ii.  582 

V.  Osbourn  iii.  101 
V.  Packwood                ii,  187,  261,  272 

V.  Palmer  ii.  875 

V.  Porter  iii.  41 

V.  Rand  ii.  215 

V.  Reynolds  ii.  819,  844 

V.  Roof  ii.  895 

V.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  ii.  549 

V.  Runnells  i.  488 

V.  Scaramanga  ii.  537 

V.  Simmerman  ii.  745,  747 

V.  Venables  i.  466 

I'.  Waite  i.  627 
V.  Wall                           i.  363,  364,  365 

V.  Warner  i.  35,  37 
V.  Watson                        i.  467 ;  ii.  467 

V.  White  ii.  758 
V.  Wilson                         i.  198 ;  ii.  828 

V.  Woodruff  iii.  266 

V.  Young  ii.  11 

Harris  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Marsh  iii.  224 
Harrison,  Ex  parte       ii.  387,  391 ;  iii.  462 

V.  Bainbridge  ii.  875 

V.  Berkley  iii.  193 
V.  Cage                         ii.  65,  68,  69,  71 

V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  249 

V.  Clifton  i.  .3.33 

V.  Close  i.  27,  211 

V.  Colton  ii.  905 

V.  Crowder  i.  303 

V.  Fane  i.  3-36,  338 

V.  Gardner  i.  173 

V.  Hall  i.  402 

V.  Harnel  iii.  1.32 

V.  Harrison  iii.  212,  220 

V.  Heathorn  i.  162,  163 

V.  Jackson  i.  122 

V.  Knight  i.  474 

V.  Lemon  i.  485 

V.  London,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  271 

V.  Lord  North  i.  537 

V.  McClelland  i.  58 

V.  McConkey  ii.  610 

V.  McHenry  i.  94 

V.  Murrell  ii.  138 

V.  Roscoe  i.  66 

V.  Roy  ii.  178 


CIV 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Harrison  i'.  Shanks 
V.  Sterry 

V.  Taylor 
V.  Young 


Ilarrod  c.  McDaniels 
liarrold  v.  Whitaker 
Harrop  i'.  Fisher 
Harsh  v.  Klepper 

V.  Morgan 
Ilarshberger  v.  Alger 
Harsliman  v.  Lowe 
Harson  v.  Pike 
Hart  V.  Aldridge 

V.  Crane 

V.  Davis 

V.  Deamer 

V.  Direct,  &c.  Cable  Co. 

V.  Dorman 

V.  Granger 

V.  Hammett 

V.  Hart's  Adm'x 

V.  Hay  den 

V.  Nash 

I'.  Otis 

V.  Prater 

V.  Prendergast 

V.  R.  &  S.  K.  R.  Co. 

V.  Sattley 

V.  Stephens 

r.  Tallmadge 

V.  Ten  Eyck 

V.  Windsor 

V.  Woods 

V.  Wriglit 
Harteau  v.  Harteau 
Harten  v.  Gibson 
Harter  v.  Moore 
Hartfield  v.  Roper 


i.  62 

i.  200 ;  iii.  391,  408, 

409 

ii.  355 

iii.  4',)0 

i.  43,  70,  75 


i.  4!) 

i.  25 

i.  G4,  288 

ii.  853 

ii.  293 

ii.  51 

iii.  882 

i.  509 

ii.  52 

iii.  403 

ii.  885 

i.  438 

ii.  284 

ii.  769 

ii.  864 

i.  624 

i.  351 

iii.  131 

iii.  80 

ii.  466 

i.  338 

iii.  72,  74 

ii.  232 

iii.  53,  54 

i.  381,  382 

ii.  91G 

i.  96 ;  ii.  129 

i.  532,  533,  537,  G33 

iii.  12 

i.  631,  632 

ii.  732,  736 

i.  377 

ii.  26 

i.  356;  ii.  248 

Hartford  Bank  r.  Stedman  i.  311,  318 

Hartford  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davenport         ii.  610 

{•.  Farrish  ii.  471 

V.  Olcott  ii.  586 

V.  Ross  ii.  478 

Ilartland  v.  Ciiace  i.  242 

Hartlov,  Ex  parte  iii.  427 

i-.Buggin  ii.  531,  532 

V.  Case  i.  322 

V.  Cunimings  ii.  37,  890 

V.  Ilannan  ii.  37,  44 

r.  Herring  iii.  189 

1-.  Rice  ii.  09,  79,  897 

V.  Wharton  i.  333,  363 

Hartley's  Appeal  i.  78 

Ilartman  v.  liowdel  i.  381 

V.  Keystone  Ins.  Co.  ii.  596,  605 

TIartoi)  r.  Iloare  ii.  103 ;  iii.  270 

Ilartnell  v.  Hill  ii.  833 

Hartbliorn  v.  S.  &  L.  Dealers  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  490 

I'.  Shoe,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  490 

Hartshorn  r.  Slodden  iii.  442 

Hartwig  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.        ii.  251 

Harvard  College  i;.  Gore  ii.  700 


Harvey,  Ex  parte 
V.  Archbold 
V.  Ashley 
V.  Hrydges 
V.  Childs 


ii.  20 ;  iii.  416,  432 

ii.  716;  iii.  122 

iii.  308 

i.  650 

i.  183 


V.  Connecticut,  &c.  E.  Co.  iii.  196 

V.  Crickett  i.  225,  226 

V.  Epes  ii.  137 

V.  Farnie  ii.  734 

V.  Gibbons  i.  492 

V.  Harris  i.  562 

V.  Harvey  i.  547 

V.  Richards  ii.  701,  867 

V.  Smith  ii.  862 

V.  Snow  iii.  236 

V.  Troupe  i.  308 

V.  Turner  iii.  206 

V.  Varncy  i.  190 

Harvie  v.  (Jswel  i.  539 

Harwood  v.  Bartlett  iii.  434 

V.  Bland  i.  525 

V.  G.  N.  R.  R.  u.  308 

V.  Heffer  i.  393 

Hasbrook  v.  Paddock  ii.  691 

V.  Palmer  i.  280 

Hasbrouck  v.  Vandervoort  ii.  126 

Hascall  v.  Whitmore  i.  287,  289 

Haselington  v.  Gill  iii.  455 

Haskell  i-.  Adams  i.  184 

V.  Boardman  i.  315 

V.  Hilton  i.  251 

V.  Hunter  iii.  224 

V.  Rice  i.  564 

Hasket  v.  Wootan  ii.  896.  897 

Haskins  v.  Burr  i.  174 

V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.  ii.  560,  580 

V.  Lombard  ii.  863,  866 

V.  Kelly  ii.  120 

V.  Patterson  ii.  122 

V.  Warren  i.  568 

Haslet  V.  Haslet  iii.  848 

V.  Street  i.  211 

Hassam  v.  St.  Louis  Perpet.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  446 

Hassard  v.  Rowe  i.  151 

Hassel  v.  Simpson  iii.  441,  442 

Ilassell  V.  Long  ii.  34 

Hassinger  v.  Diver  ii.  59 

Hastelow  v.  Jackson  ii.  759 

Hastie  v.  Couturier  i.  559 

),'.  De  Peyster  ii.  494 

Hastings  v.  Bangor  House  i.  51 

V.  Dolarhide  i.  368 

V.  Johnson  iii.  231 

V.  Lovering  i.  624 

I'.  Pepper  ii.  174,  181,  414 

V.  Westchester  Ins.  Co.  ii.  586 

V.  Whitley  ii.  890 

v'.  Wilson  iii.  447 

V.  Wiswall  ii.  709 ;  iii.  159,  161 

Hatch  V.  Bates  i.  457 

V.  Bayley  i.  571 ;  ii.  926 

V.  Ciiicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  i.  155 

V.  Cobb  iii.  312,  360 

V.  Coddington  i.  61,  75 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


cv 


Hatch  ('.  Dennis 

V.  Douglas 

V.  Hobbs 

V.  Lincoln 

V.  Mut.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Purcell 

V.  Searles 

V.  Smith 

V.  Stamper 

V.  Taylor 

V.  Trayes 
Hatchell  v.  Odom 
Hatcher  v.  Hatcher 

V.  McMorine 
Hatchett  v.  Gibson 
Hathaway  v.  Brady 


ii.  577 

u.  686 ;  iii.  123,  159 

ii.  23 

i.  571 

ii.  601,  88  J 

i.  500 

i.  272 

iu.  381,382 

i.  5.38 

i.  40,  59 

i.  281 

i.  464 

iii.  348 

i.  814 

ii.  149 

i.  132 


I'.  National  Ins.  Co.  ii.  003 

V.  Payne  ii-  932 

V.  Trenton  Ins.  Co.  ii.  600 

Hatsall  r.  Griffith        i.  11,  22,  24 ;  ii.  748 

Hattin  v.  Cliapman  ii.  75 

Hatton  V.  Bragg  iii.  202 

V.  Gray  iii.  9 

V.  Kean  ii.  338 

Hatzfield  v.  Gulden  ii.  895 

Hauberger  v.  Root  iii.  356 

Hauenstein  v.  Lynham  i.  448 

Haughey  v.  Strickler  i.  198 

Haughton  ;'.  Bayley  i.  21 

V.  Ewbank  i.  47,  48 

Haughwout  V.  Murphy  iii.  313 

Haule  V.  Hemying  ii.  803,  804 

Hausman  v.  Nye  iii.  53 

Havana,  The  ii.  458 

Havelofk  v.  Geddes  ii.  422,  603 

V.  Rockwood  ii.  399 

Haven  v.  Grand  Junction  R.  Co.       i.  330 

V.  Low  i.  509 

V.  Richardson  iii.  382 

V.  Wakefield  iii.  197 

Havens,  Ex  parte  iii.  419 

V.  Bush  ii.  660 

V.  Hussey  i.  201 

Haverley  v.  Leighton  ii.  804 

Haviland  v.  Haviland  ii.  72 

Havre,  The  ii.  435 

Hawcroft  v.  Great  Northern  Railway 

Co.  ii.  186 

Hawes  v.  Armstrong  iii.  17 

r.  Foster  i,  585,  588;  iii.  13 

V.  Humble  i.  596,  602 

V.  Knowles  i.  113  ;  iii.  185 

V.  Lawrence  i.  596,  601 

V.  Marchant  ii.  936,  937 

V.  TiUinghast  i.  183 

Hawke  v.  Ridgeway  iii.  184 

Hawkes  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.     iii.  306,  309, 

363,  374 

V.  Phillips  i.  283 

V.  Salter  i.  321 

V.  Saunders  i.  463 

Hawkeye,  &c.   Assoc,  v.  Blackburn 

iii.  117 

Hawkins,  Ex  parte  iii.  419,  420 

V.  Appleby  i.  209 


Hawkins  v.  Barney  iii.  502 

V.  Berry  i.  623 

c.  Cardy  i.  297,  298 

V.  Chace  iii.  10 

V.  Colclough  ii.  829 

V.  Cooper  ii.  247 

V.  Craig  i.  385 

V.  Great  Western  Co.  ii.  271 

V.  Gilbert  ii.  39 

V.  Hoffman  ii.  274,  275,  276 

V.  Holmes  iii.  6 

V.  Kemp  iii.  245 

V.  Moffit  i.  264 

V.  Pemberton  i.  617,  618,  625 

V.  Providence,  &c.  R.  Co.  i.  385 

V.  Pythian  ii.  131 

V.  Rutt  ii.  753 

Hawks  V.  HinchclifF  ii.  128 

Hawkyns  v.  Obyn  iii.  437 

Hawley  v.  Beverley  iii.  477 

V.  Farrar  i.  462 

V.  Foote  ii.  757,  820 

I'.  Hodge  ii.  848 

V.  James  i.  150 

V.  Smith  1.  77  ;  ii.  166 

Hawralty  v.  Warren  iii.  308 

Hawtayne  v.  Bourne  i.  42,  60 

Hawthorn  v.  Hammond  ii.  161 

Hawthorne  v.  Calef  iii.  507 

Haxall  V.  Shippen  ii.  477 

Haxtun  v.  Bishop  i.  309 

V.  Corse  iii.  388 

Hay,  Re  iii.  452 

V.  Ayling  i.  488 

V.  Bloomer,  Brig  ii.  458 

V.  Cohoes  Co.,  The  iii.  178 

V.  Fairbairn  ii.  395 

Hay  craft  v.  Creasy  ii.  916 

Hayden  v.  Cabot  iii.  199 

V.  Demets  i.  568  ;  iii.  224 

V.  Johnson  iii.  72 

V.  Madison  i.  500 ;  ii.  39,  655 

Haydon,  Er  pm-te  i.  238 

V.  Williams  i.  382 ;  iii.  72,  77,  92 

Hayes  v.  Beraent  i.  243 

V.  Heyer  i.  201,  243 

V.  Kershaw  iii.  318 

V.  Matthews  —    i.  58 

V.  Nash  iii.  478 

V.  Riddle  ii.  128 ;  iii.  216,  254 

V.  Warren  i.  475 

Hayford  v.  Cunningham  ii.  384 

Hayman  v.  Molton  ii.  397 

Hayneru.  Smith  i.  542 

Haynes  v.  Birks  i.  321 

v.  Carter  i.  190 

V.  Covington  ii.  28 

V.  HoUiday  ii.  667 

I'.  Knowles  i.  232 

V.  Nice  ii.  704 

V.  Rowe  ii.  482 

Hays  i\  Borders  ii.  52 

V.  Carr  iii.  332 

V.  Kennedy  ii.  170,  233 

V.  Mouille  i.  640,  645,  648 


CVl 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Hays  V.  Stone 

V.  Sulzor 
Hay  ward  r.  Barker 

V.  Cuthburt 

i\  Hayward 

V.  Leonard 

V.  Middlcton 

V.  National  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Soougall 


i.  51,  87 

ii.  809,  327 

i.  46.5 

iii.  238 

i.  382;  iii.  437 

ii.  655 

ii.  220,  072 

ii.  543 

i.  547,  607 


V.  Tlie  rilgrim  Society  1.  155 

V.  Young  ii.  889 

Haywood  v.  Rodgers  ii-  598 

Hazard  v.  Day  ii.  902 ;  iii.  14 

r.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  ii.  576 

V.  Hazard  i.  188 

V.  Irwin  ii.  925 

V.  New  Eng.  Mar.  Ins.  Co.  i.  505  ; 

ii.  428,  478,  511,  529,  530 

V.  Smith  iii.  129 

V.  Treadwell  1.  75 

Hazeltine  v.  Weld  ii.  153 

Hazeiton  r.  Balchelder  i.  53;  ii.  941 

Hazen  v.  Addis  ii.  829 

V.  Union  Bank  of  Tennessee    iii-  483 

Hazlebaker  v.  Reeves  iii.  75 

Hazlett  V.  Gill  i.  131 

Head  v.  Goodwin  i.  560 

Headley  v.  Kirby  i.  265 

Headrick  v.  Brattain  i.  613 

Heald  v.  Builder's  Ins.  Co.  i.  545 

V.  Kenworthy  i-  66 

Healey  v.  Gray  ii.  161 

V.  Spence  ii.  824 

Health  v.  Hall  i.  475 

Heane  v.  Rogers  ii.  936,  937  ;  iii.  416 

Heaney  v.  Heeney  iii.  191 

Heanny  v.  Birch  iii-  416 

Heaphy  v.  Hill  iii.  372 

Heapy  v.  Parris  i.  77 

Heard  v.  Bowers  iii.  170,  173 

V.  Eldredge  i.  159 

V.  Rogers  ii.  457 

V.  Stamford  i.  380,  383 

Hearle  v.  Greenbank  i.  122 

Hearne  v.  Cliadbourne  iii.  40 

Hearsey  i*.  Pruyn  i.  85 

Hearsliy  v.  Ilickox  i.  107 

Heartt  v.  Chipman  i.  129 

Heath,  In  re  iii.  474 

V.  Cliilton  i.  143 

V.  Derry  Bank  ii.  911 

V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  ii.  586,  613 

r.  Hall  i-  257 

V.  Heath  iii.  41 

V.  San.som  i.  222 

V.  Waters  i.  187 

V.  West  i.  301 

Heathcoate  v.  Crookshanks  i.  249 

V.  Ilulme  i.  229 

Ileathcock  v.  Pennington  ii.  133 

Ileatherly  v.  Record  ii.  684 

llcaton  V.  Angler  i.  245 

He.ivilow  V.  Heavilow  i.  184 

Hibb's  case  i.  514 

Ilebbard  i-.  llaughian  i.  458 


Hebden  v.  Rutter 
Hebdon  v.  West 
Heck  V.  Shener 
Heckers  v.  Fowler 
Heckhard  v.  Sayre 
Heckslier  v.  McCrea 
Hector,  The 
Hedderley,  Ex  parte 
Hedger  v.  Sieavenson 


i.  477  ;  ii.  65 
ii.  006 
ii.  879 
ii.  827 
iii.  339 
ii.  423 ;  iii.  208 
ii.  440 
iii.  468 
i.  322 


Hedges  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  R.  Co.        ii.  210 

V.  Riker  i.  149 

V.  Sealy  i.  254 

V.  Strong  iii.  40 

Hedgley  v.  Holt  i.  338,  352;  ii.  45 

Hedwig,  The  ii.  439 

Heebner  v.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.      ii.  505,  511, 

515 

Heermance  v.  Vernoy  i.  016 

Heermans  v.  Ellsworth  i.  258 

HefEer  v.  Hcffer  ii.  89 

Hefferman  r.  Benkard  i.  116 

Helfner  v.  Lewis  i.  546 

Hefner  v.  Vandolah  i.  279 

Hegeman  v.  W.  R.  R.  Co.      ii.  233,  234, 

283 

Hegler  v.  Eddv  i.  579 
Heilbutt  I'.  Hickson       i.  628,  629;  iii.  219 

Heimstreet  v.  Howland  i.  182 

Heine  v.  Appletons  ii.  338 

Heinecke  v.  Earle  i-  653 

Heinlin  v.  Castro  iii.  85 

Heinriclis  r.  Kerchner  ii.  76 

Heintz  v.  Cahn  ii-  762 

Helena,  The  ii.  398 

Hellaby  v.  Weaver  ii.  179,  231 

llellawell  v.  Eastwood  i-  547 

Helm  V.  Bryant  ii.  678 

V.  Wilson  ii-  655 

Helme  v.  Smith  ii,  387,  390 

Helms  V.  Kearns  i.  497 

Helmsley  v.  Loader  i.  125 

Helps  V.  Hereford  ii-  933 

V.  Winterbottom  iii.  97 

Helsby  v.  Mears  ii.  226 

llclsey  V.  Fairbanks  i-  26 

Ileltzell  V.  Ilvnes  iii-  293 

Helyear  v.  Ilawke  i.  59,  63 

Ilemans  v.  Picciotto  ii.  658 

llemenway,  Ex  pai-te  i.  545 

Hemingway  v.  Hamilton  ii.  913 

Ilenmienway  r.  Stone  i.  11 

Hemp  V.  Garland  iii.  100 

Hemphill  v.  Clicnie  ii.  199,  203.  206 

Henbacii  v.  MoJiman  i-  101 

Henchman  v.  OlHey  ii.  484 

Ilenck  V.  Todhunter  i.  125 

Henderson,  Ex  parte  iii.  414 
V.  Australian  Royal  Mail  Steam 

Nav-  Co.  i-  154 

V.  Barnewall  i.  89,588;  iii.  11 

V.  Blanchard  iii.  Ill 

V.  Buckley  ii.  837 

V.  Clarke  i.  333 

V.  Henderson  ii.  737;  iii.  244 

V.  Hicks  iii.  311 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


evil 


Henderson  v.  Hudson 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Lauck 

V.  Lewis 

V.  Mayhew 

V.  McDiiffee 

V.  Moore 

V.  Stevenson 

V.  Stringer 

V.  Western  Ins.  Co. 
Henilren  v.  Colgin 
Hendrick  v.  Whittemore 
Hendricks  o.  Franklin 

i\  Judali 

V.  Mount 

V.  Robinson 


i.  175 

iii.  17 

i.  563 

ii.  878 

ii.  391 

i.  34 

ii.  749 

ii.  257 

i.  396 

ii.  573 

i.  380 

ii.  10 

i.  327 

i.  295;  iii.  478 

iii.  381 

iii.  382 

Hendric-kson  v.  Hendrickson  ii.  922 

V.  Kingsburg  iii.  184 

Henen  v.  Munro  ii.  447 

Henfree  v.  Bromley  ii.  837,  855 

Hening  ;.'.  United  States  Ins.  Co.      ii.  471 
Henisler  v.  Freedman  ii.  284 

Henkel  v.  Tape  i.  515;  ii.  299 

Henkle  v.  Royal  Exch.  Ins.  Co.        ii.  475 
Henley  v.  Bank  ii.  940 

V.  Soper  ii.  825 

Henman  t>.  Dickinson  ii.  860 

Hennell  v.  Fairlamb  ii.  885 

Hennequin  v.  Clews  iii.  434 

Henniker  v.  Wigg  ii.  766 

Henning's  case  ii.  803 

Ilenop  )■.  Tucker  ii.  464 

Henrickson  v.  Margetson  ii.  511 

Henry,  The  ii.  397,  410,  442, 

443,  533 

V.  Butler  ii.  876 

V.  Goldney  i.  33  ;  ii.  863 

V.  Lee  i.  312 

V.  Means  iii.  102 

V.  Root  i.  366 

V.  Sargeant  ii.  722 

V.  Staniforth  ii.  481 

Henry  Ewbank,  The  ii.  438,  439,  440,  441 

Hensel  i'.  Noble  iii.  271 

Henshaw  v.  Hunting  ii.  865 

V.  Robins  i.  624,  625 

Henslee  v.  Cannefax  i.  208 

Hensly  v.  Baker  i.  615 

Henson,  Ex  parte  iii.  143,  465 

V.  Blackwell  ii.  607 

Hentig  r.  Staniforth  ii.  481 

Hepburn  v.  Auld  i.  525 

V.  Dunlop  iii.  355 

V.  Sewell  iii.  211 

Heran  v.  Hall  i.  167 

Herbert,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

V.  Cook  ii.  740 

V.  Hallett  ii.  418,  510 

V.  Herbert  ii.  726 

r.  Pigott  ii.  852 

V.  Turball  i.  334 

Hercules,  The  ii.  467 

Hercy  v.  Birch  iii.  821 

Herdman  v.  Pace  i.  405 

Herefordshire  Co.,  In  re  iii.  Ill 


Ilergman  v.  Dettlebach  i.  235 

Ileridia  v.  Ay  res  ii.  469 

Herkenrath  v.  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  585 

Uerlakenden's  case  i.  540 

lieriihy  v.  Smith  1.  113 

Hern  v.  Nicliols  i.  79 

Hernaman  v.  Bawden  ii.  460 

Heroine,  The  ii.  435 

Herrick  v.  Borst  ii.  24,  25 

V.  Carman  i.  284,  290 

V.  Dean  iii.  137 

V.  Herrick  ii.  837 

V.  Moore  iii.  244 

V.  Randolph  iii.  498 

I'.  Wolverton  i.  295 

Herries  v.  Jamieson  ii.  769 

Herrin  v.  Butters  ii.  50;  iii.  42 

V.  Libbey  ii.  923 

Herring  v.  Boston  Iron  Co.  ii.  678 

V.  Hoppock  i.  578 

V.  Hottendorf  i.  61 

V.  Pollard  iii.  238 

V.  Wickham  ii.  70 

Herrison  i'.  Guthrie  iii.  409 

Herrman  r.  Adriatic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540 

V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  632 

Hersey  v.  Merrimack  Co.  Ins.  Co.    ii.  491 

Hersfield  v.  Adams  ii.  178 

Hersom  v.  Henderson  i.  634 

Hervey  ?•.  Hervey  ii.  82 

Heseltine  v.  Siggers  iii.  56 

Hesketh  v.  Blanchard  i.  176,  178 

V.  Fawcett  ii.  780 

Hess  V.  Werts  i.  241 

Hesse  v.  Stevenson  ii.  634 ;  iii.  435 

Hessian  v.  Edward  Howard,  The      ii.  490 

Heth's  Ex'r  v.  Wooldridge's  Ex'r  iii.  347 

Heudebourck  v.  Langton  i.  140 

Heugh  V.  London,  &c.  Co.  ii.  108 

Hewes  v.  Hansom  ii.  758 

V.  Rand  iii.  411 

Hewett  V.  Buck  ii.  389 

Hewin  v.  Libbey  ii.  925 

He  wins  v.  Cargill  ii.  853 

Hewison  v.  Guthrie  iii.  262,  439 

Hewit  V.  Flexney  ii.  536 

V.  Mantell  iii.  420 

Hewitt  V.  Anderson  i.  513 

V.  Charier  ii.  60 

V.  Rankin  i.  172 

V.  Watertown  Ins.  Co.  ii.  628 

V.  Wilcox  ii.  00 

Hey  V.  Moorhouse  i.  469 

Heydon  v.  Heydon  i.  233 ;  iii.  298 

V.  Williams  iii.  431 

Heydon's  case  i.  28 

Heydon  &  Smith's  case  iii.  216 

Heyhoe  v.  Burge  i.  180 

Heyliger  v.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  447,  448 

Heyman  v.  Neale  i.  584,  586  ;  iii.  13 

Hey  tie  t".  Logan  iii.  116 

Heywood  v.  Hildreth  iii.  459 

V.  Perrin  ii.  633 

V.  Pickering  i.  296,  312 

V.  Watson  i.  292 


CVlli 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Heywood  v.  Wingate  i.  287 

Hey  wood's  case  ii.  640 

Hiatt  r.  Gilmer  ii.  54 

r.  Williams  iii.  352 

Hibbard  v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  M.  Co.      ii.  24(3 

V.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  286 ;  iii.  235 

Hibbert  v.  Shee  i.  525 

Hibblewhite  v.  McMorine  i.  123,  331,  560, 

598;  ii.  801 

Hibernia,  The  ii.  454,  404 

Hibernia  Ins.  Co.  v.  Meyer  ii.  580 

V.  O'Connor  ii.  587 

Hibslmuin  r.  Dulleban  ii.  807 

Hickerson  r.  Benson  ii.  897 

Hickey  v.  Burt  i.  254;  ii.  740 

Hickley  i'.  F.  &  M.  Bank  iii.  382 

Hickman  v.  Cox  i.  174 

V.  Haynes  iii.  57 

V.  Thomas  iii.  266 

Hickok  r.  Buck  ii.  135,  137;  iii.  216 

V.  Hickok  iii.  98 

Hicks  V.  Branton  iii.  293 

V.  Brown  iii.  397 

V.  Cram  ii.  936,  938 

r.  Glcason  ii.  805 

i:  Hankins  i.  42;  iii.  12 

v.  Hannibal,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  273 

r.  Ilinde  i.  288 

r.  Plotchkiss  iii.  393,  507,  508 

V.  Palington  ii.  444 

f.  Stone  ii.  928 

V.  Walker  ii.  458 

Hidden  v.  Slater  Ins.  Co.  ii.  501 

Hide  r.  Petit  ii.  826 

Hier  r.  Abrahams  ii.  352 

Higden  r.  Williamson  iii.  427,  431 

Iligert  V.  Trustees,  &c.  Univ.  i.  482 

Higgins  V.  Aguilar  ii.  487 

V.  Breen  ii.  50 

V.  Emmons  ii.  103,  785 

V.  Kusterer  iii.  35 

V.  Livingstone  1.  139 

V.  Moore  i.  103 

V:  Morrison  i.  326 

V.  Murray  i.  5G4,  574;  iii.  GO 

V.  Scott  iii.  108 

V.  Senior  i.  50,  57,  65,  00,  67 

V.  Turner  i.  540 

r.  Watson  i.  274 

Higginson  v.  Clowes  iii.  354,  371 

V.  Dall  ii.  473,  485,  491 

V.  Kelly  iii.  449 

V.  Pomeroy  ii.  496 

V.  Weld  j.  005 

Highland,  &c.  Co.  v.  Matthews  i.  572 

Highlander,  The  ii.  457,  459 

Highmore  v.  Molloy  iii.  410 

Hight  t'.  Bacon  i.  630,  031 

V.  Ripley  iii.  60 

Iliglit.stowii  Bank  v.  Christopher        i.  83 

Iliginbotham  r.  Holme  iii.  449,  472 

Hilarity,  The  ii.  403 

Hildebrand  r.  Fogle  ii.  691 

Hildreth  v.  Pinkerton  Academy         i.  450 

Hill,  Ex  pane  iii.  428,  457,  402,  472 


Hill  V.  Anderson 

i.  862 

V.  Andrus 

ii.  454 

V.  Barclay 

iii.  327 

V.  Barncr 

i.  130 

V.  Bellows 

iii.  104 

V.  Buckley 

iii.  337,  356 

V.  Buckminster 

i.  290  ;  ii.  685 

V.  Calvin 

ii.  14,  858 

V.  Chapman 

i.  206 

V.  Corcoran 

ii.  904 

V.  DeRochemont 

i.  545 

V.  Dobie 

iii.  447 

V.  Dunham 

ii.  905 

V.  Dunlap 

ii.  800 

V.  Ely 

i.  290 

V.  Featherstonhaugh 

i.  110,  128 

r.  Golden  Gate,  The 

ii.  386,  420 

V.  Gomnie                    iii 

.  308,  314,  374 

V.  Grange 

ii.  6.39 

V.  Gray 

i.  620,  621 

V.  Green 

ii.  43,  812 

V.  Heap 

i.  316 

V.  Henry 

iii.  98 

V.  Hobart       i.  581 :  ii. 

666,  790,  794 ; 

iii.  245 

I'.  Hooper  iii.  41 

V.  Humphreys  ii.  197 

r.  Idle  ii.  425 

r.  Kendall  iii.  72,  76,  92 

V.  Lafayette  Ins.  Co.  ii.  558 

V.  Manchester  &  S.  W.  Co.        ii.  931 

V.  IMecker  iii.  100 

V.  Miller  ii.  647 

V.  More            '  ii.  844 

V.  Patten          '  ii.  484 

V.  Bobbins  ii.  763,  766 

V.  Robinson  i.  543 

V.  Smith  i.  489 ;  iii  426,  435,  438,  452 

V.  Southwick  iii.  224 

V.  Thompson  ii.  309,  324 

V.  Thorn              '  ii.  827 

V.  Tucker  i.  11,  23 

V.  Voorliies  i.  188 

r.  West  i.  466  ;  ii.  933 

V.  Wiggin  i.  236 

Hill  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Boston,  &c. 

R.  R.  Co.  ii.  186 

V.  Morris  iii.  429 

Ilillebrant  v.  Brewer  i.  264 

Ililier  l:  Enghsh  ii.  898,  905 

Hilliard  v.  Greenleaf  iii.  391 

Ililliard  v.  Noyes  ii.  749 

V.  Richardson  i.  117 

Hillier  v.  Alleghany  Co.  Ins.  Co.      ii.  571 

Ilillikcr  r.  Francisco  i.  208 

llillman  r.  Wilcox  i.  623 

Hills  V.  15annistcr  i.  636 

V.  Barnes  i.  130  ;  ii.  800 

V.  Croll  iii.  364,  366 

v.  Lynch  i.  573 

V.  Miller  ii.  635 

V.  Place  i.  309 

V.  Snell  i.  656,  562 

V.  Street  i.  498 

V.  Univ.  of  Oxford  ii.  348 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CIX 


Hillyard  v.  Mutual  Benefit  Life  Ins. 


Co. 
Hillyer  v.  Bennett 
Hilton  V.  Burley 
i\  Dinsmore 
V.  Eckersley 

V.  Houghton 

V.  Sliepherd 
Hime  v.  D.ile 
Himely  v.  S.  Car.  Ins.  Co 

V.  Stewart 
Himes  v.  Barnitz 
Himrod  Furnace   Co. 

&c.  E.  Co. 
Ilincliclift'e  v.  Barwick 

V.  Earl  of  Kinnoul 
Hinckley  v.  Arey 

V.  Kreitz 

V.  Southgate 
Hind  V.  Holdship 
Hinde  v.  Gray 

V.  Liddell 

V.  Whitehouse 

Hindle  i'.  O'Brien 
Hindley  v.  Westnieath 


Hindman  v.  Dill 

V.  Langford 

V.  Sliaw 
Hindman's  Appeal 
Hine  v.  Allely 

V.  Lart 
Hinely  v.  Margaritz 
Hines  v.  Butler 
Hinesburgh  v.  Sumner 
Hingston  r.  Wendt 
Hinkle  v.  Wanzer 
Hinkley  v.  Fowler 

?'.  Marean 
Hinman  v.  Hapgood 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Judson 

V.  Moulton 
Hinsdale  v.  Bank  of  Orange 
Hinsdell  v.  Weed 
Hinton,  Ex  parte 

V.  Acraman 

V.  Citizens  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Dibbiti 

V.  Locke 
Hirbour  v.  Heeding 
Hirn  v.  The  State  of  Ohio 
Hirsch  v.  Patterson 
Hirschfeld  v.  London,  &c.  R 
Hirschman  v.  Budd 
Hirschorn  v.  Canney 
Hiscock  I'.  Phelps 
Hitch  V.  Davis 
Hitchin  v.  Groom 
Hitchcock  V.  Aicken 

V.  Buclianan 

V.  Coker 

r.  Huat 

V.  Humphrey 


I  Hitchcock  t'.  St.  John 
ii.  615    liitcliings  v.  Ellis 
i.  8G1    llitner's  Appeal 
ii.  765    Hixon  v.  Hetherington 
ii   10  V.  Hixon 

i.  487  ;  ii  890,  893    Hoadley  v.  Bliss 
ii.  900,  905  v.  M'Laine 

i.  320    Hoadly  v.  Northern  Trans.  Co 

ii.  334,  337,  347  v.  Watson 

ii.  525,  532    Hoag  v.  McGinnis 

ii.  495    Hoagland  v.  Moore 

ii.  881  V.  Segur 

Cleveland,  Hoard  v.  Garner 

iii.  15    Iloare  r.  Dresser 

iii.  223  V.  Graham 

ii.  664    Hobart  v.  Drogan 

ii.  749,  823;  iii.  13  v.  Littlefield 

ii.  6  (    t;.  Norton 

ii.  49;  iii.  41  I  Hobbs  v.  Francais 

i.  497     V.  Hull 

ii.  890     V.  London,  &c.  E.  Co. 

iii.  223     I'.  Memphis  Ins.  Co. 

1.  510,  563,  577,  584 ;     v.  Norton  ii.  939 

iii.  12,  49  Hobby  r.  Dana  ii.  545 

iii.  136  Hoblins  v.  Kimble  iii.  176 

i.  394,  395,  396,  Hobson  v.  Watson        i.  129;  ii.  60 

399  Hoby  v.  Roebuck  iii.  37 

iii.  403  Hochster  v.  De  La  Tour  ii.  38,  800,  809, 

iii.  27  810 

ii.  461 


i.  201 

i.  177 

i.  397 

i.  246 

iii.  233 

i.  315 

iii.  14 

ii.  265 

iii.  181 

iii.  169,  170 

ii.  6.54 

iii.  168 

iii.  206 

i.  64 

i.  7 

ii.  439,  408 

i.  574 

ii.  533 

ii.  355,  363 

i.  401 

iii.  193 

ii.  475 


i.  311 

ii.  358,  366,  370 

i.  335,  364,  369 

i.  475 

i.  481 

ii.  442;  iii.  288 

i.  251 

i.  497,  498 

ii.  719;  iii.  391,  507 

ii.  59 

ii.  557,  559 

i.  611 

i.  473 

i.  331 

ii.  414 

iii.  449 

iii.  462 

i.  80 

ii.  268 

ii.  670,  675,  677 

i.  167 

iii.  510 

iii.  231 

ii.  915 

ii.  853 

i.  580 

i.  167,  172 

i.  263 

ii.  624,  691 

ii.  741 

i.  282 

ii.  369,  890 

i.  636 

ii.  24 


Co. 


i.  465 ; 


Hockenbury  v.  Myers  ii.  7 

Hockett  V.  Jones  i.  463 

Hodgdon  v.  Hodgdon  iii.  Ill 

r.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  415 

Hodge  V.  Coombs  i.  46 

v.  Fillis  i.  308 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  319,  324 


Manley 
Hodgedon  v.  Hubbard 
Hodges  V.  Dawes 

r.  Eastman 

V.  Hodges 

V.  Horsfall 

V.  King 

V.  Lovatt 

V.  Richmond  Mfg.  Co. 

V.  Saunders 

V.  Shules 

V.  Welch 
Hodgkins  v.  Bond 
Hodgkinson  v.  Fernie, 

V.  Fletcher 
Hodgman  v.  Smith 
Hodgson,  Ex  parte        i.  238 

V.  Anderson 

V.  Barrett 

V.  Bell 

V.  Davies 

V.  Dexter 

V.  Glover 

V.  Hodgson 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Le  Bret 

V.  Loy 

r.  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Millward 


79,  82 

ii.  928 

i.  180 

1.  248,  254 

i.  393 

iii.  343 

iii.  168 

iii.  132 

iii.  40 

i.  467 

i.  280,  331 

ii.  342 

iii.  10 

ii.  422,  430 

i.  401,  402 

i.  180 

iii.  420,  449 

i.  74,  245 

i.  568 ;  ii.  755 

iii.  200 

ii.  668,  811 

i.  138 

ii.  492 

ii.  695 

iii.  38 

iii.  46 

i.  642,  6-15 

ii.  490 

iii.  183 


ex 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Hodgson  r.  Richardson 

ii.  522 

r.  Sliaw 

ii.  G 

V.  Temple 

ii.  894 

Hodnett  v.  Tatum 

i.  51 

Hodsden  v.  Harridge 

ii.  801 

Ilodson,  In  re 

ii.  844 

V.  Terrill 

ii.  759 

Hoey  V.  Fuvman 

ii.  870 

Hoffman  v.  ^Etna  Ins.  Co.  ii.  470,  478,  576 

V.  Beclitel  ii.  25 

V.  Brown  ii.  850 

V.  Carrow  i.  556 

V.  Coombs  ii.  28 

V.  John  Hancock  Ins.  Co.  ii.  G16 

V.  Noble  iii.  270 

V.  Pitt  i.  569 

V.  Western  Ins.  Co.  ii.  578 

Hoffnung,  The  ii.  426 

Hog  V.  Gouldney  ii.  536 

Hogabooni  i'.  Herrick  ii.  26 

Hogan  V.  Del.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475 

V.  Reynolds  i.  204 

Hogarth  v.  Latham  i.  200 

Hogarth  v.  Wherley  ii.  747 

Hoge  r.  Hoge  i.  468 

Hogg  r.  Emerson  ii.  328 

V.  Horner  ii.  535 

f.  Kirby  ii.  336,  337,  349,  361 

V.  Orgill  i.  l'o8,  242 

V.  Snaith  i.  42 

Hoggart  v.  Scott  iii.  336 

Hoggins  i:  Gordon  ii.  59,  836 

Hogins  V.  Plympton  i.  624,  634 

Hogsett  r.  Ellis  iii.  26 

Hogshead  v.  Williams  ii.  28 

Hogue  V.  Davis  i.  35 

Hoit  V.  Hodge  ii.  896 

V.  Underhill  i.  364 

Hoitt  V.  Holcomb  ii.  925 

Holabird  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  598 

Holbird  v.  Anderson  iii.  382 

Holbrook  r.  Allen  i.  305 

V.  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  575,  585 

V.  Armstrong  iii.  38,  44 

V.  Baker  i.  612 

V.  Billiard  ii.  50 

V.  Burt  ii.  811 

V.  Camp  i.  275 

V.  Cliamberlin  i.  52,  212,  546 

V.  Debo  ii.  9S2 

V.  Foss  iii.  463 

V.  Lackey  ii.  878 

V.  St.  Paul  Ins.  Co.  ii.  561 

V.  Utica  &  Schen.  Co.  ii.  240,  817 

V.  Waters  iii.  437 

V.  Wight  i.  107  ;  iii.  281 

Holbrook  &  Co.,  Re  iii.  4(;8 

Holcomb  V.  Stimpson  ii.  818 

Holcombe  v.  Hewson  i.  632 

Holcroft  r.  Barber  ii.  35 

V.  Dickenson  ii.  64,  65 

Holdemen  i.  Baker  i.  53,  08 

Holden  v.  Cosgrove  i.  273 

i;.  Dakin  i.  618,  622,  627 

V.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.  ii.  45 


Holden  v.  Taylor  i.  531 

Holder  v.  Borden  ii.  438 

I'.  Dickeson  ii.  76 

Holderness  v.  Shackels  ii.  391 ;  iii.  297,  298 

Holding  V.  Pigott  i.  544;  ii.  669 

Holdridge  v.  Gillespie  i.  150 

V.  Utica,  &c.  R.  R.  ii.  251 

Holeman  v.  P.  H.  White,  The  ii.  392 

Ilolford  V.  Blatchford       iii.  143,  145,  153 

V.  Hatch  i.  259;  iii.  424 

Holker  v.  Parker  i.  131 ;  ii.  825 

HoU  V.  Griffin  ii.  152 

V.  Hadley  iii.  103 

Holladay  r.  Davis  i.  93 

Holland,  Ex  parte  iii.  432 

V.  Hodgson  i.  546 

V.  Holland  ii.  02 

V.  Martin  iii.  471 

V.  Pelhara  ii.  605;  iii.  149 

V.  Turner  i.  306,  317 

Holliday  v.  St.  Leonard  i.  98 

Hollingworth  v.  Tooke  i.  107 

HoUingswortli  v.  Napier  1.  648,  652 ; 

iii.  444 

V.  Swedenborg  i.  348 

Hollis  V.  Claridge  iii.  287 

V.  Morris  ii.  924 

-     V.  Pool  i.  549 

V.  Staley  i.  240 

Hollister  v.  Hollister  ii.  736 

V.  Nowlen      ii.  212,  234,  258,  259,  273 

HoUoman  i'.  Life  Ins.  Co.  ii.  593 

HoUoway  v.  Griffith  ii.  810 

V.  Hampton  iii.  43 

V.  Holloway  ii.  364,  370,  372 

V.  Lowe  ii.  908 

Holly  V.  Rathbono  i.  248 

Holman  v.  Johnson  ii.  700,  880,  894 

V.  Loynes  i.  93 

Holme  V.  Brunskill  ii.  19 

I'.  Hammond  i-  183 

Holmer  ;;.  Viner  iii.  477 

Holmes,  In  the  matter  of  iii.  401 

V.  Blotrg  i.  360,  367,  374 

V.  Buckley  i.  261 

V.  Charlestown  Ins.  Co.     ii.  641,  556, 

580 
r.  German  Sec.  Bank  i.  565 

V.  Goring  ii.  664 

V.  Higgins  i.  164,  184 

V.  Holmes  ii.  85  ;  iii.  500 

V.  Hoskins  iii.  46 

V.  Kerrison  i.  302 ;  iii.  97 

V.  Knights  iii.  24 

V.  Mather  i.  113 

V.  McGray  i.  167 

V.  Misroon  iii.  114 

V.  N.  E.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 

V.  Onion  i.  114 

V.  Porter  i.  182 

V.  Remsen    ii.  701,  738;  iii.  405,  407, 
408,  409 
V.  Rhodes  in.  200 

V.  Robinson  ii.  874 

V.  SinnicksoQ  iii.  242 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


CXI 


Holmes  v.  Smythe 
V.  Tretiiper 
V.  Trumper 
V.  United  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Weed 
V.  West 
V.  Williams 
V.  Williamson' 
Holsapple  v.  Rome,  &c.  R.  Co. 
Hoist  V.  Pownal 
Holt  V.  Bodey 

V.  Brien  i-  o87 

V.  Holt  i.  679;  iii.  308 

V.  Ward  Clarencieux  i.  370,  481 ; 

ii.  m 
Holten  V.  Arthur  ii.  366 

Holtgreve  v.  Wintker  i.  I'JO 

Holtham  v.  Ryland  ii.  806 

Holtzman  v.  Millandon  i.  50-5 

Holy  land  v.  De  Mendez        i.  190;  iii.  449 
Holyoke  v.  Haskins  ii.  712 

Homan  v.  Brooklyn  Ins.  Co.  i.  54 

V.  Earle  ii.  66 

Home  Bank  v.  Carpenter  iii.  411 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Augusta  iii.  480 

V.  Baltimore  Warehouse  Co.    ii.  565, 

583 

V.  Curtis  ii.  616 

V.  Green  i.  327 

V.  Hauslein  ii.  575 

V.  Heck  i.  505 

V.  Pierce  ii.  617 

V.  Western  Trans.  Co.  ii.  564 

Home,  &c.  Assoc,  v.  Thursby  iii.  117 

Homer  v.  Ashford  i.  467 ;  ii.  890 

V.  Dorr  ii.  480 

V.  Guardian  Ins.  Co.  ii.  616 

V.  Homer  i.  167 

V.  Tliwing  i.  356 ;  ii.  137 

V.  Wood  i.  208 

Homes  v.  Crane      i.  569,  612;  ii.  122,  401 

V.  Dana  i.  474,  483 

V.  Smith  i.  321 

V.  Smyth  i.  292 

Hone  V.  Mutual  Safety  Ins.  Co.       ii.  478, 

671 

Honeyman  v.  Marryatt        i.  507 ;  iii.  312 

Homier  v.  111.  Central  R.  R,  Co.  ii.  46 

V.  Morton  iii.  438 

Ilonnett  v.  Honnett  ii.  88 

Honnick  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  478 

Honore  u.  Lamar  Ins.  Co.  ii.  564 

Honynian  v.  Campbell  ii.  67 

Hood  I'.  Adams  i.  527 

V.  Farnstock  i.  81 

I".  Hood  ii.  737 

V.  Manhattan  Ins.  Co.  ii.  478, 483,  537 

V.  New    York    &    New    Haven 

R.  R.  Co.  i.  158;  ii.  231 

V.  Riley  ii.  878 

V.  State  ii.  737 

Hood's  Estate  ii.  708 

Hoodly  V.  McLaine  i.  562 

Hooe  V.  Groverman  ii.  421 

V.  Oxley  i.  49 


iii.  117 

Ilook  V.  Hook 

ii.  940 

i.  547 

V.  Kinnear 

iii.  308 

u.  853,  862 

t'.  Moreton 

ii.  459 

ii.  480 

V.  Pratt 

i.  465 

i.  32 

i\  Stone 

i.  201 

i.  296 

V.  White 

ii.  881 

iii.  15.3,  154 

Hooker  v.  De  Palos 

i.  487 

i.  31,  34 

V.  Vandewater 

ii.  887 

ii.  270 

Hoop,  Tlie 

ii.  447 

i.  641 

Hooper,  Ex  parte 

iii.  66.  349,  463 

."•27 

V.  Brundage 

iii.  283 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  232 

V.  Edwards  ii.  901 

V.  Goodwin  i.  263 

V.  Keay  ii.  766 

V.  Perley  ii.  460 

V.  Pierce  ii.  837 

V.  Smith  iii.  441 

V.  Stephens  iii.  80 

V.  Tuckerman  iii.  403 

V.  Wells  ii.  263 

V.  Williams  i.  277,  278 

Hoover  i\  Pierce  1.  486 ;  ii.  924 

V.  Wise  i.  81 

Hopcraft  v.  Hickman    ii.  829,  834 ;  iii.  309 

V.  Keys  ii.  940 

Hope,  The  ii.  438 

Hope,  Ex  parte  iii.  463 

V.  Booth  iii.  462 

V.  Cust  i.  209 

V.  Dido,  The  ii.  4.39 

V.  Hayley  i.  612 

V.  Liddell  iii.  287 

Hope  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brolaskey  ii.  659 

Hopewell  v.  De  Pinna  ii.  612 

Hopkins  v.  Appleby  i.  638 

r.  A.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  240 

r.  Beebe  i.  276 

r.  Crittenden  iii.  113 

V.  Forsyth  ii.  387,  454 

V.  Grazebrook  iii.  246 

V.  Grey  iii.  381 

I'.  Hopkins  ii.  93 

V.  Lacouture  i.  66 

V.  Lee  iii.  245 

V.  Logan  i.  479,  602,  503 

V.  Megguire  ii.  879 

V.  Mehaffy  i.  69,  72 

V.  Richardson  ii.  12 

V.  Roberts  iii.  351 

V.  Sanford  iii.  196 

V.  Smith  i.  213 

V.  Tanqueray  i.  621 

V.  Thompson  i.  611 

V.  Westcott  ii.  277 

Hopkinson  v.  Lee  i.  14, 16,  17,  18,  22 

Hopkirk  v.  Page  i.  316 

Hopley  V.  Dufresne  i.  308 

Hopper  V.  Childa  iii.  293 

V.  Hopper  iii.  362 

V.  Sisk  ii.  917 

Hopping  V.  Quin  i.  128 

Hopson  V.  Boyd  i.  438 

r.  Trevor  iii.  310 

Horbach  v.  Elder  i.  32 


CXll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Horder  v.  Horder 

i.  410;  ii.  78 

Hore  V.  Wliitmore 

ii.  518,  521 

Horn  r.  Buck 

i.  G17  ;  iii.  2iy 

V.  Horn 

ii.  874 

V.  Ivy 

i.  153 

V.  Nason 

iii.  464 

V.  Roberts 

ii.  847 

flornbuckle  v.  Hornbury 

i.  402 

Horiib}'  r.  Lacy 

i.  497  ;  ii.  745 

Horncastle  v.  Farran 

i.  645 

V.  Hawortli 

ii.  480 

Ilorne  r.  Midland  R.  Co. 

iii.  207 

V.  Rouquette 

i.  314 

Horner  r,  Fislx 

iii.  107 

V.  Flintoff 

iii.  172 

V.  Graves 

ii.  890 

V.  Leeds 

ii.  940 

V.  Marsliall 

i.  434 

Horneyer  v.  Lushington 

ii.  480 

Hornsby  r.  Lee 

iii.  437 

Horrel  v.  M'Alexander 

ii.  832 

Horsburgli  i-.  Orme 

ii.  749 

Horsefall  v.  Matlier 

i.  535;  ii.  136 

Horsfall  v.  Fauntleroy 

ii.  745 

V.  Handly 

i.  85 

i\  Mather 

i.  635  ;  ii.  136 

Horsford  v.  Wright 

iii.  242 

Horsley  v.  Bell 

i.  139 

V.  Rush 

ii.  421 

Horst  V.  Wagner 

ii.  853 

Hon  V.  Norton                  i. 

476;  ii.  51,  61 

Horton  w.  Benson 

ii.  833 

V.  Charaplin 

iii.  286 

V.  Green 

i.  617 

V.  Home 

iii.  722 

V.  Mabon 

ii.  308 

V.  Manning 

i.  298 

V.  Stanley 

ii.  844 

Horton's  Appeal 

i.  222 

Hosack  V.  Weaver 

i.  556 

Hosea  v.  McCrory 

ii.  194 

V.  Rowley 

ii.  28 

Hosford  V.  Nichols 

ii.  701,  716 

Hoskins  >\  Duperoy 

iii.  461 

I'.  Miller 

i.  385 

V.  Paul 

i.  553 

V.  Pickersgill 

ii.  483 

Hosmer  v.  Beebe 

i.  104 

Hostler's  case 

ii.  148 

Hotchkiss  r.  Artisan's  Bank             ii.  190 

V.  Greenwood 

ii.  307 

Hotel  Co.  V.  Wade 

i.  158 

Hotham  v.  East  India  Co. 

ii.  625 

Houdlette  v.  Tallman 

i.  566 

Hougii  V.  Edwards 

iii.  286 

V.  Evans 

ii.  918 

V.  May 

ii.  755 

V.  People's  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  583 

V.  Richardson 

1.621 

V.  Warr 

ii.  34 

Houghtaling  v.  Ball 

ii.  700 

V.  Honghtaling 

iii.  37 

V.  Marvin 

i.  77 

Houghton,  Ex  parte 

iii.  464 

V.  Adams 

ii.  754 

Houghton  V.  Houghton  ii.  838 

V.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524,  526,  553, 

555,  556,  557 

V.  Matthews    i.  101 ;  iii.  274,  276,  277 

V.  Maynard  iii.  398,  508 

V.  Page  ii.  700 ;  iii.  123 

Houlditch  V.  Cauty  i.  322 

V.  Donegal  ii.  740 

t'.  Milne  iii.  27 

Houliston  t'.  Smyth  i.  393 

Ilountz  V.  Holthouse  i.  246 

Housatonic  Bank  v.  Laflin  i.  319,  322 

House  V.  Fort  i.  617,  622,  623 

V.  Palmer  ii.  639 

V.  Schooner  Lexington  ii.  208 

Househill  Co.  v.  Neilson  ii.  310 

Household  Ins.  Co.  v.  Grant  i.  515 

Houseman  i'.  Girard  Ass.  i.  80 

Houser  (;.  Laniont  iii.  344 

V.  Planters'  Bank  iii.  124 

V.  Reynolds  i.  363,  366 

Houston  V.  LafEee  iii.  39 

V.  Pollard  ii.  829 

V.  Robertson  ii.  876 

Houston,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Oram  ii.  46 

Hovenden  v.  Annesley  ii.  940 

Hovey  v.  American  Ins.  Co.  ii.  653 

V.  Blanchard  i.  51,  82 

V.  Chase  i.  438 

V.  Hobson  i.  435 

V.  Hovey  i.  433,  435 

V.  Sebring  i.  298 

V.  Stevens  ii.  307,  315,  321 

Hovil  V.  Pack  i.  51 

How  V.  Abbott  ii.  314 

V.  Camp  iii.  382 

V.  Kemball  ii.  7,  8;  iii.  17 

V.  Weldon  i.  523 

V.  Whitebanck  i.  90 

V.  Whitefield  i.  90 

Howard  v.  Ames  i.  289;  iii.  258 

I'.  Babcock  ii.  117 

V.  Baillie  i.  42 

V.  Burgen  iii.  43 

V.  Cadwalader  ii.  922 

V.  Chapman  ii.  747 

V.  Cobb  ii.  408 

V.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  ii.  614 

V.  Cooper  ii.  828 

V.  Crompton  iii.  438 

V.  Crowther  iii.  453 

V.  Daly  i.  615 

V.  Doolittle  i.  632 

V.  Edgell  ii.  826;  iii.  316 

V.  Ellis  iii.  313,  328 

V.  Emerson  i.  632 

V.  Grover  ii.  58 

v..  Henriques  ii.  354,  860,  363 

t;.  Hildreth  iii.  109 

V.  Hoey  i.  631 

V.  Holbrook  iii.  18 

V.  Ilopkyns  iii.  310 

V.  Howard  i.  69 

V.  Hudson  ii.  936,  943 

V.  Ives  i.  318 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


CXlll 


Howard  v.  Jcmmctt  iii.  424,  409 
V.  Kentucky  &  Louisville  M.  Ins. 

Co.  iii.  507 

V.  Mac;  on  (I  ray  ii.  425 

V.  Miner  i.  575 ;  ii.  784 

V.  Mississippi  Bank  i.  300 

V.  Odell  ii.  390,  400 

V.  Priest  i.  170 

V.  Rogers  iii.  346 

V.  Sexton  ii.  825 

V.  Shepherd  i.  328 

V.  Smith  i.  108 
V.  Tucker                      u.  943;  iii.  206 

V.  AVhetstone  i.  393 

V.  Williams  i.  569 

V.  Wissman  ii.  410 

Howard's  case  ii.  486 

Howard  Bank,  Ex  parte  iii.  469 

Howard  College  v.  Pace  i.  248 

Howden  v.  Haigh  iii.  477 

V.  Simpson  i.  486 

Howe  V.  Abbott  ii.  307,  312 

V.  Batcheliler  iii.  36 

V.  Bradley  i.  306  ;  ii.  769 

V.  Handley  i.  12;  iii.  218 

V.  Hay  ward  iii.  58 

V.  Howe  Machine  Co.  ii.  378 

V.  Howe  Man.  Co.  ii.  372 

V.  Huntington  ii.  666,  795 

V.  Merrill  i.  300 

V.  Morton  ii.  314 

V.  Newmarch  i.  115 

V.  Nickels  ii.  14,  15,  16 

V.  O'Mally  i.  478 

V.  Ould  i.  271 

V.  Palmer  iii.  47,  51 

V.  Searing  ii.  369,  378 

V.  Siieppard  ii.  877 

V.  Synge  i.  488 

V.  Thompson  iii.  92 

V.  Underwood  ii.  304 

V.  Ward  i.  35 
Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Ballmeg         ii.  745 

V.  Rober  iii.  224 

V.  Willie  ii.  814 

Howell  V.  Burnet  iii.  103 

V.  Cincinnati  Ins.  Co.  ii.  5-56 

V.  Coupland  i.  491;  ii.  805 

V.  Edgar  iii.  382 

V.  Gordon  i.  78 

V.  Harding  ii.  875 

V.  Harvey  i.  219 

I'.  Jackson  ii.  161 

I'.  Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.  ii.  617 

V.  Mclvers  i.  475 

V.  Morlan  ii.  153 

V.  Selving  i.  147 

V.  Sevier  ii.  28 

V.  Young  iii.  99 

Howells  V.  Landore  Steel  Co.  ii.  47 

Howes,  In  re  iii.  460 

V.  Barker  i.  458 

V.  Bigelow  i.  383,  385 

Howie  V.  Ray  iii.  219 

Rowland,  Ex  parte  iii.  415 


Ilowland  i\  Carson  i.  303 

V.  Comm.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  480,  64S 

V.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  ii.  616 

V.  Grecnway  ii.  415 

V.  Harris  i.  594 

1-.  Lounds  i.  51.3 

V.  Mar.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  512 

Howlet  V.  Strickland  ii.  873,  879 

Howley  v.  Whipple  ii.  298 

Howson  V.  Hancock  ii.  760,  887 

Howton  r.  Frearson  ii.  664 

Howze  V.  Patterson  i.  200 

Ho.xie  V.  Carr  i.  168,  169,  171,  172 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co.  ii.  410 

V.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.  ii.  531 

Hoy  I'.  Holt  i.  537 

V.  Rogers  i.  383 

Hoyle  V.  Stowe  i.  363,  366,  368,  370 

Iloyt  V.  Bridgewater  Co.  iii.  143 

V.  Byrnes  ii.  753,  774 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  203 

V.  French  ii.  28 

V.  McKenzie  ii.  336 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co  ii.  606 

V.  Shipherd  i.  92 

V.  Sprague  i.  150  ;  ii.  945 

V.  Wildfire  ii.  38,  461 

Hubbard  v.  Callahan  iii.  113 

V.  Charlestown  Branch  R.  R. 

Co.  iii.  Ill 

V.  Coolidge  i.  466,  509 

V.  Cummings  i.  361,  367,  368 

V.  Glover  ii.  523 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559,  583 

V.  Jackson  i.  297 

V.  Matthews  i.  226 

V.  Morgan  i.  242 

V.  Norton  iii.  244 

V.  Shaw  i.  537 

Hubbell  V.  Carpenter  ii.  29 

V.  Cramp  iii.  478 

V.  Great  Western  Ins.  Co.         ii.  406 

Hubbersty  v.  Ward         i.  44 ;  ii.  190,  409 

Hubbert  ik  Borden  i.  57 

Huber  v.  Steiner  ii.  721 

Hubert  v.  Moreau  iii.  6 

V.  Turner  iii.  6,  11 

Hubgh  V.  New  Orleans  R.  R.  ii.  46 

Hubon  I'.  Park  iii.  23 

Huck  V.  Globe  Ins.  Co.  ii.  569 

Huckle  V.  Money  iii.  183,  187,  188 

Huckraan  v.  Fernie    i.  47,  62,  79;  ii.  597, 

599 
Hucks  V.  Thornton  ii.  486,  527 

Huddersfield  Canal  Co.  v.  Buckley 

ii.  873 

Huddlestone's  case  i.  76 

Hudiial  V.  Wilder  i.  264,  569 

Hudnall  v.  Scott  ii.  881 

Hudson  V.  Baxendale         ii.  224,  410,  416 

V.  Bennett  ii.  377 

V.  Bilton  ii.  521 

V.  Clementson  ii.  688 

V.  Granger  i.  107  ;  ii.  883 

V.  Guestier  ii.  399 


cxiv 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Hudson  V.  Harrison 
V.  Hudson 
V.  Jolinson 
V.  Revett 
I'.  Robinson 
t'.  Tenny 
V.  Worden 


ii.  512 
i.  146 

ii.  746 

i.  123 

i.  12 

iii.  112 
ii.  57 


Huelsenkampf  i'.  Citizen's  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  240 

Huey  1-.  Finney  ii.  24 

Huff'y.  McCauley  iii.  3G 

V.  Nickerson  i.  500 ;  ii.  642 

V.  Wright  i.  411 

Huffman  v.  Hulbert  ii.  24,  25 

Hugg  V.  Augusta  Ins.  Co.         ii.  409,  418, 

503,  505,  509,  510 

Huggeford  v.  Ford  iii.  218 

Hughes,  Ex  parte  i.  95 ;  iii.  420 

I'.  Hughes  i.  348 

V.  Humphreys  ii.  55 

V.  Kerney  iii.  294,  295 

V.  Kiddell  i.  298 

V.  Large  i.  290 

I'.  Lenny  iii.  272 

V.  Morris  iii.  346 

V.  Stanley  i.  558 

V.  Stubhs  iii.  315 

V.  Washington  i.  93 

V.  Wheeler  ii.  757  ;  iii.  125 

V.  Young  iii.  3G4 

Hughes's  Appeal  i.  151 

Huguenin  v.  Basely  i.  93 

V.  Rayley  ii.  598,  912 

Hulett  I'.  Craig  ii.  806 

V.  Hugg  ii.  882 

V.  Smith  ii.  156,  157 

Hull  V.  Augustine  i.  282 

V.  Blake  ii.  738 

V.  Caldwell  iii.  113 

V.  Clark  iii.  211 

V.  Connolly  i.  350 

t;.  Cooper  ii.  532 

V.  Hull  ii.  736,  938 

V.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.  ii.  618 

V.  Peer  iii.  333 

V.  Pickersgill  i.  49,  50,  53 

Hull  Dock  Co.  V.  Browne  ii.  487 

Hull  of  a  New  Ship  ii.  126,  129 

Hulle  V.  Heightman  ii.  44 

Ilulnie  V.  Muggleston  iii.  439,  469 

Hultz  V.  Gibbs  i.  393 

Humble  f.  Hunter  i.  55,  5G 

V.  Mitchell  iii.  56 

Hume  V.  BoUand  i.  209 

V.  Hord  i.  409 

V.  Peploe  ii.  771 

Humes  v.  Scruggs  iii.  455 

Humphrey  v.  Arabin  ii.  607 

V.  Dale  i.  590,591;  ii.  667 

V.  Douglass  i.  356 

V.  Phinney  iii.  239 

Humphreys  v.  Comline  i.  623,  632 

I'.  Gardner  ii.  826 

V.  Guillow  ii._860 

V.  Jones  iii.  76 

V.  Lundy  iii.  68 


Humphreys  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.   ii.  505,  508 
Humphries  v.  Blight's  Assignees 

iii.  424,  439 
V.  Chastain  i.  218 

V.  Harrison  i.  381 

Hundley  v.  Webb  i.  569 

Hunsaker  v.  Sturgis  ii.  120 

Hunsden  v.  Cheyney  ii.  77 

Hunt,  Ex  parte  i.  351 

I'.  Adams  ii.  7,  857 

V.  Bate  i.  475,  503 

V.  Bell  ii.  897 

V.  Bridgham  ii.  26,  28 ;  iii.  88 

V.  Carlisle  ii.  468 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  48 

V.  Cleveland,  The  ii.  414 

V.  DeBlaquire  i.  393,  401,  402 

V.  Fish  i.  321 

V.  Frost  ii.  685 

V.  Hall  ii.  716 

V.  Haskell  ii.  215,  220,  221,  419 ; 

iii.  210,  252,  269 
V.  Hecht  iii.  52 

V.  Hort  ii.  693 

V.  Hunt  ii.  92,  737 

V.  Johnson  i.  384  ;  ii.  78 

V.  Jones  ii.  700 

V.  Maybee  i.  316 

V.  Moore  ii.  921 

V.  Nevers  iii.  Ill 

V.  Nugent  i.  320 

V.  Otis  Company  ii.  37,  39,  879 

V.  Peake  5.  370,  481 ;  ii.  66 

u.  Ilousmanier  i.  74,  76 ;  iii.  355 

V.  Royal  Ex.  Ass.  Co.    i.  211 ;  ii.  794 
t".  Sackett  i.  616 

V.  Silk  ii.  813,  814 

V.  Thompson  i.  343 

V.  United  States  ii.  26,  28 

V.  Wimbledon  Local  Board         i.  154 
Hunt's  Appeal  ii.  85 

Hunter  v.  Agnew  i.  335,  353 

V.  Bennison  ii.  834 

V.  Bouclier  i.  394,  395 

V.  Daniel  iii.  338 

V.  Fry  ii.  422 

V.  General  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  N.  Y.  ii.  648 
r.  Hatfield  ii.  73 

V.  Hudson  River,  &c.  Co.  i.  79 

V.  Hunt  i.  31 

V.  Hunter  i._263 

V.  Jameson  1.  62 

V.  Leathley  ii.  484,  534 

V.  Le  Conte  i.  534 

V.  Miller  i.  55 

V.  Osterhondt  i.  550 

V.  Parker  i.  52,  85,  122 

V.  Potts  ii.  428;  iii.  406 

V.  Prinsep  ii.  398,  413,  418,  484 ; 

iii.  210 
V.  Rice  i.  571 

V.  Robinson  iii.  101 

V.  Wetsell  iii.  58 

V.  Wright  ii.  481 

Hunter,  The  ii.  402,  403 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


cxv 


Huntgate  v.  Mease  ii.  837 

Huntington  v.  American  Bank  ii.  772 

I,'.  Finch  ii.  857 

V.  Gilmore  i.  263,  265 

V.  Hall  i.  616 

V.  Knox  i.  58,  66 

Huntley  v.  Bacon  iii.  183 

V.  Bulwer  i.  1-8 

V.  Sanderson  iii.  98 

Huntly  V.  Waddell  i.  615 

Huntress  v.  Patten  iii.  132 

Huntress,  The  ii.  41G 

Huntzinger  v.  Brock  iii.  507 

Hurd  V.  Brydges  iii.  416 

V.  Cook  i.  567 

V.  Fogg  ii.  875 

V.  Little  i.  324 

V.  West  ii.  142,  144 

Hurdle  v.  Waring  i.  51-5 

Hurff  V.  Hires  i.  565,  568 

Hurlburt  v.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.  ii.  885 

Hurley  v.  Brown  ii.  631 

V.  Milward  ii.  448 

Huron,  The,  v.  Simmons  ii.  392 
Hurry  v.  Hurry                            ii.  401,  421 

V.  John  &  Alice,  The  ii.  401 

V.  Mangles  i.  648 

V.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.  ii.  488 

Hursh  V.  IByers  ii.  1G2 

V.  Sheets  i.  12'J 

Hurst  V.  Bambridge  ii.  829 
V.  Gwennap                         iii.  426,  4-58 

V.  Hill  i.  219 

V.  Holding  i.  110 

V.  Usborne  ii.  422 

Hurt  I'.  Clarke  i.  208 

V.  Southern  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  238 
Hurtin  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.          ii.  523,  524 

1-.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  419 

Husband  v.  Davis  ii.  748 

Husbands  v.  Smith's  Adm'r  i.  140 

Huscombe  v.  Standing  i.  440 

Huse  V.  Hamblin  i.  279 

V.  McDaniel  ii.  756 

Hussey  v.  Christie  ii.  454 

V.  Crickett  ii.  806 

V.  Freeman  i.  318 

V.  Horn-Payne  iii.  17 

V.  Jewett  i.  870 
V.  Roundtree                     1.  338;  ii.  52 

V.  Thornton  i.  564 

V.  Whitely  ii.  324 

Hustler,  Ex  parte  iii.  282 

Huston  V.  Cantril  i.  460 

V.  Moorhead  iii.  152 
Hutcheson  v.  Blakeman              i.  50-5,  515 

Hutchins  i".  Adams  iii.  176 

V.  Bank  of  Tenn.  i.  169 

I'.  l?rackett  ii.  154 

V.  Gilchrist  i.  570 
V.  Hebbard                         i.  74 ;  ii.  938 

V.  Hudson  i.  191 

V.  Kimmell  ii.  84,  86 

V.  King  iii.  35 

V.  Olcutt  i.  645 


Hutchins  v.  Riddle 

ii.  874 

t'.  Scott 

ii.  855 

V.  Turner 

i.  209 

Hutchinson  v.  Bowker 

i.  508 

V.  Coombs 

ii.  464 

V.  Gascoigne 

iii.  416 

V.  Hosmer 

iii.  143,  149 

V.  Howard 

iii.  286 

V.  Moody 

ii.  28 

V.  Morley 

ii.  920 

V.  Pettes 

iii.  286 

V.  Reid 

ii.  879 ;  iii.  226 

V.  Smith 

i.  205,  238 

V.  Sturges 

ii.  873 

V.  Tatham 

i.  58;  ii.  668 

V.  Watkins 

i.  557 

V.  York,  Newcastle,   &   Berwick 

Ry.  Co.  ii.  46 

Hutchison  v.  Bowker,    i.  505;  ii.  471,  624, 

628,  666 

V.  Mitchell  ii.  78 

Huthacher  v.  Harris  i.  562 

Hutson  V.  Merrifield  ii.  608 

Huttmann  '-.  Boulnois  ii.  35 

Hutton  V.  Bragg  ii.  421 

V.  Bulloch  i.  67,  105 

V.  Eyre  i.  27  ;  ii.  850 

V.  Mansell  ii.  66 

V.  Moore  i.  561 

V.  Padgett  iii.  17 

V.  Warren  i.  537,  544;  ii.  668,  670,  678 

Huyler  v.  Atwood  ii.  10 

Hyat  V.  Hare  i.  206 

Hyatt  V.  Adams  iii.  178,  187 

V.  Boyls  i.  603,  624,  626 

Hyde  v.  Brashear  i.  227 

I'.  Cookson  ii.  143,  145 

?'.  Hyde  ii.  729 

V.  Johnson  iii.  85 

V.  Louisiana  Ins.  Co.  ii.  507 

V.  Paige  i.  6(i 

V.  Stone  i.  385;  iii.  115 

V.  Trent  &  Mersey  Navigation  ii.  150, 

196,  204,  205,  415,  669 

V.  Wolf  i.  m 

V.  Woods  iii.  431 

Hydraulic  Engineering  Co.  v.  McHaf- 

fie  ii.  629;  iii.  190,  197 

Ilyleing  v.  Hastings  iii.  68 

Hylton  V.  Brown  iii.  238 

Hynds  v.  Schenectady  Co.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  547,  573 
Hyne  v.  Dewdney  i.  280 

Hynes  v.  Stewart  i.  230 

Hysinger  v.  Baltzells  iii.  103 

Hyslop  V.  Clarke  iii.  382 

V.  Jones  i.  319 


Icard  V.  Goold 

ii.  460 

Ide  V.  Gray 

ii.  913 

V.  Pass.  Riv.  R.  R.  Co. 

i.  331 

V.  Stanton 

iii.  14,  18 

CXVl 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Idle  V.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.    ii.  896,  397, 

510 

V.  Thornton  i.  597 

Ilett  V.  Collins  iii.  294 

Iley  I'.  Prankenstein  i.  581 

Illidge  V.  Goodwin  ii.  247 

Illinois,  The  ii.  435,  48-3 

111.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox  ii.  46 

V.  Frankenberg  ii.  227 

V.  Mitcliell  ii.  2:32 

V.  Patterson  iii.  311 

111.,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Johnson  ii.  227 

V.  Reaa  ii.  238,  270 

V.  Whittemore  ii.  246 

Illinois  Ins   Co.  v.  Andes  Ins.  Co.     ii.  494 

Illinois,  &c.  Soc.  v.  Winthrop  ii.  593 

lUslcv  V.  Jewett  ii.  756;  iii.  80 

Inchoff  V.  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  250 

Inilay  r.  EUefsen  ii.  719  ;  iii.  391 

V.  Huntington  i.  409 

V.  N.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  315 

V.  Wikoff  ii.  831 

Imperial   Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.  r. 

London  Gas  Light  Co.  iii.  107 

Imperial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Murray  ii.  565 

Imperial  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fire  Ins. 

Corporation  ii.  484 

Imjiortcrs'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Christie  i.  539 

Inco,  1)1  re  ii.  284 

Independent  Ins.  Co.,  Re  iii.  461 

Independent  Ins.  Co.  v.  Agnevv         ii.  571 

Indiana,  The  ii.  431 

Indiana  Ins.  Co.  r.  Coquillard  ii.  539 

Indiana,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Beaver      ii.  245 

r.  Mundy  ii.  238 

Indianapolis,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen  ii.  271 

V.  Horst  ii.  245 

?;.  Maguire  i.  565 

V.  Paramore  ii.  249 

Indianapolis  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brown        iii.  125 

Industry,  Tlie  ii.  439 

Infanta,  The  ii.  458 

Ingalls  V.  Bills  ii.  180,  236,  243 

V.  Cole  ii.  028 

V.  Herrick  i.  569 

V.  Lee  i.  291 ;  iii.  153,  156 

V.  Lord  iii.  210 

Ingallsby  v.  Wood  ii.  164 

L  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Rutherford         ii.  817 

Ingate  v.  Christie  ii.  179 

Inge  V.  Bond  i.  616 

Ingersol  v.  Jones  ii.  76 

V.  Van  Rookkelin  iii.  216 

Ingersoll  r.  Baker  ii.  7 

r.  Ingersoll  ii.  91 

V.  Martin  i.  463 

Ingle  r.  Hartman  i.  94 

Ingledew  v.  Douglas  i.  352 

Inglis  V.  Ilaigh  iii.  93,  94,  96 

V.  Vaux  ii.  487 

Ingraham  v.  Albee  ii.  466 

V.  Gever  iii.  407,  409 

V.  (iilbert  i.  4(52 

»'.  Grigg  iii.  403 

f.  Hall  ii.  751 


Ingraham  v.  South  Carolina  Ins.  Co.  ii.  526 

V.  Wheeler  ii.  395 

r.  AVhitmore  i.  102 

Ingram  v.  Ingram  i.  89 

V.  Jordan  iii.  224 

V.  Lawson  iii.  197 

V.  Webb  ii.  834 

Inkster  v.  Marshall  Bank  ii.  25 

Inman  v.  Foster  iii.  179 

Inman  Steamship  Co.  v.  Bischofif     ii.  498 

Innel  v.  Newman  ii.  749 

Innes  v.  Stephenson  ii.  747 

Ins.  Co.  V.  Bruce  ii.  943 

V.  Colt  ii.  471 

V.  Davis  i.  78 

V.  Dunham  ii.  470 

V.  Dutcher  ii.  615 

V.  Eggleston  ii.  617 

V.  Express  Co.  ii.  570 

r.  Foley  ii.  597 

V.  Haven  ii.  559 

V.  Jarvis  ii.  539,  615 

V.  McCain  i.  75  ;  ii.  745 

V.  Railroad  Co.  ii.  228 

V.  Southard  ii.  542,  554,  556 

r.  Stinson  ii.  561 

i\  Thompson  ii.  561 

V.  Updegraff  ii.  561,  564 

V.  Webster  ii.  544 

r.  Weides  ii.  587,  588 

Ins.  Co.  of  Penn.  r.  Smith  ii.  472 

Ionic,  The  ii.  275 

lonides  v.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.         ii.  483,  484, 

522,  525 
V.  Pender  ii.  626 

r.  Universal,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  498 

Ipswich  Manufacturing  Company  v. 

Story  ii.  852 

Irby  V.  Wilson  ii.  732 

Ireland  v.  Kip  i.  306 

r.  Livingston      i.  61,  572,  597  ;  ii.  674 

Ireland's  case  iii.  107 

Irish  V.  Cutter  i.  263,  275,  283 

V.  Nutting  i.  263 

Irons  V.  Kentner  i.  565;  ii.  149 

I'.  Smallpicce  i.  263 

Irvine  ;■.  Crockett  i.  370 

V.  Irvine  i.  303 

V.  Kirkpatrick         i.  620  ;  ii.  918,  924 

V.  Stone  i.  486  ;  iii.  19 

V.  Watson  i.  65,  67 ;  ii.  745 

V.  Withers  i.  309 

Irving  r.  Greenwood  ii.  70,76 

V.  Manning  ii.   491,  506,  507 

I'.  Motley  i.  79 

V.  Thomas  i.  619 ;  ii.  920 

V.  Veitch  iii.  77,  80,  97 

Irwin  V.  Bid  well  i.  174 

Isaac  V.  Clark  ii.  105 

Isaacs  V.  Cooper  ii.  324 

Isabella  Jacobina,  The  ii.  426 

Isbell  V.  Norvell  ii.  136 

Isberg  V.  Bow.len  ii.  873,  883,  885 

Island  City,  The         ii.  435,  437,  439,  442 

Isle  Royale  Mining  Co.  v.  Hertin    iii.  214 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXVU 


Isler  V.  Baker 
Israel  v.  C'lark 
Itinerant,  Tlie 
Ivans  V.  Draper 
Ives  V.  Jones 

V.  Sterling 
Ives's  case 
Iveson  c.  Conington 
Ivey  V.  McQueen 
Izon  V.  Gorton 


J. 


i.  223 

ii.  242 

ii.  428 

i.  19 

i.  37,  87 

i.  484 
ii.  646 

i.  129 
iii.  183 

1.532 


Jaccard  v.  Anderson 

i.  315 

Jack,  In  re 

iii.  316 

V.  McKee 

iii.  247 

Jack  Park,  The 

ii.  459 

Jacks  V.  Bell 

iii.  185 

V.  Moore 

ii.  881 

V.  Nichols 

iii.  123 

Jacobs,  Ex  parte 

i.  324 

Jackson,  Ex  parte 

1.214;  iii.  418 

V.  Alexander 

i.  189 

V.  Ambler 

ii.  828 

V.  Baker 

1.  104 ;  iii.  173 

V.  Bartlett 

ii.  746 

V.  Blodgett 

ii.  635,  638,  640 

V.  Bowcn 

iii.  130 

V.  Bryan 

i.  548 

V.  Bull 

ii.  933 

V.  Burchin 

i.  365,  368 

V.  Carpenter 

i.  365,  368 

V.  Catlin 

iii.  12 

V.  Charnock 

ii.  446 

f.  Cobbin 

1.  602,  503,  536 

V.  Cocker 

iii.  309 

V.  Cornell 

1.  238 

V.  Covert 

iii.  00 

V.  Craig 

ii.  689 

V.  Cunimings 

iii.  267 

V.  Davis 

ii.  940 

V.  Delong 

ii.  829 

V.  Duchaire 

ii.  8,  78;  iii.  477 

V.  Dunsbagh 

ii.  035 

V.  Eddy 

i.  542 

V.  Evans 

iii.  39 

V.  Farmers  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  493 

V.  Fitzsimmons 

i.  448 

V.  Galloway 

i.  506 

d.  Gibbs  t;.  Osborn 

ii.  860 

V.  Green 

i.  448 

V.  Henry 

iii.  130 

V.  Hubble 

ii.  932 

V.  Hudson                i 

326;  ii.  639,  643 

V.  Ireland 

ii.  645 

i;.  Irvin 

iii.  418 

V.  Jackson             ii. 

732,  736  ;  iii.  352 

V.  Jacob 

ii.  745 

V.  Jacoby 

ii.  860 

V.  Johnson 

ii.  766  ;  iii.  102 

V.  Jones 

iii.  129 

V.  King 

iii.  414 

V.  Lamphire 

Iii.  488,  511 

V.  Lawrence 

ii.  639 

Jackson  v.  Lever 
V.  Ligon 
V.  Lodge 
V.  Lomas 
V.  Loomis 
V.  Lowe 
V.  Lunn 
V.  Malin 
V.  Mass.  Ins.  Co. 


iii.  429 

iii.  356 

ii.  870 

iii.  477 

iii.  238 

iii.  4 

1.448 

ii.  856 

ii.  493,  562,  575, 

582,  583 

i.  364,  370,  497 

ii.  933 

.      iii.  129 

i.  309 

i.  399 

ii.  680,  931 

iii.  66 

ii.  687 

ii.  638 

i.  313 

i.  176,  183 ;  ii.  387 

ii.  185 

ii.  479 

i.  229 

ii.  680 

ii.  634,  849,  851 

ii.  634,  933 

i.  125 


V.  Mayo 

V.  Murray 

V.  Packard 

V.  Parker 

V.  Parks 

V.  Parkhurst 

V.  Pierce 

V.  Ransom 

V.  Reeves 

V.  Richards 

V.  Robinson 

V.  Rogers 

V.  Schoonmaker 

V.  Sedgwick 

V.  Sill 

V.  Stackhouse 

V.  Stevens 

V.  Stewart 

V.  Turner  iii.  242 

i;.  Union  Bank  ii.  113 

V.  Van  Dalfsen  i.  95 

V.  Vanderhayden  1.  406 ;  ii.  933 

V.  Walker  i.  489 

V.  Walsh  i.  95 

V.  Wetherill  i.  623 

V.  Wheat  iii.  103 

V.  Wilcox  ii.  919 

V.  Winslow  ii.  9.33 

V.  Wood  iii.  237 

V.  Yabsley  ii.  833 

V.  York  &  Cumberland  R.  R.  Co.  i.  330 

V.  ii.  178 

Jackson  Ins.  Co.  v.  Partee     i.  78 ;  iii.  440 

Jacky  V.  Butler  i.  233 

Jacob,  Tlie  ii.  408 

Jacob  V.  Kirk  iii.  14 

Jacobs  V.  Adams  iii.  Ill 

V.  Featherstone  i.  407 

V  Latour  iii.  260 

V.  Locke  iii.  337 

Jacobson  v.  Le  Grange  ii.  58 

V.  Williams  iii.  431,  4.33 

Jacomb  r.  Harwood  i.  26 

Jaffray  v.  Crane  ii.  28 

Jagger  Iron  Co.  v.  Walker  ii.  756 

Jaggers  v.  Binnings  ii.  391 

Jalie  V.  Cardinal  ii.  163 

James  Adgar  ii.  433 

James  v.  Attwood  ii.  844 

V.  Bixby  ii.  50 

I'.  Campbell  iii.  178 

V.  Catherwood  ii.  700 

V.  Clialmers  i.  329 

V.  Cotton  ii.  812 

V.  David  ii.  819 


CXVlll 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


James  r\  Dowell 
V.  Emery 
V.  Fulcrod 
V.  Griffin 
V.  Jones 
«;.  Le  Roy 

V.  Lycoming  Ins.  Co. 
V.  McCredie 
V.  Morey 
V.  Morgan 
V.  IMuir 
V.  O'DriscoU 
V.  Patten 
V.  Pawnee,  The 
V.  Raggett 
V.  Shore 
V.  8tratton 
V.  StuU 


ii.  863 

i.  14,  15,  16,  17 

i.  478 

i.  644 

ii.  195 
ii.  57 

ii.  551 
i.  60 

iii.  190 

i.  466 

i.  561 

ii.  58 

iii.  8 

ii.  392 

ii.  875 
i.  525 
i.  232 

iii.  511 


V.  Williams  i.  478;  iii.  16,  17,  81 

James  Church  v.  Moore  i.  278 

Jameson  v.  Brick  &  Stone  Co.         iii.  446 

V.  Gregory  i.  581 

V.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  ii.  573 

I'.  Swinton  i.  320,  323 

Jamey  v.  Columbia  Ins.  Co.  ii.  398 

Jamieson,  In  re  ii.  814 

Jamison  v.  Brady  ii.  877 

V.  Cosby  ii.  18 

Jane,  The  ii.  402,  404 

Jane  &  Matilda,  The  ii.  459 

Janes  v.  Wliitbread  i.  174 

Janet  Mitchell,  The  ii.  438 

Jaques  v.  Marquand  i.  204,  205 

V.  Methodist  Church  i.  409 

V.  Todd  i.  39 

V.  Withy  ii.  874 

Jarmain  v.  Algar  iii.  24 

Jarman  v.  Woolloton  iii.  455 

Jarrald  v.  Houlston     ii.  836,  341,  343,  349 

Jarvis  v.  Brooks  i.  169,  23!) 

V.  Chappie  ii.  882,  883 

V.  Davis  i.  569 

V.  Peck  i.  488 ;  ii.  891 

V.  Rogers  ii.  127,  129 

V.  Wilkins  iii.  17 

Jay  V.  Almy  ii.  465 

Jebsen  v.  East  &  West  India  Dock  Co. 

iii.  186,  196 
Jee  V.  Thurlow  i.  398,  899,  400 

Jcffcott  V.  No.  Brit.  Oil  Co.  i.  585 

Jellerson  v.  Adams  iii.  184,  185 

V.  Washington  ii.  710 

Jcffer.son  Co.  Bank  v.  Chapman       ii.  882 
Jefferson  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cothral    ii.  542,  545, 

554 
Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleveland 

ii.  203 

V.  Hendrick  ii.  250 

V.  White  ii.  151 

Jeffery  v.  Walton  ii.  684,  685 

Jefferys  v.  Boosey  ii.  330,  338 

V.  Gurr  i.  500 

V.  Jefferys  iii.  318 

Jefford  V.  Ringgold  i.  370 

Jeffrey  v.  Bigclow  i.  79 


Jeffrej's  v.  Baldwin 
Jeflries  v.  G.  W.  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Jeffries 

V.  Wiester 
Jefts  V.  York 
Jelliet  V.  Broade 
Jemison  v.  Blowers 
Jenckes  v.  Cook 
Jencks  v.  Coleman 
Jendwine  v.  Slade 
Jenkins  v.  Bacon 

V.  Blizard 

V.  Brewster 

V.  Eldridge 

V.  Gillespie 

V.  Hej'cock 

V.  Hooker 

V.  Hopkins 

V.  Hutchinson 

V.  Jarrett 


ii.  848 

ii.  816 

ii.  656 

iii.  335 

i.  94 

i.  72 

ii.  888 

iii.  478 

i.  540 

ii.  241 

i.  622 

i.  476;  ii.  108 

i.  191 

i.  258 

iii.  32 

i.  131 ;  ii.  825 

ii.  531 

i.  253 

iii.  245 

i.  72 

i.  563 

V.  Nicholson  Pavement  Co.        ii.  319 

V.  Pickett  ii.  194 

V.  Quincy  Ins.  Co.  ii.  555 

V.  Reynolds  iii.  16,  17,  18 

V.  Robertson  ii.  867 

Jenks  V.  Lewis  ii.  465 

Jenkyns  v.  Brown  i.  650 

V.  Usborne  i.  328,  645,  651,  6-52  ; 

ii.  409 ;  iii.  444,  445 

Jenness  v.  Bean  i.  292 

V.  Carleton  i.  225 

V.  Emerson  i.  349 

V.  Wendell  ii.  814  ;  iii.  49 

Jenney  v.  Aldon  i.  349 

V.  Lesdemier  i.  131 

Jennings  v.  Broughton  iii.  370 

V.  Brown  i.  460,  465 

V.  Camp  ii.  39,  655 

V.  Chenango  Co.  Ins.  Co.    ii.  522,  542, 

653,  560 

V.  Estes  i.  198 

V.  Gage  i.  657 

V.  Gratz  i.  624 

V.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  402 

V.  Johnson  iii.  218 

V.  Maddock  iii.  184 

V.  Merrill  i.  102 

V.  Newman  i.  143 

V.  Pitman  1.  354  ;  ii.  54 

V.  Roberls  i.  322,  323 

V.  RunduU  i.  356 

)'.  Thomas  i.  284 

Jennison  v.  Parker  ii.  120 

V.  Stafford  i.  470 

Jenys  i-.  Fawler  i.  300 

Jeremy  v.  Goochman  i.  475 

Jerome  v.  Bigelow  i.  487 

V.  Scuddcr  iii.  338 

V.  Whitney  i.  279 

Jersey  City,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jersey 

City,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  276 

Jersey  Glass  Co.  iii.  417 

Jerusalem,  Tlie  ii.  381,403 

Jervis  v.  Berridge  iii.  15,  18 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


CXIX 


Jervoise  v.  Silk  i.  347 
Jesse  V.  Roy  i.  441 ;  ii.  458 
Jesse!  v.  Williamsburgh  Ins.  Co.        i.  254 

Jeune  v.  Ward  i-  332 

Jewell  I'.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  240 

V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  ii.  199 

V. ii.  031 

Jewett  V.  Carter  i.  79 

V.  Cornforth  i.  35 

V.  Dockray  i-  255 

V.  Dringer  ii.  145;  iii.  213 

V.  Miller  i.  95;  ii.  935 

V.  Preston  iii.  434 

V.  Ricker  iii.  38 

I'.  Stevens  i.  198 

V.  Warren  i.  474 ;  iii.  47,  49 

Jewitt  V.  Wadleigh  i.  131 

Jewry  v.  Busk  ii.  59 

Jewson  V.  Moulson  i.  381 ;  iii.  437 

Jilson  V.  Gilbert  iii.  41 

Jodderell  v.  Cowell  iii.  449 

Jodrell  V.  Jodrell  iii.  374 

Joel  V.  Morrison  ii.  247 

Johan  &  Siegnmnd,  The  ii.  388 

Joliann  Friedrich,  The  ii.  434 

Johannes,  The  ii.  439 

Johannes  Christoph,  The  ii.  454 

John  Hancock  Ins.  Co.  v.  Daly         ii.  597 

V.  Moore  ii.  603 

John  Owen,  The,  v.  Johnson  ii.  413 

John  Perkins,  The  ii.  437 

John  1-.  Bacon  ii.  251 

Johns  V.  Bailey  ii.  903 

V.  Dodsworth  i.  28 

V.  Johns  ii.  88,  91 ;  iii.  66 

V.  Simons  i.  84 

V.  Stevens  ii.  840 

Johnson,  isa:  ;3a?-/e  i.  217,  306 

V.  Arnold  iii.  195 

V.  Arrigoni  i.  307 

V.  Bank  of  N.  America  i.  296 

V.  Barry  1.  199,  200 

V.  Berlizheimer  i.  227 

V.  Berkshire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  574 

r.  Blasdale  i.  73,  88,  272 

V.  Blenkensop  ii.  37 

V.  Bloodgood  i.  258 

V.  Boone  ii.  766 

V.  Boston  ii.  47 

V.  Buck  iii.  11,  15,  18 

V.  Campbell  i.  107 ;  iii.  276 

V.  Clark  i.  167 

V.  Clay  ii.  771,  772 

V.  Collins  i.  27 

V.  Cope  i.  618 

V.  Courts  iii.  240 

V.  Craig  i.  5 

V.  Cranage  ii.  779 

V.  Credit  Lyonnais  Co.  i.  102 

•        r.  Cunningham  ii.  746 

t'.  Cuttle  iii.  53 

V.  Day  ii.  898 

V.  Dodgson  iii.  6 

V.  Dorsey  i.  466 

V.  Evans  i.  236 


Johnson  v.  Farnum 

iii.  273 

V.  Fitzhugli 

iii.  471 

V.  Foster 

i.  498 

V.  Gilbert 

iii.  27 

V.  Greaves 

ii.  405 

V.  Hartsiiorne 

i.  228 

V.  Helmstaedter 

iii.  441 

V.  Henderson 

i.  279 

V.  Ilersey 

i.  208 

V.  Hill 

ii.  167 

V.  Holdsworth 

ii.  749 

V.  Hopkins 

iii.  68 

V.  Huckins 

ii.  463 

V.  Hudson 

ii.  894 

V.  Hudson  River  R. 

Co. 

ii.  248 

V.  Hunt                  ii. 

380 

iii.  409,  436 

V.  Jackson 

ii.  815 

V.  Johnson   i.  32,  381 

,  526 

;  ii.  648, 651, 

712 

iii.  125,  .356 

V.  Kennion 

i.  297,  298 

V.  Knapp 

ii.  11 

V.  Lancashire  R.  Co 

i.  564 

V.  Lancaster 

ii.  771,  772 

V.  Latham 

ii.  830 

V.  Lines 

i.  336,  850 

V.  Marlborough 

ii.  860 

V.  Marriott 

i.  127 

V.  Martinus 

i.  290 

V.  McDonald 

i.  595,  596 

V.  Medlicott 

i.  435 

V.  Meeker 

i.  301 

V.  Midland  Railway 

ii.  185,  187 

V.  Miln 

ii.  422 

V.  Morse 

ii.  869 

V.  Municipality 

i.  154 

V.  Nyce 

iii.  243 

V.  Ogilby 

i.  67 

V.  O'Hara 

i.  104 

V.  Peck 

ii.  914 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  586 

V.  Pie 

i.  357 

V.  Planters  Bank 

ii.  24 

V.  Reynolds 

ii.  163 

V.  Root                  ii.  .304,  309,  315,  317 

V.  Sandusky,  The 

ii.  388 

V.  Schooner  McDonough 

ii.  154 

V.  Shrewsbury  &  B. 

Ry.  < 

3o.    iii.  322, 
330,  374 

V.  Sims 

i. 

442 ;  ii.  458 

V.  Smith 

1.  51,  55 ;  iii.  49 

V.  Somers 

iii.  14 

V.  Somerville 

iii.  312 

V.  Stone 

ii.  275,  277 

V.  Sumner 

iii.  211 

V.  Thayer 

i.  246 

V.  Totten 

i.  192 

V.  Trinity  Church 

iii.  8 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  578 

V.  Watson 

iii.  44 

V.  Way 

i.  289 

V.  White 

ii.  871 

V.  Whitwell 

iii.  381,  382 

V.  Wilson 

i 

.25;  ii.  835 

V.  Winona  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  236 

Johnson's  Appeal 

1.151 

cxx 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Jolinson  &  Stowers,  Re 

iii.  421 

Johnston,  Ex  parte 

i.  300 

V.  Bower 

ii.  803 

V.  Brown 

i.  42 ;  ii.  143 

V.  Browne 

i. 

558,  565 

V.  Caullvins 

ii.  809 

V.  Commonwealth 

ii. 

900,  901 

t'.  Cope 

i.  627 

V.  Button 

i.  217 

V.  Fessler 

i.  506 

V.  Glaney                       ii 

.66, 

349,  358 

V.  Huddleston 

ii.  798 

V.  Nioliolls 

ii.  24 

V.  Orr  Ewing 

ii.  370 

V.  Searcy 

ii.  28 

r.  South  Western  Railroad  Bank  i.  79 

V.  Thompson 

ii.  26 

V.  Wabash  College 

1.482 

V.  Wilcox 

i.  78 

Johnstone  v.  Iluddlestone 

i. 

544,  548 ; 
ii.  940 

Joliet  Iron  Co.  v.  Scioto  Brick  Co.   ii.  128 

Jolland, V. 

i.  97 

Jollett  V.  Ueponthieu 

iii.  406 

JoUie  V.  Jacques 

u.  348 

Jolly   V.   Baltimore   Equitable   So- 

ciety 

ii.  551 

Jonasshon  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co. 

ii.  603 

Jones,  Ex  parte 

iii. 

143,  465 

V.  Ashburnham             i. 

470, 

472,  473 

V.  Ashford 

ii.  5 

V.  Barcley 

ii.  659 

V.  Belt 

iii.  337 

V.  Bennett 

ii.  836 

V.  Blanchard 

iii.  409 

r.  Blum 

ii.  391 

V.  Boston  Mill  Corporation 

i.  467 ; 

ii.  832, 

840 

;  iii.  333 

V.  Boyce 

ii. 

180,  236 

r.  Bradner 

i.  639 

V.  Brandon 

iii.  505 

V.  Brewer 

i.  151 

V.  Bright 

i.  630 

f.  Bullitt 

ii.  751 

V.  Clarke 

ii.  673 

V.  Clifton 

i. 

384,  410 

V.  Commerce,  The 

ii.  392 

V.  Cooper 

iii.  22 

V.  Darch 

i.  370 

V.  Dexter 

i.  256 

i;.  Downian 

i.  67 

!•.  Dunn 

ii.  651 

v.  Dyke 

i.  527 

V.  Edney 

i.  524 

V.  Fales 

ii.  G69 

V.  Flint 

iii.  34,  35 

V.  Foxall                         i. 

136 

;  iii.  422 

V.  Gibbons 

iii.  427 

V.  Gihnan 

iii.  193 

V.  Gilreath 

ii.  878 

V.  Glass 

ii.  134 

V.  Goodwin 

i.  275 

V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co. 

iii.  207 

V.  Gwynn 

iii.  177 

V.  Ilarmovan 

iii.  234 

Jones 


>  V.  Harris 

i.  78 

.  Herbert 

i.  210 ;  ii.  852 

.  Hibbert 

iii.  451 

.  Hoar 

ii.  772 

.  Hoey 

ii.  674 

.  Hook 

ii.  719 

.  Hoyt 

ii.  413 

.•  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  531 

.  Johnson 

ii.  853 

'.  Jones                     i. 

646;  ii.  91,853 

;.  Judd 

ii.  63,  792 

.  Kilgore 

ii.  765 

).  Lees 

ii.  893 

.  Lewis 

iii.  101 

.  Littledale 

i.  68,  527 

.  Lock 

i.  266 

.  Lusk 

i.  231 

.  Marcy 

iii.  41 

.  Marsh 

i.  550 ;  iii.  225 

.  Marshall 

iii.  177 

.  Mechanics  Ins.  Co 

ii.  586 

.  Merchants  Bank 

ii.  128 

.  Moore 

iii.  92 

•.  Morrisett,  The 

ii.  392 

.  Nanney 

i.  527 

;.  Neptune  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  484 

.  Newman 

ii.  689 

.  Nicholson 

ii.  497,  500 

.Noy 

i.  76,  223 

.  O'Brien 

i.  308 

.  Pearce 

ii.  318 

.  Perkins 

i.  435 

.  Peterman 

iii.  66 

.  Pitcher 

ii.  396 

.  Powell 

iii.  467 

.  Provincial  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  593 

.  Randall 

ii.  896 

.  Reed 

i.  535 

.  Richardson 

i.  612 

.  Robinson               i. 

19,  23,  496,  497 

.  Roe 

i.  560 

.  Ryde 

i.  298 

.  Sawkins 

ii.  822 

.  Selby 

i.  265,  267 

.  Shatldock 

i.  137 

.  Shorter 

iii.  24 

.  Sims 

i.  573 

.  Smith 

ii.  97,  122,  804 

.  Starkey 

ii.  113 

.  Tanner 

i.  141 

.  Thurloe 

ii.  148,  167 

.  Todd 

i.  360 

.  Tyler 

ii.  166 

.  United  States 

ii.  776 

V.  Victoria  Graving  Dock  Co.     iii.  18 
V.  Voorhees  ii.  179,  253,  276 

r.  Waite  i.  399,  485,  488 

V.  Ward  ii.  769 

V.  Wasson  i.  629 

V.  Williams  i.  509 

V.  Witter  i.  257,  258 

V.  Woodbury  ii.  63 

V.  Yates  i.  229  ;  ii.  924 

Jones  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Manuf .  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524, 

545-  553 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


CXXl 


Jonge  Andries,  The  ii.  439 

Bastiaan,  The  ii.  438,  439 

Jordan  v.  Black  i.  411 

V.  Dobbins  ii.  533 

V.  Fall  River  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  275 

V.  Gillen  i.  2-53 


V.  James 

i.  109, 

594,  642 

V.  Lewis 

iii.  170 

V.  Meredith 

ii.  67G 

V.  Neilson 

ii.  8G1 

I'.  Norton 

i.  41,  508 

V.  Trumbo 

iii.  loG 

V.  Warren  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  409, 

417,  510 

V.  Williams 

ii.  408 

Joseph  v.  Bisjelow 

ii.  085 

Joseph  E.  Coffee,  The 

ii.  383 

Joseph  Cunard,  The 

ii.  385 

Joseph  Harvey,  The 

ii.  4G8 

Joseph,  The 

ii.  520 

Josephine,  The 

ii.  519 

Josephs  V.  Pebber 

i.  Ill 

V.  Pebrer 

i.  162 

Joshua  Barker,  The 

ii. 

414,  456 

Joslyn  V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  ii.  197 

V.  Smith  ii.  26,  28 ;  iii.  88 

Jourdain  v.  Wilson  i.  261 

Jowers  V.  Blandy  i.  579 

Joy  V.  Campbell  iii.  435 

V.  Hopkins  iii.  221 

V.  Sears  ii.  395 ;  iii.  433 

Joyce  V.  Adams  i.  5GG 

V.  Maine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  552 

V.  Realm  Ins.  Co.  ii.  484 

Joynes  v.  Statham  iii.  312 

Jubber  v.  Jubber  ii.  688 

Judah  V.  Harris  i.  280 

V.  Randall  ii.  509 

Judd  V.  Day  i.  511 

V.  Fulton  ii.  797 

V.  Ives  iii.  400 

V.  Lawrence  i.  449 

Judge  V.  Wilkins  i.  4G6 

Judkins  v.  Walker  1.  355;  ii.  40 

Judovine  i'.  Goodrich  ii.  941 

Judson  V.  Cope  ii.  309,  314,  315,  322 

V.  Etiieridge  iii.  26G 

Judy  V.  Gilbert  iii.  349 

V.  Holmes  i.  272 

V.  Sturges  i.  103 

I'.  Wass  i.  524;  ii.  790 

V.  Western  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  233 

Juhel  V.  Church  ii.  481 

Julia  M.  Hallock,  The  ii.  468 

Julia,  Tlie  ii.  520 

Juliana,  Tiie            i.  441 ;  ii.  457,  4-58,  460 

Jumel  V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  447,  502,  517 

Jung  V.  Second  Ward  Bank  ii.  752 

Juniata  Bank  v.  Hale  i.  30G 

Junkins  v.  Simpson  ii.  815 

Juno,  The  ii.  481 

Jupe  V.  Pratt  ii.  310 

Jupiter,  The  ii.  432,  435 

Jurgenson  i'.  Alexander  ii.  375 

V.  Catharina  Maria  ii.  4G1 

Juzan  V.  Toulrain  ii.  917 


K. 


Kain  v.  Old  i.  589,  634 ;  ii.  679 

Kaines  v.  Knightly  ii.  475 

Kallenbach  v.  Dickinson  iii.  87 
Kallman  v.  United   States   Express 

Co.  ii.  270 

Kaltenbach  v.  Mackenzie  ii.  512 

Kane  r.  Bloodgood  iii.  107 

r.  Columbia  Ins.  Co.  ii.  535 

v.  Gott  i.  150 

V.  Hood  ii.  626,  661,  663 

V.  Paul  i.  143 

Kane,  hi  re  i.  347 

Kansas,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Little  ii.  181 

Kansas  City  Bank  v.  Mills  i.  93 

Karr  v.  Karr  i.  136 

Karthaus  v.  Ferrer  i.  216  ;  ii.  828 

Kase  V.  John  i.  637 

Kasson,  In  re  iii.  456 

V.  Broeker  i.  212 

Kathman  v.  Gen.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  483 

Kautzman  v.  Weirick  ii.  31 

Kavanagh  v.  Day  ii.  716 

Kay  V.  Allen  ii.  14 

V.  Curd  iii.  14 

V.  I^uchess  De  Pienne  i.  407 

V.  Marshall  ii.  312 

V.  Wheeler  ii.  428 

Kaye  v.  Brett  i.  48 

V.  Dutton  i.  462,  502,  503 

V.  Wagliorne  ii.  824 

Kayser  v.  Disher  i.  142 

Kead  v.  Rann  ii.  673 

Keane  v.  Boycott  i.  335  ;  ii.  52 

Kearney  v.  Holmes  ii.  .39 

Kearsarge,  The  ii.  38-3,  384 

Kearsey  w.  Carstairs  iii.  448 

Kearslake  v.  Morgan  ii.  820 

Keasley  v.  Codd  i.  1G4 

V.  Cole  i.  325 

Keate  v.  Temple  iii.  22 

Keates  v.  Cadogan  i.  513,  621,  630 

Keating  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  817 

V.  Price  ii.  685 

V.  Spink  ii.  392 

Keeble  v.  Hickeringall  iii.  195 

Keech  v.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  248 

Keegan  v.  Cox  i.  354 

V.  Geraghty  ii.  701 

Keeler  v.  Field  i.  579 

V.  Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  ii.  469 

V.  Goodwin  i.  565,  639 

V.  Neal  ii.  823 

V.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.  ii.  478 

V.  Salisbury  ii.  824 

Keeley  i'.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  273 

Keen  v.  Coleman  ii.  942 

r.  M'Laughlin  iii.  180 

v.  Vauglian  ii.  751 

Keenan  v.  Brown  ii.  663 

V.  Southworth  ii.  153 

Keene  v.  Beard  i-  297 

V.  Dilke  iii.  194 

V.  Keene  iii.  113 


CXXll 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


Keene  v.  Kimball  ii.  332,  333,  334 

V.  Tliompson  ii.  753 

V.  Wheutley         ii.  333,  334,  338,  34G 

Keener  v.  Bank  of  United  States      ii.  677 

V.  Ilarrod  i.  68 

Keenliolts  v.  Becker  iii.  179 

Keiglitley  v.  Watson    i.  14,  17,  23 ;  ii.  023 

Kein  v.  Tapper  i.  564,  565 

Keine  v.  Home,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  588 

Keir  v.  Leenian  i.  469 

Keitli  V.  Clark  iii.  480 

V.  Goodwin  i.  35,  37 

V.  Jones  i.  280 

Keithsburg  v.  Frick  i.  160 

Kekewich  v.  Manning  iii.  315 

Kelby  i-.  Steel  i.  26,  34,  35 

Kellam  v.  McKinstry  i.  563 

Kell  v.  Nainby  i.  24 ;  ii.  937 

Keller  r.  Phillips  i.  391 

r.  Ybarru  i.  505 

Kelley  v.  Davis  i.  S39 

V.  Hemingway  i.  281 

v.  Hurlburt  i.  188,  189 

V.  Riley  ii.  71,  75 

V.  Sanborn  iii.  90 

V.  Solari  ii.  536 

V.  Webster  iii.  38 

Kellner  v.  Le  Mesurier  ii.  481 

Kellogg  V.  Barnard  i.  629 

V.  Brennan  ii.  392 

V.  Denslow  i.  636,  638 

V.  Gilbert  ii.  746 

V.  Hickock  iii.  160 

i\  Lovely  iii.  273 

V.  Norris  ii.  746 

V.  Richards  ii.  751 

V.  Schnyler  iii.  466,  478 

V.  Slawson  iii.  403 

V.  Smith  ii.  939 

V.  Winnebago  ii.  709 

V.  Wood  ii.  933 

Kelly  V.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.      ii.  471 

V.  Cunningham  ii.  431 

V.  Dutch  Clmreh  of  Schenectady 

iii.  242,  248 

t'.  Garrett  ii.  882 

V.  Iloldship  iii.  426 

t;.  Hooper  ii.  349 

i;.  Low  iii.  244 

V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  N.  Y.  i.  117 

V.  Morris  ii.  334,  336,  344 

V.  Powlet  ii.  091 

V.  Renfro  ii.  71 

V.  Scott  iii.  440 

V.  Smith  i.  562;  ii.  536;  iii.  206 

V.  Solari  i.  496 

V.  Whitney  i.  289 

t".  Worcester,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  578 

Kelsea  )•.  Haines  i.  5(i7 

Kelsey  v.  Crawford  Bank  i.  51 

Keraber  i\  Soutliern  Express  Co.      ii.  260 

Kemble  v.  Farren  iii.  170,  172,  173 

V.  Kean  i.  221  ;  iii.  322 

Kemeys  v.  Proctor  iii.  312,  343 

Kemleys  v.  Richards  i.  215 


Kemp  V.  Andrews 

V.  Balls 

V.  Burt 

V.  Canavan 

V.  Carnley 

V.  Coffin 

V.  Coughtry 

V.  Falk 

V.  Finden 

V.  Pryor 

r.  Westbrook 
Kempe  v.  Fitchie 
Kendal  v.  Symonds 

V.  Fitts 

V.  Hamilton 

V.  Kendall 

V.  Kingsley 

V.  Stone 

I'.  United  States 

V.  Winsor 
Kendig  v.  Marble 
Kendrick  v.  Campbell 

V.  Delafield 

V.  Lomax 

V.  McCrary 

V.  Turbell 
Kennard  v.  Burton 

V.  Cass.  Co. 
Kennaway  v.  Treleaven 


i.  30 

i.  293  ;  ii.  749 

i.  126 

i.  651 

i.200 

i.  219 

ii.  181,  225,  456 

i.  652 

i.  31,33 

i.  88,  104 

iii.  289,  291 

iii.  327 

ii.  830 

i.  569 

i.  12 

ii.  861 

ii.  790 

iii.  179,  183,  194 

i.  252 

ii.  305,  321 

iii.  130 

i.  303 

ii.  500 

ii.  820 

ii.  70 

ii.  835 

ii.  250,  251,  430 

i.  330 

i.  480;  iii.  17 


Kennebec  Co.  v.  Augusta  Ins.  Co.  ii.  474, 

475,  487 

Kennedy  v.  Baltimore  Ins.  Co.  i.  154 

V.  Barnwell  iii.  110 

V.  Bohannoa  i.  191 

V.  Dunckles  ii.  874 

V.  Gad  ii.  897 

r.  Green  ii.  804 

V.  Kennedy  ii.  91 ;  iii.  299 

V.  Lee  i.  173,  514  ;  iii.  344 

V.  McFaden  i.  184 

D.  Ross  i.  509 

V.  Shea  ii.  76 

f.  St.  Lawrence  Co.  Ins.  Co.     ii.  473, 

542,  553,  554,  555.  557,  560 

r.  Strong  iii.  209,  211 

V.  Ware  iii.  318 

V.  Whitwell         iii.  115,  209,  211,  221 

Kennersly  Caslle,  The  ii.  404 

Kennett  i\  Chambers  i.  480 

V.  Milbank  iii.  77 

Kenney  v.  Alvater  i.  200 

r.  Ingalls  iii.  441 

Kennison  v.  Taylor  iii.  242 

Kenniston  i-.  Mer.  Co.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509 

Kennon  v.  Dickens  iii.  161 

Kenny  i-.  Udall  i.  381 

Kenny's  Patent  Button-Holeing  Co. 

r.  Somerville  ii.  368 

Kenrig  v.  Eggleston  ii.  216,  274 

Kensington,  Ex  parte  i.  238 

V.  Dollond  iii.  455 

V.  Inglis  if.  545 

Kent  V.  Burgess  ii.  729 

V.  Dawson  Bank  i.  90 

V.  Elstob  ii.  840 


INDEY  TO   CASES   CITED. 


CXXlll 


Kent  V.  Ginger 

iii.  221 

V.  Humphreys 

li.  7'j:J 

V.  Huskinson 

iii.  6,  50 

V.  Kent 

ii.  49;  iii.  41 

V.  London  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  54'.J 

V.  Manuf  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  49;3 

V.  Midland  R.  Co. 

ii.  188 

V.  Plielps 

iii.  143,  145 

V.  Sliuckard 

ii.  IGO 

V.  Somervell 

i.  142 

Kentucky,  The,  v.  Brooks  ii.  3'.t2 

Kentucky  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jenks     ii.  540, 

^  Gil 

Kentucky,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dills     iii   186 

Kentyen  v.  Parks  i.  329 

Ken  worthy  v.  Schofield  i.  510;  iii.  12 

Kenyon  v.  Berthon  ii.  518,  521,  522 

V.  Farris  i.  392 

V.  Nichols  ii.  685 

V.  Welty  iii.  855 

Keplins;er  v.  De  Young  ii.  321 

Kepner  v.  Keefer  ii.  898,  900 

Ker  V.  Dungannon  i.  93 

V.  Mountain  ii.  242 

V  Snead  i.  137 
Kercheval  r.  Triplett  ii.  932 
Kermeyer  v.  Nevvby  ii.  756 
Kerns  v.  Piper  i.  42 

V  Schoonmaker  iii.  99 
Kerr  v.  Bell  i.  861 

V.  Chess  ii.  870 

V.  Laird  i.  137 

V.  Moon  ii.  700 

V.  Willan      _  ii.  273 

Kerrigan  v.  Rantigan  i.  263 

Kerrison  v.  Cole  i.  487,  488 

Kershaw  v.  Matthews  i.  220 

Kerslake  v.  White  i.  580 

Kerwhaker  v.  Cleveland  C.  &  C.  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  248 
Kesee  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  817 

Ketchell  v.  Burns  ii.  4 

Ketchum  v.  Barber  iii.  158 

V.  Durfee  i.  203 

V.  Durkee  1.  199,  231 

V.  Evertson  ii.  39 

V.  Stout  iii.  358 

Kettell  V.  Alliance  Ins.  Co.  ii.  505 

I'.  Wiggin  ii.  527,  531,  532 

Kettle  I'.  Harvey  ii.  655,  660 

Ketsey's  case  i.  373 

Kettleby  v.  Atwood  iii.  329 

Keutgen  v.  Parks  i.  329 

Keve  V.  Pa.Kton  i.  546 

Kewley  v.  Ryan  ii.  484,  533 

Key  V.  Bradshaw  ii.  64 

V.  Cotes  worth  i.  642,  650 

V.  Vattier  ii.  908 

V.  Wilson  ii.  882 

Keyes  v.  Keyes  ii.  88 

Keys  V.  Harwood  ii.  813 

V.  Williams  i.  251 

Keyser  v.  Hanbeek  i.  557  ;  ii.  407 

Keystone  Lumber,  &c.  Co.  v.  Dole  ii.  806 


Kid  V.  Mitchell  iii.  212 

Kidd  V.  Rawlinson  i.  569 

Kiddell  v.  Burnard  i.  035 

Kidder  v.  Hunt  iii.  66 

V.  Norris  ii.  764 

Kidney  v.  Stoddard  ii.  919 

Kieran  v.  Sandars  ii.  152 

Kierlighett,  The  ii.  399 

Kiester  v.  Miller  i.  478 

Kiggil  V.  Player  iii.  426 

Kiiborn  v.  Field  ii.  93 

Kilburn  V.  Kilburn  ii.  828,  833 

Kilby  V.  Wilson  i.  209 

Kilgore  v.  Bulkley  ii.  069 

V.  Dempsey  ii.  714 

V.  Powers  iii.  11-3 

Kilgour  V.  Finlyson  i.  48 

V.  Miles  ii.  799 

Kilkelly  v.  Martin  ii.  853 

Kill  V.  Hollister  ii.  844 

Killcrease  v.  Killcrease  i.  380 

KWUck,  Ex  parte  iii.  455 

Killips  V.  Putnam  Ins.  Co.  ii.  586 

Killmore  v.  Hewlett  iii.  37 

Kilmorey  v.  Thackeray  iii.  324 

Kilvington  v.  Stevenson  ii.  876 

Kimball,  The  ii.  407 

V.  Blaisdell  ii.  933 

V.  Brown  iii.  79 

V.  Cunningham  ii.  922,  923 

V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.  i.  201 

V.  Howard  Ins.  Co.  ii.  583,  584 

V.  Keyes  i.  402 

V.  Leland  i.  203 

V.  Morris  iii.  474 

V.  Proprietors   of   Boston   Athe- 

nasum  iii.  126 
V.  Rutland  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  178,  256, 

259 

V.  Thompson  iii.  403 

V.  Tucker  ii.  422 

Kimball  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Vroman       iii.  223 

Kimberley  v.  Jennings  iii.  373 

Kimberly  v.  Ely  iii.  507 

Kimbro  v.  Hamilton  i.  563 

Kimmey  v.  Commonwealth  ii.  726 

Kimpton  v.  Eve  i.  546;  iii.  328 

Kinahan  v  Bolton  ii.  355 

Kincade  v.  Conley  i.  146 

Kincaid  v.  Brunswick  ii.  773 

Kinder  v.  Howarth  iii.  428 

V.  Shaw  i.  102 

Kine  v.  Balfe  iii.  349 

King,  Ex  parte  iii.  451,  462,  466 

V.  Baldwin  ii.  26 

V.  Bardeau  i.  524;  iii.  358 

V.  Barrett  i.  127 

r.  Batterson  ii.  14 

V.  Bickley  i.  322 

V.  Bowen  ii.  828 

V.  Bradley  ii.  880 

V.  Bremond  iii.  2-30 

V.  Brown  iii.  247 

V.  Chase  ii.  868,  870,  871 

V.  Diehl  iii.  HI 


CXXIV 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


King  V.  Doolittle 
V.  Dowdall 
V.  Drury 
V.  Eagle  Mills 
V.  Faber 
r.  Fleece 
V.  Fleming 
r.  Flint  an 
V.  Fox  well 
V.  Gillett 
V.  Gilson 
I'.  Green 
V.  Hamilton 


V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co 

V.  Hoare 

r.  Hobbs 

V.  Humphreys 

V.  Hutchins 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Jones 

V.  Kerr 

V.  Kersey 

V.  Lane 

f.  Lenox 

V.  Lowry 

V.  Mashiter 

V.  Milsom 

V.  Moon 

V.  Paddock 

V.  Perrv 

V.  Philfips 

V.  Pyle 


i.  292 ;  iii.  854,  355 
ii.  799 
iii.  149 
i.  570 
i.  203 
i.  298 
ii.  905 
i.  395 
ii.  700 
ii.  425 
iii.  212 
ii.  130 
iii.  305 


ii.  487 

i.  11,  12 

i.  471 

ii.  143 

ii.  813 

iii.  153 

i.  144 

iii.  242 

ii.  75 

iii.  104 

ii.  194 

ii.  389 

ii.  631 

i.  272 

ii.  928 

iii.  415 

ii.  404 

i.  570 

iii.  242,  243 


V.  Richards  ii.  103,  218,  223,  224 ; 

iii.  261) 

V.  Root  iii.  183 

r.  Sears  i.  485 

V.  Shepherd  ii.  180,  183 

V.  Smith  ii.  746 

V.  Sow  ii.  52 

V.  State  Ins.  Co.  ii.  489,  502,  564 

V.  Talbot  i.  136 

V.  Thorn  i.  142,  143 

r.  Trice  iii.  3S2 

V.  Upton  i.  470,  472 

V.  Wilconib  i.  170 

V.  Wilson  iii.  339 

V.  Withers  iii.  317 

V.  Zimmerman  i.  331 

King's  Heirs  v.  Thompson        iii.  309,  314 

Kingdom  i\  Nottle  i.  144,  2(i0 

Kingham  v.  Robins  ii.  772 

Kinghorn  r.  Montreal  Tel.  Co.         ii.  299, 

301 

Kingman  v.  Spurr  i.  174 

King  I'hilip  ftlills  r.  Slater  ii.  815 

Kingsbury  i-.  Smith  iii.  170 

V.  Westfall  _  i.  513 

Kingi-ford  v   Merry  i.  557;  iii.  290 

King-land  v.  Braisted  i.  186 

Kingsley,  Er  parte  iii   4tJ7 

f.  Halcombe  iii.  24 

J).  Holbrooke  iii.  3(1 

r.  Lake  Shore,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii   212 

1-.  WaUis  ii.  666,  794,  811 

Kingsman  v.  Kingsman  i.  33.0 


Kingst.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clark  ii.  16 

Kingston  v.  Girard  ii.  532 

V.  Kincaid  i.  41,  87,  91 ;    ii.  831 

V.  Knibbs  ii.  073 

V.  Plielps  i.  479,  481 

V.  Preston  ii.  G59,  660 

r.  AVilson  i.  87 

Kington  v.  Kington  ii.  752 

Ivinley  ;;.  Fitzi)atrick  i.  623 

Kiulock  V.  Craig  i.  044  ;  iii.  276 

Ivinlyside  v.  Thornton  i.  546,  547 

Kinnard  v.  Daniel  i.  410 

Kinnerley  v.  Hossack  ii.  878,  880 

Kinnersley  v.  Orpe  i.  538 

Kinney  i-.  Central  R.  Co.  ii.  238 

V.  Ensign  ii.  852 

V.  Lee  i.  280 

V.  Watts  iii.  242,  248 

Kinscy  v.  Minnick  i.  543 

V.  Stewart  iii.  285 

Kinsley  v.  Ames  i.  549 

v.  Robinson  i.  307 

Kinsman  v.  Kershaw  ii   745 

V.  Loomis  ii.  932 

r.  Parkhurst  ii.  318,  893 

Kintziiig  V.  McElrath  i.  620 ;  ii.  918 

Kintzinger,  Estate  of  i.  380 

Kinzcy  u.  Leggett  i  578 

Kipling  V.  Turner  ii.  21 

Kirby,  Ex  parte  iii.  474 

V.  Bannister  i.  140 

V.  Duke  of  Marlborough  ii.  7()7 

V.  IngersoU  i.  201,  207 

V.  Sciioonmaker  i.  231 

V.  Sisson  i.  331 

V.  Smith  ii.  526 

Kirk  V.  Blurton  i.  125 

V.  Bromley  Union  iii.  348 

V.  Dodge  ins.  Co.  i.  280 

V.  Glover  ii.  746 

V.  Hamilton  ii.  938 

r.  Hodgson  i.  202,  217 

V.  Nice  i.  631 

Kirkham  v.  Boston  iii.  294 

v.  Marter  iii.  31 

Kirkman  v.  Newstcad  i.  24 

V.  Shawcross  ii.  161 ;  iii.  2.')G 

Kirkpatrick  v.  Alexander  i.  573 

V.  Bonsall  ii.  896 

V.  Houston  iii.  182 

?,'.  Howk  ii.  19 

V.  McCuUock  i.  315 

V.  Muirhead  i.  292 

V.  Smith  ii.  686 

V.  Stainer  i.  106 

Kirney  v.  Smith  iii.  416 

Kirrigan  v.  Kirrigan  ii.  737 

Kirschncr  v.  Conklin  i.  294 

Kirtland  v.  Wanzer  i.  320 

Kirton  r.  Rraitlnvaite  ii.  773,  774 

V.  Elliott  i.  337 

Kirwan  v.  Kirwan  i.  214,  466 

Kisler  V.  Tinder  ii.  881 

Kissam  i".  Albert,  The  ii.  4-30 

Kisten  v  Hildebrand  ii.  160 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXXV 


Kistner  v.  SinJlinger  i.  232 

Kitclien  v.  Bartsch  iii.  451 

V.  Bedford  ii.  78 

I'.  Lee  i-  308 

Kitcliin  V.  Buckley  i.  21 

V.  Campbell  iii.  42G,  434 

V.  Cornpton  i.  21 

Kitner  v.  VVliitlock  i.  205 

Kitson  V.  Julian  ii.  16,  18 

Kittredf^ie  v.  Brown  iii.  75 

V.  Holt  ii.  868 

V.  Woods  i.  545 

Kittridge  r.  McLauglilin  iii.  459 

Klauber  v.  Biggerstaff  i.  279 

Kleeman  r.  Collins  iii.  15 

Kleimwort  v.  Cassa  Marittima  ii.  404 

Klein,  In  re  iii.  388 

V.  Currier  i.  284  ;  ii.  8 

V.  Seibold  i.  556 

Kleine  v.  (^atara  ii.  423,  828,  840,  841 

Kleinhaus  i\  Generous  ii.  28 

Klewin  v.  Bauman  iii.  181 

Kline  v.  Beebe  i.  335,  366 

V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  245 

V.  L'Amoureux  i.  350 

V.  Raymond  ii.  14 

Klingman  v.  Holmes  iii.  181 

Klock  V.  Robiiison  iii.  Ill 

Klopp  &  Stump  V.  Lebanon  Valley 

Bank  i.  291 

Knaggs  V.  Greene  ii.  4 

Knapp,  In  re  iii.  285 

V.  Alvord  i.  76 

V.  Curtis  ii.  149 

V.  Hanford  i.  142 

V.  Harden  ii.  684 

V.  Maltby  iii.  174 

V.  McBride  i.  223,  226 

V.  Parker  i.  284 

V.  Wallace  i.  110 

Knave  v.  Ternott  i.  93 

Knears  v.  Schuylkill  Bank      ii.  309,  323, 

327 

Knecht  v.  Mitchell  i.  548 

Kneeland  v.  Ensley  ii.  7.30 

Knew  V.  Hoffman  i.  185 

Knibs  V.  Jones  iii.  219 
Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gould      ii.  587 

V.  Peters  ii.  603 
Knickerbocker,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weitz 

ii.  608 

Knight  V.  Attila,  The  ii.  401 

V.  Barber  iii.  56 

V.  Bennett  i.  544 

V.  Burton  il.  834,  836 

V.  Cambridge  ii.  490 

V.  Clements  ii.  860 

V.  Cole  ii.  6.33 

V.  Crockford  iii.  7 

V.  Eureka,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  389 
V.  Faith                       ii.  489,  606,  517 

r.  Fox  i.  116 

V.  Hughes  i.  33 

V.  Hunt  iii.  477 

V.  Knotts  ii.  684 


Knight  I'.  Lord  Plimouth  iii.  421 

V.  Luce  i.  59 

V.  Mann  iii.  50 

);.  Nepean  ii.  613 

t'.  N.  E.  Worsted  Co.  ii.  663 

V.  Nichols  i.  611 

V.  Ogden  i.  176 

V.  Parsons  ii.  463 

V.  Peachy  iii.  448 

V.  Portland,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  231 

V.  Prov.,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  226 

Knights  V.  Putnam  iii.  128 

V.  Quarles  i.  145 


Knill  V.  Hooper 
Knobb  V.  Linsay 
Knoll  V.  Harvey 
Knott  V.  Cottee 
V.  Hogan 
V.  Knott 
V.  Morgan 


ii.  527,  -528 
i.  448 
iii.  231 
i.  137 
i.  265 
i.  167 
i.  173;  ii.  360,363 


Knoup  V.  The  Piqua  Bank      iii.  482,  483 

486,  498 

Knowles  v.  A.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.     ii.  102 

I'.  Mavnard  ii.  940 

I'.  McCamly  iii.  -368 

V.  Michel  iii.  35 

Knowlman  v.  Bluett  iii.  41,  43 

Knowlton  v.  Boss  ii.  466 

V.  Vickies  ii.  843 

Knox  V.  Clifford  ii.  907 

V.  Flack  i.  335 

V.  King  iii.  12 

V.  Lee  ii.  770 

V.  Ninetta,  The     ii.  406,  410,  414,  677 

V.  Simonds  ii.  842 

V.  Waldoborough  ii.  871 

Knox  Co.  Com.  v.  Aspinwall  i.  330 

Knoxville  Bank  v.  Clark  ii.  862 

Koch  V.  Briggs  iii.  378 

V.  Godshaw        .  iii.  219 

Kockill  V.  Witherell  ii.  834 

Koehler  v.  Black  Co.  i.  153,  156 

V.  Iron  Co.  i.  156,  157 

Koenig  v.  Mueller  iii.  293 

Kohler  v.  Smith  iii.  113 

Kohlman  v.  Ludwig  i.  288 

Kolb  V.  O'Brien  iii.  181,  184 

Kohn  V.  Packard  i.  207,  218,  416 

V.  Schooner  Renaisance  ii.  894 

Kohne  v.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540 

Kollock  V.  Parcher  ii.  628 

Konig  V.  Bayard  i.  326 

Konigmacher  v.  Kimmel  i.  151 

Koons  r.  Miller  iii.  110 

Kooystra  v.  Lucas  i.  531 

Kopitoff  ('.  Wilson  ii.  406 

Kornegay  v.  White  i.  635 

Kortright  v  Buffalo  Com.  Bank       iii.  212 

Koster  ;;.  Reed  ii.  498 

Kountz  t'.  Holthouse  i.  215 

V.  Kennedy  ii.  853 

V.  Kirkpatrick  iii.  219 

Kowing  V.  Manly  ii.  108 

Kramer  v.  Sanford  i.  308,  317 

Kratzer  v.  Lyon  ii.  826 


CXXVl 


INDEX   TO   CASES    CITED. 


Kraus  v.  Arnold 

ii.  77G 

Krause  v.  Meyer 

ii.  85:3 

Kreis  v.  Gorton 

iii.  440 

Kreiss  v.  Soligman 

i.  487 

Kribbs  v.  Downing 

iii.  356 

Krider  i-.  Laflerty 

ii.  687 

Krohn  v.  Sweeney 

ii. 

156,  160 

Kroni  1-.  Sclioonniaker 

iii.  178 

Kronheim  f.  Johnson 

iii.  46 

Kruegcr,  Re 

iii.  416 

Kruger  v.  Wilcox 

iii.  275 

KruMer  v.  Ellison 

i.  565 

Krumbhaar  v.  Birch 

i.  615 

Krntz  V.  Stewart 

iii.  29 

Knhn  v.  Newman 

i.  176 

Kunckle  v.  Kunckle 

ii.  8:31 

Knnzler  v.  Koliaus 

iii. 

831,  832 

Kurtz  V.  Adams 

ii.  8 

V.  Frank 

ii.  72 

Kyle  V.  E.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  232 

I'.  Green 

i.  315 

V.  Kavanagh 

1.  562 

V.  Wells 

iii.  72,  92 

Kymer  i-.  Larkin 

iii 

435,  454 

I'.  Sinvercropp 

i.  66.  67,  643 

Kynaston  v.  Crouch   iii. 

381,  434 

457,  458 

Kynter's  case 

ii.  394 

L. 


La  Amistad  de  Rues 
Laliaree  v.  Carleton 
Laboucbere  r.  Dawson  i 

L.  A.  C.  Assoc.  V.  Fairhurst 
Lacaussade  i:  Wiiite 
Lackey  v.  Stoudcr 
Lackington  r.  Atlierton 
Lacloucli  V.  Towle 
Lacon  v.  Briggs 

V.  Higgins 

V.  Mertins 
La  Cons'tantia 
Lackawanna  R.  R.  Co.  t^.  Chenewith 

ii.  270 
Lackman  i:  Wood  ii.  945 

Lacoste  v.  Flotard  i.  492 

Lacy,  Et  parte        i.  94  ;  iii.  418,  421,  422 

V.  Dubuque  Lumber  Co.  i.  55 

V.  Kynaston  i.  27 ;  ii.  850 


iii 

196 

i. 

457 

172;  ii. 

893 

i. 

384 

ii. 

887 

i. 

616 

iii.  49 

ii. 

217 

iii.  68 

ii. 

726 

iii.  295, 

349 

ii 

405 

V.  Lear 

i.  550 

V.  Osbaldiston 

ii.  :39 

Ladd  I'.  Cbotard 

ii.  195 

V.  Ilildcbrandt 

iii.  368 

V.  Kcnney 

i.  308 

V.  Lord 

ii.  836 

;  iii.  227 

V.  Lynn 

i.  403 

Lady  Arundell  v.  Pbips 

i.  560 

Lady  Belknap's  case 

..!•  ^'^I 

Lady  fox's  case 

iii.  -iCu 

Lady  Durham,  The 

ii. 

460,  461 

Lady  Ormond  v.  Hutchinson 

i.  96 

La  Farge  v.  Herter 

ii.  27 

V.  Kneeland 

i.  85 

Lafferty  v.  Jclley 

Laflin  v.  Willard 

LafoUett  v.  Kyle 

Lafonde  v.  Ruddock 

Laforge  v.  Jayne 

Lafou  V.  Chinn 

Luliy  V.  Holland 

Laidlaw  i-.  Organ 

Laidler  v.  Burlinson  ii. 

V.  Elliott 
Laing  v.  Chatham 

V.  Colder  ii.  235, 

V.  Fidgeon 

V.  Lee 
Laing  &  Todd,  In  re 
Lainson  v.  Tremere 
Laird  v.  Allen 

V.  Pirn  iii. 

r.  Robertson 
La  Jeune  Eugenie 
Lake  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Eckler 
Lake  Hill  v.  Rose  Hill  Cemetery 
Lake  Shore,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pierce 
Lallande  v.  Ball 
Lalor  V.  C.  B.,  &c.  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Wattles 
Lamar  i'.  Minter 
Laniatt  v.  Hudson  River  Ins.  Co. 
Lamb  r.  Briard 

V.  Crafts  i.  624,  63: 

V.  Durant  ii.  395 

V.  Lathrop 

V.  Lindsay 

V.  Paine 

V.  Parkman 
Lambard  v.  Pike 
Lambert,  Ex  parte 

r.  Bessey 

V.  Liddard 
Lambert's  case 
Lambeth  v.  Western  Ins.  Co. 
Lanibreth  v.  Clarke 
Lamburn  v.  Crndcn 
Lamego  v.  Gould 
Lamerson  v.  Marvin 
Lamond  v.  Davall 
L'Amorcu.x  v.  Gould  i.  467, 

?;.  Van  Rennsselaer 
Lamourieux  v.  Hewett 
Lampen  v.  Kedgewin 
Lampct's  case 
Lampliier  r.  Phipos 
Lamphire  r.  Cowan 
Lampon  v.  Corke  ii. 

Lamprey  v.  Lamprey 
Lamson  r.  Clarkson 

V.  Westcott 
Lancashire  v.  Mason 
Lancaster  ;;.  Harrison 
Lancaster  Bank  v.  Moore  i. 

V.  Word  ward 
Lancaster  Canal  Co.,  Ex  parts 
Lance  v.  Cowan 
Lancey  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co. 
Lanchcster  v.  Tricker 


1.97 

iii.  235 

iii.  352 

iii.  104 

iii.  72 

i.  182 

i.  25 

i.  620 

380,  649 

i.  126 

ii.  881 

259,  267 

i.  6^0 

iii.  17 

ii.  826 

ii.  931 

iii.  352 

225,  248 

ii.  474 

ii.  700 

i.  96 

iii.  510 

ii.  246 

ii.  881 

ii.  48 

iii.  388 

iii.  237 

ii.  473 

ii.  463 

3;  iii.  62 

;  iii.  443 

ii.  787 

iii.  135 

ii.  18 

ii.  410 

ii.  221 

iii.  421 

iii.  178 

ii.  535 

i.  206 

ii.  482 

i.  82 

ii.  43 

iii.  151 

ii.  923 

i.  579 

480,  482 

i.  400 

ii.  3 

ii.  871 

i.  250 

i.  92 

ii.  820 

634,  929 

iii.  314 

i.  541 

ii.  403 

i.  541 

i.  28,  20 

435,  436 

i.  290 

iii.  462 

i.  656 

iii.  78 

i.  31 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


cxxvu 


Lanckton  v.  Wolcott 

iii 

.468 

Land  v.  Jefferies 

.  569 

Land  Credit  Co.,  In  re 

200 

Lander  v.  Clark 

ii 

423 

Landers  v.  Watertown  Ins.  Co. 

ii 

583 

Landry'  v.  Stansbury 

307 

Landsberger  v.  Magnetic  Tel.  Co.  ii. 

200, 

301 

i.  32 

Landsdale  t;.  Cox 

Lane,  Ex  parte 

iii 

428 

In  re 

iii 

.421 

V.  Burgliart 

iii.  25 

463 

V.  Cliandler 

884 

V.  Cook 

iii 

202 

V.  Cotton  ii.  99,  161,  185 

,187 

;  iii 

267 

V.  Drinkwater         i.  13, 

15,  20,  22,  2.3 

V.  Goodwin 

i 

i.  00 

V.  Harrison 

ii 

871 

V.  Ironmonger 

i 

388 

V.  Maine  Ins.  Co. 

ii 

574 

V.  McKeen 

i 

387 

V.  Montreal  Tel.  Co. 

ii 

290 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co. 

iii 

270 

V.  Owings 

i.  28 

V.  Pearce 

ii. 

875 

V.  Pen ni man 

ii. 

413, 

454 

V.  Steward             i.  315 

;  iii. 

153, 

156 

V.  Taylor 

i 

150 

i».  Thomas 

i. 

175 

V.  Tyler 

i 

184 

Lane,  Fraser  and  Boylston,  case 

of  i 

178 

Lane  &  Co.,  Re 

iii 

470,  472 

La  Neuville  v.  Nourse 

i. 

627 

Lanfear  v.  Sumner 

i. 

594, 

654 

Lang,  Ex  parte 

iii 

411 

In  re 

iii 

460 

V.  Anderdon 

ii. 

521 

r.  Brevard 

ii.  26 

V.  Smith 

i. 

330 

r.  Waring 

i. 

168 

V.  Webber 

ii. 

875 

V.  Whidden 

i. 

434 

Langan  v.  Hewett 

i. 

210 

Langdale,  Ex  parte 

i. 

176 

Langdon  v.  Buel 

i. 

611 

V.  De  Groot 

ii. 

309, 

315 

V.  Doud                         ii. 

944 

;  iii. 

103 

V.  Hnghes 

iii.  28 

V.  Litchfield 

iii. 

498 

V.  Minn.  Ins.  Co. 

ii. 

575 

V.  Paul 

ii. 

857 

I'.  Richardson 

iii.  22 

Lange  v.  Kennedy 

i= 

225 

Langer  ;;.  Felton 

ii. 

929 

Lansjf'ord  v.  Frey 

i. 

335 

Langfort  v.  Tiler        i.  563,  564,  572,  642 ; 

iii. 

225 

Langhorn  v.  Allnutt 

ii. 

535 

I'.  Collogan 

ii. 

474, 

481 

Langhton  v.  Higgins 

i. 

565 

Langley  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co 

ii. 

232 

V.  Berry 

i. 

246 

V.  Palmer 

i. 

310 

Langloie  v.  Brant 

ii. 

488 

Langridge  v.  Levy              ii. 

921 

;  iii. 

195 

lja.r\gston,  Ex  parte  iii.  297 

V.  Bates  iii.  352 

Langton  v.  Higgins  i.  501 

V.  Horton        i.  560,  613 ;  ii.  126,  129, 

394 

I'.  Hughes  ii.  887,  894 

Lanier  v.  McCabe  i.  215 

Lankton  v.  Stewart  iii.  351 

Lann  v.  Church  iii.  286 

Lano  V.  Neale  ii.  394 

Lansdale  v.  Brashear  iii.  79,  95,  96 

Lansdowne  v.  Lansdowne  iii.  354 

Lansing  v.  Gaine  i.  101 

V.  Lansing  i.  143;  ii.  897 

V.  McKillup  i.  211 

V.  Montgomery  ii.  929 

V.  Prendergast  iii.  464 

Lantry  r.  Parks  ii.  39,  40,  44 

Lantz  V.  Frey  ii.  52 

Lanyon  v.  Blanchard  iii.  283 

V.  Toogood  i.  572 

Lapham  r.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  ii.  487 

V.  Whipple  iii.  41 

Lapsley  v.  McKinstry  i.  99 

V.  Pleasants  ii.  502 

Larch,  The  ii.  390,  454 

Larkin  v.  McMullin  ii.  78 

Larrabee  v.  Talbot  iii.  397 

Lary  v.  Young  i.  315 

Lasher  r.  St.  Joseph,  &c.  Ins.  Co.     ii.  559 

Lassell  v.  Reed  i.  545,  547 

Latham  v.  Latham  ii.  91 

V.  Morrow  i.  526 

V.  Sumner  i.  578 

Lathrop  v.  Amherst  Bank  ii.  908 

V.  Atwood  iii.  200 

I'.  Kneeland  i.  161 

V.  Morris  i.  292 

Latimer  v.  Batson  i.  569 

Latourette  v.  Williams  i.  381 

Latt  V.  Booth  i,  335,  353 

Latta  V.  Shawk  ii.  307 

Lattimore  v.  Garrard    .  ii.  503 

Laubach  v.  Laubach  iii.  224 

Laughan  v.  Bewett  i.  406 

Laugher  v.  Pointer  i.  20,  118,  119 

Laughlin  v.  Ferguson  i.  569 

V.  Fream  i.  406 

V.  Lorentz  i.  227 

Laugiiter's  case  ii.  041 

Laughton  v.  Taylor  ii.  863 

Laurent  v.  Chatham  Ins.  Co.   ii.  565,  578, 

579 

Lavabre  v.  Wilson  ii.  535 

Laval  I'.  Myers  ii.  897 

Lavassar  v.  Washburne  i.  387 

J^avendev,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

Laveroni  v.  Drury  ii.  184,  428 

Lavery  v.  Crooke  iii.  181 

Lavertj'  v.  Burr  i.  210 

V.  Hall  iii.  311 

V.  Moore  iii.  337 

La  Vic  V.  Phillips  iii.  415 

Lavinia,  Ship,  v.  Barclay  i-  84 

Law  V.  Hollingswortb  ii.  627 


CXXVlll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Law  V.  Jackson 

ii.  773 

Lazell  V.  Pinnick 

i.  434 

V.  London  Life  Policy  Co.          ii.  606 

Lea  V.  Alexander,  The 

ii.  439 

V.  Sutherland 

iii.  1-54 

V.  Barber 

iii.  19,  20 

V.  Wilkin                i. 

339,  341,  475,  499 

V.  Guire 

i.  189 

Lawler  v.  Keaquick 

i.  91,  103 

V.  Lea 

ii.  931 

Lawley  v.  Hooper 

iii.  116,  149 

V.  Whitaker 

iii.  172 

Lawrence  v.  Aberdein 

ii.  484 

Leabo  v.  Goode 

i.  246 

V.  Brown 

ii.  936 

Leach  v.  Fobes 

iii.  319 

V.  Clark 

i.  184 

V.  French 

ii.  132 

V.  Cowles 

iii.  1-26 

V.  Hewitt 

i.  307 

V.  Dana        ii.  338, 

341,  342,  344,  346, 

V.  Mullett 

i.  625,  582 

347,  349 

V.  Republic  Fire  Ins.  Co 

ii.  588 

r.  Davis 

iii.  382 

V.  Thomas 

i.  546 

V.  Dole 

ii.  780,  790 

Leadbetter  v.  ^Etna  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  586 

r.  Dorsey 

iii.  306 

Leader  v.  Barry 

i.  333 ;  ii.  82 

V.  Fox 

i.  498 

Leads  v.  Wright 

i.  647 

V.  Gebhard 

i.  287 

Leaf  V.  Coles 

1.223 

V.  Hand 

ii.  921 

League  i-.  Waring 

ii.  756 

I'.  Heister 

i.  406 

Leake  v.  Young 

ii.  820 

V.  Holyoke  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  575 

Lean  v.  Shutz 

i.  407 

V.  Kemp 

i.  547 

Leaper  v.  Tatton 

iii.  69,  70 

r.  Kidder 

ii.  893 

Lear  v.  Yarnel 

iii.  121 

V.  McArter 

i.  834 

Learned  v.  Bellows 

ii.  851 

t'.  McCalmont 

ii.  5,  24,  634 

Leary  i'.  Miller 

i.  308 

V.  M'Gregor 

ii.  672 

Leask  v.  Scott 

i.  651 

V.  Miller 

ii.  770 

Leather  Cloth  Co.,  The,  v. 

Hirsch- 

V.  Minturn 

ii.  448 

field 

ii.  376 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  533 

V.  The  American  Leathe 

r  Cloth 

V.  Smith 

ii.  337 

Co.  ii.  353,  363,  364, 

366,  367,  368 

V.  Staigg, 

ii.  770 

Leatherdalc  r.  Sweepstone 

ii.  776,  777 

f.  Stonington  Bank 

i.  285;  ii.  113 

Leathers  v.  Farmers  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  667 

r.  Sydebotham 

ii.  533 

Leathly  v.  Hunter 

ii.  534 

V.  Taylor 

i.  169,  207  ;  iii.  14 

Leavenworth  v.  Delafield 

ii.  451,  510 

V.  Van  Home 

ii.  517 

Leavitt  v.  Cutler 

ii.  73,  75 

I".  Wardwell 

iii.  195,  197,  198 

V.  De  Launy 

iii.  146 

V.  Warrall 

iii.  69 

V.  Palmer 

1.487 

V.  Wright 

i.  146 

V.  Peck 

i.  202 

Lawrence  County  v.  Dunkle               iii.  85 

V.  Putnam 

i.  269 

Lawrence  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L 

jwell  Mills  ii.  352 

V.  Savage 

ii.  26,  28 

Lawrenson  v.  Butler 

iii.  9,  365 

V.  Simes 

i.  306 

Laws  V.  Purser 

ii.  940 

Leballister  v.  Nash 

ii.  780 

Lawson  v.  Dickinson 

iii.  287 

Lebeau  v.  General  Steam  Navigation 

V.  Dumlin 

ii.  469 

Co. 

ii.  412 

V.  Farmers  Bank 

i.  318,  321,  323 

Le  Blanche  v.  London,  &-c.  R 

.  Co.    ii.  260 

r.  Iliggins 

ii.  384 

Le  Breton  v.  Miles 

ii.  713,  730 

v.  Lawson 

i.  265 

V.  Nouchet 

ii.  730 

V.  Lovejoy             i. 

335,  361,  367,  374 

Le  Cheminant  v.  Pearson 

ii.  517 

V.  Townas 

ii.  14 

Lechmere  v.  Brasier 

iii.  886 

V.  Weston 

i.  272,  289 

V.  Carlisle 

iii.  467 

Lawton  v.  Lawton 

i.  547 

V.  Fletcher 

iii.  76 

V.  Salmon 

i.  547 

V.  Hawkins 

ii.  882 

Lay  I'.  Neville 

ii.  941 ;  iii.  49 

Leek  I'.  Maestaer 

ii.  149 

Layer  v.  Nelson 

i.  31 

Leckey  v.  McDermott 

iii.  269 

Layet  r.  Gano 

i.  64 

Leckie  v.  Sears 

ii.  415 

Layfield's  case 

i.  202 

Le  Couteulx  v.  Buffalo 

i.  167 

Lay  son  v.  Rowan 

iii.  382 

Ledlow  V.  Becton 

iii.  31 

Laythoarp  v.  Bryant 

iii.  9,  64 

Ledoux  f.  Goza 

i.  90 

Layton,  Ex  parte 

iii.  414 

Ledwich  v.  McKim 

ii.  861 

V.  Butler 

iii.  2.38 

Ledyard  v.  Hibbard 

ii.  678 

V.  Pearce 

ii.  790 

Lee,  E.r  parte 

iii.  287,  451 

Lazard  v.  Wheeler 

i.  253 

V.  Atkin-^on 

ii.  136 

Lazarus  v.  Com.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  436,476,  477, 

662 

V.  Waithman  iii.  434 

Lazear  v.  Union  Bank  iii.  124 


t".  Boardman  ii.  501 

V.  Coleshill  i.  487 

r.  Diivis  1.  187 

V.  Dick  ii.  14 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXXIX 


Lee  V.  Early  ii-  702 

V.  Elkiiis  ii.  831,  8^5 

I'.  Gaskill  ill.  ol) 

V.  Gray  ii-  5-J'3 
V.  Grinnell     ii.  444,  447,  449,  450,  451 

I'.  Hodges  ii.  70 
V.  Howard  Ins.  Co.     ii.  473,  544,  555, 

557 

V.  Kilburn  i.  640 

V.  Kimball  i.  594 

V.  Kirkpatrick  ii.  939 

V.  Lashbrooke  i.  229 

V.  Lee  ii.  52,  873,  876 

V.'  Mass.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  493 

V.  Muggeridge  i.  461,  462 

V.  Pain'  ii.  681 

V.  Perry  iii.  69 

V.  Starbird  ii.  859 

V.  Vernon  i.  532 

V.  Wood  ii.  850 

V.  Woolscy  iii.  191 

Leech  v.  Baldwin  ii.  173 

Leeds,  Ex  parte  iii.  417 

V.  Clieetham  ii.  589 

V.  Dunn  ii.  7 
V.  Metropolitan  Gas  Light  Co.  iii.  234 

V.  Vail  i.  380 

Leeds  Banking  Co.,  In  re  i.  321 
Leeds  and  Liverpool  Canal  Co.  v. 

Hustler  ii.  638 
Leeds  and  Thirsk  Railway  v.  Fearn- 

ley  i.  372,  374 
Leeke,  Ex  parte  iii.  474 
Leeming  v.  Snaith  ii.  422 
Leer  v.  Yates  ii.  425 
Lees  V.  Nuttall  i.  93,  94 
V.  Whitcomb  i.  478 
Leese  v.  Martin  iii.  281 
Leeson  v.  Ilolt  ii.  258 
Lefever  i\  Lefcver  ii.  941 
;'.  Underwood  i.  187 
Lefferson  v.  Dallas  iii.  63 
Leffingwelt  v.  Elliott          iii.  176,  240,  244 
V.  Warren  iii.  109 
Leffler  v.  Armstrong  iii.  378 
V.  Rice               '  i.  200 
Leflore  v.  Justice  i.  031 
Leftwitch  v.  St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 
Legal  V.  Miller  iii.  309 
Legg  V.  Ben  ion  i.  549 
V.  Evans  iii.  260 
V.  Legg  i.  254,  380,  384 
V.  AVillard  iii.  261 
Leggat  V.  Reed  i.  388 
Leggate  v.  Clark  i.  405 
Legge  V.  Croker  iii.  371 
Leggett  V.  Perkins  i.  409 
V.  Steele  iii.  239 
Leggott  V.  Gt.  Northern  R.  R.  Co.     i.  144 
Legh  V.  Hewitt  i.  537 ;  ii.  068 
V.  Legh  i.  26,  210,  254 
Legrand  v.  Hampden  Sydney  Col- 
lege i.  1-54 
Legro  V.  Staples  i.  246 
Le  Gufen  v.  Gouvemeur  ii.  26 

VOL.  1. 


Leliain  v.  Pliillpott  i.  552 

Lehigh  (^oal  Co.  v.  Mohr  i.  78 

Lehigh  Valley  Co.  v.  McFarlan       iii.  480 

Leiinian  v.  Jones  i.  308 

Lehnbeuter  v.  Holthaus  ii.  306 

Leicester  v.  Rose  iii.  477 

Leidig  v.  Coover  i.  351 

Leigh  V.  Hind  ii.  890 

V.  Leigh  ii.  749 

IK  Mobile  i.  564,  507 

V.  Paterson  ii.  809 ;  iii.  220 

V.  Smith  ii.  190 

i\  Taylor  i.  140 

Leighton,  Ex  parte  i.  152 

V.  Atkins  iii.  403 

V.  Sargent  i.  92 

V.  Stevens  i.  579 

V.  Wales  ii,  890 

Leitcli  I'.  HoUister  iii.  382 

V.  Wells  ii.  805 

Lekeux  v.  Nash  iii.  448 

Leland,  In  re  1.  224 

V.  Creyon  ii.  12 

V.  Hayden  i.  159 

;;.  Medora,  The  ii.  402,  403 

V.  Stone  iii.  187 

Le  Loir  v.  Bristow  ii.  45,  880 

Le  Louis  ii.  698 

Leman,  Ex  parte  iii.  420 

Leraar  v.  Miles  i.  548 

Le  Mesurier  v.  Vaughan  ii.  484 

Lemoine  v.  Bank  of  No.  America     i.  210, 

297 

Lemon  v.  Temple  i.  329 

Lemont  r.  Lord  ii.  418 

Lemott  V.  Skerrett'  i.  537 

Lempricre  v.  Pasley  iii.  427 

Lenfers  v.  Henke  iii.  30 

Lengsfield  ik  Jones  ii.  423 

Lennard  r.  Robinson  i.  68 

Lennig  r.  llalston  ii.  713 

Lennou  v.  Napper  iii.  308,  332,  373 

Lennox  v.  liobei'ts  i.  318 

Lenox  r.  United  Ins.  Co.  ii.  216,  448,  537 

V.  Winnissimet  Co.  ii.  431 

Leominster  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.   ii.  827 

Leonard  v.  Adm'r  of  Villars  ii.  709 

V.  Bates  i.  457  ;  ii.  661,  663 

V.  Fowler  i.  628 

V.  Hendrickson  ii.  182 

V.  Huntington  ii.  386,  396 

V.  Leonard  i.  437 

V.  Nye  i.  256 ;  iii.  434 

V.  N.  Y.,  Alb.,  &  B.  Tel.  Co.     ii.  279, 

280.  282,  283,  285,  290,  300 

V.  N.  Y.,  &c.  Tel.  Co.  i.  515 

V.  Pitney  iii.  107 

V.  Vredenburgh  ii.  78 ;  iii.  18 

V.  Wildes  i.  283 

Leopold  V.  Salkey  ii.  4 

r.  Van  Kirk  i.  627,  630 

Le  Page  v.  McCrea  ii.  758 

Lepard  v.  Vernon  i.  76 

Lerned  ?;.  Johns  i.  56 

Leroux  v.  Brown  ii.  722 ;  iii.  63 


cxxx 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Le  Roy  v.  Beard  ii.  719 
V.  Crowninsliield  ii.  721 ;  iii.  390,  oU7 
V.  Jolmson  i.  203 
V.  Tatham             ii.  307,  311,  312,  321 
Le  Sage  v.  Coussmaker  ii.  52 
Lesley  v.  l\osson  iii.  30 
Leslie  r.  Baillie  iii.  355 
V.  Guthrie  iii.  424 
V.  Thompson  iii.  356 
V.  Wiley  i.  189 
Lessee  v.  Kincaid  i.  540 
Lessee  of  Lazarus  v.  Bryson  i.  95 
Lester  v.  East  i.  563,  564,  567 
V.  Garland  ii.  796,  797 
V.  Jewett  i.  479  ;  ii.  663 
V.  McDowell  i.  566 
L'Estrange  v.  L'Estrange  i.  245 
Le  Sueur  v.  Le  Sueur  ii.  734 
Letcher   v.    Bank    of   the   Common- 
wealth ii.  20 
V.  Norton  i.  612 
Lethbridge  v.  Mytton  iii.  200,  245 
V.  Phillips  ii.  104 
Letorey  v.  Korstall  i.  183 
Lett  r.  Melville  iii.  416 
Letton  V.  Young  iii.  188 
Leuckhart  r.  Cooper  iii.  256,  283,  285 
Lever  v.  Fletcher  ii.  496 
Leverick  r.  Meigs  i.  87,  100 
Levering  v.  Levering  ii.  91 
V.  Union  Transportation  Co.      ii.  270 
Levezey  r.  Gorgas  ii.  834 
Levi  V.  Kanrick  i.  230 
V.  Lynn,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  180 
V.  Waterhouse  ii.  261 
Levois  V.  Gale              *  ii.  417 
Levy,  In  re  iii.  428,  457,  476 
V.  Baillie  ii.  588 
V.  Bank  of  U.  S.  i.  300 
V.  Brown  i.  130 
V.  Cohen  i.  514 
V.  Drew  i.  290 
I'.  McCartee  i.  448 
V.  Merrill  ii.  501 
V.  Walker  i.  172 
Levystein  v.  Whitman  ii.  702 
Lewin  v.  Dille  i.  51 
V.  Guest  i.  525 
Lewis,  Ex  parte           ii.  154,  403 ;  iii.  284, 

410.  422 

In  re  iii.  41(J 

V.  Ames  ii.  84 

V.  Anderson  i.  172 

V.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  i.  76 

V.  Atlas  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  iii.  203 

V.  Brass  ii.  772 

V.  Brehme  i.  101 

V.  Browning  i.  515 

V.  Burgess  ii.  836 

V.  Burr  i.  321 

V.  Campbell  iii.  248 

V.  Chapman  ii.  348 

V.  Cleveland,  The  ii.  392 

i;.  Cliftr.n  ii.  937 

V.  Covilland  i.  563 


Lewis  V.  Culbertson  ii.  878 

V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  ii.  522,  523,  5.'J4 

V.  Elizabeth  &  Jane,  The  ii.  461 

V.  FuUarton  ii.  336,  342,  348 

I'.  Gamage  i.  131;  ii.  746 

V.  Gompentz  i.  .322 

V.  Hancock  ii.  454 

V.  Ilarvcy  i.  274,  283,  284 

V.  Houston  iii.  107 

I'.  Jones    i.  325,  537,  545;  ii.  751,  915 
v.  Kramer  i.  303,  304 

V.  Langdon  i.  173  ;  ii.  .369 

V.  Lee  i.  407  ;  ii.  94 

t'.  Lewis  iii.  507 

V.  Littlefield  i.  356  ;  ii.  896 

V.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  251 

V.  Lyman  i.  545 

V.  Lvster  ii.  820 

V.  M'arshall  ii.  672,  674 

V.  McAfee  ii.  1.37 

I'.  Nicholson  i.  70,  72 

V.  Owen  iii.  397 

V.  Payn  "ii.  856 

V.  Bead  i.  438 

V.  Peake  i.  G.35;  iii.  176,  229 

i;.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  606, 609,  615,  (il7 
V.  Rucker  ii.  490 

V.  Springfield  Ins.  Co.         ii.  560,  571 
V.  The  Western  Railroad  Co.   ii.  199, 
212,  214 
V.  Trickey  i.  475 

V.  United  States  iii.  478 

V.  Webber  iii.  440 

V.  Welch  i.  489 

V.  Weldon  ii.  663 

V.  White  ii.  815 

V.  Williams  i.  276  ;  ii.  447,  452 

Lexington  r.  Clarke         i.  486  ;  iii.  19,  20 
Lexington  &  Oliio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ap- 

plegate  iii.  494 

Lexington,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ehvell  ii.  941 
Le^'cester  i\  Logan  ii.  454 

Libbey  r.  Pierce  ii.  941 

V.  Tolford  i.  533,  535 

Libby  v.  Hopkins  iii.  470 

Liber  v.  Parsons  iii.  242 

Liberty    Hall   Association  v.   Ilousa- 

tonic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  472,  542,  549 

Libhart  v.  Wood  ii.  38 

Lichty  V.  Ilugus  iii.  101 

Lickbarrow  v.  Mason         i.  200,  328,  330, 

651,  652 ;  ii.  409,  410,  443,  444 

Llddard  v.  Kain  i.  618 

t\  Lopes  ii.  419 

Liddell  V.  Sims  ii.  793 

Liddlow  V.  Wilmot  i.  401,  402 

Lidgett  V.  Secretan  ii.  517 

V.  Williams  ii.  421 

Liebig's  Extract  of  Meat  v.  Ilanbury 

ii.  353 
Licdemann  v.  Schultz  ii.  667 

Liford's  case  i.  546,  547  ;  ii.  664,  005 

Lightbody    v.  North    American   Ins. 

Co.  ii.  540 

V.  Ontario  Bank  ii.  754 


INDEX  TO   CASES   CITED. 


CXXXl 


Liglitburn  v.  Cooper 

i.  637 

Lightfoot  V.  Heron 

iii.  373 

V.  Tenant 

ii.  8y4 

Lightly  V.  Clouston 

ii.  56 

Ligonia  v.  Buxton 

ii.  87 

Like  V.  Beresford 

i.  382 

V.  Tiiompson 

ii.  760 

Lill  V.  Egan 

i.  204 

LUlard  v.  Wliitaker 

iii.  211 

Liiley  v.  Elwin                    ii. 

35,  38,  3y,  44 

Lillie  !'.  Iloyt 

iii.  98 

Lilly  c.  Hays 

i.  457,  497 

V.  Hodges 

i.  12 

Limerick  Academy  v.  Davis 

i.  482 

Lime  Rock  Bank  v.  Mallett 

ii.  28,  30 

V.  Phetteplace 

i.  107 

Lincoln  r.  Battelle 

ii.  721 

V.  Claflin 

ii.  928 

V.  Emerson 

i.  76 

r.  Erie  Preserving  Co. 

i.  505 

V.  Hapgood 

ii.  709 

V.  Hope  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  508 

V.  S.  &  S  R.  R.  Co. 

iii.  176,  194 

V.  Whittenton  Mills 

ii.  830 

V.  Wilbur 

iii.  443 

V.  Wilder 

ii.  638 

V.  Wright 

ii.  396 

Lincoln  &  Kennebec  Bank  v.  Page 

ii.  669 

Lindauer  v.  Delaware  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540 
Lindenau  v.  Desborough  ii.  558,  592,  597, 
598,  912,  919 

Linder  v.  Monroe  iii.  189 

Lindgren  v.  Lindgren  ii.  681 

Lindley  r.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  493 

Lindo  r.  Uns worth  i.  321 

Lindon  v.  Hooper  iii.  210 

Lindsay  v.  Amesley  iii.  168 

V.  Limbert  iii.  447 

V.  Lynch  iii.  65,  .309 

V.  Springer  ii.  939 

Lindsey  v.  Gordon  ii.  793 

Lindas  v.  Bradvvell  i.  392 

Line  v.  Stephenson  i.  531 ;  ii.  647 

Lineker  v.  Ayeshford  i.  328 

Lines  r.  Smith  i.  282,  616 

Linforth,  In  re  i.  558 

Lingen  v.  Simpson  iii.  325 

Lingham  v.  Eggleston  i.  564,  567 

Lingwood  v.  Eade  ii.  834 

Link  V.  Clemmens  ii.  799,  901 

Linker  v.  Long  i.  523 

Linn  v.  Crossing  i-  12 

V.  Hamilton  iii.  476 

t".  Sigsbee  ii.  893 

Linn  Boyd  Co.  v.  Terrill  iii.  15 

Linscott  V.  Mclntire  iii.  38,  41 

Linsell  v.  Bonsor  iii.  82 

Linsenbigler  v.  Gourley  i.  266 

Linsey  i\  Ashton  ii.  834 

Linsley  r.  Bushnell  iii.  176,  183 

V.  Lovely  ii.  677 

Linton  v.  Porter  i.  615 

Lion,  The  ii.  430,  431 

Liotard  v.  Graves  i.  103;  iii.  Ill 


Lipe  V.  Eiscnlerd 
Lipford  ('.  Railroad  Co. 
Lippincott  v.  Barker 
Lipscombe  v.  Holmes 
Lipson  V.  Harrison 
Liscom  V.  Boston  Ins.  Co. 


ii.  76  ;  iii.  183 

ii.  171 

iii.  381 

ii.  60 

ii.  436 

ii.  584,  588 


Lishman  v.  Northern  Maritime  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  526 

Lister  v.  Baxter  i.  84 

V.  Lister  iii.  422 

Litchfield,  In  re  iii.  418,  421,  425 

V.  Cudworth  i.  95 

Litowitch  V.  Litowitch  ii.  737 

Litt  V.  Cowley  i.  641,  642 

Littell  V.  Hord  iii.  128 

V.  Marshall  i.  293 

Little,  Ex  parte  iii.  413 

V.  Blunt  iii.  92,  98, 104 

V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  270 

V.  Clark  i.  191 

V.  Dawson  ii.  52 

V.  Dodge  i.  406 

r.  Gould  ii.  337,  338 

V.  HaU  ii.  330 

V.  Rogers  iii.  288 

V.  Willetts  i.  262 

Littledale  v.  Dixon  ii.  525 

Littlefield  v.  Littlefield  iii.  98,  332 

V.  Shee  i,  461,  462,  465 

V.  Smith  ii.  827 

V.  Winslow  ii.  631 

Littlejohn,  Ex  parte  iii.  463 

V.  Jones  ii.  181 

Little  Miami  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens      ii.  46 

Litton  t:  Baldwin  i.  409 

Lively,  The  Schooner  iii.  196 

Liver  Alkali  Co.  i:  Johnson  ii.  180 

Livermore  v.  Herschell  ii.  868 

V.  Rand           ii.  763,  766 ;  ui.  79,  111 

Liverpool  A.  L.  A.  v.  Fairhurst  i.  384 

Liverpool  Ins.  Co.  v.  Verdier  ii.  583 

Liverpool,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McGuire  ii.  546 

Livie  V.  Janson  ii.  517 

Living,  Ex  parte  iii.  427 

Livingston  v.  Bird  iii.  138 

V.  Dugan  i.  409 

V.  Indianapolis  Ins.  Co.  iii.  132 

V.  Jones  ii.  325,  327 

V.  Livingston  i.  410 

V.  Maryland  Ins.  Co.  ii.  519,  522,  526 

V.  Miller  ii.  784 

V.  Roosevelt  i.  201,  213 

V.  Wood  worth  ii.  328 

V.  Wootan  ii.  760 

Livingstone  v.  Ralli  ii.  846 

Lizardi  v.  Cohen  i.  314 

Llewellyn,  Ex  parte  iii.  474 

V.  Earl  of  Jersey  ii.  680 

Lloyd,  Ex  parte  iii.  473 

V.  Archbold  i.  25,  189 

V.  Brewster  ii.  914,  923 

V.  Crispe  i.  491 

V.  Freshfield  i.  205 

V.  Fulton  ii.  77 

V.  Goodwin  iii.  216,  218 


CXXXll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Lloyd  !-.  Howard 
V.  Johnson 
V.  Keucli 
V.  Leisenring 
Lloyd 


i.  285,  286 

i.  .'«7 

iii.  127,  153 

ii.  897 

ii.  79 


V.  Maund  ii.  621,  G25 ;  iii.  G9,  70,  74,  75 

V.  Oliver  i.  276,  281 

V.  Scott  iii.  116,  127,  149 

V.  Tiiomas  i.  225 

V.  Walkey  ii.  773 

V.  "West  Branch  Bank  i.  59 

V.  Williams  iii.  133,  134,  135,  142 

Load  r.  Green  ii.  914 

Lobdell  r.  Baker  i.  59  ;  ii.  943 

V.  Hopkins  i.  575  ;  ii.  783 

Lock  V.  Furze  iii.  165 

V.  Miller  ii.  881 

Lock  Company  v.  W.  &  N.  R.  R.       ii.  228 

Locke  V.  Lewis  i.  203 

V.  McVean  ii.  20 

V.  North  Am.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  562 

V.  Swan  ii.  424 

V.  United  States  ii.  26,  29 

V.  Williamson  i.  627 

Lockett  V.  Merch.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  532 

Lockhart  v.  Barnard  i.  22 

Lockridge  v.  Foster  ii.  917,  927 

Lockwood  V.  Barnes  iii.  41,  44 

V.  Bostwick  ii.  358,  370 

V.  Crawford  i.  295 

V.  Cullen  i.  384 

V.  Ewer  ii.  129 

V.  Laskell  ii.  249 

V.  Salter  i.  383 

V.  Thomas  i.  402 

Lockyer  c  Offley  ii.  499,  612 

V.  Savage  '  iii.  472 

Loder  v.  Chesleyn  i.  474 

Lodge  V.  Phelps  ii.  719;  iii.  319 

Lodwicks  (-'.  Ohio  Ins.  Co.                 ii.  573 

Loehner  v.  Home  Ins.  Co. 

Loeschman  v.  Machin 

V.  Williams 
Lofield's  case 
Logan  V.  Austin 
V.  Birkett 
V.  Bond 
V.  Hall 
V.  Mason 
V.  Mathews 
V.  McGinnis 
V.  Simmons 
V.  Wiciiholt 


ii.  134 
i.  647 
ii.  639 
ii.  823 
i.  398 
i.  204,  206 
i.  537 
ii.  763,  7<i6 
li.  134,  901 
iii.  o62 
i.  411 
.  .  _     _  iii.  310,  362 

Logs  of  Maliogany     ii.  407,  413,  421,  863 
Lohnes  v.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Loker  v.  Damon  iii.  190 

LoUey's  case  ii.  734 

Lombard  Bank  v.  Thorp  iii.  429 

London  Chartered  Bank  of  Australia 

V.  Wiiite  iii.  281 

London  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Nichols         i.  12 
London  S.  F.  Society  v.  Hagerstown 

Savings  Bank  i.  280 

London  &  B.  Railway  Co.  v.  Fairclough 

i.  263 


London  &  Bir  Railway  Co.  t-.  Winter 

iii.  345,  363 
London  &  Prov.  Law  Ass.  Co.  v.  Lon- 
don &  Prov.  Joint-Stock  Ins.  Co.  ii.  375 
London   &   South  Western    Bank   (;. 

Wentworth  i.  298 

Londonderry  »-•.  Chester  ii.  83,  87  ;  iii.  501 

Lonergan  v.  Stewart  i.  558,  565 

Long,  /»  re  i.  240 

V.  Allen  ii.  669 

V.  Battle  Creek  i.  505 

r.  Bonner  i.  552 

V.  Brown  iii.  369 

V.  Colburn  i.  65,  56,  72 

V.  Hicks  1.  617 

V.  Maiestre  i.  187 

I'.  Millar  i.  67  ;  iii.  18 

V.  Preston  i.  654 

V.  Ryan  ii.  708 

V.  Storie  iii.  126 

V.  Story  i.  219 

V.  Younge  i.  230 

Long  &  Wharton's  case  iii   150 

Longcope  r.  Bruce  i.  2.32 

Longley  v.  Griggs  i.  35 

Longman  v.  Winchester  ii.  336 

Longridge  »•.  Dorville     i.  468,  471  ;  ii.  823 

Longworth  r.  Mitchell  i.  512  ;  ii.  770 

Lonsdale  r.  Brown  i.  326,  471 

V.  Littledale  i.  114 

Loomis  V.  Barker  i.  208 

r.  Bedel  ii.  240,  242 

V.  Cline  i.  352 

V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  ii.  605,  606,  607 

V.  Green  ii.  868 

V.  Marshall  i.  180 

V.  Newhall  i.  351,  462;  iii.  19 

!'.  Pierson  i.  211 

V.  Shaw  ii.  511 

Loop  V.  Loop  i.  358 

Loosemore  r.  Radford  iii.  200 

Loraine  v.  Cartwright  i.  87 

Lord  r.  Baldwin  i.  233 

i\  Belknap  ii.  660 

V.  Bigelow  i.  540 

V.  Brig  Watchman  iii.  382,  436 

r.  Dall  ii.  489,  606 

V.  Ferguson  ii.  396 

V.  Goddard  ii.  917 

V.  Grow  i.  625 

V.  Jones  iii.  261,  267 

17.  Midland  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  260 

V.  Neptune  Ins.  Co.    ii.  409,  417,  502, 

510 

f.  Ocean  Bank  i.  293 

V.  Stc[)hens  iii.  364 

V.  Wlieeler  ii.  655,  805 

Lord  Brooke  v.  Rounthwaite  iii.  356 

Lord  Camoys  v.  Scurr  ii.  118 

Lord  Coclirano,  The  ii.  402,  405 

Lord  Cranslown  '•.  Johnston  iii.  3-33 

Lord  Darcy  v.  Ask  with  ii.  665 

Lord  Dormer  v.  Knight  ii.  633 

Lord  Nelson,  The  ii.  441 

Lord  Ward  v.  Lumlcy  ii.  862 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXXXIU 


Lorcnt  v.  Kentring 

ii.  215 

Lorillard  v.  I'almer 

ii.  415 

V.  So.  Car.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  486 

Loriiig  i\  Brackett 

ii.  852 

t'.  Cooke 

ii.  778 

V.  Gurnej' 

ii.  075 

V.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  577 

V.  Neptune  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  537 

V.  Proctor 

ii.  471,  474 

V.  Steininan 

ii.  612 

V.  Thorndike 

ii.  729 

Lorj'iner  v.  Smith 

i.  500 

Los  Angeles  Assoc,  v.  Phillips         iii.  310 

Losee  v.  Dunkin  i.  295 

Losli  V.  Hague  ii.  307 

Lotlirop  V.  Foster  ii.  36  ;  iii.  36 

V.  Greenfield  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Lotty,  Tlie  ii.  408,  469 

Loud  V.  Citizens  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524 

V.  Loud  ii.  737 

V.  Pierce  iii.  388 

Loudon  ;•.  Taxing  District  iii.  230 

V.  Tiflfany  ii.  882 

Loughor  Coal  &  Ry.  Co.  v.  Williams 

ii.  628 
Loughran  ;'.  lloss  i.  545 

Louis  V.  Brown  iii.  168 

Louisa,  Tlie  ii.  426 

Louisa  Bertha,  The  ii.  403 

Louisiana  i'.  New  Orleans  iii.  506 

Louisiana  Banlc  v.  Citizens  Bank       i.  301 
V.  Kenner's  Succession  i.  226 

Louisiana  State  Bank  v.  Seneca  i.  83 

Louisiana,  The,  v.  Fislier  ii.  431 

Louisville  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bland  ii.  507 

Louisville  Manuf.  i'.  Welsh  ii.  31 

Louisville  &  Charleston  II.  R.  Co.  v. 

Letson  i.  153 

Louisville  &  Frankfort  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Ballard  ii.  246 

Louisville,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins     ii.  47 

V.  Filbern  ii.  48 

Lounsbury  v.  Protection  Ins.  Co.    ii.  547, 

551 

Lovatt  V.  Field  i.  595 

V.  Hamilton  i.  597 

Love  V.  Cobb  iii.  362 

V.  Hackett  iii.  75 

V.  Hinckley  ii.  439 

V.  Pares  ii.  639 

V.  Sierra  Nevada  Co.  i.  125 

V.  Wells  ii.  903 

Lovegrove  v.  White  i.  130 

Lovejoy  r.  Augusta  Ins.  Co.  ii.  557 

V.  Spafford  i.  191 

V.  Whipple  ii.  900,905 

Lovel  V   Whitridge  ii.  878 

Lovelace's  case  iii.  425 

Loveland  v.  Shepard  ii.  32 

Lovell  V.  Briggs  i.  180 

V.  Howeli  ii.  46 

V.  Williams  i.  65  ;  ii.  756 

Lovelock  !'.  Franklyn  ii.  800,  809 

V.  King  ii.  61,  147 

Lover  v.  Davidson  ii.  836 


Lovett  V.  Ilobbs  ii.  179,  186 

Lovcwell  V.  Westchester  Ins.  Co.      ii.  628 

Lovie's  case  i.  145 

Lovrein  v.  Thompson  ii.  467 

Low  V.  Allen  iii.  109 

V.  Arclier  iii.  199 

i\  Barchard  i.  466 

V.  Blodgett  ii.  6 

V.  Davy  ii.  488 

V.  El  well  i.  548 

V.  Hart  ii.  370 

V.  Howard  i.  308 

i\  Pew  i.  560 

Lowber  v.  Connit  iii.  15 

V.  Le  Roy  ii.  633 

Lowe  V.  Beckwith     »  ii.  14 

V.  Bliss  i.  280 

V.  Griffiths  i.  337 

;;.  Martin  iii.  285 

V.  Moss  ii.  172,  173,  198,  215 

V.  Peers  ii.  64,  79  ;  iii.  174 

0.  Waller  iii.  117, 127 

V.  Weatherly  i.  470 

Lowell  V.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  Co.    i.  117, 

120 

V.  Daniels  ii.  942 

V.  Gage  i.  274 

V.  Johnson  iii.  129 

V.  Lewis  ii.  307,  309,  315,  327 

V.  Middlesex  Ins.  Co.   ii.  555  ;  iii.  295 

Lowell  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Safeguard  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  582,  687 

Lowell  Wire  Fence  Co.  v.  Sargent  ii.  227 

Lower  v.  Winters  iii.  36,  41 

Lowerre,  Matter  of  iii.  457 

Lowery  v.  Gear  iii.  85 

V.  Scott  i.  311 

Lowes  z'.  Mazzareddo  iii.  127 

Loweth  V.  Fothergill  iii.  69 

Lowfield  V.  Bancroft  i.  28 

Lowman's  Appeal  ii.  877 

Lowndes  i'.  Lane  i.  522 

Lowrey  v.  Murrell  i.  302 ;  ii.  754 

Lowry  v.  Adams  ii.  4,  16 

V.  Bourdieu  ii.  481 

V.  Dufferin  iii.  350 

V.  Francis  iii.  481 

V.  Guilford  i.  126 

V.  Hall  iii.  409 

V.  Houston  i.  380 

V.  Mehaffy  ii.  660 

V.  Steamboat  Portland  ii.  249 

V.  Thornton  i.  381 

Lowther  v.  Lowther  i.  94,  95  ;  iii.  329 

Loy  ?'.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  575 

Loyd  V.  Hicks  iii.  189 

V.  Lee  i.  460,  465,  471 

V.  Mansell  iii.  286 

Lubbock  I'.  Inglis  ii.  152 

V.  Potts  ii.  887 

Lucas  1-.  Bank  of  Darien  i.  192 

V.  Beach  i.  164 

V.  Beale  i.  22 

V.  Bristow  ii.  670 

V.  Brooks  i.  540 


CXXXIV 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


iii.  24 

i.  174 

iii.  320 

i.  55 

i.  330 

i.  494  ;  ii.  50,  793 

i.  101,  103 

iii.  372 

i.  32 ;  ii.  582 

i.  236 

ii.  245 

ii.  53 

ii.  429 

i.  562 


Lucas  V.  Chamberlain 

V.  Cole 

V.  Comerford 

V.  De  La  Cour 

V.  Dorrien 

V.  Godwin 

V.  Groning 

V.  James 

V.  Jefferson  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Laws 

V.  Milwaukee  R.  Co. 

V.  Novosilieski 

V.  Steamboat  Swann 

V.  Worswick 
Lucena  v.  Craufurd         i.  48 ;  ii.  460,  473, 

561,  565 

Lucesco  Oil  Co.  v.  Brewer  ii.  048 

Luckett  I'.  Townsend  ii.  129 

I'.  Williamson  iii.  335,  337,  347 

Lucy,  Ex  parte  i.  468 

V.  Ingram  i.  117 

V.  Levington  i.  144 

Ludington  v.  Bell  i.  192 

Ludlam  v.  Ludlam  i.  447 

Ludlow  V.  Cooper  i.  168 

V.  Gill  ii.  914 

V.  McCrea  i.  12 

V.  Van  Ransselaer  ii.  700,  894 

Ludlow,  Mayor  of,  v.  Charlton  i.  154 

Ludwick  V.  Iluntzinger  iii.  113 

Luey  V.  Bundy  ii.  815 

Lufburrow  v.  Henderson  ii.  880 

Luff  V.  Pope  i.  304 

Luffkin  V.  Curtis  i.  405 
Luke  V.  Lyde              ii.  418,  419,  420,  047 

Lukem's  Appeal  i.  136 

Lumbermen's  Bank  v.  Pratt  i.  225 

Lumley  v.  Gye  ii.  52 

V.  Wagner   iii.  304,  328,  330,  364,  367 

Lumpkin  r.  Wilson  i.  61 

Lundie  v.  Piobertson  i.  308 

Luney  v.  Vantyne  i.  351 

Lunn  V.  Thornton  i.  561,  612 

Lunt  V.  Adams  i.  303 

V.  Stewart  i.  27,  211 

V.  Whitaker  iii.  265 

Lupton  r.  White  1.96,110 

Lush  V.  Druse  iii.  HI 

V.  Russell  ii.  43 

Lusk  V.  Smith  i.  219 

Lutz  V.  Linthicum  ii.  831,  842 

Luxmore  v.  Robson  iii.  249,  424 

Lyde  v.  Mynn  iii.  324,  463 
Lydecker  v.  Palisade  Land  Co.       iii.  506 

Lyell  V.  Sanbourn  i.  47 

Lygf)  V.  Ncwbold  ii.  237 

Lyie  V.  Barker  iii.  216 

V.  Murray  iii.  98 

I'.  Rodgers  ii.  827,  830 

Lylly's  case  ii.  54 

Lyman  v.  Babcock  iii.  172 

V.  Brown  ii.  804,  871 

V.  Cessford  ii.  926 

V.  Clark  ii.  634,  851 

V.  Lyman  i.  229,  230  j 


Lyman  v.  United  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475 

Lynch  v.  Baldwin  i.  552 

V.  Bragg  ii.  878 

V.  Clemence  ii.  826,  827 

V.  Commonwealth  i.  125,  126 

V.  Crowder  ii.  458 

V.  Dalzell  ii.  574,  577 

V.  Fallon  i.  94 

V.  Hamilton  ii.  524 

V.  Livingston  ii.  636 


V.  Nurdin 
V.  O'Donnell 
V.  Smith 
Lynde  v.  Budd 
V.  McGregor 


ii.  247,  248 ;  iii.  195 
i.  565 

ii.  817 
i.  368 

ii.  913 


Ljndeborough    Glass   Co.    v.    Mass. 

Glass  Co.  i.  49,  158 

Lyndon  u.  Gorham  i.  232,  233,  234 

V.  Lyndon  ii.  88 

Lynn  v.  Bruce  i.  29 

V.  Burgoyne  ii.  480 

Lynx  V.  King  ii.  172,  173 

Lyon  V.  Armstrong  ii.  908 

V.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.        ii.  558,  919 

V.  Culbertson  ii.  896 

V.  Johnston  i.  230 

V.  King  iii.  43 

V.  Knott  ii.  730 

V.  Lamb  iii.  16 

V.  Marshall  iii.  477 

V.  Mells  ii.  258,  267 

1-.  Pollock  i.  62 

V.  Reed  i.  543  ;  ii.  941 

V.  Richmond  iii.  355 

V.  Smith  ii.  155 

V.  State  Bank  iii.  139 

V.  Strong  ii.  900 

V.  Sundius  i.  304 

Lyons  v.  Barnes  i.  581 

V.  Martin  i.  114 

Lyons  Bank  v.  Ocean  Bank  ii.  98 

Lysaft  V.  Bryant  i.  323 

Lysaght  r.  Walker  iii.  17 

Lysatt  r.  Bryant  i.  323 

Lysney  v.  Selby  i.  621 

Lytet".  Perry  i.  263 

Lytle  V.  Pope  i.  36 

Lytton  V.  Lytton  i.  372 


M. 


i.  42; 


Maanss  v.  Henderson 
Mabbett  r.  White 
Maber  v.  Maber 

V.  Massias 
Maberley  v.  Sheppard  iii 

Maberly  j-.  Turton 
Macally's  case 
Macarlhur  r\  Campbell 
Macbeth  v.  Haldiman 
Macclesfield  v.  Davis 
Ma('(-()rd  r.  Osborne 
MacDonald  v.  Law  Union  Ins.  Co. 


ii.  938 
i.  200 
iii.  85 

iii.  259 

,  46,  55 

i.  347 

ii.  898 

ii.  837 
i.  138 

iii.  329 
i.  363 

ii.  592 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


CXXXV 


Macdowall  v.  Fraser 
Mace  V.  Wells 
Macfarlane  v.  Taylor 
MacGliee  '•.  Morgan 
Macliir  v.  Moore 
Macliou  V.  Kailway  Co. 
Mack  V.  -lonos 

V.  Patcliln 
MackaiiL'ss  )-.  Long 
Mackay,  In  re 

V.  Bloodgood 

V.  Holland 
Mackenzie  v.  Pooley 
Mackersy  v   Kamsays 
Mackie  v.  Cairns 
Mackinley  v.  IMcGregor 
Mackintosh  v.  Barber 

V.  Mitclieson 


ii.  523 

iii.  463,  4G4 

i.  GSl 

i.  4G6  ;  iii.  olO 

ii.  8'J7 

ii.  lb? 

iii.  4U9 

1.531 

i.  5(58 

ii.  827 

i.  122 

i.  281) 

ii.  396 

i.  46 

iii.  381,  382 

i.  380 

i.  95 

i.  84 


V.  The  M.  C.  Kailway  Company  ii.  064 
V.  Whitworth  ii.  494 

Macklin  t-.  Kichardson  ii.  330,  334 

Mackrfll  v.  Simond  ii.  424 

Mackreth  v.  Synimons  iii.  293,  294 

Maclay  v.  Harvey  i.  505,  512,  515 

Maclean  v.  Dunn  i.  46,  587,  592,  636 ; 

iii.  11 

Macloon  ?>.  Smith  i.  313 

MacMahon  r.  Jacobs  iii.  411 

Macomber  r.  Cambridge  Ins.  Co.     ii.  563 

V.  Durham  iii.  113,  121 

V.  Howard  Ins.  Co.      ii.  544,  545,  555, 

557 

V.  Parker  i.  564,  566;  ii.  420 

V.  Thompson  ii.  365 

Macon  v.  Crump  ii.  826,  831 

V.  Slieppard  i.  483 

Macrory  v.  Scott  iii.  4 

Macrow  v.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  213 

Mactier  v.  Frith  i.  514 ;  ii.  296,  540 

Macy  V.  De  Wolf  ii.  391 

V.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  531 

V.  Whaling  Ins.  Co.    ii.  478,  511,  667, 

672 
V.  Wheeler  ii.  400 

Mad  River,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fulton 

ii.  275,  277 

Maddeford  r.  Austwick         i.  187  ;  ii.  920 

Madden  v.  Kenipster  iii.  277,  301 

Maddock  v.  Hammett  iii.  133 

Maddux  v.  Bevan  i.  51 

Madeira  v.  Hopkins  iii.  343 

Madeley  v.  Booth  iii.  357 

Madigan  v.  Walsh  iii.  36 

Madison  Bank  v.  Davis  iii.  124 

Madonna  DTdra,  The  ii.  403,  461 

Maester  );.  Atkins  iii.  276 

Magalhaens  v.  Busher  ii.  408 

Magee,  Ex  parte  iii.  413 

V.  Atkinson  i.  68 

V.  Badger  i.  289 

V.  Lavell  iii.  172 

V.  Young  iii.  501 

Maggs  V.  Ames  ii.  4 

Maghee  v.  Morgan  i.  4 

Maghee  v.  O'Neil  iii.  84 


Magill  V.  Hinsdale 

V.  Merrie 
Magnay  v.  Edwards 
Magniac  r.  Thompson 
Magnin  c.  Dinsmore 
Magnus  v.  Buttcmer 
i\Iagoffin  I'.  Holt 
Magratli  v.  Church 
JNlagruder  v.  Gage 

r.  Union  Bank 
Maguire  v.  Card 


i.  55 

i.  191 

i.  22 

i.  410,  460 

ii.  270,  274 

ii.  497 

iii.  339 

ii.  451,  502 

i.  574 

i.  300 

ii.  884 


V.  Maguire             ii.  732,  736 ;  iii.  501 

Mahan  v.  Waters  i.  309 

Mahana  v.  Blunt  iii.  347 

Maher  r.  Hibernia  Ins.  Co.        ii.  586,  588 

Mahier  v.  Keays  i.  280 

Mahoney  r.  Porter  iii.  456 

Mahony  v.  Ashlin  i.  325 

r.  MetropoUtan  R.  R.  ii.  817 

V.  Young  iii.  239 

Mahurin  v.  Bickford  •              ii.  744 

V.  Pearson  ii.  878 

Maigle\'  v.  Haner  i.  458 

Maillafd  c.  The  Duke  of  Argyle       iii.  81 

Main  v.  Melbourne  iii.  349 

Maine  Bank  v.  Butts  iii.  123,  138,  142 

Maine  Central  Institute  v.  Haskell    i.  483 

Main  waring  v.  Baxter  iii.  309 

V.  Brandon  i.  92 

V.  Leslie  i.  394 

V.  Newman  i.  186 

V.  Sands  i.  394 

]\Iainzinger  v.  Mohr  iii.  90 

Mair  v.  Glennie  i.  176;  iii.  443 

Mairs  v.  Taylor  ii.  130 

Maisonnaire  v.  Keating  ii.  447 

Maitland  i'.  Martin  i.  87 

Majestic,  The  ii.  415 

Major  V.  Haukes  i.  225 

V.  Tardos  iii.  160 

Majors  v.  Everton  i.  410;  ii.  78 

Makarell  v.  Bachelor  i.  337 

Makepeace  v.  Coutes  i.  26 ;  ii.  874 

V.  Harvard  College  ii.  634 

Makin  v.  Watkinson  ii.  802 

Making  v.  v.  Welstrop  ii.  836 

Makins,  Ex  jiarte  iii.  429 

Malbnn  v.  Southard  i.  272,  274,  283 

Malcom  v.  Loveridge  i.  551 

jMalden  v.  Fyson  iii.  245,  361 

Male  V.  Roberts  ii.  704 

Maleverer  v.  Redshaw  i.  487 

Maley  ".  Shattuck  ii.  931 

Malin  v.  Malin  ii.  916 

Malins  v.  Brown  iii.  350 

V.  Freeman  ii.  371,  873,  812 

Mallam  v.  Ardan  i.  540 

Mallan  v.  May  ii.  890 

Mallett  V.  Foxcroft  ii.  869 

Mallory  v.  Bird  iii.  133 

V.  Vanderheyden  i.  883 

I'.  Willis  ii.  143 

Ma  Hough  1-.  Barber  i.  93 

Malone  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.       ii.  260 

V.  Hathaway  ii.  47 


ex  XXVI 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Maloney  v.  Stephens  i.  78 ;  ii.  745 

Malory  v.  Gillett  iii.  2U 

Makby,  Ex  parte  iii.  473 

V.  Harwood  ii.  52,  54 

Man,  Ex  parte  iii.  429 

V.  Shiffner  i.  93;  iii.  260 

Manalian  v.  Noyes  ii.  81o 

Manby  v.  Long  i.  153 

r.  Scott  i.  337,  388,  394,  396 

Mancliester  v.  Hougli  i.  40(3 

V.  Milne  ii.  410 

Manchester  Bank  v.  Fellows    i.  120,  316, 

319 

V.  AVhite  i.  320 

Manchestei"  Iron  Co.  v.  Sweeting  ii.  26 
Mandel  v.  Steel  ii.  879 

Manderston  v.  Robertson  iii.  87,  88 

Mandeville  v.  Reynolds  i.  130 

t'.  Welch         i.  245,  247,  249 ;  iii.  297 


V.  Wilson 

iii.  90 

Maneelly  v.  McGee 

ii.  750 

Manella  r.  Barry 

i.  87 

Maney  v.  Killough 

i.  569 

Mangles  v.  Dixon 

i.  254 

Manliattan  Co.  v.  Osgood 

iii.  143 

Manliattan  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barker 

ii.  559 

V.  La  Pert 

i.  40 

V.  Stein 

ii.  575 

V.  Warwick 

i.  7 

3 ;  ii.  601 

Manley  v.  Geagan 

iii.  23 

V.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  570 

Manly  r.  Hewlett 

iii.  314 

V.  United  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  485 

Mann  v.  Evertson 

i.  027 

V.  Forrester 

iii.  283 

V.  Huston 

iii.  401 

V.  Shiffner 

i.  102 

V.  White  River  Log,  &c 

Co. 

ii.  175 

Manning  v.  Albee 

1.570;  ii.  810 

V.  Cox 

ii.  749 

V.  Manning 

i.  136 

V.  McClure 

i.  292 

V.  Purcell 

ii.  759 

V.  Wells 

ii 

150,  102 

Manrow  v.  Durham 

ii.  12  ;  iii.  18 

Mansell  r.  Burredge 

i.  12 

Manser  v.  Heaver 

ii.  834 

Mansfield  v.  Cole 

ii.  131 

V.  Mclntyre 

ii.  730 

V.  Oole 

iii.  116 

V.  Trigg 

ii. 

650,  814 

Manson  v.  Felton 

i.  430 

Manton  r.  Parker 

ii.  309 

Mantz  !.-.  Cioriiig 

i.  536 

Manufacturers  Bank  v.  Barnes 

i.  301 

r.  Follett 

ii.  853 

V.  Hazard 

ii.  945 

V.  Schofield 

ii.  944 

Manufacturing  Co.  i:  Corbir 

ii.  308 

Manville  r.  Cleveland  &  Toledo  R.  R. 

Co. 

ii.  46 

V.  West.  Union  Tel.  Co 

ii.  :]()() 

Many  i'.  Bcekman  Iron  Co. 

ii.  632 

i;.  Jagger               ii.  307, 

309, 

314,  322 

V.  Sizer                         ii. 

307, 

309,  324 

Maple  V.  Kussart 
Maples  V.  Wiglitman 
Marble  v.  Moore 
Marburg  v.  Brooks 
r.  Marburg 


ii.  945 

i.  335 

i.  504,  567 

iii.  382 

iii.  166 


Marcardier  v.  Chesapeake  Ins.  Co.  ii.  421, 

500 

March  v.  Berrier  i.  150 

V.  Hammond  ii.  930 

V.  Pigott  ii.  486 

V.  Putney  ii.  31 

Marchant  v.  Dodgin  iii.  131 

Marchesseau  v.  Chaffee  iii.  220 

Marcus  v.  St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.      ii.  610,  617 

Marcy  r.  Marcy  iii.  38 

V.  Sun  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497,  528 

Mardall  v.  Thelusson  ii.  877 

Marden  v.  Babcock  i.  509 

Mardis  v.  Tyler  i.  404 

Mare,  Ex  parte  ii.  402 

V.  Charles  i.  57,  288 

Marengo,  The  ii.  388 

Marfield  v.  Goodhue  i.  77, 104, 108 ;  iii.  205 

Margaret,  The  ii.  442 

Margaret  Rodger's  case  i.  50 

INIargetson  v.  Wright  i.  017 

Maria,  The     i.  117  ;  ii.  436,  439,  464,  469, 

520 
Marietta  r.  Flearing  iii.  483 

Marine  Bank  v.  Wright  ii.  410 

Marine  Dock  &  Mutual  Ins.  Co.   v. 

Goodman  ii.  507,  508 

Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stras  ii.  534 

V.  Tucker  ii.  480,  533 

i;.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  419 

Marine  &  F.  Ins.  Bank  i'.  Jauncy       i.  270 

Mariners  i'.  Washington,  The  ii.  462 

Marion  Commissioners  v.  Clark         i.  330 

Marion,  The  ii.  382 

Markham  v.  Brown  ii.  161 

V.  Gonaston  ii.  853 

V.  Jones  i.  196 

Markle  r.  Hatfield  i.  301 ;  ii.  753 

Marks  v.  Barker  iii.  439 

V.  Hamilton  ii.  561 

V.  Morris  iii.  136 

Marley  v.  Noblett  iii.  40 

Marlow  ;;.  Pitfield  i.  338,  392 

Marmon  r.  Marmon  i.  438 

Marquand  v.  Hipper  iii.  17 

v.  K.  Y.  .Man.  Co.  i.  174,  220, 222,  224 

Marquette  Bankt'.  Stewart  ii.  195 

Marquette  Man.  Co.  v.  Jeffcry  i.  578 

Marquette  R.  Co.  v.  Kirkwood  ii.  226 

Marquis  of  Huntley  ii.  441 

Marr  v.  Johnson  i.  294 

Marrett  v.  Brackett  ii.  755 

Marriott  v.  Shaw  i.  234 

V.  Stanley  ii-  250 

Marryatt  v.  Broderick  i.  74;  ii.  759 

Marryatts  v.  White  ii.  767 

Marsdon  v.  Reid  ii.  535 

Marseilles  v.  Kenton  iii.  95 

Mtirs\\,  Ex  j>artc  iii.  474 

V.  Billings  ii.  860 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXXXVll 


Marsli  V.  Blythe 

ii.  432,  4U 

V.  Fuller 

i.  204 

V.  Griffin 

ii.  19,  853 

i\  Home 

ii.  261,272 

V.  llutciiinson 

i.  407 

r.  Hyde 

iii.  57 

V.  Keating 

i.  49 

V.  Low 

iii.  223 

V.  Marsh 

i.  411 

V.  Martindale 

iii.  116, 

120,  138,  141 

V.  Minnie,  The 

ii.  38G 

V.  Packer 

ii.  837,  847 

V.  Putman 

iii.  398 

V.  Rouse 

i.  563 

V.  Rulesson 

ii.  39 

V.  Russell 

i.  76,  175 

V.  Titus 

i.  658 

V.  Ward 

i.  11 

r.  Webber 

1.621 

;  iii.  19-5,  219 

V.  Wood 

ii 

848 ;  iii.  427 

Marsh's  Appeal 

i.  230 

Marshall,  Ex  parte 

iii.  462 

V.  Am.  Express 

Co. 

ii.  196,  198 

V.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R. 

R.  Co.  i.  469  ; 

ii.  895 

V.  Betner 

iii.  176 

V.  Broadhurst  i. 

143, 145 

,  146  ;  ii.  604 

V.  Duke 

i.  616 

V.  Fall 

i.  647 

V.  Ferguson 

iii.  35 

V.  Garner 

ii.  446,  450 

V.  Green 

iii.  37,  50 

V.  Hutchison 

iii.  382 

i;.  Lynn 

iii.  16 

V.  Marshall 

i.  221 

V.  JMltchell 

i.  308,  315 

V.  Nasliville  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  499 

V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  R. 

Co.       ii.  187 

V.  Pierce 

ii.  939 

V.  Rutton 

i.  399,  406 

V.  Smith 

i.  13 

V.  Stevens 

1.409 

V.  York,  N.  &  B. 

Co. 

11.  238 

Marson,  Ex  parte 

111.  470 

Marsteller  v.  M'Clean 

ill.  102 

Marston  v.  Allen 

1.286 

V.  Hobbs 

i. 

260 ;  iii.  240 

Martendale  v.  Follet 

ii.  858 

Martha,  The 

11.  414,  426 

Martha  Washington, 

The 

ii.  386 

Martin,  Ex  parte 

iii.  439 

V.  Atkinson 

iii. 

238,  242,  245 

V.  Baker 

i.  144 

V.  Barton  Iron  Works 

1.457 

t'.  Berens 

1.  538 

V.  Black's  Ex'rs 

1.470 

V.  Boyd 

1.  274.  283 

V.  Brecknell 

ii. 

767 ;  ill.  463 

I'.  Broach 

iii.  75 

V.  Chauntry 

1.289 

V.  Clarke 

11.  908 

?;.  Cotter 

1.624 

V.  Crokatt 

11.  511 

I'.  Delaware  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  532,  672 

V.  Dwelly 

iii.  368 

Martin  r.  Fishing  Ins.  Co.  ii.  518,  631 

V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  ii.  477 

V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  11.  234 

V.  Harrington  Iii.  286 

V.  Hawks  ii.  875 ;  ill.  286 

V.  Hayes  1.  297 

V.  Heathcote  iii.  96 

V.  Hcwson  ii.  759,  760 

I'.  Hill  ii.  722 

V.  Ilurlbut  1.  556 

V.  Long  ill.  240 

V.  Martin  1.  399 

V.  Mathiot  1.  519 

V.  Miiyo  1.  364,  370 

V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Brooklyn  11.  154 

V.  McCormick  iii.  355 

V.  Merritt  iii.  332 

V.  Mitchell  iii.  9,  366,  368,  369 

V.  Morgan  1.  496 

I'.  Nicolls  11.  740 

V.  Nutkin  iii.  331 

V.  Porter  iii.  215 

V.  Pycroft  iii.  343,  345 

I'.  Roberts  ii.  922 

V.  Salem  Ins.  Co.  11.  428 

V.  Silliman  1.  110 

V.  Sitwell  11.  479 

V.  Striblin  ii.  9 

V.  Temperley  i.  116,  117 

V.  Tliornton  •  11.  836 

V.  Thrasher  i.  206 

V.  Voeder  ii.  908 

V.  Wade  ii.  895 

V.  Wliarton  iii.  39 

V.  Williams  ii.  826,  827 

V.  Winslow  1.  806 

V.  Wright  ii.  24,  52,  344 

Martin's  Heirs  v.  Martin  11.  88 

Martindale  v.  Booth  iii.  264 

V.  Smith  i.  643 

Martine  v.  International  Ins.  Co.     1.  222 ; 

ii.  601,615 

Martineau  ?'.  Kitching  1.  566,  576 

Martini  v.  Coles  i.  102 

Marvin,  £a;  parte  111.417 

V.  Bates  iii.  107 

V.  Titsworth  iii.  378 

V.  Trumbull  1.  172 

V.  Wallis  iii.  46 

Marvino  v.  Hymers  iii.  138,  141,  143 

Marwick,  In  re  i.  238 

Mary,  The   ii.  399,  401,  403,  439,  447,  448, 

462,  718;  iii.  147 

Mary  Ann,  The  ii.  403,  406 

Mary  Caroline,  The  ii.  4-54 

Mary  Hale,  The  ii.  438 

Mary  Paulina,  The  11.  462 

Mary  Pleasants,  The  11.  441 

Maryland  v.  Bank  of  Md.  iii.  382 

Maryland  Ins.  Co.  v.  Le  Roy  ii.  531 

V.  Ruden  ii.  523 

Marx  V.  National  Ins.  Co.  ii.  471 

Marzetti  v.  Williams  1.  87,  92 

Mascal's  case  1.  260;  iii.  235 

Mason  v.  Armitage  iii.  325 


CXXXVlll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Mason  v.  Bauman  i.  92 

V.  Blair  iii.  347 

V.  Blaireau,  Tlie  ii.  437,  438,  440,  441, 

442 

V.  Chambers  i.  531 ;  ii.  659,  (360 

V.  Citizens  Ins.  Co.  ii.  587,  (515 

I'.  Connel  i.  174,  189,  220 

V.  Crosby  ii.  927 

V.  DcMJson  iii.  415 

V.  Dennison  i.  309 

I'.  Farnell  i.  141 

V.  Felton  i.  439 

V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  ii.  483,  538 

r.  Fuller  ii.  730 

V.  Haile  iii.  393,  503 

V.  Harvey  ii.  586 

V.  Homer  ii.  730 

I".  Knowlson  ii.  874 

V.  Jordan  ii.  942 

V.  Joseph  i.  89,  90 

V.  Lickbarrow  i.  94,  575 

V.  Martin  iii.  273 

V.  Mason  ii.  613 

V.  Pritcliard  ii.  641 

V.  Kobinson  ii.  089 

V.  Thompson        ii.  156,  162,  164,  166 

V.  Whitbeck  Co.  iii.  51 

V.  White  ii.  689 

V.  Whithorne  i.  136 

V.  "Wright  i.  337 

Mass.  Gen.  Hospital  v.  Fairbanks      i.  433 

Massasoit,  The  ii.  461 

Massey  v.  Davies  i.  97,  111 

V.  Building  Assoc.  iii.  117 

Massie  v.  Sebastian  ii.  933 

V.  Watts  iii.  333 

Massiter  v.  Cooper  ii.  242 

Masson  r.  Bovet  ii.  814,  923 

Mast  V.  Pearce  i.  633 

Master  v.  Miller    i.  253;  ii.  854,  855,  857, 

907 

Masterman  v.  Cowrie  ii.  119,  143 

Masters,  In  re  ii.  907 

V.  Baretto  i.  309 

V.  Madison  Co.  Ins.  Co.       ii.  555,  575 

V.  Masters  ii.  686 

V.  Warren  iii.  178 

Masterton  v.  Mayor  of  Brooklyn   iii.  198, 

201,  206 

Matasce  v.  Hughes  ii.  750 

Matuhin  v.  Matchin  ii.  93 

Mateer  v.  Brown  ii.  156,  157 

Matern  v.  Gibbs  ii.  457 

Mather  v.  American  Express  Co.     ii.  253 

V.  Bush  iii.  391,  393 

V.  Maidstone  i.  300 

V.  Ney  ii.  89 

Matlieson  v.  Equitable  Ins.  Co.        ii.  517 

Mathews  v.  Aiken  ii.  0 

V.  Davis  iii.  238 

V.  Howard  Ins.  Co.  ii.  573 

V.  Hunter  i.  167 

V.  Lewis  iii.  151 

V.  Menedger  iii.  277 

Mathewson  v.  Clarke  i.  173,  174 


Matliewson  r.  Johnson 

V.  Stockdale 
Mathewson's  case 
Matlock  V.  Gibson 

V.  Matlock 

V.  Todd 


i.  334,  362 

ii.  336,  344 

i.  12 

i.  457 

i.  109 

iii.  107 


Matsell  u.  Flanagan    ii.  353,  361,  370,  375 

Matson  i\  Farm  Building  lus.  Co.    ii.  551 

V.  Wharam  iii.  22 

Matteson  v.  Holt  iii.  223 

V.  Nathanson  i.  225 

Matthews,  jEz  parte  ii.  895,  400 

V.  Allen  j.  817 

t'.  Baxter  i.  435 

V.  Bliss  i.  621 

V.  Coalter  ii.  861 

V.  Coe  iii.  144 

V.  Cribbett  ii.  75 

V.  Felch  i.  182 

V.  Fuller  i.  91 

V.  Houghton  ii.  577 

V.  Howard  Ins.  Co.  ii.  499 ;  iii.  192 

V.  McStea  i.  226 

V.  Milton  ii.  12 

V.  Offley  ii.  464 

V.  Parker  i.  635 

i\  Poythress  i.  289 

Matthie  f.  Potts  ii.  488 

Matthiessen  Co.  v.  McMahon  i.  434 ; 

iii.  58 

Mattison  v.  Marks  i.  281 

V.  Westcott  ii.  781 

Mattocks  V.  Cliadwick  iii.  77 

Mattoon  v.  Pearce  iii.  217 

Mattox  V.  Craig  iii.  231,  232 

Mauck  r.  Melton  iii.  66 

Maud  I".  Waterhouse  i.  472 

Maudslay  v.  Le  Blanc  i.  163 

Maul  V.  Rider  i.  523 

Maule  V.  Murray  ii.  738,  739 

Maundrell, /sx  ;jarte  iii.  448 

Mauncy  v.  Coit  i.  225 

I'.  Ingram  iii.  267 

Maunsell  r.  White  iii.  33 

Maury  v.  Talmadge  ii.  234,  236 

Maving  v.  Todd           ii.  154,  192,  257,  258 
Mavor  r.  Pyne       ii.  649,  792 ;  iii.  44,  108 

Mawdesley  v.  Parke  iii.  409 

Ma  we  V.  Samuel  ii.  837 

Mawman  v.  Tegg       ii.  341,  342,  344,  348, 

349 

Mawson  v.  Blane  i.  363 

Maxcy  v.  Strong  i.  225 

IMaxim  v.  Morse  i.  463 

Maxwell  v.  Day  ii.  756 

V.  Deare  ii.  757 

V.  Goodruni  i.  280 

V.  Hogg  ii.  361,  363 

t).  Jameson  i.  247 

V.  Mcllvoy  ii.  155 

V.  Robinson  ii.  535 

May  V.  Babcock  ii.  410,  686 

V.  I^reed               iii.  395,  404,  409,  508 

V.  Calder  i.  150 

V.  Campbell  iii.  153,  156 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXXXIX 


May  I'.  Christie 

ii.  536 

V.  Coffin 

i.  467 

V.  Gamble 

ii.  757 

V.  Harvey 

iii.  478 

V.  May 

i.  20 

V.  Princeton 

ii.  248 

V.  Skey 

i.  392 

V.  Woodward 

1.  12,  30 

May  Queen,  The 

ii.  459 

Mayall  u.  Mitford 

ii.  548 

Mayberry  v.  Willoughby 

i.  225 

Maybin  v.  Coulon 

ii.  832 

i:  Kailroad  Co. 

ii  190 

Maydew  v.  Forester 

i.  .32 

Mayeli  v.  Potter 

ii.  416 

Mayer  v.  Mayer 

ii.  92 

i\  Mutual  Ins.  Co.               ii. 

543,  617 

Mayfield  v.  Wadsley            i.  486 

ii.  649 ; 

iii.  19,  35,  3() 

Mayhana  v.  Coombs 

iii.  294 

Mayhew  v.  Boyce 

ii.  250 

V.  Boyd 

ii.  19 

V.  Crickett                                i 

.  36,  210 

V.  Eames 

i.  83 

V.  Mayhew 

ii.  89 

V.  Terry 

ii.  457 

Maynard  v.  Brown 

iii.  365 

V.  Hunt 

ii.  776 

V.  Morse 

ii.  16 

V.  Rhodes                               ii. 

599,  912 

V.  Wright 

ii.  629 

Mayne  v.  Oris  wold 

iii.  107 

Maynell  v.  Surtees 

•  iii.  352 

Mayo  v.  Arelier 

iii.  416 

V.  Maine 

ii.  491 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  491 

V.  Snow 

ii.  421 

Mayor  v.  Humphries 

ii.  244 

V.  Johnson 

i.  331 

V.  Lefferman 

i.  446 

V.  Steward 

iii.  449 

V.  Williams 

i.  466 

Mayor   of   Berwick-upon-Tweed 

V. 

Oswald                                        ii 

18,  824 

Mayor  of  Cambridge  v.  Dennie 

ii.  18 

Mayor  of  Ludlow  v.  Charlton 

i.  154 

Mayor  of  New  York  v.  Bailey 

i.  117, 

120 

V.  Colgate 

iii.  108 

V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  588 

Mayor  of  Norwicli  v.  Norfolk  Railway 

Co.  ii.  660 

Maj'or  of  Thetford's  case  i.  153 

Mayor,  &c.  of  Alexandria  v.  Patten 

ii.  762 
Mayor,  &c.  of  Kidderminster  v.  Hard- 
wick  i.  154 
Mays  V.  Cannel                                     ii.  833 
V.  Manufacturer's  Bank     iii.  438,  446 
Maj'son  i».  Beazeley                             i.  230 
Maze  V.  Miller                                      ii.  822 
Mazozon  v.  Foot                                 iii.  104 
McAUester  v.  Sprague  i.  27 
McAllister  v.  Gallaher                        ii.  761 
V.  Hoffman                           ii.  761,  897 


McAllister  v.  New  England  Mut.  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  615 

V.  Keab  ii.  879 

McAlpine  v.  Wingard  i.  290 

McAndrew  v.  Bassett  ii.  354,  355,  363 

McAndrews  v.  Electric  Tel.  Co.      ii.  279, 

286,  287 

McArthur  v.  Sears      ii.  170,  171,  181,  183 

V.  Slauson  i.  109 

McAuley  v.  Billinger  i.  484 

McAvoy  V.  Medina  ii.  106 

McBride  v.  Gray  iii.  75 

V.  Hagan  i.  210  ;  ii.  827 

V.  McBride  i.  349 

V.  McClelland  i.  569 

V.  M'Laughlin  iii.  178,  183 

McCaffrey  v.  Woodia  1.  552  ;  iii.  302 

McCall  V.  Clayton  i.  55 

V.  Flowers  ii.  134 

V.  Hinckley  iii.  382,  403 

McCall's  ca.se  i.  137 

McCallen  v.  Adams  i.  401 

McCan  v.  Baltimore,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  232 

McCandlish  r.  Newman  i.  561 

McCann  v.  South  Nashville  Street 

R.  Co.  iii.  322 

McCardel  v.  Peck  ii.  361,  378 

McCargo  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.        ii.  487 

V.  N.  0.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  499 

McCartee  v.  Camel  ii.  612,  013 

V.  Teller  i.  371 

McCarthy  v.  Goold  i.  253 

V.  Pope  iii.  39 

McCartney  v.  Gambart  ii.  370 

McCarty  v.  Emlen  i.  234 

V.  Blevins  i.  560 

V.  Murray  i.  335 

McCaskill  v.  Ballard  i.  329 

McCawley  v.  Furness  R.  Co.  ii-  2-38 

McClain  v.  Davis  i.  4-36 

McClane  v.  Fitch  i.  318 

McClartey  v.  Gokey  i.  573 

McClintick  v.  Cummins  i.  446 

McClintock  v.  Lary  ii.  406 

McCluer  v.  Girard  Ins.  Co.  ii.  549 

McClung  V.  Kelley  i.  564,  627 

V.  McClung  ii.  91 

McClure  v.  McClure  iii.  314,  362 

V.  Richardson  ii.  177 

V.  Williams  iii.  130,  219 

McCiures  v.  Hammond  ii.  177 

McClurg  V.  Kingsland  ii.  305,  321 

V.  Terry  ii.  87 

McClurg's  Appeal  ii.  893 

McCiuskey  v.  Providence  Ins.  Co.   ii.  475 

McColl  ;;.  Oliver  i.  186 

McComb  V.  Wright  i.  123  ;  iii.  12 

McConicke  v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  R.  Co. 

i.  565 
McConihe  v.  IMcMann  i.  486 

McConnell  v.  Dunlap  iii.  246 

V.  Gibson  i.  95 

V.  Hampton  iii.  188 

V.  Hector  i.  226 

V.  Hughes  i.  561 


cxl 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


McConochie  v.  Sun  Ins.  Co.  ii.  511 

MuCorniiclc  v.  Biirnum  ii.  9;j'J 

V.  C'onnoly  ii.  62 

V.  Deniary  ii.  37 

V.  Drunimett  iii.  41 

V.  Dunville  iii.  219 

V.  Haddeu  i.  570 

V.  Littler  i.  434 

V.  Manny  ii.  315 

V.  Seymour  ii.  805,  308,  328 

r.  Sullivant  ii.  701 

V.  Talcott  ii.  314 

1-.  Trotter  i.  280 

McCoy  V.  Artcher  i.  616 

V.  Hock  iii.  267 

V.  Iluffiiian  i.  355 

V.  K.  &  D.  M.  R.  Co.  ii.  174 

?'.  INietropolitan  Ins.  Co.  ii.  592 

McCracken  v.  Haywood  iii.  505,  511 

V.  West  ii.  921 

McCrea  v.  Purmort  iii.  9 

McCready  v.  Freedly  i.  12 

V.  Goldsniitli  ii.  431,  432,  433 

V.  Tliorn  ii.  389 

McCreary  r.  Van  Hook  ii.  10 

McCreery  r.  Green  ii.  805 

McCreight  c.  Aiken  i.  434,  438 

McCrillis  r.  Bartlett      i.  436,  438 ;  iii.  414 

?•.  Carlton  ii.  815 

V.  How  i.  353 

McCulloch  v.  Dashiell  i.  238 

V.  Eagle  Ins  Co.      i.  514,  515;  ii.  540 

V.  Jiidd  iii.  05 

V.  McKee  i.  51 

McCullough  V.  Cox  ii.  663 

V.  Henderson  iii.  82 

V.  Myers  ii.  827 

V.  Sonicrville  i.  207;  iii.  382 

V.  Wainvvriglit  ii.  680 

McCuUum  r.  Gourley  ii.  760 

McCune  v.  Belt  i.  294 

McCurrj'  r.  Hooper  i.  438 

McCutciien  v.  McGahay  i.  387,  393,  394, 

395,  396 

McDaniel  v.  Cornwell  i.  407 

V.  King  ii.  710 

McDaniell  v.  Bell  ii.  827 

McDaniels  v.  Barnum  iii.  136 

V.  Flower  Brook  Manuf.  Co.  ii.  6 

V.  liapliam  ii.  823 

?-.  ]{(jbinson  ii.  157,  166 

McDavid  v.  Adams  i.  384 

McDerniot  r.  Laurence  i.  172 

McDoal  V.  Yc'onians  ii.  3 

McDoie  r.  I'urdy  iii.  295,  297 

McDonald  v.  Bacon  ii.  830 

r.  Bennett  iii.  266,  267 

V.  Black  ii.  565 

V.  Edgerton  ii.  100,  162,  165 

V.  Eggleston  i.  122 

V.  Hewett  i.  566 

V.  Hodge  iii.  231 

»•.  Law,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  556 

V.  Magruder  i.  35,  294 

V.  Morton  i.  437 


McDonald  v.  Napier 

iii.  285 

V.  Ked  Wing 

iii.  496 

V.  Hicliardson 

ii.  369 

V.  Smith 

iii.  137 

V.  Western  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  212 

McDonnell  v.  Pope 

i.  543 

McDougal  V.  Paton 

iii.  464 

McDougall  V.  Maguire 

ii.  881 

McDowall  V.  Wood 

i.  407 

McDowell  V.  Cliambers 

iii.  9 

V.  Lucas 

iii.  352 

V.  Rissell 

ii.  146 

V.  Simms 

i.  526 

V.  The  Blackstone  Canal  Co. 

ii.  765 

McDowle's  case 

ii.  54 

McDuffee  v.  Portland,  &c.  R. 

Co. 

ii.  187 

McElfatrick  v.  Hicks 

iii.  138 

McElroy  v.  Buck 

iii.  15 

V.  Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  R 

Corp.  ii.  244 

McElvey  ?•.  Le.wis 

i.  219 

McElwee  v.  Collins 

iii.  156 

McEntire  v.  McEntire 

i.  621 

McEvers  v.  Mason 

i.  303 

McEweii  V.  Montgomery  Ins 

Co 

ii.  584 

V.  Morey 

i.  501 

V.  Smith 

i.  039 

McFarland  v.  Newman 

i.  623 

McFee  v.  S.  Car.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  534 

McGahay  r.  Williams 

i.  396 

McGan  v.  Marshall 

i.  335 

McGee  r.  Mathis 

in.  481 

V.  Metcalf 

ii.  29 

McGill  V.  Dowdle 

i.  176 

V.  McGill 

i.  165 

V.  Rowand                      ii. 

180, 

276,  277 

1-.  Ware                         iii. 

123, 

127,  143 

McGilvery  v.  Capen 

ii.  422 

McGinley  v.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  597 

McGinn  c.  Pontiac,  The 

ii. 

438,  440 

V.  ShaefFer 

i.  370 

McGivney  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co 

ii.  662 

McGoon  V.  Ankeny        i.  563 

;  ii. 

105,  909 

McGowan  r.  Dyer 

i.  79 

V.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co. 

ii.  47 

McGowin  i\  Remington 

iii.  330 

McGrath  v.  Clark 

ii.  853 

V.  Robertson 

i.  407 

McGregor  v.  Comstock 

i.  129 

V.  (Jardner 

i.  77 

V.  Pcnii 

i.  623 

i\  Rhodes 

i.  275 

McGregory  v.  McGregory 

i.  331 

McGrew  v.  Browder 

i.  656 

McCiruder  v.  Bank  of  Washington    i.  31 1 

McGuire  v.  Bosworth 

i. 

274,  283 

V.  Newkirk 

ii.  15 

V.  Ramsey 

i.  171 

McHenry  r.  Dulfield 

i.  72 

V.  Railway  Co. 

ii.  196 

McIIose  V.  Fulmer 

iii.  223 

r.  Wheeler 

i.  161 

McHugh  r.  Wells 

iii.  332 

Mcllvaiiic  '•.  Harris 

iii.  35 

r.  Wiikins 

iii.  Ill 

Mclneffe  v.  VVheelock 

ii.  774 

INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


cxli 


Mclntire  v.  Carver  iii.  270 

r.  Patton  ii.  U40 

Mclntyre  r.  Agricultural  Bank        iii.  377 

V.  Browne  ii.  105 

V.  Parks  i.  562 

V.  Williamson  ii.  634 

Mclver  ?-.  Humble  i.  213 

V.  IJicliardson  i.  509 ;  ii.  13 

McJilton  r.  Love  i.  254  ;  ii.  864 

McKanna  v.  Merry  i.  337 

McKay  v.  Bryson  ii.  52 

V.  Carrington  iii.  334,  340 

V.  Green  iii.  298 

McKeage  r.  Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.    i.  546 

McKecknie  v.  Ward  ii.  28 

McKee  v.  Barley  iii.  312 

V.  Hamilton  i.  209 

McKcen  r.  Allen  ii.  829 

'.'.  Gammon  iii.  248 

V.  Oliphant  ii.  832 

McKelvey  v.  Jarvis  ii.  764 

McKelvy's  Appeal  i.  224 

McKenna  v.  George  i.  32,  34 

McKenzie  v.  Durant  i.  309,  322 

V.  Hancock  i.  6-36 

V.  McLeod  i.  538 

V.  Stevens  i.  -342 

V.  Sykes  ii.  625 

McKeon  )'.  Caherty  ii.  897  ;  iii.  426 

V.  Citizens  R.  R.  Co.  iii.  186 

V.  Mclvor  ii.  197 

McKesson  i\  Stanbury  i.  329 

McKibbin  r.  Brown  iii.  310 

McKinlay  v.  Morrish  ii.  410 

McKinley  v.  Watkins  i.  470,  479 

McKinney  v.  Alvis  i.  247 

I'.  Bradlee  i.  581 

V.  Crawford  i.  290 

V.  Fort  i.  618 

V.  Jewett  ii.  253 

V.  Neil  ii.  234,  239,  244 

V.  Page  ii.  843 

V.  Pinckard  i.  523 

V.  Snyder  iii.  92 

McKinnon  v.  McEwan  iii.  196 

McKinsey  v.  Anderson  ii.  863 

McKissick  v.  Millowners'  Ins.  Co.     ii.  575 

McKnight  v.  Devlin  i.  616  ;  iii.  210, 

224 

V.  Dunlop  ii.  649,  65-5,  792  ; 

iii.  57 

V.  Hogg  i.  354 

V.  Ratcliflf  i.  243  ;  iii.  199 

McLane  v.  Sliarpe  ii.  250 

McLaren  v.  Watson  ii.  3,  4 

McLauchlin  i'.  Lomas  ii.  134,  137 

McLaughlin  v.  Hill  iii.  202 

V.  Piatti  iii.  310 

V.  Waite  ii.  106 

McLean  v.  Burbank  ii.  180 

V.  Dunn  i.  574 

V.  Republic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  802 

V.  Richardson  iii.  224 

McLcarn  v.  McLellan  iii.  293 

McLellan  v.  Cumberland  Bank            i.  28 


McLcmore  )'.  Powell 

i. 

323 

McLeoil,  Tiio 

ii 

459 

v.  Burroughs 

iii. 

490 

McLoughliii  V.  Bishop 

i 

530 

McLure  v.  Asliby 

iii 

1U7 

V.  Rush 

ii 

660 

V.  Wilson 

i 

483 

McMahan  v.  Franklin 

i.y? 

McIMahon  ?;.  Field 

iii 

193 

V.  McClcrnan 

i.  187, 

219 

V.  Portsmouth  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  541, 

584 

V.  Sloan 

ii. 

104 

McManus  v.  Crickett 

i. 

114 

I'.  L.  &  Y.  Ry.  Co. 

ii. 

266 

McMaster  (;.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  ii.  536 

McMasters   v.  Westchester  Co.  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  587 

McMicken  v.  Beauchamp  ii.  860 

McMillan  v.  Bull's  Head  Bank       ii.  3,  31 

V.  McNeil  iii.  392,  396 

V.  Michigan  South.  R.  R.  Co.     ii.  265 

V.  Peacock  ii.  78 

V.  Vanderlip  ii.  39 

McMillen  v.  Lee  i.  347 

McMinn  v.  Richnionds  i.  335,  353 

McMullen  v.  Rafferty  iii.  98 

McMurry  v.  The  State  ii.  783 

McNair  v.  Gilbert  i.  332 

McNairy  v.  Bell  i.  309 

V.  Thompson  ii.  633 

McNamara  v.  King  iii.  184 

McNaught  V.  McClaughry  ii.  8 

McNaughter  v.  Casally  iii.  224,  226, 

354 
McNaughton  v.  Conkling  ii.  4 


V.  Partridge 

iii.  3.54 

McNear  v.  Bailey 

ii.  828 

McNeil  V.  Colquhoon 

iii.  409 

V.  Knott 

i.  299 

V.  Magee 

iii.  310 

V.  Reed                    i.  478, 

492; 

iii.  197 

V.  Tenth  Bank 

i.  2.52 

V.  Williams 

ii.  348 

McNeill  r.  McDonald 

i.  290 

McNeille  v.  Acton 

i.  227 

McNeilly  v.  Patchin 

i.  35 

r.  Reid 

i.  175 

McNorton  v.  Akers 

ii.  928 

McPherson  r.  Cox        i.  129, 

443; 

ii.  668 ; 

iii 

40,  285 

V.  Gale 

ii.  147 

V.  Rathbone 

i.  197 

V.  Rees 

i.  462 

('.  Walters 

ii.  939 

McQueen  v.  Farquhar 

i.  526 

McQuewans  v.  Hamlin 

i.  209 

McRae  v.  Creditors 

iii.  293 

McRaven  v.  Crisler 

ii.  853 

McRea  v.  Central  Bank 

i.  545 

McRoberts  r.  Washburne 

iii.  484 

McShane  v.  Hazlehurst 

iii.  372 

McSherry  r.  Brooks 

i.  185 

McSparran  v.  Nceley 

.436 

;  ii.  862 

McStea  v.  Matthews 

i.  226 

McVey  v.  Cantrell 

i.  408 

cxlii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


McWhortor  r.  McMahan 
McWilliams  v.  Hopkins 
M'x\.llister  v.  Kcab 
M'Arthur  v.  Seafortli 
M'Bride  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co 


iii.  14 
ii.  875 
iii.  110 

iii.  212,  220 

u.  425,  447, 
513 

iii.  217,  218 
ii.  758 
ii.  734 
ii.  753 
ii.  13 
iii.  12 
i.  93,  102  ;  iii.  270 

ii.  781,  787 
ii.  858 


M'Cabe  v.  Morehead 
M'Cart}'  V.  Colvin 

V.  Deciiix 
M'Clarin  v.  Nesbit 
M'Colliim  V.  dishing 
M'Conib  V.  Wright 
M'Conibie  r.  Uavies 
M'Connel  v.  Hall 
M'Cormick  v.  Fitzmorris 
M'Coy  V.  M'Coy 
M'Crane}'  r.  Aklen 
M'Crea  v.  Purmort 
M'Culloch  V.  M'Culloch 

V.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co. 
M'Daniel  i'.  Hughes 
M'Dermid  v.  Redpath 
M'Derniott  v.  S.  G.  Owens,  The 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co. 
M'Donald  v.  Carr 
V.  Rainor 
V.  Scaife 
V.  Trafton 
M'Donnell  u.  Branch  Bank 
M'Donough  r.  Dannery 
M 'Do well  V.  Tyson 
M'Elmoyle  v.  Cohen 
M'Ewan  v.  Smith 
M'Fadden  v.  Jenkyns 
M'Gaw  V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  ii.  409,  414,  417, 

510 
M'Gillivray  v.  Simson  ii.  882 ;  iii.  259 
M'Gregor  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  Penn.  ii.  478,  669, 

677 
iii.  123 
ii.  776 
ii.  148 
ii.  700 
ii.  400 
ii.  396 
iii.  227 
ii.  766 ;  iii.  283 
iii.  143,  145 
ii.  828 


ii.  91 
iii.  125 
ii.  932 
ii.  729 
ii.  479 
ii.  738 
iii.  219 
ii.  385 
ii.  833 
ii.  617 
ii.  871 
iii.  218 
ii.  913 


ii.  437 
ii.  877 
ii.  721 
i.  652 ;  iii.  444 
iii.  315 


M'Guire  v.  Warder 
M'llard  v.  Whetcroft 
MTntyre  v.  Carver 

V.  Parks 

r.  Scott 
MTvcr  r.  Humble 
M'Kenzie  v.  Hancock 

V.  Xevins 
M'Kesson  v.  M'Dowell 
M'Kinstry  v.  Solomons 
M'Lanahan  v.  Universal  Ins.  Co.     ii.  523, 

525,  528 
M'Lelcs  V.  Hale  iii.  43 

M'Lellan  r.  Maine  Ins.  Co.        ii.  520,  537 
M'Meclien's  Lessee  v.  Grundy  iii.  442 


M'Moiiomv  I'.  Ferrers 
M'Millan  ('.  M'Ncil 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 
M'Xitt  r.  Clark 
M'Queen  v.  Burns 
M'Quirk  v.  Penelope,  The 
Meach  v.  Meach 
Mead  r.  Chase 

r.  Davidson 

V.  Degolyer 

V.  Small 


iii.  382,  426 

iii.  507 

ii.  469,  527 

ii.  790 

iii.  123 

ii.  460 

i.  265 

iii.  45 

ii.  486 ;  iii.  329 

ii.  655,  792 

1.308 


i. 

551 

iii. 

170 

i. 

285 

i.  61 

ii. 

878 

i 

215 

iii.  12 

iii 

370 

iii 

449 

Mead  v.  Thompson 

V.  Wheeler 

V.  Young 
Meade  v.  Brothers 
Meader  v.  Scott 
Meador  v.  Hughes 
Meadows  v.  Meadows 

V.  Tanner 
Meashan,  Li  re 
]\Ieaher  v.  Cox  i.  215,  221 ;  iii.  429 

Meany  v.  Head  iii.  250 

Mears  v.  Humboldt  Ins.  Co.  ii.  547 

V.  Swomcstedt  i.  58 

Meason  v.  Cline  iii.  321 

V.  Kaine  i.  185 

V.  Philips  iii.  231,  232 

Mechanics  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia i.  54 

V.  Earp  ii.  112,  113 

V.  Edwards  iii.  132 

V.  Griswold  i.  308 

V.  Merchants  Bank  i.  91,  313  ; 

ii.  112 

V.  New  York,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.   i.  43.  44, 
45,  331 
Mechanics  Bank  of  Alexa.  v.  Seton 

iii.  325,  330,  831 
Mechanics  &  Farmers  Bank  v.  Capron 

iii.  404 
Mechanics  &  Traders  Bank  v.  Debolt 

iii.  48G,  498 

V.  Gordon  ii.  115,  193 

Mechanics,  &c.  Bank  v.  Farmers,  &c. 

Bank  i.  656 

Mechelen  v.  Wallace  i.  485 

r.  Williams  iii.  19 

Medburv  v.  Hopkins  ii.  700,  721 

V.  Watrous  i.  355,  360;  ii.  40 

Meddlemore  v.  Goodale  i.  259 

Medeiros  v.  Hill  ii.  520 

Medill  V.  Collier  i.  161 

Medina  v.  Stoughton  i.  614 

Medley  v.  Hughes  ii.  416 

Medlin  v.  Plat"t  County  ii.  856 

Medora,  The  ii.  404 

Medway  v.  Needham  ii.  723,  724,  729 

Meech  v.  Robinson  ii.  445 

;;.  Smith  i.  72;  iii.  110 

Meek  v.  Atkinson  i.  444 

r.  Kettlcwell  iii.  315 

Meeker  v.  Jackson  i.  332 

Meert  v.  Moessard  i.  245 

Megginson  v.  Harper  iii.  92 

Mfggs  V.  Binns  i.  126 

Megrath  v.  Gray  i.  324  ;  iii.  411 

V.  Robertson  iii.  415 

Mehan  v.  Tiiompson  ii.  756 

Mfidc'l  V.  Antliis  iii.  184 

Meigs  V.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  488 

Mcincke  ;;.  Fa  Ik  iii.  60 

Meist  y.  Penn.  K.  Co.  ii.  242 

Meister  v.  Moore  ii.  86 

Molan  V.  Fitz  James  ii.  719;  iii.  391 

Melancon  v.  Robichaux  i.  627 

Melchert  v.  American  Un.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  896 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


cxliii 


Melflrum  v.  Snow  i.  581 

Melhado  r.  Porto  Alegre,  &c.  R.  Co.   i.  155 
Melleilge  r.  Boston  Iron  Co.  ii.  756 


Mellen  c.  Boarman 

V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co 

r.  Moore 
Mcllerish  v.  Rippin 
Melley  i:  Casey 
Mellish  v.  Andrews 

V.  Mottcux 

r.  Simeon 
Mellona,  Tiie 
Mellor  c.  Spateman 

V.  Watiiins 
Melius  V.  Silsbee 
Melody  v.  Chandler 
Melville  r.  Brown 

V.  De  Wolf 

V.  Hay  den 


ii.  877 

ii.  477,  493,  58^ 

i.  58 

i.  322 

i.  411 


i.  684 


11 

ii.  394 

i.  327 

ii.  434 

iii.  233,  234 

i.  543,  548  ;  ii.  665 

ii.  305 

i.  613 
iii.  291 

ii.  43 
ii.  640 


Melvin  v.  Proprietors,  &c.   on   Mer. 

River  ii.  638 

Memphis,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Blakeney 

ii.  817 

Menagh  v.  "Whitwell  i.  240 

Menard  v.  Scudder  ii.  13,  16 

Mendel,  Ex  parte  iii.  420 

Menetone  r.  Athawes  ii.  140 

Menham  v.  Edmonson  iii.  425 

Mentor,  The  ii.  460 

Mentz  V.  Renter  i.  383 

Mercantile  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chase  ii.  254 

V.  Holthaus  ii.  586 

i:  State  Ins.  Co.  ii.  478,  494 

Mercein  v.  Smith  ii.  876 

Mercer  v.  Irving  iii.  168 

V.  Jones  iii.  209,  210 

V.  Selden  iii.  103 

r.  Whall  ii.  43 

Merchant,  The  ii.  441 

Merchant  Shipping  Co.  v.  Armitage 

ii.  415 

Merchants  Bank  v.  Bangs  i.  579 

V.  Easley  i.  307 

V.  N.  Jersey  Steam  Nav.  Co.     ii.  255 

i;.  Spalding  iii.  355 

V.  Spicer  ii.  755 

I'.  State  Bank  ii.  113 

r.  Trenholm  i.  102 

Merchants  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Hallock    ii.  203 

V.  Smith  ii.  172 

Merchants  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clapp  ii.  480 

V.  Morrison  ii.  531 

V.  Shillito  ii.  485 

Merchants  Trans.  Co.  v.  BoUes         ii.  257 

Merchants,  &c.  v.  Grant  i.  364 

Merchants,  &c.  Co.  v.  Bolles  ii.  187 

V.  Goodrich  ii.  897 

V.  Story  ii.  151 

Meredith  v.  Gilpin  ii.  870 

V.  Hinsdale  ii.  719 

V.  Meigh  iii.  54 

Merele  v.  Wells  ii.  23 

Meres  v.  Ansell  ii.  679 

Merest  v.  Harvey  iii.  183 

Merethew  v.  Andrews  iii.  347 


Meretony  v.  Dunlope 
Merewether  v.  Shaw 
Meriihew  v.  Sampson 
Meriwether  r.  Bird 
Merkle  r.  Wehriieim 
Merle  v.  Andrews 
Merrell  v.  Tice 
Merriam  v.  Bayley 

i\  Cunningham 

V.  Field 

V.  Granite  Bank 


ii.  489 

ii.  77 

ii.  445,  446 

ii.  872,  873 
iii.  311 
i.  448 
ii.  332 
i.  463 
i.  338 
i.  626,  627 
i.289 


V.  Hartford,  &c.  Railroad  Co.   ii.  188, 

193 

V.  Wilkins  i.  365 

Merrick  v.  Avery  ii.  392 

V.  Gordon  i.  176 

e.  Santvord  i.  161 

Merrick's  case  iii.  436 

Merrick's  Estate  iii.  409,  427 

Merril  v.  Frame  ii.  647 

Merrill  v.  Bartlett  ii.  391 

V.  Boylston  Ins.  Co.  ii.  534 

V.  Gore  ii.  633 

V.  Grinnell  ii.  2.39 

V.  Merrill  iii.  174 

V.  Smith  i.  385 

Merrills  v.  Law  iii.  121,  125 

Merrimac  Man.  Co.,  The,  v.  Garner 

ii.  372,  373,  374,  378 

Merrimack,  The  ii.  519 

Merrimack  Co.  Bank  v.  Brown  ii.  20,  768 

Merrimack  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Qiiintard  iii.  219 

Merriman  v.  Col.  Butts,  The  ii.  392 

V.  Moore  i.  245 

Merritt  v.  Benson  iii.  145 

V.  Brown  iii.  338,  339 

V.  Claghorn  ii.  156,  157 

V.  Clason  i.  583  ;  iii.  7,  9 

r.  Day  i.  225 ;  iii.  90 

V.  Earle  ii.  171 

V.  Johnson  ii.  141.  380 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  197 

V.  Pollys  i.  219,  230 

V.  Seaman  i-  146 

I'.  Todd  i.  295 

Merry  v.  Prince  ii-  474 

Merrywetlier  v.  Nixan  i.  36,  37 

Mers  V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559 

Merse  v.  Seymour  iii.  307 

Mershonr.  Hobensack  ii.  169, 171, 175, 434 

V.  National  Ins.  Co.  ii-  545 

Mertens  v.  Adcock  i.  574 

V.  Winnington  i.  326 

Merwin  v.  Butler  ii.  179,  196 

V.  Playford  i.  177 

i  Mesner  v.  Suffolk  Bank  ii.  438 

I  Messenger  v.  Clarke  i.  385 

V.  Penn.  R.  Co.  ii-  187 

V.  Southey  j-  322 

Messer  v.  Woodman  i.  566 

Messerole  v.  Tynberg       ii.  354,  355,  363, 

373 
Messier  v.  Amery  i.  105 

Messmore  v.  New  York  Shot  Co.     i.  627  ; 

iii.  199 


cxliv 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Mestaer  v.  Gillespie 

iii.  357 

Metcalt  V.  Bruin 

ii.  21 

V.  Cooke 

1.409 

V.  Hess 

ii.  157 

V.  Ives 

ii.  828 

V.  Pilcher 

iii.  158,  150 

V.  Sclioley 

iii.  441 

V.  Taylor 

ii.  663 

Metcalfe  r.  Britannia  Iron  Works  ii.  418, 

411) 
V.  Parry  ii.  534 

V.  Pulvertoft  iii.  317 

V.  Ricliardson  i.  322 

V.  Shaw  i.  388 

Methodist  Episcopal  Church  v.  Gar- 

vey  i.  484 

Metropolitan    Wash.    Mach.    Co.    v. 

Earle  ii.  321 

Mettler  v.  Moore  iii.  233 

MetZQT,  Ex  parte  iii.  421 

Meu.x  V.  Humphries  i.  211 ;  ii.  894 

Mews  i\  Carr  iii.  13 

Mexborough  i-.  Bower  ii.  845 

Mey  i:  SorCar.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  487,  532 

Meyer,  E.r  parte  iii.  421 

V.  Atkins  i.  225 

V.  Everth  i.  589 

V.  Hanchett  i.  94 

j;.  Haworth  i.  465 

V.  Hehner  i.  75 ;  ii.  745 

V.  Hibsher  i.  307 

V.  Isaac  ii.  639,  640 

V.  Johnston  i.  613 

V.  Lemcke  ii.  188 

V.  Peek  ii.  410 

Meyerhoff  v.  Froehlich  iii.  76 

Meyerstein  i-.  Barber  iii.  274 

Meymot,  Ex  parte.  iii.  416,  472 

Meynell  y.  Surtees  i.  506 

Meyrick  r.  Anderson  i.  147 

Miaghan  v.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  i.  83 

Michael  r.  Mills  iii.  243 

V.  Tredwin  ii.  531 

Michaell  v.  Stockworth  i.  27 

Michaels  v.  N.  Y.  11.  R.  Co.  ii.  172 

Michclen  c.  Wallace  iii.  36 

Michell  V.  Burlington  iii.  433,  481 

Mich.  Cent.  P.  Co.  v.  Dolan  ii.  46 

Michigan  Central  R.  R.  v.  Ilale       ii.  203, 

208 

V.  Ward  ii.  203,  208 

Michigan  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bowes     ii.  616, 

018 

Michigan  State  Bank  v.  Gardner       i.  102 

V.  Hastings  iii.  486 

Michigan,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Carrow        ii.  274 

I'.  Caster  iii.  207 

I'.  Coleman  ii.  240 

V.  Heat  on  ii.  270,  271 

V.  McDonough  ii.  174 

V.  Mineral  Springs  Manuf.  Co.  ii.  232 

V.  Oelim  ii.  213 

r.  Phillips  i.  557,  568,  574 

Michoud  V.  Girod  i.  95 

Mickey  v.  Burlington  Ins.  Co.  ii.  552,  573 


Mickle  )-.  Peet  i.  185 

Mickles  v.  Colvin  i.  292 

Micklcwaite  u.  Winter  ii.  129 

Middlebrook  v.  Corwin  i.  545,  547 

Middlebury  College  v.  Chandler        i.  337 

Middlesex,  The                   ii.  208,  415,  427 

Middleton  v.  Bryan  iii.  218 

V.  Findler  i.  110 

V.  Hill  ii.  875 

V.  Hoge  i.  301 

V.  Janverin  ii.  723 

r.  AVeeks'  ii.  836 

V.  Welles  i.  93 

Middleton  Bank  v.  Jerome  i.  273 

Middlewood  v.  Blakes  ii.  532 

Midgley  v.  Lovelace  i.  22,  261 

Midland  Rv.  Co.  v.  Bromley  ii.  190 

Mihills  Maiiuf.  Co.  v.  Day  iii.  106 

Milan  &  R.  Plank  R.  Co.  v.  Rusted 

iii.  498 

Milbourn  v.  Ewart  ii.  852 

Milburn  v.  Beach  iii.  184 

V.  Belloni  i.  637 

V.  Codd  i.  184 

V.  Gayther  i.  196 

Mildmay  i\  Folgham  ii.  477 

Miles  V.  Cattle  ii.  168 

I'.  Conn.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  592 

V.  Durnford  i.  143 

V.  Edelen  i.  570 

V.  Gorton   i.  G46,  653  ;  iii.  262,  274 

r.  Ogden  ii.  765 

V.  Williams  iii.  437 

Miletus,  The  ii.  428 

Milford  r.  Worcester  ii.  87 

Milks  V.  Rich  iii.  27 

Mill  Dam  Foundry  v.  Hovey  ii.  663 

Millar  v.  Hall  iii.  397 

V.  Tavlor              ii.  329,  330,  336,  342 

Millard  v.  Ramsdell  i.  229 

Millaudon  ?•.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  566 

V.  N.  O.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  570 

V.  Western  Ins.  Co.  ii.  578,  582 

Miller  v.  Adsit  ii.  104 

V.  Austen  i.  279 

V.  Baker  i.  548 

V.  Ball  iii.  348 

V.  Ballard  i.  484 

V.  Bartlet  i.  180 

V.  Berkey  ii.  24 

V.  Brigham  i.  220 

V.  Chetwood  i.  522 

V.  Cook  iii.  17 

V.  Covert  ii.  751 

r.  Drake                i.  459,  478,  498,  678 

V.  Eagle  Life  Ins.  Co,  ii.  G05,  607 

)•.  Gaither  ii.  880 

V.  Gaston  ii-  3 

V.  Gilleland  ii.  853 

V.  Goddard  ii.  89,  657 

V.  Hacklev  i.  325 

V.  Hannibal,  &c.  R.  "Co.  ii-  647 

V.  Hayes  ii-  73 

V.  Henlan  iii-  372 

V.  Hines  i-  207 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


cxlv 


Miller  r.  Howell  ii.  017 

V.  Hull  iii.  l;JO 

V.  Johnson  ii.  ^71 

V.  Kellcy  ii.  4.]7 

V.  Kendig  i.  505 

V.  Kennedy  ii.  ^^3 

V.  Kreiter  i-  ^oS 

V.  Lea  ii.  H82 

V.  Levi  i.  548 

V.  Lynch  ii.  901 

V.  Manice  i.  205 

V.  Mariner's  Church  iii.  I'JO 

V.  Marston  iii.  2G(3 

V.  McBrier  i.  540 

V.  McClain  ii.  787 

V.  McEIroy  ii.  348 
V.  Miller  i.  205,  266;  ii.8o4;  iii.  91,97 
V.  Mut.  Ben.  Ins.  Co.           ii.  543,  591 

V.  Pelletier  iii.  10 
V.  Pittsburg  &  Cleveland  R.  Co.  ii.  604 


V.  Piatt 

V.  Price 

V.  Race 

V.  Reed 

V.  Rosier 

V.  Sawyer 

V.  Shields 

V.  Sims 

V.  Smith 

V.  State 

V.  Steam  Nav.  Co. 

V.  Stem 

V.  Stewart 

V.  Tassell 

V.  Thompson 

V.  Travers 

V.  Whittier 

V.  Young 
Millerd  v.  Thorn 
Millett  V.  Parker 

?;.  Snowden 
Milligan  r.  Cooke 

V.  The  B.  F.  Bruce 

V.  Wedge 
Milliken  v.  Brown 

V.  Dehon 

V.  Loring 

V.  Milliken 

V.  Pratt 

V.  Thorndike 
Millikin  v.  Brandon 
Milliman  v.  N.  Y.  Cent., 
Millington  v.  Fox 


Millon  V.  Salisbury 
Millot  V.  Lovett 
Mills,  Ex  parte 

V.  Alderbury  Union 

V.  Ball 

V.  Bank  of  U.  S. 

V.  Barber 
V.  Bayley 
V.  Bcil 
V.  Catlin 
V.  Dennis 


ii.  939 

i.  176;  iii.  290 

i.  272,  289,  329,  3-30 

ii.  861 

ii.  73 

1.34 

i.  535 

1.354 

i.  654 

iii.  10-2 

ii.  172,  197,  211 

ii.  28,  29 

ii.  16,  18 

i.  615 

ii.  640 

i.  531 ;  ii.  681,  693,  695 

i.  251 

1.622 

ii.  756 

ii.  10 

ii.  242 

iii.  337,  357,  358 

ii.  458 

i.  116 

i.  27 ;  ii.  750 

i.  108;  ii.  129 

i.  2.30 

iii.  364,  366 

ii.  700,  730 

i.  531 

iii.  416 

&c.  R.  Co.  ii.  251 

ii.  362,  373,  377 


131 

ii.  458 

iii.  420 

i.  496 

i.  647 

i.  91,  322  ;  ii  669, 

676 

i.  200,  201,  207 

i.  257;  ii  658 

iii.  242 

ii.  634,  038 

i.  149 


Mills  ?'.  Duryee  ii.  740,  741,  742 

V.  Farmers  Ins.  Co.  ii.  576 

V.  Fellows  i.  187 

V.  Fowkes  ii.  763;  iii.  79,  82 

V.  Graham  i.  3-58 

V.  Graves  ii.  939 

V.  Hunt  i.  627;  iii.  49 

V.  Hyde  i.  34 

V.  Jefferson  iii.  113 

V.  Ladbroke  i.  10,  25 

V.  Lee  i.  468,  469 

V.  Mills  ii.  895 

V.  Oddy  i.  525 

V.  Shult  ii.  408 

V.  United  States  Bank  i.  313 

V.  Voorhees  iii.  337 

V.  Williams  iii.  483 

V.  Wright  ii.  645 

V.  Wyman  i.  351,  462 

Millward  v.  Littlewood  ii.  69,  71 

Miln  V.  Spinola  ii.  391,  400 

Milne  v.  Duncan  i.  496 

V.  Gratrix  ii.  847 

V.  Huber  i.  489 

V.  Moreton     ii.  701 ;  iii.  407,  409,  436 

Milner  v.  Harewood  i.  371 

V.  Milnes  i.  383 

V.  Tucker  i.  638 

Milnes  v.  Cowley  i.  466 

V.  Duncan  i.  496 

V.  Gery  ii.  845 ;  iii.  3.32,  360 

V.  Milnes  iii.  437 

Miltenberger  i\  Beacom  ii.  562,  507 

Milton  V.  Mosher  i.  123,  Oil 

r.  Rowland  i.  036 

Milward  v.  Hibbert  ii.  485 

Milwaukee,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Arms        iii.  186 

Mims  V.  Mitchell  ii.  134 

Minard  v.  Mead  i.  56,  392 

.Minden  !\  Cox  i.  348 

Miner  v.  Bradley  ii.  651 

V.  Gaw  i.  208 

V.  Ilarbeck  ii.  463 

V.  Iloyt  1.  290 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

V.  Tagert  ii.  490 

Miners  Bank  v.  United  States  iii.  486,  490 

Minerva,  The  ii.  437,  457,  466 

Minet,  Ex  parte  iii.  15,  462,  404 

Minett  v.  Forrester  i.  76 

Mingus  V.  Pritchett  ii.  784 

Minn.  Oil  Co.  v.  Collier  Lead  Co.     i.  515; 

ii.  296 

Minnit  r.  Whinery  i.  188,  202 

Minns  r.  Morse  iii.  63 

Minock  v.  Shortbridge  i.  354 

Minor  v.  Michie  ii.  783 

V.  Walter  ii.  881 

Minot  V.  Joy  i.  538 

V.  Paine  i.  159 

V.  Tappan  iii.  426,  431 

V.  Thayer  iii.  476 

Minter  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.  i.  41 

Minturn  v.  Col.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  491 

V.  Fisher  i.  316 


cixlvi 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Mintiirn  v.  Manufact.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475 

i\  Seymour  i.  522 

V.  Warren  Ins.  Co.  ii.  483 

Mirabila  r.  Imperial  Bank  i.  57'.) 

Miranda  v.  City  Banlc  of  N.  Orleans   i.  i'l 

JNIisner  v.  Granger  i.  C31 

Missouri,  The  ii.  S92 

r.  Iowa  ii.  939 

Missouri's  Cargo,  The  il.  436 

Missouri  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kittle  ill.  117 

Missouri,    &c.   Co.   v.   Hannibal,  &c. 

K.  R.  Co.  ii.  mn 

Missroon  v.  Waldo  i.  027 
Mitchell  V.  Beal  1.  5(19 
V.  Billingsley  ill.  183 
?'.  Burton  ii.  19 
V.  Chambers  ii.  389 
V.  Cotten  ii.  28 
r.  Cragg  ii.  823 
V.  Cross  i.  318 
V.  Dall  1.  188 ;  ii.  763,  7U8 
V.  Darthez  ii.  G47 
V.  Degrand  i.  318 
r.  Edie  i.  650;  ii.  504 
V.  Fuller  i.  287 
V.  Gile  i.  558 
V.  GrlfBn  iii.  27 
V.  Harris  ii.  844 
V.  Hazen  iii.  240 
V.  Holmes  i.  3fcO 
V.  Homfray  i.  203 
V.  Hughes  iii.  426,  433,  437 
V.  Kingman  i.  434  ;  ii.  6»5 
V.  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  Rail- 
way ii.  210 
V.  Lajtage  i.  588 
V.  M'Lemore  iii.  98 
V.  M'Millan  Hi.  409 
V.  Merrill  ii.  786 
I'.  Minis  i.  79;  il.  134 
V.  Newhall  ii.  670 
V.  Oldfield  ii.  875 
V.  Penn.  K.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 
V.  Reed  i.  187 
V.  Reynolds  ii.  889,  891 
V.  Roulstone  i.  198 
V.  Scllman  iii.  72,  76 
I'.  Smith  i.  489 
V.  St.  Andrew's  Bay  Land  Co.  i.  52 
r.  Stcinmetz  ill.  334 
I'.  Taylor  ii.  SSO 
V.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  605,  (j06 
V.  Warner  i.  144,  260 
I'.  Whoaton  ii.  751 
V.  Williamson  i.  458 
t'.  Wilson  ill.  340 
V.  Wlnslow  iii.  424,  441 
V.  Wordcn  ii.  915 
^litcheson  r.  Oliver  il.  396 
Mltford  )•  Mitford  i.  381  ;  iii.  424,  4.37 
V.  Walcot  i.  3,2(i 
Mi.x  r.  Bioomington  Bank  i.  293 
V.  Shattuck  i.  225;  iii.  87 
V.  Singleton  ii.  5 
Mixer  v.  Cuburn  i.  495,  618 


Mixer  V.  Howarth 

iii.  CO,  01,  62 

Mlzcn  V.  Pick 

i.  401 

Moak  V.  Johnson 

iii.  248 

Moale  V.  Buchanan 

ill. 

343,  354 

Moar  V.  Wright 

i.  254 

Mobile,  &c   R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Jarboe 

ii.  270 

Mobley  v.  Clark 

i.  807 

V.  Lombat 

1.233 

Mock  r.  Kellcy 

ii.  60 

Mockbee  v.  Gardner 

i.  616 

Mockman  v.  Shephcrdson 

ii.  48 

Moddewell  v.  Kecvcr 

i. 

173,  201 

Moderwell  v.  Mulilson 

i.  168 

Moehring  ;•.  Mitchell 

ii.  613 

Moens  v.  Heyworth 

ii 

912,  913 

Moct  u.  Conston 

ii.  376 

iMofTat  r.  INI'Dowell 

ill.  382 

V.  Parsons 

i.  46;  il 

747,  774 

V.  Smith 

i.  532 

V.  Strong 

i.  541 

V.  Ward 

ii.  487 

Moggrldge,  Ex  parte 

iii.  465 

V.  Davis 

iii.  470 

V.  Jones 

i.  495 

Mohawk  Bank  v.  Broderick  i.  296 

V.  Burrows  ii.  875 

Mohawk  Bank  Bridge  Co.  v.  Utlca  & 

Sch.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  639 

Mohr  V.  Boston,  Sc.  R.  Co.  i.  647 

V.  C,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  210 

Moles  V.  Bird  i.  275,  283 

Molr  ;;.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.  ii.  521 

Molst's  Appeal  ii.  51 

Moley  V.  Brine  i.  354 

Mollncux,  Ex  parte  iii.  420 

MoUer  v.  Young  ii.  413 

Mollet  r.  Brayne  ii.  940 

Moliett  V.  Whackerbarth  ii.  855,  856 

Molloy  V.  Egan  iii.  309,  341,  372 

Molonj'  V.  Kernan  i-  95 

Molson  V.  Hawlcy  i.  293  ;  ill.  451 

Molton  V.  Camroux  i.  437  ;  iii.  414 

Molwo,  &c.  Co.  r.  Court  of  Wards     i.  183 
Molyn's  case  ii.  GoQ,  638 

Monadnock  R.  Co.  v.  Manufacturers 

Ins.  Co.  ii  561 

Moncrlef  v.  Ely  i.  351 

Moncrlcff  t'.  Goldsborough  ill.  310 

Moncure  v.  Dermott  iii.  153 

Mondel  v.  Steel  i.  494 

Monitor  Ins.  Co.  v.  Buffum  i.  49 

V.  Young  i.  96 

Monk  r.  Clayton  i.  41,  43 

Monmouth  Ins.  Co.  i'.  Lowell  ii.  539 

Monnell  v.  Burns  ii.  44 

Monnott  v.  Sturges  iii.  113 

Monro  v.  I)e  Chemant  i.  75 

Monroe  v.  Conner  i.  203 

V.  Douglas  ii.  742 

Montacute  v.  Maxwell     ii.  77;  iii.  14,  32, 

352 

Montague  v.  Benedict  i.  388,  390 

V.  Esplnnasse  i.  387 

V.  Perkins  i.  272 

V.  Sewell  iii.  117 


INDEX    TO    CASES   CITED. 


cxlvii 


Montague  );.  Smith  ii.  887 

Montaiiy  v.  Rock  i.  Oil 

Monte  Allegre,  The  i.  62,  0^8 

Montefiori  v.  Montefiori        ii.  73;  iii.  471 

Montelius  v.  Charles  i.  oU2 

Montesquieu  v.  Sandys  i.  98 

Montgomery  v.  Dillingham  ii.  28 

V.  Hughes  ii.  5 

V.  Kellogg  ii.  10 

V.  Kirksey  iii.  408 

V.  Lampton  i.  408 

V.  Middleton  i.  O'JO 

V.  Robinson  i.  518 

V.  The  T.  P.  Leathers      ii.  437,  4.88, 

442 
V.  Walker  i.  294 

Montgomery  Co.  v.  American  Emi- 
grant Co.  ii.  814 
Montgomery    County    Bank    v.    Al- 
bany City  Bank          i.  303,  305  ;  ii.  112 
Montgomery,  &c.   R.  R.   Co.  v.  Ed- 
monds 
Montova  v.  London  Ass.  Co. 
Montreal,  The 
Montreal  Bank  v.  Page 
Montriou  v.  Jefferies 
Monys  v.  Leake 
Mooar  v.  Harvey 
Moody ,  Ex  parte 
V.  Baker 
V.  Blake 
V.  Brown 
V.  Fiske 
V.  Mahurin 
V.  Payne 
V.  Threlkeld 
V.  Webster 
Moon  V.  Durden 


ii.  270 

ii.  428,  497 
ii.  409 
i.  225 
iii.  206 
i.  488 
ii.  709 
iii.  472 
iii.  194 
i.  556 
566;  ii.  380,050 
ii.  307,  814 
ii.  753,  779 
i.  235 
i.  286 
iii.  284 
ii.  890,  897 
V.  Guardians  of  Whitney  Union 

1.90;  ii.  670 

Mooney  r.  Lloyd  i.  128 

V.  Musser  i.  108 

Moor  V.  Veazie  i-  251 

V.  Wilson  i.  73,  89 

Moore,  Ex  parte  iii.  410 

V.  Abernathy  i.  367 

V.  Adam  iii.  194 

V.  American  Transportation  Co. 

ii.  427,  455 


V.  Barthop 

i.  571 

?;.  Blake 

iii.  372 

V.  Campbell 

i.  50S 

;  ii.  007 

V.  Clementson 

ii. 

745,  988 

r.  Coffield 

i. 

308,  317 

V.  Collins 

iii.  382 

V.  Cornell 

i.  405 

V.  Crofton 

iii. 

316,  318 

V.  Dalton 

i.  265 

V.  Davis 

i.  170 

V.  Edwards 

iii.  347 

V.  Evans 

ii.  256 

V.  Fitzwater 

i.  468 

V.  Foley 

iii.  328 

V.  Fox 

iii.  42 

V.  Gano 

i.  187 

Moore  v.  Hart  ii.  77 

V.  Hendrick  iii.  104 

V.  Hershey  i.  436 

I'.  Hill  i.  247 

V.  Hitchcock  iii.  270 

I'.  Hylton  iii.  120 

V.  Hyman  iii.  75 

V.  Inhabitants  of  Abbot  ii.  250 

V.  Jones  iii.  426 

V.  Kendall  ii.  907 

V.  Lowrey  i.  252 

V.  Magrath  ii.  034 
V.  Mckinlay                          i.  587,  603 

V.  Meagher  iii.  189 

V.  Moore  i.  95 

V.  Mountcastle  iii.  15 

I'.  Murdock  ii.  901 

V.  Platte  Co.  iii.  173 

V.  Randolph  iii.  374 

r.  Ross  iii.  38 

V.  Sample  i.  235 

V.  Small  iii.  348 

V.  Stone  i.  75 

V.  Taylor  ii.  487 

V.  Turbeville  ii.  915 
V.  Vance                               iii.  118,  157 

V.  Viele  i.  464 
V.  Voughton                        iii.  112,  159 

V.  Weber  i.  531 

V.  Woolsey  ii.  610 

Moorehead  v.  Gilmore  i.  200 

V.  Wriston  i.  215 

Moorliouse  v.  Crangle  iii.  21 
Mooring  v.  Mobile  M.  D.  &  M.  I.  Co. 

ii.  757 

Moors  V.  Albro  iii.  414,  432 

Moorson  v.  Greaves  ii.  426 

Moran  v.  Baudin  ii.  458,  466 

V.  Miami  Corns.  ii.  943 

V.  Prather  i.  210 

Morancy  v.  Quarles  ii.  852 

Moravia  v.  Levy  i.  185 

Morcure  v.  Dermott  iii.  129 

Mordaunt  v.  Moncreiffe  ii.  93 

Mordy  v.  Jones  ii.  510 

More  V.  Howland  iii.  144,  158 

V.  Mayliew  i.  80 

Morean  v.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co. 

Moreau  v.  Edwards 

V.  Saffarans 
Morehouse  v.  Comstock 
Morel  and  v.  Lawrence 
Mores  v.  Conhara 
V.  Mead 

V.  Missouri,  The 
Moreton  v.  Hardern 
Morewood  v.  Pollock 
Morford  v.  Bliss 
Morgan,  Ex  parte 
V.  Bnin 
V.  Biddle 
V.  Bliss 

V.  Blitzenberger 
V.  Brundett 
V.  Campbell 


ii.  509 

i.  172 

i.  168 

i.  603,  626 

iii.  113 

ii.  120 ;  iii.  253 

i.  618 

ii.  392 

i.  209 

ii.  209,  427 

ii.  939 

iii.  422 

iii.  224 

380,  395 

ii.  913 

iii.  38 

iii.  442 

i.  552 


ii.  813: 
ii. 


cxlviii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Morgan  v.  Congdon 

ii.  148 

Morris  v.  Jones 

iii.  149 

V.  Davis 

1.548 

V.  Joseph 

i.  137 

V.  Elford 

i.  110 

V.  Langdale 

iii.  194 

V.  Fenclier 

i.  615 

V.  Lee 

i.  280 

V.  Gregg 

iii.  212 

V.  Lowell  Manuf.  Co. 

ii.  324 

V.  Griftitli 

iii.  38 

V.  Martin 

i.  894 

V.  Gruff 

ii.  7G0 

V.  Miller 

ii.  82 

V.  Hefler 

iii.  198 

V.  Moore 

ii 

936,  939 

V.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A. 

ii.  415 

V.  Morris 

i 

149,  238 

V.  Alalleson 

i.  2m 

V.  Norfolk 

i.  383 

V.  Mather                       ii 

.  842;  iii.  159 

V.  Plielps 

iii.  243 

1-.  McGhee 

ii.  720 

V.  Pedficld 

ii.  58 

V.  Milman                     iii. 

309,  350,  300 

V.  Robinson 

ii 

398,  456 

V.  Nunes 

i.  185 

?'.  Siiryock 

i.  645 

V.  Pebrer 

ii.  896 

V.  Silter 

ii.  661 

V.  Peet 

i.  325 

V.  Stacey 

iii.  15 

V.  Kainsford                 iii. 

314,  317,  363 

V.  Summerl 

L93 

V.  Eeintzel 

i.  331 

V.  Tiilson 

i.  536 

V.  Richards 

ii.  89G,  900 

V.  Thompson 

1. 

616,  618 

V.  Pichardson 

i.  216 

V.  Vanderen 

ii.  860 

V.  Powhinds 

iii.  83 

V.  Way 

iii.  377 

V.  Scliermerliorn 

iii.  117,  136 

Morris  Run  Coal  Co.  ??. 

Barclay 

Coal 

V.  Spangler 

ii.  941 

Co. 

ii.  888 

V.  Stearns 

i.  170 

Morrison  v.  Blodgett   i 

232,  235, 

236,  237 

V.  Stell 

i.  75 

V.  Bowman 

i.  46 

V.  Taylor 

i.  568 

V.  Buclianans 

ii.  836 

V.  Tener 

i.  90 

V.  Davis 

iii.  194 

V.  Thames  Bank 

i.  385 

V.  Deaderick 

i. 

252,  253 

V.  Tliomas 

i.  146 

V.  Dingley 

i. 

564,  565 

V.  Vale  of  Neath  Co. 

ii.  47 

V.  Galloway 

ii.  663 

V.  Walton 

iii.  72,  92 

V.  Kurtz 

i.  239 

V.  Wood  worth 

i.  323 

V.  Moreland 

ii.  882 

V.  Yarborough 

ii.  64,  65,  70 

V.  Morrison 

ii.  91 

Moriarty  v.  Bailey 

i.  208 

V.  Muspratt 

ii. 

597,  598 

Morison  v.  Thompson 

i.  92 

V.  Peay 

iii. 

316,  348 

Morisone  v.  Arbuthnot 

ii.  78 

V.  Salmon 

ii.  362 

Moritz  V.  Hoffman 

ii.  78 

V.  Smith 

ii.  756 

V.  Melliorn 

ii.  65 

V.  Tenn.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  561, 

564,  574 

Morley  v.  Attenborough 

i.  614,  615 

V.  Woodley 

i.  505 

V.  Inglis 

ii.  879 

Morriss  v.  Harvey 

i.  248 

V.  Polliill 

i.  144 

Morriset  v.  King 

iii.  151 

Morly  V.  Boothby 

i.  456;  ii.  8 

Morrow  v.  Delaney 

i.  564 

Morning  Light,  The 

ii.  431 

V.  Reed 

i.  564 

Morphett  r.  Jones 

iii.  66,  348 

V.  Starke 

ii.  746 

Morj)hy  v.  Blaiicliin 

ii.  816 

r.  Waltz 

i.  509 

Morrell  r.  Fisher 

ii.  681,  6b2 

Morse,  Ex  parte 

iii.  420 

V.  Fritii        ii.  624,  625  ; 

iii.  72,  74,  75 

v.  Auburn 

iii.  177 

I'.  Irving  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  572 

V.  Bellows 

i.  210,  254 

;  ii.  746 

V.  Trenton  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  605 

V.  Brainard 

ii.  226 

Morrill  r.  Aden 

i.  338,  356 

V.  Buffalo  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  547 

V.  Colehour 

iii.  39 

V.  Crawford 

1.434 

;  iii.  178 

V.  Nigiitingale 

iii.  219 

V.  Earl 

i.  383 

V.  Wallace 

i.  623 

V.  Faulkner 

ii.  933 

Morris,  Ex  parte 

iii.  420 

V.  Goddard 

ii.  940 

In  re 

iii.  409 

V.  Gould 

iii.  506 

V.  Abat 

iii.  242 

V.  Ilovey 

iii.  464 

V.  Ashboe 

ii.  336,  344 

V.  Lowell 

iii.  478 

V.  Bowen 

i.  62 

V.  Massachusetts  Bank  i.  801 

;  ii.  113 

V.  Clay 

i.  434 

V.  Merest 

iii. 

332,  338 

V.  Cieasby                     i. 

100,  101,  497 

V.  Ro^^al 

i.  94 

V.  Cornell 

ii.  465,  466 

V.  Slierman 

i.  563 

V.  Edgington 

i.  531 

V.  Slue 

ii.  175, 

182,  274 

V.  Eves 

iii.  391 

V.  St.  Paul  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  544 

V.  Grier 

i.  131 

V.  Wei  ton 

i.  349 

V.  Ilusson 

i.  310,  320 

V.  Wilson 

i.  178 

;  iii.  152 

INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


cxlix 


Morss  V.  Elmendorf 

V.  Gleason 
Mortimer  ik  Capper 
V.  Orchard 
V.  McCalhin 
V.  Mortimer 
Mortimore  v.  Wright 
Martin  v.  Burge 
Morth)ck  v.  Duller 


iii.  358,  359 

i.  220 

iii.  429 

iii.  309 

i.  5t;o 

1.397 

i.  340.  351,  475 

ii.  831,  833 

i.  406,  523;  iii.  13, 

305,  357,  361 

Morton  v.  Dean  iii.  12,  14 

r.  Fenn  ii.  72 

V.  Lamb  i.  578 

V.  N.  Y.  Eye  &  Ear  Infirmary    ii.  303, 

311 
V.  Tliurber  iii.  123 

V.  Tibbett  iii.  51,  53 

V.  Webb  ii.  866 

V.  Weir  i.  539 

V.  Westcott  i.  320 

Morville  v.  Am.  Tract  Soc.  i.  158 

V.  The  Great  Northern  Railway 

Co.  ii.  264,  268 

Mosby  V.  Wall  ii.  871 

Mosdell  V.  Middleton  i.  487 

Moseby  v.  Partee  iii.  368 

Moseley  v.  Boush  i.  251,  252 

V.  Lord  ii.  456 

V.  Shattuck  i.  579 

V.  Virgin  iii.  309,  326 

Moses  V.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.       ii.  192, 

259 

V.  Col.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  502,  -509 

V.  Fogartie  i.  388 

V.  Maeferlan  i.  492,  522 

V.  McDivitt  iii.  130 

V.  Mead  i.  628,  632 

V.  Norris  ii.  177 

V.  Norton  iii.  23 

V.  Pratt  ii.  480 

V.  Stevens  i.  355  ;  ii.  40 

V.  Sun  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497,  527,  529 

Mosher  v.  Smith  i.  568 

V.  Soutliern  Express  Co.  ii.  226 

Moshier  v.  Kitchell  iii.  26 

V.  Shear  ii.  842 

Moss  V.  Adams  ii.  765 

V.  Atkinson  iii.  15 

V.  Bainbrigge  ii.  632 

V.  Charnock  iii.  443 

V.  Hall  i.  324 ;  ii.  28 

V.  Jerome  i.  175 

V.  Livingston  i.  55 

V.  Rossie  Lead  Mining  Co.  i.  49 

V.  Smith  ii.  500 

V.  Sweet  i.  581 

V.  Townsend  ii.  148;  iii.  250 

Mosteller  v.  Bosh  i.  290 

Moston  V.  Burn  i.  470 

Mote  V.  Chicago,  &c,  R.  R.  Co.         ii.  251 

Moth  V.  Frome  iii.  431 

Motley  V.  Downman  ii.  355,  359,  378 

V.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  563 

V.  Motley  i.  96 

Mott  V.  Comstock  i.  401 


Mott  V.  Consumer's  Ice  Co.  i.  113 

V.  Mott  ii.  893;  iii.  174 

Motte  V.  Dorrell  iii.  121 

Motteux  V.  London  Ass.  Co.  i.  24  ;  ii.  4b6, 

532 

Mottram  v.  Ileyder  i.  641,  647 

Motz  r.  Mitchell  i.  446 

Mouflet  V.  Cole  ii.  888 

Mouldsdale  v.  Birchall  i.  474 

Moule,  Ex  parte  iii.  414 

Moulor  V.  Am.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  556,  592 

Moulten  )-'.  Posten  ii.  28 

Moulton  V.  Bowker  i.  130 

V.  Greene  iii.  270 

V.  Trask  ii.  40,  654 

Mounce  v.  Byars  iii.  207 
Mound  City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Twining      ii.  618 

Mount  V.  Larkins  ii.  532 

Mountaineer,  The  ii.  438 

Mountford  v.  Gibson  i.  147 

V.  Willes  iii.  112 

Mountfort  v.  Scott  i.  81 

Mountney  v.  Collier  i.  540 

Mountstephen  v.  Brooke  i.  210 ;  ii.  749  ; 

iii.  70,  92 

V.  Lakeman  '         iii.  26 

Mount  Wollaston  Bank  v.  Porter    iii.  478 

Mouse's  case  ii-  216 

Mouton  V.  Noble  i.  457,  458,  483 

Mowatt  V.  Howland  i.  91 

Mowbray,  Ex  parte  iii.  427 

Mowers  v.  Fethers  ii.  161 

Mowrey  v.  Walsh  iii.  270,  290 

Mowry  ;;.  Bishop        iii.  141,  159,  160,  161 

V.  Bradley  i.  170 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co.  ii.  597,  614 

V.  Siiumway  iii.  123 

V.  Todd  i.  254,  258 

Moxey,  The  ii.  430 

Moxhay  v.  Inderwick  iii.  363 

Moxley  v.  Moxley's  Adm'r  i.  512 

Moxou  V.  Atkins  ii.  487,  524,  673 

Moynahan  v.  Hanaford  i.  210,  275 

Moyses  i;.  Little  iii.  435,  454 

Mozley  v.  Tinkler  i.  480,  509  ;  ii.  12 

Mudd  V.  Harper  i.  296 

V.  Reeves  ii.  753 

Mudge  V.  Wilmot  iii.  411 

Mugford  V.  Richardson  i.  542 

Muggridge,  In  re  iii.  424 

r.  Evelt'th  ii.  420 

Muhler  v.  Bohlens  i.  101 

Muilman  v.  D'Equino  i.  302 

Muir  V.  United  Ins.  Co.  ii.  512 

Muirhead  v.  Kirkpatrick  i.  469,  470  ; 

ii.  885 

Muldon  V.  Whitlock  ii.  390 

Mulgrave,  The  ii.  442 

Mulhern  v.  McDavitt  i.  349 

Mulherrin  v.  Hannum  i-  309 

Mulholland  v.  Bartlett  i.  470 

Mullasky  v.  Cedar  Falls  i.  160 

Mullen  (;.  Ensley  ii-  137 

V.  GiUdnson  ii-  41 

V.  Russell  iii.  130 


cl 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Muller  V.  Pondir  i.  107,  G45;  iii.  277 

Mullett  V.  Mason  iii.  195,  211) 

Mullick  V.  Kiulakissen  i.  302 

MuUikin  v.  Augliinbaugh  iii.  409 

Mulliner  v.  Florence  ii.  167;  iii.  205 

Mulloy  r.  Backer  ii.  419 

Mulrey  v.  Barrow  iii.  293 

Mulry  r.  .Mohawk  Valley  Ins.  Co.    ii.  500 

Miilvcliall  i\  Millward  ii.  75 

Mumford,  Ex  parte  iii.  464 

V.  Bowen  i.  536 

V.  Comm.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  517 

V.  Hallett  ii.  478,  483 

V.  Mcl^lierson  i.  633;  ii.  679 

V.  Nicholl  ii.  387 

v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  501 

!•.  Wliitney  iii.  .37 

Munday  v.  Kahway  iii.  500 

Mundorff  v.  Kilbourn         iii.  347,  362,  374 

V.  Wickersham  i.  51 

Mundy  v.  Culver  iii.  168 

V.  Joliffe  iii.  310,  351 

Munet  V.  Gibson  i.  283 

Hunger  v.  Tonawanda  R.  Co.           ii.  248 

Munn,  In  re  iii.  417 

V.  Baker  ii.  273,  640 

V.  Commission  Co.    i.  59;  iii.  128,  153 

Munro  v.  Alaire  ii.  828,  832 

V.  De  Chemant  i.  75,  404 

V.  Saunders  ii.  726 

Munroe  v.  Connor  i.  203 

V.  Cooper  i.  273 

V.  Hamilton  i.  220 

V.  Holmes  ii.  380 

V.  Leach  ii.  250 

f.  Merchant  i.  448 

V.  Perkins  ii.  085 

V.  Pritcliett  ii.  917,  927 

Munsey  r.  Goodwin  ii.  57 

March  v.  Concord  R.  R.  Corp.  ii.  248 

1-.  Wright  i.  580 

Murden  v.  S.  Car.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  532 

Murdock  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.        ii.  904  ; 

iii.  187 

V.  Chenango  Co.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  473, 
542,  552,  554,  555,  557 

V.  Harris  i.  547 

Murphy,  In  re  iii.  449 

V.  Abrams  i.  167 

V.  Boese  iii.  1 1 

V.  Commissioners,  &c.  i.  118 

V.  Ilaiiralian  i.  248 

V.  N.  v.,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  209 

V.  O'Siiea  i.  95 

V.  Rcnkert  ii.  10;  iii.  22 

V.  Simpson  ii.  900 

V.  Smith  ii.  47 

V.  Union  Railway  ii.  247 

V.  Webber  ii.  764 

V.  Welcii  i.  58,  155 

Murray  v.  Alsop  ii.  526 

V.  Baker  iii.  106 

V.  Barlce  i.  388 

V.  Beiibow  ii.  337 

V.  Blatchford  i.  22,  26 


Murray  v.  Bogert 
V.  Bogue 
V.  Brooks 
V.  Burtis 
V.  Carret 
V.  Charlestown 
V.  Col.  Ins.  Co. 
V.  De  Rottenham 
V.  East  India  Co. 
V.  Elliston 
V.  Gouveneur 
V.  Harding 
V.  Harway 
V.  Hatch 
V.  House 
V.  Jennings 
V.  Johnston 
V.  Judah 
V.  Lylburn 
V.  Mann 


i.  34,  174,  183,  184 

u.  342,  349 

i.  62 

iii.  428 

i.  492 

iii.  480 

ii.  479,  484,  491 

iii.  301 

i.  42 

•  ii.  333 

iii.  238 

iii.  149 

i.  539 

ii.  503,  505,  511 

i.  126 

iii.  219 

i.  228 

i.  294 

i.  254 

ii.  916 


V.  Mechanics  Bank 

V.  Mumford 

I'.  Murray 

V.  Pa  rice  r 

V.  Riggs 

V.  United  Ins.  Co. 
Murrill  i-.  Neill 
Murrin,  In  re 


iii.  75 

i.  222,  227,  229 

i.  238 

ii.  928 

iii.  382,  439 

ii.  479,  519,  525 

i.  231,  237,  238 

iii.  455 


Murry  v.  Smith  i.  581 ;  ii.  666,  794 

Muscan  Hair  Man.  Co.  v.  Auier.  H. 

M.  Co.  ii.  324 

Muschanip  v.  L.  &  P.  June.  Railway 

Co.  ii.  227,  230,  231,  2-32 

Muse  V.  Donelson  iii.  90 

V.  Lettermann  ii.  939 

V.  Swayne  iii.  168 

Muser  v.  Holland  ii.  253 

Musgrove  i-.  Gibbs  iii.  153 

Music  Hall  Ass.  v.  Cory  i.  568 

Musier  v.  Trumpbour  i.  185 

Mussen  ?;.  Price  iii.  226 

Musser  v.  F.  &  A.  Street  Ry.  Co.      ii.  273 

Mussey  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  ii.  498 

V.  Beeclier  i.  45 

V.  Rayner  ii.  14 

Musson  V.  Fales  ii.  382 

Mutford  V.  Walcot  i.  826 

Mutual  Ass.  Co.  v.  Mahon  ji.  555 

.Mutual  Benefit  Ass.  v.  Iloyt  ii.  607 

Mutual  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  ?;.  Brown  i.  124 

V.  Tisdalc  ii.  613 

V.  Wise  ii.  592 

Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  i-.  Noyes  i.  338 

Mutual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cargo  ii.  446,  451 

V.  Coatesville  ii-  552 

V.  Cohen  ii.  506 

V.  French  ii.  615 

V.  Hone  i.  32  ;  ii.  582 

V.  Hunt  i.  436 

V.  Munro  ii.  491,  503,  536 

V.  Newton  ii.  586 

V.  Ruse  ii.  617,  618 

V.  Schmidt  ii.  613 

V.  Swift  ii.  479 

Myatt  V.  Alyatt  ii.  87 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


cli 


Myatts  I'.  Bell 
Myers,  Ex  parte 

V.  Edge 

V.  First  Bank 

V.  Girard  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Harriet,  Tiie 

V.  James 

V.  Keystone  Ins.  Co, 

V.  Mayfield 

V.  Mcllugli 

V.  MeiuratU 

V.  Nell 

V.  Perry 

V.  Sanders 

V.  Silljacks 

V.  Smith 


i.  227 
iii.  402 
ii.  4,  21 

ii.  28 

ii.  527,  528,  529 

ii.  449 

ii.  78 
ii.  471 

i.  552 

i.  12'J 
ii.  'J04 
ii.  85:3 
ii.  483 

i.  362 
iii.  323 

i.  230 


V.  United  Guarantee,  &e.  Com- 
pany i.  258 
V.  Watson  iii.  300,  371 
V.  Willis  ii.  396,  400 
Myler  v.  Fitzpatrick  ii.  217 
Mynard  v.  Syracuse,  &c.  R.  Co.        ii.  270 
Mynn  v.  Joliffe  ii.  74G 


N. 


Nailor  v.  Bowie 

1.  308,  311 

Naish,  In  re 

iii.  149 

Naftzinger  v.  Roth 

iii.  351 

Nagle  r.  Baylor 

iii.  373 

11.  Mallison 

iii.  185 

Naglee  v.  Ingersoll 

ii.  877 

V.  Lyman 

i.  303 

Najac  V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  220 

Nance's  Lessee  v.  Thompson  ii.  838 

Nanson  v.  Gordon  iii.  440,  475 

Napier  v.  McLeod  i.  20 

V.  Schneider  i.  327 

Napoleon,  The,  v.  Etter  ii.  392 

Narragansett,  The  iii.  190 

Nash,  Ex  parte  iii.  420 

V.  Drew  i.  01 

V.  Harrington  i.  318 

V.  Hodgson  ii.  763 ;  iii.  82,  85 

r.  Lull  ii.  320 

V.  Nash  iii.  437 

V.  Russell  i.  404 

V.  Skinner  i.  283 

V.  Towne  iii.  221 

V.  Tu;)per  ii.  719,  721 ;  iii.  301 

Nashua  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moore  ii.  539 

Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliot  i.  336;  ii.  47, 

249 

V.  Messino  ii.  233,  245 

Nason  v.  Dinsmore  ii.  900,  905 

Nathan  v.  Giles  iii.  443 

Nathaniel  Hooper,  The     ii.  413,  419,  420, 

439,  451,  452 

National  Bank  v.  Graham  ii.  97,  98 

V.  Hall  i.  505 


V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Insurance  Co. 
V.  Merchants  Bank 
V.  Norton 


ii.  113,  557 

ii.  412 

1.  83,  191 


National  Bank  v.  Fassett  i.  65 

National    Bank   of   Greenfield  v.  M. 

&  C.  R.  K.  Co.  ii.  213 

National  Exchange  Co.  v.  Drew  i.  80 

National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Loomis      i.  520 ; 

iii.  10 

National  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen  i.  50,  65 

V.  Minch  i.  79 

V.  Webster  ii.  573 

National  Mahaiwe  Baidc  v.  Peck       ii.  767 

National   Park   Bank  v.  Ninth  Nat. 

Bank  i.  300 

Naugatuck  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Waterbury 

Co.  ii.  231 

Nautilus,  The  ii.  429 

Nave  ?'.  Ilume  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509 

Navone  v.  Haddon  ii.  505,  510 

Navulshaw  v.  Brownrigg  i.  60,  102 

Nay  V.  Mograin  iii.  60 

Naylor  v.  Dennie  i.  640,  653 

!•.  Fall  River  Iron  Works  ii.  36 

V.  Mangles  iii.  256 

V.  Moody  ii.  20,  28 

V.  Palmer  ii.  499 

V.  Taylor  ii.  520 

Nazareth  v.  Lowe  iii.  296 

N.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Bastlan  i.  154 

Neal  V.  Bellamy  ii.  10 

V.  Clark  iii.  433 

V.  Gilmore  ii.  51 

V.  Saunderson  ii.  170 

V.  Sheffield  ii.  824 

V.  Wilmington,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.     ii.  203 

Neale  v.  Clantice  i.  553 

V.  Ledger  ii.  844 

V.  Mackenzie  iii.  364,  305 

V.  Turton  i.  104,  186 

V.  Wyllie  i.  537 

Neate  v.  Ball  i.  581 

Neave  v.  Moos  ii.  929 

Nebraska  City  v.  Campbell  iii.  199 

Nedriffe  v.  Hogan  ii.  875 

Nedrow  ;;.  Farmers  Ins.  Co.  ii.  615 

Neel  V.  Deens  i.  493 

Neelson  v.  Sanborne  ii.  7 

Neff  r.  Horner  ii.  853 

Negley  v.  Jeffers  •  iii.  38 

Negus,  Ex  parte  iii.  200 

Neidlet  v.  Wales  i.  537 

Neil  I'.  Cheves  ii.  685 

V.  Cottingham  iii.  406 

Neill  V.  Morley  iii.  414 

Neilsou  c.  Col.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509 

V.  Harford  ii.  310,  311,  624 

V.  Morgan  iii.  184 

V.  Thompson  ii.  324 

Neirinckx,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

Neldon  w.  Smith  i.  595 

Nellie  D.,  Tjie  ii.  435 

Nellis  V.  Clark  i.  522 ;  ii.  924 

Nelson,  The  ii.  402,  404 

V.  Belmont  ii.  447,  449,  450,  452 

V.  Boynton  ii.  11 ;  iii.  26,  30 

V.  Bridges  iii.  323 

V.  Brown  i.  505 


clii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Nelson  i\  Carland                '  iii.  388 

V.  Carriiigton  iii.  243 

V.  Cartwell  iii.  Ill 

V.  Cowing  i.  02 

V.  Ealon  i.  370 

V.  FeUler  iii.  Ill 

V.  Garey  ii.  605 

I".  Hopkins  ii.  080 

i:  Iverson  ii.  103 

V.  heland  ii.  431 

V.  Lloyd  i.  198 

V.  Macintosh  ii.  115 

V.  jNlatlliewa  iii.  243 

r.  Morgan  iii.  184 

V.  Neely  i.  205 

V.  Powell  i.  60 

V.  Salvador  ii.  520 

V.  Serle  j.  472,  473 

V.  Stephenson  ii.  409 

V.  Suddarth  i.  443,  445 

V.  Suffolk  Ins.  Co.  ii.  495,  4'J'J 

V.  Woodruff  ii.  409 

Nelthorpe  v.  llolgate  iii.  308,  357 

Neponset  Bank  v.  Leland  iii.  282 

Neptune,  Tlie       ii.  381,  437,  460,  401,  408 

Neptune  Ins.  Co.  v.  Robinson  ii.  523 

Neptunus,  The  ii.  520 

Nereide,  The  ii.  520 

Keret  v.  Burnard  i.  21!) 

Nerot  V.  Wallace  i.  459,  489,  402 

Nesbit  V.  Burry  i.  500 

Nesbitt  V.  Digby  iii.  403 

V.  Lushington  ii.  499,  501 

V.  Meyer  iii.  321 

Nesmith  r.  Calvert  ii.  318 

V.  Dyeing  i.  107,  108 

Nestor,  tlie  ii.  381,  384 

Netiierland  S.  Co.  v.  Styles  ii.  433 

Netlierly  r.  Ripley 

Nettles  V.  Railroad  Co. 

Nettleton  v.  Billings 

V.  Sikes 
Nevada,  The 
Neve  V.  Hollands 
Neves  v.  Scott 
Neville  r.  Merchants  Ins.  Co 


Styles 

iii.  347 
ii.  190 
ii.  044 
iii.  34 
ii.  431 
iii.  80 
i.  40!) 
ii.  489, 
540 

V.  Wilkinson  ii.  78,  926 

Nevins  ?•.  Rockingham  Ins.  Co.        ii.  577 
r.  Town(!end  i.  2!)0 

Ncvison  V.  Wliitley  iii.  138 

Nevitt  f.  Clarke  ii.  403 

New  f.  Swain  i.  563  ;  iii.  202 

Newall  I'.  Elliott  ii.  306 

V  Hussey  ii.  757 

Newark,  Tlie  ii.  184 

New  Bedford  Turnpike  v.  Adams      i.  483 
Newbeggin  v.  Pilhms 
Newbert  r.  C^niiuingham 
Newbcry  v.  Wall 
New    Brunswick    S.    &    T.    Co. 

Tiers 
Newburgh  Bank  i\  Smith 
Newbury  r.  Armstrong  i.  480 

V.  Brunswick 


i.  407 
i.  129;  iii.  100 
iii.  15 


ii.  172 
ii.  702 
iii.  17 
ii.  729 


Newbury's  case  ii.  345 

Newby  v.  Paynter  iii.  358 

1-.  Vestal  i.  552 

Newcastle  Ins.  Co.  f.  Macmorran    ii.  518, 

544 

Newcomb  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  i.  568,  570 

V.  Brackett  i.  580 

V.  Cabell  i.  568 

V.  Clark  i.  57 

V.  Hale  ii.  25 

V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  ii.  608 

V.  Ranier  iii.  35 

V.  Wallace  iii.  235 

New  Draper,  The  ii.  388 

Newel  l:  Keith  ii.  50 

Newell  V.  Hamer  ii.  28 

V.  Hill  i.  500 

V.  Newton  ii.  801 

V.  Smith  ii.  190 

V.  Turner  ii.  922 

N.  E.  Bank  v.  Lewis  ii  Si'l 

N.  E.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  ;•.  Schettler  ii.  543,  532 

N.  E.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Robinson  ii.  541 

V.  Wetmore  ii.  477 

N.  E.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Wolf     i.  51 ; 

ii.  421 
V.  Sarah  Ann,  The      ii.  396,  397,  398 
N.  E.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Butler  ii.  539,  800 
Newhall,  Ex  parte  iii.  424,  429 

V.  Buckingham  i.  230 

V.  Paige  ii.  100 

V.  Vargas       i.  G41,  043,  645,  649,  050 
V.  Wright  ii.  635 

Newbam  v.  May  iii.  359 

New  Hamps.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rand  ii.  539,  579 
New  Hamps.  Savings  Bank  v.  Col- 
cord  i.  470  ;  ii.  27 
New  Haven  County  Bank  v.  Mitch- 
ell ii.  14,  20 
New  Haven  S.  B.  Co.  v.  Vanderbilt  ii.  430 
Hew  Haven,  &c.  Co.  v.  Campbell   iii.  270 
New  Hope,  &c.  Co.  v.  Perry  i.  309 
V.  The  Pboenix  Bank  i.  83 
New  Jersey,  Tlie                                 ii.  435 
r.  Wilson                                      iii.  502 
N.  J.  Ins.  Co.  )•.  Baker                        ii   591 
New  Jersey  Railroad  Co.  v.  Kennard  ii.  244 
New  Jerse}'  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Mer- 

cliants  Bank  ii.  254,  259,  207,  427 

Newlan  v.  Dunham  i.  501 

Newlin  V.  Freeman  i.  410 

r.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  489 

Newman  v.  Alvord    ii.  352,  354,  359,  303, 

371 
I'.  Bagley  i.  232 

V.  Bean  i.  236 

V.  British  i.  59 

?;.  Cazalet  ii.  536 

V.  Chapman  iii.  299 

t'.  De  Lorimer  iii.  68 

V.  Edwards  ii-  943 

V.  Jackson  iii.  378 

V.  Labeaume  ii-  837 

r.  McComas  i.  225 

V.  Meek  ii.  765 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


cliii 


Newman  v.  Morris  i.  IGG 

V.  Nevvnian  i.  4b8 

V.  Rogers  iii.  340 

V.  Springfield  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559 

V.  Walters  ii.  •1;J8 

V.  Wasliington  i.  129 ;  ii.  59 

Newmarcli  v.  ('Any  ii.  763 

Newnliarn  v.  Stevenson  iii.  441 

New  Orleans  v.  Gauthreaux  i.  232 

New  Orleans  Bank  v.  Matthews         i.  226 

New  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Allbritton  i.  117 

V.  Bailey  iii.  185 

V.  Mills  i.  ,308 

V.  Moore  iii.  209 

V.  Moye  iii.  39 

New  Phoenix,  The  ii.  45 

Newport  v.  Cook  i.  347 

Newry  &  Enniskillen  R.  R.  v.  Coombe 

i.  373,  374,  376 
Newsom  v.  Thornton         i.  328,  640,  651 ; 

ii.  127 
Newsome  v.  Coles  i.  213 

V.  Graham  ii.  870 

Newton  r.  Bronson  i.  53 

V.  Chantler  iii.  441,  442 

V.  Foster  ii.  880 

V.  Galbraith  ii.  780,  787 

V.  Harland  i.  550 

V.  Kennerly  iii.  113 

V.  LiJdiard  ii.  937 

V.  Lucas  ii.  680,  683 

V.  Mut.  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  603 

V.  Newton  i.  146 

V.  Swazey  iii.  347 

V.  Trigg  iii.  265,  416 

V.  Wilson  iii.  113 

New  York,  The,  v.  Rea  ii.  431,  434 

New   York  Belting  Co.  v.  Washing- 
ton Ins.  Co.  ii.  470 
New  York  Bowery  Ins.  Co.  v.  N.  Y. 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  494,  558,  586,  919 

New  York  Central  Ins.  Co.  v.   Na- 
tional Prot.  Ins.  Co.  i.  81 
New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.,  In  re  ii.  5 
N.  Y.  Cent.,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Standard 

Oil  Co.  ii.  253 

New  York  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bennett 

i.  210 
New  York  Fireman  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ely 

iii.  123,  139,  141 
V.  Milne  iii.  511 

New  York  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stur- 

ges  iii.  123 

New  York  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clopton  ii.  601 

V.  Delavan  ii.  580 

V.  Hendren  ii.  601 

V.  Langdon  ii.  544,  547 

V.  Lawrence  ii.  533 

V.  Protection  Ins.  Co.  ii.  494,  585 

V.  Roberts  ii.  480,  484,  490 

V.  Robinson  ii.  511 

V.  Statham  ii.  601 

V.  Tiiomas  ii.  473 

New  York  Iron  Mine  v.  Citizens  Bank 

i.  41 


New  York  Life  Ins.  Co,  v.  Flack     ii.  594, 

609,  610 
New  York  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Schuyler  i.  155 
New  York  &  Bait.  Trans.  Co.  v.  Phil. 

&c.  Steam  Nav.  Co.  ii.  432 

New  York  &  E.  R.  v.  Skinner  ii.  248 

New  York  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Story       iii.  198 
New  York  &  N.  Haven  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Pixley  i.  478 

New  York  &  Va.  Steamship  Co.  v. 

Calderwood  ii.  431 

New  York  &  Wash.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dry- 
burg  ii.  279,  280,  284,  294 
New  York,  &c.  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  470 

New  York,  &c.  Co.  v.  De  Wolf  i.  484 

Niagara,  Tlie,  v.  Cordes  ii.  452 

Niagara  Bank  v.  Rosevelt  ii.  765 

Nias  V.  Adamson  iii.  424 

Niblo  V.  North  American  Ins.  Co.    ii.  559, 

565,  578,  579 

Niboyet  v.  Niboyet  '  ii.  734 

Nichol  V.  Bate  i.  292,  316 

V.  Godts  i.  629 

V.  Martyn  ii.  52 

Nicholas  v.  Chamberlain  i.  546 

V.  Ciiapman  ii.  837 

V.  Clent  iii.  277 

Nicholas  v.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  270 

Nichole  v.  Allen  i.  342,  475 

Nicholls  V.  Stretton  ii.  890 

V.  Poulson  ii.  60 

V.  Wilson  iii.  101 

Nichols,  The  ii.  435 

V.  Bellows  iii.  454 

V.  Bucknam  i.  500 

V.  Chalie  ii.  844 

V.  Coolahan  ii.  37,  44 

V.  Cosset  iii.  123 

V.  Diamond  i.  288 

V.  Eaton  iii.  429,  431 

V.  Fayette  Ins.  Co.      ii.  555,  561,  580 

V.  Fearson  iii.  125,  127,  152 

V.  Freeman  iii.  247 

V.  Haywood  i.  27 

V.  Johnson         ii.  475,  856;  iii.  14,  19 

V.  Lee  iii.  125 

V.  Luce  ii.  664 

V.  McDowell  ii.  23 

V.  Nichols  ii.  93 

V.  Norris  i.  325 

V.  Patten  ii.  924 

V.  Pool  i.  309 

V.  Raynbred  i.  477,  479 

V.  Rensselaer  Mut.  Ins.  Co.        ii.  831 

V.  Rogers  ii.  722 

V.  Ruggles  ii.  342 

V.  Whiting  ii.  787 

Nicholson  v.  Chapman  ii.  105 

V.  Leavitt  i.  204;  iii.  403 

V.  May  i.  473 

V.  Paget  ii.  640,  641 

V.  Revill  i.  210,  325 

V.  Sykes  ii.  833 

V.  Willan  ii.  253,  261 


clvi 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Ogden  I'.  Jackson 

iii.  381 

V.  Jennings 

i.  531 

V.  MarsliiiU 

i.  98 

V.  New  York  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  480.  501 

V.  Ogden 

iii.  32,  33 

V.  Kayniond 

i.  72 

Omoa,  &c.  Co.  v.  Huntley 
Oneida  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Lawrence 

O'Neil  V.  Buffalo  Ins.  Co. 


V.  Saunders  iii.  385,  392,  394,  39G,  397, 

409,  437,  449,  502,  507,  509,  510 

V.  Stone  iii.  381 

Ogg  V.  Sliuter  i.  567,  579 

Ogilvio  V.  Foliambe  i.  524;  iii.  7 

V.  Hull  i.  541 

Oglauder  v.  Boston  iii.  437 

Ogle  V.  Atkinson  ii.  152 

V.  Ege  ii.  324 

V.  Wrangham  ii.  389 

O'Hara  v.  Carpenter  ii.  886 

Olide  V.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.         ii.  618 

Ohio  R.  K.  Co.  V.  McPherson  ii.  911 

V.  Miihling  ii.  238 

Ohio  &  Miss.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Tindall      ii.  46 

O.  &  M.  R.  Co.  V.  Yohe  ii.  173 

Ohio,  &c.  College  v.  Love  i.  482 

Ohio,  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Selby  ii.  238,  270,  271 

V.  Swarthout  ii.  273 

Ohl  V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  ii.  387 

Onison  V.  Heritage  i.  396 

O'Keeffe  v.  Kellogg  i.  563 

Okell  V.  Smith  ii.  811 

O'Keson  v.  Barclay  i.  468 

Olcott  V.  Tioga  Railroad  Co.  i.  161 ; 

iii.  105 

Oldaker  v.  Lavender  i.  229 

Oldershaw  ;;.  King  ii-  6 

Oldfit'ld  V.  Wihners  ii.  826,  831 

Oldham  v.  James  ii.  375 

V.  Litchford  iii.  353 

V.  Turner  iii.  153 

Oldknow,  Ex  parte  i-  237 

OHphant  i\  Mathews  i-  204 

Oliver,  Ex  parte  iii.  474 

f.  Bank  ofTenn.  i.  307 

V.  Com.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  471,  474,  475 

V.  Court  i.  95 

V.  Gray  iii.  92 

V.  Greene  ii.  485,  525 

V.  Iloudlet  i.  370 

V.  Moore  i.  108  ;  iii.  275 

V.  Munday  i.  300 

V.  Oliver  i.  397;  ii.  336 

V.  Woodroffe  i.  335,  352 

Olivera  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  501 

Oliverson  v.  Briglitman  ii.  487 

Ohvier  v.  Townes  iii.  409 

Oliivant  v.  Bayley  i.  630,  637 

Ollive  V.  Booker  i.  602  ;  ii  408 

Olmstead  v.  Beale     ii.  36,  39,  42,  43,  655, 

657,  792 

r.  McNall  ii.  392 

V.  Miller  iii.  189 

Olmsted  (■.  Hotailing  i.  78 

OIney  v.  Howe  i.  567 

Olypliant  v.  Baker  i.  5n() 

V.  McNair  i.  61 

O'Mara  v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.  iii.  209 


i.  118 

i.  623, 

628 

ii.  546,  547, 

551,  587 

r.  New  York  Mining  Co.  iii.  45 

Ongley  v.  Chambers  i.  530 

Onion  v.  Robinson  ii.  832 

Onondaga  County  Bank  v.  Bates      i.  325 

V.  De  Buy  i.  205 

Onslow  V. iii.  328 

V.  Corrie  iii.  424,  448 

V.  Eames  i.  635 

V.  Orchard  i.  28 

Ontario  Bank  v.  Lightbody  i.  302 

V.  Mumford  i.  251,  252  ;  iii.  424 

f.  Root  iii.  346 

V.  Schermerhorn  iii.  145 

r.  Worthington  i.  292 

Ooades  v.  Woodward  i.  77 

Oom  V.  Bruce  ii.  481 

Oppenheim  v.  Russell        i.  648 ;  iii.  257, 

268 
V.  White  Lion  Hotel  Co.  ii.  159 

Oppenheimer  v.  U.  S.  Ex.  Co.  ii.  260  . 

V.  Edney  ii.  277 

Orange  Co.  Bank  v.  Brown       ii.  263,  275 

Orbona,  The  ii.  439 

Orcutt  V.  Nelson  i.  573  ;  ii.  713 

Ord  V.  Fenwick  i.  146 

V.  Noel  iii.  361 

Ordinary  v.  Wherry  i.  363 

Orear  v.  McDonald  i.  304,  306,  307 

Oregon,  The,  o.  Rocca  ii.  433 

O'Reilly  v.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  ii.  533 

V.  Guardian  Ins.  Co.  ii.  586,  613 

V.  Morse  ii.  305,  308,  309,  310 

Orelia,  Tlie  ii.  403,  404 

Organ  r.  Stewart  iii.  58 

Oriental,  The  ii.  404 

Oriole,  The  ii.  386 

Orleans,  The,  v.  Phoebus  ii.  388 

Ormerod  i\  Tate  ii.  8.38  ;  iii.  286 

Ormond  v.  Anderson  iii.  309,  365 

V.  llolhuid  ii.  45 

V.  Hutchinson  i.  96 

Ormrodr.  Iluth  i.  629;  ii.  916 

Orms  V.  Ashley  i-  458 

Ormsbee  v.  Machlr  i.  564 

Ormston  v. i-  311 

Orndorffi'.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  ii.  270 

Orne,  In  re  iii.  428,  457 

V.  Townsend  ii.  464 

O'Rourke  v.  O'Rourke  ii.  902 

V.  Percival  iii.  372 

Orr  V.  Ciiurchill  iii.  170 

V.  Hodgson  i.  448 

V.  Littlefield  ii.  324,  325 

V.  Tanner  ii.  908 

V.  Union  Bank  of  Scotland         i.  300 

1-.  Ward  i.  75 

V.  Williams  ii.  785 

Orrell  v.  Hampden  Ins.  Co.      ii.  476,  477, 

576 
Orrick  i-.  Colston  i.  275 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clvii 


Orrok  v.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.     ii.  447, 
5UG,  507,  508,  515 


Ortucan  v.  Dickson 

i.  45(J 

Orvis  r.  Kimball 

i.  304 

Ory  r.  Winter 

iii.  307 

Osacar  v.  La.  St.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  488 

Osborn  v.  Adams 

iii.  396,  409 

V.  Brennan 

i.  196 

V.  Crosbern 

i.  29 

V.  Etheridge 

ii.  879 

V.  Gantz 

i.  580 

V.  Governors  of  Guy's 

riospital  ii.  52 

V.  Harper 

i.  20,  22,  35 

V.  Haw  ley 

1.279 

V.  Humphrey 

iii.  498 

V.  Rogers 

i.  503 

V.  United  States  Bank 

1.  125,  126 

V.  Wise 

ii.  689 

Osborne  i\  Bremar 

i.  525 

V.  Knox,  &c.  R.  Co. 

ii.  4'j 

Osceola,  The 

ii.  457 

Osgood  V.  De  Groot 

ii.  878 

V.  Franklin                     i 

.  466,  522,  523 

V.  Hutehins 

ii.  G44 

V.  Lewis 

i.  623,  624 

V.  Nichols 

ii.  940 

V.  Strode 

iii.  314 

Osmaiili,  Tiie 

ii.  405 

Osmond  ??.  Fitzroy 

i.  438 

Osprey,  Tiie 

ii.  433 

Ossulston  V.  Yarmouth 

iii.  159,  ICO 

Ostell  V.  Lepage 

ii.864 

Osterhout  v.  Shoemaker 

ii.  940 

Osterman  v.  Baldwin 

i.  448 

Ostrander  v.  Brown     ii.  19C 

,  198,  206, 207, 

416 

Oswald  V.  Gray 

ii.  843 

V.  Mayor,   &c.  of  Berwick-upon-          | 

Tweed 

ii.  18 

Oswego  Falls  Bridge  v.  Fish            iii.  490  | 

Oswego  Starch  Factory  v. 

Lendrum 

1.569;  ii.  914 

Otis  V.  Gazlin 

i.  463 

V.  Hussey 

i.  308 

V.  Lindsey 

iii.  160 

V.  Raymond 

ii.  918 

V.  Sill 

i.  612 

V.  Tliom 

ii.  392 

Otread  v.  Round 

iii.  869 

Otsego  Co.  Bank  v.  Warren               i.  308 

Ottawa,  The 

ii.  431 

Ottawa  Bank  v.  Dudgeon 

ii.  6 

Otts  V.  Alderson 

i.  619,  623 

Ottumwa  Woollen  Co.  v.  Hawley     i.  546 

Ougler  r.  Jennings         ii. 

478,  532,  669, 

676 

Ouimit  V.  Henshaw 

ii.  276 

Oulds  V.  Harrison 

i.  290 

Outcall  r.  Darling 

iii.  260 

Outcalt  V.  Van  Winkle 

ii.  437 

Outhwaite  r.  Porter 

i.  292 

Outram  r.  ]\Iorewood 

ii.  867,  869 

Outwater  i\  Dodge 

i.  566  ;  iii.  51 

I'.  Nelson 

ii.  666 

Overbay  v.  Lighty 

i.  622 

Overend,  &c.  Co.  v.  Oriental  Corpora- 
tion ii.  28 
Overholt  v.  Ellswell  i.  404 
Overliolt's  Appeal  i.  168 
Overseers  of  St.  Martin  v.  Warren  iii.  465 
Overton  v.  Freeman  i.  116 
Owen,  Ex  parte  i.  174 
V.  Bartholomew  ii.  929 
V.  Bowen  i.  248 
V.  Burnett  ii.  268 
V.  Cawley  i.  387 
V.  Foulkes  iii.  422 
V.  Gooch  i.  68 
V.  llonian  i.  825 
I'.  Johnson  ii.  413 
V.  Lf)ng          •  i.  335 
?,'.  Owen  ii.  02 
I'.  Thomas  ii.  680;  iii.  19 
V.  Union  Match  Co.  iii.  206 
V.  Van  Uster  •        i.  305 
V.  White  i.  344 
V.  Wolley  iii.  68 
Owens  r.  Clay  tor  iii.  254 
V.  Collins  i.  108 
V.  Dickenson  i.  388 
V.  Lewis  iii.  33 
V.  Roberts  i.  80 
V.  Weedman  i.  5G8 
Owensboro  Bank  v.  Western  Bank    i.  40, 

87 

O wings  V.  Baldwin  iii.  335,  349 

V.  Hull  i.  51 

V.  Low  i.  254 

V.  Speed  iii.  480 

O  wings'  case  i.  434;  iii.  316 

Owsley  V.  Cobin  iii.  433 

Owston  V.  Ogle                i.  25  ;  ii.  387,  389 

Oxendale  v.  Wetherell  ii.  654,  655,  785, 

791,  792 

Oxford  V.  Peter  i.  113 

Oxford  Bank  v.  Haynes  ii.  31 

V.  Lewis  ii.  29 

Oyster  v.  Longnecker  iii.  132,  134 

Ozeas  V.  Johnston  i.  185 

Ozley  V.  Ikelheimer  i.  408 


Pacific  Ins.  Co.  v.  Guse  ii.  539 

Pacific  R.  Co.  V.  Maguire  iii.  480 

Packard  v.  Dunsmore  i.  570 

V.  Getman  ii.  193 

V.  Hill  ii.  628 

I'.  Nye  .  i.  136 

V.  Richardson  1.  6;  iii.  16 

Packer  ?'.  Gillies  iii.  290 

V.  Hinckley  i.  75 

V.  Hinckley  Locomotive  Works 

ii.  745 

V.  Willson  iii.  17 

Packet,  The  ii.  404,  447,  454,  456 

Packet  Co.  v.  Sickles  ii.  869;  iii.  43 

Paddelford  v.  Thacher  ii.  750 


clviii 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Paddock  r.  Com.  Ins.  Co.  ii 

V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.   u.  484,  486 

r.  Robinson  .' 

r.  Strowbridge  ..        i 

Padelford  r.  Boardraan  u.  440 

Padwick  V.  Turner  ] 

Page,  Ex  parte  .] 

r.  Arnim  .-11 

V.  Bauer  Ml 

V.  Broom  ]V 

'•■  Bussel  .              y, 

r.  Carpenter  i-  ^>i^.  ^?!- 

f.  Estes  " 

r.  Ferry  "•  -^O^'  ^1." 

r.  Foster  .? 

r.  Godden  M 

f.  Hill  ^ 

r.  Parr 

r.  Sheffield  J 

V.  Way  1 

Paget  r.  Pcrcbard 
Pahlman  t-.  Graves 

r.  Taylor 
Paice  V.  Walker 
Paige  r.  McIkliUan  ., 

r.  Ott  »•  ^'^ 

V.  Smith 

r.  Stone  .V 

Pain  V.  Packard  "•, 

V.  Smith  • 

Paine  v.  Cave 
V.  FuUon 
V.  Ilowells 
V.  Jones 
V.  Ringgold 
V.  Voorhees 
Painter  v.  James 

t'.  Kewby 
Paley's  case 
Palin  V.  Gathercole 
Palliser  v.  Ord 
Palm  V.  Medina  Ins.  Co. 
Palmer  v.  Andrews 
IK  Baker 
V.  Blackburn 
V.  Cheney 

V.  City  of  New  York 
V.  Davis 
V.  DeWitt 
V.  Dodge 
V.  Edwards 
V.  Eliot 
V.  Foley 
V.  Goodwin 
t".  Gracie 
V.  Green 
V.  Hand 
V.  Harris 
V.  Hatcli 

V.  Largent  _, 

V.  Lorillard  n-  413, 

V.  Marquette,  &c.  Mill  Co. 
V.  Marshall 


I  Palmer  v.  Merrill    i.  254,  257  ;  ii.  610,  751 


V.  Myers 

t.\  Nay  lor 

V.  Keave 

V.  Oakley 

V.  Pratt 

r.  Reynolds 

V.  Richards 

V.  Scott 

V.  Sparshott 

V.  Stebbins 

V.  Stephens 

V.  Warren  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Whitney 

;•.  

Palmerton  v.  Huxford 
Palo  Alto,  The 
Pancoast  v.  Addison 

V.  Travellers  Ins.  Co. 
Papayanni  v.  Hocquard 
Pape'i'.  Lister 
Pappa  V.  Rose 


i.  20'J 
ii.  499 
ii.  78 
i.  1.52 
i.  280;  ii.  480 
iii.  176 
i.  285 
iii.  365 
i.  23 
ii.  890 
i.  72 
ii.  522,  639 
i.  319 
ii.  833,  837 
ii.  823 
i.  515 
iii.  106 
iii.  123 
ii.  533 
ii.  73 
i.  91  ;  ii.  833 


I'aradine  v.  Jane     i.  536,  598;  ii.  199,  806 


Paradise  v.  Gerson 

V.  Sun  Ins.  Co. 
Parage  v.  Dale 
Paragon,  The 
Paramour  v.  Yardly 
Pardee  v.  Drew 

;;.  Fish 
Pardington  v.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co 
Parliara  v.  Green 

V.  McGravy 


i.  215 

ii.  483,  500 

ii.  507 

ii.  448,  669,  672 

i.  141  ;  ii.  645 

ii.  274 

i.  295 

ii.  2G0 

i.  .34 

iii.  107 


..Randolph  i.  526;  ii- 917.  927 

Parham,  &c.  Co.  v.  Brock  ii-  '<^6 


Paris  V.  Strong 

V.  Stroud 
Parish  v.  Crawford 
V.  Sevon 
V.  Stone 
V.  Wheeler 
Park  V.  Bates 
V.  Hamond 
I'.  Thomas 
Park  Bank  v.  Ninth  Bank 
Parke  v.  Eliason 
Parken  v.  Whitby 
Parker  i'.  Adams 
V.  Atwood 
V.  Baker 
V.  Bamber 
V.  Barker 
V.  Brancker 
V.  Bridgeport  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Bristol,  &c.  Ry.  Co 


iii.  41 
i.  337 
ii.  195 
iii.  405 
i.  266,485;  ii.  685 
iii.  216 


417.  425 
iii.  14 
ii.  532  1 


V.  Brown 

V.  Carter 

V.  Colcnrd 

V.  Cousins 

V.  Crole 

V.  Davis 

V.  Donaldson 

V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Eggleston 


iii.  242 
i.  93 
i.  296 
i.  .300 
i.  571 
iii.  374 
ii.  248 
iii.  476 
i.  370 
ii.  327 
j.  212,  213;  ii.  8 
i  74,  108  ;  iii.  205,  253 
ii.  5.5C>,  5.57 
i.  86  ;  ii.  185, 
186 
iii.  240 
i.  462 
ii.  806 
1.219;  iii.  123 
iii.  465 
ii.  770 
ii.  883 
ii.  580 
ii.  830 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clix 


Parker  ?•.  Ellis 
V.  Fergus 
V.  Fiagg 
V.  Flint 
V.  Gordon 
V.  Gossage 


i.  34 
i.  182 
ii.  172,  181 
ii.  155 
i.  303 
ii.  633 


V.  Great  Western  Railway  Co.  ii.  185, 
187,  039 
V.  Greele  i.  303 

V.  Gregg  i.  ^2 

V.  Haworth  ii.  314 

V.  Heaton  iii.  25 

V.  Hulme       ii.  304,  311,  313,  327,  328 
V.  Jackson  i.  228 

V.  Jones  ii.  49(3,  4'.)7 

V.  Kelly  i.  255 

V.  Kendall  ii.  882 

V.  Lawrence  i.  27 

V.  Leggett  ii.  869 

V.  Manning  iii.  426 

t'.  Nichols  ii.  635 

t'.  Norton  iii.  465,  466 

V.  Parker  iii.  4,  .343 

V.  Parmele  ii.  663,  790 

V.  Patrick  iii.  290 

V.  Pistor  i.  234 

V.  Potts  ii.  527,  529 

V.  Pringle  i.  636 

V.  Ramsbottom      i.  190  ;  iii.  116,  119, 

125 

•      V.  Redfiekl  iii.  498 

V.  Rochester  ii.  887 

V.  Rolls  i.  126 

V.  Russell  ii.810;  iii.  201 

V.  Sears  ii.  324 

V.  Sinionds  iii.  218 

V.  Smith  i.  76 

V.  South  Eastern  R.  Co.  ii.  2.57 

V.  Staniland  iii.  35 

r.  Stiles  ii.  304,  308,  315 

V.  Tainter  iii.  15 

V.  Wallis  iii.  46 

V.  Way  i.  377 

V.  Webb  iii.  424 

V.  Wells  iii.  416 

Parkersburg,  The  ii.  435 

Parkhouse  l-.  Foster  ii.  155 

Parkliurst  v.  Dickerson  i.  304 

V.  Foster  ii.  155 

V.  Kinsman  i.  222  ;  ii.  304 

V.  Smith  ii   620 

V   Sumner  ii.  871 

V.  Vail  ii.  7,  8 

V.  Van  Cortlandt     ii.  939;  iii.  14,  18, 

343,  352 

Parkin  v.  Carruthers  i.  75,  192 

V.  Thorold  iii.  312,  339,  341 

Parkinson  v.  Lee  i.  618,  629 

i\  Scoville  iii.  395 

Pnrkist  v.  Alexander  i.  88,  93 

Parks  V.  Alta  California  Tel.  Co.     ii.  279, 

280,  292,  391 

V.  Rarrowman  iii.  369 

V.  Boston  iii.  209,  214 

V.  General  Interest  Ass.  Co.       ii.  506 


Parks  V.  Hall  i.  639  ;  iii.  273,  291 

V.  Ingram  i.  282,  294 

V.  Morris  iii.  219 

Parmalee  v.  Hoffman  ii.  546 

Parmelee  v.  Fisher  ii.  276 

Parmeter  v.  Cousins  ii.  486 

V.  Todhunter  ii.  511 

Parmiter  v.  Coupland  ii.  025 

Parnell  v.  Price  ii.  29 

Parr,  Ex  parte  iii.  468 

V.  Eliason  iii.  125,  127 

Parrill  i-.  ]\IcKinIey  iii.  343 

Parris  i'.  Roberts  i.  578 

Parrish  ;;.  Koons  iii.  309,  343 

Parrott  v.  Kumpf  iii.  487 

Parry,  Ex  parte  ii.  391 

V.  Ashley  ii.  477 

V.  House  i.  540 

V.  Spikes  ii.  13 

Parshall  v.  Shirts  i.  523 

Parslowe  i\  Dearlove  iii.  461 

Parson  v.  Sexton  i.  637 

Parsonage  Fund  v.  Osgood  iii.  83 

Parsons  v.  Aldrich  ii.  828 

V.  Armor  i.  48 

V.  Briddock  ii.  6 

V.  Camp  i.  645 

V.  Carey  iii.  82 

V.  Crosby  ii.  937 

V.  Hardy        ii.  172,  181,  198,  215,  419 

V.  Hill  i.  370 

V.  Loucks  iii.  45 

V.  Lyman  i.  135 

V.  IMartin  i.  Ill ;  iii.  212 

V.  Mass.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  487 

V.  Monteath  ii.  172,  254,  255,  259,  268 

V.  Parsons  ii.  681 ;  iii.  437 

V.  Woodward  i.  255 

Partin  v.  Luderlow  i.  208 

Partlow  V.  Cooke  ii.  52 

Parton  v.  Hervey  ii.  86,  87,  89 

Partridge  i\  Colby  ii.  274 

V.  Dartra.  Coll.  iii.  271 

V.  Davis  ii.  4 

V.  Dearborn  iii.  421,  470 

V.  Dorsey's  Lessee  iii.  313 

V.  Hannum  iii.  426 

V.  Menek  ii.  358,  363,  372 

V.  Wooding  i.  563 

Paschal,  In  re  i.  129 

V.  Terry  ii.  842 

Paschall  v.  Passmore  ii.  642 

Passenger  R.  Co.  r.  Stutlen         "       i.  348 

Passmo're  v.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.         ii.  288 

Pastorious  v.  Fisher  iii.  234 

Patapsco  Ins.  Co.  i>.  Coulter    ii.  483,  492, 

500,  573 

V.  Smith  ii.  472 

r.  Southgate  ii.  396,  506,  511 

Patch  u.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  615 

Patchett  V.  Holgate  i.  377 

Patchin  v.  Swift  i.  458 

Pate  I'.  Henry  ii.  186 

V.  Wright  il.  902 

Patce  V.  Pelton  i.  616 


clx 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Paterson  r.  TVallace  ii.  45 

Pateshall  r.  Tranter  i.  C36 

Patience  v.  Townley  i.  308 

Patman  v.  Vauglian  iii.  416 

Patruor  v.  Haggard  iii.  17 

Paton  V.  Brebner  iii.  357 

I'.  Duncan  i.  024 
V.  Rogers                             iii.  336,  357 

Patrick,  Ex  parte  iii.  143 

V.  Comm.  lus.  Co.  ii.  611 

r.  Greenway  iii.  2-'A 

V.  Leach  i.  017 

V.  Littell  i.  408 

V.  Ludlow  ii.  480 

V.  Marsliall  iii.  24G 

V.  Patrick  ii.  77 

Patron  v.  Silva  ii.  425 
Pat  tee  v.  Greeley                        ii.  900,  903 

Patten  v.  Browne  iii.  410 

I'.  Ellingwood  i.  463 

V.  Mercliants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  557 

V.  Moses  i.  161 

V.  Rca  i.  119 

I".  Thompson  i.  108 

Patterson  v.  Atherton  i.  254 
V.  Black                                u.  498,  013 

V.  Brown  iii.  95,  96 

V.  Chalmers  ii.  380 

V.  Gage  ii.  43 

V.  Gaines  i.  377 

V.  Gandasequi  i.  60,  105 

V.  Grimes  i.  377 

V.  Ilardacre  i.  272 

V.  Lytle  ii.  930 

V.  Patterson                   .  ii.  58 

V.  Stewart  iii.  245 

V.  Tash  i.  00,  102 

V.  Todd  i.  284.  290 

Pattison  r.  Blanchard  i.  170 

V.  Hall  ii.  705 

V.  Syracuse  National  Bank  ii.  98 

Patton  V.  M'Clure  iii.  347 

V.  Randolph,  The  i.  84 

V.  Smith  i.  569 

V.  State  Bank  i.  331 

Paul  V.  Dowling  iii.  416 

V.  Frazier  ii.  04,  74 

V.  Hard  wick  -       i.  035 

V.  Joel  i.  322 

V.  Jones  iii.  404 

V.  Perry  i.  37 

V.  Reed  i.  578,  580 

V.  Slason  iii.  235 

V.  Young  iii.  370 

Pauli  V.  Simes  i.  588 

Paulsen  v.  Dallott  i.  110 

Pawling  V.  Bird  ii.  73(5 

V.  Pawling  iii.  101 

f .  Wilson  ii.  732 

Pawson  r.  Barnevelt  ii.  473 
V.  AVatson      ii.  518,  522,  523,  524,  520 

Paxton  V.  Newton  iii.  .327 

Payler  r.  Iloniersham  ii.  633,  851 

Payne  '■.  Allen  ii.  405 

V.  Baldwin  iii.  487 


Payne  v.  Banner 

V.  Bettisworth 

V.  Cave 

V.  Commercial  Bank 

V.  Cutler 

V.  Freer 

V.  Graves 

i\  Haine 

V.  Hutchinson 

V.  Matthews 

V.  Newcomb 

V.  New  South  Wales  Co 

V.  Rodden 

!•.  Rogers 

V.  Shadbolt 

V.  Trezevant 

V.  Watcrston 
Paynter  v.  Walker 

V.  Williams 
Payson  v.  Whitcomb 


iii.  338 

ii.  003 

i.  510 

ii.  28 

i.  292 

iii.  152 

iii.  358 

i.  530 

ii.  487 

i.  238 

iii.  144,  145 

i.  479 

i.  010 

ii.  749 

i.  564;  iii.  274 

iii.  127 

i.  110 

ii.  877 

i.  501 

i.  309 


Peabody  r.  Proceeds  of  28  Bags  of 

Cotton  ii.  437 

V.  Speyers  iii.  15,  57 

Peace,  The  ii.  441 

Peachey  v.  Rowland  i.  110 

Peacock  r.  Cummings  i.  217 

V.  Dickerson  ii-  779 

V.  Evans  iii.  310 

V.  Jcffery  ii.  874 

V.  Monk  i.  458 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  592 

V.  Peacock  i.  177,219,220,  227;  ii.  50 

V.  Pembroke  i.  382 

V.  Penson  iii.  301 

V.  Purcell  ii.  757 

1'.  Rhodes  i.  272 

Peak  r.  Bull  ii.  866 

Peake,  Ex  parte  iii.  429 

Pearce,  Ex  jmrte  iii.  469 

In  re  iii.  477 

i\  Atwood  ii.  901 

r.  Blackwell  i.  020 

V.  Blagrave  iii.  24 

!■>.  Chamberlain  i.  220 

V.  Ilennessy  iii.  113 

V.  Hitchcock  i.  23 

V.  Patton  iii.  511 

V.  Piper  i.  230 

V.  Wilkins  i.  204 

Pearl  v.  Harris                    '  iii.  319 

V.  Walls  ii.  8.50 

Pearl  St.  Cong.  Soc.  ?".  Imlay  ii.  5 

Pcarsall  v.  Dwight  ii.  700,  719,  721 

Pearse  v.  Green  i.  90 

Pearson  v.  Archbold  ii.  831,  8-33 

V.  Commercial  Ass.  Co.  ii.  550 


V.  Davis 
V.  Duane 
V.  Duckham 
V.  Graham 
V.  Henry 
V.  Humes 
V.  Kcedy 
V.  Lemaitre 
V.  Mason 


iii.  242 

iii.  209 

i.  33 

i.  70;  iii.  434,  454,  458 

i.  143 

i.  487 

i.  231 

iii.  179 

i.  110;  iii.  224 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


clxi 


Pearson  v.  M'Gowran 

iii.  133 

V.  Parker 

i.  21,  35 

V.  Pearson 

i.  4G0 

V.  Rockhill 

iii.  382 

V.  Skt'lton 

i.  35,  37,  184 

Pease,  Ee  jiaite 

iii.  261 

V.  Dwiglit 

i.  273 

V.  Hirst 

i.  21 

;  ii.  22 ;  iii.  87 

V.  Mead 

i.  145 

r.  Sabin 

i.  631 

V.  Smith 

i.  556 

r.  Turner 

i.  299 

Peasle  f.  Breed 

i.  30,  35 

Peate  v.  Dicken         i. 

475; 

ii.  899;  iii.  17 

Peay  v.  Pickett 

i.  279 

Pebbles  v.  Stephens 

i.  457 

Pec'hner  v.  Phoenix  Ins 

Co. 

ii.  518 

Peck  V.  Barney 

ii.  16 

V.  Briggs 

ii.  897 

V.  Burr 

ii.  887 

V.  Davis 

ii.  829 

V.  Fislier 

i.  170 

V.  Halsey 

ii.  688 

V.  Hozier 

ii.  719 

V.  Hubbard 

ii.  784 

V.  Lusk 

i.  193 

V.  Mayo 

ii.  714 

V.  Neal 

ii.  244 

V.  N.  Y.  Cent.,  &c. 

R.  Co.          ii.  246 

V.  Peck 

ii.  82 

V.  Ritcliie 

i.  51 

V.  Wakely 

ii.  829 

Pecker  v.  Hoit 

ii.  937 

V.  Kennison 

ii.  719 

Peckhani  v.  Balch 

iii.  349 

V.  Farla 

iii.  22 

V.  N.  Parish  in  Haverhill        i.  12,  20 

Pedder  v.  Watt 

ii.  758 

Pederson  i\  Lotinga 

i.  66 

Pedrick  v.  Bailey 

i.  160 

Peek  V.  Nortli  S.  Ptailway  Co.           ii.  271 

Peel,  Ex  parte 

i.  207,  214 

V.  Price 

ii.  408 

V.  Slicpherd 

ii.  745 

V.  Tliomns 

i.  163 

Peele  v.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii 

504,506,507, 

508, 

511, 

512,  513,  515 

V.  Northcote 

i.  101 

V.  Suffolk  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  508 

Peers  v.  Lambert 

iii.  356 

Peet  V.  Chicago 

ii.  227 

V.  McGraw 

ii.  164 

Peeters  v.  Opie 

i.  578 ;  ii.  660 

Peifer  v.  Landis 

iii.  348 

Peigne  v.  Sutcliffe 

i.  856 

Peirce  v.  Boston 

ii.  879 

V.  Bufler 

ii.  669 

V.  Corf 

iii.  12 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

ii. 

397,  398,  511 

V.  Rowe 

iii.  161 

V.  Somersworth 

iii.  494 

Peiscli  V.  Dickson 

ii.  688 

Peixotti  V.  McLaughlin 

ii.  180 

Pellecat  v.  Angell 

ii.  894 

Pellew  V.  Wonford 

ii.  797 

Pelly  i\  Wathcn  iii.  287 
Peltier  f.  Collins      i.  508,  586,  589;  iii.  13 

Pemberton  ;;.  King  i.  548 

V.  Oakes  ii.  21 

V.  Vauglian  ii.  890 

Pemberton  Bank  i'.  Lougee  i.  275 

V.  Porter  i.  298 

Pembroke  v.  Thorpe  iii.  326,  343,  350 

Pembroke  Iron  Co.  v.  Parsons  ii.  422 

Pefia  V.  Vance  iii.  58 

Pence  v.Duvall  iii.  242 
Pendar  v.  Am.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.    ii.  493,  583, 

584 

Pender  v.  Fobes  i.  634 

Pendergrast  v.  Foley  iii.  102 

Pendleton  v.  Dyett  i.  541 

Pendrell  v.  Pendrell  i.  377 

Penfold  V.  Universal  Ins.  Co.  ii.  602 

Penley  v.  Record  iii.  174 

V.  Watts  i.  537  ;  iii.  229 

Penn  v.  Bennet  i.  464 

V.  Lord  Baltimore  i.  467 ;  iii.  333 

Penn's  Adm'r  v.  Watson  iii.  96 

Penned  v.  Alexander  i.  590 

V.  Hinman  ii.  936,  943 

Penniman  v.  Hartshorn  iii.  7,  9 

V.  Norton  iii.  477 

V.  Patchin  ii.  827 

V.  Rodman  iii.  333 

V.  Tucker  ii.  479 

Penniman's  case  '  iii.  503 

Pennington  v.  Baehr  i.  279 

V.  Gittings  i.  263  ;  iii.  318 

V.  Taniere 
Pennock  v.  Freeman 

V.  Dialogue 

V.  Tilford 
Pennock's  Appeal 
Penn.  Co.  v.  Roy 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Lynch 

V.  McCloskey 

V.  Miller 

I.  Titusville 

Pennsylvania     &    Ohio  Canal 

Graham 
Penn.,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Books 


ii.  940 

iii.  107 

ii.  305 

i.  623 

i.  526 

ii.  237 

ii.  46 

ii.  268 

ii.  212 

iii.  196 

V. 

iii.  178 
ii. -270; 
iii.  186 
iii.  .304 
ii.  270 
ii.  249 
ii.  227 
ii.  447 

274,  283 
ii.  7G2 

137,  151 


V.  Delaware,  &c.  Co. 

V.  Henderson 

V.  Kerr 

V.  Schwartzenberger 
Penny  v.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Parham 
Pennypacker  ;;.  Umberger 
Pennypacker's  Appeal 
Penobscot,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bartlett  ii.  713 
Penoyer  v.  Hallett  ii.  424 

V.  Watson  ii.  21 

Penrose  v.  Curren  i.  356 

Penshoer,  The  ii.  434 

Pensonmeau  v.  Bleakley  i.  95 

Penton  ?-.  Robart  i.  548 

Pcntz  y.  Receivers  of  .^tna  Fire  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  571 

People  V.  Baker  ii.  737 


clxii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


People  r.  Bartlett 

ii.  810 

V.  Chicago,  &c. 

R. 

Co. 

ii.  203 

r.  Commissioners, 

&c. 

iii.  484 

V.  Conklin 

i.  448 

V.  Gasiierie 

iii.  112 

V.  Harvey 

i.  120 

I'.  Janseii 

ii.  25,  26 

V.  Jolmson 

i.  263 

r.  Judges 

ii.  875 

V.  Kendall 

i.  3.56 

V.  Manhattan  Co. 

iii.  486 

V.  McHatton 

ii.  29 

?).  Moores 

i.  355 

V.  Morris 

iii.  483 

V.  New  York  Common  Pleas     ii.  875 

V.  Otis  iii.  480 

V.  Overseers  i.  377 

V.  Pettit  i.  390 

V  Sliall  i.  458 

V.  Slack  ii.  87 

V.  St.  Francisco  ii.  928 

V.  White  ii.  28 

People's  Bank  v.  Bogart  i.  620 

V.  Gridley  i.  508 

I'.  Keech  i  318 

People's  Ferry  Co.  v.  Beers  ii.  380 

People's  Savings  Bank  v.  Collins      ii.  932 

Pepper  v.  Aiken  ii.  823 

V.  Haight  ii.  603,  887 

Pequawket  Bridge  v.  Mathes  ii.  856 

Percival  v.  Blake  i.  638  ;  iii.  50 

V.  PVampton  i.  292 

V.  Maine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  556 

V.  Phipps  ii.  336,  347 

Percy,  line  i.  126 

V.  Millaudon  ii.  115 

V.  Percy  ii.  713 

Perham  v.  Raynal  iii.  87 

Perine  v.  Dunn  ii.  908 

Perkins  v.  Augusta  Ins.  Co.     ii.  511,  533, 

535 
V.  Bootliby  i.  51 

V.  Burbank  iii.  70 

V.  Cady  i.  66 

V.  Catlin  i.  284 

V.  Challis  i.  291 

r.  Clay  ii.  888 

i;.  Cummings  i.  48() 

t;.  Dana  i.  535 

V.  Douglass  i.  581 

V.  Eastern  &  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Cos. 

ii.  248 
I".  Eaton  ii.  760,  761 

V.  Franklin  Bank  i.  312 

V.  Gilman  ii.  30,  850 

v.  Hart  ii.  61,649 

i;.  Her.sey  ii.  74;  iii.  188 

t;.  Littlefield  iii.  24 

V.  Lyman  ii.  800;  iii.  174 

f.  New  Eng.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 

V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  2.38 

V.  Parker  i.  256 

V.  Perkins  i.  129 

V.  Prout  ii.  928 

V.  Thompson  i.  95 


Perkins  v.  Washington  Ins.  Co.     ii.  471, 

540;  iii.  329 

V.  Whelan  i.  616;  iii.  99 

V.  Wright  iii.  306 

Perley  v.  lialeh  i.  495  ;  ii.  815,  922 

Perren  v.  Monmouthshire  R.  Co.      ii.  773 

Perrin  v.  Noyes  i.  329 

V.  Protection  Ins.  Co.   ii.  495,  497,  573 

Perrine  i-.  Cheeseman  i.  458 

i".  Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  ii.  27 

Perring  v.  Hone  i.  164 

Perry,  Ex  parte  iii.  414 

V.  Barrett  i.  283 

V.  Green  i.  308,  317 

V.  Jackson  iii.  102 

V.  Jones  iii.  431 

V.  Mays  i.  290 

V.  Osborn  ii.  420 

i;.  Randolph  i.  188 

V.  Roberts  i.  254 

V.  Smith  iii.  232 

V.  Thompson  ii.  260 

V.  Truefitt  ii.  362,  363,  372 

V.  Worcester  ii.  943 

Perry  Co.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stuart     ii.  545,  561, 

576 

Perry  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Brown  iii.  397 

Perryclear  v.  Jacobs  i.  382 

Perryer,  Ex  parte  iii.  420 

Perscii  r.  Quiggle  ii.  106 

Persia,  The  ii.  439 

Person  v.  Chase  i.  350 

V.  Warren  i.  434 

Persons  v.  Jones  iii.  107 

Perth  Amboy  Man.  Co.  v.  Condit     ii.  024 

Peru  V.  Turner  i.  511 

Petchell  V.  Hopkins  iii.  106 

Peter  v.  Beverly      i.  150;  ii.  757;  iii.  378 

V.  Compton  iii.  42 

V.  Craig  ii.  848 

V.  liich  i.  34 

V.  Steel  ii.  50 

Peterborough  Bank  v.  Childs  iii.  124 

Peters  c.  Anderson  ii.  762 

V.  Ballistier  i.  61;  ii.  450;  iii.  48 

V.  Brown  iii.  92 

V.  Delaware  Ins.  Co.  ii.  492,  582 

V.  Fleming  i.  336,  337 

V.  Gooch  ii.  815 

V.  llobbs  i.  312 

i>.  Lord  i.  355 ;  ii.  52,  54,  56 

V.  McKeon  iii.  2b5 

f.  Ncwkirk  ii.  842,  843;  iii.  404 

0.  Piiocni.v  Ins.  Co.  ii.  507,  530 

V.  Ryland  iii.  184 

V.  Warren  Ins.  Co.      ii.  447,  448,  49!  >, 

931  ;  iii.  192 

V.  Wcstborough  ii.  49;  iii.  42,  43 

Peterson  ;;.  Ayre  ii.  843;  iii.  320 

V.  Humphrey  ii-  361 

Pctkin  V.  Tompson  i.  383 

I'eto  V.  Blades  i.  615 

V.  Hague  i.  79 

V.  Reynolds  i-  308 

Petrie  v.  Bury  1.  14.  22 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxiii 


Petrie  v.  Clark 

i.  292 

Philips  V.  Bury 

iii.  482 

Pettee  r.  Tonn.  Manuf.  Co. 

ii.  879 

V.  Hunter               ii.  738, 

739 ;  iii.  406 

Peltegrew  v.  Priiigle 

ii.  521 

V.  Kniglitley 

ii.  820,  834 

Pettenpill  r.  Elkins 

i.  608 

V.  Morrison 

ii.  794 

V.  Hinks 

ii.  587 

V.  Williams 

iii.  Ill 

Pettibone  v.  Roberts 

i.  492 

Phillimore  v.  Barry 

iii.  4 

Petti iigill  V.  McGregor 

i.  130 

Phillips  I'.  Allan 

iii.  397 

Pettis  V.  Kellogg 

i.  612 

I'.  Barber 

ii.  497 

V.  Ray 

ii.  818 

V.  Bateman 

i.  460 ;  ii.  4 

Pettit,  Ex  parte 

iii.  427 

V.  Berger 

iii.  319,  331 

V.  Braden 

iii.  20 

V.  Berick 

ii.  751 

Pettitt  i'.  Johnson 

iii. 

377,  378 

V.  Bistolli 

iii.  40,  50 

Petty  V.  Anderson 

i.  391 

V.  Bonsall 

i.  12 

V.  Cooke 

ii.  19 

V.  Bridge 

i.  232 

Pettyt  r.  Janeson 

i.  229 

V.  Broadley 

iii.  101 

Pevey  r.  Skinner 

i.  531 

V.  Bullard 

ii.  755 

Peyroux  v.  Howard 

ii. 

382,  384 

V.  Clagett 

ii.  749 

Pey  toe's  case 

ii. 

788,  818 

V.  Cockayne 

iii.  125 

Peyton  v.  Bladwell 

ii.  78 

f.  Condon 

ii.  117 

Peytona,  The                       ii 

209, 

415,  410 

V.  Cook 

i.  235 

Pezant  i'.  National  Ins.  Co. 

ii. 

507,  515 

V.  Crammond 

i.  171 

Pfau  V.  Reynolds 

ii.  817 

V.  Duke  of  Bucks,  The 

iii.  308 

Pfeffer  v.  Steiner 

i.  228 

V.  Earle 

ii.  190 

Pfei£Eer  v.  Maltby 

i.  175 

V.  Foxal 

ii.  30,  33 

Phalen  v.  Virginia 

iii.  510 

V.  Germon 

iii.  286 

Phalen's  case 

iii.  510 

V.  Green 

i.  366 

Phares  v.  Barbour 

ii.  6 

V.  Headlam 

ii.  527 

Phebe,  The 

ii. 

420,  454 

V.  Pliggins 

ii.  833 

Phelan  v.  Currency  Bank 

i.  289 

V.  Howell 

i.  73 

V.  Douglass 

ii.  796 

V.  Innes 

ii.  901 

V.  Moss 

i.  289 

V.  Ives 

ii.  897 

V.  Piielan 

.    ii.  92 

V.  Jones 

ii.  50,  58 

Phelps  V.  Auldjo 

ii.  533 

V.  Knox  Co.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  555,  561 

V.  Bellows 

iii.  117 

I'.  Lawrence 

iii.  183 

V.  Comstock 

ii.  319 

V.  London,  &c.  R.  Co. 

ii.  241 

V.  Hubbard 

1.568;  iii.  78 

V.  Merrimac  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  580 

V.  McDonald 

iii.  434 

V.  Moore 

i.  448,  578 

V.  Paris 

ii.  880 

V.  Moses 

ii.  763 

V.  Pierson 

iii.  136 

V.  Ocmulgee  Mills 

i.  565 

V.  Riley 

iii.  233 

V.  Page 

ii.  308 

V.  Townsend 

i.  479 

V.  Piiillips 

i.  168 

V.  Vi seller 

i.  275 

V.  Purington                     1. 

198 ;  ii.  387 

V.  Williamson 

iii.  72 

V.  Rounds 

ii.  28 

V.  Worcester                  i 

33G, 

338,  350 

V.  Smith 

iii.  242 

Phetteplace  v.  Steere 

i.  470 

V.  Stanch 

iii.  370 

Philadelphia  v.  Loekhardt 

i.  2-55 

V.  Stevens 

i.  536 

V.  Maryland 

iii.  498 

V.  Sun,  &c.  Co. 

i.  538 

r.  Philadelphia.  &c.  R.  Co.         ii.  634 
Philadelphia  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Amer. 

Life  Ins.  Co.  ii.  611 

Philadelphia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Havre  de 

Grace  Steamboat  Co.  ii.  907 

Philadelphia,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Howard  ii.  943 

Philadelphia  &  Read.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Derby  i.  114;  ii.  237 

Philadelphia,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Larkin    ii.  240 ; 

iii.  181,  187 

Philbrick  v.  Preble  ii.  827 

Philbrook  v.  Belknap  ii.  792 ;  iii.  03 

V.  Delano  iii.  297 

V.  New  England  Mut.  Fire  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  631 

Philips  V.  Bank  of  Lewiston  i.  258 

V.  Biggs  i.  37 


r.  Tliomas  Scattergood,  The      ii.  4-59 

V.  Tiiompson  iii.  66,  347,  358 

V.  Wright  ii.  383 

Phillipson  v.  Hayter  i.  388 

Philipott  V.  Jones  ii.  765 

Phillpotts  V.  I<:vans  ii.  809;  iii.  225 

Philpot  V.  Bryant  i.  323 

V.  Hoare  iii.  448 

V.  Wallet  ii.  68 

PhiJpott  V.  EUiott  iii.  354 

Phipps,  Ex  parte  iii.  416 

V.  Anglesea  ii.  716 

V.  Chase  i.  316 

V.  Jones  i.  482 

Phoenix  v.  Assig.  of  Ingrahara       iii.  381, 

442 
Phoenix  Bank  v.  Hussey  i.  326 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Badger  ii.  588 


clxiv 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cochran 

ii.  495 

V.  Doster 

ii.  802 

V.  Dunham 

ii.  608 

V.  McLoon 

ii.  4U1 

V.  Michigan,  &c.  E.  Co. 

ii.  58o 

Pho.spliate  Co.  v.  Green 

i.  53 

P.  H.  Wiiite,  The,  v.  Levy 

ii.  392 

Phyfe  V.  Eimer 

i.  538 

V.  Warden 

iii.  319 

Phyn  V.  Royal  Excii.  Ass.  Co. 

ii.  499 

Physick's  Estate 

ii.  85 

Pianciani  v.  L.  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co. 

ii.  2(36 

Piatt  V.  Eads 

i.  306 

V.  OHver 

i.  108 

Pickard  r.  Low 

i.  613 

V.  Sears                                 ii 

936,  944 

V.  Valentine 

i.  311 

Pickas  V.  Guile 

ii.  109 

Pickering  v.  Appleby 

iii.  50 

V.  Banks 

iii.  129 

V.  Barkley 

ii.  174 

V.  Bishop  of  Ely                  iii. 

323,  365 

V.  Busk     i.  42,  47,  59,  63,  109;   ii.  938 

V.  Cease  ii.  896 

V.  Dowson                i.  589,  634 ;  ii.  679 

V.  Eisk  ii.  719 

«.  Holt  ii.421 

V.  Pickering  1.  142,  386 

Picket  v.  Crook  iii.  184 

Pickett  V.  King  iii.  82 

V.  Memphis  Bank           i.  130  ;  ii.  763 

V.  State  iii.  68 

Pickford  v.  Grand  Junction  Railway 

Co.  ii.  184,  185,  187,  190 

Pickman  r.  "Woods  ii.  407,  413 

Pickrel  v.  Rose  i.  507 

Pickup  V.  Thames  Ins.  Co.  ii.  528 

Picquet  v.  Cormick  ii.  881 

V.  Curtis  i.  309 

V.  Swan  i.  410 

Pidcock  r.  Bishop  ii.  8,  919 

Piddiiig  V.  How  ii.  363,  378 
Piddington  v.  South  Eastern  R.  R. 

Co.  i.  446 

Pidge  V.  Pidge  ii.  91 

Pidgin  v.  Cram  i.  343,  345 

Piedmont  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ewing  ii.  540 

Piehl  V.  Balchen  ii.  457,  462 

Piert'.  Carr  i.  541,  543 

Pierce,  //;  re  i.  384 

V.  Andrews  ii.  936,  943 

V.  Benjamin  iii.  211 

V.  Boston  Savings  Bank  i.  265 

V.  Boston,  &c.  Bank  iii.  113 

V.  Brown  ii.  940 

V.  Bryant  i.  242 

V.  Burnham  ii.  94 

V.  Butler  ii.  069 

V.  Cameron  i.  495 

V.  Fuller  ii.  890 

V.  Gilkcy  i.  304 

U.Jackson  i.  209,  231,232 

V.  Johnson  i.  66 

V.  Kennedy  i.  284 

V.  Kittredge  i.  304 


Pierce  r.  Knight  ii.  766,  767 

V.  Milwaukee,  &c.  R.  E.  Co.       ii.  187 

V.  Minturn  i.  540 

V.  Nashua  Ins.  Co.  ii.  478,  576 

V.  O'Keefe  i.  116 

V.  Parker  ii.  850 

V.  Pcndar  i.  319 

V.  Schenck  ii.  143,  144 

V.  Selleck  ii.  664 

V.  Seymour  iii.  76 

V.  State,  The  ii.  625 

V.  Struthers  i.  320 

V.  Thornely  iii.  424,  437 

V.  Tobey  iii.  91 

V.  Travellers  Ins.  Co.  ii.  602 

V.  Trigg  i.  168,  170 

r.  Whitney  i.  316 

V.  Wood  ii.  923 

V.  Woodward  ii.  890 

Pierce,  Clark,  &  Co.  i'.  Knight  ii.  762 

rierpont  v.  Eowle  ii.  339,  349 

V.  Graham       i.  201,  207,  220;  iii.  382 

Piers  r.  Piers  ii.  83 

Pierson  v.  Dunlop  iii.  260 

V.  Eagle  Screw  Co.  ii.  321,  327 ; 

iii.  176 

V.  Hooker  i.  26,  201,  210 

V.  Hutcliinson  i.  331 

v.  McCahiU  i.  468 

Pigeon  V.  Osborn  ii.  883 

Pigott, V.  ii.  185 

V.  Bagley  i.  226 

V.  Thompson  i.  497 

Pigott's  case  ii.  853,  854,  855,  856 

Pike  V.  Balch  ii.  398 

V.  Gage  ii.  830 

V.  Galvin  ii.  933 

V.  Irwin  ii.  8 

V.  King  ii.  901 

V.  McDonald  iii.  463 

V.  Munroe  ii.  038 

V.  Nicholas  ii.  340,  349 

V.  Vaughn  i.  564 

V.  Warren  iii.  88 

Pilcher  r.  Arden  i.  129 

Piltbrd's  case  iii.  236 

Pilkington  u.  Scott  ii.  87,  49,  890 

Pillans  V.  Van  Mierop     i.  7,  303,  457,  459 

Pilmore  ?•.  Hood  ii.  921 

Pim  V.  Curell  i.  531 

V.  Downing  i.  151 

V.  Reid  ii.  558 

Pincknc}-  v.  Ilagadorn  i.  55 

Pincombc  v.  Huilgc  iii.  241 

Pindall  r.  The  Nortli  Western  Bank  ii.  753, 

754 

Finder  v.  Morris  iii.  286 

Pine  V.  Smith  i.  292 

Pingree  v.  Comstock  iii.  383 

Pinhorn  v.  Tuckington  iii.  159 

Pinkerton  v.  ("aslon  ii.  828 

V.  Marshall  i.  272 

V.  Woodward  ii.  160,  164 

Pinkham  v.  Macy  i.  322 

i;.  Mattox  iii.  51 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxv 


rinkston  v.  Brewster  ii.  940 
V.  Hide  iii.  240 
rinncl's  case                   i.  249;  ii.  749,  751 
Finney  r.  Barnes  ii.  868 ;  iii.  202 
V.  (;  lea  son  iii.  232 
Pinnock  r.  Harrison  iii.  251 
Pintard  ?'.  Tackington  i.  382 
Pinto  r.  Santos  i.  96 
Pipe  V.  Ratcman  i.  240 
Piper  r.  Manny  ii.  156,  160 
V.  Smith  i.  228 
Pipon  V.  Cope  ii-  500 
V.  Pipon  iii.  406 
Piqua  Bank  v.  Knoup  iii.  498 
Pirie  v.  Anderson  ii.  395 
Piscataqua   Bridge   v.   New    Hamp- 
shire Bridge     iii.  490,  493,  494,  497,  498 
Pitcairn  v.  Oghourne  ii.  78 
Pitcher  r.  Bailey  i.  36 
V.  Barrows  i.  109 
V.  Livingston                iii.  175,  240,  242 
V.  Tovey  iii.  424,  448 
V.  Wilson  ii.  49  ;  iii.  41 
Pitchford  v.  Davis  i.  163 
Pitkin  v.  Brainerd  ii.  420 
V.  Flanagan  i.  35 
V.  Pitkin  i.  226 
V.  Tiie  Long  Island  R.  R.  Com- 
pany iii.  41 
V.  Thompson  iii.  397 
Pitman  v.  Hooper  ii.  459,  460 
Pitney  r.  Glen's  Falls  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543,  582 
Pits  V.  Wordal  ii.  820 
Pitsinowsky  v.  Beardsley  i.  62 
Pitt  V.  Albrithow  ii.  152 
V.  Berksliire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  615 
V.  Petway  i.  95 
V.  Purssord  i.  32,  501 
V.  Smith  i.  435;  iii.  414 
V.  Yaldan  i.  120 
Pittam  r.  Foster  i.  441 
Pitts  V.  Beckett                  i.  586 ;  iii.  10,  13 
XK  Congdon  i.  324 
V.  Hall  ii.  805,  327,  328 
V.  Mangnm  i.  460 
V.  Wangh  i.  188 
V.  Wemble  ii.  307 
V.  Wemple  ii.  315 
Pittsburgh,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Alleghany  i.  158 
V.  Ilazen  ii.  198 
V.  Heck  iii.  224 
V.  Hollowell  ii.  198 
V.  McChirg  ii.  817 
i\  Shaeffer  ii.  29 
Pixley  r.  Boynton  ii.  890 
Place  V.  Delcgal  i.  24  ;  ii.  21 
V.  Sweetzer  i.  230 
Plahto  V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  490 
Plaisted  v.  B.  &  K.  Steam  Navigation 

Co.  ii,  171,  183,  4.35 

Planchc  v.  Colburn  ii.  654,  813 

V.  Fletcher  ii.  534,  700,  804 

Plank  Road  v.  Griffin  i.  483 

Plant,  Ex  parte  iii.  424 

V.  Condit  i.  636 


Planters  Bank  v.  Markhara  ii.  669 

V.  Merritt  i.  296 

V.  Sellinan  i.  323 

V.  Sharp  iii.  482,  486,  507 

V.  Snodgrass  iii.  139 

V.  St.  John  i.  226 

V.  Stockman  ii.  765 

V.  Wilmington  Bank  i.  327 

Planters  Ins.  Co.  v.  Deford        ii.  543,  586 

V.  Myers     '  ii.  543 

Plate  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  9.31 

Plath  V.  Minn.,  &c.  Ins.  Co.      ii.  557,  576 

Piatt  V.  Button  ii.  348 

V.  Drake  i.  322 

V.  Hibbard    ii.  134,  149,  151,  153,  192 

V.  New  South  Wales  ii.  708 

?!.  Squire  ii.  941 

Playford  v.  United  K.  Tel.  Co.        ii.  280, 

281,  282,  295 

Pleasants  ?'.  Pendleton  i.  577 

Plevins  v.  Downing  iii.  57 

Plimmer  v.  Sells  i.  47 

Plimpton  V.  Curtiss  iii.  41 

Vmt,  Ex  parte  iii.  286 

Plomer  v.  Long  ii.  765,  767 

Plowman  v.  McLane  ii.  785 

Pluckwell  V.  Wilson  ii.  250 

Plumer  v.  Gregory  i.  203 

Plumleigh  v.  Dawson  iii.  234 

Plunimer  v.  Jarman  i.  381 

V.  Keppler  iii.  373 

V.  Lyman  i.  304 ;  iii.  28 

V.  McKean  iii.  170 

17.  Wildman  ii.  447 

Plunkett  V.  Methodist  Episc.  Society 

iii.  310 
Poe  V.  Duck  iii.  395,  .396,  508 

Poillon  V.  Secor  i.  193 

Poinde.Kton  v.  Blackburn  iii.  437 

Point  Street  Iron  Works  v.  Simmons 

iii.  353 

Polak  V.  Everett  ii.  19,  937 

Poland  V.  Glyn  iii.  442 

Pole  V.  Ford  i.  323 

Polglass  V.  Oliver  ii.  753 

Polhemus  v.  Heiman  i.  617 

Polhill  (,'.  Walter  i.  71,  72 ;  ii.  916 

Polk  V.  Oliver  i.  191 

Pollard,  Ex  parte  iii.  461,  469 

V.  Baylor  iii.  125,  126 

V.  Baylors  iii.  125,  126 

V.  Gibbs  i.  52 

V.  Scholv  iii.  116,  125 

V.  Shaaffer  i.  536,  537 

V.  Somerset  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475,  577 

V.  Stanton  i.  188 

Pollen  V.  Le  Roy  iii.  225 

PoUfe.xen  v.  Moore  iii.  293 

Pollock  V.  Babcock  ii.  496 

V.  Donaldson  ii.  480 

V.  Hall  ii.  847 

V.  Landis  ii.  162  ;  iii.  26? 

V.  Maison  iii-  109 

V.  Pratt  iii.  464 

V.  Stables  i.  60,  87 ;  ii.  669 


clxvi 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Pollock  V.  Stacy 
Polly  V.  McCiill 
Polyclore  V.  Prince 
Pomeroy  v.  Burnett 

V.  Donaldson 

V.  Sniitli 
Pomfret  v.  Hicroft 
Pond  V.  Lockwood 

V.  Underwood 

V.  Williams 
Ponder  i-.  Carter 

V.  Graham 


ii.  635 

iii.  08 

ii.  7ol 

iii.  244 

ii.  181 

ii.  129 

i.  535  ;  ii.  13G,  604 

i.  292 

i.  80 

i.  27;  ii.  7G3;  iii.  83 

i.  36  ;  iii.  98 

iii.  500 


Pondrom  r.  Cli.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.         ii.  817 

Pool  V.  Pratt  i.  370  ;  ii.  66 

V.  Welsh  ii.  464 

Poole  V.  Hill  i.  24 

V.  Palmer  ii.  937 

V.  Protection  Ins.  Co.                 ii.  509 

V.  Rice  ii.  756 

V.  Tunibridge  ii.  770,  771 

Poole's  case  i.  546,  548 

Pooley  r.  Budd  iii.  319,  330 

V.  Driver  i.  183 

V.  Harradine  i.  294 

Poor  V.  Hazleton  i.  382 

V.  Humboldt  ii.  546 

V.  Oakinan  ii.  665 

Poorman  v.  Mills  i.  279 

Pope  V.  Albion  Bank  ii.  113 

V.  Brett  ii.  827,  835 

V.  Carl  ii.  330,  336 

V.  Chaffe  ii.  858 

V.  Duncannon  iii.  333 

V.  Harkins  ii.  940 

V.  Jackson  i.  546 

V.Linn  ii.  901,904 

V.  Nance  i.  301 

V.  Nickerson        ii.  396,  397,  403,  405, 

454,  456 

V.  Onslow  iii.  424,  427 

V.  Randolph  i.  186,  264 

V.  R.  B.  Forbes  ii.  435 

V.  Risley  i.  230 

V.  Timstall  ii.  819 

Popham  r.  Eyre  iii.  308,  342,  346 

PoplewL'll  V.  Wilson  i.  282 

Poppenbausen  v.  N.  Y.  G.  P.  C.  Co. 

ii.  309,  328 

V.  Palke  ii.  313 

Pordage  v.  Cole  ii.  658,  660 

Port  V.  Jackson  iii.  200 

V.  Port  ii.  82,  84 

V.  Turton  iii.  4]() 

Port  Carbon  Co.  v.  Groves  i.  031 

Porter  v.  Androscoggin  &  Ken.  R.  R. 

Co.  i.  1.56 

V.  Ballard  i.  257 

V.  Bank  of  Rutland  i.  83 

V.  Barry  i.  200 

t'.  Blood  ii.  794;  iii.  2.".:5 

V.  Briggs  i.  3HH 

V.  Bu.ssey  ii.  479 

V.  Dougherty  iii.  30fi 

V.  llildebrand  ii.  275 

V.  Judson  i.  310 


Porter  v.  Kemball 

i.315 

V.  Lane 

ii.  875 

V.  Langhorn 

ii.  12 

V.  McCoUum 

i.  272 

V.  Morris 

ii.  884 

r.  Munger 

iii.  Ill 

V.  Pettengill 

i.  578 

V.  Providence  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  444 

V.  Sawyer 

ii.  897 

V.  Stewart 

ii.  793 

V.  Taylor 

ii.  746 

V.  Vorley                     ii 

.  426,  452,  454 

V.  White 

i.  200 

I'.  Wilson 

i.  198 

Porterfield  v.  Augusta 

ii.  712 

Porthouse  v.  Parker 

i.  211,  321 

Portis  V.  Cummings 

ii.  941 

Portland  Bank,  Ex  parte 

i.  205 

V.  Apthorp 

iii.  498 

V.  Brown 

ii.  705,  768 

V.  Hyde 

i.  186 

V.  Stacey 

ii.  380,  395 

V.  Stubbs             ii.  395, 

400,410,418; 

iii.  443 

Portwood  V.  Outton  iii.  432 

l^st  V.  Jones  ii.  .397,  440,  442,  4-56 

V.  Kimberly  'i.  183,  195,  198 

r.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  533 

V.  Post  i.  549 

V.  U.  S.  i.  627 

Postlethwait  v.  Garrett  iii.  121,  130 

V.  Parkes  ii.  75 

Postmaster-General  v.  Furber  ii.  766 

V.  Norvell  ii.  768 

V.  Reeder  ii.  19 

Pothonier  v.  Dawson  iii.  253 

Pott  V.  Clegg  iii.  77 

V.  Eyton  i.  182 

V.  Todhunter  ii.  086 

V.  Turner  iii.  416 

Potter  V.  Brown  ii.  731 ;  iii.  406 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  iii.  235 

V.  Deboos  ii.  67 

V.  Holland  ii.  307,  308,315,  318 

V.  Irish  ii.  .386 

V.  Kerr  iii.  395 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  492 

V.  Mayo  i.  129  ;  ii.  60 ;  iii.  286 

V.  McCoy  i.  212 

V.  Merchants  Bank  i.  75 

V.  Morland  ii.  668 

V.  Muller  ii.  324 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  ii.  447,  515 

V.  Ontario  &  Livingston  Mut.  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  584,  6.30 

V.  Parsons  i-  130 

V.  Providence  Ins.  Co.        ii.  502,  517 
V.  Sanders  i.  514 

V.  Spilnian  iii.  455 

V.  Sulfolk  Ins.  Co.  ii.  497 

I'.  Taggart  ii.  770 

V.  Thompson  ii.  129 ;  iii.  253 

V.  Tyler  i.  289 

V.  Whitney  ii-  324 

V.  Yale  College  iii.  121 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxvii 


Pottingerr.  Wightman 

ii.  712 

Pratt  r.  Elgin  Baptist  Soc. 

i.  483 

Potts  V.  Aecliternacht 

i.  110 

V.  Flamer 

i.  377 

r.  Henderson 

i.  08 

V.  Foote 

ii.  757 

V.  Now  York,  &e. 

R.  Co. 

iii.  270 

V.  Hackett 

ii. 

827,  837 

!'.  Wliiteliead 

i.  515 

V.  Hubbard 

ii.  722 

Pouelier  r.  Ilollcy 

ii.  874 

V.  Huggins 

iii.  108 

V.  Norin.in 

ii.  00 

I".  Humphrey 

iii.  24 

Pougett  V  Tompkins 

ii.  89 

V.  Hutchinson 

i.  162 

Poiiglikoei)sic'  Bank  v. 

Phelp 

s     iii.  17,  98 

V.  Landon 

1.177 

I'oultor  r.  Ivillingbeck 

iii.  35 

V.  Law 

iii.  358 

Pounsctt  V.  Fuller 

iii.  223 

V.  Maynard 

i.  564 

Pourie  i:  Fraser 

i.  48 

V.  Paine 

ii.  646 

Poussard  v.  Spiers 

ii.  809 

V.  Parkman              i.  594,  59t! 

;  ii.  395 

I'outz  r.  La.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  481 

V.  Railway  Co. 

ii.  227 

Powder  Co.  v.  Burkliardt 

i.  558 

V.  Reed                         ii. 

381, 

382,  453 

Powell,  Et  parte 

iii.  419 

V.  Richards,  &c.  Co. 

i.  543 

V.  Biddle 

ii. 

G81,  692 

V.  Russell 

i.  463 

r.  Bradlee 

ii.  915 

V.  Willey 

iii.  117 

i>.  Brown 

i.  4.59 

Pratt's  case 

iii. 

417,  474 

V.  Conant 

iii.  335 

Pray  ;•.  Clark                         i. 

532 

;  iii.  309 

V.  Divett 

ii. 

854,  855 

V.  Gorham 

i.  348 

V.  Edmunds 

i.  521 

V.  Maine 

i.  297  ;  ii.  6 

r.  Graham 

i.  143 

r.  Mitchell 

iii.  56 

I".  Hinsdale 

ii.  210 

Prebble  r.  Boghurst              i 

466 

;  iii.  373 

V.  Ilorton 

ii.  667 

Preble  v.  Baldwin 

iii.  24,  .38 

V.  Hyde 

ii.  501 

Precious  v.  Abel 

i.  59 

V.  Little 

ii.  746 

Prentice  v.  Achorn               i 

435 

;  iii.  373 

V.  Lylos 

i.  615 

I'.  Reed 

ii.  840 

V.  Manson  Manuf. 

Co. 

i.  406 

V.  Zane 

i.  292 

V.  Myers 

ii,  213 

Prentiss  v.  Danielson 

i.  308 

V.  M.  &  B.  Manuf. 

Co. 

iii. 

237,  239 

V.  Graves 

i.  273 

V.  New  burgh 

iii.  206 

V.  Russ 

ii.  918 

V.  Salisbury 

iii.  195 

V.  Savage 

ii.  713 

V.  Smith 

iii.  200 

V.  Sinclair 

i.  191 

V.  Thomas 

i.  283 

V.  Stevens 

iii.  77 

V.  Tuttle 

i.  89 

Presbrey  v.  Williams 

ii.  797 

V.  Waters 

iii. 

129,  153 

Presbury  v.  Morris 

i.  627 

Power  V.  Barham 

i.  622 

Presb.  Church  v.  City  of  New  York 

V.  Finnic 

i.  286 

ii.  807 

V.  Kent 

iii.  286 

Presb.  Congr.  v.  Williams 

ii.  941 

I'.  Whitniore 

ii. 

447, 

537,  669 

Presbyterian  Soc.  v.  Beach 

i.  483 

Powers  )•.  Dellinger 

i.  564 

Prescot,  Ez  parte 

iii.  439 

i\  Fowler 
r.  Hale 

iii.  16 
316,371 

,. 

ii.  644 
424,  468 

iii. 

Prescott,  Ex  parte 

iii. 

t'.  Nash 

i.  32 

V.  Brinsley 

i.  285 

V.  North  Eastern  Ass. 

ii.  592 

V.  Brown 

i.  385 

V.  Russell 

i.  386 

V.  Elms 

i.  548 

V.  Ware 

ii.  858 

V.  Flinn 

i.  47 

Powhattan  Steamboat 

Co.  V 

.  Appo- 

V.  Holmes 

i.  015 

matto.x  R.  R.  Co. 

ii. 

190,  907 

V.  Hull 

i.  257 

Powis  V.  Smith 

i.  22 

V.  Locke 

i. 

564,  567 

Powles  ?•.  Hider 

i.  114 

V.  Norris 

i.  338 

V.  Innes 

ii.  476 

V.  Parker 

iii.  Ill 

V.  Page 

i.  83 

V.  Perkins 

i.  35 

Powley  V.  Walker 

i.  537 

V.  Trueman 

iii.  244 

Pownal  V.  Ferrand 

i.  500 

President,  The  Brig 

ii.  381 

Praeger  r.  Bristol,  &c. 

R.  Co 

ii.  251 

President,  &c.  v.  Ogle 

ii.  884 

Prankard,  Ex  parte 

iii.  413 

Preslar  v.  Stallworth 

iii.  109 

Prat  her  r.  Vineyard 

iii.  28 

Presley  i'.  Davis 

i.  347 

Pratt  r.  Adams 

iii. 

116, 

118,  123 

Preston  v.  Boston 

i.  4f)6 

V.  Bates 

iii.  23 

V.  Christmas 

ii.  823 

V.  Ik'aupre 

i.  58 

V.  Dayson 

1.316 

V.  Bryant 

ii. 

146 

;  iii.  213 

I'.  Greenwood 

ii.  487 

V.  Chase 

iii.  49,  411 

V.  Jackson 

Iii.  129 

V.  Curtis 

iii.  441 

V.  Merceau 

ii.  679 

clxviii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Preston  v.  Preston 
V.  Tubbin 
V.  Walker 
V.  Whitney 
Prestwick  v.  iMarshall 
Prettynian  v.  Unland 
Prevost  V.  Gratz 
Prevot  r.  Lawrence 
Prewett  v.  Carruthers 
Prewitt  V.  Wilson 
Price  V.  Alexander 
V.  Asheton 
V.  Barker 
V.  Bcnington 

V.  (Corporation  of  Penzance 
V.  Dyer 
V.  Easton 
V.  Green 
V.  Griffith 
r.  Hartshorn 
V.  IlarwGod 
V.  riewett 
V.  Hicks 
V.  Hopkins 
?;.  Justrobe 
V.  I^a vender 
V.  Lea 
V.  IMacauley 
V.  Neale 
V.  Page 
V.  Powell 
V.  Kalston 
V.  Richardson 
V.  Seaman 
V.  Severn 
r.  Trusdell 
V.  Tyson 
V.  Upshaw 
Prickett  v.  Badger 
Pride  v.  Earl  of  Bath 
Prideaux  v.  Burnett 
Pridgen  v.  Andrew 

V.  Hill 
Prieger  v.  Exchange  Ins.  Co. 
Priest  V.  Citizens  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Cone 
Priestley  v.  Foulds 

V.  Fowler 
Priestley's  case 
Prime  v.  Cobb 
V.  Koehler 
Primrose  v.  Bromley 
Primus,  The 
Prince  r.  Clark 
V.  Fuller 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  , 

Prince  Albert  v.  Strange    ii.  330,  332,  342 
Prince  Edward  r.  Trevellick  ii-  406 

Prince  George,  The  ]\  4o._» 

Prince  Regent,  The  \\-  40o 

Princessa,  Ti.e  i}-  :?^ , 

Princeton  ?-.  Gulick  i-.l-^^ 

Pringle  r.  Dunn  ..i-»l 

V.  M'Clonachan  »•  ^-^^ 

V.  Phillips  •■  '^^'^ 


iii.  311 
iii.  2\M 
iii.  160 
i.  678,  57!) 
i.  47,  3'.)2 
i.  552 
ii.  800 
i.  540 
i.  403 
i.  460 ;  ii.  70 
i.  122 
iii.  304 
i.  325 
i.  437 
iii.  309 
iii.  371 
i.  406 
iii.  169,  170 
iii.  309,  337 
ii.  200 
ii.  941 
1.  3,^7 
i.  167 
iii.  511 
iii.  231 
i.  274 
iii.  49 
iii.  370 
i.  300 
ii.  688,  095 
ii.  208,  410 
iii.  439 
iii.  17 
i.  474 
iii.  188 
ii.  6,  11 
ii.  849 
iii.  95 
i.  97 


Prior  I'.  Ilembrow 
Priscilla,  The 
Pritchard  v.  Brown 

V,  Howell 

V.  Martin 


i.  145 ;  ii.  848 

ii.  405 

ii.  982 

iii.  72 

ii.  43 


V.  Merchants  Ass.  Soc.  ii-  618 

V  Norton  ''•  '''■^ 

,,;  Ovey  iii.  323,  324,  329,  338 


V.  Schooner  Lady  Horatia 
Pritchett  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Probart  v.  Knouth 
Proctor  V.  Jones 

V.  Keith 

V.  Moore 

V.  Nicholson 

I'.  Sargent 
Profilet  V.  Hall 
Propert  v.  Parker 


i.  84 

ii.  484 

i.  338 

iii.  47 

i.  536 

iii.  394,  397,  409 

ii.  161,  167 

ii.  890 

ii.  160 

iii.  6 


ii.  10,  11 


i.  631 

iii.  113 

iii.  96 

ii.  552 

ii.  5«7 

i.  408 

ii.  639 

ii.  45,  46 

ii.  837 

i.  556 

iii.  27 

ii.  421 

ii.  519 


Proprietors  of  Canal  Bridge  v.  Gor- 

don  ,  ^  >•  154 

Proprietors  of  Ken.  Purchase  v.  La- 

boree  .      "i"  ^^^ 

Proprietors   of  Trent   Navigation   r. 

Wood  ii-  169,  I'O,  180 

Proprietors,    &c.    Credit    Co.    v.   Ar 

duin 
Prosser  v.  Edmonds 

V.  Hooper  i 

Protection  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hall 
V.  Montefiore 
V.  Wilson 
Prouty  V.  Roberts 

V.  Ruggles 
Providence,  The  ... 

Providence  Bank  v.  Billings    ui.  48b  488, 

498,  502 

V  Frost  "'•  1'"^*^ 

Providence  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Martin  ii.  619 
Providence,  &c.  Co.  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 

Co  "■ 

Providence,  &c.  R.  Co.   v.  Yonkers 


i.  508 

i.  251,  253 

638;  ii.  811 

ii.  491 

ii.  297,  525 

iii.  482,  490 

i.  294 

ii.  315 

ii.  458 


878 
ii.  397,  506 


Ins.  Co 
Providentia,  The 
Provincial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Leduc 
Provost  V.  Wilcox 
Prugnell  v.  Gosse 
Pruman  i'.  Hardin 
Pruyn  v.  INIilwaukee 
Pryke  v.  Waddingham 
Puckett  r.  Reed 

V.  Smith 

V.  United  States 

Pudor  V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co. 

Pugh  V.  Bussed  111.  391,  39o.  508 

%.  Chesseldine  .      "•  ^89 

V  Currie  ^-  l"^'  1'" 

V.  Duke  of  Leeds  ii.  486,  635,  795,  797 


ii.  549 
ii.  519 
i.  65 
ii.  392 
ii.  888 

i  579 
iii.  113 
iii.  335 

i.  568 
iii.  201 

i.  638 

ii.  277 


V.  Durfce 

i<.  Good 
Pulbrook  I'.  Lawes 
Pulcifer  v.  Page 
Piillcn  V.  Shaw 
Pnllian  v.  I'ensonnoau 
Pulling  '•.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co. 

V.  Tucker 


111 


i.  292 
5-18 
ill.  38 
ii.  145 
ii.  8.59 
ii.  840 
i.  144 
iii.  442 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxix 


Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  £ 

smiti 

ii 

15(J 

V.  Taylor 

ii 

237 

Pulsifer  r.  Hotchkiss 

i 

495 

Pulte  V.  Derby 

ii 

338 

Piilteney  v.  Shelton 

iii 

328 

Pultne}'  V.  Keymer               i 

102 

;  iii. 

293 

Pulver,  In  re 

iii. 

428 

457 

Pulvcrtoft  V.  Pulvertoft 

iii. 

317 

Pupkcy  V.  Resolute,  &c.  Ins. 

Co. 

ii. 

477 

Purcell  i\  Miner 

iii. 

347 

Purchell  v.  Salter 

ii. 

882, 

1)38 

Purdew  v.  Jackson 

iii. 

437 

Purtly  V.  Delavan               ii. 

831, 

832, 

834 

;;.  Philips 

iii. 

111 

Purser  v.  Brain 

ii 

371 

Pursley  v.  Hays 

i. 

367 

Purviance  v.  Sutherland 

i. 

212 

Purvis  V.  Rayer 

ii. 

334 

Pusey  V.  Clemson 

ii. 

852 

V.  Pusey 

iii. 

329 

Putnam  v.  Dutch 

ii. 

395 

V.  Farnham 

ii.  10 

V.  French 

ii. 

745 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co. 

i.  5S 

;  ii. 

471 

V.  Putnam 

ii. 

724 

J.  Ritchie 

iii. 

238 

V.  Story                   i.  253 

474 

;  iii. 

431 

V.  Sullivan 

i. 

308 

t'.  Tennyson 

i. 

384 

V.  Tillotson 

ii. 

409, 

008 

V.  Wise 

i. 

174, 

183 

V.  "Wood 

ii. 

422, 

423 

Pye,  Ex  parte 

iii. 

315 

V.  Daubuz 

iii. 

427 

Pyke  V.  Thomas 

ii. 

890 

Pyle,  &c.  V.  Cravens 

i. 

334 

Q. 


Quackenbush  v.  Danks 

r.  Sawyer 
Quantock  v.  England 
Quarles  v.  Brannon 

V.  George 

V.  Quarles 
Quarman  v.  Burnett 
Quarrier  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Quebec  Ins.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  ii.  564 

Queen  i".  Inhabitants  of  Stoke-upon- 

Trent  ii.  668 

V.  L.  &  S.  Railway  Co.  ii.  938 

V.  Nevill  ii.  034 

Queiroz  v.  Trueman     i.  102 ;  iii.  258,  278 


iii.  505 

i.  183 

iii.  68,  108 

iii.  126 

ii.  801 

i.  458 

i.  118,  119,  120 

ii.  576 


Quclin  V.  Moisson 
Quick  V.  Luilborrow 
Quigley  v.  De  Haas 

V.  Thompson 
Quimby  v.  Hazen 

V.  Putnam 

V.  Cook 
Quince  v.  Callender 
Quincey  v.  Quincey 

V.  vSliarpe 
Quincy,  Ex  parte 


iii.  406 

ii.  664,  852 

i.  69;  ii.  048 

ii.  909 

iii.  254 

iii.  91 

iii.  101 

ii.  715 

ii.  603 

iii.  76 

i.  547 


Quincy  ?•.  Hall  iii.  105 

V.  Quincy  i.  395 

V.  Tilton  i.  054;  ii.  812 

Quincy  Bank  i-.  Ricker  i.  300 

Quinebaug  Bank  v.  Tarbox  ii.  866 

Quinn  V.  Davis  i.  550 

V.  Fuller  i.  211 


R. 


Raba  v.  Ryland  iii.  290 

Rabaud  v.  De  Wolf  ii.  78 

Ral)one  v.  Williams  11.  883,  884 

Racehorse,  The  ii.  426 

Rack  ham  v.  Marriott  iii.  75 

Rackstraw  v.  Imber  i.  185 

Radford  v.  Smith  i.  572,  580 

Ratlley  r.  Manning  iii.  124,  135 

Rae  V.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  ii.  184 

RafFerty  v.  New  Brun.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  546,  547 
Raffin.  Ex  parte  iii.  298 

Ragan  v.  Kennedy  i.  569 

Ragg  V.  King  ii.  459 

Ragsdale  z\  Memphis  R.  Co.  ii.  47 

i.  558 
Irving    St. 

i.  546 

i.  280 

iii.  16,  17 

ii.  248 

ii.  236 

ii.  232 

iii.  187 

iii.  487 

iii.  506 

ii.  270 

ii.  257 

i.  291 

ii.  319 

i.  66 

ii.  9,  918 

ii.  246 

ii.  853 

ii.  900 

i.  337 

ii.  931,  932 

i.  338 

i.  94 

ii.  6C9;  iii.  264,271 

iii.  44 


V. 


Raliilly  v.  Wilson 
Rahway    Sav.   Inst. 

Church 
Raiguel  v.  Ayliff 
Raikes  v.  Todd 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Aspell 

V.  Barrow 

V.  Campbell 

V.  Finney 

t'.  Georgia 

V.  Hecht 

V.  Lockwood 

V.  Manuf.  Co. 

V.  National  Bank 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Trimble 
Railton  v.  Hodgson 

V.  Mathews 
Railway  Co.  v.  Vallely 
Rainbolt  v.  Eddy 
Rainey  i'.  Capps 
Rainsford  v.  Fenwick 

V.  Smith 
Rainwater  v.  Durham 
Raisin  v.  Clark 
Raitt  V.  Mitchell 
Rake  v.  Pope 
Raleigh  v.  Atkinson 
Ralli  V.  Janson 
Ralph  V.  Brown 
Ralston  v.  Smith 

V.  The  State  Rights 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 
Ramaley  v.  Leland 
Ram   Coomar    Coondoo  i 

Canto  Mookerjee 
Ramdulollday  v.  Darieux 
Ramires  v.  Kent 
Rammelsberg  v.  Mitchell 
Ramsay  v.  George 

V.  Joyce 


434; 


i.  74 
ii.  489 
ii.  866 
ii.  308 
iii.  185 
ii.  507 
ii.  160 
Chunder 

ii.  908 
i.  307 
i.  448 
i.  172 
i.  383 
1.411 


clxx 

r.ainsbotlmm  v.  Cator 
Kauisbottoni  v.  Gosden 
liamsilale  r.  Ilortou 
Kauisdell  v.  Maxwell 

c.  Morgan 

V.  Sigerson 
Ramsden  i'.  Ilylton 
Kanisour  v.  Tlioinas 
Ranay  v.  Alexander 
Raud  ( .  Hubbard 

V.  llubbell 

V.  Matlier 

V.  The  Barge 
Randall  v.  Harvey 

V.  Howard 

V.  Kchlor 

r.  Kolsey 

V.  Lynch 

V.  ^loon 

V.  Morgan 

V.  New  son 

V.  Randall 

V.  Raper 

V.  Rhodes 

r.  Snyder 

V.  Sweet 

V.  Van  Vechten 

V.  Wilkms 

V.  Willis 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


i.  286  1 
iii.  312 
ii.  loo 
i.  541 
iii.  i;]7 
iii.  382,  403 
ii.  034 
ii.  705 
i.  580 
i.  271 
i.  150 
i.  486 ;  iii.  20 
ii.  302 
i.  471 
ii.  014 
i.  02 
iii.  23 
ii.  425 
ii.  750 
ii.  76  ;  iii.  33 
i.  G30  ;  iii.  219 
i.  390  ;  ii.  02 
iii.  227 
i.  033 
i.  58 
i.  3o8 
i.  52,  72, 122,  155 
iii.  103 
iii.  862 


11. 


Randel  v.  Chesapeake  &  Delaware 

Canal  Co. 
Randle  v.  Harris 

;•.  Fuller 
TXandle^on,  Ex  parte 

V.  Murray 
Rangely  v.  Spring 
Ranger  v.  Carey 
Rankcn  v.  Reeve 
Rankin  v.  Am.  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Black  well 
V.  Huskisson 
V.  I. odor 
r.  Matthews 
V.  Rotter 
V.  Scott 
V.  Simpson 
V.  Wood  worth 
Ranking  v.  Barnard 
Rann  v.  Home  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Huglics 
Ranney  v.  Edwards 
Rannie  v.  Irvine 
Ransom  v.  Mayor  of  N.  Y. 
Ransome  v.  Bentall 
Hanson  ?•.  Mack 
r.  Sherwood 


ii.  844 

11;  iii.  27 

ii.  875 

i.  7(i3 

i.  120 

ii.  940 

i.  290,  290 

ii.  535 

478,  497 

ii.  800 

iii.  331 

iii.  882 

i.  524 

ii.  505 

iii.  254 

iii.  343 

iii.  100 

iii.  420 

ii.  551 

i.  7,  457 

ii.  843 

ii.  890 

ii.  815,  327 

ii.  355 

i.  321 

i.  284 


Rapelye  v.  Anderson    i.  291 ;  iii.  I'j3.  l-J'; 

r.  Bailey 

?■.  Mackie 
Raphael  r.  Bank  of  Eng. 

V.  Birdwood 

V.  Boehm 

V.  Pickford 

?•.  Thames  Valley  R.  Co. 
Rapid,  The 


i.  506 
i.  289 
ii.  400 
i.  137 

ii.  ino 

ii.  307 
ii.  443 


Rapier  v.  Holland 
Rapp,  Ex  parte 
V.  Latham 
V.  Palmer 
V.  Rapp 
Rashleigh,  Ex  parte 
Ratcliffe  v.  Allison 

r.  Planters  Bank 
Rateau  v.  Bernard 
Rathbone  v.  Orr 
Rathbun  v.  Payne 
Rattary  v.  Cook 
Rat  toon  v.  Overacker 
Ratzer  r.  Ratzer 
Raubitschek  v.  Blank 
Raux  V.  Brand 
Ravee  v.  Farmer 
I  Raw  V.  Cutten 
Rawley  )'.  Rawley 
Rawlings  v.  Bell 
Rawlins  v.  Goldfrap 
V.  Jenkins 
V.  Van  Dyke 
Rawlinson  v.  Oriet 
V.  Pearson 
V.  Shaw 
V.  Stone 
Rawson  v.  Johnson 
V.  Spencer 
V.  Walker 
Rawstorne  v.  Gandell 
l^ay.  Ex  parte. 

V.  Bank  of  Kentucky 
V.  Catlett 
V.  Sherwood 
V.  Wi!,ht 
Raymond  v.  Bearnard 
r.  Fitch 

V.  Loyd  1 

1-.  Pritchard 
i;.  Proprietors  of  Crown 

Mills 
V.  Roberts 
V.  Tyson 
Rayne  v.  Orton 
Rayner  r.  Grote 
V.  Mitchell 
r.  Stone 
Rayncs  v.  Bennett 
Raynor  v.  Linthorne 

V.  Nims 
Rea  r.  Cutler 
V.  Durkee 
IK  Gibbons 
Reab  v.  Moor 
Read,  Ex  parte 
V.  Bonham 
t;.  Cutts 
r.  Dupper 
V.  ICarle 
V.  Goldring 
V.  Cranberry 
1-.  Hull  of  a  New  Brig 
V.  Legard 
V.  Long 


ii.  877 
iii.  420 
i.209 
ii.  672 
ii.  624 
iii.  470 
iii.  343 
i.  308 
i.  570 
ii.  318 
247,  248, 431 
i.  563 
i.  140 
i.  174 
iii.  18 
iii.  78 
ii.  836 
iii.  421,  428 
ii.  882 
ii.  916 
i.  352 
ii.  633 
347,  393,  401 
ii.  863 
iii.  416 
ii.  852 
i.  271 
i.  577,  578 
iii.  483 
iii.  426 
ii.  749 
iii.  467 
iii.  354 
ii.  900 
ii.  727 
iii.  471 
ii.  773 
i.  144 
337,  344,  348 
iii.  3G8 
&  Eagle 

i.08 

ii.  034 

ii.  413 

i.  29 

i.  70 

i.  113 

iii  327 

i.  387 

iii.  11 

iii.  181 

ii.  445 

i.  394,  39G 

ii.  837 

ii.  36,  39 

iii.  421 

ii,  511 

ii.  32 

ii.  875 

i.  387 

ii.  773,  777 

ii.  667 

ii.  384 

i.  390 

iii.  316 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


clxxi 


Read  v.  Nash 

i\  Passer 

V.  Power 

V.  Uann 

V.  Spaulding 

V.  Taft 

V.  Teakle 
Reade  v.  Com.  lus.  Co. 

V.  Lacy 

V.  Lamb 

V.  Livinirston 
Readinj;  v.  Hlackwell 
Ready  v.  Noakes 
Reakcrt  i\  Saiiford 
Real  Estate  Co.  v.  Keech 


iii.  26 
ii.  82 

iii.  337 

i.  110;  ii.  65i 

ii.  172 

i.  480 

i.  391 

ii.  533 

ii.  342,  343 

iii.  64 

i.  410 

i.  150 

iii.  316 
i.  392 

iii.  124 


Ileal  Estate  Ins.  Co.  v.  Roessle  ii.  470,  540 

Ream  r.  Rank  iii.  240 

Reancy  v.  Cidbertson  i.  41 

Reay  v.  White  ii.  770 

Rebecca,  The  ii.  183,  407,  432,  454 

Reddick  v.  Jones  i.  292 

Redding  r.  Hall             i.  537 ;  ii.  136,  133 

V.  Wilkes  iii.  3.50 

Redfield  v.  Holland  ii.  561 

V.  Middleton  ii.  348 

Redhead  i'.  Cator  ii.  32 

Redman  i".  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii.  552 

V.  Redman  ii.  78 

V.  Wilson  ii.  405,  529 

Redmon  v.  Phoeni.x  Ins.  Co.  ii.  554 

Redmond  v.  Liverpool,  &c.  Steamship 

Co.  ii.  208 

Red  Oak  Bank  v.  Orvis  i.  312 

Redpath  v.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  287 

Red  Rover,  The  ii.  442 

Reece  v.  Allen  iii.  378 

Reech  r.  Kennegal  iii.  3.53 

V.  Kennigate  iii.  353 

Reed  v.  Ashburnham  R.  Co.  i.  48 

V.  Bartlett  ii.  823 

V.  Boardman  ii.  7G3 

V.  Bostick  iii.  285 

V.  Canfield  ii.  463 

V.  Chambers  iii.  338 

V.  Clark  ii.  73 

V.  Cole  ii.  476,  404 

V.  Cutter  ii.  304,  303 

V.  Evans  iii.  17 

17.  FuUum  ii.  17;  iii.  15 

V.  Garvin  ii.  4 

V.  Hodges  iii.  332 

V.  Holcomb  iii.  22 

I".  Howard  i.  235 

I'.  Jewett  i.  569,  611 

V.  Kilburn  Co-operative  Society 

ii.  790 

V.  Latham  i.  75 

V.  Marsh  i.  303 

V.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  ii.  550 

V.  M(jore  i.  393 

V.  Murphy  i.  268 

V.  Noe  i.  525 

V.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.  ii.  74 

V.  Rann  ii.  654 

V.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.  ii.  600 


Reed  ?'.  Shaw 

V.  Siiejiardson 
V.  Smitli 
V.  Taylor 
V.  Ui)ton 
V.  While 


ii.  849 
i.  231,  234 
iii.  120 
iii.  400 
ii.  756 
ii.  390 


V.  Williamsburg  Ins.  Co.  ii.  561 

V.  Wilmott  i.  569 

V.  Wilson  i.  313 

V.  Wood  i.  589,  633 

Reeder  v.  Craig  ii.  9.33 

V.  Purdy  iii.  188 

V.  Saj're  i.  548 

Recdic  v.  Lond.  &  North  Western  Rail- 
way Co.  i.  116,  120 
V.  Seixas  i.  322 
Rees  V.  Lines  ii.  60 
V.  Ovcrbaugh                                ii.  856 
Reese  r.  Bradford                                 i.  231 
Reeside,  Schooner       ii.  183,  427,  671,  677 
V.  Knox                                           i.  280 
Reeve  v.  Bird                                 i.  543,  544 
V.  Parkins                                       i.  230 
Reeves  v.  Capper              ii.  125,  128,  401 ; 
iii.  254,  288 
V.  Hearne                                     ii.  819 
V.  Reeves                                          ii.  88 
V.  The  Ship  Constitution    ii.  131,  428 
Regina  r.  Ambergate,  &c.  R.  Co.      ii.  943 
V.  Basingstoke                               ii.  938 
V.  Millis                                    ii.  84,  85 
V.  Smith                                     ii.  44,  54 
V.  Welch  ii.  49 
u.  Wheeler                                      i.  547 
Rehoboth  v.  Hunt                               iii.  481 
Reid  V.  Barber                                       i.  616 
V.  Darby                                         ii.  398 
V.  Fairbanks                                  ii.  380 
I'.  Harvey                                     ii.  522 
V.  IloUinsliead        i.  106,  176;  iii.  289 
V.  Iloskins                             ii.  425,  808 
V.  McNanghton                              iii.  89 
V.  Morrison                                      i.  311 
V.  Rensselaer  Glass  Factory    iii.  110, 

111 
Reif  V.  Page  ii.  802 

Reilly  v.  Jones  iii.  172,  174 

V.  Smith  i.  230 ;  iii.  370 

Reiman  v.  Hamilton  i.  387 

Reimers  v.  Ridner  i.  597 

Reinheimer  v.  Hemmingway  i.  236 

Reinicker  v.  Smith  i.  435;  iii.  373 

Reisli  V.  Tliompson  ii.  G6 

Reitz  V.  People  iii.  463 

Pelf  r.  Ship  Maria  i.  442  ;  ii.  464,  405,  466 
Reliance,  The  ii.  461 

Relle  V.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  294 

Remelee  v.  Hall  iii.  203 

Remer  i>.  Downer  i.  318 

Remick  i-.  O'lvyle  i.  30.9 

(.'.  Sanford  i.  685;  iii.  50,  51 

Remington  v.  Harrington  i.  318 

V.  Palmer  iii.  38 

Remington    Sewing  Machine   Co.   v. 
Kezertee  ii-  8 


clxxii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Eernnants  in  Court 
lieiuon  V.  Ilayward 
Kcnard  c.  Sampson 
Renaux  r.  Teakle 
Renew  i\  Butler 
Renitrer  r.  Fogossa 
RennelL  r.  Kimball 


ii.  384 

ii.  (38G 

I'i.  420,  G78 

j.  388,  ;]S9 

i.  i:]7 

i.  6  ;  ii.  605 

ii.  390,  453 


Renner  v.  Bank  of  Columbia  i.  313;  ii.  GOD 

Rennick  (-.  Ficklin  i.  30G 

Rennie  r.  Robinson  ii.  940 

Reno  V.  Hogan  ii.  256,  207 

Renouil  ;•.  r)ai>kam  i.  .532 

Rentcria  r.  Ruding  i.  328 

Renton  v.  Cliaplin  i.  221 

Renwicdv  !'.  Williams  i.  293;  iii.  451 

Reppert  v.  Colvin  iii.  91 

Repplier  v.  Orrich  iii.  382 

Rerick  r.  Hearn  iii.  314 

Reserve  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kane  ii.  BOG 

Resli  V.  Bank  ii.  113 

Resor  (;.  Johnson  ii.  52 

Resultatet,  The  ii.  442 

Reusse  v.  Meyers  ii.  396 

Reutch  V.  Long  iii.  39 

Reuter  v.  Electric  Tel.  Co.  ii.  291 

V.  Sala  i.  572 ;  ii.  790 

Revens  ?;.  Lewis  ii.  389,  454 

Revenue  Cutter,  The  ii.  384 

Rew  V.  Pettet  i.  136 

Rex  i\  Adderley  ii.  797 

V.  Allen  iii.  125 

V.  Bellringer  i.  100 

V.  Birdbrooke  ii.  37 

V.  Bower  i.  100 

V.  Brampton  ii.  39,  729 

V.  Brotherton  ii.  898 

r.  Butterton  ii.  939 

V.  Carlile  ii.  930 

V.  Christ's  Parish  ii.  36 

V.  Cole  i.  354 

r.  Collector  of  the  Customs        ii.  387 

V.  Cording  iii.  253 

V.  Cumberland  ii.  797 

V.  Do  Hales  Owen  ii.  55 

V.  Friend  i.  .347 

V.  Girdwood  ii.  025 

V.  Great  Ijorden  ii.  36 

V.  Great  Wigston  i.  354 

f.  Gutch  i.  114 

V.  Hanger  ii.  129 

r.  Ilarborne  ii.  613 

r.  Hay  ii.  013 

V.  Hertford  ii.  99 

V.  Ilumphery  ii.  154;  iii.  284 

I'.  Ivens  ii.  101 

V.  Laindon  ii.  087 

r.  Lolley  ii.  730 

V.  Lr)ndonthorpe  i.  547 

V.  Maiinvaring  ii.  633 

i\  Manning  i.  234 

V.  Mary  Mead  i.  398 

V.  Miller  i.  100 

t^.  Miinden  i.  351 

V.  Nutt  i.  114 

V.  Pedley  i.  120 


Rex  V.  Robinson 
V.  Scanmionden 
V.  Sedgley 
V.  Shatton 
I'.  Stevens 
V.  St.  Mary's 
V.  Twyning 
V.  Varlo 
V.  Webb 
V.  Westwood 
V.  Wliitnash 
Re3'man  r.  Moslier 
Reynell  r.  Lewis 
Reyner  v.  Hall 
Reynolds,  Ex  parte 


iii.  449 

u.  685,  687 

ii.  646 

i.  Ill 

ii.  797 

ii.  644 

ii.  012 

i.  160 

i.  162 

i.  100 

ii.  899 

iii.  06 

i.  48,  168 

ii.  536 

iii.  420,  422,  428 


V.  Commerce  Ins.  Co.  ii.  544 
V.  Douglass                        i.  326;  ii.  16 

V.  Doyle  iii.  98 

V.  Fenton  ii.  7-38 

r.  Lounsburg  ii.  936 

V.  Magness  ii.  687 

V.  McCurry  i.  363 

V.  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  iii.  4.36 

V.  Nelson  iii.  341 
V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.         ii.  445,  508,  537 

V.  Piidiowe  ii.  823 

V.  Railroad  i.  642 

V.  Robinson  i.  385 

J'.  Rowley  i.  42 

r.  Rucknian  i.  172 

r.  Shuler  i.  548,  553 

V.  Stevenson  ii.  901 

I'.  Sweetzer  i.  346 
V.  Toppan                  i.  181 ;  ii.  194,  195 

V.  Waller  i.  435 

Rhea  v.  Rhenner  i.  407 

Rhine  v.  Ellen  ii.  934 
Rhiiielandor  r.  Ins.  Co.  of  Penn.       ii.  501 

Rhines  v.  Phelps  i.  612 

Rhoades  r.  Castnet  iii.  18 

Rhodes,  Ex  parte  ii.  875 

V.  Amsinck  i.  206 

V.  Forwood  i.  75 

V.  Ibbetson  iii.  371 

r.  Lindly  i.  279 

V.  Rhodes  iii.  348,  350 

V.  Thuaites  i.  566 

Rice,  Ex  parte  iii.  418 

V.  Austin  i.  108,  232 
r.  Barnard                i.  168,  231 ;  ii.  745 

V.  Barrett  i.  193 

V.  Bixleo  i.  468 

V.  Churchill  ii.  783 

V.  Courtis  ii.  719 

V.  Dwight  Man.  Co.  ii-  39 

r.  Forsvth  i.  616 

f.  Gist'  ii.  896 

V.  (iordon  i.  523 

V.  Groffman  i.  59 

V.  Hart  ii.  210 

V.  Homer  ii.  505 

V.  King  iii.  201 

V.  Mather  iii.  153 

V.  Maxwell  iii.  477 

V.  McMartin  i.  231 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxxiii 


Rice  V.  New  England  Ins.  Co.   ii.  523,  524 

V.  Puet  i.  4S4 

V.  Ricliards  i.  227 

V.  Sims  i.  478 

V.  Stearns  i.  2ny 

V.  Tavernier  i.  01 

V.  Tower  ii.  489,  575 

V.  Welling  ill.  125 

V.  Wood  i.  04 

Rich  V.  Aldrert  ii.  10:3 

V.  Basterfield  i.  120 

V.  Jackson  i.  524;  iii.  312,  354 

V.  Kneeland  ii.  180 

V.  Lambert  ii.  184,  407 

V.  Lippincott  ii.  314,  315 

V.  Lord  ii.  634,  851 

V.  Parker  ii.  518 

V.  Smith  i.  538 

V.  Topping  iii.  118 

Richard  Busted,  The  ii.  381,  383,  385 

Richards  v.  Brockenbrough        ii.  826,  827 

V.  Brown  iii.  116,  14!) 

V.  Clark  ii.  797 

V.  Drinker  ii.  828 

V.  Hazzard  iii.  382 

V.  Hudson  iii.  409 

V.  James  ii.  882 

V.  London,  &c.  Railway     ii.  189,  202, 

212 

V.  Maryland  Ins.  Co.                   iii.  427 

V.  Merriam  iii.  427 

r.  Porter  iii.  5,  6 

V.  Richards  ii.  91 

Richardson,  Ex  parte  iii.  474 

In  re  iii.  460 

V.  Boright  i.  307,  368 

V.  Brown  i.  022 

V.  Clark  ii.  394 

V.  Duncan  i.  443,  444 

V.  Farmer  i.  189 

V.  Fen  iii.  69,  70 

V.  French  i.  205 

V.  Goddard  ii.  200,  208,  410 

V.  Goss    i.  647,  654;  iii.  257,  271,  2«3 

V.  Hogg  i.  242 

V.  Jackson  ii.  779 

V.  Jojmson  i.  617 

V.  Langridge  i.  548 

V.  Lester  i.  200 

V.  Lincoln  i.  299 

V.  Maine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  425,  490,  501,  5-31 

V.  Martyr  i.  281 

V.  Mellish  i.  469 

V.  Moies  i.  48 
V.  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  249 

V.  Nourse  ii.  840 

V.  Pierce  iii.  43 

V.  Rardin  i.  508 

V.  Richardson  i.  260  ;  iii.  106 

V.  Rickman  ii.  820 

V.  Ridgley  iii.  293.  295 

V.  liohbins  iii.  29 

V.  Scott  River  Co.                i.  153,  1-50 

V.  Stodder  i.  411 

V.  Strong  i.  43G;  iii.  414 


I  Richardson  )'.  Watson  ii.  090 

V.  Wiiiting  ii.  454 

V.  Williamson  i.  09 

V.  Wil.  &  Man.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  248 

V.  Wyatt  i.  170 

Riches  i-.  Brigges  ii.  108,  109 

Riclimond  v.  Dubuque,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  319 

V.  Roberts  ii.  66 

i>.  Smith  ii.  156.  157,  159 

V.  Union  Steamboat  Co.  ii.  207 

Richmond  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Stark  i.  52 

Richmond  R.  R.  Co.  v.  The  Louisa 

R.  R.  Co.  iii.  490,  493,  494 

Richmond  Trading,  &c.  Co.  v.  Farquar 

i.  024 
Richmondville  Seminary  ik  McDonald 

i.  161 
Richmondville    Union    Seminary    v. 

Hamilton  Ins.  Co.  ii.  557,  582 

Richtcr  v.  Poppenhusen  i.  227 


Rickard  v.  Kohl 

ii.  881 

Ricker  v.  Cross 

ii.  395 

Rickert  v.  Snyder              iii. 

240 

243,  244 

Rickets  v.  Dickens 

i.  615 

Rickctson  v.  Compton 

i.  132 

Ricketts  v.  Bell 

iii.  371 

V.  Pendleton 

i.  812 

V.  Weaver 

i.  144 

Rickford  v.  Ridge 

ii.  755 

Rickman  v.  Carstairs 

ii.  484 

Ricks  V.  Dillahunty              i. 

615, 

610,  023 

Ricord  v.  Bettcnham 

ii.  447 

Riddell  v.  Sutton 

i.  143 

Riddle  v.  Backus 

iii.  41 

V.  Bowman 

i.  82 

V.  Brown 

iii.  37 

I'.  Littlefield 

i.  530 

V.  Rosenfeld 

ii.  764 

V.  Varnum 

i.  566 

V.  Welden 

i.  553 

Riddlesbarger  v.  Hartford  Ins.  C 

3.   ii.  588 

Riddlesden  v.  Wogan 

ii.  88 

Rider  v.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.       ii. 

875 

;  iii.  288 

V.  Pond 

ii.  661 

Rider  and  Fisher,  In  re 

ii.  829 

Ridgeley  v.  Crandall 

i.  335 

Ridgeway  v.  Day 

i.  316 

V.  Kennedy 

i.  579 

Ridgway  v.  English 

ii.  52 

V.  Hungerlord  Market  C 

0. 

ii.  36,  43 

V.  Ingram 

iii.  4,  15 

V.  I'Jiilip 

i.  193 

I'.  Wharton 

ii 

.  18,  343 

R id g way's  Appeal 

i.  175 

Ridley  v.  Gyde 

iii.  442 

V.  ]\IcNairy 

iii.  347 

Ridout  V.  Brough 

iii. 

4.39,  469 

Righy  V.  Hewitt                   ii 

250 

;  iii.  192 

Rigden  v.  Martin 

ii. 

842,  843 

V.  Wolcott 

iii.  180 

Riggs  V.  Doolcy 

iii.  102 

V.  Murray 

iii.  383 

V.  Price 

i.  280 

?;.  Waldo 

i. 

275,  284 

Right  V.  Bawden 

i.  649 

clxxiv 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Ei£;ht  V.  Bucknell 

ii.  9C2 

Robbins  v.  Eaton    i.  3G 

3,3G4 

,3G7 

,  368,  374 

V.  Cuthell 

1.49 

V.  Farley 

iii.  75 

V.  Darby 

i.  548 

V.  Fennel 

i.  90 

V.  Proctor 

ii.  931 

V.  Fuller 

i.  218 

Rigs  V.  Cage 

i.  76 

V.  Hay  ward 

i.  137 

Riley  v.  Carter 

ii.  885 

V.  Luce 

ii.  781 

V.  Cuthcll 

i.  50 

V.  Mount 

i. 

356,  532 

V.  Fanisworth 

iii.  12,  15 

Robert  i:  Garnie 

ii. 

763,  7G5 

V.  Gerrish 

i.  275 

V.  West 

i  409 

V.  Ilorne 

ii.  261,  273 

Robert  Fulton,  Ship 

ii. 

385,  863 

V.  iMallory 

i.  361 

Robert  Morris,  The,  v. 

Williamson  ii.  392 

i\  AVilliams 

iii.  15 

Roberts  v.  Barker 

i.  545;  ii. 

669,  677 

Riley's  Atliii'rs  v.  Vanhouten 

ii.  0.32 

V.  Beatty       ii.  783 

784, 

785, 

787,  794 

Eineliart  r.  Olwine 

iii.  22(j 

I'.  Berry 

iii. 

339,  341 

Ring  r.  P'ranklin 

ii.  396 

V.  Chenango  Co. 

ii. 

473,  553 

Ringgold  v.  Ringgold 

ii.  150 

V.  Cocke 

ii.  587 

Riplca  r.  Pope 

i.  309 

V.  Connelly 

ii.  76 

V.  Sergeant 

iii.  234 

I'.  Continental  Ins. 

Co 

ii.  543 

Ripley  ;•.  Cliipman 

ii.  39,  792 

V.  Eberliardt 

221,  230 

V.  Colby 

i.  1G5 

r.  Eden 

i.  285 

V.  Davis 

iii.  211 

V.  Fisher 

ii.  756 

V.  Etna  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  470,  522 

V.  Filler 

i.  184 

V.  Kingsbury 

i.  194,  204 

V.  Goff 

iii.  136 

t'.  IMcClure 

ii.  809 

V.  Hammon 

iii.  82 

V.  N.  J.,  &c.  R.  Co. 

ii.  246 

V.  Havelock 

i.  493;  ii. 

652,  653 

V.  Scaife 

ii.  422 

V.  Hughes 

i.  618 

V.  Watcrworth 

i.  169 

V.  Jenkins 

i.  635 

V.  AVoods 

iii.  437 

V.  Kelley 

i.  387 

Rippey  v.  Miller 

iii.  180 

i:  Kclsey 

i 

222 

;  iii.  322 

Risdale  v.  Newnliam 

ii.  521 

V.  Mackoul 

ii.  875 

Rising  v.  Granger 

iii.  202 

V.  Mariett 

ii.  836 

Rising  Sun,  The 

ii.  441 

V.  Marston 

i.  500 

Risley,  Succession  of 

ii.  610 

V.  Mason 

i.  316 

V.  l^lienix  Bank 

i.  256 

V.  Morgan 

i.  623 

V.  Kislcy 

i.  258 

I'.  Myers 

ii. 

333,  338 

Rison  V.  Wilkerson 

ii.  008 

V.  Ogilby 

ii.  218 

Riston  V.  Cobb 

ii.  681 

V.  Peake 

i.  280 

Ritchie  v.  Atkinson        i.  493  ; 

ii.  414.  G58 

V.  Riley 

ii.  256 

V.  Smith 

ii.  894 

V.  Rockbottom  Co. 

ii.  49;  iii.  43 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  508 

V.  Smith 

ii.  47 

i\  Willianis 

ii.  852 

V.  Spicer 

iii.  456 

Ritson  V.  Dodge 

iii.  311 

V.  Taft 

i.  319 

Rittenhouse  r.  Leigh 

i.  193 

V.  Thompson 

ii.  120 

Ritter  v.  Cushnian 

ii.  127 

V.  Tremoiile 

iii.  149 

V.  Phillips 

iii.  113 

V.  Trenayne 

iii. 

121, 

125,  147 

V.  The  Jamestown 

ii.  392 

V.  Tucker 

ii. 

50; 

ii.  14,  43 

Rittiniiouse  v.  Ind.  Line  of  Tel. 

ii.  290,  301 

i\  Turner 

ii. 

149,  191 

Ritts  V.  Hall 

ii.  318 

V.  Ward 

ii. 

307,  309 

Rivers  v.  Walker 

ii.  842 

r.  W^att 

ii. 

128,  137 

Rix  V.  Adams 

i.  472 

Robcrtshaw  r.  Ilanway 

i.  170 

c.  Strong 

ii.  787 

Robertson  v.  Baker 

i.  1G8 

Rixford  v.  Nye 

ii.  827,  835 

V.  Brcedlove 

i.  290 

V.  Smith 

ii.  173 

V.  Clarke 

ii.  G68 

Roach  V.  Chapman 

ii.  .381 

V.  Col.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  481 

r.  Garvan 

ii.  739 

V.  Deatherage 

i.  37 

V.  Perry 

i.  229 

V.  Ewell 

5.  5G9 

r.  Quick 

i.  S37,  383 

r.  French               ii 

478, 

626, 

633,  647 

V.  Thompson 

i.  33 

V.  Jackson 

ii. 

667,  672 

Roliaiina  v.  Armstrong 

i.  377 

V.  Kennedy 

ii. 

175, 179 

Robards  ?•.  Iliitson 

i.  407 

V.  Kensington 

i.  286 

Robb  V.  Halscy 

iii.  12:] 

?".  Kctclium 

i.  41 

r.  Montgomery 

ii.  GOO,  Gi)3 

V.  Liddell 

iii.  441 

Robbins  v.  Alexander 

ii.  749 

V.  Livingston 

i.  60 

V.  Bacon                         i.  245.  249,  257 

V.  Marcli 

i.  483 

V.  Cooper 

i.  232 

V.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins 

Co. 

ii.  617 

INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxxv 


Hobertson  v.  Money  ii.  068 

V.  Smith  i.  12,  28,  211 

V.  St.  Jolin  i.  532 

V.  Stnith  ii.  872 

V.  United  Ins.  Co.  ii.  480 

V.  Viuiglian  iii.  45,  62 

V.  Wes'tcM-n  Ins.  Co.  ii.  478 

Robeson  v.  French  ii.  902 

Uobinet  r.  Cobb  ii.  837 

Robinson  v.  Abcll  i.  274,  284 

V.  Alexander  iii.  96 

V.  Anderton  i.  615 

V.  Ashton  i.  17G 
V.  Baker                          ii.  223 ;  iii.  2(58 

v.*  Bakewell  iii.  176 

V.  Bank  of  Attica  iii.  443 
V.  Batchelder                ii.  685,  781,  782 
V.  Bland       ii.  700,  701,  713,  714,  719, 
887;  iii.  112,  105 

V.  Bien  i.  306 

V.  Campbell  iii.  237 
V.  Commonwealth  Ins.  Co.  ii.  396,  505, 

509 

V.  Cone  ii.  248,  250 

V.  Cook  ii.  775 
V.  Crowder              i.  200,  201 ;  iii.  409 

V.  Davison  ii.  805 

V.  Day  i.  308 

V.  Doolittle  ii.  705 

V.  Dunmore  ii.  176,  189 

I'.  Elliott  i.  613 

V.  Fiske  ii.  631 

V.  Frost  ii.  129 

V.  Gardner  ii.  104 

V.  Garth  iii.  12 

V.  Georges  Ins.  Co.  ii.  844 

V.  Gleadow  i.  66 

V.  Green  ii.  649 

V.  Greinold  i.  386 

V.  Ilarman  ii.  165,  245 

V.  Harvey  i.  617 

?;.  Ilawkcsford  i.  296 

V.  Hindnian  ii.  35 

V.  Hofman  i.  211 

V.  Jones  ii.  520,  931 

V.  Kettletas  iii.  352 

r.  Knights  ii.  415 

V.  Larrabee  iii.  254 

V.  Lotus,  The  ii.  392 

V.  Lyall  i.  84 

r.  Lyle  i.  38 

V.  Lyman  i.  290 

V.  Mansfield  iii.  291 

V.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  491 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  419,  420 

V.  McDonnel  i.  558 

V.  Moliett  ii.  672 

t'.  Moore  ii.  827 
V.  Musgrove  i.  524,  525,  582 
V.  Nahon                         i.  394,  395,  404 

r.  New  York  Ins.  Co.  ii.  58 

V.  Noble  iii.  208,  233 

V.  Nnrris  i.  Ill 

V.  Offutt  ii.  27 

V.  Page  iii.  371 


Robinson  v.  Perry  ii.  870 

V.  Prescott  ii.  740,  744 

V.  Price  ii.  447 

r.  Kaj)elye  iii.  382 

V.  Hed  Jacket,  Tlie  ii.  392 

V.  Reed  ii.  18 

V.  Reynolds  i.  300,  407 

V.  Rice  i.  610 
V.  Robinson            i.  137,  406  ;  ii.  877  ; 
iii.  200,  316 

V.  Skipwortli  i.  550 

V.  Snyder  ii.  649 

V.  Taylor  iii.  455 

V.  Thompson  i.  21 1 
V.  Threadgill           i.  477  ;  ii.  110,  112 

V.  Tobin  ii.  474 

V.  Turpin  ii.  204 

V.  Vale  iii.  470 

V.  Walker  i.  12 

V.  Walter  ii.  167 

V.  Ward  i.  120 

V.  Webb  i.  110 

V.  Weeks  i.  302 

V.  Wilkins  ii.  348 

V.  Wilkinson  i.  189 

V.  Yarrow  i.  47 
Robinson  Machine  Works  v.  Vorse  i.  87 
Robinson  Works  v.  Chandler    i.  515,  618, 

630 

Robison  v.  Gosnold  i.  395 

V.  Lyle  i.  37 

Robson  V. iii.  427 

V.  Bennet  i.  312;  ii.  755 

V.  Collins  iii.  344 

V.  Curlewis  i.  322 

V.  North  Eastern  R.  Co.  ii.  251 

Rocco  V.  Hackett  ii.  743 

Rochester  Bank  v.  Harris  i.  290 

Rockford  Bank  v.  Gaylord  ii.  31 

Rockwell  V.  Adams  ii.  939 

V.  Hobby  iii.  297,  432 

V.  Hubbell  iii.  508 

V.  Lawrence  iii.  358 

Rodes  V.  Blythe  iii.  161 

Rodger  v.  Comptoir  D'Escompte       i.  651 

Rodgers  v.  Jones  iii.  50 

V.  Niles  i.  630 

V.  Nowill  ii.  373,  376 

r.  Smith  i.  615 

V.  Torrant  ii.  319 

Rodman  r.  Hedden  iii.  200 

V.  Zilley  i.  522 

Rodney  v.  Strode  i.  28 

Rodocanachi  v.  Buttrick  i.  283 

V.  Elliott  ii.  470,  501 

Rodrigues  v.  Habersham  i.  633 

i-CMelhuish  ii.  409 

Rodriguez  v.  Hefferman  i.  09,  102 

Rod  well  V.  Phillips  iii.  35 

Roe,  The  ii.  438,  439 

V.  Arclibishops  ii.  940 

r.  Harrison  i.  539;  ii.  20 

V.  Mayley  i.  261 

V.  Prideaux  i.  88,  549 

V.  Tranmarr  ii.  635,  636,  637 


clxxvi 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Eoe  cl.  Diirant  v.  Doe  i.  548 
lloehner  v.  Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.   i.  281 ; 

ii.  797 

Roelandts  v.  Harrison  ii.  521 

Roffey,  III-  parte  iii.  467 

Roger  Williams  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carring- 

ton  ii.  471 

Rogers  v.  Allen  iii.  409 

V.  Atkinson  ii.  G7!) 

V.  Bachelor  i.  208 

r.  Boehm  i.  97 

V.  Bradsliaw  iii.  494 

V.  Buinpass  i.  380 

V.  Clifton  ii.  48;  iii.  177 

V.  Coleman  ii.  740 

r.  Colt  ii.  624 

V.  Currier  ii.  383 

V.  Eagle  Fire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  6;^5 

V.  Fales  iii.  176 

I'.  Hackett  i.  325 

V.  Hanson  iii.  223 

V.  Hurd  i.  335,  363 

V.  Kneeland  i.  49;  iii.  17 

V.  Langford  i.  298 

V.  Ludlow  i.  409 

V.  March  i.  55 

V.  Maylor  ii.  536 

V.  Mechanics  Ins.  Co.  ii.  451,  484,  485, 

600,  672,  674 

V.  Miller  _                i.  332 

V.  Nowill  ii.  370,  373,  376 

V.  Painter  i.  172 

V.  Palmer  i.  81 

V.  Parrcy  ii.  888 

V.  Pitcher  ii.  940 

V.  Rathbun  iii.  136 

V.  Rogers  i.  150;  ii.  93 

V.  Riuter  ii.  780 

V.  Saunders  iii.  342 

V.  Smith  i.  408 

V.  Snow  1.  539 

V.  Spenco  iii.  215,  453 

V.  St.  Charles,  The  ii.  429,  431,  433 

V.  Stephens  i.  463 

V.  Taintor  ii.  369 

V.  Traders  Ins.  Co.  i.  252 ;  ii.  482 

V.  Thomas  i.  639,  641,  643 

V.  Weir  ii.  153 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.         ii.  903 

V.  Wheeler  ii.  184 

Rogers,  &c.  Works  r.  Lewis  i.  579 

Rogerson  r.  Ladbroke  ii.  882 

Rohback  r.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  47 

Rohl  V.  Parr  ii.  428 

Rohr  V.  Kindt  iii.  247 

Rolirback  v.  Germania  ii.  561 

Roland  v.  Gundy  i.  556 

Rolfe  V.  Abbot  i.  340 

V.  Rolfe  iii.  323,  330,  331 

Roller  I'.  Woodridge  i.  130 

Rolleston  r.  Ilibbert  iii.  44:'>' 

V.  Smith  iii.  443 

Rollins  r.  Columbian  Ins.  Co.           ii.  574 

V.  Marsh  i.  152,  473 

V.  Moody  i.  542 


Rollins  V.  Mooers 

iii.  403 

V.  Stevens 

i.  210 

Rolls,  Ex  parte 

iii.  420 

V.  Yate 

i.  15,  31 

Rolt  V.  Watson 

i.  331 

Romaine  r.  Allen 

iii.  212 

Roman  v.  Serna 

ii.  3 

Romig  V.  Romig 

iii.  210 

Rommel  v.  Wingate 

i.  515,  565 

Romp,  The 

ii.  400 

Ronaldson  v.  Tabor 

i.  540 

Rondeau  v.  AVyatt 

iii.  59,  60,  62 

Rood  c.  Jones 

i.  470 

V.  W^inslow 

i.  444 

Roff  V.  Stafford 

i.  334 

Rooke  V.  Midland  Railway  Co.         ii.  212 

Roosevelt  V.  Hopkins  i.  539 

V.  Kellogg  ii.  710 

t'.  Mark  iii.  75,  463,  464 

Root  V.  Ball  ii  933 

V.  Crock  ii.  933 

V.  Godard  1.  301 

V.  Great  Western  R.  Co.  ii.  227 

V.  Lord  i.  578 

V.  Lowndes  iii.  179 

•  V.  Ren  wick  ii.  840 

V.  Taylor  ii.  876 

Rooth  V.  North  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.    ii.  270 

V.  Quinn  i.  202 

Taylor  ii.  876 

V.  W^ilson  ii.  100 

Roots  V.  Lord  Dormer  i.  525 

Roper  V.  Johnson  ii.  810 ;  iii.  223 

V.  Stone  i.  458 

V.  Williams  iii.  331 

Rosa  V.  Brotherson  i.  292 

Roscorla  v.  Thomas  i.  475,  502,  621 

Rose,  The  ii.  431 

V.  Beatie  i.  627,  628 

V.  Bowler  i.  143 

V.  Clarke  i.  251 

V.  Cunynghame  iii.  14 

;;.  l)an"iel  i.  370 

r.  Dickson  iii.  117 

V.  Hart  iii.  439,  469 

V.  Haycock  iii.  441 

V.  Izard  i.  167  ;  iii.  440 

V.  Poulton  i.  21,  180 

V.  Sims  iii.  439,  469 

V.  Spark  ii.  835 

V.  Story  i.  579 

V.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.  ii.  295 

V.  Williams  ii.  28 

Rosetto  V.  Gurney  ii.  418,  495,  510 

Rosevelt  v.  Fulton  ii.  926 

V.  Hopkins  i.  539 

Uoss,  Ex  parte  iii.  469 

V.  Active,  The  ii.  446,  456 

V.  Bradsliaw  ii.  593 

V.  City  of  Madison  i.  154 

V.  Cornell  i.  185 

t\  Green  ii.  896 

i\  Henderson  i.  167 

V.  Hill  ii.  169 

V.  Howell  i.  206 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxxvii 


Ross  V.  Jolinson  ii.  154 

V.  Knight  ii.  878 

V.  Parky ns  i.  174 

V.  Ross  ii.  701 ;  iii.  72 

V.  Sadgbeer  ii.  8'Jl 

V.  Tliwaite  ii.  484 

V.  Turner  1.  260 

V.  Welch  iii.  35 

Ross's  Ex'r  v.  McLauchlan's  Ad.       i.  4(57 

Rosse  V.  Bramsteed  ii.  167 

Rossiter  v.  Chester  ii.  215,  419 

V.  Miller  iii.  14 

V.  Rossiter  i.  64,  Gl) 

V.  Trafalgar  Life  A.  i.  90 

Roswell  y.  Vaughan  i.  615 

Rotch  ('.  Edie  ii.  501 

V.  Hawes  ii.  137 

Rotch's  Wharf  Co.  v.  Dudd  i.  155 

Roth  V.  Buffalo,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  212 

V.  Colvin  i.  289 

Rotliery  v.  Munnings  iii.  101 

Rothschild  v.  Corney  i.  296 

V.  Currie  i.  313,  314 

V.  Michigan,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  203 

Rothwell  V.  Humphreys  i.  203 

Rouch  V.  The  Great  Western  Co.  iii.  434, 

454,  458 

Rouquette  v.  Overmann  i.  308,  313 

Rourke  v.  White  Moss  Colliery  Co.    ii.  46 

Rouse  I'.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  531 

Rousset  ('.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  476 

Routh  V.  Thompson        i.  49 ;  ii.  389,  474, 

479,  480,  482 

Routledge  v.  Burrell  ii.  473,  521 

V.  Grant  i.  527,  562 

V.  Ramsay  ii.  471;  iii.  72 

Roux  V.  Salvador  ii.  503,  506,  512 

Rovena,  The  ii.  467 

Rover,  The,  v.  Stiles  ii.  392 

Row  V.  Dawson  i.  251 ;  iii.  300 

V.  Pulver  ii.  24,  26 

Rowan  v.  Kirkpatrick  i.  136  ;  iii.  422 

Rowan's  Appeal  iii.  362 

Rowe  V.  Bellaseys  iii.  149 

V,  Brig ii.  437,  440 

V.  Galliers  iii.  449 

V.  Hamilton  i.  406 

V.  Pickford  i.  647 

V.  Stevens  i.  94 

V.  Tipper  i.  323 

V.  Ware  i.  ^6 

V.  Young  i.  309 ;  ii.  770 

Rowena,  The  ii.  216 

Rowland  v.  Bull's  Ex'rs  iii.  143 

V.  State  i.  130 

Rowlandson,  Ex  parte  i.  180 

Rowley  v.  Ball  i.  331 

V.  Bigelow      i.  328,  643,  650  ;  ii.  409, 

937 
V.  Empire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

V.  Gibbs  iii.  115,  217 

V.  Houghton  ii.  370 

V.  Stoddard  i.  27,  28 

Rowning  v.  Goodchild  ii.  1-55 

Roworth  r.  Wilkes  ii.  342 


Rowton,  Ex  parte  iii.  427,  4-38,  452 

V.  Wiilink  iii.  357 
Royal   Bank  of   Scotland   v.  Cuth- 

bert  iii.  400 

Royal  Stewart,  The  ii.  404 

Royal,  &c.  Co.  v.  Braham  i.  153 
Royalton  v.  The  R.  &  W.  Turnoike 

Co.  *    iii.  201 

Royce  v.  Barnes  ii.  883 

Royster  v.  Johnson  i.  228 

Ruan  V.  Gardner  ii.  483 

Rubber  Company  v.  Goodyear  ii.  312,  321 

Rucher  v.  Conyngham  iii.  147 

Ruciiizky  v.  De  Haven  i.  362 

Rucker  v.  Alinut  ii.  535 

V.  Cammeyer  iii.  12,  13 

V.  Donovan  i.  642 

V.  Hannay  iii.  69 

V.  London  Ass.  Co.  ii.  488 

Ruckman  v.  Bergholz  i.  94 

V.  Bryan  ii.  897 

V.  Cowell  iii.  477 

V.  Mercliant  Ins.  Co.  ii.  397,  505,  507, 

508 

V.  Mott  ii.  420 

V.  Pitcher  ii.  760 

Rudd  V.  Planters  Bank  iii.  129 

Rudder  v.  Price  iii.  165 

Iludderow  v.  Huntington  ii.  373 

Rudge  V.  Birch  ii.  884 

Uuding  V.  Smith  ii.  698,  702,  729 

Rud(jlpli  V.  Wagner  ii.  777 

Iludston  V.  Yates  ii.  829 

Ruff  '•.  Bull  iii.  102 

llufRn,  Ex  parte  i.  227,  228,  240 

Rufford,  Ex  parte  iii.  468 

Rugglcs  )'.  Bucknor  ii.  423 

V.  General  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524,  525 

V.  Keeler  ii.  721  ;  iii.  104 

V.  Patten  i.  309 

Rugh  V.  Ottenheimer  iii.  499 

Rumball  v.  Metropolitan  Bank  ii.  936 

Rumney  v.  Keyes  i.  342,  394,  401 

Rumsey  v.  Berry  ii.  896 

Rundale  v.  La  Fleur  ii.  829 

Rundel  v.  Keeler  i.  353 

Rundell  v.  Murray  ii.  339,  348 

Rundle,  Ex  parte  iii.  467 

V.  Moore  i.  87,  353 

Runquist  v.  Ditchell  i.  59;  ii.  408 

Runyan  v.  Caldwell  ii.  134 

V.  Nichols  i.  128 

Runyon  v.  Montford  i.  316,  320 

Rupart  V.  Dunn  i.  627 

Rusby  V.  Scarlett  i.  47,  48,  52 

Ruse  V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  ii.  607,  614 

Rush  V.  Baker  iii.  426 

Rushforth  v.  Hadfield  ii.  129,  672,  675 

Rushton  V.  Crawley  ii.  309 

Rusk  ;;.  Fenton  i.  437 

Russel  V.  Asa  R.  Swift,  The  ii.  385 

V.  Field  ii.  864 

V.  Russel  iii.  297 

r.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  525 

Russell  V.  Allard  i.  540 


/ 


clxxviii 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Russell  V.  Babcock 
V.  Bell 
V.  Branham 
r.  Brooks 
V.  Buck 


11.  I 

iii.  439,  409 

ii.  915 

i.  385 

i.  474 


V.  Carrington   i.  564,  565,  567  ;  ii.  146 

V.  Clark  ii.  917 

V.  Coffin  ii.  635 

r.  Cowles  ii.  66 

V.  De  Grand     i.  489 ;  ii.  479,  481,  886 

I'.  Doty  iii.  464 

V.  Failor  •             i.  32 

V.  Fillmore  i.  612 

V.  Hankey  i.  91 

V.  Langstaffe  i.  272,  306 

V.  Livingston  ii.  178 

I'.  Miller  ii.  876 

V.  Nichols  i.  595 

V.  NicoU         i.  566,  603,  604,  606,  786 

V.  O'Brien  i.  568 ;  ii.  395 

V.  Ormsbee  ii-  784,  795 

V.  Palmer  i.  529  ;  iii.  204 

r.  Pellegrini  ii.  845,  847 

V.  Perkins  ii.  520 

V.  Phillips  i.  304 

V.  Pyland  ii.  897 

V.  Skipwith  i.  450 

I'.  Slade  iii.  41 

V.  Wiggin  i.  303;  ii.  485 

V.  Woodward  iii.  382 

Rust  V.  Gott  ii.  897 

r.  Larue  i.  128;  ii.  908 

r.  Nottidge  ii.  49 

Ruston  V.  Dun  woody  ii.  847 

Rutenberg  r.  Main  iii.  11 

Rutgers  v.  Hunter  i.  523 

V.  Lucet  ii.  51,  110 

Ruth,  Ex  parte  iii.  452 

Rutherford  v.  RuflF  i.  435  ;  iii.  373 

Rutland  Bank  v.  Buck  i.  292 

Rutland  Railroad  v.  Cole  i.  65 

Rutland  &  Burlington  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Crocker  ii.  635 

Rutter  r.  Blake  i.  636 

Ryall  V.  Rolle       ii.  128,  401,  443 ;  iii.  427 

Ryan  v.  Cumb.  Valley  R.  R.  Co.       ii.  46 

V.  Dorr  iii.  3 

V.  Goodwin  ii.  306,  307,  315 

V.  Hall  ii.  683 

V.  Martin  i.  132 ;  iii.  169 

V.  Rand  ii.  68() 

V.  Sans  i.  47,  404 

V.  Tomlinson  iii-  64 

V.  Trustees  ii.  5 

V.  Ward  iii.  749 

V.  Wilson  i.  536 

Ryberg  v.  Snell  i.  328,  6-52 ;  iii.  444 

Ryder,  In  re  i.  345,  347,  348 

V.  Hathaway  iii.  213 

V.  llulse  i.  383 

V.  Mansell  i.  541 

V.  Thayer  iii.  205 

V.  Wombwell  i.  337 

Ryerson  r.  Eldred  i.  540 

Ryerss  v.  Farwell  ii.  940 


Ryland  r.  Smith  iii.  437 

Kyle  r.  Brown  iii.  316 

Ryram  v.  Hunter  i.  308 


Sabel  V.  Slingluff  i.  381 

Saccum  v.  Norton  ii.  848 

Sackett  v.  Andross  iii.  385,  388 

r.  Johnson  ii.  56 

Saco  v.  Casanueva  ii.  934 

Saoo  Bank  v.  Sanborn  i.  319 

Saddington  v.  Kinsman        i.  381 ;  iii.  437 

Sadler  r.  Evans  i.  85,  86 

V.  Henlock  i.  113,  114 

V.  Hobbs  i.  29 

V.  Leigh  iii.  400 

V.  Nixon  i.  31,  34,  184 

V.  Robins  ii-  738 

Sadlers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Badcock     ii.  476,  574 

Sadlicr  v.  Biggs  i.  532 

Safford  V.  McDonough  iii.  50 

V.  Stevens  ii.  836 

Sage  r.  Brooklyn  ii.  832 

V.  M'Guire  iii.  348 

V.  Sleutz  i.  570 

V.  Strong  ii.  18 

V.  Wilcox  i.  6,  471;  ii.  7;  iii.  17 

Sageman  v.  Brandywine,  The  ii.  459 

Sager  v.  Portsmouth,  &c.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  174,  256,  259,  266 

Sainsbury  v.  Jones  i.  522  ;  iii.  359 

?'.  Matthews  iii.  34 

V.  Parkinson  i.  271 

Saint  r.  Pilley  i.  545 

St.  Alban  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Wilkins  ii.  39, 

792 

St.  Albans  Bank  v.  Wood  iii.  137 

St.  George  v.  Wake  i.  411 

St.  Jago  de  Cuba  ii.  381,  382,  459 

St.  John  V.  Am.  Ins.  Co.    ii.  572,  573,  606 

V.  P.encdict  iii.  374 

V.  Diffendorf  iii.  285 

V.  Garrow  iii.  92 

V.  Purdy  ii.  757 

V   Quitzlow  i.  541 

V.  St.  Jolm  i.  397 

r.  Van  Santvoord  ii.  230 

St.  Jolni's  Parish  v.  BronsoD  i.  388 

St.  Lawrence,  Tlie  ii.  384 

St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  v.  Glasgow  ii.  573 

St.  Louis,  &c.  Co.  V.  Parker  i.  59 

St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Lamed         ii.  227 

St.  Mary's  Church,  case  of  i.  160 

St.   Saviour's     Churchwardens     v. 

Smith  i.  260 

Saintcr  v.  Ferguson    ii.  890;  iii.  1G8,  174, 

307 
Salem  Bank  v.  Gloucester  Bank        i.  42  ; 

ii.  112 

V.  Thomas  i.  203 

Sales  1-.  Western  Stage  Co.  ii.  236 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxxix 


Salisbury,  In  re 

V.  Ilutcher 

V.  Howe 

V.  Marshall 

V.  Uenick 

V.  Stainer 
Salkeld,  Ex  parte 
Sallery  v.  Prindle 
Salley  Magee,  The 
Sallinger  i\  Simmons 
Salmon  v.  Davis 

IK  Smith 

V.  Wooton 


i.  149 

iii.  336,  3(36 

ii.  919 

i.  532,  633 

i.  317 

i.  028 

iii.  41(3 

i.  304 

i.  103;  ii.  411 

ii.  231 

i.  210 

i.  541 

ii.  864 


Salmon  Falls  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Goddard 

iii.  15 

I'.  Tangier  ii.  208,  415,  416,  427 

Salomon  v.  Hathaway  i.  580 

Saloucci  V.  Johnson  ii.  519 

Salte  V.  Field  i.  75,  653,  654 

Salter  v.  Burt         i.  313,  321 ;  ii.  783,  799 

V.  Ham  i.  106 

V.  Kid  ley  ii.  932 

Saltmarsh  v.  Planters  &  Merchants 

Bank  iii.  153 

V.  Tuthill  i.  289;  ii.  900 

Saltourn  r.  Houstoun  ii.  642 

Salt  Springs  Bank  v.  Burton  i.  311 

Saltus  V.  Everett  i.  328 ;  ii.  223 

•   )'.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  ii.  418,  505,  510 

Salvador  r.  Hopkins  ii.  532 

Samms  v.  Stewart  ii.  178 

Saiiion's  case  ii.  829,  830 

Sainpayo  v.  Salter  ii.  413,  419 

Sampson  v.  Clark  iii.  478 

V.  Easterby  ii.  642 

V.  Ohlyer  1.  130 

V.  Pattison  iii.  378 

V.  Security  Ins.  Co.  ii.  560 

V.  Smith  ii.  465 

Sams  V.  Stockton  i.  337 

Sam  Slick,  Tlie  ii.  384 

Samson  v.  Thornton  i.  274 

Samuel,  The  ii.  437,  439,  443 

V.  Berger  ii.  359,  363 

V.  Royal  Ex.  Ass.  Co.  ii.  488 

Samuel  Book,  In  re  i.  354 

San  Antonio  v.  Lane  i.  330 

San  Bernardo,  The  ii.  439 

Sanborn  r.  Benedict  i.  560 

V.  Fireman's  Ins.  Co.  ii.  470,  544 

V.  Flagler  iii.  9 

V.  French  i.  406 

V.  Little  i  254,  258 

V.  Murphy            .  ii.  838 

Sander  v.  Hoffman  ii.  893 

r.  Sander  iii.  414 

Sanders  v.  Branch  Bank  ii.  751 

V.  Etcherson  ii.  16 

V.  Filley  i.  498 

V.  Keber  i.  579,  580 

V.  Knox  ii.  762 

V.  Logan  ii.  305,  825,  328 

V.  Pope  iii.  327 

V.  Spencer  ii.  160 

V.  Stuart  iii.  193 


Sanderson  v.  Aston 
V.  Bell 
V.  Bowes 
V.  Bradford 
V.  Busher 


ii.  33 

ii.  747  ;  iii.  266 

i.  309 

iii.  409 

ii.  408 


V.  Cockermouth  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  iii.  309, 

327 

V.  Graves  iii.  38 

V.  M'Cullora  ii.  474 

r.  Milton  Stage  Co.  i.  219 

V.  Simonds  ii.  474 

Sandford  v.  Sandford  ii.  91 

Sandham,  Ex  parte  i.  215 

Sandiland,  Ex  parte  i.  398 

Sandilands  v.  Marsh  i.  207,  215 

Sandiman  v.  Breach  ii.  634,  899 

Sands  v.  Church  iii.  132 

V.  Lyon  ii.  783,  797,  799 

V.  Matthews  i.  276 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.       i.  78  ;  ii.  601,  615 

V.  Sanders  ii.  539 

V.  Taylor  i.  574;  iii.  225 

Sanford  v.  Bulkley  ii.  779 

V.  Dodd  i.  492 

V.  Eighth  Av.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  246 

V.  Handy  ii.  919 

V.  Hayes  iii.  83 

V.  Mechanics  Ins.  Co.  ii.  541,  546 

V.  Mickles  i.  205,  296 

V.  Norton  i.  284,  289 

V.  Raikes  ii.  680 

V.  Trust  Fire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540 

Sanger  v.  Dun  i.  90 

v.  Eastwood  i.  612 

San  Jose  Indiano,  The  i.  226 

Sansee  v.  Wilson  i.  572 

Sansom  v.  Ball  ii.  447 

V.  Rhodes  ii.  794 

Sappho,  The  ii.  428 

Sapsford  v.  Fletcher  ii.  873 

Sarah,  The  ii.  440 

Sarah  Ann,  The  i.  78;  ii.  397,  398 

Sarah  Starr,  The  ii.  382 

Saratoga,  The  ii.  464 

Saratoga  R.  R.  v.  Row  ii.  923 

Sard  V.  Rhodes  ii.  819 

Sargeant  r.  Butts  ii.  898 

Sargent  v.  Chubbuck  ii.  78 

V.  Currier  i.  616 

V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  iii.  113,  209,  212, 

220 

V.  Gile  i.  578,  579 

V.  Graham  ii.  776 

V.  Howe  iii.  376 

V.  Larned  ii-  316 

V.  Seagrave  ii.  305,  324 

V.  Southgate  i.  290 

Sari  V.  Bourdillon  iii.  8 

Sarratt  v.  Austin  iii.  439 

Sasportas  v.  Jennings  i.  445 

Sasscer  v.  Farmers  Bank  i.  320 

Sasseen  v.  Clark  ii.  161 

Satterlec  v.  Frazer  ii.  908 

I'.  Groat  ii.  178 

V.  Matherson  iii.  506 


clxxx 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Satterthwaite  v.  Mut.  Ben.  Ins.  Ass. 

ii.  558 

Sauer  r.  Scliulenberg  ii.  75 

Sauerwein  v.  Brunner  iii.  127 

Saul  i'.  His  Creditors  ii.  698,  704,  706 

Saulsburv  r.  Blandys  iii.  32!) 

Saunders"  y.  Bartlett      i.  108,202;  iii.  275 

V.  Frost  ii.  776 

V.  Graham  ii.  775 

V.  Iliitternian  ii.  915 

V.  Joiinson  i.  22 

V.  Smith  ii.  337,  341,  348 

V.  Topp  iii.  50 

V.  AVakcficld  i.  G;  iii.  16,  18 

V.  Williams  iii.  407,  409,  437 

Saunderson  v.  Gregg  iii.  458 

V.  Griffiths  i.  49 

V.  Jackson  i.  586 ;  iii.  4,  7,  8,  18 

V.  Judge  i.  310 

V.  I.Iarr  i.  335,  337 

V.  Piper  i.  281  ;  ii.  693 

V.  Rowles  iii.  416 

Saurez  v.  Sun  Mut.  Ins.  Co.      ii.  506,  508 

Savage  v.  Aldren  i.  286 

V.  Carroll  iii.  309,  348 

V.  Everman  ii.  824 

V.  Howard  Ins.  Co.  ii.  575 

V.  King  i.  285 

V.  Ki.x  i.  39,  56,  68,  73 

Savage  Man.  Co.  v.  Armstrong  i.  575 

Savanna]),  &e.  R.  Co.  v.  Callahan    iii.  172 

Savary  r.  Clements  ii.  406 

V.  Goe  ii.  783 

Saveland  v.  Green  i.  51 

Saville  v.  Robertson  i.  195,  198 

Savings  Bank  v.  Bates  i.  313 

V.  Ela  ii.  29 

Savory  r.  Stocking  iii.  478 

Savoury  v.  Chapman  ii.  746 

Saward  r.  Austey  ii.  634 

Sawin  v.  Guild  ii.  316 

Sawrey  v.  Rumney  ii.  682 

Sawtell  !-•.  Sawtell  ii.  732 

Sawyer,  In  re  iii.  411 

V.  Coasters  Ins.  Co.  ii.  518,  523,  525, 

520 

V.  Cutting  ii.  221 

V.  Dodge  County  Ins.  Co.  ii-  549 

V.  Fisher  i.  557,  579 

V.  Gcrrisli  iii.  267 

V.  Ilanimatt  ii.  635,  666 

V.  Hoovcy  i.  290 

V.  Joslin  i.  646 

V.  Maine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  399 

V.  l^Iayhcw  i.  92 

V.  Mcintyre  iii.  248 

V.  Patterson  ii.  28 

V.  Tappan  ii.  764 

V.  Turpin  iii.  415,  421 

V.  Twiss  i.  547 

V.  Wagstaff  ii.  820 

Say  V.  Barwick  iii.  373 

Sayer  >:  Bennet  i.  76,  223 

(,'.  Ciiaytor  i.  11 

Sayles  v.  Wellman  ii.  905 


Sayre  v.  Flournoy 

V.  Frick 

V.  Moore 
Sayward  r.  Stevens 
Scale  V.  Fothergill 
Scales  V.  Anderson 

V.  Universal  Ins.  Co. 
Scampellini  v.  Atcheson 
Scanlan  i-.  Geddes 

V.  Wright 
Scaramanga  v.  Stamp 
Scarborough  v.  Lyrus 

V.  Reynolds 


1.  380 
i.  312 
ii.  334,  344 
ii.  413,  414 
ii.  834 
i.  552 
ii.  597 
i.  382 
iii.  15 
ii.  692 
ii.  533 
ii.  401 
i.  131 ;  ii.  825 


Scarfe  v.  Morgan        ii.  890,  907  ;  iii.  261, 

266 
Scarman  v.  Castell  ii.  44 

Sceales  v.  Scanlan  i.  617 

Schank  v.  Schank  ii.  91 

Scheifflin  i\  Stevens  i.  191 

Schenck  v.  Schenck  i.  136 

Schenkl  v.  Dana  i.  228 

Schenley's  Appeal  i.  552 

Schermerhorn  v.  Schermerliorn       ii.  874, 

875 

V.  Vanderheyden  i.  458 

Schieffelin  v.  Carpenter      ii.  941 ;  iii.  249 

r.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  418,  517 

t'.  Stewart  i.  136,  137;  iii.  422 

Schilling  v.  Holmes  i.  542 

Schimmelpemiicli  v.  Bayard  i.  48 

Sclik'singer  r.  Stratton  i.  581 

Schley  v.  Lyon  iii.  212,  2i0 

Schlizzi  V.  Derry  ii.  425 

Schlosser's  Appeal  i.  245 

Schmaling,  Ex  parte  iii.  465 

Schnialz  v.  Avery  i.  09 

Schmidlapp  r.  Currie  i.  240 

Schmidt  r.  Blood  ii.  134,  153 

r.  Livingston  i.  522 

Schmitz  V.  Langliaar  ii.  32 

Schneider  v.  Cochrane  i.  326 

V.  Foster  i.  575 

V.  Heath  i.  63,  634 ;  ii.  394 

V.  Norris  i.  586 ;  iii.  8,  9 

V.  Provident  Life  Ins.  Co.  ii.  817 

V.  Schiffman         i.  274,  275,  283,  870 

Sclmewind  i\  Ilacket  ii.  853 

Schnitzer  v.  Oriental  Works  i.  628 

Schnuckle  v.  Bierman  i.  396 

Sclioch  r.  Garrett  ii.  51 

SchoHcld  V.  Corbett  ii.  876 

Scholefield  r.  Kichelbcrger  i.  223,  226,  316 

Scholes  V.  Murray,  &c.  Co.  ii.  712 

Sclioley  )•.  Goodman  i.  399 

Schollenberger  v.  Nehf  i.  284 

Sclionier  r.  Ilekla  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Schoni])  /-.  Sclienck  ii.  908 

Scliondlcr  c.  Wacc  iii-  435 

Scliool  Di.'it.  ?•.  Bragdon  i.  356 

Schoole  I'.  Noble  ii-  875 

Sclioonover  ;;.  Rowe  ii'-  ^^^ 

Schopr-.an  v.  B.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.      ii-  184. 

232 
Schotsmans  v.  Lancashire  R.  R.  Co.  i.  579, 

042,  650 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxxxi 


Sclireger  v.  Carden 

ii.  773 

Scott  V.  Rivers 

ii.  874 

Scinoeder  v.  llarvcy 
V.  Johns 

i.  301,  558 
iii.  100 

I'.  Scholcy 
r.  Scott 

iii.  441 
i.  61G;  ii.  7 

Schroepel  r.  Hopper 
Schroeppel  v.  Corning 
Sc'hroyer  v.  Lynch 
Schuchardt  i\  Aliens 

iii.  388 

iii.  137 

ii.  154,  155 

i.  62,  563 

r.  Seymour 
V.  Slioplierd 
r.  Simons 
?-.  Stanford 

ii. 

ii.  718 

iii.  I'JS 

i.  542 

3.36,  342,  344 

Schultz  V.  Pacific  R.  R. 

Co. 

ii.  47 

V.  Surman 

iii. 

301,  424,  438 

Schumitsch  v.  American  Ins.  Co.      ii.  555 
Schurmeier  v.  St.  Paul,  &c.  R.  R.  Co. 

iii.  484 

Schuyler  v.  Hoyle  i.  381 

V.  Russ  i.  617,  634 

V.  Van  Der  Veer  ii.  829 

Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.  v.  Moore  ii.  033 

Schwabacker  v.  Ri  Idle  i.  209 

Schwartz  i'.  Germania  Ins.  Co.  ii.  614 

V.  Gilmore  i.  115 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  481 

V.  Yearly  i.  110 

Schwartzel  r.  Ilolenshade  ii.  328 

V.  Holenshall  ii.  327 

Scioto,  The  ii.  428,  429,  4-30 

Scofleld  V.  Day  ii.  715 

V.  Tompkins  iii.  172 

Scorell  V.  Boxall  iii.  35 

Scotia,  The  ii.  435 

Scotland,  The  ii.  435,  455 

Scott,  In  re  iii.  411 

V.  Alexander  i.  318 

V.  Avery  ii.  845,  846 

V.  Barnes  ii.  827 

V.  Bevan  i.  328 

V.  Biligerry  iii.  304 

I'.  Bourdlllion  ii.  667 

V.  Buchanan  i.  335,  366,  367 

V.  Busli  iii.  38 

V.  Caruth  i.  185 

V.  Chester  Valley  Bank  ii.  99 

V.  Coimesnil  i.  189,  191 

V.  Corporation  of  Liverpool       ii.  431 

V.  Crane  ii.  103 

V.  Fisher  ii.  763 

V.  Franklin  iii.  281 

V.  Godwin         ■  i.  14,  23 

V.  Haddock  iii.  102,  103 

V.  Harmon  ii.  908 

V.  Irving  ii.  672,  675 

?;.  James  i.  380 

V.  Jester  iii.  285 

V.  Kittanning  Coal  Co.                ii.  648 

V.  Lewis  iii.  129 

V.  Libbey  ii.  415,  425 

V.  Lifford  i.  319 

V.  Littledale  ii.  928 

V.  Lloyd  iii.  116,  149 

V.  Miller  ii.  453 

V.  Nesbit  ii.  887 ;  iii.  136 

V.  Nichols  iii.  98 

V.  Pettit  i.  648 

V.  Pilkington  ii.  872 

V.  Plymouth,  The  ii.  392 

V.  Porcher  i.  248 ;  iii.  301 

V.  Ray  ii.  764 

V.  Rayment  iii.  321 


V.  The  Eastern  Counties  Rail- 
way Co.  iii.  40 
V.  Thompson  ii.  533 
V.  Trent  ii.  746 
r.  White  iii.  29 
Scotthorn  r.  South  Staffordshire  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  214,  231,  232 

Scottin  r.  Stanley  ii.  391 

Scottish  Mar.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Turner      ii.  507, 

510 

Scouton  V.  Eislord  i.  463,  464 

Scoville  I'.  Griffith  ii.  198 

V.  Tolland  ii.  335 

Scrace  v.  Whittington  i.  129 

Scranton,  The  ii.  435 

V.  Baxter  ii.  118 

V.  Clark  i.  616 

Screws  v.  Roach  i.  560 

Scribner  v.  Collar  i.  94 

V.  Fisher  iii.  508 

Scrimshire  v  Alderton  iii.  439 

V.  Scrirasliire  ii.  726,  729 

Scripps  V.  Reilly  iii.  183 

Scripture  v.  Lowell  Ins.  Co.      ii.  569,  571 

Scruggs  V.  Gass  i.  302 ;  ii.  754 

Scrugham  v.  Carter  i.  234;  iii.  218 

Scudder  v.  Andrews  i.  495 

V.  Balkam  ii.  383 

V.  Bradbury  i.  568 

V.  Bradford  ii.  444,  449,  450 

V.  Union  Bank  ii.  712 

Scull  V.  Briddle  ii.  398 

Scully  r.  Kirkpatrick  iii.  400 

V.  Scully  iii.  362 

Scurry  r.  Freeman  iii.  134 

Seaborne  ;■.  Blackston  ii.  746 

V.  Maddy  i.  340 

Seabury  ".  Hungerford  i.  274 

Seacord  v.  Burling  i.  280 

V.  Miller  i.  317 

Seago  V.  Martin  i.  51 

Seagood  v.  Meale  ii.  77 ;  iii.  14,  82 

Seagraves  i\  City  of  Alton  i.  154 

Sea  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fowler  ii.  484 

Sea  Lark,  The  ii.  382 

Seaman,  Ex  parte  iii.  467 

V.  Aschermann  iii.  323 

V.  Fonereau  i.  78;  ii.  524 

V.  Vavvdrey  iii.  358 

Seamans  v.  Loring  ii.  532 

Seamore  v.  Harlan  iii.  240 

Sea  Renter,  The  ii.  388 

Searle  v.  Adams  iii.  113 

V.  Keeves  iii.  48,  444 

i\  Laverick  ii.  149 

V.  Scovell  ii.  418 

Sears  v.  Bags  of  Linseed  ii.  407 


clxxxii 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Sears  r.  Brink  iii.  17 

V.  Giddey  i.  3'j;J 

V.  Lyons  iii.  IbJJ 

V.  The  City  of  Boston  ii.  709, 710,  711 : 

iii.  oGl 

V.  Vincent  ii.  82G 

V.  Wills  ii.  407,  413 

V.  Wingate  ii.  410 

Searsburgh  T.  Co.  v.  Cutler  ii.  942 

Seaton  r.  Benedict  i.  387,  388,  390 ;  ii.  772 

V.  Booth  i.  25,  525 

V.  Plenson  i.  27 

I'.  Rlapp  iii.  338 

V.  Scoville  i.  270 

V.  The  Second  Municipality      iii.  108 

Seaver  r.  Coburn  i.  G8 

V  Morse  ii.  30,  41,  43 

?;.  Phelps  i.  434 

Seawell  v.  Henry  ii.  753 

Secconib  ;■.  Provincial  Ins.  Co.         ii  534 

Seckel  r.  Scott  i.  5(J4 

Secomb  v.  Nutt  i.  610 

Seeonibe  v.  Edwards  ii.  629 

Security  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Republic  i.  301 

V.  Cushman  i.  83 

V.  McDonald  i.  210 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gober  ii.  615 

Seddon  v.  Senate  ii.  626 

Sedgworth  v.  Overend  ii.  748 

Seed  V.  Higgins  ii.  310 

V.  Lord  i.  580 

Seeger  v.  Pettit  i.  545 

Seeley  v.  Bisbee  i.  308 

V.  Bishop  ii.  665 

V.  Engell  i.  329 

V.  Fisher  ii.  837 

Seers  r.  P'owler  ii.  660 

V.  Turner  ii.  863 

Segar  v.  Edwards  i.  88 

Segars  ?;.  Scgars  iii.  38 

Segura  v.  Heed  ii.  41(3 

Seidenbender  v.  Charles  i.  4H!) 

Seignior  and  Wolnier's  case  i.  63 

Seig worth  r.  Leflel  iii.  219 

Seixas  v.  Woods  i.  018,  622,  625 

Seizo  V.  Provczende    ii.  355,  370,  371,  375 

Selby  V.  Eden  i.  309 

V.  Hutchinson  ii.  654 

V.  Selby  iii.  6,  293 

Selden  v.  Cushman  iii.  187 

V.  Hcndrickson  ii.  403,  -J04 

Seldon  v.  Tutop  ii.  836 

.Selfridge  v.  Gill  iii.  4(!4 

Si'ikrig  V.  Dnvios  i.  109;  iii.  406 

Selleck  V.  French  iii.  110,  111 

r.  Talhnan  iii.  332 

ScUen  r.  Nr)rnian  ii.  44,  53 

Seller  r.  Work  ii.  108 

Sellers  v.  Dugan  ii.  901 

Sellick  V.  Addams  ii.  837 

Selser  v.  Brock  ii.  9 

Selway  r.  Fogg  ii.  101,  922 

/'.  IloiJiiway  ii.  193 

Sc-lwood  i:  .Mildraay  ii.  081,  682 

Selwyn's  case  ii.  013 


Seminary  v.  McDonald  i.  161 

Senmies  v.  City  Ins.  Co.  ii.  601 

Semple  v.  Cornewall  iii.  115 
Seneca  County  Bank  v.  Neass   i.  319,  320 

V.  Schermerhoru  iii.  116 
Senior  v.  Armytage      i.  537,  544 ;  ii.  669, 

678 

Sentance  r.  Poole  i.  436 

Sergeson  v.  Sealey  i.  438 

Servante  v.  James  i.  13 

Sessions  r.  Moseley  i.  266 

V.  Richmond  iii.  143,  170 

Seton  V.  Del.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509 

V.  Low  ii.  522 

V.  Slade  iii.  9,  312,  365 

Settle  V.  St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  ii.  5.33 

Seventh  Bank  v.  Cook  i.  300 

Seventh  Ward  Bank  v.  Hanrick        i.  318 

Severance  v.  Kimball  i.  443 

Severn  v.  Clerks  ii.  642 

Sewall  V.  Allen  il.  187 

V.  Fitch  iii.  62 

V.  Henry  ii.  635 

V.  Hull,  The,  of  a  New  Ship      ii.  383 

I'.  Sewall  ii.  93,  737 

V.  Sparrow  ii.  849 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  508,  512 

Seward  v.  L'Estrange  i.  225 

V.  Mitcliell  i.  478;  iii.  39 

Sewer  v.  Bradfield  i.  12 

Sexton  V.  Graham  i.  505;  ii.  146 

V.  Montgomery  Ins.  Co.    ii.  542.  5-54, 

555,  557,  560,  584,  586,  587 

V.  Pike  i.  129 ;  ii.  60 

V.  Wheaton  i.  264,  410 

Seybel  v.  Currency  Bank  i.  289 

Seyds  v.  Hay  iii.  284 

Scyfert  v.  Bean  i.  552 

Seymour  v.  Brown  ii.  142,  143,  145 

V.  Darrow  ii.  757 

V.  Davis  iii  49 

r.  Delancey            i.  522;  iii.  300,  316 

V.  Delaney  i.  435 

V.  Fellows  ii.  78 

V.  Gartside  ii.  05 

V.  Marvin  iii.  143 

V.  McCormick  ii.  327 

V.  Minturn  ii.  749 

V.  O'Keefe  i.  568 

V.  Osborne  ii.  304,  315,  317 

V.  Sexton  ii.  765 

V.  Strong  iii.  116 

Shackel  v.  Rosier  i.  485,  488 

Shackelford  v.  Handley  ii.  927 

V.  Morris  iii.  15.3,  154 

Shackleton  v.  Sutcliffe  iii.  350 

Sliaddle  v.  Disborough  iii.  372 

Sliaeffer  v.  Lee  iii.  201 

V.  Shcppard  i.  .385 

V.  Sleade  ii.  920 

Shafer  r.  Plicrnix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Shaffer  v.  McKanna  i.  248 

r.  Saw^'er  i.  579 

Sh.-ifler's  Ajipeal  i.  147 

Shafher  v.  The  State  ii.  87 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxiii 


Sliakeshaft,  Ex  parte 
SlialiT  I).  Trowbridge 
Shamburj,^  r.  Kuggles 
Shank  c.  Northern  U. 
Shannon  v.  Cornstock 

Shapley  v.  Bellows 

V.  Tappan 
Sharington  v.  Stratton 
Sliarke  v.  Roahde 
Sharkey  v.  Mansfield 
Sliarnian  ?•.  Brandt 
Sharp  V.  Brice 

v.  Conkling 

?'.  Gibbs 

V.  Grey 

V.  New  York 

V.  No  well 

i\  Parks 

V.  Uiiiel 

V.  Taylor 

V.  Teese 

V.  Tlioinpson 

V.  Wright 
Sharpe  v.  Kelley 

('.  Roahde 
Sharpley  v.  Hurrel 
Sharrod  v.  Lond.  &  N. 

way  Co. 
Sliattnck  v.  Lawson 
Shaughnessy  v.  Fogg 
Shaw,  Ex  parte 

V.  ^tna  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Allen 

V.  Arden 

V.  Badger 

V.  Batley 

V.  Berry 

V.  Boyd 

V.  Cooper 

V.  Farnsworth 

V.  Finney 

V.  Fisher 

V.  Gookin 

V.  Hoffman 

V.  Holland 

V.  Jakeman 

V.  Kay 

V.  Knox 

V.  Leavitt 

V.  Loud 

V.  M'Combs 

V.  McGregory 

V.  Mitchell 

V.  Nudd 

V.  Picton 

V.  Pratt 

v.  Kailroad  Co. 

V.  Keed 

V.  Rep.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Robberds 

V.  Robbins 

V.  Sliaw 

V.  Sherwood 

V.  Spencer 


iii.  474 

i.  187 

i.  215 

U.  Co.  ii.  47 

ii.  423;  iii.  208, 

248 

ii.  874,  875 

ii.  487 

i.  45G 

iii.  429 

ii.  881 

i.  94,  107;  iii.  11 

iii.  187,  188 

i.  25 

ii.  521 

u.  242,  243 

i.  79 

ii.  834 

i.  556 

iii.  40 

ii.  700 ;  iii.  374 

i.  489 

ii.  64G 

iii.  311 

ii.  940 

iii.  435 

ii.  402  ;  iii.  147 

Western  Rail- 

i.  114 

i.  184 

i.  127 

iii.  419,  420 

ii.  501 

iii.  75 

i.  110.  128 

ii.  792 

iii.  458 

i.  146;  ii.  156 

i.  360 

ii.  305,  306 

i.  538 

iii.  13 

i.  522;  iii.  325 

ii.  877 

i.  548 

iii.  220 

iii.  471 

i.  537 

i.  275 

ii.  685,  680 

i.  32 

ii.  898 

i.  200,  215,  245 

iii.  438,  450 

1.  46,  123 ;  iii.  220 

ii.  763 

i.  27,  210;  ii.  765 

i.  .331 

i.  306 

ii.  614 

ii.  547,  548,  573 

iii.  393,  394 

iii.  63 

i.  31 

1.329 


Shaw  r.  Stone 

V.  Thaekray 

V.  Tlioinpson 

V.  Turnpike  Co. 

V.  White 

V.  Wilkins 

V.  York  &  N.  M.  Ky.  Co 
Shawe  v.  Felton 
Shawhan  v.  Van  Nest 


Slieahan  v.  Barry 
Sheahy  v.  Adarene 
Shearer  v.  Handy 

V.  Shearer 
Shearman  v.  Akins 
Shed  V.  Brett 

V.  Pierce 
Shedd  ;;.  Wilson 
Shee  V.  Hale 
Sheehan  v.  Davis 
Siieehy  v.  Mandeville 
Slieernian  v.  Thompson 
Sheflield  v.  Page 
Sheftall  I'.  Clay 
Shelby  V.  Guy 
Shelden  v.  Bennett 

('.  Robinson 
Sheldon  v.  Benham 

V.  Capron 

V.  Conn.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Cox 


i.  104 

iii.  373 

i.  390 

ii.  813 

iii.  239 

iii.  242 

ii.  268 

ii.  488 

i.  664 ;  iii.  224, 

225 

ii.  73,  810 

iii.  43 

ii.  827,  828 

i.  168,  227 

i.  441 

i.  311,  322 

i.  28 

i.  237 

i.  538;  iii.  449 

i.  125 

i.  12 ;  ii.  757 

i.  485 

ii.  464 


ii.  723  ;  iii.  106 
ii.  762 
ii.  179 
i.  321 ;  ii.  687 
i.  525 
ii.  616 
i.  558 

V.  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.    ii.  542,  558 
V.  Haxtun  iii.  123,  128 

.  Kendall  i.  55;  ii.  884 


V.  Newton 
Sheldon  Co.  v.  Eickmeyer  Co. 
Shellenbarger  i'.  Blake 
Shelley  v.  Wright 
Shelling  v.  Farmer 
Shelton  v.  Gill 

V.  Homer 

V.  Livius 

V.  Pendleton 

V.  Sherfey 

V.  Springett 

V.  Tiffin 

V.  Tutt 

V.  Walker 
Shepard,  Ex  parte 

V.  Hawley 

V.  ]\Iilwaukie  Gas.  Co 

V.  Ward 

V.  Watrous 
Shepherd,  Ex  parte 

V.  Bevin 

V.  Chamberlin 

V.  Chewter 

V.  Conquest 

V.  Hampton 

V.  Harrison 

V.  Johnson 

V.  Kain 

V.  Kottgen 

V.  Mackoul 

V.  Percy 


356 

ii.  941 

ii.  71 

ii.  931 

ii.  836 

iii.  136 

i.  95 

i.  624 

i.  388,  402,  403 

i.  329 

i.  341,  344,  351 

ii.  709 

ii.  167 

iii.  419 

iii.  467 

i.  211,  312,  321 

iii.  199 

ii.  746 

i.  444 

iii.  468 

iii.  314,  316,  318 

i.  311 

ii.  536 

ii.  338 

iii.  220 

i.  579;  ii.  412 

iii.  212,  220 

i.  624,  635 ;  ii.  394 

ii.  444 

i.  402,  403 

i,  93 


clxxxiv 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


Shepherd  v.  Pybus 

i.  030 

;  ii.  393 

V.  Sawyer 

ii.  890 

r.  Taylor 

ii.  412 

V.  Temple 

i.  623 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  575 

Shepley  v.  Davis 

i.  5G6 

V.  Wateriioiise 

iii.  88 

Sheppanl  v.  Boggs 

i.  172 

V.  Doolan 

iii. 

323,  335 

V.  Stites 

ii.  829 

Slieppards  v.  Turpin 

iii.  382 

SiiLTburne  i-.  Shaw 

iii.  14 

Sheridan  r.  Brooklyn  R.  R.  Co.         ii.  240 

V.  Carpenter  ii.  853 

V.  The  New  Quay  Co.  ii.  218 

Sheriff  r.  Potts  ii.  534 

Sherman  v.  Ballou  ii.  873 

V.  Barnard  i.  486 

V.  Buffalo  Bayou  R.  R.  Co.       iii.  107 

V.  Charaplain  Trans.  Co.  i.  617 ; 

ii.  37,  38,  43 ;  iii.  43 

V.  Clark  i.  320 

V.  Dutch  i.  553 

V.  Fair  ii.  577 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.      ii,  196,  210 

V.  Rochester  &  Syracuse  R.  R.    ii.  46 

V.  Rugee  i.  646 

V.  Wakeman  iii.  72 

V.  Williams  i.  531 

V.  WitJiers  iii.  95 

Slierratt  ;•.  Bentley  ii.  645 

Sherriil  v.  Hopkins  iii.  397,  404 

Sherrod  v.  Langdon  i.  178 

Shersby  v.  Hibbert  ii.  408 

Sherwood  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.    ii.  577 

V.  Gen.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  499 

V.  Marwick  i.  209 

V.  Robins  i.  582 

V.  Sutton  iii.  107 

Shields  r.  Fuller  i.  227 

V.  Ohio  iii.  487 

r.  Pettee  1.595,597,000,630; 

iii.  222 

V.  Wash.  &  N.  O.  Tel.  Co.   ii.  279,  301 

r.  Yonge  ii.  46 

Shiells  V.  Blackburne  ii.  114,  115 

Shiff  V.  La.  State  Ins.  Co.  ii.  537 

Shiffner  v.  Gordon  ii.  886 

Sliilcock  V.  Passman  i.  126 

Siiillibeer  v.  Glyn  i.  477;  ii.  110 

Siiilling  V.  Accidental  Death  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  GOO 

Shimer  v.  Jones  ii.  27 

Sliindler  v.  Houston  iii.  40,  49 

Shipherd  v.  Underwood  i.  85 

Ship  Lavinia  ;•.  Barclay  i.  84 

Shipman  r.  Horton  i.  334,  362 

Shippev  r.  Derrison  iii.  4 

V.  Eastwood  ii.  900,  905 

V.  Henderson  i.  403 

Shipton  r.  Casson  ii.  055,  792 

r.  Thornton  ii.  417,  418,  510 

Shirland  r.  Monitor  Iron  Works  Co.    i.  94 

Shirley  r.  Shirley  iii.  9,  295 

V.  Stratton  iii.  370 


Shirtz  V.  Shirtz 
Shisler  v.  Vandike 
Sliitler  V.  Bremer 
Shitz  V.  Dleffenbach 
Shober  r.  Hauser 


iii.  239 

i.  301 

iii.  75 

iii.  432 

iii.  116,  127 


Shoe  &  Leather  Bank  v.  Dix  i.  58 

Shoecraft  r.  Bailey  ii.  162 

Shoemaker  v.  Benedict  iii.  89 

I',  llinze  ii.  99 

i\  Keeley  iii.  454,  465 

Shoemaker,  &c.  Co.  v.  Bernard  i.  215 

Shoenfield  v.  Fleisher  i.  103 

Shook  r.  State  ii.  27,  30 

Shore  r.  Bentall  ii.  495 

r.  Lucas  i.  040 

V.  Wilson  ii.  032,  080,  091,  096 

Shorey  r.  Rcnnell  "'.  465,  400 

Short  V.  Home  Ins.  Co.  ii.  544 

r.  McCarthy  iii.  99 

V.  New  Orleans  i.  247 

V.  Skipwith  i.  93,  97 

V.  Stone  ii.  69,  71,  799,  800,  809 

r.  Stotts  ii.  64,  68 

Shorter  r.  Smith  iii.  490,  494 

Shortrede  r.  Cheek  iii.  17 

Shotwell  V.  Miller  i.  211 

V.  jNIurray  iii.  355 

V.  Wendover  iii.  215 

Shreeves  v.  Allen  i.  289 

Shreve  v.  Brereton  iii.  169 

V.  Joyce  i.  140 

Shreves  v.  Leonard  iii.  99 

Siirewsbury  v.  Blount  ii.  917 

Shrewsbury  &  B.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lon.  & 

N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  iii.  374 

Sln-impton  r.  Laight  ii.  375 

Shroyer  v.  Richmond  ii.  934 

Shubrick  v.  Salmond  i.  450 

Shucardt  v.  Aliens  i.  563 

Shuck  V.  Wight  iii.  120 

Sliuey  V.  United  States  i.  513 

Shufeldt  i\  Pease  i.  557 

Shuler  r.  IMillsaps  ii.  74 

Slmltz  V.  Elliott  i.  540 

V.  Oiiio  Ins.  Co.  ii.  517 

Shumway  v.  Reed  ii.  757 

V.  Stillman  ii.  740 

Shurlds  r.  Tilson  i.  191 

Shurtleff  c.  Millard  i.  355,  301 

Shute  r.  Dorr  iii.  41 

r.  Taylor  iii.  108,  173 

Shutford  r.  Borougli  iii.  97 

Shuttk'worth  v.  Bruce  i.  257 

Sibbald  v.  Bethlehem  Iron  Co.  i.  109 

V.  Hill  ii.  523,  520 

Sibley  v.  Aldrich  ii.  160 

V.  Fisher  ii.  860 

V.  Ilayward  iii.  273 

V.  Holden  ii.  634 

V.  Lumbert  iii.  84 

V.  McAllaster  i.  32 

V.  Tie  1.  563 

Sibly  V.  Tutt  i.  327 

Sihoni  r.  Kirkman         i.  145,  140;  ii.  604 

Sibree  v.  Tripp  i.  249 ;  ii.  751 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxv 


Sice  V.  .Cunningham  i.  SOO 

Sicklemore  v.  Thistleton  ii.  Goo 

Sicikles  V.  Borden  ii.  311,  ;]28 

V.  Carson  ii.  88,  u;] 

V.  Gloucester  Man.  Co.       ii.  315,  o2o 

V.  Matlier  iii.  70 

V.  Mitchell  ii.  325 

V.  Pattison  ii.  39,  649,  653 

V.  Tlie  Falls  Co.  ii.  311 

I'.  Youngs  ii.  324 

Sldaways  v.  Todd  .           ii.  153 

Siddall  V.  Rawclifl  ii.  752 

Sidwell  V.  Evans  i.  471,  472 

17.  Mason  iii.  75 

Siebert  c.  Spooner  iii.  441 

Siebert's  case  ii.  338 

Sievewright  v.   Archibald        i.  585,  686, 

591 

Siewert  v.  Hamel  iii.  123 

Siffken  v.  Wrav  i.  644 

Siffkin  r.  Walker  i.  194 

Sigerson  7\  Matthews  i.  325 

Sigourney  v.  Drury  iii.  88,  90 

V.  Lloyd  i.  286 

V.  Munn  i.  168,  229 

Sikes  V.  Johnson  i.  356 

Sill  V.  Worswick  iii.  406 

Sillem  V.  Thornton  ii.  542,  545,  548 

Sillick  V.  Booth  ii.  G13 
Silhman  v.  Fredericksburg,  &c.  R.  Co. 

i.Gl 

Silsbee  v.  Ingalls  iii.  21 

Silsbiiry  r.  McCoon  ii.  145  ;  iii.  215 

Silsby  V.  Foote  ii.  808,  322 

Silva  V.  Low  ii.  527,  533 

Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  Harding  ii.  744 

Silverman  r.  Chase  i.  245 

Silvernail  v.  Cole  i.  467,  471 

Silveus  r.  Porter  i.  1G6 

Silvey  v.  Sumner  i.  541 

Silvis  V.  Ely  i.  470 

Sinierson  v.  Branch  Bank  i.  570 

Simmonds  v.  Swaine  ii.  831,  835 

Simmons  v.  Almy  i.  129 ;  iii.  285 

V.  Cincinnati  Sav.  Soc.  i.  203 

V.  Clark  ii.  818 

V.  Law  ii.  232 

V.  Simmons  ii.  77 

V.  South  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.       iii.  199 

V.  Swift  i.  562 

Simms  v.  Marryatt  i.  615;  iii.  331 

V.  Norris  i.  550 

Simon  «.  Barber  i.  347 

V.  Lloyd  ii.  820 

V.  Miller  ii.  IGG 

?•.  Motivos  iii  12,  59 

Simond  v.  Boydell  ii.  480 

V.  Braddon  1.  GOB 

Simonds  v.  Catlin  iii.  12 

V.  Clapp  i.  G2 

V.  Hodgson  ii.  402,  403 

V.  Strong  i.  192 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  510 

V.  Walter  iii.  Ill 

V.  White  ii.  444,  451,  452 


Simons  v.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.  ii.  257 

V.  Johnson  ii.  634,  851 

Simpson,  Ex  parte  iii.  462 

V.  Bloss  ii.  88G 

V.  Charleston  lus.  Co.  ii.  501 

V.  Clayton  i.  25 
V.  Crippin                      ii.  660 ;  iii.  223 

V.  Fotfo  ii.  872 

V.  FuUenwider  iii.  129 

V.  Hand  ii.  429 

V.  Ilanley  ii.  874 

V.  Hart  ii.  874 

V.  Hawkins  i.  526 

V.  Henderson  ii.  683,  G91 

V.  Henning  iii.  411 

V.  Ingham  ii.  764,  766 

V.  Lc^eeh  i.  170 

V.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  197 

V.  Nicholls  ii.  90r, 

f.  Pacific  Ins.  Co.  i.  29() 

('.  Potts  i.  635 

V.  Robertson  i.  339 

I'.  Sadd  iii.  334 

V.  Simpson  ii.  91 

V.  Stackhouse  ii.  860 

V.  Turney  i.  323 

V.  Vaughn  i.  30 

V.  Warren  iii.  133 

V.  Wilson  ii.  321 

Simpson  College  v.  Bryan  i.  483 
Sims  r.  Bond                     i.  66  ;  ii.  883,  9.38 

V.  Brittain  ii.  389 

V.  Brutton  i.  203,  215 

V.  Chance  ii.  134 

V.  Clarke  ii.  753,  754 

V.  Everhardt  ii.  945 

V.  Gondelock  iii.  98 
V.  Gurney             ii.  444,  445,  448,  449 

V.  Howard  ii.  415 

V.  Hutchins  iii.  63 

V.  Rickets  ii.  78 

V.  Sims  i.  263 
■V.  Willing                      i.  195,  196,  198 

Simson  v.  Cooke  ii.  21,  766 

V.  Jones  i.  481 

Sinard  v.  Patterson  ii.  822 

Sinclair,  In  re  ii.  455 

V.  Bank  of  S.  Car.  iii.  99 

V.  Bowles  ii.  653,  655 

V.  Jackson  ii.  929 
V.  Pearson                         i.  114;  ii.  134 

V.  Richardson  ii.  12 

V.  Tarbox  iii.  183 

Singer  v.  Kelly  i.  243 

V.  McCorniick  ii.  39 
V.  Walmsley         ii.  304,  308,  315,  317 

Singleton  v.  Bolton  ii.  362,  365 

V.  Hilliard  ii-  672 

V.  Kennedy  hi.  186 

V.  Lewis  iii.  161 

V.  St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  ii.  606,  609 

Sinnot  v.  Davenport  ii.  386,  399 

Siordet  v.  Hall  ii.  173 

SipperJy  v.  Stewart  ii.  114 

Sir  WoUaston  Dixie's  case  iii.  135 


clxxxvi 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Sissons  V.  Keynolds  ii.  909 

Sistare  r.  Gushing  i.  219 

Siter  r.  Morrs  ii.  505 

Sivewright  v.  Archibald         i.  508 ;  iii.  lo 

V.  Richardson  i.  92 

Rkaggs  V.  Emerson  i.  542 

Skeate  v.  Beale  i.  445,  465 

Skeels  r.  Cliickering  ii.  881 

Skelton  r.  Brewster  ii.  11 

r.  Dustin  i.  oOo 

Skidmore  v.  Dcsdoity  ii.  495,  497 

Skillen  v.  Waterworks  i.  530 

Skillings  v.  Coolidge  ii.  8o5 

Skingly,  In  re  i.  536 

Skinner  v.  Dayton  i.  122,  220 

V.  (itinn  i.  02 

V.  Hall  ii.  227 

V.  London,    Brighton,    &    Soutli- 

coast  Ry.  Co.  ii.  135,  2.S9 

V.  M'Douall  iii.  345 

V.  Somes  i.  254,  255 

V.  Stocks  i.  65 

V.  Upshaw  ii.  220 

V.  Western  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509 

Skinner's  Appeal  i.  382 

Skip,  Ex  parte  iii.  136,  465 

Skipp  V.  Eastern  Counties  E.  Co.       ii.  46 

Skrine  v.  Hope,  The  ii.  388 

Slack  V.  Brown  ii.  772 

Slackhouse  v.  O'Hara  i.  131 

Slade  V.  Arnold  ii.  900 

Slater,  Ex  parte  i.  211 

V.  Irwin  i.  83;  iii.  260,  293 

V.  Lawson  iii   87 

V.  Magraw  '   11  ;  ii.  004 

V.  Sherman  iii.  188 

Slater  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barstow  ii.  539 

Slatterie  v.  Pooley  ii.  938 

Slaughter  v.  Green  ii.  142 

V.  McRae  iii.  227 

Slaymaker  v.  Irwin  i.  508 

Sleat  v.  Fiagg  ii.  261,  273 

Sleath  V.  Wilson  ii.  247 

Sleech  v.  Thorington  i.  382 

Sleeper  r.  Paige  iii.  106 

Sleight  V.  Ilartshorne  ii.  666 

Slim  ?•.  Northern  Railway  Co.  ii.  250 

Slingerhuid  v.  Morse         ii.  103,  786,  788 ; 

iii.  27 

Slingsby's  case        i.  13,  14,  15,  17,  19,  22 

Slipper  V.  Stidstone  iii.  469 

Sloan  i:  Gibson  i.  458 

V.  R.  F.  &  M.  Co.  ii.  941 

V.  Sommers  iii.  125 

Sloane  »•.  Cadogan  iii.  315 

V.  IMoore  i.  221 

Slocond)  >•.  Lizardi  i.  222 

Sloconibe  v.  Glubb  i.  372 

Slocuni  f.  Despard  ii.  663 

V.  Faindiild  ii.  268 

V.  Hooker  i.  370 

V.  Seymour  iii.  3() 

Slocumb  '•.  Holmes  iii.  95 

Sioman  >•.  Walter  iii.  171 

Sloo  V.  Law  i.  131 


Sloop  Mary,  The 
Sloper  V.  Fish 
Slossom  V.  Duff 
Slubey  r.  Hey  ward 
Sluby  V.  Champlin 
Slutz  r.  Desenbcrg 
Slumway  v.  Cooper 
Sly  I'.  Edgley 
Slyhoof  V.  Flitcraft 
Small  c.  Atwood 

V.  Browder 

V.  Currie 

V.  Gibson 

V.  Moates 

V.  (Judley 

V.  0 wings 

V.  Robinson 

V.  Quincy 

V.  Small 

V.  Stagg 
Smalley  ;•.  Greene 

V.  Smalley 
Smallpiece  v.  Dawes 
Smart  v.  Batchelder 

I'.  Harding 

V.  Sandars 
Smedburg  v.  More 


iii.  147 

iii.  435 

iii.  118 

i.  504,  G46  ;  iii.  49 

iii.  69 

i.  558 

i.  150 

i.  114 

ii.  863 

i.  021 

i.  258 

ii.  19 

ii.  528,  531 

i.  651;  ii.  417 

iii.  382,  3S3 

iii.  310,  346,  347 

iii.  258 

ii.  790 

ii.  91 

iii.  273 

ii.  893 

iii.  181 

i.  391 

i.  504 

iii.  37 

i.  74,  77,  104,  108 

iii.  342 


Smc'des  v.  Bank  of  Utica 
Smedley  v.  Felt 
Smctliurst  ?•.  Mitchell 

r.  Wuolston 
Smilax,  The 
Smiley  v.  Bell 
Smillie  r.  Quinn 


i.  91;  ii.  112 
ii.  610 
i.  6(5 
iii.  211,  220 
ii.  403 
i.  251 
ii.  600 


Smith,  Eximrte    i.  126,  224,  651 ;  iii.  421, 

468,  471 
In  re  i.  235;  iii.  434,  506 

Re  iii.  416 

r.  JEtna  Ins.  Co.  ii.  592 

V.  Algar  i.  470,  472 

r.  Allen  i.  411,  460;  ii.  79 

V.  Applcton  iii.  484 

V.  Arnold  iii.  14 

V.  Atlantic  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  803,  864, 

866 
V.  Ayer  i.  83 

V.  Babcock  ii.  927 

V.  Barker  i.  232 

V.  Barrow  i.  184,  185 

V.  Bartholomew  i.  467 ;  ii.  823 

V.  Bates  ii.  6.35 

r.  Bean  ii.  996 

j;.  Bell  ii.  515 

r.  Berry  1.  254  ;  iii.  220 

V.  Bickmore  ii.  759,  887 

V.  Birmingham  Gas  Co.       i.  153,  154 
V.  Bishop  iii.  107 

V.  Bond's  Heirs  iii.  106 

V.  Boston,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  275 

V.  Bouck  iii.  56 

V.  Bouvior  ii-  896 

V.  Bowditch  Ins.  Co.  ii.  541,  5.55 

V.  Bowles  i.  645 

V.  P.raine  i.  273,  286 

V.  Brotherline  i.  127 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


clxxxvii 


Smith 


V.  Brown 

ii.  686,  751.  823,  824  ; 

Smitli  r.  Henry 

i.  569 

iu. 391,  404 

V.  llibbard 

iii.  293 

Rruning 

ii.  80 

V.  Iliggins 

ii.  314 

Brush 

iii.  119 

V.  Hill 

iii.  102 

Bryan 

iii.  84 

V.  Iliscoek 

i.  287,  289 

Muchanan 

iii.  397,  40G 

V.  Ilodson 

iu.  439,  478 

Burnliam 

1.  174,  188 

V.  Home 

ii.  261 

Catnpbell 

iii.  382 

V.  Hubbs 

ii.  924 

Cedar  Falls, 

&C.R. 

Co.              i.  73 

V.  Hughes 

i.  620 

Chester 

i.  300 

V.  Hunt 

i.  26 

Clark 

i.287;ii.  143 

V.  Hyde 

ii.  60 

Cleveland 

iii.  486 

V.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  563 

Coe 

iii.  293 

V.  Jackson 

i.  169 

Coffin 

iii.  426,  433,  435 

V.  Jameson 

ii. 

748 ;  iii.  425 

Columbia  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  505,  555, 564 

V.  Jeffryes 

ii.  690 

Collins 

i.  200,  209 

V.  Johnson        i.  63 ;  ii.  334,  828,  83() ; 

Condry 

i.  93; 

ii.  434 ;  iii.  196 

iii.  361 

Cong.  Meet. 

House 

in  Lowell 

V.  Jones 

i 

.  751  ;  iii.  12 

ii.  655 

V.  Kelley 

i.  368 

Cook 

ii.  149 

V.  Kingsford 

ii.  44 

Cragen 

i.  195 

V.  Kittridge 

i.  266 

Creole,  The 

ii.  468,  469 

V.  Knowlton 

ii.  612,  613 

Crooker 

ii.  857,  861 

V.  Knox 

1. 

293 ;  iii.  451 

Dallas 

1.563;  iii.  15 

V.  Lamberts 

i.  131 

Dann 

ii.  16 

V.  Lascelles 

i.  91,93,  574 

Davenport 

i. 

84  ;  ii.  415,  456 

V.  Lawrence 

iii.  340 

Dawson 

iii.  79,  95 

V.  Lay 

ii.  389 

Dearlove 

ii.  164, 168 

V.  Lewis 

ii.  737,  814 

Demarest 

ii.  828 

V.  Little 

i.  318,  322 

De  Silva 

ii.  390 

V.  Littlefield 

i.  548 

De  Witt 

i.  292 

V.  Lloyd 

ii-  765 

Dickenson 

iii.  168 

V.  Lock 

ii.  934 

Dixon 

i.  131 

V.  Loomis 

ii.  781,  787  ;  iii.  29 

Downing 

ii.  311,  312,  317 

V.  London,  &c.  R. 

R.  Co. 

ii.  249 

Dunlap 

iii.  220,  233 

V.  Love 

i.  627,  628 

Easton 

ii.  298 

V.  Lowden 

ii.  874 

Edwards 

i.  213,  231 

V.  Lynes 

i. 

557,  578,  579 

Ely 

ii.  311 

V.  Manufacturers  Ins.  Co 

ii.  504, 506 

Empire  Ins. 

Co. 

ii.  560 

V.  Marrable 

i.  633 

Estate  of  Steel 

ii.  27 

V.  Marsack 

i.  300 

Evans 

i.  200,  360,  361 

I'.  Maw  hood 

i 

489 ;  ii.  894 

Field 

i.  653 

V.  Mayer 

iii.  219 

Finch 

i.  284 

V.  Mayo 

i.  364,  370 

Fisher 

i.  318 

V.  McClure 

i.  311 

Forty 

iii.  83 

V.  McClusky 

ii.  872 

Foster 

i.  578 

V.  McGowan 

ii.  856,  862 

Fox 

iii.  99 

V.  Mead 

ii.  700 

Frederick 

ii.  636 

V.  Mec.  &  Traders  Bank 

i.  2S9 

Frost 

ii.  149 

V.  Mercer 

i.  298 

,  300 ;  ii.  308 

Gibson 

i.  338 

V.  Miller 

i.  296,  30:i 

Glens  Falls  Ins.  Co 

ii.  587 

V.  Milles 

iii.  426,  454 

Godfrey 

i.  486  ;  ii.  698,  700 

V.  Mitchell 

ii.  916 

Gordon 

iii.  423,  424,  427,  446 

V.  Montgomery 

ii.  4 

Goss 

i.  653;  in.  260 

V.  Moore 

i.  612 

Gould 

ii.  403 

V.  Morse 

i.  58,  506 

Green 

iii.  219,  227 

V.  Mullett 

i.  320 

Greenlee 

i.  527 

V.  Myers 

i.  558,  5i)7 

Griffith 

iii.  208,  222 

V.  Nashua  &  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.    ii.  202. 

Gugerty 

ii.  793 

214 

Guild 

ii.  940 

V.  New  York  Cent 

R.R. 

Co.      ii.  256 

Hathom 

iii.  119 

V.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem 

R.  R. 

Co.      ii.  268 

Haverhill  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  587 

V.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  R. 

Co. 

ii.  232 

Haynes 

ii.  789 

V.  Nichols 

ii.  737 

Hay  ward 

ii.  37.  44 

V.  Nicolls 

ii. 

737,  740,  743 

Healy 

ii.  719  ;  iii.  391 

V.  Niles 

ii.  144,  145 

clxxxviii 

INDEX  TO   C 

Smith  r.  Odlin 

ii.  470 

r.  Overby 

iii.  178 

r.  ( ).\f<)rd  Iron  Co. 

ii.  45,  47 

V.  Piickliurst 

ii.  035 

V.  Par^ons 

iii.  394,  507 

i\  Pekiii,  The 

ii.  45".) 

V.  I'ottee 

i.  597  ;  iii.  '224 

V.  Philadelphia  Bank                   i.  280 

V.  Philbrick 

i.  312 

V.  Phillips 

iii.  313 

V.  Pickering 

iii.  427,  452 

V.  Pierce 

ii.  182 

V.  Pittsburg  Bank 

iii.  132 

r.  Plonier 

i.  385 

V.  Plummer 

ii.  454 

r.  Pocklington 

i.  12 

V.  Proprietors,  &C. 

i.  1.54 

V.  Raleigh 

1.  542,  551 

V.  Ramsay 

iii.  47(5 

V.  Readfield 

i.  4-tO 

V.  Rice 

i.  627 

V.  Richardson 

iii.  207 

V.  Robertson 

ii.  512 

V.  Robinson 

iii.  123 

V.  Ryan 

iii.  80 

V.  Sanborn 

ii.  790 

V.  Saratoga  Co.  Ins.  Co.     ii.  575,  577 

V.  Schroeder 

ii.  936,  937 

V.  Scott 

iii.  41() 

V.  Seward 

ii.  181 

V.  Shaw 

i.  328 

V.  Slielden 

ii.  28 

V.  Sheldon 

i.  225 

V.  Shepherd 

ii.  171 

V.  Sherman 

ii.  74 

V.  Simms 

iii.  82 

V.  Simonds 

i.  144 

V.  Sleap 

i.  86 

V.  Sloan 

i.  204 

V.  Smith        i.  170, 

265,  397,  460,  469  ; 

ii.  51,  87,  73G, 

757,  784,  915,  937  ; 

iii.  174 

,  349,  394,  397,  409 

V.  Sparrow 

i.  588 ;  ii.  899,  905 

V.  Spinolia 

ii.  719;  iii.  .391 

V.  Spooner 

i.  436,  439,  440 

V.  Sprague 

iii.  244 

T.  Stafford 

ii.  70,  852 

V.  State  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  578 

V.  Steele 

ii.  46 

V.  Stone 

i.  210 

V.  Strong 

iii.  240 

j;.  Sullivan 

i.  .388 

V.  Surman  i.  571 ; 

iii.  6,  84,  35,  51,  60 

V.  Swift 

ii.  468 

I'.  Talcott 

i.  21 

V.  Tarlton 

i.  171,  174 

V.  Thompson 

i.  128 

V.  Thorn 

iii.  72 

V.  Tra(;y 

i.  02,  78  ;  ii.  60 

V.  Turner 

iii.  335,  51 1 

V.  Uiiderdimck 

iii.  349 

V.  Van  Loan 

i.  292 

V.  Ware 

i.  462 

V.  Watson 

i.  166,  176 

V.  Weaver 

i.  512 

Smith  V.  Weed 

i.473 

V.  Westmoreland 

iii.  82 

V.  Whiting 

i.  146,  322 

V.  Wigley 

ii.  766 

V.  Wilcox 

ii.  900 

v.  Williams 

i.  684 

i:  Wilmington 

i.  145 

V.  Wilson                       ii. 

424,  670,  678 

V.  Winter 

i.  219;  ii.  27 

V.  Wolf 

iii.  144 

V.  Wood 

i.  228 

V.  Woodfine 

ii.  73 

V.  Wooding 

i.  552 

V.  Woodruff 

ii.  363 

V.  Wright         i.  176;  ii. 

210,  447,  672 

V.  WyckofE 

i.  272 

Smith's  Heirs  ?'.  Dickson 

i.  131 

Smith  Paper  Co.  v.  Servin 

1.546 

Smitiierman  v.  Smith 

ii.  821 

Smithson  v.  Garth 

i.  28 

Smithurst  v.  Edmunds 

ii.  130 

Smoot  V.  Rea 

iii.  307 

Smout  V.  Ilbery 

i.  70,  76 

SmuUer  v.  Union  Canal  Co. 

ii.  762 

Smyley  v.  Head 

ii.  9 

V.  Reese 

i.  393 

Smyrl  v.  Niolon 

ii.  172 

Smyth,  Ex  parte 

ii.  652 

V.  Craig 

i.  76 

V.  M 'Masters 

ii.  897 

V.  Tankersley 

i.  183 

V.  Ward 

i.  565 

Snaith  r.  Gale 

iii.  464 

Snead  v.  Watkins 

ii.  167 

Sneathen  v.  Grubbs 

i.  565 

Snedeker  i'.  Warring 

i.  546 

Snee  v.  Prescot 

i.  642 

Sneed  v.  Ewing 

ii.  726 

V.  Weister 

ii.  766 

I'.  Wiggins 

ii.  793 

Sneider  v.  Geiss 

ii.  159,  277 

Snell  V.  Dwight 

i.  176 

V.  Foussat 

ii.  742 

V.  Mitchell 

iii.  335 

V.  Moses 

i.  027 

V.  Rich 

ii.  468 

V.  The  Independence 

ii.  45 

Snellgrove  v.  Bailey 

i.  265 

I'.  Hunt 

iii.  426 

Snelling  v.  Lord  Iluntingfield            ii.  49  ; 

iii.  40 

Snethen  v.  Memphis  Ins.  Co 

ii.  529 

Snevilv  v.  Read 

i.  463 

Snider  v.  Thrall 

iii.  48 

Snoddy  v.  Cage 

iii.  104 

Snodgra.'ss's  Appeal 

i.  231 

Snook  r.  Davidson 

iii.  283 

V.  Fries 

ii.  649 

V.  Hellyer  ii.  826,  827,  848;  iii.  427 

Snow,  In  re  iii.  4.56 

V.  Conant  ii.  877 

r.  Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  277 

r.  Franklin  ii.  824 

V.  Orleans  i.  69 

(•.  Perkins  i.  322 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED, 


clxxxix 


Snow  r.  Perry  ii.  753,  779 

V.  Ware  ii.  63,  (355 

V.  Warner  iii.  5(3 

V.  Wope  ii-  465,  460 

Snowden  v.  Noah  ii.  301,  378 

V.  riioenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  520 

V.  Warder  ii.  671 

Snovvdon  v.  Davis  i.  86,  496 

Snowhill  V.  Snowliill  iii.  4;>7 

Snowman  v.  Harford  iii.  339 

Snyder  v.  Farmers  Ins.  Co.  ii.  541,  5.54 

r.  Findley  ii.  917,  927 

V.  Keno  i.  272 

I'.  Riley  i.  290 

V.  Sponable           "  i.  80 

V.  Vaux  iii.  215 

V.  Wise  ii.  744 

Soames  r.  Spencer                   •  i.  592 

Scares  v.  Rahn  ii.  404 

Soblomsten,  The  i.  129 

Society  in  Troy  v.  Goddard  i.  484 

V.  Perry  i.  482,  484 

Society,  &c.  i\  New  Haven  iii.  485 

V.  Wheeler  i.  462  ;  ii.  482,  511 

Sogers  V.  Ilackett  i.  308 

Sohier  v.  Easterbrook  ii.  828 

V.  Loring  i.  325 

V.  Norwich  Ins.  Co.  ii.  569 

Solarte  r.  Palmer  i.  322 

Soles  V.  Hickman  iii.  309 

Sellers,  Ex  parte  iii.  438 

Solly  V.  Forbes     i.  27,  29,  210;  ii.  851,  852 

V.  Rathbone  i.  89,  102,  109 

V.  Wliitmore  ii.  535 

Solomon  V.  Fitzgerald  i.  167 

V.  Gregory  ii.  27 

i\  Kimmel  i.  457 

Solomons  v.  Bank  of  England  i.  272, 

287  ;  iii.  290 

V.  Jones  iii.  127 

V.  M'Kinstry  ii.  826,  836 

V.  Ross  iii.  406 

Soltau  V.  De  Held  iii.  331 

Somerby  v.  Buntin  iii.  50,  321,  343 

Somers  i:  Pumphrey  i.  433 

Somerville  v.  Somerville  ii.  701 

V.  Williams  i,  313 

Somes  V.  Brewer  ii.  925 

V.  British  Empire  Shipping  Co.  ii.  382 

V.  Skinner  ii.  925 

V.  Sugrue  ii.  396,  397 

Sommer  v.  Wilt  iii.  183 

Soome  r.  Gleen  iii.  147 

Soov  V.  State  i.  80 

Soper  V.  Fry  i.  206,  335 

V.  Soper  ii.  91 

Sophie,  The  ii.  385 

Sorbe  V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  484 

Sorrelle  i\  Sorrelle  ii.  877 

Sorsl)ie  v.  Park  i.  15,  10,  17,  23 

Sortwell  y.  Hughes  i.  486 

Sottomayor  v.  l)e  Barros  ii.  726 

Souch  V.  Strawbridge       iii.  38,  43,  44,  63 

Soulden  i-.  Van  Rensselaer  iii.  92 

South,  Ex  parte  i.  245 


Soutliampton  v.  Brown  i.  498 

Southard  v.  Porter  i.  290 

V.  Re.xford  ii.  67,  71,  73 

V.  Steele  i.  216 

South  Carolina  Society  v.  Johnson     ii.  18 

Southcomb  v.  Bishop  of  Exeter       iii.  342 

Southcoinbe  v.  Merriman  ii.  597 

Southcote  c.  lloaro  i.  15,  22 

V.  Stanley  ii.  164 

Southcote's  case  ii.  98,  121 

South  Eastern  Railway  Co.  v.  Knott 

iii.  365 

Souther,  Re  iii.  471 

Southern  r.  How  i.  617  ;  ii.  351,  375 

Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Moon  ii.  270 

V.  New  by  ii.  265 

V.  Purcell  ii.  260 

V.  Shea  ii.  227 

Southern  Ins.  Co.  v.  Booker  ii-  616 

V.  Gray  i.  55 

V.  Lewis  ii.  559 

r.  McCain  ii.  543,  617 

Southern  Life  Ins.  &  Tr.  Co.  v.  Cole  iii.  57 

Southern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kendrick        ii.  250 

Southerne  v.  Howe  i.  617 

Southey  v.  Sherwood  ii.  837,  347 

Southorn  v.  Reynolds  ii.  378 

South  Sea  Co.  v.  Bumbstead  ii.  842 

r.  Duncomb  iii.  289 

South  Wales,  hi  re  i.  175 

South  Wales  Railway  Co.  v.  Wythes 

iii.  327,  330,  360 

Southwell  V.  Beezley  i.  565  ;  iii.  40 

V.  Bowditch  i.  107 

Southwestern  Co.  v.  Stanard  i.  564 

South  Western  Freight  Co.  v.  Plant  i.  568, 

578 

Southwick  V.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559 

V.  Estes  i.  114 

V.  The  Clyde  ii.  .392 

Southworth  v.  Smith  ii.  777,  780 

Southworth  Bank  v.  Gross  ii.  858 

Soward  v.  Palmer  ii.  770 

Spafford  v.  Dodge  ii.  426,  447,  451 

Spain  V.  Arnott  ii.  35,  38 

V.  Hamilton  i.  257 

Spalding  v.  Adams  ii.  128 

V.  Dixon  iii.  461 

V.  People  iii.  478 

V.  Rosa  ii.  805 

V.  Ruding  i.  652 

V.  Vandercook  i.  495  ;  ii.  773 

Spann  v.  Baltzell  i.  319,  322 

V.  Mercer  i.  387 

Sparhawk  v.  Allen  i.  150 

V.  Buell  i.  834 

V.  Russell  i.  2.39 

V.  Wills  ii.  769 

Sparkes  i'.  Marshall  ii.  476,  477 

Sparkling  v.  Smitli  iii.  68 

Sparkman  v.  Higgins  ii.  305 

Sparks  '.'.  Garrigues  ii.  769 

V.  Kittredge  ii.  446 

V.  Purdy  iii.  210 

Sparling  v.  Marks  i.  617;  iii.  223 


cxc 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Sparr  i'.  Wellman 

ii.  277 

Spreadbury  i;.  Chapman 

i.  387 

Sparrow  v.  Caruthcrs 

ii.  488 

Sprigwell  v.  Allen 

i.  615 

iSparry's  case 

ii. 

8G3,  8G4 

Spring  V.  Chase 

iii.  240 

Spaulding  v.  Alford 

ii.  60 

r.  Coffin 

i.  492 

V.  Bank  of  Muskingum 

iii.  116 

V.  Gray                        iii. 

70,  94,  95,  96 

V.  Lord 

iii.  113 

V.  Haskell 

ii.  455 

r.  Preston 

i.  486 

V.  So.  Car.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  475,  476 ; 

Spear  v.  Gardner 

i.  76 

iii.  382 

V.  Hart 

iii.  18 

Springer  r.  Foster 

iii.  394,  395 

V.  Hartley 

iii. 

256,  284 

r.  Hutchinson 

ii.  3 

V.  Hooper 

ii.  835 

V.  Springer 

i.31 

V.  Newell 

ii.  676 

Springfield  Bank  v.  Merrick 

i.  489 ; 

V.  Orendorf 

iii.  348 

ii.  886,  887 

Spears  v.  Hartley 

iii.  108 

Sproatt  V.  Donnell 

ii.  448 

Speclit  V.  Commonwealth 

ii.  905 

Sprott  I'.  Powell 

i.  140 

Speed  r.  Philips 

i.  466 

Sproul  V.  Ilemmingway 

i.  117 

Speer  r.  Bishop 

i.  193 

Sproule  V.  Pord 

iii.  211 

Speights  V.  Peters 

i.  221 

Spruill  V.  N.  Car.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  602 

Spelman  v.  Aldrich 

ii.  78 

Sprye  v.  Porter 

ii.  908 

V.  Pisher  Iron  Co. 

ii.  48 

Spurrier  v.  Hancock 

iii.  340 

Spence  v.  Chadwick     i.  536, 

607 

;  ii.  215, 

Squier  r.  Hunt 

i.  572 

415 

V.  ilayer 

i.  547 

V.  White 

ii.  875 

Squire  v.  Campbell           iii. 

331,  343,  345 

Spencer  v.  Barnett 

iii.  293 

V.  Grevell 

ii.  834,  837 

V.  Billing 

i.  213 

V.  Tod 

i.  522 

V.  Cone 

iii.  62 

V.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co. 

ii.  285,  300 

V.  Daggett 

ii.  181 

V.  Whipple 

ii.  49;  iii.  41 

V.  Diirant 

i.  14,  23 

Squires  v.  Whiskan 

ii.  897 

V.  Eiistis 

ii. 

466,  4G7 

Srodes  i'.  Caven 

ii.  129 

v.  Field 

i.  56,  m 

Staats  V.  Bristow 

i.  231 

V.  Harding 

i.  527 

V.  Hewlett             i.  206  ; 

ii.  21 ;  iii.  17 

V.  Harvey 

i.  308 

V.  Ten  Eyck       iii.  175, 

240,241,242, 

V.  Milwaukee,  &c.  E.  R. 

Co. 

ii.  817 

246 

V.  Tissue 

ii.  746 

Stables  v.  Eley 

i.  192;  ii.  247 

V.  Wilson 

i.  75 

Stacey  ?'.  Uecy 

ii.  938 

Spencer's  case 

i.  261 

I'.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.     ii. 

493,  582,  583 

Spensley  v.  Lancashire  Ins. 

Zo. 

ii.  5tjy 

Stache  v.  St.  Paul  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  587 

Sperry,  In  re 

i.  238 

Stackpole  v.  Arnold 

i.  7,  56 

V.  Panning 

i.  152 

V.  Simon 

ii.  591 

V.  Horr 

i.  279 

V.  Symonds 

ii.  905 

Spicer  v.  Cooper 

ii.  667 

Stackwood  v.  Dunn 

ii.  938 

V.  Earl 

i.  355 

Stacy  V.  Kemp 

ii.  903 

V.  Norton 

ii.  12 

V.  Ross 

i.  506 

Spiers  v.  Brown                  ii. 

342 

.343,  349 

Sta<lt  I'.  Lill 

iii.  16 

Spies  V.  Gilmore 

i.  284 

Stafford,  In  re 

i.  137 

V.  Joel 

iii.  882 

V.  Bartholomew 

iii.  362 

V.  Newberry 

i.  322 

V.  Bryan 

iii.  75 

Spikes  V.  English 

iii 

184,  186 

V.  Clark 

ii.  772 

Spildt  r.  Bowles 

iii 

435,  454 

V.  Newsom 

ii.  913 

(;.  Heath 

i.  600 

V.  Richardson 

iii.  98 

Spiller,  E.r  parte 

iii.  420 

V.  Koof 

i.  361 

V.  Scribner 

ii.  941 

Stagg,  Ex  parte 

iii.  420 

Spindler  v.  Greillet 

i.  .300 

V.  Eureka  Co. 

i.  54:) 

Spinetti  V.  Atlas  Steamship 

Co. 

ii.  183 

Stainback  r.  Bank  of  Virginia            i-  42 

Spires  v.  Ilamot 

ii.  769 

V.  Kae 

ii.  42') 

Spitzer  r.  St.  Marks  Ins.  Co 

ii.  471 

V.  Read 

i. -12 

Spong  (.'.  Wright 

iii.  75 

Stainbank  r.  Penning      i.  84;  ii.  402,  403 

Spooner  v.  Holmes 

i.  557 

Staines  v.  Plank 

ill.  im 

Spoor  V.  Holland 

iii.  216 

V.  Shore 

i.  520 

S])ot8wood  V.  Barrow 

ii.  43 

Stainland  i;.  Hopkins 

ii.  644 

Spottiswoode  r.  Clarke      ii 

348 

,301,378 

Stalker  v.  McDonald 

i.  292 

Sprague  v.  Baker 

i.  260 

Stamford  P.ank  r.  Benedict 

ii.  765 

r.  Craig 

ii. 

69,  70,  71 

Stannners  r.  Macomb 

i.  388 

r.  Ilazcn winkle 

ii.  7'ir, 

Stanard  ;■.  Eldridge 

iii.  244 

V.  Quinn 

i.  548 

Slandeu  v.  Chriunas 

i.  530 

i 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


CXCl 


Standisli  v.  Ross 
V.  Whitwell 

Stamlridge  v.  Stanclridge 

Staiiitbrtli  v.  Fellowes 

ytaniliind  v.  Hopkins 

Stanley  v.  Cliamberlin 
V.  (iaylord 
V.  Jones 
V.  Kemp  ton 
V.  Hobiiison 
V.  Stanley 
i\  Towgood 

Stanley's  Appeal 

Stanly  i;.  Duliurst 
•     V.  Hendricks 

Stannus  v.  Stannus 

Stansbnry  v.  Fringer 

Stansell  r.  Roberts 

Stansfield  v.  Johnson 

Stanton  v.  Allen 
V.  Bell 
V.  Blossom 
V.  Eager 
V.  Hall 
V.  Henry 
V.  Small 
V.  Wilson 

Stanwood  v.  Rich 

Stapilton  v.  Stapilton 

Staples  V.  Anderson 
V.  Emery 

Stapleton  v.  Conway 
V.  Nowell 

Star  Glass  Co.  v.  Morey 

Starbuck  v.  New  England  Ins.  Co.   ii.  530 

Stark  V.  Parker  ii.  3G,  39,  792 

Stark  Co.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hurd  ii.  583 

Starkweather  v.  Cleveland  Ins.  Co.  ii.  570 
V.  Loring  ii.  744 

Starr  v.  Bennett  ii.  915 

V.  Goodwin  ii.  394 

V.  Pease  iii.  236 

V.  Peck  ii.  83,  85 

V.  Robinson  iii.  504 

V.  Taylor  i.  406,  407 

V.  Torrey  i.  '290 

V.  Winegar  ii.  146  ;  iii.  213 

Startup  V.  Cortazzi  iii.  220 

V.  Mucdonald  i.  573,  580 ;  ii.  783,  787 

State  ?'.  Atlierton  i.  61 

V.  Baltimore,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.        iii.  209 
V.  Bell  Telephone  Co.  ii.  278 

V.  Campbell  ii.  245 

V.  Clarke  i.  334 

V.  Cook  i.  343 

V.  Davis  ii.  88 

V.  Dean  ii.  100 

V.  Dunnavant  ii.  028 

11.  Evans  i.  569 

V.  Gaillard  i.  457,  027 

V.  Hallett  ii.  709 

V.  Hawthorne  iii.  511 

V.  Heyward  iii.  480 

V.  Kreider  ii.  863 

V.  Litchfield  ii.  284 


i.  496 

ii.  302 

ii.  734 

iii.  469 

ii.  644 

i.  81 

ii.  137 

ii.  908 

iii.  131 

iii.  372 

iii.  487 

iii.  249 

i.  150,  151 

iii.  454 

ii.  11 ;  iii.  25 

i.  293 

iii.  833 

iii.  298 

iii.  12 

i.  487 

ii.  114 

i.  328 

1.  328,653;  ii.  411 

iii.  438 

ii.  837 

i.  560,  561 ;  iii.  224.  220 

i.  336,  343,  347 

ii.  527 

i.  467 ;  iii.  365 

i.  532 

i.  545,  547 

ii.  716 

ii.  772 

iii.  219 


State  V.  Matiiews 
V.  Miller 
V.  Neal 
V.  Patterson 
V.  Plialen 
r.  Keynolds 
V.  Richmond 
1-.  Rosen fc'ld 
V.  Spartanburg 
V.  Sterling 
V.  Suhcer 
V.  Torinus 


ii.  155 

ii.  85 

i.  209 

ii.  726 

iii.  511 

ii.  24,  26 

i.  336;  iii.  415 

i.  570 

i.  52 

iii.  511 

ii.  900 

i.  99 


State  Bank  v.  Bank  of  the  Capitol       i.  63 

V.  Cowan  iii.  139 

V.  Fox  i.  101 

V.  Hastings  i.  253 

V.  Hunter  iii.  143 

V.  Littlejohn  ii.  822 

V.  Seawell  iii.  103,  104 

V.  Slaughter  i.  321 

V.  Welles  ii.  754 

V.  WUborn  iii.  388 

V.  Woody  iii.  82,  83 

State  Ins.  Co.  v  Maackens  ii.  577 

V.  Roberts  ii.  475,  577 

I'.  Todd  ii.  587 

State  of  New  York  v.  Mayor  ii.  274 

State  Treasurer  v.  Cross  i.  482 

Staton  V.  New  iii.  369 

Stavely  v.  Parsons  iii.  449 

Stavers  v.  Curling  ii.  663 

Stead  V.  Dawber  ii.  799 

V.  Nelson  iii.  309 

V.  Salt  i.  216 

Steadman  v.  Duhamel  ii.  942 

Steamboat  Co.  v.  Whillden  ii.  434;  iii.  184, 

196 

Steamboat  New  World  v.  King  ii.  96,  238 

Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Dandridge  ii.  182 

Stearnes  v.  Newson  iii.  372 

Stearns  v.  Barrett  ii.  890,  892 

V.  Dean  iii.  268 

V.  Doe  ii.  456 

V.  Felker  '  ii.  908 

V.  Frearman  i.  369 

V.  Haven  i.  178,  212 

V.  Marsh  ii.  129;  iii.  216 

V.  Sampson  ii  542 

V.  Swift  iii.  239 

Stebbins  v.  Globe  Ins.  Co.  ii.  542,  553,  554 

V.  Edmunds  i.  161 

r.  Leuwolf  ii.  783 

V.  Palmer  i.  145 ;  ii.  74 

V.  Sherman  i.  463 

V.  Smith  i.  473;  iii.  21 

Steckel  v.  Bank  ii.  113 

Stedman  v.  Eveleth  i.  101 

V.  Gooch  i.  301 

V.  Western  Transportation  Co.  ii.  270 

Steel,  Ex  parte  iii.  420,  422 

V.  Frick  i.  531 

V.  Hoe  iii-  17 

V.  Jennings  i.  205 

r.  Lacv  ii.  526 

V.  Smelting  Co.  u.  938 


cxcu 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Steel  V.  Steel  ii.  52 

V.  Whipple  iii.  129 

Steele  r.  llarnier  i.  103 

V.  Lis.  Co.  ii.  169,  5GG 

r.  I'litney  ii.  937,  94o 

V.  Xliatcher  ii.  4GG 

V.  Townsend  ii.  233 

Steen  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  587 

Steene  v.  A3  lesworth  iii.  441 

Steers  v.  Lasliley  i.  293 

Stegall  V.  Stegall  i.  377 

Steiglitz  V.  Egginton  i.  52 

Stein  V.  La  Dow  i.  201 

Stein's  case  iii.  40(J 

Steinbaek  v.  Kliinclander  ii.  474,  480 

Steiner  v.  Heald  ii.  308 

Steiniiauer  v.  Witman  ii.  92'J 

Steinman  v.  Magnus  ii.  751 ;  iii.  477 

V.  Wilkins  ii.  153 

Steinweg  v.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  18G 

Steman  v.  Harrison  i.  282,  498 

Stemmer's  Appeal  i.  220 

Stenburg  r.  (,'allanan  i.  215 

Stephens  r.  Australasian  Ins.  Co.     ii.  484 

V.  Badcock  i-  96 

V.  Baird  ii.  938 

r.  Bales  of  Cotton  ii.  436 

V.  Beal  i.  380 

V.  De  Medina  iii.  414 

V.  Ehvall  iii.  434,  458 

V.  Farrar  i.  129 

V.  Felt  ii.  327 

V.  Olive  i.  401 

V.  Peel  ii.  372 

V.  Sole  iii.  427 

V.  Squire  iii.  25 

V.  Wilkinson  1.  642 

Stephenson  v.  Cady  ii.  813 

1-.  Dickson  i.  318 

V.  Hall  i.  351 

V.  Hardy  i.  392 

V.  Hart  ii.  224 

V.  Little  iii.  214 

V.  I'rinirose  i.  808,  317 

V.  Weeks  i.  138 

Steptoo's  Adni'rs  v.  Harvey's  Ex'rs. 

iii.  116 

Sterling  v.  Sinnickson  ii.  79 

Sterry  v.  Ardon  i.  460 
Stetson  V.  Mass.  Ins.  Co.    ii.  485,  489,  545, 

501,  562 

V.  Patton  i.  52,  72,  122 

Stevens,  Ex  parte  iii.  41G 

V.  Adams  i.  129  ;  ii.  59 

V.  Armstrong  i.  117,  119 

V.  Austin  ii.  922 

V.  Bell  iii.  382 

V.  15onton  ii.  934 

V.  Blanchard  ii.  292 

V.  Briggs  ii.  749 

V.  Cushing  ii.  815 

V.  Davis  iii.  119,  145 

V.  De  Conto  ii.  3G1 

V.  lOiio  i.  566 
V.  Fuller                        i.  623 ;  ii.  918 


Stevens  v.  Gaylord 

r.  Gladding 

V.  Hartwell 

V.  Hauser 

r.  Hoy 

V.  Head 

V.  Jackson 

i\  Judson 

I'.  Lincoln 

?•.  Lyford 

r.  Park 

i\  Phoenix  Ins.  Co. 

r.  Reeves 

r.  Robins 

V.  Robinson 

r.  Stevens 

?-.  Stewart 

i\  Strange 

V.  Warren 

V.  Webb 

V.  Wilson 
Stevenson  i\  Agry 

V.  Blakelock 

r.  Hart 

r.  Hej'land 

V.  Kleppinger 

V.  Lambard 

V.  McLean 

V.  Montreal  Tel.  Co. 

r.  State 

r.  Watson 
Steward  i-.  Blakeway 

V.  Harding 

V.  Lee 

V.  Lombe 

V.  Winters 
Stewart,  Ex  parte 

V.  Aberdeen 

V.  AUiston 

V.  Ball 

V.  Bell 


ii.  852 

ii.  330 

iii.  194 

iii.  428 

i.  61 

ii.  318 

iii.  414 

ii.  925 

iii.  134 

iii.  188 

ii.  756 

i.  155 

ii.  672,  675 

i.  107 

ii.  915 

iii.  37 

iii.  49 

i.  283 

ii.  609 

ii.  791,  806 

i.  102 

iii.  382 

iii.  285 

ii.  224 

i.  292 

ii.  660 

i.  540 

i.  514,  515 

ii.  285,  301 

i.  557 

ii.  833 

i.  183 

i.  549 

ii.  748 

i.  569 

iii.  328 

iii.  416 

ii.  669,  670,  675 

i.  525 

iii.  416 

ii.  488,  524 


V.  Brooklyn,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.         ii.  244 

V.  Brown  ii.  774 

V.  Caldwell  i.  203 

V.  Campbell  ii.  11 ;  iii.  26 

V.  Cass  ii.  825 

V.  Donelly  ii.  785 

V.  Dougherty  i.  622 

V.  Drake  iii.  242 

V.  Dunlop  ii.  525 

V.  Eddowes  ii.  680;  iii.  15 

i:  Greenock  Marine  Co.             ii.  507 

V.  Harvard  College  ii.  47 

V.  Leliigli  Valley  R.  Co.                 i.  95 

V.  Lohigli,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  187 

V.  Loring  i.  493 

V.  Maddox  iii-  184 

V.  Mather  i.  109 

V.  McKean  ii.  19 

t'.  Moody  iii.  441 

V.  M orison  ii-  522 

V.  Noble  iii.  245 

i\  I'arsons  ii.  160 

V.  Sloper  iii.  416 

V.  Sniithson  ii.  364 


I 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXCill 


Stewart  v.  Spedden 
V.  Spenser 
V.  Steele 
V.  Stewart 
V.  Stimpson 
V.  Teiin.  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Tlie  State 


iii.  102 

iii.  382,  403 

ii.  517 

iii.  315,  354 

ii.  57 

ii.  53-2 

i.  522 


t;.  Trustees  of  Hamilton  College  i.  484 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  882 

V.  Walker  ii.  38 

V.  West  India,  &c.  Co.  ii.  450 

V.  Woodward  ii.  882 

Stickles  V.  Arnold  ii.  833 

Stickney  v.  Allen  iii.  212 

V.  Jordan  ii.  714 

Stidliam  v.  Mattl)ews  iii.  368 

Stief  V.  Hart  ii.  129 

Stikeman  v.  Dawson  i.  358 

Stiles  r.  Cowper  i.  254  ;  ii.  939 

V.  Farrar  i.  254 

V.  Granville  i.  349 

V.  White  ii.  91G 

Stilk  V.  Myrick  i.  467 

Still  V.  Hall  ii.  879 

V.  Hoste  ii.  695 

Stilley  V.  Folger  i.  408 

Stillwell  V.  Craig  i.  281 

V.  Staples  ii.  474,  565 

Stimpson  v.  B.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  315 

V.  The  Railroads  ii.  327,  328 ;  iii.  176, 

185 

Stinemets  v.  Ainslie  iii.  464 

Stinson  v.  Clark  i.  570 

V.  Wyman  ii.  454 

Stirling  v.  Peet  iii.  242 

V.  Vaiighan  ii.  489 

Stitt  V.  Warden  ii.  534 

Stoallings  r.  Baker  i.  177 

Stobie  V.  Dills  i.  543 

Stock  v.  Inglis  ii.  489 

I'.  Mawson  iii.  477 

Stockdale  v.  Dunlop      i.  595,  601 ;  ii.  561 

V.  Unwhyn  ii.  337 

V.  Young  iii.  237 

Stocken  v.  Collen  i.  514 

Stockcr  V.  Brockelbank  i.  180 

V.  Harris  ii.  534 

Stocking  V.  Hunt  iii.  507 

V.  Sage  iii.  80,  206 

Stockley  v.  Stockley     i.  435;  iii.  351,  37-3 

Stocks  V.  Dobson  i.  258 

V.  Van  Leonard  iii.  107 

Stockton  V.  Frey         ii.  234,  239,  246,  823 

V.  Turner  ii.  645 

Stockton  R.  Co.  v.  Barrett  ii.  487 

Stockwell  V.  Dillingham  i.  197 

Stoddard  v.  Hart  iii.  346 

V.  Kimball  i.  285,  286 

V.  Long  Island  Railroad  Co.      ii.  254, 

255,  256,  259,  267 

V.  Martin  ii.  897 

V.  Mcllwain  i.  60 

V.  Mi.x  i.  468 

V.  Penniman  i.  283  ;  ii.  853 

V.  Treadwell  ii.  53 

VOL.  I.  J 


I  Stoddard's  case  i.  52 

Stoddard  Woollen  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Ilunt- 

I      ley  iii.  264 

Stoddart  r.  Smith  i.  525 

Stodden  v.  Harvey  ii.  794 

i  Stoddert  v.  Bowie's  Ex'r  iii.  309 

V.  Vestry  of  Port  Tobacco  Parish 

i.  157 

Stoever  v.  Whitman  ii.  671,  909 

Stokely  v.  Thompson  iii.  159 

Stokes  ('.  Cox  ii.  524 

V.  Landgraff  ii.  352,  360,  371,  375 

V.  Mason  iii.  467 

V.  Moore  iii.  7 

(,'.  Saltonstall  ii.  2-34,  235,  236, 239,  244 

Stollenwerck  v.  Thacher    i.  103,  568,  570, 

651 


Stona 

rd  V.  Dunkin 

ii 

152 

Stone 

Ex  parte 

i 

205 

V. 

Blanchard 

ii 

311 

V 

Boston  &  Maine  Railroad 

iii. 

453, 

455 

V. 

Browning 

iii.  51 

V 

Carlan 

ii 

360 

V 

Carr 

i 

348 

V. 

Charlestown 

iii 

483 

V. 

Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co 

, 

ii 

273 

V. 

Codman 

i. 

117 

120 

V. 

Compton 

ii.  9 

V. 

Dennis 

ii 

844 

V. 

Dennison                i 

.352 

;  iii.  44,  64 

V. 

Denny 

ii 

917 

V. 

Fouse 

i 

184 

V. 

Fowle 

ii 

790 

V. 

Gilliam 

i. 

576 

V 

King 

i. 

572 

V. 

Lidderdale 

i 

253 

V. 

Marsh 

i. 

20C 

;  ii 

747 

V. 

McNair 

Matthews 

i 
i. 

392 
553 

V. 

Miller 

ii. 

822 

V. 

Mississippi 

iii. 

510 

V. 

National  Ins.  Co. 

ii. 

499 

V. 

Peacock 

i. 

566 

V. 

V. 

Pointer 
Rockefeller 

i. 

615 
ii.  3 

V. 

Seymour 

ii. 

763, 

765 

V. 

Swift 

i. 

328 

V. 

Vance 

ii. 

686 

V. 

Waitt 

ii.  199, 

224, 

455 

V. 

Ware 

iii. 

1.36 

V. 

Whiting 

i. 

543 

V. 

Wilson 

ii. 

861 

V. 

Withipool 

i. 

356 

V. 

Wood 

i.  68,  69 

Stone 

lewer  v.  Farrar 

ii. 

830, 

833 

Stone 

louse  I'.  Gent 

i.  84 

Stoneman  v.  Pyle 

i. 

27H 

Stoney  v.  Amer.  Life  Ins. 

Co. 

iii. 

132 

I'. 

Beaubien 

i 

283 

Stoolf 

oos  r.  .Jenkins 

i. 

357 

Stoonevart  Maatschappy 

Nederl 

ind, 

The 

,  r.  Peninsular,  &c. 

Co. 

ii. 

420 

Storer 

IK  Gordon 

ii. 

663 

V. 

Great  Western  Railway  Co.  iii. 

327 

CXCIV 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Storer  r.  Hunter 

V.  Logan 
Storke  v.  De  Smeth 
Storm  V.  Green 

V.  Smith 

V.  Stirling 
Storr  V.  Crowley 
Storrs  V.  Barker 

V.  City  Bank  of  Utica 
Story  V.  Elliot 

V.  Finiiis 

V.  Flournoy 

V.  Holeombe 


i.  5G9 

i.  303 

ii.  835 

iii.  181 

i.  016 

i.  280 

ii.  196,  197,  214 

ii.  989;  iii.  355 

i.  117 

ii.  898 

ii.  77.") 

iii.  202 

ii.  336,  341,  342,  344, 

345,  349 

i.  366 

ii.  769 

i.  80 

ii.  874 

i.  20,  25 

1.292 

iii.  324 

i.  443 

1.  187;  iii.  161 

ii.  415 


V.  Johnson 

V.  Livingston 

V.  Lord  Windsor 

V.  ratten 

V.  Richardson 
Stotts  V.  Byers 
Stouffer  V.  Coleman 

V.  Latshaw 
Stoughton  V.  Lynch 

V.  Rappalo 

Stoughton's  Appeal  i.  150 
Stourbridge  Can.  Co.  v.  Wheeley     ii.  638 

Stout  V.  Folger  iii.  200 

V.  Jackson  iii.  242 

Stoveld,  E.r  parte  iii.  418 

i\  Brewin  ii.  772 

V.  Hughes  i.  647,  653 

Stover  V.  Herrington  iii.  381,  382 

Stow  V.  Russell  iii.  340 

V.  Stevens                     '  ii.  790 

Stowe  V.  Meserve  i.  612 

V.  Thomas  ii.  330,  341,  342 

V.  Wyse  ii.  931 

Stowell  )'.  Robinson  iii.  341 

V.  Roch  i.  374 

Stowell's  Adm'r  i'.  Drake  i.  31 

Stracey  v.  Deey  ii.  882 

Stracy  v.  Bank  of  England  i.  469 

Strader  i-.  Lambeth  ii.  687 

Strafford  Bank  v.  Crosby  ii.  29 

Straker  v.  Kidd  ii.  424 

Strang  r.  Hir.st  ii.  756 

Strangborough  v.  Warner  i.  478 

Strange  v.  Brennan  iii.  374 

V.  Price  i.  322 

Strathmore  v.  Bovces  i.  411 

Strathnaver,  The  ii.  436 

Stratoii  r.  Hnstall  ii.  686 

Stratton  r.  Allen  i.  157 

V.  Hale  iii.  472 

V.  Pettit  ii.  627,  637,  643 

V.  Stratton  i.  460;  iii.  370 

Straus  ?'.  Minzesheimer  i.  564 

V.  Wessel  i.  579 

Strauss  v.  l{ors  i.  564 

Stray  v.  Russ..|l  ii.  806 

Streaper  17.  Williams  iii.  169 

Streatfield  r.  llalliday  i.  12 

Street  v.  Blay  i.  6.">7 

V.  Righy  ii.  845;  iii.  172 

Streeter  v.  ilorlock  ii.  68 


Stretch  ?'.  Parker  ii.  65 

V.  Schenk  iii.  311 

Stretton  r.  Busnach  i.  407 

Stribblehill  v.  Brett  ii.  80 
Stribling  v.  Bank  of  the  Valley      iii.  118, 

143 

Strickland  v.  Coker  i.  372 

V.  Hudson  i.  54 

V.  Ma.xwell  i.  544;  ii.  634 

V.  Turner  i.  558 

Stricklcr  v.  Burkholder  ii.  27 

Strithrost  r.  Graeme  iii.  104 

Strode  v.  Russel  ii.  695 

Stroh  V.  Uhrich  ii.  881 

Strohn  v.  Detroit  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  265 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540 

Strong  V.  Barnes  ii.  634 

V.  Blake  ii.  777 

V.  Campbell  ii.  155 

V.  Clawson  iii.  424 

V.  Foote  i.  336 

V.  Foster  i.  294;  ii.  627 

V.  Hart  iii.  261 

V.  Harvej"^  ii.  775 

V.  Manuf  Ins.  Co.  ii.  559,  562,  575 

V.  Martin  ii.  500 

V.  Natally  ii.  212,  488 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  537 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  494 

I'  Place  i.  177 

I'.  Smith  i.  382 

V.  Stewart  i.  109 

V.  Strong  ii.  749;  iii.  216 

V.  Wilkin  i.  410 

V.  Willey  ii.  825 

Stronghill  v.  Buck  ii.  931 

Strother  v.  Lovejoy  ii.  392 

V.  Lucas  ii.  713 

Stroud  V.  Marshall  i.  433 

Strowd  V.  Willis  ii.  931 

Stuart  V.  Commonwealth  ii.  877 

V.  L.  &  N.  W.  Railway  Co.       iii.  306 

V.  Stiinpson  ii.  57 

j;.  Wilkins  i.  618 

Stubbs  r.  Lund  i.  649,  650 

!;.  Page  iii.  240 

Stucky  V.  Clyburn  i.  618 

Studabaker  ?•.  Marquardt  iii.  132 

Stukeley  ''.  Butler  ii.  645 

StuU  ('.  Haiise  ii-  5 

Stults  y.  Silva  i.  281 

Stnltz  r.  Dickey  i.  544 

Stump  V.  Henry       -  iii.  80 

Stnpetski  v.  Transatlantic  Ins.  Co.  ii.  546 

Sturdevant  v.  Pike  i.  94 

Sturge  I".  Sturge  i.  523 

Sturges  V.  Crowninshield  i.  5;  iii.  385, 

390,  391,  392,  397,  400,  449,  502, 

503,507,  509,511 

r.  Keith  iii.  211,220 

V.  Murphy  ii.  430 

Sturgess  v.  Cary  ii.  444,  445 

Sturgis  V.  Clough  ii.  430 

V.  (ialindo  iii.  322 

V.  Slocum  iii.  277 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


cxcv 


Sturm  V.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.         ii.  561,  583 
Stiirt  V.  Mellisli  iii.  95 

Sturtevaiit  v.  Ballard  i.  570 

V.  Randall  ii.  870 

Stuyvesant  v.  Mayor  of  New  York 

iii.  327 
V.  Woodruff  ii.  004 

Styan,  In  re  ii.  610 

Styles  V.  Wardle  ii.  798 

vSnecess,  The  ii.  519 

Succession  of  Dulhonde  i.  292 

Suckley  v.  Delafield  ii.  520 

V.  Furse  ii.  545 

Su(,'klinge  v.  Coney  ii.  770 

Suffell  V.  Bank  of  England  ii.  853 

Sufflckl  Society  v.  Loomis  iii.  113 

Suffolk     Bank     v.    The    "Worcester 

Bank  ii.  771,  773 

Suffijlk  Ins.  Co.  V.  Boyden  ii.  504 

Sugden  v.  Lolley  ii.  735 

Sugg  r.  Tillman  iii.  403 

Suit  V.  Woodhall  i.  81 

Sullivan  v.  Jacob  iii.  373 

V.  Ferguson  iii.  294 

V.  Mitchell  i.  311 

V.  Sullivan  i.  397;  ii.  88 

V.  Tuck  iii.  320 

Siimnierhays  v.  Kansas,  &c.  R.  Co.    ii.  47 

Sunimeiil  v.  Elder  i.  645 

Summers  v.  Ball  i.  399 

Summersett  v.  Jarvis  iii.  416 

Sumner  v.  Bowen  i.  320 

V.  Ferryman  i.  445 

V.  Ford  i.  309 

V.  Hamlet  ii.  380 

V.  Jones  ii.  907 

V.  Powell  i.  228 

V.  Williams  i.  143  ;  ii.  32,  631 ;  iii.  175 

Sumter  v.  Lehie  iii.  237 

Sunbolt  V.  Alford  ii.  107  ;  iii.  265 

Sunderland  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kearney        ii.  482 

Sun  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wright  ii.  490 

Supervisors  v.  Otis  ii.  28 

Supervisors  of  Albany  Co.  v.  Dorr  ii.  154 

Supple  r.  Iowa  State  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Surcouie  v.  Pinniger  iii.  32,  353 

Surplice  v.  Farnsworth  i.  533,  537 

Surtees,  Ex  parte  iii.  419,  420 

V.  Hubbard  i.  248 

Surtell  V.  Brailsford  i.  407 

Susan,  The  ii.  439,  440 

Suse  ('.  Ponipe  i.  327 

Susquehanna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Perrine       ii.  541 

Susquehanna,  &c.  Co.  v.  Finney         i.  571 

Sussex  Bank  v.  Baldwin    i.  308,  311,  316, 

318 

Sutcliffe  V  Dohrman  i.  231 

Sutcr  V.  Sheeler  iii.  75 

Sutherland,  In  re  iii.  435 

V.  Briggs  iii.  337 

V.  Pratt  ii.  486 

Sutplien  V.  Fowler  iii.  333 

Sutphin  V.  Crozer  ii.  700 

Sutton  V.  Ballon  i.  568 

V.  Buck  ii.  103 


Sutton  V.  Chetwynd 

V.  Crain 

V.  Hawkins 

V.  Horn 

V.  Irwine 

I'.  Kettell 

V.  llowley 

V.  Tathara 

V.  Temple 

V.  Tyrell 

V.  Warren 
Suttons  V.  Tyrrell 
Suydam  v.  Bartle 

V.  Broadnax 


iii.  316 

i.  142 

ii.  779 

ii.  841 

i.  210 

ii.  410 

iii.  350 

1.  87;  ii.  070 

i.  533,  633  ;  ii.  135 

ii.  39 

ii.  88,  724,  726,  727 

ii.  847,  848 

iii.  143 

iii.  396,  397 


V.  Clark  i.  508,  583,  586 ;  iii.  444 

V.  Columbus  Ins.  Co.  ii.  540 

V.  Day  ii.  318 

V.  Jenkins  iii.  115,  210,  211,  212,  215, 

217,  218,  220,  221 

V.  Vance  ii.  27 

V.  Westfall  iii.  143 

Swain  v.  Howland  ii.  467 

V.  Seamans  ii.  939 

V.  Senet  iii.  286 

V.  Tyler  i.  342 

Swallow  V.  Emery  i.  578 

Swampscot  Machine  Co.  v.  Partridge 

ii.  539,  579 

Swan,  The  ii.  441 

V.  Broome  ii.  898 

V.  Nesmith  i.  101 

V.  Snow  ii.  608 

V.  Stedman  i.  212 

V.  Tappan  iii.  189 

Swanson  v.  Swanson  i.  376 

V.  White  iii.  117 

Swanton  v.  Reed  ii.  420 

Swanzey  v.  Moore  ii.  40,  657 

Swartwout  v.  Payne  iii.  121,  125 

Swasey  v.  Antram  i.  166 

V.  Vanderheyden  i.  353 

Sweany  v.  Hunter  i.  467 

Sweat  V.  Hall  i.  399 

Sweatland  v.  111.  &  Miss.  Tel.  Co.    ii.  280, 

283,  286,  287,  288,  289 

Sweeney  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  ii.  501 

V.  Owsley  i.  563 

Sweeny  v.  Easter  iii.  276 

Sweet  V.  Bartlett  iii.  286 

V.  Benning  ii.  337,  344,  346 

V.  Cater  ii.  348 

V.  Franklin  iii.  74 

V.  Harding  ii.  783 

V.  Jenkins  ii.  677 

V.  Lee  iii.  9,  10,  41 

V.  Maugham  ii.  337,  348 

V.  Pym  i.  644;  iii.  271 

Sweeting  v.  Darthez  ii.  424 

r.  Turner  i.562 

Sweetland  v.  Illinois,  &c.  Telegraph 

Co.  i.  79;  ii.  287 

Sweetzer  v.  French  i.  209,  210 

Sweezey  v.  Thayer  i.  150 

Sweigart  v.  Berk  i.  23 

Swete  V.  Fairlie  ii.  592,  599 


CXCVl 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Swetland  r.  Creigh 

1.280 

Swett  V.  Colgate 

i.  616,  622,  625 

V.  Patrick                  i 

.25;  iii.  175,  242 

V.  Soutliworth 

i.90;  ii.  745 

Swick  V.  Home  lus.  Co. 

ii.  597,  609 

V.  Scars 

ii.  939 

Swift  V.  Barnes 

iii.  218,  220 

I'.  Barnett 

i.  338 

V.  Clark 

i.  442;  ii.  458 

V.  Dey 

ii.  374,  375 

V.  Hawkins 

i.  457 

V.  Kelly 

ii.  726 

V.  Pierce 

iii.  23 

V.  Railway,  &c.  Ass 

ii.  610 

V.  Stevens 

i.  332 

V.  Tvson 

i.  291,  292 

V.  Vt.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  561 

V.  Williams 

ii.  39 

t'.  Wliesen 

ii.  .304 

Swigert  v.  Graham 

ii.  132 

Swindall  v.  Swindall 

i.  137 

Swindler  )•.  Ililliard 

ii.  256,  268 

Swiney  v.  Barry 

ii.  856 

Swinfen  v.  Chelmsford 

i,  126,  1.30 

V.  Swinfen 

i.  131 

Swinford  v.  Burn 

ii.  59 

Swire  v.  Kedman 

ii.  3,  28,  756 

Swires  v.  Parsons 

ii.  52 

Swisher  v.  Williams 

ii.  901 

Switzer  v.  Gardner 

iii.  323 

V.  Skiles 

i.  527 

V.  Smith 

i.  256 

Sword  V.  Keith 

iii.  41 

Swoyer's  Appeal 

i.  382 

Sydebotham,  Ex  parte 

i.  354;  iii.  415 

Sydney  Cove,  The 

ii.  404 

Sydnor  v.  Hurd 

i.  55,  68 

Syers  r.  Bridge 

ii.  674 

V.  Jonas 

ii.  668,  678 

V.  Syers 

i.  176 

Sykes  v.  Dixon 

i.  478 ;  ii.  48,  52 

V.  Giles  i.  41,  87,  528,  529;  ii.  74(5,747 

V.  Ilalsted 

i.  391 ;  ii.  91 

V.  Sykes                ii. 

364,  372,  373,  375 

Sylvester  v.  Crapo 

i.  296 

V.  Downer 

i.  274,  283,  284 

Symes,  Ex  jiarte 

iii.  473 

V.  Hughes 

ii.  886 

Symington  r.  McLin 

i.  00 

Synionds  r.  Cockerill 

iii.  IK),  1 19 

V.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.             ii-  (il8 

Symons  r.  .lames 

i.  524 

Syplier  v.  McHenry 

i.  137 

Syracuse,  &c.  Ii.  Co.  v. 

Collins          ii.  755 

Taber  v.  Cannon 

i;.  Penett 
Tabor  v.  Micliigan  Life  Ins. 
Taffe  V.  Warnick 
Taft  V.  Bnffurn 

V.  Lark  in 

V.  Montague 


Co. 


ii.  390,  391 
ii.  112 
ii.  016 
i.  547 
i.  222 
ii.  878 
ii.  655 


Taft  V.  Sergeant  i.  364 

Taft  &  Co.  r.  Pike  i.  361 

Tagart  v.  The  State  of  Indiana        iii.  104 

Tagg  V.  Tennessee  Bank  i.  81 

Taggard  v.  Loring  ii.  386,  420,  600 

Taggart  v.  Buckmore  ii.  383 

Taintor  v.  Prendergast  i.  68,  106 

Tait  V.  Levi  ii.  480,  527 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  601 

Taitt,  Ex  parte  i.  238 

Talbot  V.  Commonwealth  Bank         i.  .309 

V.  Gray  ii.  31,  795 

V.  M'Gee  i.  131  ;  ii.  825 

V.  Seamen,  The  ii.  441 

V.  Wilkins  i.  209 

Talcot  V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  5-34 

Talcott  V.  Goodwin  iii.  426 

I'.  Henderson  ii-  914 

Tallcott  V.  Dudley  iii-  424 

Talley  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.        ii.  212 

Talliaferro's  Ex'rs  v.  King's  Adm'rs 

iii.  161 
Tahnadge  i-.  The  Rensselaer  &  Sara- 
toga R.  R.  Co.  iii.  44 
Talver  v.  West                                      iii-  49 
Tameret  v.  Edwards  i-  569 
Tamplin  v.  Diggins                    iii.  439,  469 
Tams  V.  Way  ^  i.  290 
Tamvaco  v.  Simpson                           i.  446 
Tandy  r.  Tandy                                   ii.  834 
Tanner,  Ex  ))nrte                                 iii-  422 
V.  Ciiristian  i-  68 
V.  Livingston                                iii-  240 
V.  Moore                                           ii-  24 
V.  Scovell                               i.  645,  646 
V.  Smart          iii.  71,  72,  74,  76,  78,  79 
Tansley  v.  Turner                                i.  566 
Tapley  v.  Butterfield           i.  200,  201,  207 
r.  Martens                                     ii-  755 
Tappan  r.  Blaisdell                      i.  231,  232 
V.  Kimball                                       iii-  90 
V.  Nat.  Bank-note  Co.                 ii.  324 
Tappenden  v.  Burgess                       iii.  441 
Tapscott  i;.  Williams  i-  23 
Tarbox  r.  Eastern  Steamboat  Co.    ii.  410 
Tardy  v.  Boyd                                        i.  307 
Tarleton  v.  Backhouse                      iii-  159 
V.  Baker                                         ii-  897 
u.  M'(iawley                               iii-  1''5 
r.  Tarleton                                     ii-  740 
Tarling  v.  Ihixter                          1.  503,  5G0 
V.  O'Hiordan                                   i.  565 
Tarpley  ;;.  Hamer                               iii-  506 
Tarquair  v.  Redinger                          ii.  833 
Tarr  v.  Williams                                    i-  409 
'I'arrant  ;•-  Webb                                      ii-  46 
Tartar,  Tlio                                           ii-  404 
Tasker  v.  Kenton  Ins.  Co.                  ii-  588 
Tassell  »•-  Lewis                                     i-  321 
Tatam  r.  Williams                                iii   *"' 
Tate  ».  Citizens  Ins.  Co.     ii.  476,  574,  57H 


r.  Clements 
r.  (Jreenlee 
t'.  Weliings 
V.  Wymoud 


199,  225 

iii.  12 

iii.  116,  119,  125 

ii.  29 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXCVll 


Tatham  v.  Le  Roy 

ii.  317,  321 

Taylor  v.  Moseley 

ii.  860 

V.  Lijwber 

ii.  325 

V.  Neville 

iii.  329 

i:  Piatt 

iii.  30'J 

V.  Nicolson 

ii.  827 

Tatlock  r.  Harris 

i.  245 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  544 

Tattersall  v.  Groote 

i.  229;  ii.  840 

V.  Patrick                                i 

435,  468 

Tatton  ('.  Wade 

ii.  915 

V.  Plumer                             iii 

.  300,  439 

Tatum  V.  Bonner 

ii.  5 

V.  Pophara 

ii.  875 

Taunton  v.  Costar 

i.  550 

V.  Pratt 

ii.  13 

Taunton  Bank  v.  RichardsoE 

i.  315 

V.  Pugh 

ii.  71 

Taunton  Copper  Co.  i'. 

Merch.  Ins. 

V.  Robinson 

iii.  277 

Co. 

ii.  485 

V.  Ross 

iii.  17 

Taussig  V.  Hart 

i.  94 

V.  Salmon 

i.  93,  94 

Tawney  v.  Crowther 

iii.  4,  18 

i\  Savage 

i.  37 

Tayler  v.  Marling 

ii.  848 

V.  Shelton 

i.  68 

Tayloe  v.  Merchants  Fire  Ins 

.Co.    i.  515; 

1-.  Shura                              iii. 

424,  448 

ii. 

540 

587;  iii.  329 

V.  Snyder 

i.  312 

V.  Sandiford 

ii 

763;  iii.  1(58 

V.  Spear 

iii.  98 

Taylor  v.  JFAna.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  601,  613 

V.  Stibbert 

iii.  313 

V.  Agricultural,  &c. 

Assoc.         iii.  353 

V.  Taylor 

ii.  371 

V.  Ashton 

i.  71;  ii.  917 

V.  Terme 

i.  180 

V.  Atwood 

i.  435 

V.  Thomas 

i.  271 

V.  Backhouse 

ii.  844 

V.  Trueman 

i.  330 

V.  Baldwin 

ii.  687 

V.  Wakefield 

iii.  46 

V.  Bank  of  Illinois 

i.  326 

V.  Waters 

ii.  874 

V.  Blacklow 

i.  126 

V.  Weld 

ii.  924 

V.  Blanchard 

ii.  893 

V.  Wells 

ii.  225 

V.  Bowers 

ii.  886 

V.  W^etmore 

ii.  14 

V.  Brewer 

ii.  59 

V.  Wheeler                  iii.  427 

431,432 

V.  Briggs 

ii.  666,  672 

V.  Whitehead 

ii.  136 

V.  Bryden 

i.  318 

V.  Whitthorn 

iii.  442 

V.  Bullen 

i 

.  635 ;  ii.  394 

I'.  Wilson                               ii. 

483,  525 

V.  Carpenter    i.  449 

ii. 

356,  357,  358, 

V.  Young                 i.  192  ;  iii. 

463,  466 

372,  375, 

376, 

377 ;  iii.  185 

V.  Zepp 

ii.  940 

V.  Cato,  The 

ii.  438,  461 

Taymon  v.  Mitchell 

i.  626 

V.  Chapman 

i.  543 

Teaff  V.  Hewitt 

i.  547 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co. 

i.  48 

Teague  v.  Hubbard 

i.  186 

V.  Clay 

ii.  425 

Teal  V.  Auty 

iii.  35 

V.  Coryell 

i.  216 

V.  Felton 

ii.  155 

V.  Croker 

i.  370 

V.  Sears 

ii.  191 

V.  Curry 

i.  281 

Teasdale  v.  Charleston  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  512 

V.  Diplock 

ii.  613 

Tebbets,  In  re 

iii.  478 

V.  Dobbins 

i.  279 

IK  Haskins 

ii.  62 

V.  Field                   i. 

234, 

2.36 ;  iii.  298 

Tebbetts  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  542 

V.  Fleet 

i 

.626;  ii.  911 

Tebbitts  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  557 

V.  French 

i.  315,  317 

Tebbs  V.  Carpenter 

i.  137 

V.  Gallup 

ii.  784 

Tebbutt  V.  Bristol  R.  Co. 

i.  153 

V.  Geary 

iii.  409 

Teed  v.  Ell  worthy 

i.  23 

V.  Germania  Ins.  Co 

ii.  471,  616 

Teesdale  i\  Anderson 

i.  624 

V.  Gilman 

ii.  908 

Teese  v.  Huntington 

ii.  328 

V.  Green 

i.  78 

Tegetmeyer  v.  Lumley 

ii.  876 

V.  Henderson 

i.  197 

Tempest  v.  Fitzgerald             i.  57 

1 ;  iii.  46 

I'.  Henry 

i.  263 

V.  Kilner                               iii. 

220,  221 

V.  Horde 

ii.  634 

Templar  v.  McLachlan 

i.  128 

V.  Hutchinson 

i.  226 

Temple,  Ex  parte 

iii.  427 

f.  Jones 

i. 

308,  475,  515 

V.  Hawley 

i.  372 

V.  Kynier                  i 

330 

;  ii.  766,  938 

V.  Seaver 

i.  218 

V.  Laird 

ii.  37 

V.  Turner 

ii.  459 

V.  Liverpool    &    Great 

Western 

Templeman  v.  Biddle 

i.  544 

Steam  Co. 

ii.  183 

1-.  Case 

ii.  104 

V.  Longwortli 

iii.  3.38 

Tenant  v.  Elliott 

ii.  887 

V.  Lowell 

ii. 

472,  480,  529 

Ten  Brocck  v.  Be  Witt 

iii.  287 

V.  Maguire 

iii.  196 

V.  Livingston 

iii.  334 

V.  Merrill 

iii.  11 

Tench  v.  Cheese 

ii.  642 

V.  Mills 

iii.  200,  464 

Ten  Eyck  v.  Brown 

ii.  4 

V.  Mortindale 

i.  523 

V.  Wing 

iii.  72 

CXCVlll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Tennant,  Ex  parte 

i.  174,  183 

V.  Strachan 

iii.  426,  4d1 

Tennessee  v.  Sneed 

iii.  50G 

Tennessee  Bank  v.  Ebbert                 i.  613 

Tenn.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scott 

ii.  478 

Tenney  v.  Foote 

i.  208 

Tennj'  v.  Prince 

i.  274,  283;ii.  7 

Terhune  v.  Mayor,  &c. 

of  New  York 

ii.745 

Terrell  v.  Goddard 

i.  221 

Terrett  v.  Taylor 

iii.  481,  483,  485 

Terrill  v.  Richards 

i,  175,  198,  213 

Territt  v.  Bartlett 

i.  486,  489 

Terry  v.  Belcher 

i.  569 

V.  Bissell 

ii.  936 

V.  Carter 

i.  187 

V.  Duntze 

ii.  600 

V.  Fargo 

i.  42 

I'.  Parker 

i.  307,  310 

V.  Wacher 

i.  96 

Tetley  v.  Easton 

ii.  308 

r.  Taylor 

iii.  402 

Tewksbury  v.  Bennett 

i.  617,  621 

V.  O'Connell 

ii.  809 

V.  Spruance 

i.  94 

Thacher  v.  Dinsmore 

i.  7,  154;  ii.  750 

Thackaray  v.  Tlie  Farmer  ii.  459 

Thacker  v.  Hardy  ii.  890 

V.  Shepherd  i.  24 

Thackoort^evdass  v.  Dhondraull        ii.  896 
Thallhimer  r.  Brinckcrhoff  ii.  908 

Thames  v.  Barbour  ii.  6 

Thames  Iron  Co.  v.  Patent  Derrick 

Co.  ii.  148;  iii.  253 

Tharsis  Sulphur  Co.  v.  Loftus  ii.  833 

Thatcher  v.  Bank  of  New  York  i.  48 


V.  Gammon 

iii.  130 

Thaxton  r.  Edwards 

ii.  783 

Thayer  v.  Brackett                 i. 

290;  ii.  778 

V.  Clemence 

i.  260 

V.  Daniels                          i. 

258;  iii.  98 

V.  King 

i.  332 

V.  Luce 

iii.  15 

V.  Middlesex  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  541 

V.  Mowry 

ii.  806 

V.  Rock 

iii.  19,  30 

V.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  R.  Co 

ii.  233,  236 

V.  Torrey 

i.  400 

V.  Turner 

ii.  922 

V.  Viles 

iii.  38 

V.  Wadsworth 

ii.  36,  39 

V.  Wendell 

i.  143 

V.  Wliite 

i.  342 

Thelusson  r.  Fergusson 

ii.  520,  533 

V.  Fletcher 

ii.  513 

Theobald  v.  Colby 

ii.  885 

Thetford  r.  Hubbard 

ii.  775,  780 

Thetis,  The 

ii.  440 

Thibault  v.  Gibson 

iii.  115 

Thibodcau  r.  Levasseur 

ii.  721 

Thickncsse  r.  Broinilow 

i.  204 

Thickstun  r.  Howard 

ii.  156,  104 

Tbiis  7-.  Byers 

ii.  424 

Tliimblcby  v.  Barron 

ii.  850 

Thimbletliorp  v.  Ilardesty 

i.  23 

Thing  V.  Libbey 
Tliinne  v.  Rigby 
Thorn  V.  Bigland 
Thomas  v.  Afflick 
V.  Allen 
V.  Atherton 
V.  Atkinson 
V.  Bishop 


i.  365 

ii.  82'J 
ii.  916 
ii.  797 
iii.  200 
i.  206 
i.  00 
i.  135 


V.  Boston  &    Providence  R.   R. 

Co.  ii.  151,  184,  201,212 

V.  Cadwallader  ii.  663 

V.  Catheral  iii.  119 

V.  Clarke  ii.  422,  423 

i;.  Cleaves  iii.  132 
V.  Cook          i.  37,  543,  644;  ii.  941  ; 

iii.  24 

V.  Courtnay  iii.  477 

V.  Crosswell  iii.  179 

V.  Davis  ii.  31,  795 

V.  Day  ii.  152 

V.  Dering  iii.  358 

V.  Desanges  iii.  400 

V.  Dickinson  iii.  38 

V.  Dike  i.  355 ;  ii.  40 

V.  Dingley  i.  031 

r.  Dow  ii.  28 

V.  Edwards  i.  06,  69 

V.  Evans  ii.  776 

V.  Freelon  ii.  863 

V.  Graves  ii.  676 

V.  Hammond  iii.  40 

V.  Hayden  i.  535 

V.  Heatliorn  ii.  749,  751 

V.  Hewes  i.  69 

V.  Hopper  ii.  877 

V.  Jones  iii.  323 

V.  Kelsoe  iii.  437 

V.  Lane  ii.  465 

V.  Lewis  ii.  389 

V.  Lincoln  i.  110 

V.  Mason  iii.  136 

V.  McCann  ii.  917,  927 

V.  Miles  ii.  892 

V.  Molier  ii.  829 

V.  Newton  i.  287,  289 

V.  O'Hara  ii.  676 

V.  Osborn  ii.  404,  421 

V.  Pemberton  iii.  447 

V.  Pennrich  i.  208 

V.  R.  R.  Co.  i.  157 

V.  Rawlings  i.  126 

V.  Rideing  iii.  426 

t".  Roossa  i.  279 ;  ii.  785 

V.  Rhymney  Railway  Co.  ii.  236 

V.  Roberts  i.  335 

V.  Shillibcer  i.  247 

r.  Snrrell  ii- 6J2 

V.  Stetson  ii-  20 
V.  Thomas  i.  457,  497 ;  ii.  93,  680,  094 

V.  Todd  ii.  753 

V.  Vonkapff  ii.  505;  iii.  301 

V.  Weeks  ii-  305 
V.  Williams  i.  486  ;  ii.  43;  iii.  19,  20,  31 

r. i.  20 

Thomas  Martin,  The  ii.  433 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CXCIX 


Thomason  v.  Frere      i.  224,  272  ;  iii.  420, 

438 

Thomasson  v.  Boyd  i.  308 

Tliomblc'son  v.  Black  iii.  331 

Tlioiiioiui  V.  Earl  of  Suffolk  i.  383 

Thompson,  Ex  parte  iii.  4G2,  405 

In  re  ii.  710 

V.  Alger  iii.  224,  225,  388 

V.  Andrews  i.  220 

V.  Bell  i.  47 

V.  Berry  iii.  130 

V.  Blanchard  i.  458,  509 ;  il.  U38 

V.  Botts  i.  018,  030 

V.  Brown  ii.  705 

V.  Charnock  ii.  844 

V.  Cohen  iii.  324 

V.  Davenport  i.  60,  68 ;  ii.  3V)1 

V.  Dawson  iii.  294 

V.  Dominey  i.  328,  651 ;  ii.  410 

V.  Emery  i.  254,  257 

V.  Fargo  i.  90 

V.  Finden  ii.  390 

V.  Gardiner  i.  583,  585;  iii.  13 

V.  Gillespy  ii.  521 

V.  (ilover  ii.  14 

V.  Guthrie  iii.  245 

V.  Hale  i.  293,  290 

V.  Harding  i.  147 

V.  Havelock  i.  93,  111 

V.  Hervey  i.  402 

V.  Hewitt  iii.  471,  478 

V.  Hopper  ii.  495,  531 

V.  Inglis  ii.  423 

V.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  017 

V.  James  i.  515 

V.  Jones  iii.  120 

V.  Ketcham  ii.  683,  713 

V.  Lacy  ii.  155,  167 

V.  Lay  i.  304 

V.  Lindsay  i.  627 

V.  Lovrein  i.  405 

V.  Lyon  i.  350 

V.  Marrow  iii.  239 

V.  McCuUough  i.  298 

V.  McFarland  ii.  939 
V.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  R.  Co.    iii.  490 

V.  Page  i.  483 

V.  Patrick  ii.  120 

V.  Percival  i.  192,  245 

V.  Perkins  i.  100,  101 

V.  Powles  iii.- 122 

V.  Reynolds  ii.  499,  909 

V.  Ross  ii.  76 

V.  Royal  Exch.  Ass.  Co.  ii.  505 

V.  Shattuck  iii.  199,  249 
V.  Shepherd           i.  273,  293  ;  iii.  452 

V.  Sickles  iii.  101 

V.  Small  ii.  407 

V.  Stanhope  ii.  330 

V.  Tiiompson  i.  640  ;  ii.  92 

V.  Tiles  i.  571 

V.  Tod  iii.  347 

V.  Towle  i.  010 

V.  Trail  i.  649;  ii.  407 

V.  Williams  ii.  900 


Thompson  r.  Williamson 

i.  177 

V.  Woodbridge 

iii.  135 

Thorns  V.  Dingley 

iii.  193 

Thomson  ;'.  Bank  of  S.  C. 

ii.  112 

V.  Brit.  No.  Am.  Bank 

ii.  755 

V.  Buchanan 

ii.  524 

V.  Davenport         i.  105, 

106 

107,  590 

V.  Dougherty 

i 

204,  410 

.  V.  Harrison 

ii.  78 

V.  Hopper 

iii.  95 

V.  Picket 

iii.  113 

V.  Redman 

ii.  879 

V.  Royal  Ex.  Ass.  Co. 

ii.  403 

V.  Winchester 

ii.  302 

Thomyris,  The 

ii.  519 

Thoreau  v.  Pallies 

ii.  828 

Thorley,  Ex  jiarte 

iii.  420 

V.  Lord  Kerry 

iii.  185 

Thorn  ih  Wilson 

iii.  295 

Thornhorow  v.  Whiteacre 

i.  406 

Tiiornbury  v.  Bevill          iii. 

344, 

360,  374 

Thorndike  v.  Bath 

i. 

564,  508 

V.  Boardman 

ii.  534 

V.  Burrage 

i.  536 

V.  City  of  Boston        ii. 

708, 

710,  711 

V.  De  Wolf      i.  176,  184 

;  ii. 

387,  805 

V.  Norris 

ii.  933 

V.  Stone                          ii. 

404 

;  iii.  147 

Thorne  v.  Deas 

ii.  112 

v.  Kathan 

i.  396 

V.  Watkins 

ii.  701 

V.  White 

ii. 

464,  465 

Thornett  v.  Haines  i.  526 ;  iii.  370 

Thornton  v.  Appleton  ii.  858 

V.  Bank  of  Washington  iii.  143 

V.  Carson  ii.  826,  831,  835 

V.  Charles  i.  586 ;  iii.  13 

V.  Davenport  i.  569 

V.  Dixon  i.  168 

V.  Exchange  Bank  i.  405 

V.  Fairlie  i.  469 

V.  Illingworth        i.  365,  369  ;  iii.  415 

V.  Kelly  iii.  15 

V.  Kempster  i.  587  ;  iii.  13 

V.  Meux  i.  586;  iii.  13 

I'.  Place  i.  494 ;  ii.  055 

V.  Thompson  iii.  227 

V.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  447,  537 

V.  Wynn  i.  325,  637 

Thorogood  v.  Bryan  ii.  250 

V.  Marsh  ii.  172 

Thorold  v.  Smith  i.  51 ;  ii.  747 

Thorp  V.  Thorp  ii.  660,  661,  728 

Thorpe  v.  Booth  i.  302 

V.  Cooper  ii.  836 

V.  Fowler  i.  579 

V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  ii.  237 

V.  Shapleigh  i.  .387,  393 

V.  Thorpe  i.  473  ;  ii.  91 ;  iii.  452 

V.  White  ii.  39 

Thouvenin  v.  Lea  iii.  39,  43 

Thrall  v.  Hill  L  545,  560 

V.  Newell  ii.  637 

V.  Wright  i.  338 

Thrasher  v.  Everhart  ii.  719 


cc 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Thrasher  v.  Haynes 

ii.  827 

Tillotson  V.  McCrillis 

V.  Tuttle 

ii.  746 

V.  Tillotson                       i 

Threfall  v.  Uorwick 

ii.  1G7 

Tillou  V.  Britton           ii.  776 

Threlkelci  i\  Fitzhugh 

iii.  212 

V.  Clinton  INIut.  Fire  Ins 

Tlirockiiiurton  v.  Tracey 

ii.  638,  640 

V.  Kingston  Ins.  Co. 

Thropp  v.  Field 

i.  531 

Tilton  V.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co. 

Thropp's  Appeal 

i.  545 

V.  Russell 

Thrupp  I'.  Fielder 

i.  363,  364 

V.  Tilton 

Thrustout  r.  Crafter 

ii.  875 

Tilton  Safe  Co.  v.  Tisdale 

Thurber  i\  Anderson 

i.41 

Tilton,  The  Sch. 

V.  Blackburne 

ii.  740 

Timberman  r.  Craddock 

Thurlow  I'.  Massachusetts 

iii.  511 

Timbers  v.  Katz 

Thurman  v.  Wells 

i.  253 

Timmins  v.  Gibbins               i 

Thiirn  v.  Alta  Cal.  Tel.  Co. 

ii.  285 

Timmis  v.  Piatt 

Thursby  v.  Plant 

iii.  44'J 

Timrod  v.  Shoolbred 

Thurston  ?-.  Blanchard 

ii.  756 

Tindal,  Ex  parte 

V.  Col.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  500 

V.  Bright 

V.  Cornell 

iii.  144 

V.  Brown 

V.  Fisher 

iii.  106 

V.  Taylor         i.  328;  ii. 

j>.  Koch 

ii.  582 

Tindall  v.  Touchberry 

V.  Maddocks 

iii.  96 

Tingle  v.  Tucker 

V.  Martin 

iii.  176 

Tingley  v.  Cutler                   i. 

V.  McKown 

i.  273,  295 

Tingrey  v.  Brown 

V.  Percival                        i. 

128 ;  ii.  908 

Tinker  v.  McCauley 

V.  Thornton 

i.  509 

Tinkler  v.  Prentice 

V.  Wolfborough 

iii.  98 

Tinney  v.  Ashley 

Thurstont  r.  Grey 

iii.  237 

Tinsley  v.  Beall 

Thweatt  v.  Jones 

i.  36,  37 

V.  Lacy 

Thwing  V.  Wash.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  418,  510, 

Tipper  v.  Bicknell 

611,512 

Tippet  V.  Hawkey 

Tibbetts  v.  Towle 

i.  578 

Tippets  V.  Heane 

V.  Moore 

iii.  293 

V.  Walker 

Tibbits  V.  George   i.  245,  254, 

257;  ii.  610 

Tipping  I".  Smith 

Tice  V.  Gallop 

i.  59 

Tirrell  i-.  Gage 

Tichburne  v.  White 

ii.  217,  274 

Tisdale  v.  Co'mi.  Ins.  Co. 

Tickel  V.  Short 

i.  91 

V.  Harris 

Ticonic  Bank  v.  Johnson 

iii.  143 

V.  Mitchell 

Tidd  V.  Lister 

iii.  438 

V.  Mut.  Ben.  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Kines 

i.  55 

Tisloe  V.  Graeter 

Tidewater  Canal  Co.  i'.  Archer              i.  93 

Tit  comb  v.  Wood 

Tidmarsh  v.  Washington  Ins 

Co.   ii.  525, 

Titman  v.  Titman 

528,  52i) 

Tittemore  v.  Vt.  Ins.  Co. 

Tidswell  v.  Angerstein 

ii.  605 

Titus  I'.  Carkins 

Tier  v.  Lampson 

i.  75 

V.  Glens  Falls  Ins.  Co. 

Tierman  v.  Beam 

iii.  294 

V.  Hobart                       ii. 

Tiernan  v.  Napier 

ii.  783,  787 

V.  Perkins 

V.  Poor 

iii.  310 

Tobago,  The 

TifEt  V.  Culver 

iii.  183 

Tobey  v.  County  of  Bristol 

V.  TifEt 

i.  351 

V.  Ellis 

Tilden  r.  Barnard 

i.  58 

V.  Lennig 

Tilcston  V.  Nettleton 

ii.  11 

V.  Robinson 

V.  Newell 

ii.  663 

V.  Wood 

Tiley  i'.  Courtier 

ii.  753 

Tobias  v.  Francis 

Tilford  r.  Ramsey 

iii.  189 

Tobin  V.  Crawford 

Tilglimau  r.  Proctor 

ii.  310 

V.  Post 

Tilley  '••  County  of  Cook 

ii.  680 

Tod  V.  Baylor 

V.  Hudson  11.  K.  Co. 

iii.  209 

V.  Benedict 

V.  Tilley 

ii.  613 

Todd  V.  Clapp 

Tillier  v.  Whitehead 

i.  211 

V.  Emly 

Tillingliast  v.  Nourse 

iii.  88 

V.  Gee                             i. 

V.  Wlienton 

i.  2()(! 

V.  Lorah 

Tillock  V.  Webb 

ii.  902,  904 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co. 

Tillotson  V.  Boyd 

i.  260 

V.  Parker 

V.  Clieetliara 

iii.  1H3 

V.  Stokes 

V.  Gesner 

ilL  335 

V.  Summers 

i.  349 

260  ;  li.  716 

);  iii.  381,382 

Co.  ii.  860 

ii.  552,  562 

ii.  571 

i.  348 

iii.  309 

i.  631 

ii.  398 

i.  109 

i.  381 

i.  302 ;  ii.  754 

i.  145 

i.  627 

iii.  462 

i.  186 

i.  322 

407,  410,  417 

ii.  11 

ii.  406 

,458;  iii.  174 

i.  146 

ii.4 

i.  488 

ii.  790 

i.  290 

ii.  316 

i.  475 

i.  26 

iii.  81 

i.  68  ;  iii.  37 

ii.  829 

ii.  413 

ii.  612 

iii.  56 

iii.  97 

ii.  586 

ii.  686 

i.  557 

ii.  51 

ii.  576 

iii.  181 

ii.  587 

719;  iii.  391 

ii.  829 

ii.  401 

ii.  845 

i.  323 

i.  322 

i.  487 

i.  354 

i.  547 

i.  42 

iii.  220 

iii.  239 

i.  61 

i.  166,  354 

i.  41 

522;  iii.  359 

i.  208 

ii.  817 

ii.  774 

i.  401 

ii.  663 


i 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCl 


Todd  i:  Todd 
Tohind  V.  Sprague 
TolbcTt  ('.  Harrison 
Toledo  Bank  v.  Bond 


iii.  79 

iii.  95 

ii.  874 

iii.  482,  483,  48(3, 

498 

Toledo  Works  v.  Bernhelnier  iii.  29;J 

Toledo,  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Hamilton        ii.  174 

?'.  Hammond  ii.  '273 

Tolen  V.  Tolen  ii.  732,  736 

ToUey  v.  Greene  iii.  43 

Tome  V.  Doelger  ii.  807 

r.  Dubois  i.  559,  562 

Tomlin  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Fordwich   ii.  834 

Tomlinson  v.  Gill  iii.  21 

V.  Hammond  ii.  835 

V.  Savage  i.  526 

Tompkins  v.  Bernet  iii.  137 

V.  Brown  iii.  76,  89 

V.  Corwin  ii.  644 

V.  Elliot  ii.  660,  663 

V.  Haile  ii.  426 

V.  Weeks  i.  147 

V.  Wiieeler  iii.  381,  382 

Tonnawanda  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Munger    ii.  248 

Tonson  v.  Walker  ii.  341,  346 

Toof  i:  Martin  iii.  415 

Took  V.  Tuck  iii.  477 

Tooke  V.  Hollingworth  i.  575;  iii.  434,  438 

Tooker  v.  Bennett  i.  211 

V.  Sloan  i.  49 

Tooley  v.  Windham  i.  471 

Toomer  v.  Dawson  i.  583;  iii.  4,  18 

Tope  ('.  Hockin  iii.  434,  458 

Topliam  V.  Braddick  i.  96  ;  iii.  98 

V.  Chapman  iii.  409 

Toppan  V.  Atkinson  ii.  479 

Torrey  v.  Baxter  i.  218 

V.  Fisk  i.  272 

V.  Grant  iii.  129 

Torriano  v.  Yonng  i.  535 

Toulmin  i\  Copland  ii.  766 

Toulson  V.  Grout  iii.  429 

Touro  r.  Cassin  ii.  700 

Tourville  ".  Naish  i.  80 

Touson  V.  Walker  ii.  330 

Toussaint  v.  Hartop  ii.  848 

V.  Martinnant  i.  31 ;  iii.  463 

Touteng  i\  Hubbard  ii.  425 

Tovey  r.  Lindsey  ii.  734 

V.  Pitcher  iii.  448 

Tow  Boat  Co.  v.  The  Delphos  ii.  441 

Towell  V.  Gatewood  i.  621,  62.3,  624 

Tower  v.  Ricliardson  i.  270 

V.  The  Utica,  &c.  Railroad  Co.  ii.  189 

Towers  i\  Barrett  ii.  812 

V.  Moore  i.  30 

V.  Osborne  iii.  59,  61 

Towle  r.  Dresser  i.  361 

V.  Kettell  ii.  424 

V.  Larrabee  ii.  900 

r.  Leavitt  i.  60,  526 

V.  Marrett  ii.  60 

r.  Raymond  iii.  266 

Town  c.  Stetson  ii.  353 

Town  of  Pawlett  v.  Clark  iii.  483 


Towne  v.  Fiske 

V.  Rice 

V.  Smith 

V.  Wason 

V.  Wiley 
Townend  r.  Drakeford 
Townes  v.  Mead 


i.  546 

i.  58,  281 

iii.  397,  409 

i.  298 

i.  350 

i.  580;  iii.  13 

iii.  106 


Townly  v.  Crump 

Townsend  v.  Bush 

V.  Carpenter 

V.  Crowdy 

V.  Devaynes 

V.  Ilargraves 

V.  Houston 

I'.  Inglis 

V.  Jennison 

V.  Long 

V.  Loraine  Bank 

V.  Neale 

V.  Newell 

V.  Nickerson 

V.  Riddle 

V.  Riley 

I'.  Townsend 

V.  Wells 
Townshend,  Ex  parte 

V.  Stangroom 
Townsley  v.  Sumrall 

V.  Tickell 
Towsley  v.  Moore 


i.  648,  652;  iii.  274, 

444 

iii.  127 

i.  252 

i.  496 

i.  169 

i.  563;  iii.  63 

iii.  350 

i.  48;  ii.  747 

ii.  722 

ii.  9 

i.  322 

i.  22 

iii.  260,  270 

i.  542 

i.  211;  ii.  24,28 

ii.  769 

iii.  393 

ii.  784,  785 

iii.  419,  420 

iii.  344 

i.  32.5,  459 

iii.  430 

iii.  38 


Towson  V.  Havre-de-Grace  Bank  ii.  162, 

165,  779 

Tracey  v.  Albany  Exchange  Co.  i.  532 

V.  Jenks  ii.  905 

V.  McArlton  i.  404 

r.  Strong  ii.  772,  775,  776 

V.  Suydam  i.  228 

Tracy  v.  Reed  ii.  863 

V.  Torry  ii.  325 

V.  Wood  ii.  101 

Traders  Ins.  Co.  v.  Robert  ii.  562 

Tradesmen's  Bank  v.  Third  Bank  i.  300 

Trai'ton,  Ex  parte  iii.  411 

Train  v.  Holland  Ins.  Co.  ii.  616 

Trainer  v.  The  Superior  ii.  459 

Trail  V.  Trail  ii.  91 

Trammell  r.  Harrell  ii.  878 

Transportation  Co.  v.  Downer  ii.  817 

Traphagen  v.  Traphagen  iii.  348 

Trapnall  v.  Burton               ii.  939;  iii.  102 

v.  Merrick  i.  530 

Trask  v.  Patterson  ii.  664 

Traver  v. i.  474 

Travis  v.  Bishop  i.  612 

Treadway  v.  Smith  iii.  41 

Tread  well  v.  Aydlett  i.  645 

I'.  Bladen  ii.  307 

V.  Brown  iii.  440 

V.  Marden  iii.  464 

V.  Moore  ii.  763 

i\  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  418,  527 

V.  Williams  i.  174 

Treasurer,  The  ii.  416 

V.  Commercial,  &c.  Co.  iii.  319 


ceil 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED, 


Treasurers  c.  Bates  i.  12 ;  ii.  863 

Treat  v.  Orono  i.  492 

Trehilcock  v.  Wilson  ^  ii.  771 

Treiiweu  r.  Bourne  i.  69,  ('-j 

Trcf  '■.  Quin  ii-  8'J 

TregDiiing  v.  Attenborough  iii.  lo7 

Treloar  v.  Bigge  i.  538 

Tremain  v.  Liming  ii.  790 

Treniont,  The  ii.  398 

Treinont  Bank,  Ex  parte  iii.  427 

Treini)er  r.  Conkiin  i.  228 

Trencli  r.  Clienaiigo  Ins.  Co.    ii.  542,  560 
Trenciiard  r.  Iloskiiis  ii.  033 

Trent  Navigation  Co.  v.  Harley  ii.  25 

Trenton  Bank  v.  Gay  i.  61,  279 

V.  Wallaue  ii.  864,  866 

Trenton  Banking  Co.  v.  Duncan       ii.  944 
Trenton  Ins.  Co.  r.  Johnson     ii.  599,  605, 

607 
Trescott  v.  Davis  ii. 

Treuttell  v.  Barandon  i. 

Trevor  v.  Wood  ii.  29G 

V.  Woods 
Tribune,  The  Sch. 
Trickett  v.  Tonilinson 
Trident,  The 

Trieber  v.  Commercial  Bank 
Trigg  V.  Faris 
Triggs  V.  Ncwnham 
Trimbev  v.  Vitinier 
Trimble  v.  Hill 

V.  Kateliffe 

V.  Strother 
Trinity  House  v.  Clark 
Tripp  V.  Armitage 


ii.  936 
i.  103 
iii.  14 
ii.  299 
ii.  421 
i.  41 
ii.  403 
ii.  907 
i.  616 
iii.  69 

ii.  700,  719 
ii.  760 
i.  264 
i.  248 
ii.  422 
iii.  458 
i.  279 
ii.  688 
ii.  895 
iii.  328 
ii.  438 
ii.  904 
ii.  418 

ii.  669,  672 
iii.  143 
iii.  296 
ii.  400 
iii.  99, 107 
i.  548 
iii.  338 


V.  Curtenius 
Trippee  v.  Frazier 
Trist  ;;.  Child 
Triton  i'.  Foote 
Triumph,  The 
Troewert  v.  Decker 
Tronson  v.  Dent 
Trott  V.  Wood 
Trotter  v.  Curtis 

!'.  Evans 
Troubadour,  The 
Troup  V.  Smith 
Trousdale  v.  Darnell 
Trontman  i\  Gowing 
Trow  V.  Vermont  C.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  248,  250 
Trowbridge  v.  Cushman  i.  232 

V.  Wetlierbee  iii.  39 

Trowel  v.  Castle  ii.  859 

Troy  Academy'  v.  Nelson  i.  482,  483 

Troy  Iron  &  Nail  Factory  v.  Corning 

ii.  679 
Trov,  &c.  II.  Co.  V.  Boston,  &c.  R. 

Co.  i.  158 

True  V.  Fuller  ii.  3 

V.  International  Tel.  Co.  ii.  286 

V.  I'hnnley  ii.  898 

V.  Kamiey  ii.  87,  88,  727 

True  Blue.  The  ii.  442 

Trueman  r.  Fenton  iii.  69 

V.  Hurst  i.  352 


Truesdale  v.  Hazard  ii.  392 
Truett  V.  Chaplin  i.468,  471 
V.  Wainwright  ii.  858 
Truitt  V.  Baird  i.  185 
Trullinger  r.  Kofoed  ii.  762 
Trull  V.  Koxbury  Ins.  Co.  ii.  579,  588 
Truman  v.  Loder  i.  56,  591,  670  ;  iii.  11 
Trumbull  v.  Portage  Co.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  575 
V.  Tilton  i.  463 
Trundy  r.  Farrar  i.  154 
Truscott  r.  Davis  ii  941 
Trusler  );.  Murray  ii.  336,  344 
Trustees  of  Howard  College  v.  Pace  i.  248 
Trustees  of  Iowa  College  v.  Hill  i.  292 
Trustees  of  Schools  v.  Tatman  iii.  482 
Trustees,  &c.  v.  Kendrick  ii.  757 
Trustees,  &c.  of  Vincennes  Univer- 
sity r.  Indiana  iii.  485 
Tryon  v.  Whitmarsh  ii.  917 
Tubb  v.  Harrison  i.  348 
Tuck  !-.  Fyson  iii.  449 
Tuckahoe    Canal    Co.   v.  Tuckahoe 

R.  R.  Co.  iii.  490 

Tucker  v.  Andrews  i.  411 

V.  Buffi ngton  ii.  395,  400 

V.  Clarke  iii.  337 

V.  Humphrey           i.  G17,  652 ;  iii.  444 

r.  Justices  i.  138 

L'.  Magee  ii  55 

V.  Moreland  i.  366,  368 

V.  Oxley  iii.  439 

r.  Ruston  iii.  48,  444 

V.  Taylor  iii.  254 

V.  Tucker  i.  331 ;  ii.  884 

V.  Wilamouicz  iii.  127 

V.  Wilson  ii.  129 

?•.  Woods  i.  506 

Tuckerman  v.  French  ii.  14 

V.  Ilinkley  ii.  903 

V.  Home  Ins.  Co.  ii.  562 

i;.  Newhall  i.  26  ;  ii.  850 
V.  Stevens,    &c.     Transportation 

Co.  ii.  227 

Tuckwell  V.  Lambert  ii.  918 

Tudor  V.  New  Eng.  Ins.  Co.      ii.  503,  509 

V.  Terrel  ii.  681 

Tudway  r.  Bourn  iii.  429 

Tuel  V.  Weston  i.  113 

Tuffnell  V.  Constable  i.  490 

Tufts  V.  Adams  iii.  244 

V.  McClure  i.  572 

V.  Tufts  iii.  17 

Tupgle  V.  Gilbert  i.  147 

Tuik  V.  Moxhay  iii.  .307 

TuUer  ?;.  Talbot  ii.  245 

TuUett  V.  Armstrong  iii.  455 

Tullidge  r.  Wade  ii.  76;  iii.  183 

Tunison  ;'.  Ciiamblin  i.  363 

V.  Cramer  ii.  16 

Tunnell  v.  Pettijohn  ii.  187 

Tunno  r.  Bird  i.  309 ;  ii.  844 

V.  Lague  i-  309 

?•.  Trezevant  i-  238 

Tuppcr  r.  Cad  well  i.  336,  .337,  .338 

V.  Hay  thorn  iii.  296 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCIU 


Tupper  V.  Powell 

iii.  136 

Tutela,  The 

ii.  425 

Turberville  v.  Whitehouse 

i.  353 

Tutliill  V.  Davis 

iii.  129 

Turley  v.  Bates 

i.  566 

Tutor  V.  Patton 

i.  289 

?'.  A'ortli  Amer.  Ins.  Co 

ii.  58G 

Tutt  V.  Land 

i.  187 

V.  Tlionias 

ii.  250 

Tuttle  r.  Bartholomew 

ii.  84 

Turnball  r.  Gadsden 

ii.  016 

V.  Brown 

i.  023 

V.  Stroht'cker 

ii.  881 

V.  Clark 

iii.  153 

V.  Turnbull 

ii.  93 

V.  Cooper 

i.  198 

Turner,  Ex  parte 

iii.  428 

V.  Love 

i.  505,  506 

V.  Bissel 

i.  181 

1-.  Swett 

ii.  49;  iii.  41 

V.  Browne 

ii.  824 

I'.  Tuttle 

ii.  823 

V.  Burrows                     ii 

389 

,  478,  482 

Twiggs  V.  Chambers 

i.  129 

V.  Calvert 

iii.  127 

Twiss  V.  George 

iii.  352 

V.  Cameron 

i.  545 

V.  Massey 

i.  463 

V.  Clirisman 

i.  404 

Two  Catherines,  Tlie 

ii.  461 

V.  Coffin 

ii.  944 

Two  Friends,  The 

ii.  438 

V.  Coolidge 

ii.  395 

Twopenny  v.  Young        i. 

29 ;  ii.  852,  853 

V.  Davies 

i.  37 

Twycross  v.  Dreyfus 

i.  99 

V.  Diaper 

ii.  880 

Tye  r.  Gwynne 

i.  495 

V.  Hawkeye  Tel.  Co. 

ii.  282 

Tyler  v.  JEtna.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  559,  561 

V.  Ilubbell 

iii.  31 

V.  Binney 

ii.  3 

V  Hulme 

iii.  131 

V.  Bland 

ii.  780 

V.  Jay  cox 

i.  240 

V.  Carlton 

i.  458 

V.  Langdon 

i.  563 

V.  Currier 

ii.  383 

V.  Leech 

i.  323 

V.  Pickett 

ii.  680 

V.  Lewis 

ii.  392 

V.  Gould 

i.  303 

V.  Maddox 

ii.  849 

V.  Home 

ii.  481 

V.  Mason 

ii.  38 

V.  Jones 

ii.  848 

V.  Me^'ers 

iii  414 

V.  McCardle 

ii.  793 

V.  Meyniott 

i.  550 

V.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co. 

ii.  287,  289, 292, 

I'.  Protection  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  532 

300 

V.  Kicliardson 

iii. 

424,  446 

Tyly  V.  Morrice 

ii.  274 

V.  Robinson        i.  110;  ii.  36 

,  43,  330, 

Tynes  v.  Grimstead 

i.  93 

332 

Tyre  v.  Causey 

i.  623 

V.  Rookes 

i.  402 

Tyrell  v  Hope 

iii.  456 

V.  Rusk 

i.  434 

Tyrer  v.  King 

iii.  246 

V.  Samson 

i.  294 

Tyrie  v.  Fletcher 

u.  472,  48a 

V.  Satterlee 

ii.  874 

Tyrrell  v.  Washburn 

i.  36 

V.  Stetts 

ii.  565 

Tyson  v.  Cox 

ii.  27 

V.  Swainson 

ii. 

826,  832 

V.  Gurney 

ii.  519 

V.  Thomas 

ii. 

882,  938 

I'.  Prior 

ii.  437,  440 

V.  Trisby 

i.  337 

V.  Rickard 

iii.  116,  119 

V.  Trustees  of  Liverpool  Docks  i.  649,  | 

V.  Robinson 

ii.  847 

050 

V.  Watts 

iii.  367 

V.  Turner 

ii.  833 

V.  Vaughan 

iii.  434 

Turner's  case 

ii. 

459,  465 

u. 

Turney  v.  Dodwell 

iii.  80 

V.  Williams 

i.  136 

Udell  V.  Atherton 

i.  79 

V.  Wilson                       ii. 

177, 

181,  183 

Uhde  r.  Walters 

ii.  668 

Turnpike  Co.  v.  Commonwea 

Ith 

ii.  815 

Uhl  V.  Harvey 

i.  191 

V.  Phillips 

iii.  486 

V.  Robinson 

i.  568 

r.  State 

iii.  484 

Ulary  v.  Washington,  The 

ii.  466,  467. 

Turpin,  Ex  parte 

iii.  463 

902 

V.  Povall 

iii. 

123,  136 

Ullman  v.  Kent 

i.  574 

Turquand  v.  Vanderplank 

iii.  458 

Uilock  V.  Reddelein 

i,  573 

Turrell  r.  ]\Iorgan 

iii.  6 

Ulmer  v.  Cunningham 

i.  26 

Turrill  v.  Boynton 

ii.  28 

Ulrich  V.  Berger 

ii.  881 

V.  Crawley 

ii.  167 

V.  McCormick 

i.  75;  ii.  745 

V.  Mich.,  &c.  R.  R. 

ii.  315 

Underbill  r.  Agawam  Ins.  Co.   ii.  524,  586 

Turtle  V.  Muncy 

i.  385 

V.  Gibson 

i.  474 

i\  Worsley 

i.407 

V.  Sa-atoga  &  W.  R.  R 

.  Co.        ii  fi60 

Turton  ?•.  Benson 

ii.  78 

r.  Van  Cortlandt 

ii.  840 

r.  Turton 

i.  381 

Underwood  v.  Birchard 

i.  531 

Tuscurabia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rhodes 

i.  290 

V.  Wing 

ii.  618 

I 


CCIV 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Unger  v.  Boas  ii.  897 

Union,  The  ii.  4iJ4 

V.  Jansen  ii.  466,  4G7 

Union  liiuik  v.  Commerce  Bank      iii  440 

J-.  C'ostar's  Ex'rs  ii.  Iti 

V.  Eaton  i.  206 

I'.  Edwards  iii.  312 

V.  Geary  i.  409 

V.  Hyde  i.  315,  326 

V.  Kindrick  ii.  709 

V.  Oceana  County  Bank  i.  303 

r.  Kidpoly  ii.  17 

V.  Willis  i.  274,  283,  312,  321 

Union  liank  of  Georgetown  v.  Geary 

i.  131 

Union  Bank  of  La.  v.  Kowman  ii.  15 

Union  Bank  of  Md.  ?'.  Ridgely  i.  154 

Union  Bank  of  Tenn.  v.  Gowen         i.  320 

Union  College  Trustees  i'.  Wlieeler  i.  255 

Union  Ex.  Co.  v.  Graham  ii.  270 

Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chipp  ii.  543 

r.  Conuu.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  470,  494 

V.  Grant  ii.  010 

V.  Lenox  ii.  413,  419,  510 

V.  Mowry  ii.  017 

V.  Pottker  ii.  617 

V.  Keif  ii.  597 

V.  T\  sen  ii.  488 

V.  Wilkinson  ii.  543 

Un.  Man.  Co.  v.  Lourisbury       ii.  304,  324 

Union  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Boston  iii.  113 

Union  Steamship  Co.  r.  N.  Y.  S.  Co.  ii.  432 

Union  Sugar  Uifinery  v.  Mathieson  ii.  314 

Union  Towboat  Co.  r.  Delphos,  Tlie  ii.  441 

Union  'J'rust  Co.  v.  Kigdon  ii.  128 

Union  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Jenkins  i.  7 

United  States  v.  Alden  ii.  465,  466 

t\  Ames  i.  60 ;  ii.  825 

I'.  Arredondo  iii.  4b8 

c.  Bainbridge  i.  335,  355,  375 

V.  Bank  of  U.  S.  iii.  381 

I'.  Barker  i.  318 

V.  Bartlett  iii.  355 

V.  Blakeney  i.  355 

V.  Borden  ii.  465 

V.  Boslwick  i.  535 

V.  Boyd  ii.  16 

V.  Bradbury  ii.  766 

V.  Buchanan  ii.  672 

V.  Buford  i.  251 

V.  Coffin  ii.  465 

V.  Collins  ii.  465 

V.  Crosby  ii.  701 

V.  Curry  i.  131 

V.  Chitier  ii.  465 

V.  Freeman  ii.  465 

V.  Great  Falls  iii.  484 

V.  Crush  ii.  465 

V.  Hatch  ii.  463 

V.  Herron  iii.  478 

V.  IlilJcgas  ii.  19 

V.  Hudson  i.  60 

t'.  Hunt  ii.  465 

V.  Ins.  Cos.  i.  153 

V.  Jarvis  i.  74 


United  States  v.  King 

iii.  382 

V. 

Kirkpatrick 

ii.  766 

V 

Le  Baron 

ii.  479 

V. 

Lunt 

ii.  465 

V. 

Matthews 

ii.  466 

V 

McLemore 

ii.  769 

V 

Netcher 

ii.  465 

V. 

Parmelee 

i.  56 

V. 

Paul  Shearman,  The 

ii.  534 

V. 

Iiobeson 

iii.  391 

V. 

Buggies 

ii.  465 

i:. 

Small 

ii.  465 

V. 

Steffcns 

ii.  350 

V 

Tillotson 

ii.  19 

v. 

Wardwell 

ii.  766 

V 

Wilder 

ii.  451,  459 

V. 

Winn 

ii.  465 

V. 

Wyngall 

i.  59 

?'. 

Yates 

i.  131 

U.  S. 

Bank  v.  Bank  of  Ga.    i. 

301 ;  ii.  753 

V 

Binney 

i.  188 

V. 

Carneal 

i.  322 

V. 

Chapin 

iii.  113 

V. 

Smith 

i.  309 

U.S. 

Ex.  Co.  V.  Backman 

ii.  175,  270 

V. 

Bed bury 

i.  187 

U.  S.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kimberley  ii.  549 
U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Scott  ii.  456 

U.  S.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Advance  Co.  ii.  543 
U.  S.  Tel.  Co.  V.  Gildersleeve  ii.  287 

V.  Wenger  ii.  290,  292 

V.  Western  Union  Tel  Co.  ii.  291 

Unity  Assurance  Ass.  v.  Dugan  iii.  455 
University  i'.  People  iii.  499 

University  of  Cambridge  r.  Bryer  ii.  334 
University  of  Oxford  r.  Richardson  ii.  349 
University  of  Vt.  v.  Buell  i.  482,  483 

Unwin  r.  Heath  ii.  314,  317 

V.  Woolsley  i.  138;  ii.  631 


Updegraff  v.  Bennett 

ii.  76 

Updyke  v.  Doyle 

i.  215 

V.  Ten  Broeck 

iii.  43 

Upham  V.  Lefavour 

i.  108 

V.  Prince 

i.  299;  ii.  3 

Upnor,  The 

ii.  437 

Upshaw  V.  McBride 

ii.  940 

Upson  V.  Austin 

iii.  132 

Upton  ?;.  Gray 

i.  66 

V.  Salem  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  487 

V.  Sturbridge  Mills 

i.  677,  580 

Ure  V.  Coflinan 

ii.  431 

Urquhart  v.  Barnard 

ii.  534 

V.  Mclvcr 

i.  102 

Urruston  v.  Newcomen 

i.  339 

Usher  r.  l)e  Wolfe 

i.  254,  250 

Uthwatt  V.  Elkins 

i.  140 

Uiica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bloodgood 

ii.  887 ; 

iii.  143 

V.  Cad  well 

ii.  887 

V.  Kip 

ii.  887 

V.  Scott 

ii:  887 

V.  Tillman 

iii.  130 

Utley  ".  Donaldson 

i.  505 

V.  Union  Tool  Co. 

i   161 

Utterson  i-.  Vernon 

iii.  462,  406 

INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCV 


V. 


Vaccaro  v.  Toof 
Vail  V.  Durant 

('.  Ilcastis 

V.  Rico 

V.  Strong 
Vale  !'.  Bayle 
Valojo  V.  Wliceler 
Valentine  v.  Foster 

r.  Valentine 

I'.  Vauglian 
Valk  V.  Gaillarti 

V.  State  Bank 
Vallance  v.  Dewar 
Valli'L'  r.  Dunicrgiie 
Vallette  r.  jNIasoii 


i.  191 
i.  107 

iii.  118 

ii.  GU7,  074 

1.  558 

i.  573 

ii.  195 
i.  403 

ii.  825 

iii.  41G 

i.  323 

i.  328 

ii.  524,  532,  6(39 

ii.  737 
i.  292 


Vallev  Bank  ;•.  Stribling  iii.  117 

Valliant  v.  Dodemede        iii.  424,  448,  449 

Vallier  v.  Ditson  ii.  75(5 

Valpy  V.  Gibson  i.  650 

V.  Oakeley  iii.  429,  435 

V.  Sandars  iii.  435 

Valton  V.  National  Ins.  Co.        ii.  591,  <J05 

Van  Aernam  r.  Van  Aeniam  i.  377 

Van  Alen  u.  Rogers  iii.  236 

V.  Vanderpool  i.  60 

Van  Allen  v.  Hnniphrey  i.  410 

Van  Alstyne  c.  Van  Slyck  i.  11 

Van  Amringe  i\  Peabody  i.  102 

Van  Antwerp  v.  Stewart  ii.  848 

Van  Arsdale  r.  Howard  ii.  917,  918 

Van  Atta  v.  McKinney  i.  129 ;  ii.  60 

Van  Baggen  v.  Baines  ii.  521 

Van  Benscliooter  v.  Lawson  ii.  7(J9 

Van  Bracklin  v.  Fonda  i.  032 

Van  Buskirk  v.  Hart.  Fire  Ins.  Co.   i.  215 

V.  Purinton  ii.  223 

V.  Roberts  ii.  41 

Van  Casteel  v.  Booker  i.  61,  649,  6-50 

Van  Derveer  v.  Wright  ii.  32 

Van  Deusen  v.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.  ii.  575 

Van  Doren  v.  Everitt  i.  544 

V.  Robinson  iii.  372 

V.  Tjader  i.  274 

Van  Duyne  v.  Van  Duyne  ii.  941 

Van  Duzor  ik  Allen  i.  580 

Van  Dyck  v.  Howitt  ii.  481 

r.  Van  Beuren  i.  487 

Van  Dyke  v.  Davis  i.  468 

Van  Epps  v.  Dillaye  ii.  757 

V.  Sebenectaily  i.  525 

V.  Van  Detisen  iii.  437 

Van  H;igen  v.  Van  Rensselaer         ii.  635 

Van  Hook  v.  Pendleton  ii.  325 

Van  Horn  v.  Ilann  i.  4.3(5 

Van  Horn  &  Clark,  Adm'rs,  v.  Bell  ii.  8-56 

Van  Home  v.  Crain  i.  200 

V"an  Hoven  v.  Irish  ii.  905 

Van  Keuren  v.  Central  Railroad        i.  5415 

V.  Parmeleo  iii.  88,  89,  90,  91 

Van  Master  v.  Babcock  ii.  893 

Van  Naita  v.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  ii.  5(56 

Van  Ness  r.  Forrest  i.  185 

V.  Packard  ii.  608 


Van  Orden  v.  Van  Orden  i.  142 

Van  Oslnind  v.  Reed     i.  589,  633;  ii.  757 

Van  Pat  ton  v.  Beals  i.  435 

Van  Raugli  v.  Van  Arsdale  iii.  397,  409 

Van  Reinisdyke  v.  Kane      i.  198 ;  ii.  700, 

719,  721;  iii.  507 

Van  Rensselaer  v.  Gallup  i.  200,  551 

V.  Jewett                         i.  535;  iii.  Ill 

V.  Jones  iii.  Ill 

IK  Read  iii.  507 

Van  Rhyn  v.  Vincent  iii.  96 

Van  Sandau  v.  Crosbie  iii.  463 

Van  Santvoord  i:  St.  John  ii.  230,  281 

Van  Shaick  v.  Hudson  River  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  817 

Van  Storch  v.  Griffin  ii.  69,  73 

Van  Syckell  v.  Ewing,  The  ii.  184 

Van  Vactlier  v.  Flack  i.  280 

Van  Valen  v.  Russell  i.  2-33 

Van  Valkenburg  v.  Bradley  i.  227 

V.  Roun  ii.  685 

Van  Valkinburg  v.  Watson  i.  343,  345 

Van  Vetchen  v.  Pruyn  i.  319 

Van  VIeet  v.  Adair  iii.  233 

Van  Voorhis  y.  Brintnall  ii.  728 

Van  Wart  v.  Smith  i.  91 

V.  Wooley           i.  91  ;  ii.  112  ;  iii.  206 

Van  Winkle  v.  Ketcham  i.  358 

Van  Woert  v.  Albany,  &c.  R.  Co.  iii.  40,  49 

Van  Wyck  v.  Allen  iii.  219 

V.  Brasher  i.  435 

Van  Zandt  u.  New  York  iii.  311 

V.  Mut.  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  603 

Vanada  r.  Hopkins  i.  88 

Vance  v.  Blair  i.  184 

V.  Bloomer  ii.  783 

V.  Campbell  ii.  309,  315 

V.  Lowther  ii.  853 

V.  McLaughlin  i.  382 

V.  Monroe  ii.  765 

V.  Tourne  iii.  220 

V.  Vance  ii.  92 

V.  Ward  i.  303 

V.  Wells  i.  465 

Vancouver  v.  Bliss  iii.  335 

Vandenanker  v.  Desbrough  iii.  454, 456 

Vandenheuvel  v.  United  Ins.  Co.  ii.  509, 

518 

Vanderbilt,  The  ii.  433 

V.  Adams  iii.  510 

V.  Richmond  Turnpike  Co.  i   114 

Vanderburgh  v.  Hull  i.  181 

V.  Trua.x  iii.  195 

Vanderlieyden  r.  Mallory  i.  409 

Vfinderpoel  v.  Van  Allen  i.  547 

Vanderslice  v.  Newton  iii.  188 

V.  Steam  Towboat  Superior       ii.  182 

Vandervoort  r.  Smith  ii.  679 

Vandeuzer  v.  McMillan  i.  230 

Vane  t- .  Cobbold  ii.  912 

Vanliooser  v.  Logan  ii.  785 

Vanlandinghain  r.  Huston  iii.  106 

Vanmcter  v.  McFadden  iii.  432 

Vann  v.  Husscy  i.  236 

Vanquelin  v.  Bo  ward  ii.  872 


CCVl 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


ui. 


A^ansanclau  v.  Browne  iii.  101 

Vanvive'e  r.  Vanvivee  ii.  Hod 

Vardy,  Ex  parte  iii.  440 

Varick  r.  Crane  iii.  125,  12G 

Varley  v.  Coppard  i.  5oU 

Varner  v.  Nobleborough  ii.  750 

Varney  v.  Brewster  ii.  828 

I'.  Grows  iii.  100 

V.  Hickman  ii.  700 

V.  Youiiir  i.  344,  349 

Varnum  v.  Bellamy  i.  292 

V.  Martin  i.  120 

Vassar  v.  Camp  1.  508,  514 

Vasse  V.  Ball  ii.  524 

V.  Smith  i,  356,  300 

Vauglian  v.  Aldridge  ii.  70 

r.  Da  vies  ii.  875 

V.  Fuller 

r.  Hancock 

V.  TafE  Vale  Ry.  Co. 
Vaughn  v.  Hankinson 
Vaupell  V.  AVoodward 
Vaux  r.  Draper 

V.  Slicffer 
Vawter  v.  Griffin 
Veacock  r.  McCall 
Veazie  v.  Parker 

V.  Somerby 

V.  Williams 
Veazy  v.  Harmony 
Vedder  r.  Vedder 
Venable  i>.  Curd 
Venables  v.  Smith 

V.  Thompson 
Vennum  r.  Gregory 
Vent  V.  Osgood 
Ventris  v.  Shaw 

V.  Smith 
Venus,  The 
Vere  v.  Smith  i.  102 

Vermilye  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  i.  330 

Vermont  Central  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Estate 

of  Hills  ii.  G79 

Vernard  v.  Hudson  ii.  412 

Verncde  v.  Weber  i.  01)0 

Vernon,  The  ii.  434 

V.  Alsop  ii.  045 

V.  Ilankey  iii.  458,  409 

V.  Hanson  iii.  420 

V.  Keys  ii.  918 

V.  Manhattan  Company  i.  191 


i.  308 

19,  30 

ii.  248 

iii.  81 

iii.  5G 

i.  21 

ii.  429 

iii.  56,  57 

i.  458 

i.  109 

ii.  386  ;  iii.  217 

i.  51,  78,  526 ;  ii.  924 

ii.  780 

ii.  821 

i.  58 

i.  113 

ii.  687 

iii.  165 

i.  335,  355;  ii.  40 

iii.  72 

i.  550 

iii.  175 


Morton 

V.  Smith 

V.  Vernon 
Vertue  v.  Jewell 
Very  v.  McIIenry 
Vibbard  v.  Johnson 
Vicars  )-.  Wilcocks 
Vice  V.  Fleming 
Vickers  v.  Vickers 
Vickery  v.  Welch 
Victoria,  The 
Victors  V.  Davics 
Vidal  V.  Tliomfison 
Viele  V.  Gcrnauaia  Ins.  Co. 


1.501 


iii.  382 

ii.  565 

iii.  308,  314 

i.  640,  045 

ii.  71S 

i.  016 

iii.  194 

202 

319 

ii.  8!M) 

ii.  429,  431 

i.  503 

ii.7n0 

ii.  545 


Viele  V.  Hoag 
Vielie*.  Osgood 
Vigers  v.  Pike 
Villers  v.  Beaumont 
Vinal  V.  Richardson 
Vincennes,  The 
Vincent  v.  Chicago 

V.  Germond 

(;.  Horlock 
Viner  v.  Cadell 
Vining  v.  Gilbreth 
Vinton  v.  Middlesex  R.  R.  Co. 

V.  Peck 
Violett  V.  Paton  i.  6, 

V.  Powell 
Virany  v.  Warne 
Virgil,  The 
Virgin,  The 

V.  Gaithcr 
Vischer  i-.  Yates 
Vivian  r.  Campion 
Vivior  V.  Wilde 
Vlierboom  v.  Chapman 
Vogel  i'.  People's  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Ripper 
Voguel,  Ex  parte 
Volant,  The 
Voltz  V.  Blackmar 

V.  Harris 
Volunteer,  The 
Von  Hemert  v.  Porter 
Von  Hoffman 

Von  Lindenau  v.  Desborough 
Voorliees  r.  Dorr 

V.  Earl  i.  630,  637  ; 

V.  Wait 
Voorhies  v.  Atlee 
Voorliis  V.  Olmstead 
Vore  i\  Hurst 
Vos  V.  Robinson 

r.  United  Ins.  Co. 
Vose  V.  Allen 

r.  Eagle  Ins.  Co. 

IK  Handy 

V.  L.  &  Y.  Ry.  Co. 

V.  Morton 

V.  Pliilbrook 
Voyle  V.  Hughes 
Vreede  r.  Scholyts,  The 
Vreeland  r.  Hyde 

}•.  Hy no 
Vroom  r.  Van  Home 
Vrow  Elizabeth,  The 
Vulliamy  r.  Noble 
V3-nior's  case 
Vyse  V.  Wakefield 


w. 

Wabash  &  R.  Co.  v.  Rector 
Wabasli,  &c.  Co.  v.  Beers 

V.  Toledo  National  Bank 
Wack  r.  Sorber 
Waddell,  In  re 


ii.  29 

iii.  8 

iii.  370 

ii.  686 

i.  473 

ii.  388 

ii.  203 

iii.  46 

i.  270 

iii.  439 

i.  570 

ii.  247 

ii.  903 

272;  iii.  17 

i.  67,  66 

ii.  59 

ii.  42!t.  431 

ii.  403,  404 

i.  266 

ii.  897 

i.  260 

ii.  848 

ii.  419,  456 

ii.  556 

ii.  858 

i.  237 

ii.  454 

iii.  181 

ii.  32 

ii.  413.  421 

iii.  161 

iii.  481 

ii.  605 

ii.  908 

iii.  194,  227 

i.  370 

i.  315 

i.  639 

i.  284 

ii.  587 

ii.  495 

ii.  415 

ii.  594 

i,  257 

ii.46 

ii.  453 

ii.  878 

iii.  315 

ii.  519 

i.  317 

i.  385 

i.  147 

ii.  519 

i.  222 

ii.  847 

ii.  802 


iii.  186 
iii.  502 
i.  580 
iii.  318 
ii.  284 


i 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCVll 


Waddell  (•.  Col.  Ins.  Co. 

^  ii.  50D 

V.  Cook 

i.  2oo 

Wadtliiigton  v.  Bristow 

iii.  o5 

V.  Oliver 

ii.  39,  7'J2 

V.  Uiiiteil  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  470 

Wade  i:  Dowling 

ii.  837,  844 

V.  Grimes 

i.  380 

V.  Ilauiilton 

iii.  :^77 

r.  Haycock 

ii.  6i>:^ 

r.  Kiilbfleish 

ii.  74 

V.  Lindsay 

ii.  933 

?'.  Newbern 

iii.  G 

V.  Powell 

i.  131 

I'.  Simeon 

i.  470,  471 

V.  Taylor 

i.  113 

V.  Thayer 

iii.  181 

V.  Wilson 

iii.  134,  135 

Wade's  case 

ii.  775,  779 

Wadhnm  v.  Marlowe 

iii.  406,  449 

Wadleigh  v.  Elines 

ii.  933 

V.  Jordan 

iii.  101 

V.  Pillsbury 

ii.  806 

V.  Veasie 

ii.  863,  805 

Wadley  v.  Jones 

i.  185 

Wadling  ?;.  Olipliant 

iii.  435 

Wadlington  v.  Gary 

ii.  20 

Wadsworth  v.  Alcot 

ii.  143 

V.  Manning 

iii.  306 

V.  Pacific  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  488 

V.  Sherman 

i.  4.37 

Wagenscller  v.  Simmers 

ii.  66,  68 

Wagman  v.  lioag 

ii.  28,  29 

Wagner  ii.  Holbrunner 

iii.  180 

V.  Simmons 

i.  200 

V.  White 

i.  537 

Wagonseller  v.  Snyder 

ii.  897 

Wailing  V.  Toll 

i.  350 

Wain  r.  Bailey 

i.  331 

Wakcman  v.  Gowdy 

V.  Grover 

I'.  Iloyt 
Waland  v.  Elk  ins 
Walbridge  v.  llarroon 
Walburn  v.  Ingilby 


ii.  128 

iii.  381 

iii.  416,  441 

ii.  226,  246 

i.  403,  464 

i.  210 


V.  Warlters     i.  6  ;  ii.  7;  iii.  15,  16,  17 

Wainewright  v.  Bland  ii.  606 

Wainman  v.  Kynian  iii.  82,  83 

Wainwright  v.  Crawford  ii.  403 

V.  Webster  i.  302  ;  ii.  754 

Waistell  v.  Atkinson  ii.  773 

Wait,  hi  re  i.  234 

V.  Baker  ■   i.  650;  ii.  411 

V.  Brewster  ii.  755 

V.  Green  i.  580 

V.  Morris  i.  464 

V.  Pomeroy  ii.  853 

Waite  r.  Barry  ii.  829 

V.  Delesdernier  ii.  746 

V.  Foster  i.  299 

V.  The  Hundred  of  Stoke  ii.  898 

Waithman  v.  Miles  i.  549 

Waitman,  ^x /jarte  i.  211 

V.  Wakefield  i.  387 

Wake  V.  Tinkler  ii.  884 

Wakefield  v.  Governor,  The  ii.  435 

V.  Lithgow  ii.  752 

V.  Martin  ii.  475 

V.  Orient  Ins.  Co.  ii.  549 

V.  Smart  iii.  106 

V.  So.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  i.  48 

Wakefield  &  Bingley  v.  Brown  i.  20 


Walcot  V.  Walker          i.  560;  ii.  347,  348 

Walcott  V.  Keith  i.  569 
Waldeck  v.  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  58(5 

Walden  r.  Bolton  i.  130 

i\  Chamberlain  ii.  404 

V.  Le  Koy  ii.  447 

V.  Louisiana  Ins.  Co.  ii.  524,  658,  019 

V.  Murdock  i.  570 

V.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  527 

V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ii.  513 

V.  Sherburne  i.  207  ;  iii.  Ill 

Waldo,  The  ii.  224,  454,  456 

V.  Belcher  i.  566 

V.  Long  iii.  175,  245 

Waldo  Bank  v.  Lumbert  i.  205 

Waldron  v.  Chase  i.  566 

V.  Harring  ii.  3 

V.  Komain  i.  566 

Wales  V.  Webb  iii.  129 

Walkenshaw  v.  Perzell  i.  243 

Walker  v.  Bank  of  Augusta  i.  320 

V.  Bank  of  Mont.  Co.  i.  323 

V.   Bank  of   the    State   of  New 

York  i.  72,  304 

V.  Bank  of  Washington  iii.  120 
V.  Birch                  ii.  120 ;  iii.  250,  275 

V.  Boiling  ii.  47 

V.  Boston  Ins.  Co.  ii.  455 

V.  Burnell  iii.  435 

V.  Butterick  i.  558 

V.  Campbell  iii.  75 

V.  Carrington  i.  94,  387 

V.  Collier  i.  569 

V.  Constable  iii.  12 

V.  Davis  i.  288,  356,  360 

V.  Derby  i.  94 

V.  Ellis  iii.  190 

V.  Eyth  i.  239 

V.  Fitts  1.  183 

V.  Forbes  ii.  14 

V.  Geiss  i.  292 

V.  Graham  i.  316 

V.  Hatton  i.  637 

V.  Hill  iii.  22,  29,  409 

V.  Hitchcock  iii.  236 

V.  Hoisington  i.  635 

V.  House  i.  220 
V.  Jeffreys           iii.  339,  340,  341.  342 

V.  Johnson  iii.  40 

V.  Leighton  ii.  877,  878 

V.  Lide  i.  304 

V.  Maitland  ii.  495 

V.  May  i.  147 

V.  McCuIloch  i.  27,  210 

V.  McDonald  i.  269 

V.  Merrill  ii.  827 

V.  Metropolitan  Ins.  Co.  ii.  472 

V.  Moore  iii.  245,  246 


CCVlll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Walker  v.  Newton                              ii.  745 

V. 

Nussey                                      iii.  58 

V. 

Perkins                                       i.  465 

V. 

Protection  Ins.  Co.                  ii.  50a 

V. 

Ueeves                                      iii.  44» 

r. 

Sargeant         i.  129;  ii.  CO;  iii.  28.J 

i". 

Sclmyler                                 iii.  231) 

V. 

Scott                                            i.  l;31 

V. 

Slierman                                546,  547 

V. 

Shoemaker                               i.  502 

V. 

Simpson                     i.  338,  392,  394 

V. 

Smitii                    i.  60;  iii.  185,  187 

V. 

Stetson                                i.  303,  319 

V. 

Supple                                         iii.  50 

V. 

U.  S.  Ins.  Co.                   ii.  444,  445 

V. 

Wait                                            i.  222 

V. 

Walker          i.  51,  411,  457  ;  ii.  838 

V. 

Wilson                                      iii.  183 

V. 

Witter                                        ii.  739 

V. 

Woollen                                     i.  281 

V. 

York  &  North  Midland   Rail- 

way Co.                          ii.  231,  256 

Wall 

;.  Bry                                            i.  315 

V. 

Charlick                                     i.  469 

V. 

East  River  Ins.  Co.         ii.  553,  560 

V. 

Howard  Ins.  Co.              ii.  542,  500 

V. 

Lakin                                        iii.  381 

V. 

London  Real  Property  Co.   iii.  247 

V. 

Williamson                      ii.  724,  728 

Wallace  v.  Agry                                 ii.  757 

V. 

Breeds                                         i.  5G6 

V. 

Clark                                         iii.  218 

V. 

De  Pau                                      ii.  528 

V. 

Fielden                                       ii.  404 

V. 

Fouclie                                     ii.  676 

V. 

Ilardacre                          iii.  427,  450 

V. 

Ins.  Co.                             ii.  578,  648 

V. 

Jewell                             i.  11 ;  ii.  853 

V. 

Kensall                                          i.  26 

V. 

Lewis                                         i.  367 

V. 

McConneU                                i.  309 

V. 

McLaren                                     i.  22 

V. 

Miner                                       ii.  932 

V 

Morss                                          i.  357 

V. 

Patterson                   i.  234  ;  iii.  400 

V. 

Rappleye                     i.  465 ;  iii.  374 

V. 

Rippon                                        i.  407 

V 

Talbot                                       iii.  242 

V 

Vigus                                       ii.  196 

r 

Woodgate                               iii.  254 

V. 

Wren                                         iii.  227 

Waller  r.  Cralle                                     i.  444 

i; 

Drakefbrd         ii.  941,  943  ;  iii.  426, 

V 

•1  ■ )  J 
Ilendon                                       iii    14 

.      V 

King                                           ii.  8.32 

V 

Lacy                     ii.  705,  708;  iii.  75 

V 

Parker                                         i.  571 

V 

Smitli                                        iii.  25:'. 

Walley  r.  Montpomcry                       ii.  411 

Waili 

ngsfonl  r.  Wallingsford          iii.  371 

Wallis  V.  Hard  well                       i.  162,  8.'57 

f 

Bastard                                        ii.  873 

r 

Carpenter                                 iii.  167 

V 

.Cook                                           ii.  413 

Wallis  V.  Day  ii.  86,  890 

V.  Mease  iii.  188 

r.  Truesdell  ii.  936,  937 

V.  Wallis  i.  458  ;  ii.  635 

i\  Wheelock  i.  175 

Walls  V.  Atchcson  i.  544 

Walhvyn  v.  Coutts  iii.  316 

Walmesley  r.  Cooper  ii.  852 

Walpole  V.  Bridges  ii.  170 

V.  Cliohnondeley  ii.  623 

I'.  Ewer  ii.  537 

Walrond  v.  Hawkins  i.  539 

Walsli  V.  Adams  i.  235 

V.  Bailie  ii.  16 

r.  Bisliop  i.28 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  904 

V.  Durkin  ii.  864,  865 

V.  Etna  Ins.  Co.  ii.  601 

V.  Farrand  iii.  394,  507 

V.  (iilmor  ii.  829 

V.  Homer  ii.  533 

V.  Medley  i.  569 

V.  Nourse  iii.  404 

V.  Peet  Valve  Co.  ii.  45 

!'.  Philadelphia  Fire  Ass.    ii.  559,  561 

V.  Sexton  i.  266 

V.  Washington  Ins.  Co.  ii-  529 

I'.  Whitcomb  i.  74,  77 

Walter  v.  Brewer  ii.  194 

f.  Dewey  i.  534 

V.  Harvey  i.  301 

I'.  Haynes  ii.  753 

V.  Kirk  i.  322  ;  iii.  444 

V.  Ross  i.  328,  594,  652 

V.  Smith  iii.  289,  291 

Walters  v.  Munroe  i.  317 

r.  Short  ii.  8G0 

Walton  V.  Betliune  ii.  518 

r.  Crowley  ii.  358,  367,  371 

V.  Dickerson  i.  129 ;  ii.  00 

I'.  Dodson  ii.  4 

r.  Ilanbury  i.  36 

V.  Mandeville  iii.  28 

V.  Neptune,  The  ii.  463 

V.  Potter  ii.  305 

Walwortli  V.  Pool  iii.  208 

Walwyn  v.  St.  Quintin  i.  316,  323 

Walz  V.  Alback  i.  275 

Wanglcr  ;;.  Swift  ii.  802 

Wankford  v.  Fotherley  ii.  77 ;  iii.  32 

V.  Wankford  ii.  852 

Wanlcss  r.  McCandle.'is  i.  61 

Wann  v.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.      ii.  286,  288 

Wansbrough  v.  Maton  i.  547 

Wape  V.  Ilemenway  ii.  457 

Waples  V.  Fames  ii.  488 

r.  Hastings  i.  335 

Warbasse  v.  Sussex  Ins.  Co.  ii.  475 

AVarburton  v.  Aken  ii.  924 

r.  lyytton  i.  372 

V.  Storr  ii.  847 

W&xA,  Ex  parte  iii.  465 

V.  Allen  i.  304 

V.  Ames  ii.  466 

V.  Blunt  ii.  618 


INDEX   TO    CASES    CITED. 


CCIX 


Ward  V.  Bodeman 
V.  Buckingham 
V.  Byrne 
V.  Dalton 
V.  Evans 
I'.  P>yer 
V.  Fuller 
V.  Green 
V.  Hobbs 
r.  Hunter 
V.  Jenkins 


i.  183 
iii.  328 
ii.  8'JO 
iii.  434 
ii.  747 

i.  474 
iii.  430 
ii.  421 

i.  632 

i.  441 
iii.  426,  42!) 


V.  .Johnson      i.  12,  13,  28,  211  ;  ii.  850 

V.  Kilpatrick  i.  54G 

V.  Lambert  ii  925 

V.  Morris  iii.  40!) 
V.  New  York  Central  R.  Co.      ii.  100 

V.  Peck  ii.  500 

V.  Perrin  i.  312 

V.  Ruckman  ii.  388 

r.  Shiiw  1.  564,  566 

V.  Stahl  ii.  5 

V.  Stout  ii.  27 

I'.  Tingley  ii.  402  ;  iii.  402 

V.  Turner  i.  2()5 


r.  Tyler 

i.  225 

V.  Uncorn 

ii.  836 

V.  Ward 

ii.  605 

V.  Wards  worth 

iii.  280 

V.  Warren 

i.  81 

V.  Weeks 

iii.  194 

V.  Whitney 

ii.  410 

V.  Wilson 

ii.  392 

V.  Wood 

ii.  474,  500 

Ward's  case 

i.  547 

WardcU  v.  Mourillyan 

ii.  196,  206 

V.  Railroad  Co. 

i.  157 

Warden  v.  Eichbaum 

i.  51 

V.  Greer 

ii.  173,  410 

Wardens,  &c.  of   St.  James  Church 

r.  Moore  i.  278 

Wardens,  &c.  of  St.  L.  v.  Kerwan   ii.  813 

Wardens,  &c.  of  St.  Saviour  r.  Bostock  ii.  10 

Warder  i:  Baker  ii.  943 

V.  Horton  ii.  493 

V.  Tucker  i.  467 

Wardwell  v.  Haight  i.  75,  191 

Ware  v.  Adams  ii.  8 

V.  Gay  ii.  135,  23!» 

V.  Hylton  i.  449 

r.  Miller  iii.  503 

Wareliani  Bank  v.  Burt  ii.  171 

Warfield  v.  Campbell  i.  129 

Warfield's  Adm'rs  i'.  Boswell  iii.  118 

r           Waring  t\  Ayres  iii.  311 

I                  V.  Clarke  ii.  430 

■                 V.  CunliiJe  iii.  159,  161 

V.  Favenck  i.  67 ;  ii.  883 

V.  Knight  iii.  407,  409 

V.  Mason  i.  589,  628,  636 

I                    V.  Smith  ii.  856,  862 

L                   V.  Waring  i.  434 

I           Wark  r.  Willard  ii.  933 

ft           Warlow  V.  Harrison  i.  526 

;|  .         Warmstrcy  v.  Tanfield  i.  251 

•  '        Warn  v.  Bickford  ii.  879 


Warner  ?-.  Beckett 

1.263 

V.  Booge 

i.  474 

V.  Cunningham 

i.  226 

V.  Daniels          i. 

621 

ii.  921,  926,  927 

V.  Heiden 

i.  388,  402 

V.  Hitchins 

i.  537 

V.  Martin 

i.  103 

V.  McKay 

i.  66 

V.  People 

iii.  483 

V.  Valiily 

iii.  210 

V.  Van  Alstine 

iii.  296 

V.  Warner 

ii.  93 

Warnick  i-.  Grosshob 

z 

iii.  29 

Warnock  v.  Davis 

i.  253;  ii.  609 

Warren,  In  re 

i. 

175,  238;  iii.  416 

V.  Allnutt 

i.  310 

V.  Batchelder 

i.  247 

V.  Buckminster 

i.  566 

V.  Crabtree 

iii.  122,  129 

V.  Flagg 

ii.  744 

V.  Green 

ii.  827 

V.  Hodge 

i.  470 

V.  Leland 

iii.  .35 

V.  Lyons  City 

ii.  496 

V.  Mains 

ii.  753,  779,  793 

V.  Manuf.  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  527 

V.  Merrifield 

ii.  633 

I'.  Middlesex  Ass 

.  Co 

ii.  555 

V.  Milliken 

ii.  146 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co 

ii.  474 

V.  Philadelphia  Coal  Co.      i.  617,  619 

V.  Richardson 

iii.  334 

V.  Saxby 

ii.  660 

V.  Skinner 

ii.  823 

V.  Stearns 

i.  483 

V.  Tenth  Nat.  Bank 

iii.  421 

V.  Thunder 

iii.  345,  372 

V.  Wells 

ii.  877,  878 

V.  Wheeler        i. 

254 

;  ii.  683;  iii.  247 

V.  Whitney 

i.  463,  464 

Warren  Bank  v.  Suffolk  Bank          ii.  113 

Warrender  v.  Warrender 

i.  397;  ii.  701, 

712,  727 

370,  481 ;  iii.  35 

Warrick  v.  Bruce    i. 

353, 

V.  Scott 

ii.  473 

V.  Warrick 

i.  81 

Warring  v.  Layton 

ii.  860 

Warters  v.  Herring 

ii.  810 

Warwicke  v.  Noakes 

ii;  752 

Washburn  v.  Bank  of  Bellows  Falls  i.  231, 

232,  234 

V.  Fletcher 

i;  515 

V.  Goodman 

i.  219,  22S,  227 

V.  Gould 

ii.  304,  324,  633 

V.  Hale 

i.  385 

V.  Jones 

ii.  162 

V.  Ramsdell 

i.  290 

Washburn,  &c.  Co.  v 

.  Providence,  &c. 

R.  Co. 

ii.  227 

Washington  Bank  v. 

Brown             iii.  237 

V.  Lewis 

iii.  282 

V.  Shurtleff 

iii.  Ill 

Washington  Bridge  Co.  v 

State       iii.  487 

Washington  Co.  Ins. 

Co. 

V.  Colton  ii.  931 

Washington  Co.  Mut.  Lis. 

Co.  V.  Miller  i.  281 

ccx 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


Washington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kelley  ii.  559 

V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  ii.  645 

Washington  &  Baltimore  Turnpike  Co. 

V.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.      iii.  490 
Washington  &  N.  O.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hob- 
son  ii.  290,  301 
Wason  I'.  Rowe                     i.  624  ;  ii.  624 
Watchman,  The  iii.  409 
Water's  Appeal  ii.  944 
Waterhury  v.  Graham  iii.  17 
?'.  Sinclair  i.  284 
Waterer  v.  Freeman                          iii.  233 
Waterhouse  v.  Skinner                       i.  577 
V.  Waite                                        iii.  459 
Waterman  v.  Barratt                   i.  291,  473 
V.  Clark                                        ii.  880 
V.  Gilson  ii.  50 
V.  Hunt                                          i.  240 
V.  Johnson                            ii.  680,  689 
V.  Meigs                                  iii.  14,  62 
V.  Robinson                                  ii.  103 
Waters  v.  Allen                                 ii.  480 
V.  Bean                                            i.  465 
V.  Bridges                                     ii.  827 
V.  Brogden  i.  41 
V.  Comly                                       iii.  382 
V.  Earl  of  Thanet                  iii.  98,  99 
V.  Grace                                           i.  129 
V.  Howard                ii.  76  ;  iii.  30-5,  306 
V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.         ii.  489,  495, 

569 

V.  Monarch  Ins.  Co.  ii.  474,  482 

V.  Riley  i.  30,  82 

V.  Simpson  ii.  29 

V.  Taylor  i.  76,  223 

V.  Tomkins  iii.  82,  84 

V.  Towers  iii.  197 

V.  Travis  i.  525;  iii.  358 

Waterston  v.  Getchell  iii.  265 

Watertown  i\  White  i.  255 

Watertown  Ins.  Co.  v.  Grover  ii.  586 

Water  Witch,  The  ii.  410 

Wathen  v.  Sandys  i.  12 

W^atkins  v.  Atkinson  ii.  392 

V.  Baird  i.  443 

V.  Birch  i.  569 

V.  Bowers  i.  271 

V.  Crouch  i.  309 

V.  Durand  '  ii.  567 

V.  Eames  i.  483 

V.  Halstead  i,  464,  465 

V.  Hill  ii.  756 

V.  Holman  ii.  940  ;  iii.  333 

V.  Maule  i.  271 ;  iii.  329,  427,  4.52 

V.  Peck  ii.  936,  939 

V.  Perkins  iii.  23 

V.  Stevens  iii.  75,  92 

V.  Vince  i.  47,  125 

Watkinson  ;;.  Bank  of  Penn.  i.  191 

V.  Inglesby  ii.  749,  751,  818 

V.  Laughton  iii.  206,  207 

Watriss  v.  Cambridge  Bank  i.  545 

Watrous  r.  Chalker  i.  406 

Watson,  Ex  parte         i.  180 ;  iii.  415,  474 

r.  Alcock  ii.  0 


Watson  V.  Ambergate  ii.  231 
V.  A.  N.  &  B.  Railway  Co.    ii.  229 ; 
iii.  195 

V.  Bennett  i.  153 

V.  Bladen  ii.  305,  313 
V.  Bourne             iii.  394,  397,  409,  507 

V.  Brightwell  iii.  13 

V.  Clark  ii.  529 

V.  Cross  ii.  167 

V.  Denton  i.  635 

V.  Hensel  ii.  878 

V.  Hetherington  ii.  774 

V.  Hurt  i.  284 

V.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  A.  ii.  511 

V.  King  i.  76,  77 

V.  Lyle  iii.  95,  96 

V.  Mainwaring  ii.  593 

V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  ii.  502 

V.  Marston  iii.  305,  373 

V.  McLaren  ii.  3  ;  iii.  18 

V.  Mercer  iii.  506 

V.  Moore  iii.  180 

V.  Murray  i.  175 

V.  Murreli  i.  129 
V.  Pittsburg  &  Cleveland  R.  R. 

Co.  iii.  240 

V.  Poulson  ii.  916 

V.  Randall  i.  470 

V.  Reid  iii.  372 

V.  Sherman  i.  122 

V.  Spratlev  iii.  37 

V.  Thelkeld  i.  394,  395,  404 

V.  Watson  ii.  829  ;  iii.  238 

Watt,  The  ii.  437,  439 

V.  Hoch  ii.  763;  iii.  110 

V.  Morris  ii.  527 

V.  Potter  11.456;   iii.  211 

Watters  v.  Smith  i.  468 

Watts  V.  Everett  iii.  506 

I'.  Eraser  iii.  191 

V.  Friend  iii.  62 

V.  Hendry  i.  564 

V.  Kavanagh  i.  74 

V.  Rees  ii.  876 

?'.  Van  Ness  ii.  900 

V.  Waddle  iii.  333 

Wattson  V.  Marks  ii.  455 

Waugh  V.  Carver  i.  188 

V.  Cope  iii.  82 

I'.  Riley  i.  448 

Waul  V.  Kirkman  iii.  14 

Wave,  The,  v.  Hyer  ii.  439 

Waverley,  The,  v.  Clements  ii.  392 

Way  V.  Howe  iii.  411,  476 

V.  Peck  ii.  78 

V.  Sperry  1.  463,  464 

Wayde  v.  Carr  ii.  250 

Waydell  v.  Luer  ii.  757 

Wayland  v.  Mosely  ii.  410,  686 

Waymire  v.  Jetmore  ii.  87 

Wayne  v.  Holmes  ii.  315,  327 

V   The  Gen.  Pike  ii.  392 

Weatherall  t'.  Georing  iii.  435 

Weatherbee  r.  Weatherbee  ii.  737 

Weathered  v.  Mays  ii.  875 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCXl 


VVeatherford  v.  Fishback  ii.  916,  921 

Weatlierhcad  v.  Boyers  iii.  118 

WeatlierliLnid's  Lessee  v.  Baskerville 

ii.  689 

¥/eatherstone  v.  Hawkins    ii.  48 ;  iii.  177 

Weave  i\  Gove  i.  98 

Weaver  v.  Bachert  ii.  G7,  74 

V.  Childress  ii.  6(31 

V.  Jones  i.  552 

V.  Lynch  ii.  941 

V.  Sessions  ii.  81;] 

v.  S.  G.  Owens,  The  ii.  380 

V.  Ward  iii.  414 

Webb,  In  re  ii.  151,  610 

V.  Daggett  iii.  381,  402 

V.  Direct  Lond.  &  Port.  Railway 

Co.  iii.  306,  309,  332.  374 

V.  Duckingfield  i.  442  ;  ii.  458 

V.  Fairnianer  ii.  797 

V.  Fox  ii.  108  ;  iii.  424,  446 

V.  Ingram  ii.  83G 

V.  Odell  i.  562 

V.  Pierce  ii.  421 

V.  Plummer  i.  544  ;  ii.  669,  677 

V.  Porthmd  Manuf.  Co.     iii.  233,  234 
V.  Powers     ii.  336,  341,  342,  344,  346, 

349 

V.  Protection  Lis.  Co.  ii.  571 

V.  Pose  ii.  330 

v.  Steele  i.  255 

Webb's  case  ii.  688 

Webber  v.  Davis  i.  562 

V.  Ives  ii.  842 

V.  Tivill  iii.  94 

Webster  v.  Bray  i.  229 

V.  Cobb  i.  274,  284 

V.  Coffin  i.  580 

V.  De  Tastet  i.  93  ;  ii.  460 

V.  Ela  iii.  14 

V.  Enfield  ii.  654 

V.  French  i.  526 

V.  Granger  i.  574 

V.  McGinnis  i.  386 

V.  Seekamp  ii.  453 

V.  Spencer  i.  146 

V.  Withey  iii.  403 

V.  Woodford  i.  434 

r.  Wvser  ii.  824 

V.  Zeilly  iii.  10,  39 

Wedderburn  r.  Bell  ii.  527 

V.  Wedderburn  ii.  940 

Wedge  V.  Newly n  iii.  441 

Wedgwood  v.  Adams  iii.  305 

Wed  lake  v.  Hurley  1.  248 

Weed  V.  Clark  ii.  12 

V.  Ellis  ii.  882 

V.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  236,  454 

V.  Schenect.  &  Sar.  R.  R.  Co.   ii.  227, 

230,  231,  275 

V.  Van  Houten  i.  309 

Weed,  &c.  Co.  v.  Emerson  i.  405 

Weeks  v.  Burton  ii.  917 

V.  Hull  ii.  797 

V.  Leighton  i.  355,  360  ;  ii.  39 

V.  Propert  i.  69 


Weeks  v.  Tybald 

i.  506 

V.  Wead 

i.  569 

Weger  v.  I'enn.  R.  R.  Co. 

ii.  47 

Welirum  i).  Kuln 

i.  468 

Weibergy.  The  St.  Oloff 

ii.  458 

Weigel,  Succession  of 

i.  131 

Wciger  v.  Gould 

1.627 

Weiler  v.  Hoch 

ii.  27 

Weimer  v.  Clement 

i.  621 

Weir  V.  Aberdeen 

ii.  627 

V.  Weir 

ii.  51 

Wcisser  v.  Dcnison 

1.301 

V.  Maitland 

ii.  647 

Weiting  v.  Nissley 

Iii.  240 

Weitzel,  In  re 

iii.  416 

Welborn  v.  Sechrist 

iii.  362 

Welch  V.  Goodwin 

i.  300 

V.  Hicks 

ii.  215,  418 

V.  Knott 

ii.  375 

V.  Mandeville 

i.254 

V.  Marvin 

iii.  22 

V.  Myers 

iii.  447 

V.  Ware 

iii.  183 

V.  Whittemore 

1.613 

V.  Wordsworth 

iii.  506 

Wclclmian  v.  Sturgis 

i.  146 

Weld  V.  Cutler 

1.564 

V.  Hadley 

ii.  787 

V.  Lancaster 

ii.  895 

V.  Walker 

1.393 

Weldon  v.  Buck 

1.327 

Wei  ford  v.  Beazley 

iii.  4,  8 

V.  Liddel 

iii.  96 

Welland  Canal  Co.  v.  Hathaway     ii.  936, 

942,  944 

Weiler  v.  Baker  iii.  235 

V.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  251 

Welles  V.  Boston  Ins.  Co.  ii.  572 

V.  Cowles  iii.  37 

V.  Gray  ii.  447 

V.  March  1.  197,  201 

Weilesley  v.  Wellesley  iii.  324 

Wellington  v.  Downer  iii.  219 

V.  Jackson  i.  279,  301 

)'.  Mackintosh  ii.  844,  845 

Wellman  v.  Southard  iii.  77 

Wells,  Ex  parte  iii.  417 

V.  Abernethy  iii.  220 

V.  Archer  Ii.  010 

V.  Banister  i.  500 

V.  Cookfi  Ii.  844 

V.  Girling  iii.  477 

V.  Hatch  i.  129 

V.  Horton  ii.  49 ;  iii.  48 

V.  Jackson  i.  284 

V.  Jewett  Ii.  917 

V.  Kingston-upon-HuU  1.  154 

V.  Mace  iii.  463 

V.  Meldrum  ii.  464 

V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.    ii.  238 

V.  Padgett  ii.  65,  75 

V.  Phila.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  485 

V.  Pierce  ii.  943 

V.  Porter  1.  560 ;  iii.  127 

II.  Ragland  Iii.  103 


ccxu 


INDEX    TO    CASES    CITED. 


Wells  V.  Robinson 
17.  Smith 

V.  Steam  Nav.  Co. 
V.  Tregusan 
V.  Watliiig 
I'.  Williams 
V.  Wright 


iii.  137 
iii.  338 
ii.  182 
ii.  645 
iii.  235 
i.  450;  ii.  482 
ii.  645 


Welsh  V.  Gtrman  American  Bank    i.  300 

V.  Hole  iii.  280 

V.  Lawrence  ii.  247 

V.  Speakman  i.  1U8 

r.  Usiier  iii.  207,  432 

i;.  Welsh  iii.  464 

Welts  V.  Conn.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  601 

Wence  v.  Wykoff  ii.  51 

Wendell  v.  Van  Rensselaer  ii.  939 

Wennall  v.  Adney  i.  460,  462 

Wen  nan  r.  The  Mohawk  Ins.  Co.      iii.  98 

Wentworth  v.  Bullen  i.  478;  ii.  819 

V.  Clark  i.  406 

V.  Cock  i.  145 

V.  Day  ii.  105  ;  iii.  255 

V.  Dows  iii.  219 

V.  Outhwaite  i.  642,  616 

V.  Realm  ii.  412 

Werner  v.  Humphreys  i.  145 

Werns^e  r.  Hall  ii.  721 

Wertheimer  )-.  Penn.  R.  Co.  ii.  253 

West  V.  Ashdown  ii.  27 

V.  Cairns  i.  460 

V.  Citizens  Ins.  Co.  ii.  576 

r.  Cunningham  i.  618,  627 

V.  Cutting  i.  637 

V.  Emmons  i.  578 

V.  Foreman  i.  280 

V.  Francis  ii.  342 

V.  Lady  Franklin,  The  ii.  392 

V.  Moore  i.  356 

V.  Newton  i.  572 

V.  O'Hara  iii.  22 

V.  Pritchard  iii.  220 

r.  Pryce  iii.  469 

V.  Raymond  i.  132 

V.  Skip  i.  108,  234 

V.  Tih^hman  ii.  939 

V.  Wentworth  iii.  211,  212,  220 

V.  Wheeler  i.  392 

West  Bank  v.  Shawnee  Bank  ii.  113 

West  Boston  Bank  v.  Thompson        i.  83, 

297 
West  Branch  Bank  v.  Morehead  ii.  703 
West  Feliciana  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stockett 

iii.  511 
West  Hickory  Ass.  v.  Reed  i.  167 

West  India,  &c.  Co.  v.  Home,  &c.  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  497 

West  Mass.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duffey  ii.  471 

West  of  England  Bank,  Tti  re  i.  210 

Wfst  River  Bank  v.  Taylor  i.  320 

West  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix         iii.  483, 
490,  491,  492,  493,  494,  496 
West  St.  I>ouis  Co.  Bank  v.  Shawnee 

Co.  Bank  i.  297 

West  T.  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Kilderhouse 

ii.  714,  762 


Westbrook  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Grant  iii.  460 
W'estbury  v.  Abcrdein  ii.  912 

Westchester  Ins.  Co.  v.  Earle  ii.  471 

V.  Foster  ii.  585 

Westerlo  v.  Evertson  i.  185 

Westerman  v.  Means  ii.  793 

Western  v.  Genessee  Mut.  Fire  Tns. 

Co.  ii.  713 

V.  Russell  iii.  18,  316,  337,  365 

Western  R.  R.  v.  Babcock  iii.  367,  371 
Western  Stage  Co.  v.  Walker  i.  199,  217 
Western  Trans.  Co.  v.  Barber  iii.  268 

West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Am.  U.  Tel.  Co. 

ii.  278 
V.  Buchanan  ii.  286,  288 

V.  Carew       ii.  280,  282,  283,  285,  286, 

288 

V.  Chicago,  &c.  R,  Co.  iii.  15 

V.  Fenton  ii.  286 

V.  Fontaine  ii.  279,  286 

V.  Meyer  ii.  291 

Western,  &c.  Co.  v.  Lansing  i.  532 

Western,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McElwee         i.  51 

Westfall  V.  Parsons  i.  35;  iii.  24 

Westlake  v.  St.  Lawrence  Ins.  Co.  ii.  582, 

587 

Westley  r.  Clarke  i.  29 

Westmeath  v.  Salisbury  i.  399 

V.  Westmeath  i.  397 

Westminster  College  v.  Gamble        i.  484 

Weston  V.  Alley  i.  61 

V.  Barton  ii.  20,  21 

V.  Chamberlain  i.  35 

V.  Davis  i.  500 

V.  Ernes  ii.  473 

V.  Penniman  ii.  386,  396 

V.  Wright  i.  84 

Westwick  v.  Theodor  ii.  55 

Westwood  V.  Bell  ii.  883;  iii.  283 

Westzinthus,  In  re  i.  652,  653 

Wetherbee  v.  Green  iii.  214 

Wetherell  v.  Jones  ii.  886 

V.  Langston  i.  23 

Wetherill  v.  Neilson  i.  627,  629 

Wetliey  v.  Andrews  i.  296 

Wetmore  v.  Baker  ii.  246 

V.  Brien  iii.  153 

V.  Neuberger  iii.  37 

V.  Pattison  ii.  639;  iii.  199 

V.  Scovill  ii.  336 

V.  Wells  ii  65 

Wetzel  V.  Sponsler's  Ex'rs  ii.  20 

Weyland  v.  Elk  ins  ii.  226 

Weybosset    Bank    v.    Borden    City 

Mills  iii.  414 

Weymouth  v.  Boyer  iii.  302 

W^iser  >.•.  Lcckwood  ii.  88 

Wliallon  i'.  Kauffman  ii.  634 

Wharton  r.  King  ii.  831,  833,  835 

V.  McKenzie  i-  337 

V.  O'Hara  i.  492 

V.  Walker  i.  247,  248 

V.  Williamson  i.  324 

Wlieat,  The  Convoy's  ii.  298 

Wheatcrot't  v.  Hickman  i.  174 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCXlll 


Wlieatloj-  V.  Low 

i.  477  ;  ii.  109 

Whitaker,  The 

ii.  442 

V.  Turr 

iii.  315 

V.  Bond 

iii.  370 

I'.  Strobe 

i.  281 

t;.  Brown 

1.  204,  205 

V.  Williams 

iii.  97 

V.  Cone 

ii.  909 

Wheaton  v.  East 

i.  335,  866,  367 

V.  Eastwick 

1.  616,  618 

V.  Ilibbard 

ii.  887;  iii.  137 

V.  Rice 

iii.  85 

t'.  Peters 

ii.  330,  331.  337 

V.  Sumner 

i.  611 

r.  Wilmarth 

i.  322 

V.  Whitaker 

i.  380 

Wheeler  ;•.  Borman 

iii.  424 

V.  Williams 

ii.  938 

V.  IJowen 

i.  382;  iii.  437 

Whitbeck  v.  Whitheck 

i.  473 

I'.  Bramah 

iii.  446,  447 

Whitbread  v.  Broekliurst 

iii.  350 

r.  Collier 

i.  520;  iii.  14 

Whitcher  v.  Morey 

iii.  40 

V.  Constantine 

ii.  731 

Whitchurch  v.  Bevis          iii 

346,  347,  350 

17.  Eastern  State,  The                  ii.  4;]2 

Whitcomb  v.  Converse 

i.  176 

V.  Field 

i.  308,  31 1 

V.  Jacob 

iii.  301 

V.  Guild 

i.  27S 

V.  Preston 

ii.  829 

V.  Knaiigs 

ii.  753,  777,  779 

V.  Williams 

ii.  756 

V.  Moore 

i.  382 

V.  Whitcomb 

1.  564  ;  ii.  737 

V.  Nevins 

i.  52 

V.  Whiting 

iii.  87,  88,  90 

V.  Newbold 

iii.  253 

V.  Whitney 

i.  566,  571 

V.  Raymond 

ii.  739,  884 

White,  Ex  parte 

i.  558 

V.  Rice 

i.  215 

V.  Allen 

ii.  304 

V.  Russel 

i.  489,  886,  887 

V.  Bailey 

iii.  103 

t'.  Spencer 

ii.  761,  897 

V.  Banks 

iii.  382 

r.  San  Francisco,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  226 

V.  Baxter 

i.  459 

V.  Stone 

i.  276 

V.  Bluett 

i.  462,  469 

V.  Sumner 

ii.  380.  395 

V.  Boulton 

ii.  234 

V.  Thompson 

ii.  459 

V.  Bradshaw 

ii.  681 

i;.  Train 

i.  569 

V.  Branch 

i.  361 

V.  Van  Wart 

i.  219 

V.  Brockway 

iii.  219 

i\  Warner 

i.  295;  iii.  98 

V.  Brown 

Ii.  564,  651 

V.  Vv'ashburn 

ii.  28 

r.  Canfield 

iii.  391 

V.  Webster 

iii.  106 

V.  Chapman                     1 

110;  iii.  206 

r.  Wheeler          i.  263  ;  ii.  91,  92,  749 

V.  Commonwealth 

i.  146 

Wlieeler,  &c.  Co.  v.  TeetzlafE            ii.  802 

V.  Crew 

iii.  12 

Wheeling  Ins.  Co.  v.  Morrison         ii.  562 

V.  Cuddon 

iii.  356,  361 

Wheelock  v.  Doolittle 

iii.  88 

V.  Cushing 

i.  464 

V.  Freeman 

ii.  858 

V.  Daedalus,  The 

ii.  402 

V.  Eee 

iii.  426 

V.  Damon 

iii.  305 

V.  Tanner 

1.571;  ii.  779 

V.  Demilt 

1.  478,  481 

V.  Wlieelwright 

ii.  137 

V.  Dingley 

ii.  849,  850 

Wheelwright  v.  Beers 

iii.  207 

V.  Dougherty 

i.  645 

V.  Depe3'ster 

i.  556  ;  ii.  399 

V.  East  Saginaw 

ii.  16 

V.  Moore 

ii.  7 

V.  Fox 

ii.  859 

Whelan  ;•.  Lynch 

1.96 

V.  Franklin  Bank 

Ii.  886,  887 

r.  Keilly 

1.47 

V.  Gainer 

iii.  261 

r.  Whelan 

1.  460 

V.  Geroch 

ii.  333,  334 

Whehlale  v.  Partridge 

i.  150 

V.  GiflFord 

i.  76 

Whelpdale  v.  Cookson 

iii.  422 

V.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co. 

ii.  266 

Whetstone  v.  Davis 

i.  548 

V.  Griffing 

iii.  446 

Whichcote  v.  Lawrence 

i.  94  ;  iii.  422 

V.  Hale 

iii.  88 

Whillington  c  Polk 

iii.  484 

V.  Hancock 

ii.  645 

Wliincup  V.  Hughes 

ii.  814 

V.  Holford 

ii.  837 

Whipple  v.  Blackington 

iii.  80 

I'.  Humphrey 

ii.  151 

V.  Chamberlain  Man 

Co.          iii.  234 

V.  Jordan 

ii.  823 

V.  Cumberland  Man. 

Co.           iii.  176 

V.  Lady  Lincoln 

1.  96,  110 

V.  Dow 

i.  343 

V.  Lowe 

ii.  84 

V.  Giles 

i.  388 

I'.  Mann 

ii.  806 

V.  Parker 

iii.  41 

V.  Mavnard 

iii.  37 

V.  Stevens 

iii.  79,  90 

V.  Miller    i.  630;  ii.  932, 

iii.  110,  196 

V.  Walpole 

iii.  183,  186 

V.  Mitchell 

i.  645 

V.  Whitman 

i.  180 

V.  Moseley 

iii.  199,  239 

Whisler  v.  Hicks 

iii.  244 

V.  Murphy 

i.  191 

Winston  V.  Stodder 

U.  700,  713,  717 

V.  Mutual  Ins.  Co. 

ii.  546,  560 

Whitacre  v.  Culver 

ii.  941 

V.  Nelis 

ii.  76 

CCXIV 


INDEX  TO    CASES   CITED. 


White  r.  Oliver 
V.  Palmer 
V.  Parker 
V.  Patten 
V.  Perley 
V.  Proctor 
V.  Reed 


ii.  63,  655 

i.  4;J7 

i.  150,  151 

ii.  9:];5 

ii.  784,  785 

i.  125;  iii.  12 

ii.  24 


V.  Pepulilic,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  571 

V.  Slfinner  i.  08,  72 

V.  Smith  i.  281  ;  iii.  271 

V.  Solomoiisky  iii.  25 

V.  Springfield  Bank  i.  292 

V.  Stoddard  i.  307 

V.  Trotter  i.  95 

V.  Walker  ii.  850,  941 

V.  Webb  iii.  21G 

V.  Westport  Cotton  Man.  Co.        i.  42 
V.  White  ii.  730;  iii.  333,  501, 

500 

V.  Whitman  ii.  865,  860 

V.  Whitney  iii.  242,  244 

V.  Williams  iii.  295 

V.  Winnisimmet  Co.    ii.  181,  101),  218 

V.  Wright  iii.  120,  121,  119 

White's  Bank  v.  Smitli  ii.  330 

White's  case  ii.  161 

White  River  Turnpike  v.   Vermont 

Central  R.  R.  Co.  iii.  490,  494 

Whitebread,  Ex  parte  iii.  297 

Wliitecross,  &c.  Co.  v.  Savill  ii.  450 

Whited  V.  Germania  Ins.  Co.  ii.  543 

Whitefield  v.  Longfellow  i.  444 

V.  McLeod  i.  522,  027 

Whitehead  v.  Anderson  i.  641 

V.  Cade  ii.  870 

V.  Greethara  i.  476;  ii.  110 

V.  Lord  iii.  101 

V.  Price  ii.  548 

V.  Reddick  i.  55 

V.  Tuckett  i.  39,  42,  59 

V.  Vaughan  iii.  282 

V.  Walker  i.  290,  327 ;  iii.  100 

Whitehouse  v.  Bickford  ii.  939 

V.  Frost  i.  053 

V.  Hanson  ii.  10 

Whitehurst  v.  Boyd  ii.  635 

V.  Fayetteville  Ins.  Co.        ii.  551,  571 

Whiteley  r.  Swayne  ii.  304 

Whitestll  V.  Crane  ii.  277 

V.  Heiney  iii.  23 

Whiteside  v.  Jennings  iii.  247 

Whiteside«  i\  Dorria  i.  ?>^'2 

V.  Laffertv  i.  229 

V.  ThurlkiU  ii.  171,  183 

Whitestown  r.  Stone  i.  484 

Whitfield  V.  Collingwood  ii.  800 

V.  I/C  Desi)encer  ii.  154,  155 

V.  Levy  iii.  KW 

Whitford  r.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  247 

Whiting,  AV  parU  iii.  409 

V.  Barrett  i.  263 

V.  Brastow  i.  547 

V.  Earle  i.  349,  350 

V.  Independent  Ins.  Co.  ii.  492 

V.  Mass.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  014,  018 


Whiting  V.  Staccy 
Whitley  v.  Loftus 

V.  Piedmont  Ins.  Co. 
Whitlock  V.  Dnffield 
Whitlocke  v.  Walton 
Wliitnian,  Kx  parte 

V.  Bryant 

V.  Freese 

V.  Leonard 


354: 


ii.  25 

ii.  54 

ii.  014 

i.  532;  iii.  323 

iii.  107 

iii.  423 

iii.  22 

i.  624 

i.  223 


Whitmarsh 

V.  Hall 

V.  Walker 
Whitmore  v.  Adams 

V.  Coats 

V.  Gilmour 

V.  Shiverick 

V.  Steamboat  Caroline 
Whitney  v.  Allaire 

V.  Bigelow 

V.  Black  River  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Boardman 

V.  Brattleboro  Bank 

V.  Cochran 

V.  Dutch 

V.  Eaton 

V.  Emmett 

V.  Ferris 

V.  Groot 

V.  Haven 

V.  Hitchcock 

V.  Lee 

V.  Meyers 

V.  N.  Y.  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co. 

V.  Potsdam  Bank 

V.  Robinson 

V.  Spencer 

V.  Stearns 

V.  Sutton 

V.  Whiting 
Whitney  Arms  Co.  v.  Barlow 
Whitney  &  JMimson,  Re 
AVhiton  i\  Mears 

V.  Spring 
Whitridge  v.  Dill 


Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.  ii.  545 

ii.  40 

i.  355 ;  iii.  33,  37 

i.  208 

ii.  666;  iii.  224 

i.  65 

1.  107 

ii.  194 

ii.  923 

iii.  92 

ii.  546 

634 ;  iii.  224 

ii.  99 

iii.  03 

i.  304 

i.  580 

ii.  306,  307,  309,  312 

i.  198 

ii.  24 

ii.  523,  533 

iii.  185 


ii.  114 

i.  543 
ii.  418 
ii.  527 

i.  272 
ii.  941 
ii.  810 

i.  458 
023 
398 

i.  158 
iii.  422 

ii.  31 
ii.  745 
ii.  431,  432 


1. 
iii. 


Wliittaker  v.  Manchester,  &c.  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  251 

V.  Mason  ii.  008 

Whitteniore  v.  Adams  ii.  719 

V.  Cutter      ii.  307,  311,  313,  823,  328 ; 

iii.  189 


)'.  Gibbs 
Whitten  v.  Fuller 

V.  Peacock 
Whittier  ?'.  Dana 

c.  (irnffam 
Whittingluun  v.  Hill 

V.  Thornburgh 

V.  Wooler 
Whittinghani's  case 
Whittington,  Ex  parte 

V.  Farmer's  Bank 
Whittle  V.  Skinner 
Whittlesey  v.  Dean 


iii.  57 

iii.  220 

i.  261 

iii.  57 

i.  30(5 

i.  353 

ii.  523 

ii.  341,  349 

i.  370 

iii.  448 

ii.  879 

i.  257,  466,  474 

i.  318 


Whitton  V.  Commerce,  The 


'•  "'"   I. 
ii.  464 

1 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCXV 


Whitton  V.  Smith 

V.  Wass 
WhitwcU  0.  Harrison 

V.  Johnson 
Wliitworth  V.  Adams 

V.  Davis 

V.  Erie  R.  Co. 

V.  Ferguson 

V.  Harris 
Whoregooil  v.  Wlioregood 
Wliywail  r.  Champion 


i.  201,  207,  220 

iii.  lU-1 

ii.  488 

i.  318,  till) 

iii.  15i 

iii.  4;]5 

'    ii.  228 

iii.  102 

i.  220 

i.  400 

i.  303 


W  ibert  V.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.    ii.  198 ; 

iii.  198 

Wick  V.  Samuel  Strong,  The  ii.  302 

Wickens  v.  Evans  ii.  890 

Wicker  v.  Norris  ii.  797 

Wickes  V.  Caulk  ii.  852 

Wicknam  v.  Hawker  ii.  642 

Wicks  I'.  Gogerley  iii.  128 

V.  Lippnian  i.  185 

Widgery  v.  Haskell  iii.  381,  382 

Widoe  V.  Webb  i.  486 

Wieland  v.  White  i.  130 

Wieler  r.  Schilizzi  i.  G26 

Wigg  V.  Shuttleworth  i.  488 

V.  Wigg  i.  80 

Wiggin,  Ex  parte  iii.  413 

V.  Coffin  iii.  177,  188 

V.  Peters  ii.  797 

V.  SiimAk  Ins.  Co.  ii.  492 

V.  Tudor  i.  20,  210 

V.  Wiggin  i.  541 

Wiggins  I".  Hammond  i.  20(3 

I'.  Hathaway  ii.  154,  155 

Wiggle  V.  Thompson  i.  322 

Wigglesworth  v.  Dallison  i.  537,  544 ; 

ii.  608,  678 

V.  Steers  i.  435  ;  iii.  373 

Wight  r.  Geer  ii.  900 

V.  Shuck  iii.  126 

Wightman  v.  Chartman  i.  12 

V.  Coates  ii.  64,  GO 

V.  Wightman  ii.  88,  726 

Wigmore  v.  Jay  ii.  46 

Wigmore  and  Wells'  case  i.  12 

AVilbert  v.  New  York  &  Erie  Railroad 

Co.  iii.  197 

Wilborn  r.  Whitfield  i.  540 

Wilbour  r.  Turner  i.  272,  298 

Wilbur  V.  Beecher  ii.  309,  327 

V.  Crane  i.  469 

V.  Jernegan  ii.  756,  757 

V.  Tobey  i.  448 

Wilburn  v.  Larkin  i.  55 

Wilby  V.  Phimiey  i.  186 

;;.  W.  C.  R.  Co.  ii.  226,  2:)2 

Wilcocks  V.  Union  Ins.  Co.  ii.  499 

Wilcox  V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  i.  47 

V.  Draper  ii.  14 

V.  Hall  i.  027 

V.  Howland  i.  444;  iii.  159,  160 

V.  Hunt  ii.  700,  719 

Wilcus  ?'.  Kling  iii.  172 

('.  Lee  ii.  869 

V.  Par  melee  ii.  230 


Wilcus  V.  Plummer 

V.  Roath 

V.  Singletary 

IK  Wilcox 

V.  Wood 
Wild  V.  Harris 

V.  VA'illiams 
Wilde  V.  Armsby 

V.  Gibson 

V.  Vinor 

V.  Waters 
Wilder  c.  Keeler 

I'.  Winne 
Wildes  V.  Savage 
Wildman,  Ex  parte 


iii.  99 

i.  364 

i.  210 

ii.  833 

ii.  069 

ii.  71 

ii.  749 

ii.  860 

iii.  371 

ii.  848 

i.  547 

i.  238 

iii.  382 

i.  303  ;  ii.  14 

iii.  408 


Wilds  V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.  Co.     ii.  248 

Wilelmina  Eleanora,  The  ii.  426 

Wiley  I'.  Bradley  iii.  39 

V.  Brattleboro  Bank  ii.  99 

;;.  Griswold  i.  208 

V.  Knight  iii.  403 

V.  Moor  ii.  861 

th  Shoemak  ii.  785 

Wilhelm  v.  Schmidt  ii.  764 

Wilkes  I'.  Ferris  iii.  48,  382 

V.  Jacks  i.  307 

V.  Lion  iii.  237 

V.  Wilkes  i.  397 

Wilkie  V.  Geddes  ii.  527 

V.  Roosevelt  iii.  127 

Wilkins  v.  Aiken        ii.  335,  341,  342,  343, 

348 

V.  Bromhead  iii.  435 

V.  Carmichael  ii.  454  ;  iii.  286 

V.  Casey  iii.  301,  451 

V.  Davis  i.  224 ;  iii.  440 

V.  Fry  iii.  424,  448 

V.  Germania  Fire  Ins.  Co.           ii.  552 

V.  Pearce  i,  202,  217 

V.  Reed  i.  69 

V.  Taliaferro  i.  552 

;;.  Tobacco  Ins.  Co.  ii.  552 
Wilkins  School  District  v.  Milligan  iii.  66 

Wilkinson,  irJx  parte  iii.  421,  425 

V.  Adam  ii.  633 

V.  Byers  i.  469 ;  ii.  823 

V.  Candlish  i.  203 

V.  Conn.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  598 

V.  Coverdale  ii.  108 

V.  Gaston  ii.  797 

V.  Godefroy  ii.  761 

V.  Hall  i.  26 

V.  Holiday  i.  564,  567 

V.  Henderson  i.  228 

V.  Hunter  i.  143 

V.  Leland  iii.  481 

V.  Lindo  i.  26 

V.  Lloyd  ii.  806 

V.  Scott  i.  458;  ii.  932 

V.  Torkington  iii.  323 

V.  Verity  iii.  99 

V.  Wilkinson  i.  877;  iii.  449 

V.  Wilson  ii.  404 

V.  Wright  i.  409 

Wilks  V.  Black  i.  55, 124 


ccxvi 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Wilks  V.  Davis  ii.  845 ;  iii.  332 

r.  Smith  ii.  GOO 

Will's  case  i.  515 

Willamette  Co.  v.  Remick  iii.  208 

Willan  V.  Willan  i.  582 

Willard  v.  Bridge  ii.  152 

V.  Dorr  ii.  454 

V.  Fox  ii.  875 

V.  Hewlett  i.  'Mi 

V.  Perkins  i.  57.'] 

V.  lleeder  iii.  121 

V.  Kice  iii.  218 

V.  Sperry  ii.  751 

V.  Stevens  i.  622 

V.  Stone  L  370,  481 ;  ii.  0(3 

V.  Tayloe  iii.  305 

V.  Twitchell  iii.  210 

Willats  V.  Kennedy  i.  459,  470 

Willcoc'ks,  Ex  parte  i.  KiO 

YflWes,  Ex  parte  iii.  410 

V.  Glover  i.  80  ;  ii.  524 

Willet  v.  Atterton  iii.  70 

V.  Blanford  i.  228 

V.  Chambers  i.  208 

Willets  V.  Green  ii.  43 

Willetts  V.  Buffalo  &  Rochester  R.  R. 

Co.  ii.  248 

Willey  V.  Beach  i.  388 

r.  Connor  i.  544 

William,  The  ii.  102,  40'.) 

William  Beckford,  The  ii.  440 

William  F.  Burden,  The  ii.  485 

William  Ilannington,  The  ii.  440 

William  Lushington,  The  ii.  442 

William  &  Emmeline  ii.  40;J,  404 
Williams,  Ex  parte             i.  224,  226,  228  ; 

iii.  440 

In  re  ii.  827;  iii.  414 

V.  Alexander  i.  478 

V.  Archer  iii.  221 

V.  Avery  ii.  77 

V.  Bacon  iii.  1 1 

V.  Bank  of  Michigan  i.  240 

V.  Bank  of  U.  S.  i.  811 

V.  Bartholomevir  iii.  355 

V.  Barton  i.  102;  iii.  102 

V.  Branson  ii.  172 

V.  Brown  iii.  ?>>^'A 

V.  Bruffy  iii.  480 

V.  Butler  i.  126 

V.  Carpenter  ii.  758 
V.  Chester  &  Holyhead  Railway 

i.  154 

V.  Commercial  Exch.  Co.            i.  4(i7 

V.  Crary  ii.  882 

V.  ("^urrie  iii.  187 

V.  Dakin  iii.  170,  178 

V.  Delafiold  ii.  .525 

V.  Donaldson  i.  400 

V.  Dormer  ii.  782 

V.  Durst  iii.  101 

V.  Dyde  i.  46:'. 

r.  Everett  i.  218 

V.  Field  iii.  248 

V.  Fowler  i.  403 


Williams  v.  Gilchrist 
V.  Gillies 
V.  Gihnan 
I'.  Given 
V.  Grant 
V.  Gridley 
V.  Griffith 
V.  Ilance 
V.  Harrison 
V.  Hart 
V.  Healey 
V.  Ilenshaw 
I'.  Hide 
V.  Hill 
V.  Ilolcombe 


ii.  881 

i.  107,  212 

ii.  068,  670 

i.  557 

ii.  172,  183 

iii.  84 

ii.  763;  iii.  72,  75,  79 

iii.  145 

i.  355 

iii.  312 

ii.  063 

i.  184,  185 

ii.  805 

iii.  189 

ii.  138 


r.  IloUingsworth 
r.  Iloughtaling 
V.  llutehinson 
V.  Ingersoll 
t'.  Jenny  Lind,  The 
V.  Jolinson 


ii.  73,  75 

ii.  769 

i.  348 

ii.  838 ;  iii.  300 

ii.  442 

ii.  .3.55,  371 


V.  .Jones     i.  105  ;  ii.  721 ;  iii.  108,  381 
V.  Kennebec  Ins.  Co.  ii.  505,  509 

V.  Landman  iii.  349 

V.  Leper  iii.  27,  30,  31 

V.  Little  i.  292 

V.  Littlefield  i.  107 

V.  Lloyd  ii.  805 

V.  London  Ass.  Co.  ii.  452 

r.  London  Com.  Ex.  Co.  ii.  821 

V.  Marshall  i.  95 

V.  Maybee  i.  366 

V.  Mayor  of  Annapolis  iii.  310 

V.  Mil'lington  i.  528 

V.  Moor  i.  353 

V.  Moore  i.  336 

V.  Morris  ii.  665;  iii.  15 

r.  Mostym  iii.  233 

V.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  473,  522,  524, 

542,  547,  554,  555,  557 
I'.  Nicliols  ii.  224,  450 

t;.  North  China  Ins.  Co.  i.  49 

V.  Gates  ii.  724,  728 

V.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  ii.  885 

V.  Paul  ii.  906 

V.  Pendleton  i.  480 

V.  Planter's  Bank  iii.  487 

V.  Prince  i.  396 

V.  Kawlinson  ii.  766,  768 

V.  Bobbins  i   58 

V.  Roberts  iii.  294 

V.  Roger  Williams  Ins.  Co.       ii.  559, 

5(i3 
V.  Roser  i.  Oil 

V.  Shee  ii.  532,  535 

V.  Sherman  iii.  1 11 

V.  Sims  i.  280 

V.  Smith  ii.  410,  505,  507  ;  iii.  102 

i;.  SpaiTord  i.  (i-iS 

V.  Spence  ii.  370 

I'.  Storrs  iii.  112 

V.  Stratton  iii.  482 

V.  Suffolk  Ins.  Co.        ii.  449,  495,  501 
V.  Taylor  ii.  235,  288 

V.  Thorp  ii.  610 


INDEX   TO   CASES   CITED. 


CCXVU 


Williams  v.  Vanderbilt 
V.  Vermeule 
V.  Vreeland 
V.  Wiilsby 
V.  Wiirintr 


ii.  228;  iii.  209 
iii.  424 
iii.  358 

ii.  748 ;  iii.  425 
i.  310 


Wash.  Life  Ins.  Co, 
Whiting 


V.  Williams 


V.  Wilson 

V.  Winans 

V.  Woods 

V.  Young 
Williams  Bros.  v.  Davis 
Williams  College  v.  Danforth 


ii.  (iOO 
ii.  70'J 
i.  537;  ii.  85,  92.  421, 
834;  iii.  110,378 
i.  173;  ii.  309,  830 
i.  303 
i.  80 
i.  503 
i.  558 
i.  485 


Williamsburg  Ins  Co.  v.  Gary    ii.  549,  587 
Williamson  v.  Alplionso,  The  ii.  441 


V.  Barrett 

V.  Dickens 

V.  Henley 

V.  Missouri,  The 

V.  N.  J.  S.  11.  Co, 

f.  Taylor 

V.  Wilson 

V.  Woodman 
Willing  I'.  Peters 
Willingham  v.  Joyce 
Willings  V.  Blight 

V.  Consequa 
Wiilion  IK  Berkley 
Willis,  In  re 

V.  Bank  of  England 

V.  De  Castro 

V.  Dyson 

V.  Evans 

V.  P'reeman 

V.  Gammell 

V.  Green 

V.  Hall 

V.  Long  Island  II.  R.  Co 


V.  New  ham 

V.  Peckham 

V.  Poole 

V.  Twambly 

V.  Willis 
Willison  V.  Watkins 
Williston  V.  Williston 
Wilioughby  v.  Backhouse 

V.  Conistock 

V.  llorridge 

?'.  Moulton 
Wills  V.  Brown 

V.  Cow  per 

V.  Ross 

V.  Stradling 
Will's  case 

Wilmer  v.  Smilax,  The 
Wilmhurst  v.  Bowker 
Wilinot  )'.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.       ii.  018 

V.  Hurd  i.  621;  ii.  879 

V.  Smith  ii.  61,  747,  774 

Wilson,  Ex  parte  iii.  410,  427 

In  re  iii.  400 

V.  Alexander  ii.  753 


ii.  434 ;  iii.  190 

iii.  405 

ii.  907 

ii.  392 

1546;  ii.  914 

ii.  49 

i.  224 

ii.  941 

i.  403 

iii.  429,  454 

ii.  388 

1.  629 ;  ii.  700 

i.  448;  ii.  038 

iii.  463 

i.  82 

ii.  851 

i.  202 

iii.  309 

iii.  450,  451 

i.  470 

i.  321 

i.  204 

ii.  2.34,  246, 

250 

iii.  84,  85 

i.  467 

ii.  593,  594 

i.  2.58,  361 

i.  504,  577 

i.  540 

iii.  338,  348 

ii.  215 

iii,  118 

ii.  181,  248 

i.  279 

iii.  20,  27 

ii.  701 

ii.  14 

iii.  349 

i.  515 

ii.  401 

i.  642,  0.50 


Wilson  V.  Anderton  ii.  218 

V.  Applelon  iii.  104 

V.  Backhouse  i.  624 

V.  Balfour  iii.  259,  290 
V.  Bai)tist  Educational  Society   i.  482 

V.  Barker  i.  53 

i\  Beddard  iii.  10 

V.  Borstel  ii.  463 

V.  Bowden  i  200 

V.  Breeding  i.  3rfO 
V.  Brett                      i.  92;  ii.  102,  110 

V.  Broom  iii.  225 
V.  Burr                       i.  129,  403;  ii.  59 

V.  Butler  ii.  918' 

V.  Calvert  iii.  79 

V.  City  Bank  iii.  421 

V.  Clements  i.  303 

V.  Codman  ii.  883 

V.  Coffin  i.  126 

V.  Conine  i.  2.35 

V.  Curzon  i.  164 

V.  Day  iii.  441 

V.  Dickson  ii.  454 

V.  Ducket  ii.  523 

V.  Edmonds  i-  77 

V.  Ferguson  i.  618 

V.  Einch  Ilatton  i.  532 
V.  Eoote                             i.  274  ;  ii.  30 

V.  Forbes  iii.  242 

V.  Gen.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  500 

V.  Genessee  Ins.  Co.  ii.  584 

^'.  George  iii-  232 

V.  (Jreenwood  i.  219,  224 
V.  Guy  ton                       ii.  105;  iii.  255 

V.  Hamilton  ii.  181 

V.  Ilardesty  iii.  136,  500 

V.  Hart  i.  66 

V.  Ilatton  i.  633 

V.  Henderson  ii.  860 

V.  llentges  i.  492 
V.  Herkimer  Co.  Ins.  Co.     ii.  553,  560 

V.  Hicks  ii.  423 
V.  Hill                           ii.  476,  563,  574 

V.  Hirst  ii.  766 

i>.  Hodson  i.  147 

V.  Holmes  i.  286 

v.  Hooper  i.  509 

r.  Hudson  i.  147 

V.  King  iii.  224 

V.  Knott  ii.  140 

V.  Lazier  i-  329 
V.  Little         ii.  123,  126;  iii.  220,  221 

V.  Lutwidge  i.  300 

V.  Marsh  i-  683 
V.  Martin                         ii.  489;  iii.  41 

V.  Mary,  The  ii.  465 

V.  Merry  ii.  46,  47 

V.  Milncr  i-  36 

V.  Mnshett  i.  398,  399 

V.  Northern  Pac,  R.  Co.  ii-  240 

V.  Oat  man  iii.  239 

V.  Oiiio,  The  ii-  459 

V.  Paulsen  i.  568 

V.  Poulter  _i-  61 

V.  Powers  !••  29 


ccxviu 

Wilson  r.  Ray 
V.  Kobcrtson 
V.  Uoiisjoau 
r.  Kussell 
r.  Siinpsoa 
V.  Smyth 
r.  Soper 
r.  Spencer 
r.  Stolley 
I".  Sugg 
V.  Swabcy 
V.  Trumbull  Ins.  Co 
V.  Tumnian 
V.  Umtfd  Ins.  Co. 
V.  WatUeigh 
1-.  Wilson 


INDEX   TO   CASES  CITED. 


iii.  477  I 

11.  080 

ii.  310 

iii.  378 

li.  320 

1.401 

1.  201 

iii.  24(i 

ii.  320 

i.  131 

i.  323 

ii.  53'J 

i.  49,  o3 

ii.  501 

ii.  7-10 


i.  120,  013 ;  ii.  920,  928  ; 
iii.  374 
V  Y.  &  M.  Eailroad  Co.  ii-  9'^ 

V.  York,  Newcastle,  &  Berwick 
Railway  Co. 


V.  Youn 
Wilt  v.  Franklin 

V.  Vickcrs 
Wilton  r.  Falmouth 

V.  Ilarwood 

i\  Railroads 
Wiltse  I'.  Barnes 
"Wiltshire  r.  Cottrell 

r.  Sims 
Winans  c  Allemainia  Ins.  Co. 

r.  Denmead 

V.  Huston 
Winberrv  v.  Koonce 


ii.  231  ;  iii-  190 

i.  131  ;  ii.  825 

iii.  381 


iii.  170 

ii.  709 

ii.  939;  iii.  347 

ii.  322 

li.  188 

i.  547 

i.  60,  91 

ii.  543 

ii.  307,  314 

ii.  850 

iii.  39 


ii.  502; 


iii.  143,  405 
i.  254,  255 ;  iii.  424,  435 

ii.  8;!5 
iii.  312,  354 
iii.  402,471 

ii.  413 


Winch  r.  Fenn 
V.  Keeley 
V.  Sanders 
i\  Winchester 
Winchester,  Ex  parte 
V.  Patterson 
V.  Union  Bank 
Windham  r.  Doles 

V.  Windham 
Windham's  case 
Windham  Bank  v.  Norton 
Windle  f.  Andrews 
Windsor,    Dean   and  Chapter   of,  i 

(jovcr 
Winfield  v.  Dodge 
Wing  V.  Angrave 
V.  Chapman 
V.  Clark 
V.  Dunn 
V.  Harvey 
r.  Hurlburt 
V.  Mill 
V.  Schramm 
Wingate  v.  Dail 
V.  Foster 
r.  Smith 
Wingo  r.  McDowell 
Winks  V.  Has^sall 
Winn  V.  Albert 
V.  Bowles 
V.  Bull 
V.  Col.  Ins.  Co. 


Winn  V.  Southgate 

V.  Thomas 
Winne  v.  Reynolds 
Wimicsheik  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schueller 
Winship  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.  i. 

V.  Bass 
V.  Winship 
W'inslow  i>.  Croker 
V.  Dawson 

V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.  i. 

V.  Fatten 
V.  Tarbo.K 

V.  Vermont,  &c.  R.  R- 
Winson  v.  McLellan 
Winsor  v.  Dillaway 

I'.  Griggs 
I  V.  Lombard 

V.  McLellan 
Winsted  Bank  v.  Spencer 
Winston  r.  Ewing 

V.  Westfeldt 
Winstone  v.  Linn 
Winter  v.  Branch  Bank 
V.  Delaware  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Garlick 
V.  Iowa 
V.  Jones 
V.  Kretchman 
r.  Munton 
?;.  Perratt 
V.  Richards 
V.  White 
Wintermute  v.  Clarke 

V.  Redington 
Winterstoke  Hundred's  case 
Winthrop  v.  Carlton 
V.  Union  Ins.  Co. 
Wintle  1-.  Crowther 
Wintringham  r.  Lafoy 
Wirth  V.  Austin 
Wisconsin  Bank  v.  Morley 
Wise  V  G.  W.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Metcalfe 

V.  St.  Louis  Mar.  Ins.  Co 
V.  Wilson 
Wiseman  v.  Chiapella 
f.  Roper 
r.  Vandepnt 
Wiser  v.  Lock  wood 
Wiswall  r.  Brinson 
Wiswould,  Kx  pdiie 
Witbeck  v.  Holland 
Witcher  v.  Brewer 
Wiiherell  r.  Maine  Ins.  Co 
Witherow  v.  Witherow 
Witiiers  r.  Atkinson 
V.  Bircham 
V.  Lyss 
V.  Reynolds 
..-..,         '••  Weaver 
iii!  434    Witherspoon  i;.  Anderson 
iii.  346  V.  Dubose 

i.   251    Withington  v.  Herring 
14  I  Withy  V.  Cottle 


ii.  .39 
iii.  477 
iii.  334 
ii.  587 
205,  206 
ii.  852 
ii.  737 
1.  385 
iii.  126 
i.  546,  012 
ii.  638 
i.  611;  ii.  400 
Co.  ii-  197 

1.612 
ii.  675 
1.68 
1.  GIB,  624,  032 
ii.  395 


1.  140 
1.  240 
i.  531 
i.  18  ;  ii.  637 
i.  309 
1.  325 


1.53 
ii.  905 
ii.  613 
iii.  219 

I.  577 
iii.  128 

II.  599 
i.  703 
i.  501 
i.  405 

iii.  363 

ii.  550 

iii.  213 

279 


607  1  Witt  V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York 


11.  932 
i.  234 
i.  288 
ii.  55 
ii.  26 
li.  533 
ii.  8.34 
iii.  416 
iii.  482 
iii.  426 
li.  828 
ii.  688 
1.233 
li.  828 
li.  150,  165 
11.  311,  315 
i.  19 
ii.  716,  865 
ii.  532,  535,  074 
1.88 
iii.  382 
1.  297 
1.  53 
ii.  261 
i.  536 
ii.  478 
ii.  39,  55 
1.  303 
i.467 
i.  642 
li.  88 
i.  117 
iii.  416 
il.  203 
i.  208 
li.  571 
li.  655 
ii.  802 
i.  15,  25 
i.  563;  111.48,444 
ii.  649,  653 
i.  203 
iii.  242 
i.  383 
1.  41,  59 
iii.  311,319,  3-23 
1.  535 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCXIX 


Witt  V.  Welsh  i.  356 

V.  Derby  Fishing  Co.  i.  157 

Wittersliciin  v.  Lady  Carlisle  iii.  'J7 

Wittkowsky  v.  Wasson  i.  561 

Witty  V.  Matthews  i.  5.']0 

Wodell  V.  Coiigeshall  i.  3i9 

Wodrop  I'.  Ward  i.  238 

Woert  r.  Jenkins  iii.  183 

Woldenberg  v.  Lageman  ii.  840 

Wolcott  V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  ii.  483,  484,  485, 

490,  491 

V.  Heath  ii.  896 

V.  Mount  i.  617,  631  ;  iii.  196, 198,  219 

V.  Van  Santvoord  i.  309 

Wolf  V.  Dozer  iii.  41 

V.  Sti.x  iii.  462 

V.  Summers  iii.  265 

V.  Trochelman  i.  131 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  ii.  28G,  287 

Wolfe  V.  Frost  iii.  37 

V.  Goulard  ii.  353,  372,  378 

V.  Myers  ii.  410 

V.  Whiteman  iii.  97 

Wolfcnberger  v.  Young  iii.  74 

Wolfersberger  v.  Bucher  ii.  877 

Wolff  r.  Koppel  i.  101 

Wolien Webber  v.  Ketterlinus  i.  307 

Wolton  V.  Gavin  ii.  899 

Wolverton  v.  Lacey  ii.  457,  459 

Wonder  v.  Baltimore  ii.  47 

Wood  V.  Adcock  ii.  826 

V.  Akers  ii.  877 

V.  A.  R.  R.  Co.  i.  52 

V.  Ashe  i.  618,  621 

V.  Beard  i.  548 

V.  Bell  ii.  380,  394,  650 

V.  Benson  i.  486;  iii.  19 

V.  Bodwell  ii.  756 

V.  Brown  i.  146 

V.  Corl  i.  313 

V.  Crocker  ii.  210 

V.  Curling  ii.  149 

V.  Davis  iii.  15 

V.  Day  ii.  931 

V.  Dodgson  iii.  463 

V.  Dudley  i.  611 

V.  Earl  ii.  831 

V.  Goodridge  i.  124 

V.  Griffith      ii.  832  ;  iii.  310,  332,  357, 

361,  373 

V.  Grimwood  iii.  135,  136 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii.  542,  544 

V.  Hitchcock  ii.  778 

V.  Hubbell  i.  537 

V.  Jones  i.  645 

V.  Leadbitter  ii.  642 

V.  Lee  ii.  691 

V.  Lincoln  Ins.  Co.      ii.  506,  508,  511 

V.  Mauley  ii.  665 

r.  McCann  ii.  895 

V.  Midi.  South.  R.  R.  ii.  319 

V.  Milwaukee,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  210 

V.  More  wood  iii.  215 

V.  Mytton  i.  277,  278 

V.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  488,  497 


Wood  ;;.  Nimrod 

ii.  458 

V.  O'Kelley 

i.  189 

V.  Partridge 

i.  254,  256 

V.  I^itterson 

iii.  354 

V.  Pennell 

i.  193 

V.  Perry 

i.  254 ;  ii.  686 

V.  Pierson 

iii.  255 

V.  Pugli 

i.  326 

r.  Roach 

i.  645 

V.  Kobbins 

iii.  112 

V.  Savage 

iii.  32 

V.  Smitii 

i.  623 

V.  Steele 

ii.  856,  858 

V.  TunniclifF 

ii.  7 

V.  Watkinson 

ii.  719 

V.  Warren 

i.  290 

V.  Wellington 

i.  158 

V.  Wood 

ii.  91,  672 

;;.  Wylds 

iii.  82,  83 

I'.  Yeatman 

iii.  290 

Wood  and  Foster's  case 

i.  558 

Wood,  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Brooke  i.  579 

Woodard  v.  Herbert  iii.  462 

Woodbridge  v.  Allen  iii.  75,  397 

r.  Wright  ii.  719 

Woodburn  v.  Mosher  iii.  403 

Woodbury  v.  Blair  i.  69 

Woodcock  V.  Bcnnet     i.  522 ;  iii.  358,  359 

r.  Nuth  i.  544 

V.  O.xford  &  Worcester  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  27 

v.  Parker  ii.  304 

Woodend  v.  Paulsbury  .  ii.  712 

Wooden- Ware  Co.  ?'.  United  States  iii.  214 

Wooderman  v.  Baldock  i.  569 

Woodes  V.  Dennett  i.  73 

Woodfin  r.  Hooper  iii.  504 

Woodfolk  V.  Blount  iii.  300 

Woodford  v.  McClenahan  i.  62 

Woodger  v.  Great  Western  R.  R.  Co. 

iii.  209 

Woodham  i\  Hubbard  ii.  904 

Woodhouse  v.  Meredith  i.  93 

;'.  Sbepley  ii.  64,  68 

WoodhuU  V.  Wagner         iii.  394,  395,  397 

Woodin  V.  Burford  i.  41,  62,  79 

V.  Foster  i.  322 

Woodland,  Tlie  ii.  454 

Woodleife  v.  Curties  ii.  169 

Woodlife's  case  ii.  169 

Woodman  v.  Boothby  i.  275. 

V.  Chapman  i.  383 

V.  Eastman  i.  308,  317 

V.  Stimi)son  ii.  304 

V.  Timrston  i.  315 

V.  Woodman  i.  380 

Woodrop  Sims,  Tlie  ii.  428,  429 

Woodruff  V.  Col.  Ins.  Co.  ii.  471 

V.  Dobbins  ii.  818 

V.  Hinman  i.  486 

V.  King  i.  207 

V.  Logan  i.  354  ;  ii.  54 

V.  M'Gehee  i.  66 

V.  Plant  _  i.  296 

V.  Richardson  iii.  187 

V.  Robb  iii.  376 


ccxx 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Woodruff  1-.  Trapnall 

iii.  502 

V.  WoDilrutt' 

ii.  'J2 

Woods  I'.  Anders 

i.  129 

r.  Ayres 

i.  7 

V.  Blodtrett 

i.  130 

f.  Carlisle 

ii.  877 

V.  Dennett 

ii.  890 

V.  Devin 

ii.  192,  276 

V.  Farniaro 

iii.  348 

i".  Masterman 

ii.  588 

i".  Nortli 

i.  279 

V.  Pickett 

ii.  889 

V.  Ridley 

i.  142,  278 

V.  Kussell 

ii.  380,  394,  649 

V.  Wilder 

i.  226 

"Woodstock  Bank  v.  Downer  ii.  31 

Woodward  v.  Barnes  i.  384 

V.  Cowing  i.  492 

V.  Darcy  ii.  852 

V.  Lazar  ii.  359,  3G1 

».  Seeley  ii.  642 ;  iii.  37 

V.  Timelier  i.  636;  iii.  227 

V.  Towne  iii.  434 

Woodwortli  V.  Curtis  ii.  320 

V.  Downer  i.  218 

V.  KogtTs  ii.  314,  325 

V.  Sliernian  ii.  318 

Wooland  ;•.  Crowtlier  iii.  437 

Wooldridge  ;■.  Wilkins  i.  168, 170;  iii.  239 

Wooley  V.  Batte  i.  37 

V.  Clianiberlin  ii.  936 

V.  Clements  i.  322 

Woolf  V.  Beard  ii.  247 

V.  Clagpett  ii.  527,  533 

Woolfe  V.  Home  i.  527 

Woollam  r.  Ilearn  iii.  309,  345,  354 

V.  Ratcliff  ii.  371 

Woolley  V.  Alexander  iii.  132 

Woolsey  v.  Crawford  i.  327 

V.  liogan  iii.  411 

V.  Judd  ii.  330,  336 

Woolston's  Appeal  ii.  77 

Wooster  v.  Sage  ii.  813 

Wooten  V.  Miller  i.  486 

V.  Read  ii.  655 

Wope  r.  Ilemenway  ii.  465 

Worcester  c.  (jreen  ii.  92!) 

Worcester  Bank  v.  Hill  ii.  7 

Worcester  Corn  E.xcli.  Co.  i.  216 

Worcester  M.  I.  t'.  Harding  ii.  942 

Word  V.  Cavin  i.  617 

r.  \'ance  i.  356 

V.  Word  ii.  91 

Wordell  v.  Smith  i.  569 

W<irden  v.  Sharp  iii.  38 

Wordsworth  ?•.  Willan  ii.  250 

Work  r.  Cow  hick  iii.  15 

Works  V.  llershey  ii.  822 

World  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scliultz  ii.  556,592,  594, 

508 

Wormack  v.  Rogers  i.  466 

Wormley  v.  Lowry  i.  292 

Worms  V.  Storey  ii.  423 

Worral  ;;.  Akwortli  ii.  834 

Worrall  v.  GhecD  ii.  850 


Worrall  v.  Harford  iii  301 
V.  .Miinn                i.  52;  iii.  10,  14,  338 

Worrell's  Appeal  i.  137,  150,  151 

Worsley  v.  De  JIattos  iii.  441 

V.  Scarborough  i.  81  ;  iii.  299 
V.  Wood                   i.  491 ;  ii.  473,  586 

Worth  V.  Case  i.  271 

i:  Worth  iii.  352 

Worthington  v.  Charter  Oak  Life  Ins. 

Co.  ii.  601,  615 

V.  Cowles  i.  67 

V.  Curtis  ii.  610 

V.  Grimsditch  iii.  83 

V.  Warrington  iii.  245 

V.  AVigley  ii.  823 

V.  Young  iii.  238 

Worthy  v.  Jones  iii.  43 

V.  Patterson  iii.  227 

Wotton  '•.  Cooke  i.  24 

V.  Shirt  i.  551 

Wray  v.  Milestone  i.  185 

Wren  v.  Kirton  i.  94,  96 

V.  Pearce  iii.  17 

Wrexliam  v.  Huddleston  i.  226 

Wright  V.  Bigg  i.  512 

V.  Brosseau  i.  246 

V.  Burroughes  i.  550 
t'.  Butler                        ii.  752;  iii.  100 

V.  Camjjbell  iii.  444 

V.  Coblcigh  ii.  874 

V.  Crookes  i.  51 

V.  Daily  i.  131 

V.  Dame  iii.  297 

V.  Dannah  iii.  11 

V.  De  Groff  iii.  39 

V.  Deklyne  ii.  867 

V.  Fairfield  iii.  426,  454 

?•.  Gihon  ii.  56 

V.  Goddard  ii.  772 

V.  Hart  i  603 

V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  ii-  586 

V.  Hazen  ii.  929 

V.  Ilerrick  i.  189 

V.  Hooker  i.  204 

V.  Howard  iii.  336,  357 

V.  Howell  i.  636 

V.  Hunter  ii.  387 
V.  Laing                          ii.  763;  iii.  134 

V.  Lawes  i.  647 

V.  Lawton  ii.  756 

V.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  ii.  46 

V.  McAlexander  iii.  116 

V.  Morley  ii.  6 ;  iii.  437 

i".  Morse  i.  285;  ii.  684 

V.  Nutt  ii.  6 

V.  Orient  Ins.  Co.  ii.  629 

V.  Post  i.  21 

V.  Proud  i.  93 

V.  Reed  ii.  753 

V.  Remington  i-  443 

V.  Rider  ii.  803 

V.  Russell  ii.  5,  21 

V.  SliawcroBS  i-  321 

V.  Shiffiier  ii.  521 

V.  Simpson  ii.  6 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


CCXXl 


Wright  V.  Smith 
V.  Smyth 
V.  Steele 
V.  Taliis 
r.  Waliier 
V.  Ward 
V.  Wlieeler 
V.  AVilcox 


ii.  831,  830 

ii.  87'J 

i.  364,  3(55 

ii.  337 

i.  93 

ii.  28 

iii.  130 

i.  114 


V.  Wright       i.  129, 136,  251,  331,  399, 

407,  400  ;  ii.  02,  737,  828 

Wriglitup  V.  Chamberlain  iii.  221' 

Wrigley,  In  re  ii.  710 

Wrutesley  v.  Adams  i.  531 ;  ii.  082 

Wrotli  r.  Johnson  ii.  807 

Wyat  V.  Buhner  i.  293 

r.  Hodson  iii.  87,  90 

Wyatt  V.  Barnard  ii.  342 

Wyburd  !•.  Stanton  i.  Ill 

Wycotr  r.  Longhead  ifi.  153 

Wvckoff  V.  Anthony  ii.  776 

Wyeth  v.  Stone  ii.  306,  308,  311,  314,  324 

Wyke  V.  Rogers  ii.  29 

Wyld  V.  Pickford  ii.  203 

Wylie  V.  Marine  Bank  i.  109 

V.  Smitherman  iii.  183,  187 

Wyllis  r.  Ault  iii.  144 

Wylly  V.  Collins  i.  409 

Wyman  c  Ballard  iii.  244 

V.  Gray  iii.  17 

V.  Goodrich  ii.  11 

V.  Hallowell  &  Augusta  Bank       i.  42 

V.  People's  Ins.  Co.  ii.  5-55,  588 

V.  Smith  iii.  28,  30 

V.  Winslow  ii.  780 

Wvndham,  Ex  parte  iii.  410 

V.  Wav  i.  540 

Wynn  v.  Alden  i.  322 

V.  Allard  ii.  247,  248 

i\  Cox  ii.  G79 

Wynne  v.  Jackson  ii.  700 

V.  Price  1.  522;  iii.  325 

r.  Raikes  i.  304 

Wyoming  Co.  v.  Price  i.  540 


X. 


Xenos  V.  Wickham 


ii.  471 


Y. 


Yager  v.  Merkle  i.  405 

Yalden,  Ex  parte  i.  129 

Yale,  Ex  parte  i.  125 

V.  Dederer  i.  403,  408 

V.  Edgerton  iii.  25 

Yallop  V.  Ebers  iii.  402 

Yancey  v.  Brown  ii.  31 

Yandes  v.  Lefavour  ii.  740 

Yarborough  v.  Bank  of  England       i.  154 

Yard  v.  Eland  i.  480 

Yaniell  v.  Anderson  i.  192 

Yate  V.  Roules  i.  22 

V.  Willan  ii.  772 


Yates  V.  Boen 

i.  434 

V.  Bond 

i.  615 

V.  Brown                   i. 

117;  ii. 

468,  419 

i;.  Carnsew 

iii.  426 

V.  DufE 

ii.  408 

V.  Donaldson 

i.  32 

V.  Foot 

ii.  897 

V.  Freckleton 

ii.  746 

V.  Hoppe 

i.  74 

V.  Nash 

i.  282 

V.  Pym 

i.  624;  ii.  677 

V.  Sherrington 

iii. 

439,  469 

V.  Van  Rensselaer 

ii.  874 

Yea  i\  Fouraker 

iii.  OS 

Yeager  v.  Farwell 

i.  307 

V.  Wallace 

i.  202 

Yealey  v.  Fink 

i.  98 

Yeamans  v.  Yeamans 

ii.  825 

Yeatman  ;;.  Savings  Inst. 

iii.  421 

V.  Woods 

i.  109 

Yeaton  v.  Berney 

i.  309 

Yokom  V.  McBride 

iii.  240 

Yong  V.  ReynoU 

ii.  G 

Yonkers,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hoffman,  &c. 

Ins.  Co.  ii.  494 

Yopst  V.  Yopst  i.  384 

York  V.  Grindstone  ii.  164,  105 

V.  Landis  ii.  6 

York  Buildings  v.  Mackenzie  i.  95 

York  Co.  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  ii.  233 

Yorke  i'.  Grenaugh      ii.  164,  165 ;  iii.  268 
Yorks  V.  Peck  i.  ll*  29,  30 

Yorkshire  Banking  Co.  v.  Beatson    i.  204 
Yorton  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.  ii.  246 

Yost  I'.  American  Ins.  Co.  ii.  614 

Youde  V.  Jones  ii.  645 

Young,  Ex  parte    u.  387,  390,  391 ;  iii.  449, 

463,  464 
V.  Adams  i.  300;  ii.  753 

V.  Axtell  i.  190 

V.  Bank  of  Bengal  iii.  439,  409 

V.  Berkley  iii.  127 

V.  Black  ii.  868 

V.  Bradley  i.  557 

V.  Bryan  i.  325 

V.  Conant  Mfg.  Co.  ii.  650 

V.  Covell  ii.  917 

V.  Dearborn  iii.  286 

V.  Duhme  i.  146 

V.  Durgin  i.  320 

V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  ii.  476,  570 

V.  French  iii.  27 

V.  Frier  i.  239 

I'.  Frost  iii.  371 

V.  Hall  ii.  915,  916 

I'.  Harris  1.  314 ;  ii.  700 

V.  Hockley  iii.  464 

V.  Hunter  i-  194 

V.  Keighley  i-  284 

V.  Mackall  iii.  102 

V.  MacRae  ii-  353 

V.  Matthews  i-  566 

V.  McClure  i-  569 

V.  Miller  iii-  1 10 

V.  Paul  iii.  370 


CCXXll 


INDEX   TO    CASES   CITED. 


Young  !••  Ivathbone 

V.  Reuben 

J'.  Scott 

c.  Smith  ii. 

V.  Stevens 

V.  Taylor 

V.  Timmins 

r.  Turner 

V.  Virginia,  The 

r.  Ward 

I'.  Wasliinston  Co.  Ins.  Co.  ii 

V.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co. 

V.  Wood 

r.  Writrht 
Young,  &c.  (^o.  V.  Wakefield 
Young  IMechanic,  The  ii. 

Young  Sam,  The 
Youngblood  v.  Loury 
Younger  f.  Givens 
Youngs  V.  Lee 
Youqua  r.  Ni.xon 
Yoxtheimer  r.  Keyser 
Yulee  V.  Canora 
Yundt  V.  Hartrunft 


z. 

Zacharias  v.  Zacharias 
Zacharie  v.  Orleans  Ins.  Co. 


2!)1, 


iii.  334 

ii.  82!) 

iii.  13G 

197,  220 

i.  43G 

iii.  463 

ii.  890 

iii.  170 

ii.  392 

i.  272 

,  550, 551 

ii.  285 

iii.  205 

iii.  127 

ii.  814 

381,  401 

ii.  .383 

i.  553 

221,  222 

202,  322 

490,  574 

i.  463 

i.  99 

m.  178 


75 


Zachrison  r.  Ahman 

1.109 

Zachrisson  v.  I'oppe 

1.586 

Zagury  v.  FurnoU 

i.  566 

Zaleski  v.  Clark 

i.  564;  ii.  63 

Zane  v.  Brig  President, 

The        ii.  381, 

384 

V.  Zane 

4G8,  471 

Zarega,  In  re 

iii.  404 

Zell  !'.  German  Sav.  Inst. 

iii.  281 

Zeigler  v.  Day 

ii.  47 

Zenobia,  The 

ii.  454 

Zent  V.  Heart 

iii.  88 

Zephyr,  The 

ii.  402,  403,  442 

Zephyrus,  The 

ii.  440 

Zerbee  i\  Miller 

ii.  52 

Zerega  v.  Poppe 

ii.  410 

Ziegenfuss,  Ex  parte 

iii.  400,  401 

Ziegler  r.  Bank 

ii.  113 

Zimmerman  v.  Rote 

ii.  862 

V.  Zimmerman 

ii.  941 

Zimmcrmann  v  Marchland                 i.  541 

Zimpleman  i\  Veeder 

ii.  128 

Zinck  V.  Walker 

i.  571 

Zinn  V.  Rowley 

ii.  787 

Zipcey  i'.  Thompson 

ii.  699 

Zodiac,  The 

ii.  453 

Zollar  V.  Janvrin 

i.  191 

Zoueh  V.  Parsons 

i.  334 

Z\ichtmann  v.  Roberts 

i.  578 

Zwinger  v.  Samuda 

i.  330 

PART    I. 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS 


CONSIDERED  IN   REFERENCE   TO 


THE     OBLIGATIONS 


ASSUMED   BY 


THE     PARTIES. 


THE   LAW    OF    CONTHACTS. 


PRELIMINARY  CHAPTER. 
SECTION  I. 

OP  THE   EXTENT   AND   SCOPE   OF  THE  LAW  OF   CONTEACTS. 

The  Law  of  Contracts,  in  its  widest  extent,  may  be  regarded 
as  including  nearly  all  the  law  which  regulates  the  relations  of 
human  life.  Indeed,  it  may  be  looked  upon  as  the  basis  of 
human  society.  All  social  life  presumes  it,  and  rests  upon  it ; 
for  out  of  contracts,  express  or  implied,  declared  or  understood, 
grow  all  rights,  all  duties,  all  obligations,  and  all  law.  Almost 
the  whole  procedure  of  human  life  implies,  or,  rather,  is,  the  con- 
tinual fulfilment  of  contracts. 

Even  those  duties,  or  those  acts  of  kindness  and  affection, 
which  may  seem  most  remote  from  contract  or  compulsion  of  any 
kind,  are  nevertheless  within  the  scope  of  the  obligation  of  con- 
tracts. The  parental  love  which  provides  for  the  infant  when,  in 
the  beginning  of  its  life,  it  can  do  nothing  for  itself,  nor  care  for 
itself,  would  seem  to  be  so  pure  an  offering  of  affection,  that  the 
idea  of  a  contract  could  in  no  way  belong  to  it.  But  even  here, 
although  these  duties  are  generally  discharged  from  a  feeling 
which  borrows  no  strength  from  a  sense  of  obligation,  there  is 
still  such  an  obligation.  It  is  implied  by  the  cares  of  the  past, 
which  have  perpetuated  society  from  generation  to  generation  ; 
by  that  absolute  necessity  which  makes  *  the  performance  of  *  4 
these  duties  the  condition  of  the  preservation  of  human  life  ; 
and  by  the  implied  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  unconscious 
objects  of  this  care,  that  when,  by  its  means,  they  shall  have  grown 
into  strength,  and  age  has  brought  weakness  upon  those  to  whom 
they  are  thus  indebted,  they  will  acknowledge  and  repay  the  debt. 

3 


*  5  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 

Indeed,  the  law  recognizes  and  enforces  this  obligation,  to  a 
certain  degree,  on  both  sides,  as  will  be  shown  hereafter. 

It  would  be  easy  to  go  further,  and  show  that  in  all  the  rela- 
tions of  social  life,  its  good  order  and  prosperity  depend  upon  the 
due  fulfilment  of  the  contracts  which  bind  all  to  all.  Sometimes 
these  contracts  are  deliberately  expressed  with  all  the  precision  of 
law,  and  are  armed  with  all  its  sanctions.  More  frequently  they 
are,  though  still  expressed,  simpler  in  form  and  more  general  in 
language,  and  leave  more  to  the  intelligence,  the  justice,  and  hon- 
esty of  the  parties.  Far  more  frequently  they  are  not  expressed 
at  all ;  and  for  their  definition  and  extent  we  must  look  to  the  com- 
mon principles  which  all  are  supposed  to  understand  and  acknowl- 
edge. In  this  sense,  contract  is  co-ordinate  and  commensurate  with 
duty ;  and  it  is  a  familiar  principle  of  the  law,  of  which  we  shall 
have  much  to  say  hereafter,  and  which  has  a  wide,  though  far 
from  a  universal  application,  that  whatsoever  it  is  certain  that  a 
man  ought  to  do,  that  the  law  supposes  him  to  have  promised  to 
do.  "  Implied  contracts,"  says  Blackstone  (vol.  ii.  p.  443),  "  are 
such  as  reason  and  justice  dictate,  and  which,  therefore,  the  law 
presumes  that  every  man  undertakes  to  perform."  These  con- 
tracts form  the  warp  and  woof  of  actual  life.  If  they  were  wholly 
disregarded,  the  movement  of  society  would  be  arrested.  And 
in  so  far  as  they  are  disregarded,  that  movement  is  impeded  or 
disordered. 

If  all  contracts,  express  or  implied,  were  carried  into  full  effect, 
the  law  would  have  no  office  but  that  of  instructor  or  adviser.  It 
is  because  they  are  not  all  carried  into  effect,  and  it  is  tliat  they 
may  be  carried  into  effect,  that  the  law  exercises  a  compulsory 
power. 

Hence  is  the  necessity  of  law ;  and  the  well-being  of  society 
depends  upon,  and  may  be  measured  by,  the  degree  in  which 

*  5    *  the  law  construes  and  interprets  all  contracts  wisely  ;  elimi- 

nates from  them  whatever  is  of  fraud  or  error,  or  otherwise 
wrongful ;  and  carries  them  out  into  their  full  and  i>roi)er  effect 
and  execution.  'JMicso,  then,  are  the  results  whicli  the  law  seeks. 
And  it  seeks  these  results  by  means  oi  jjrincijyles ;  that  is,  by 
means  of  truths,  ascertained,  defined,  and  so  ex])ressed  as  to  be 
practical  and  operative.  There  are  many  of  tlic  rules  of  law 
which  do  not  come  within  this  definition  of  principles.  They 
are  formal  or  technical ;  but  they  arc  in  force  because  they  are 
4 


PRELIMINARY   CHAPTER.  *  0 

believed  to  be  subsidiary  to,  and  needed  or  useful  for  the  compre- 
hension, application,  and  enforcement  of  principles  ;  and  these  for- 
mal rules  derive  their  whole  power  and  value  from  the  principles 
which  they  explain  or  enforce  and  carry  into  effect. 

It  is  said  that  the  law  seeks  these  results  by  means  of  princi- 
ples ;  and  these  again,  in  their  most  general  form,  may  be  said  to 
be,  first,  those  rules  of  construction  and  interpretation  which  have 
for  their  object  to  find  in  a  contract  a  meaning  which  is  honest, 
sensible,  and  just,  without  doing  violence  to  the  expressions  of  the 
parties,  or  making  a  new  contract  for  them ;  and,  secondly,  those 
which  discharge  from  a  contract  whatever  would  bring  upon  it  the 
fatal  taint  of  fraud,  or  is  founded  upon  error  or  accident,  or  would 
work  an  injury.  And  if  these  elements  of  wrong  are  so  far  vital 
to  any  contract,  that  when  they  are  removed  it  perishes,  then  the 
law  annuls  or  refuses  to  enforce  that  contract,  unless  a  still  greater 
mischief  would  thereby  be  done. 

Subsidiary  to  these  are  the  rules  and  processes  of  the  law,  by 
means  whereof  a  contract,  which  in  itself  is  good,  and  has  been 
properly  construed,  and  is  free  from  all  removable  elements  of 
wrong,  is  enforced,  or  carried  into  execution. 


♦SECTION  II.  *6 

DEFINITION    OF   CONTRACTS. 

A  contract,  in  legal  contemplation,  is  an  agreement  between 
two  or  more  parties,  for  the  doing  or  the  not  doing  of  some  par- 
ticular thing,  (a) 


(a)  "A  contract  is   an  agreement  in  cration  and  the   promise,   and  the  sale, 

■which  a  party  undertakes  to  do,  or  not  ought  to  meet  togetlier,  for  a  contract  is 

to  do,  a  particular  thing."  Marshall,  C  J.,  derived  from  con  and  tralicre,  which  is  a 

Sturges  V.  Crowninshield,  4  Wheat.  197.  drawing  together,  so  as  in  contracts  every 

—  "A   contract  is   an  agreement,   upon  thing  which  is  requisite  ougiit  to  concur 

sufficient  consideration,  to  do  or  not  to  do  and  meet  together  ;  namely,  the  consid- 

a  particular  thing."     2  61.  Com.  440. —  cration,  of  the  one  side,  and  the  sale  or 

In  Sidonham  and  Worlington's  case,  2  the  promise  on  the  other  side.     But  to 

Leon.  224,  225,  which  was  an  assumj)sit,  maintain  an  action  upon  an  assumpsit,  the 

founded  upon  an  executed  consideration,  same  is  not  requisite,  for  it  is  sufficient  if 

Pcriam,  J.,  conceived  that  the  action  did  there  he  a  moving  cause,  or  considera- 

well  lie,  and  he  said  there  was  a  great  tion  precedent,  for  which  cause  or  consid- 

differcnce between  con^rarfs  and  that  case:  eration  the  promise  was  made." 
"For  in  contracts  upon  sale,  the  consid- 


*  7  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 

It  has  been  said  tliat  the  word  agreement  is  derived  from  the 
phrase  "  aggregatio  mentium.''  (6)  This  is  at  least  doubtful,  and 
was  probably  suggested  by  the  wish  to  illustrate  that  principle  of 
the  law  of  contracts  which  makes  an  agreement  of  the  minds  of 
the  parties  or  the  consent  and  harmony  of  their  intentions,  essen- 
tial. We  shall  presently  sec  that  they  must  propose  and  mean 
the  same  thing,  and  in  the  same  sense. 

The  word  "  contract "  is  of  comparatively  recent  use,  as  a  law 
term.  Formerly,  courts  and  lawyers  spoke  only  of  "  obliga- 
tions," ((?)  —  meaning  thereby  "  bonds,"  in  which  the  word 
"  oblige "  is  commonly  used  as  one  of  the  technical  and  formal 
terms,  —  "  covenants,"  and  "  agreements,"  which  last  word  was 
used  as  we  now  use  the  word  "  contract."  The  word  "  promise  " 
is  often  used  in  instruments,  and  sometimes  in  legal  proceedings. 
"  Agreement "  is  seldom  applied  to  specialties  ;  "  contract "  is 
generally  confined   to  simple  contracts ;  and  "  promise  "  re- 

*  7    fers  to  the  engagement  of  a  party  *  without  reference  to  the 

reasons  or  considerations  for  it,  or  the  duties  of  other  parties. 
In  the  above  definition  of  a  contract,  no  mention  is  made  of  the 
consideration.  The  Statute  of  Frauds  requires,  in  many  cases, 
and  for  many  purposes,  that  the  "  agreement "  shall  be  in  writing, 
and  some  note  or  memorandum  thereof  be  signed  by  the  party 
sought  to  be  charged.  Under  this  provision,  it  has  been  much 
controverted  whether  the  word  "agreement"  so  far  implies  a 
"  consideration,"  that  this  also  must  be  in  writing.  This  question 
will  be  considered  in  a  subsequent  part  of  this  work,  (c?)  We 
have  not  included  the  consideration  in  the  definition  of  the 
contract,  because  we  do  not  regard  it  as,  of  itself,  an  essential 
part  thereof.  But  for  practical  purposes  it  is  made  so  by  some 
important  and  very  influential  rules,  and  we  shall  treat  of  the 
consideration  as  one  of  the  elements  of  a  legal  contract. 

(b)  Per  Pollard,  sorjcant,  arguendo  in  v.  Warlters,  5  East,  IG;  Saunders  v. 
Reniger  r.  FoRossa,  Plowd.  17.  Wakefield,  4  B.  &  Aid.  505;   Violett  v. 

(c)  See  the  Abridgments  of  Brooke,  Patton,  5  Cranch,  142;  Packard  v.  Ricli- 
Rolle,  Bacon,  &c.  ardson,  17  Mass.  122:  Sage  v.  Wilcox.  6 

(d)  Vol.  III.  *  14-*  16.    And  see  Wain  Conn.  81. 

6 


PEELIMINARY   CHAPTER.  *8 

SECTION  III. 

CLASSIFICATION   OP  CONTRACTS. 

The  most  general  division  of  contracts  is  into  contracts  by  spe- 
cialty, and  simple  contracts.^ 

Contracts  by  specialty  are  those  which  are  reduced  to  writing 
and  attested  by  a  seal  —  or,  to  use  the  common  phrase,  contracts 
under  seal ;  and  contracts  of  record.  These  last  are  judgments, 
recognizances,  and  statutes  staple.  But  the  term  "  contracts  by 
specialty  "  is  sometimes  confined  to  contracts  under  seal. 

Simple  contracts  are  all  those  which  are  not  contracts  by  spe- 
cialty. It  is  not  accurate  in  point  of  language  to  distinguish  be- 
tween verbal  contracts  and  written  contracts ;  for  whether  the 
words  are  written  or  spoken,  the  contracts  are  equally  verbal,  or 
expressed  in  words.  Nor  is  it  accurate  in  point  of  law  to 
*  distinguish  between  written  and  parol  contracts,  (g)  For  *  8 
whether  they  be  written  or  only  spoken,  they  are,  in  law,  if 
not  sealed,  equally  and  only  parol  contracts.  For  some  pur- 
poses, and  especially  by  the  requirements  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds, 
the  evidence  of  the  contract  must  be  in  writing  ;  and  when  it  is 
in  writing,  some  peculiar  rules  of  law  apply  to  it.  (/)  But  it  is 
a  mistake  to  rest  upon  this  a  legal  distinction  between  written 
and  oral  contracts ;  and  from  this  mistake  some  confusion  has 
arisen.  (^) 

(e)  "  The  law   makes   no  distinction  clared    to   exist  by   a  higher   sort.    In 

in  contracts,  except   between    contracts  this   sense  it  is  unquestionably  true,   as 

which  are,  and  contracts  whicli  are  not.  Lord  Ellenboroiujh   said  in  Hoarc  v.  Gra- 

under  seal.     I  recollect  one  of  the  most  ham,   3   Camp.   57,  that   to  incorporate 

learned  judges  who  ever  sat  upon  this  with  a  written  contract  an  incongruous 

or   any  other  bench,  being  very    angry  parol  condition,  is  contrary  to  first  prin- 

when  a  distinction  was  attempted  to  be  ciples. 

taken    between   parol   and   written   con-  (g)  Wilmot,  J.,  Pillans  r.  Van  Mierop, 

tracts,   and  sajing,  '  They  are  all  parol,  3  Burr.    1670-1,  and  Parker,  J.,    Stack- 

unless   under   seal.'"     Lord   Ahinger,  C.  pole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  27,  30,  recog- 

B.,   in  Beckham   v.   Drake,  9  M.  &  W.  nize  three  classes   of  contracts,  but  are 

92.  not   sustained  by   the   authorities.      See 

(/)  And  independently  of  the  statute,  Kann     v.     Hughes,    7    T.    E.    350,    n. ; 

a    familiar    rule    of    judicial  procedure  Thacher  v.  Dinsmore,  5  Mass.  299,  301 ; 

forbids   the    contradiction,   by   one   sort  Cook    v.    Bradley,    7   Conn.    57 ;    Union 

of    evidence,  of    a   state   of  things   de-  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  1  Caines,  38G. 

1  As  to  express,  implied,  and  constructive  contracts,  see  "Woods  v.  Ayres,  39 
Mich.  345. 

7 


*  8  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 

The  essentials  of  a  legal  contract,  of  which  wc  shall  now  pro- 
ceed to  treat,  arc,  first,  the  Parties,  for  we  cannot  conceive  of  a 
contract  which  has  no  parties ;  secondly,  the  Consideration,  for 
this  is,  in  legal  contemplation,  the  canse  of  the  contract ;  thirdly, 
the  Assent  of  the  Parties,  without  which  there  is  in  law  no  con- 
tract ;  and,  fourthly,  the  Subject-Matter  of  the  Contract,  or  what 
the  parties  to  it  propose  as  its  effect. 


*BOOK    I. 
OF  PARTIES   TO  A  CONTRACT. 


CHAPTER   I. 

CLASSIFICATION   OF   PARTIES. 

Parties  may  act  independently  and   severally,  or  jointly,  or 
jointly  and  severally. 

They  may  act  as  representative  of  others,  as 

Agents, 

Factors  or  Brokers, 

Servants, 

Attorneys, 

Trustees, 

Executors  or  Administrators, 

Guardians. 
They  may  act  in  a  collective  capacity,  as 

Corporations, 

Joint-Stock  Companies, 

Partnerships. 
They  may  be  Ncav  Parties, 

By  Novation, 

By  Assignment, 

By  Indorsement. 
They  may  be  Parties  disabled  in  whole  or  in  part,  as 

Infants, 

Married  Women, 
*  Non  Compotes  Mentis,  *  10 

Drunkards, 

Spendthrifts, 

Seamen, 

9 


10  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

Persons  under  Duress, 
Aliens, 
Outlaws, 
Attainted, 
Excommunicated. 
These  subjects  we  will  proceed  to  consider  separately. 
10 


CH.  II.]  OP  JOINT  PARTIES.  *  11 


*  CHAPTER   11.  *11 

OF   JOINT   PARTIES. 

Sect.  I. —  Whether  Parties  are  Joint  or  Several. 

Wherever  an  obligation  is  undertaken  by  two  or  more,  or  a 
right  given  to  two  or  more,  it  is  the  general  presumption  of  law 
that  it  is  a  joint  obligation  or  right.^  Words  of  express  joinder 
are  not  necessary  for  this  purpose ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  there 
should  be  words  of  severance,  in  order  to  produce  a  several  respon- 
sibility or  a  several  right,  (a) 

Whether  the  liability  incurred  is  joint,  or  several,  or  such  that 
it  is  either  joint  or  several  at  the  election  of  the  other  contracting 
party,  depends  (the  rule  above  stated  being  kept  in  view)  upon  the 
terms  of  the  contract,  if  they  are  express ;  and  where  they  are 
not  express,  upon  the  intention  of  the  parties  as  gathered  from 


(a)  Hill  V.  Tucker,  1  Taunt.  7;  Hat-  But,  in  Slater  v.  Ma^raw,  12  G.  &  J. 
sail  V.  Griffith,  4  Tyr.  487 ;  King  v.  265,  where  (on  the  sale  of  a  negro)  the 
Hoare,  13  M.  &  W.  499,  per  Parke,  B. ;  form  of  Ihe  covenant  was,  "  I  do  here- 
English  V.  Blundell,  8  C.  &  P.  332;  by  obligate  to  give  the  said  William 
Yorks  V.  Peck,  14  Barb.  644.  —  With  re-  Slater  a  good  title  for  said  boy  when 
spect  to  instruments  under  seal,  it  is  said  called  on.  W.  M.  F.  Magraw  (seal), 
in  Shep.  Touch.  375:  "If  two,  three,  or  Security:  George  H.  Button  (seal)," 
more  bind  tliemsclves  in  an  obligation,  —  a  demurrer  to  a  count  declaring  on 
thus,  ohlif/nmus  nos,  and  say  no  more,  the  this  as  a  joint  and  several  covenant, 
obligation  is,  and  shall  be  taken  to  be,  joint  was  sustained,  and  the  court  held  that 
only,  and  not  several."  And  see  Ehle  v.  the  covenant  to  convey  the  title  was 
Purely,  6  Wend.  629.  —  If  an  instrument,  the  covenant  of  Magraw  alone  ;  that  the 
worded  in  the  singular,  is  executed  by  covenant  of  Dutton  was  a  several  cov- 
several,  the  obligation  is  a  joint  and  enant  as  surety  that  Magraw  would 
several  one;  and  those  who  thus  execute  make  the  title  when  called  on  for  that 
it  may  be  sued  either  separately  or  to-  purpose ;  and  that  therefore  an  action 
gether.  Hemmenway  v.  Stone,  7  Mass.  on  the  covenant  to  convey  could  nsD^t  be 
58 ;  Van  Alstyne  v.  Van  Slyck,  10  Barb,  maintained  against  them  jointly.  See, 
383;  Powe//,  J.,  Sayer  r.  Chaytor,  1  Lutw.  also,  l)e  Bidder  v.  Schermerhooi,  10 
695,  697;  Marsh  v.  Ward,  Peake,  Cas.  Barb.  638;  Allen  v.  Fosgate,  11  How. 
130;  Clerk  v.  Blackstock,  Holt,  474;  Pr.  218. 
and  see   Hall  v.  Smith,  1  B.  &  C.  407. 

1  Thus,  a  promissory  note  in  the  form  :  "  I  promise,"  &c.,  signed  by  several  per- 
sons, is  joint  as  well  as  several.  Wallace  v.  Jewell,  21  0.  St.  163.  See  also  Crosby 
V.  Jeroloman,  37  Ind.  264,  274,  citing  the  text  with  approval. 

11 


12 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  12    all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  (i)  ^    It  may  *  be  doubted, 
however,  whether  any  thing  less  than   express  words  can 
raise  a  liability  which  shall   be   at   once   a  joint  and   a  several 
liability. 

Where  the  obligation  is  joint  and  several,  an  ancient  and  famil- 
iar rule  of  law  forbids  it  to  be  treated  as  several  as  to  some  of  the 
obligors,  and  joint  as  to  the  rest.  The  obligee  has  the  right  of 
choice  between  the  two  methods  of  proceeding ;  but  he  must  re- 
sort to  one  or  the  other  exclusively,  and  cannot  combine  both ; 
that  is,  he  must  proceed  either  severally  against  each,  or  jointly 
against  all.  (c)  ^ 


(6)  Wilde,  J.,  in  Peckham  v.  North 
Parisli  in  Haverhill,  16  Pifk.  274,  283. 
In  the  following  cases  the  liability  was 
held  to  ho  Joint :  Wijjmore  and  Wells' 
case,  3  Leon.  200;  Wightman  v.  Cliart- 
man,  Gould,  83 ;  Anonymous,  Moore, 
260;  Coleman  v.  Sherwin,  1  Salk.  137, 
1  Show.  I'j  ;  Bvers  v.  Dobey,  1  H.  Bl. 
2.36;  Exall  v.  Partridge,  8  T.  R.  308; 
Wathen  v.  Sandys,  2  Camp.  640;  For- 
ster  V.  Taylor,  3  "id.  49;  Eadon  v.  Titch- 
niarsh,  1  A.  &  E.  001  ;  London  Gas 
Light  Co.  V.  Kicholls,  2  C.  &  P.  365; 
Phillips  V.  Bonsall,  2  Binn.  138.  In  the 
following  cases  the  liability  was  held  to 
be  several:  39  H.  6,  9,  pi.  15;  Bro. 
Abr.  Covenant,  pi.  27  ;  s.  c.  Viner  Abr. 
Covenant  (M.  a),  pi.  1,  2  ;  s.  c.  Mathew- 
Bon's  case,  5  Rep.  22;  Brown  v  Doyle, 
3  Camp.  51,  n. ;  Gibson  v.  Lupton,  9 
Bing.  .303;  Collins  v.  Prosser,  1  B.  &  C. 
682  ;  Hudson  v.  Robinson,  4  M.  &  Sel. 
475;  Smith  r.  Pocklington,  I  Cr.  &  J. 
445;  Fell  v.  Goslin,  7  Exc;h.  185;  Harris 
V.  Campbell,  4  Dana,  586;  M'Cready  v. 
Freedly,  3  Rawle,  251 ;  Ernst  v.  Bartle, 
1  Johns.  Cas.  319 ;  Ludlow  v.  McCrea, 
1  Wend.  228;  Howe-  v.  Handley,  25  Me. 
116.  In  the  following  cases  the  liability 
was  held  to  ho  joint  (ind  severed :  Constable 
V.  Clol)ery,  Pop.  161  ;  Burden  v.  Ferrers, 
1  Sid.  189;  Hankinson  v.  Sandilaus,  Cro. 
J.  322  ;  Linn  v.  Crossing,  2  Roll.  Abr. 
148,  Obligation  (G) ;  Lilly  v.  Hodges, 
1  Stra.  553,  8  Mod.  166;  Robinson  v. 
Walker,  1  Salk.  39.3,  7  Mod.  153.  The 
words  there  were,  ennvpniunt  pro  xe  et  quo- 
liliet  eorum.  But  Holt,  (J.  J.,  dissenting 
from  the  majority,  thought  this  miglit  be 
considered  joint   by  reason  of  the  word 


of  agreement  (conveniunt)  being  in  the 
plural,  and  not  being  repeated  in  the 
singular,  so  as  to  express  a  distinct  sev- 
eral promise.  Bolton  v.  Lee,  2  Lev.  56 ; 
Sewer  v.  Bradfield,  Cro.  E.  422  ;  May  v. 
Woodward,  Freem.  248 ;  Enys  v.  Don- 
nithorne,  2  Burr.  1190  ;  Mansell  i-.  Bur- 
redge,  7  T.  R.  352;  Bangor  Bank  v. 
Treat,  6  Greenl.  207. 

(c)  Streatfield  v.  Halhdav,  3  T.  R. 
782 ;  Cabell  v.  Vaughan,  1  Wms.  Saund. 
291,  f,  n.  4;  Bangor  Bank  v.  Treat,  6 
Greenl.  207.  In  the  case  of  a  joint  and 
several  debt,  judgment  (without  satisfac- 
tion) recovered  against  one  of  the  debt- 
ors, is  no  bar  to  an  action  against 
another.  Per  Popham,  C.  .1.,  Brown  v. 
Wootton,  Cro.  J.  74,  cited  by  Parle,  B., 
m  King  V.  Hoare,  13  M.  &  W.  504.— 
But  a  judgment,  though  unsatisfied,  re- 
covered agn,inst  one  of  two  joint  debtors, 
is  a  bar  to  an  action  against  the  other, 
or  to  an  action  against  both.  3  Kent's 
Com.  30;  Ward  v.  Johnson,  13  Mass. 
148  ;  King  v.  Hoare,  13  M.  &  W.  494.  — 
In  Robertson  v.  Smith,  18  Jolms.  484, 
which  was  the  case  of  a  solvent  dormant 
partner,  discovered  after  judgment  ob- 
tained against  the  insolvent  ostensil)le 
partner,  Speiirer,  J.,  while  holding  the 
plaintiff's  action  to  be  barred,  suggested 
that  the  court,  on  application,  might  be 
induced  to  vacate  the  former  judgment.  — 
But  Collins  V.  Lemasters,  1  Bail.  345; 
Treasurers  v.  Bates,  2  Bail.  362,  and 
Sheehy  v.  Mandeville,  (!  Cranch,  253,  are 
contra.  In  King  v.  Hoare,  13  M.  &  W. 
494,  Sheehy  v.  Mandeville  was  cited,  but 
Parke,  B.,  giving  the  judgment  of  the 
court,  observed :   "  During  the  argument. 


'  Where  the  principal  obligor  is  bound  in  a  certain  sum,  and  A,  B,  and  C,  "  each 
as  surety  respectively  "  in  a  third  of  that  sum,  the  liability  of  each  surety  isseveraL 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Gorham,  11  R.  I.  162. 

^  Kendall  i'.  Hamilton,  4  App.  Cas.  504,  follows  and  approves.  King  v.  Hoare, 
supra. 

12 


CH.  II.] 


OF   JOINT   PARTIES. 


13 


*  The  question  whether  the  right  under  a  contract  is  johit    *  13 
or  otherwise,  enters  more  intimately  into  the  nature  of  the 
contract,  and  therefore  is  of  more  importance ;    and  it  is  at  the 
same  time  of  greater  difficulty. 

As  a  contract  with  several  persons,  for  the  payment  to  them  of 
a  sum  of  money,  is  a  joint  contract  with  all,  and  all  the  payees 
have  therein  a  joint  interest,  so  that  no  one  can  sue  alone  for  his 
proportion  ;  so,  the  designating  of  the  share  of  each  will  not  create 
such  a  severance  of  interest  as  to  sustain  a  several  action ;  but  all 
must  join  in  an  action  for  the  whole,  (^d)  But  if  the  contract 
contains  distinct  grants,  or  promises  of  distinct  sums  to  distinct 
payees,  they  would  then  have  several  interests,  and  certainly 
may,  perhaps  must,  bring  separate  actions,  (e) 

Where  there  are  three  or  more  obligees  or  promisees,  the  con- 
tract, if  treated  as  joint  by  any,  must  be  treated  as  joint  by  all. 
In  no  case  can  two  sue  together,  leaving  the  other  to  seek  his 
remedy  upon  the  same  contract,  by  himself.  (/) 


a  decision  of  the  Chief  Justice  Marshall, 
in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  was  cited  as  being  contrary  to  the 
conclusion  tins  court  has  come  to  ;  the 
case  is  that  of  Shceliy  v.  Mandeville.  We 
need  not  say  we  have  the  greatest  re- 
spect for  every  decision  of  that  eminent 
judge  ;  but  tlie  reasoning  attributed  to 
him  by  tliat  report  is  not  satisfactory  to 
us ;  and  we  have  since  been  furnished 
witli  a  report  of  a  subsequent  case,  in 
wliich  that  authoritj-  was  cited  and  con- 
sidered, and  in  wliicli  tlie  Supreme  Ju- 
dicial Court  of  Massachusetts  decided 
that,  in  an  action  against  two  on  a  joint 
note,  a  judgment  against  one  was  a  bar. 
Ward  V.  Johnson,  13  Tyng,  148."  — 
Where  one  contracts  in  writing  witli 
three  persons  to  give  a  bill  of  sale  of 
two-thirds  of  a  vessel  to  two  of  them,  and 
of  one-third  to  the  other,  and,  in  pursu- 
ance of  the  contract,  does  convey  two- 
thirds  ;  this  is  not  a  severance  of  the 
cause  of  action,  and  a  suit  may  be 
maintained  for  the  price  against  the 
whole.     Marshall  v.  Smith,  15  Me.  17. 

(d)  Lane  v.  Drinkwater,  5  Tyr.  40,  1 
C,  M.  &  R.  599 ;  Bvrne  v.  Fitzhugh,  5 
Tyr.  54,  1  C,  M.  &  R.  613. 

(e)  The  master  of  a  vessel  covenanted 
with  the  several  part-owners  and  their 
several  and  respertive  executors,  adminis- 
trators, and  assigns,  to  pay  certain  mon- 
eys to  them  and  to  their  several  and  re- 
spective executors,  &c.,  at  a  certain 
banker's,   and  in   such  parts   and  propor- 


tions as  were  set  against  their  respective 
names.  Upon  this  covenant  an  action 
was  brought  by  the  covenantees  jointly. 
Htld,  on  demurrer  to  the  declaration, 
that  the  covenant  was  several,  because 
otherwise  no  effect  would  be  given  to 
the  words  "  several  and  respective  exe- 
cutors," &c.,  and  because  the  money  was 
to  be  paid  to  the  banker,  not  as  an  entire 
sum  for  him  to  make  distributions,  but 
in  several  proportions  to  the  separate 
account  of  each  part-owner,  thus  making 
the  interest  of  the  covenantees  several. 
Servante  v.  James,  10  B.  &  C.  410.  See 
also  Ford  v.  Bronaugh,  11  B.  Mon.  14. 

(f)  Contra,  Bro.  Abr.  Covenant,  49. 
A  man  covenanted  with  twenty,  and 
witli  each  of  them,  to  make  certain  sea- 
banks  ;  and  by  his  not  doing  it  the  land 
of  two  was  overflowed  to  their  injury. 
Held  by  the  court,  that  these  two  could 
have  their  action  of  covenant  without 
the  others.  "  Qucere,"  adds  Brooke, 
"  for  it  seems  that  each  should  bring 
an  action  by  himself."  The  criticism  of. 
Brooke  is  undoubtedly  well  founded. 
It  may  be  questioned,  moreover,  whether 
this  case  is  authority  even  to  give  such 
a  covenant  the  legitimate  attributes  of  a 
several  covenant.  The  case  was  cited  in 
Slingsby's  case  (according  to  the  rc])ort 
of  the  latter  in  2  Leon.  47).  There,  A,  B, 
and  C,  being  parties  respectively  to  an 
indenture  tripartite,  wherein  A  cove- 
nanted with  B  and  C,  et  qnolihet  eorum, 
that  the  land  which  he  had  conveyed  to 

13 


*  14  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

If  a  contract  which  is  expressly,  and  in  its  very  terms,  joint 
and  several^  be  made  with  divers  persons,  but  for  the  pay- 

*  14    mcnt  *  of  a  sum  or  the  accruing  of  some  other  benefit  to 

one  of  them  only,  all  must  join  in  a  suit  upon  that  con- 
tract ;  {g)  because  but  one  thing  is  to  be  done,  and  all  have  a 
legal  interest  in  the  performance  of  that  thing,  although  but  one 
party  has  a  beneficial  interest.  So  if  there  be  in  one  instrument 
a  covenant  with  A,  and  another  separate  and  distinct  covenant 
with  B,  and  both  are  for  the  payment  of  a  sum  of  money  to  A,  A 
cannot  sue  alone  for  this  sum,  but  B  must  join,  because  other- 
wise the  payer  might  be  subjected  to  suits  by  both  parties.  (Ji) 
In  general,  all  contracts,  whether  express,  or  implied  and  result- 
ing from  the  operation  or  construction  of  law,  are  joint,  where  the 
interest  in  them  of  the  parties  for  whose  benefit  they  are  created, 
is  joint,  and  separate  where  that  interest  is  separate.  But  the 
interest  which  is  thus  important  as  a  criterion,  is  an  interest  in 
the  contract^  and  not  in  any  sum  of  money,  or  other  benefit,  to 
be  received  from  it.  It  is  a  strictly  legal  and  technical  interest 
created  hy  the  contract,  and  does  not  depend  upon  the  condition 
or  state  of  the  parties  aside  from  the  contract.  (^)  ^ 

A  covenant  which  is  single  in  its  nature,  or  which  is  for  one  and 
the  same  cause,  and  so,  in  strict  propriety,  may  be  called  one  cov- 
enant and  not  a  cluster  of  covenants,  can  never  be  joint  and  sev- 
eral in  respect  to  the  covenantees.  In  other  words,  this  class  of 
covenants  does  not  exist  with  respect  to  the  parties  plaintiff  in  an 
action  for  covenant  broken ;  it  never  lies  in  the  option  of  the  cove- 
nantees to  say  whether  they  shall  sue  for  the  breach,  jointly  or 
severally.     They  must  sue  jointly  if  they  can.  (/)  '  The  circum- 

B  was  discharged  of  all  incumbrances,  B  Spencer  v.  Durant,  Comb.  115  ;   Eccles- 

brought   a  several  action  of   covenant;  ton   i\  Clipsliani,   1   Wms.    Saund.   153; 

and  tiie   court  held,  notwithstanding  the  Petric  v.  Bur^y,  .3  B.  &  C.  353 ;    Scott  i'. 

case  from  Brooke,  that  C  ought  to  have  Godwin,  1    B.&  V.  07,   71;   Gihhs,  C.  J., 

been  joined.  James  c.   Emery,   5  Price,  533 ;    Foley  v. 

(-/)  Anderson  v.    Martindale,   1    East,  Addenbrooke,  4'Q  B.  107 ;  Pollock,  CR., 

497.  Pnrke,   B.,  and    Rolfe,  B.,    Kcightley   v. 

(h)  Id.  Watson,  3  Exch.  721,  723,   726.  — Possi- 

((■)  Anderson    v.  Martindale,    1  East,  bly,  an  exception  to  this  rule  is  to  be 

497  ;    English  v.  Blundell,  8  C.  &  P.  332;  found  in  the  case  where  the  v:ords  of  the 

Lord  Dniiiiian,  llopkinson  v.  Lee,  0  Q.  B.  covenant  are  joint  and  several  as  to  the 

971,  972.  covenantees,  while  their  interest  is  scv- 

(j )  Slingsby's    case,   5    Hep.    19    a ;  eral.     In  such  a  case  the  law,  perhaps, 

1  As  where  one  enters  into  a  business  contract  under  seal,  and  afterwards  takes  a 
partner  in  his  business,  the  latter  cannot  sue  upon  the  contract.  Duff  v.  Gardner, 
7  Lansing,  105. 

14 


CH.  II.]  OF  JOINT   PARTIES.  *  15 

stances  of  each  case,  and  the  situation  *  and  relation  of  the    *  15 


allows  the  covenantees,  who,  upon  any 
principle  of  construction,  clearly  may 
sue  separately,  the  liberty  to  sue  jointly. 
See  Eccleston  v.  Clipshani,  1  Wins. 
Saund.  153;  Withers  v.  Bircham,  3  B. 
&  C.  256 ;  Slingsby's  case,  5  Rep.  19  a  ; 
Rolls  V.  Yates,  Yelv,  (Metcalf  s  ed.),  177, 
n.  —  On  the  supposition  that  this  ex- 
ception exists,  both  rule  and  exception 
might  be  expressed  by  stating  the  prop- 
osition tlms  :  It  is  not  possible,  by  any 
mere  words  of  joinder  and  severance,  to 
give  the  covenantees  the  election  to 
sue  separately  or  together. 

By  what  principles  it  is  to  be  deter- 
mined whether  a  given  contract  is  joint, 
or  joint  and  several,  or  several,  is  a  mat- 
ter in  regard  to  which  the  authorities  are 
in  a  state  of  some  confusion.  A  doubt, 
suggested  by  Mr.  Preston  in  his  edition 
of  the  Touchstone,  and  taken  up  by  the 
Court  of  Exchequer,  has  at  once  shaken 
the  received  opinion,  and  occasioned  at 
least  apparent  conflict  between  that  court 
and  the  Queen's  Bench.  It  is  evident 
that  a  covenant  may  be  considered  with 
reference  either  to  the  covenantors  or 
covenantees.  If  A,  B,  and  C  covenant 
with  X,  Y,  and  Z,  two  distinct  questions 
arise.  Shall  X,  Y,  and  Z  join,  or  not, 
as  plaintiffs'?  Shall  A,  B,  and  C  be 
joined,  or  not,  as  defendants  ?  There 
appears  no  reason  for  doubting  that  the 
words  of  joinder  or  severalty  determine 
the  answer  of  the  second  of  these  ques- 
tions. The  covenant,  with  respect  to 
the  covenantors,  may  belong  to  either 
one  of  the  three  classes  of  joint,  several, 
and  joint  and  several,  just  as  tlie  par- 
ties have  chosen  to  say  in  the  covenant 
that  it  shall.  The  language  of  severalty 
or  joinder,  and  not  the  interest,  is  then 
the  test  of  the  quality  of  the  covenant 
quoad  the  covenantors.  Enys  v.  Donni- 
thorne,  2  Burr.  1190.  As  regards  the 
joinder  of  the  covenantees  there  is  nothing 
a  priori  to  prevent  the  existence  of  tlie 
same  three  classes  to  choose  amongst; 
namely,  the  class  where  they  must  sue 
jointly,  that  where  they  must  sue  sepa- 
rately, and  that  where  it  is  at  their 
option  to  sue  either  jointly  or  severally. 
But  the  proposition  stated  above,  if  true, 
obviously  removes  the  third  alternative. 
The  covenantees  either  must  join  or  must 
sever.  Thus  the  inquiry  is  narrowed  to 
this.  By  what  means  is  it  to  be  deter- 
mined in  a  given  case  whether  they 
must  or  must  not  sue  jointly  t  And 
this  is  the  point,  and,  as  it  would  seem, 
the  only  point  upon  which   there  is  a 


real  conflict  of  authorities.  A  series  of 
cases,  received  without  question  by  the 
text-writers,  went  upon  tlie  principle 
that  the  interest  which  tiie  covenantees 
take  by  the  covenant,  quite  irrespective  of 
u'ords  of  severalty  or  joinder,  is  in  all  cases 
the  decisive  test.  James  v.  Emery,  5 
Price,  529,  8  Taunt.  245;  Withers  v. 
Bircham,  3  B.  &  C.  254;  Servante  v.  James, 
lOB.  &  C.  410;  Lane  v.  Drinkwater,  5 
Tyr.  40,  s.  c,  1  C,  M.  &  R.  699.  But 
Mr.  Preston  denies  the  correctness  of 
the  rule  as  stated.  "  On  the  subject  of 
joint  and  several  covenants,  tliat  emi- 
nent lawyer.  Sir  Vicary  Gibbs,  assumed 
that  covenants  must  necessarily  be  joint 
or  several  according  to  the  interest.  The 
language  was,  '  Wherever  the  interest 
of  parties  is  separate,  the  action  may  be 
several,  notwithstanding  the  terms  of 
the  covenant  on  which  it  is  founded  may 
be  joint ;  and  where  the  interest  is  joint, 
the  action  must  be  joint,  although  the 
covenant  in  language  purport  to  be  joint 
and  several.'  James  v.  Emery,  5  Price, 
5.33.  With  great  deference,  however,  the 
correct  rule  is,  that,  by  express  words 
clearly  indicative  of  the  intention,  a  cove- 
nant may  be  joint,  or  joint  and  several, 
to  or  with  the  covenantors  or  covenan- 
tees, notwithstanding  the  interests  are 
several.  Salk.  393;  2  Roll.  Abr.  419; 
[possibly  should  be  149;  see  6  Q.  B.  971, 
n.J.  So  they  may  be  several,  although 
the  interests  are  joint.  But  the  implica- 
tion or  construction  of  law,  when  the 
words  are  ambiguous,  or  are  left  to 
the  interpretation  of  law,  will  be,  that  the 
words  have  an  import  corresponding  to 
the  interest,  so  as  to  be  joint  when  the 
interest  is  joint,  and  several  wlien  the 
interest  is  several ;  notwithstanding  lan- 
guage which,  under  different  circum- 
stances, would  give  to  the  covenant  a 
different  effect.  Slingsby's  case,  5  Rep. 
19 ;  8  Chanc.  126  ;  5  T.  R.  522 ;  South- 
cote  v.  Hoare,  3  Taunt.  89;  1  Wood, 
537;  2  Burr.  1190."  Shcp.  Touch,  by 
Preston,  166.  In  Sorsbie  v.  Park,  12  M. 
&  W.  146,  Lord  Abinger  said :  "  I  think 
the  rule  is  plain  and  certain,  and  re- 
quires no  authority  ;  it  is  corrcctlj'  stated 
by  Mr.  Preston  in  the  passage  in  Sliep. 
Touch.  166,  which  Mr.  Temple  cited. 
Where  the  words  of  a  covenant  are  in 
their  nature  ambiguous,  so  that  they 
may  be  construed  cither  way,  tlien  the 
deed  in  which  they  arc  inserted  supplies 
the  mode  of  their  construction.  If  it  ex- 
hibit a  several  interest  in  tlie  parties, 
you  may  construe  it  as  a  several  cov- 
enant, and   vice  versa.    But   there  is  no 

15 


*  16  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

*  16    parties,  and  the  nature  of  the  consideration,  *  are  all  to  be 


rule   to   say   that   words,  which   are  ex- 
pressly a  joint  covenant  by  [to]  several 
persons,  siiall  be  construed  as  a  several 
covenant,  unless   there   is   sometiiing  to 
lead  to  that  construction."     In  tJiis  view 
Parke,   B.,   concurred    (p.    158).      "The 
rule  is,  that  a  covenant  will  be  construed 
to  be  joint  or  several  according  to  the 
interest   of   tlie  parties  appearing  upon 
the   face  of  the  deed,  if  tlie  words  are 
capable  of  that  construction  ;  not  that  it 
will  be  construed  to  be  several  by  rea- 
son of  several  interests,  if  it  be  expressly 
joint."  — In  Foley  v.  Addenbrooke,  4  Q. 
B.  197  (which  was  decided  a  little  before 
Sorsbie  v.  Park,  but  was  not  referred  to 
in   that   case),   the   doubt  suggested  by 
Preston  was  not  agitated.     Mills  v.  Lad- 
broke,  7  Man.  &  (}.,  218  [1844],  was  an 
action  brought  by  a  single  plaintiff.     It 
was    contended    that    the    covenant    on 
which  the  action  was  founded,  although 
several  in  terms,  ought  to  be  treated  as 
joint  b\'  reason  of  the   interest   of    the 
covenantees,    who    were    engaged    in  a 
partnership  transaction.     Tindal,  C.  J.,  in 
overruling  the  objection,  thus  adverted  to 
the  doctrine  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer : 
"  The  covenant,  therefore,  entered  into 
by  the  defendant,  as  representing  Kings- 
cote,   witli   the  shareholders,  is,  in  point 
of   form,  not   a   covenant    with    all   the 
covenantees  jointly,  but  a  several  cove- 
nant with  each.     And  we  think  this  is 
80   clearly  the   case,  that  if  the  general 
rule  as  laid  down  by  Sir  Viciry  Gibbs,  in 
James  c.  Emery,  is   qualified   according 
to  the  suggestion  of  Mr.    Preston,  in  a 
note  to    Sheppard's    Touchstone,  p.  106, 
which  was  adopted  by  the  Court  of  Ex- 
chequer in  the  case  of    Sorsbie  v.  Park, 
all  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  plain- 
tiff's   interest     would    be     unnecessary. 
But,  assuming  on   tlie  autiiority  of  the 
several    cases   referred   to   in   tlie  argu- 
ment, that  the  unqualified  rule  of  law  is, 
that  the  action  shall  follow  the  nature 
of  the  interest  of  tlie  covenantees,  with- 
out regard  to  the   precise  form    of   the 
covenant,    so    that    the   action    must   be 
joint  where    the  interest  in  the  suliject- 
matter  of  the  covenant  is  joint,  and  sev- 
eral where  tlie  interest  of  eacii  covenantee 
is  a    several    interest,    we   think,    upon 
reference  to  the  deed  itself,  the  plaintiff 
has  such  several  interest  in  the  subject- 
matter  as  will   enal)le  him  to  sue  alone 
on  this  several  covenant."     [His  lordship 
then  proceeds  to  examine  the  language 
of  the   deed.]     It   was   not    long   before 
Hopkinson   v.   Lee,  0   Q.   B.  mi  [1845], 
afforded  an  opportunity  for  the  expres- 

16 


sion  of    the    opinion    of    the    Court  of 
Queen's  Bench.     This  was  an  action  by 
a  trustee  upon  articles  of  agreement  un- 
der seal,  to  which  the  defendant  and  T 
were  parties,  of  the  one  part,  and   the 
plaintiff  and  his  cestui  que  trust,  parties  of 
the  other  part.     The  agreement  recited 
a  loan  by  the  plaintiff  to  E  of  money  in 
the  hands  of  the  plaintiff,  belonging  to 
the  cestui  que  trust;    in    consideration    of 
which  defendant  and  T  covenanted  sev- 
erally  and    respectively   "  with    and   to 
[the  plaintiff|  his  executors,  administra- 
tors, and  assigns,  and  also  as  a  distinct 
covenant  with  and  to  [the  cestui  que  ti-ust] 
her    executors,    administrators,  and    as- 
signs," that  they,  the  covenantors,  would 
pay,  or  cause  to  be  paid,  interest  at  five 
per  cent  per  annum  on  tlie  money  lent  to 
E.     It  was  held  that  the  cestui  que  trust 
ought  to  have  been  joined  as  a  plaintiff. 
Lord   Dennian,    in    the    opinion,  referred 
with  approbation  to  the  rule  that  words 
of  severalty  do  not  prevent  a  covenant 
from  being  joint  where    the    interest   is 
joint,  and  said  that  Mr.  Preston's  excep- 
tion was  not  grounded   on  any  judicial 
authority.     His  Lordship  added  (p.  971), 
"  We  think  there  is  no  ground  for  Mr. 
Preston's  apprehension  that   words   per- 
fectly plain  and  unambiguous,  confining 
the  contract  expressl}'  to  one  person,  and 
excluding  all   others  from  its  operation, 
will  be  strained  by  the  law  so  as  to  com- 
prehend those  whom  it  took  pains  to  ex- 
clude.    Tlie  true  explanation  of  the  rule 
is  rather  this:  that  the  whole  covenant, 
taken  together,  binds  to  botii  covenantees, 
and  not  to  either  of   them  alone,  though 
separately  named  in  some  of   its  words, 
by  reason  of  the  joint  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject-matter,   of  tiie  action   appearing  on 
the  face  of  the  deed  itself.     Such  being 
the  state  of  tlie  authorities,  a  special  case 
was   reserved   from    the  assizes    for  the 
Court  of  Exchequer,  where  certain  per- 
sons, with  whom  a   covenant   had  been 
made,    sued   the    covenantors    upon    it. 
The  deed,  being  fully  set  out,  was  found 
to  make  a  (covenant  with  tlie  plaintiffs  for 
themselves 'U( J  o///(;-.s ,  and  in  Michaelmas 
Term,  184."],  the  court  held,  in  strict  con- 
formity  with  all    the  cases,  that  a  non- 
suit ought   to  be  entered,  because  those 
others   had  not  been  joined  as   plaintiffs 
in  bringing  the  action,  though  the  cove- 
nant declared  on  was,  in  its  terms,  made 
with  them  alone.     But  the  jilaintiff  here 
places   his    whole  reliance  on  some  dicta 
which  fell  from  the  late  Chief  Baron  and 
from   Parke,  B.,  applicable,  not  to  that 
case,   but   only    to    the  converse    of    it, 


CU.  II.]  OP   JOINT   PARTIES.  *  17 

looked  into,  to  ascertain  who  is  really  interested,  *  and  who    *  17 


wliich  were  represented  as  at  variance 
with  tlie  old  law.  I'nlucdcily,  no  refer- 
ence was  made  to  Anderson  v.  Mariin- 
dale,  as  the  court,  justly  thinking-  ihe 
general  rule  too  clear  for  argument, 
stopped  the  learned  counsel  who  sup- 
ported it.  Lord  Ahim/er  thought  the 
rule  j)lain  and  certain,  and  that  it  re- 
(juired  no  authority :  '  it  is  correctly 
stated  by  Mr.  Preston ; '  he  then  cites 
the  rule  with  the  exception.  Parke,  B., 
also  thinks  the  correct  rule  is  laid  down 
by  Gibbs,  C.  J.,  in  James  v.  Emery  (5 
Price,  533),  witli  the  qualification  stated 
by  Mr.  Preston.  These  learned  judges 
could  not  intend  to  override  Anderson  v. 
Martindale  (1  East,  4U7),  which  was 
not  brought  before  them ;  nor,  if  they 
did,  could  we  agree  to  be  bound  by  their 
extrajudicially  declaring  such  an  inten- 
tion where  their  decision  itself  pursued 
the  doctrine  of  that  case."  —  In  Brad- 
burne  v.  Botfield,  14  M.  &  W.  559,  572 
[1845],  the  matter  was  thus  left  by 
Baron  Parke:  "There  is  no  occasion 
to  refer  to  the  cases  relating  to  the  rule 
of  construction,  as  to  covenants  being 
joint  or  several,  according  to  the  inter- 
est; of  the  parties,  which  is  perfectly  well 
established.  In  the  case  of  Sorsbie  v. 
Parke  (12  M.  &  W.  14G),  Lord  Abinger 
and  myself,  on  referring  to  the  estab- 
lished rule,  as  laid  down  by  Lord  Chief 
Justice  Gibbs,  in  the  case  of  James  v. 
Emery  (2  Moore,  195),  approved  of  Mr. 
Preston's  qualification  and  explanation 
of  it  in  his  edition  of  the  Touchstone, 
lOG,  namely,  that,  if  the  language  of  the 
covenant  tias  capable  of  being  so  construed, 
it  was  to  be  taken  to  be  joint  or  several, 
according  to  the  interest  of  the  parties 
to  it.  Mr.  Preston  adds,  that  the  gen- 
eral rule  proposed  by  Sir  Vicnrij  Gibbs, 
and  to  be  found  in  several  books,  would 
establish  that  tiiere  was  a  rule  of  law  too 
powerful  to  be  controlled  bj/  avy  inten- 
tion, hmcever  express,  and  I  consider  such 
qualification  to  be  perfectly  correct,  and 
at  variance  with  no  decided  case,  as  it 
is  surely  as  competent  for  a  person,  by 
express  joint  words,  strong  enough  to 
make  a  joint  covenant,  to  do  one  thing 
for  the  benefit  of  one  of  the  covenantees, 
and  another  for  the  benefit  of  another, 
as  it  is  to  make  a  joint  demise  where  it 
is  for  the  benefit  of  one.  I  mention  this, 
because  the  Court  of  Queen's  Bench, 
in  the  case  of  Hopkinson  v.  Lee  (14 
Law  J.  (n.  s.)  Q  B.  i04),  have  supposed 
that  Lord  Abinger  and  myself  had  sanc- 
tioned some  doctrine  at  variance  with 
the  case  of  Anderson  v.  Martindale,  and 


Slingsby's  case,  which  it  was  far  from 
my  intention,  and  I  have  no  doubt  from 
Lord  Abingtr's,  to  do  ;  it  being  fully  es- 
tablished, I  conceive,  by  those  cases, 
that  one  and  the  same  covenant  cannot 
be  made  both  joint  and  several  with  the 
covenantees.  It  may  be  fit  to  ob.scrve, 
that  a  part  of  Mr.  Preston's  exi)lanation, 
that  by  express  words  a  covenant  may 
be  joint  and  sevoi-al  with  the  covenant- 
ors or  covenantees,  notwithstanding  the 
interests  are  several,  is  inaccurately  ex- 
pressed ;  it  is  true  only  of  covenantors, 
and  the  case  cited  from  Salkcfd,  p.  303, 
relates  to  them;  probably  Mr.  Preston 
intended  no  more,  and  I  never  meant  to 
assent  to  the  doctrine  that  the  same  cov- 
enant might  be  made,  by  an}'  words, 
however  strong,  joint  and  several,  where 
the  interest  was  joint;  and  it  is  this  part, 
I  apprehend,  of  Mr.  Preston's  doctrine, 
to  which  the  Court  of  Queen's  Bench 
objects.  I  think  it  right  to  give  this 
explanation,  that  it  may  not  be  supposed 
that  there  is  any  difference  on  this  point 
with  the  Court  of  Queen's  Bench."  — 
Afterwards  [1849]  came  the  case  of 
Keightley  v.  Watson,  3  Exch.  716.  That 
was  an  action  of  covenant  by  one  plain- 
tiff on  a  deed  executed  by  one  Dobbs 
of  the  first  part,  the  plaintiff'  of  the 
second  part,  and  the  defendants  of  the 
third  part.  The  deed,  after  reciting  that 
Lobbs  had  agreed  to  purchase  certain 
land  of  the  plaintiff",  which  same  land 
Dobbs  had  agreed  to  sell  to  the  defend- 
ants, stated  that  it  was  thereby  cove- 
nanted by  each  party  thereto,  that  Dobbs 
should  sell,  and  the  defendants  should 
purchase,  the  said  land,  at  £7,335,  £900 
to  be  paid  upon  the  execution  of  the 
deed,  and  £G,4S5  on  the  27th  of  Novem- 
ber, 1851.  The  deed  then  contained  the 
following  covenant :  "  And  the  defend- 
ants for  themselves,  their  heirs,  &c., 
hereby  covenant,  with  the  said  plain- 
tiff', his  executors,  &c.,  and,  as  a  s^pa- 
ratc  covenant  with  the  said  Dobbs,  his 
executors,  &c.,  that  the}-  the  said  de- 
fendants, and  their  heirs,  &c.,  shall,  on 
performance  of  the  covenant  and  agree- 
ment, hereinbefore  contained,  on  the 
part  of  the  said  Dobbs,  pay  to  the  said 
plaintiff,  his  executors,  &c.,  or  to  the  snid 
Dobbs,  his  executors,  &c.,  in  case  tlie 
said  plaintiff,  his  executors,  &c  ,  shall 
then  have  been  paid  his  or  their  i>ur- 
chase-money,  payable,  &c.,  the  sum  of 
£6,435,  being  the  remainder  of  the  said 
purchase-money,  on  or  before  the  27th 
November,  1851.  And  further,  tliat  the 
said  defendants,  their  heirs,  &c.,  shall  ia 

2  17 


18 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  18   has  sustained  the  damage  arising  from  a  breach  of  *  the  con- 
tract, and  whether  such  damage  was  joint  or  several.  (^) 


the  mean  time,  and  until  the  whole 
of  the  sail!  siiin  of  .£(J,l:Jo  shall  be  paid 
off,  pay  to  the  said  plaintiff,  his  execu- 
tors, &c.,  interest  on  so  much  of  the 
purchase-money  as  shall  from  time  to 
time  remain  unpaid,  at  the  rate  of  £o 
per  cent  per  annum,  from  the  date  of 
these  presents,"  &c.  Ihld,  that  plain- 
tiff might  probably  sue  alone  for  interest 
on  the  unpaid  portion  of  the  purchase- 
money,  tlie  covenant  being  several. 
Pollock,  *.  B.,  said  :  "  I  am  of  opinion 
that  in  this  case  the  plaintilT  is  entitled 
to  tlie  judgment  of  tlie  court.  I  con- 
sider that  the  inquiry  really  is  as  to  the 
true  meaning  of  the  covenant,  at  the 
same  time  bearing  in  mind  the  rule,  — 
a  rule  which  I  am  by  no  means  willing 
to  break  in  upon,  —  that  the  same  cove- 
nant cannot  be  treated  as  joint  or  sev- 
eral at  tlie  option  of  the  covenantee.  If 
a  covenant  be  so  constructed  as  to  be 
ambiguous,  that  is,  so  as  to  serve  either 
the  one  view  or  the  other,  then  it  will 
be  joint,  if  the  interest  be  joint,  and  it 
VFill  be  several,  if  the  interest  be  sev- 
eral. On  tlie  other  hand,  if  it  be  in  its 
terms  itnmlst(ik(il>li/  joint,  then,  although 
the  interest  be  several,  all  tlie  parties 
must  be  joined  in  the  action.  So,  if  the 
covenant  be  made  clearly  several,  the 
action  must  be  several,  altiiough  the  in- 
terest be  joint.  It  is  a  question  of  con- 
struction. What  then,  in  this  case,  did 
the  parties  mean  ?  Tiie  words  of  the  cove- 
nant are,  '  And  the  said  Iv.  Watson,  11. 
Watson,  and  J.  Smith,  for  themselves, 
their  heirs,  executors,  and  administrators, 
thereby  covenant  with  the  said  W.  T. 
Keightley,  his  executors,  administrators, 
and  assigns,  and  as  a  separate  covenant 
with  the  said  A.  A.  Dobbs,  his  executors, 
administrators,  and  assigns,  that  they 
will  do  so  and  so.     If  I  am  to  put  a  con- 


(t)  In  Windham's  case,  5  Rep.  7,  it 
is  stated  that  joint  words  in  a  grant  are 
sometimes  taken  severally.  1.  In  respect 
of  the  several  interests  of  the  grantors  ; 
as  if  two  tenants  in  common,  or  several 
tenants,  join  in  a  grant  of  a  rent-charge, 
yet  in  law  tiiis  grant  .shall  be  several,  al- 
tiiough the  wonls  are  joint.  2.  In  respect 
of  tlie  several  interests  of  the  grantees, 
&c.  19  II.  U,  (y.j,  04.  A  warranty  made 
to  two  of  certain  lands  shall  enure  as 
several  warranties,  in  respect  tliat  they 
are  severally  .seized,  the  one  of  part  of 
the  lands,  and  the  otlier  of  the  residue  in 

18 


struction  upon  that,  I  should  say  that  it 
is  intended  to  be  a  several  or  separate 
covenant.  In  the  case  of  Hopkinson  v. 
Lee,  it  seems  to  have  been  understood  at 
one  time  by  this  court,  that  there  were 
joint  words.  There  are  certainly  none. 
But  the  nature  of  the  interest,  upon  look- 
ing into  that  particular  case,  may  possi- 
bly justify  that  decision.  The  words  of 
this  instrument  are  several,  and  its  terms 
disclose  a  several  interest ;  the  covenant, 
therefore,  must  be  construed  according 
to  the  words  as  a  several  covenant ;  and 
it  appears  to  me  that  the  words  used  by 
the  parties  were  intended  to  create  such 
a  covenant.  I  think,  therefore,  that  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  sue  alone."  Parke, 
B.,  in  the  course  of  an  opinion  of  consid- 
erable length,  said  :  "  The  rule  that  cove- 
nants are  to  be  construed  according  to 
the  interests  of  the  parties,  is  a  rule  of 
construction  merely,  and  it  cannot  be 
supposed  that  such  a  rule  was  ever  laid 
down  as  could  prevent  parties,  whatever 
words  they  might  use,  from  covenanting 
in  a  different  manner.  It  is  imj)ossi- 
ble  to  say  that  parties  may  not,  if  they 
please,  use  joint  words,  so  as  to  express 
a  joint  covenant,  and  thereby  to  exclude 
a  several  covenant,  and  that,  because  a 
covenant  may  relate  to  several  interests, 
it  is  therefore  necessarily  not  to  be  con- 
strued as  a  joint  covenant.  If  there  be 
words  capable  of  two  constructions,  we  must 
look  to  the  interests  of  the  parties  wliich 
they  intended  to  protect,  and  construe 
the  words  according  to  that  interest.  I 
apprehend  that  no  case  can  be  found  at 
variance  with  that  rule,  unless  Hopkin- 
son V.  Lee  may  be  thouglit  to  have  a 
contrar}'  aspect.  During  the  course  of 
tlie  argument  in  Bradburne  v.  Botfield,  I 
certainly  was  under  the  imiiression,  from 
reading  the  case  of  Hopkinson   v.  Lee, 


severalty.  6  E.  2 ;  Covenant,  Br.  49. 
[But  this  case  does  not  seem  to  be  law. 
See  note  (w)  supra.]  A  joint  covenant 
taken  severally  in  respect  of  the  several 
interests  of  the  covenantees.  Vide  16 
Eliz.  Dyer,  337,  338  [infra,  note  (c)],  be- 
tween Sir  Anthony  Cook  and  Watton,  a 
good  case.  3.  In  respect  that  the  grant 
cannot  take  effect  but  at  several  times. 

4.  In  respect  of  the  incapacity  and  im- 
possibility of  the  grantees  to  take  jointly. 

5.  In  respect  of  the  cause  of  the  grant,  or 
ratiane  subjecta;  inulerice.  G.  Ne  res  clestrualur 
el  ut  evitetur  absurdum. 


CH.  II.] 


OP   JOINT   PARTIES. 


*19 

*-19 


*  The  nature,  and  especially  the  entireness  (Z)  of  the  con- 
sideration, is  of  great  importance  in  determining  whether 
the  promise  be  joint  or  several ;  for  if  it  moves  from  many  persons 
jointly,  the  promise  of  repayment  is  joint ;  (m}  but  if  from  many 
persons,  but  from  each  severally,  there  it  is  several,  (w)  Where 
the  payment  is  in  the  first  place  of  one  sum  in  solido,  and  this 
is  afterwards  to  be  divided  among  the  payees,  there,  generally. 


that  there  were  in  that  case  words  capa- 
ble of  sucli  a  construction  as  to  malve  tlie 
covenant  a  joint  covenant.  If  that  had 
been  so,  then  the  words  subsequently  in- 
troduced would  not  have  made  it  several, 
unless  there  had  also  been  an  interest  in 
respect  of  which  it  could  be  several,  ac- 
cording to  the  rule  referred  to  by  the 
Lord  Chief  Baron,  as  laid  down  in  Slings- 
by's  case,  that  it  is  not  competent  to  the 
court  to  hold  the  same  covenant  joint  or 
several  at  the  option  of  the  covenantee." 
Rolfe,  B.,  gave  the  following  opinion, 
which  is  cited  at  length  as  containing 
within  a  small  compass  a  clear  and  able 
review  of  the  whole  subject :  "  I  am  of 
the  same  opinion.  It  seems  to  mo  that 
the  question  turns  entirely  upon  the  rule, 
as  stated  by  my  Brother  Parke,  which 
was  distinctly  laid  down  by  this  court  in 
the  cases  cited,  and  in  which  I  fullj'  con- 
cur. It  appears  to  me  that  Mv.  Preston's 
suggestion  was  perfectly  well  founded, 
that  the  rule  in  Slingsby's  case  was  not  a 
rule  of  law,  but  a  mere  rule  of  construc- 
tion. From  that  case  it  appears,  that,  if 
a  covenant  be  cum  quoUbet  et  qualibet  eorum, 
that  may  be  either  a  joint  or  several  cove- 
nant, and  it  will  depend  upon  the  context 
whether  it  is  to  be  taken  as  a  joint  or 
several ;  but  it  cannot  be  both.  The  rule 
given  in  Slingsby's  case  is  not  very  satis- 
factory to  my  mind  ;  namely,  with  regard 
to  the  difficulty  which  arises  as  to  the 
proper  person  to  recover  damages.  If  a 
party  choose  to  enter  into  a  covenant 
which  creates  such  a  difficulty,  I  do  not 
see  what  the  court  has  to  do  with  it.  It 
is  clear  that  parties  can  so  contract  by 
separate  deeds ;  why,  then,  should  they 
not  be  able  equally  to  do  so  by  separate 
covenants  in  the  same  deed  ?  If  they  so 
word  one  covenant  as  to  make  it  a  joint 
and  separate  covenant,  had  it  not  been 
otherwise  decided,  I  confess  I  should 
have  seen  nothing  extraordinary  in  hold- 
ing that  if  they  choose  so  to  contract  as 
to  impose  upon  themselves  that  burden, 
and  state  it  to  be  both  joint  and  several, 
the  court  ought  so  to  construe  it.  But 
Slingsby's  case  has  laid  down  the  oppo- 
site rule.    I  take  it,  that  from  that  time, 


the  rule  has  always  been,  —  whether  dis- 
tinctly expressed  or  not,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  consider,  —  but  the  rule  has  been 
that  you  are  to  look  and  see  from  the 
context  what  the  parties  meant.  Apply- 
ing that  rule  here,  I  see  no  doubt  about 
the  question.  They  have  said,  in  terms, 
that  it  is  to  be  a  separate  covenant.  Ac- 
cording to  the  other  construction,  if 
Dobbs  had  satisfied  Keightley,  and  Dobbs 
had  died,  Keightley  might  have  to  sue 
for  the  money  coming  to  Dobbs,  and  vice 
versa  ;  or,  suppose  Dobbs  had  not  satisfied 
Keightley,  and  Keightley  had  died,  Dobbs 
would  have  had  to  sue  for  the  money 
coming  to  Keightley's  representatives. 
The  parties  have  expressed  themselves  in 
words  showing  it  was  to  be  a  separate 
covenant  with  each,  and  I  think  we 
should  so  hold  it ;  consequently  the  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  our  judgment."  Plait, 
B.,  concurred  in  the  judgment.  —  From 
the  whole  we  may  gather  that  the  Court 
of  Exchequer  maintain  the  general  prin- 
ciple that  it  is  competent  for  the  parties 
to  make  the  contract,  by  express  words, 
what  they  please,  as  well  with  respect 
to  the  joinder  of  parties  as  with  respect 
to  any  other  legal  quality  of  the  con- 
tract. The  rule,  carried  to  its  extent, 
would  permit  the  making  of  a  covenant 
joint,  or  several,  or  joint  and  several,  as  to 
the  covenantors ;  and  joint,  or  several,  or 
joint  and  several,  as  to  the  covenantees. 
But  the  Court  of  Exchequer  add  that  the 
rule  is  to  be  taken  with  this  qualification, 
namely,  that  one  of  the  six  cases  above 
enumerated  is  excluded  by  the  doctrine 
(settled,  perhaps,  on  authority  rather  than 
principle),  that  no  covenant  can  be  joint 
and  several  as  to  the  covenantees.  Of  course 
it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  in  this  respect 
all  contracts,  whether  under  seal  or  not, 
are  governed  by  the  same  principles. 

(/)  Chanter  v.  Lccse.  5  M.  &  W.  698, 
701  ;  1  Roll.  Abr.  81,  pi.  9. 

(m)  Ivans  v.  Draper,  1  Roll.  Abr.  31, 
pi.  9 ;  Winterstoke  Hundred's  case.  Dyer, 
370,  a.  But  see  Jones  v.  Robinson,  1 
Exch.  454,  inj'ra,  note  (c). 

(n)  BeU  V.  Chaplain,  Hardres,  321. 

19 


*  20  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

*  20    the  *  interest  of  the  payees  is  joint ;  (o)  liut  where  the  first 

payment  is  in  several  sums  among  the  several  payees,  there, 
generally,  their  interest  is  several,  (p)  So  if  a  snm  in  solido  is 
advanced  to  one  by  many  persons,  the  promise  of  repayment  is  a 
promise  to  all  jointly ;  (5-)  but  if  several  sums  are  advanced  sepa- 
rately by  each,  there  the  promise  is  to  each  severally,  (r)  And 
if  the  several  persons  raise  the  sum  by  separate  and  distinct  con- 
tribution ;  but,  when  raised,  it  is  put  together  and  advanced  as 
one  sum,  there  the  promise  of  repayment  is  to  all  jointly,  (s) 

Both  a  joint  obligation  or  right,  and  a  several  obligation  or 
right  may  coexist ;  for  there  may  arise  from  the  same  contract, 
one  joint  duty  to  all,  and  also  several  duties  to  each  of  the 
parties,  {t) 

In  analogy  with  the  rule  in  the  case  of  contracts,  it  is  well  es- 
tablished, that  there  can  be  no  joint  action  for  an  injury,  unless 
that  injury  be  a  joint  injury  to  the  plaintiffs.  Therefore  husband 
and  wife  cannot  sue  jointly  for  assault  and  battery  of  them,  or  for 
slander  of  them,  (u) 

Whatever  rule  be  adopted  as  the  leading  principle  of  construc- 
tion, the  question  whether  the  right  created  by  a  contract  is  joint 
or  several,  must  be  left  in  any  particular  instance  so  much  to 
mere  authority,  that  we  close  the  subject  with  a  reference  to  the 
decisions  collected  in  the  note,  (y') 

(0)  Lane  v.  Drinkwater,   5  Tyr.  40;  action  was  held  properly  brought;  where 

Byrne  t-.  Fitzhugh,  id.  54.  it  was  hold  that  a  several  action  should 

(/')  Thomas  and ,  Styles,  46L  have  been  joint ;  wliero  a  several  action 

(7)  May  V.  May,  1  C.  &  P.  44.    Money  was  held  properly  brought ;  where  it  was 

advanced  on  the  joint  mdll  of  two  par-  held  that  a  joint  action  should  have  been 

ties  may  be  recovered  b^-  tliem  in  a  joint  several :  — 

action  against  tiie  i>erson  for  wliose  ben-         \.    Where  a  joint  action  teas  held  properly 

efit  it  was  paid.     Osborne  v.  IIari)er,    5  brouf/ht. 

East,  225.  Wakkfield   &   Bingley    v.  Brown. 

(r)  Brand  r.  Boulcott.  3  B.  &  P.  235.  9  Q.  B.  209.     Covenant.     Bingley,  being 

(s)  May  V.  May,  1  ('.  &  P.  44.  owner   of    a    term    of     si.\ty-one    years, 

[t]   Story  r.  Uichard.son,  0  Bing.  N.  C.  granted  an  aimuity  to    Samuel  W.,  and 

123;  Peckham  v.  North  Parish  in  Haver-  for  securing  payment,  assigned  the  term 

hill,  1(5  Pick.  274.  (wanting   one   day)    to    Bobert  W.     By 

(«)  9    Ed.   4,   51  ;   Cole   v.  Turner,  0  indenture,    reciting   these    facts,    Robert 

Mod.  149.    The  husliand  should  sue  alone  \V.,  at    the  request    of    Samuel  W.   and 

for  the  injury  to  him,  and  the  husband  of    Bingley,   demise<l,  and    Bingley   de- 

and  wife  should  sue  jointly  for  the  injury  niised    and   confirmed    the    premises    to 

to  her.     Gazinsky  tt   ux.    v.    Colburn,  11  Sophia  P>.,  at  a  rent  payable  to  Samuel 

Cush.  10.  W.,   while    the    premises    remained    sub- 

{v)  It  is  attempted  in  this  note  to  col-  ject  to  the   annuity,  and    afterwards  to 

Icct  at  least  the  most  imj)ortant  cases  in  Bingley.     Sophia  B.  covenanted   to  and 

which  the  question  of    tiie  propriety  of  with    Samuel  W.   and    Robert  W.,   and 

the  joinder  of  plaintiffs  lias  been  passed  their  respective  executors,  &c.,  and  also 

ujion.     Tliese    cases    fall,    it    is    evident,  with  and  to  liingley,  iiis  executors,  &c., 

within  one  of  four  classes  :  Where  a  joint  to  pay  the  rent,  while  the  premises  were 

20 


CH.  II.] 


OF  JOINT  PARTIES. 


21 


♦SECTION  II. 


21 


OP  SOME   INCIDENTS   OF   JOINDER. 


Parties  are  not  said  to  be  joint  in  law,  merely  because  they 
are    connected   together   in    some    obligation    or   some    interest 


subject  to  the  annuity,  to  Robert  [  sic  ] 
W.,  and  afterwards  to  Bingley,  and  also 
to  make  certain  repairs.  Tiie  action 
was  upon  the  covenant  to  repair.  Held, 
on  demurrer,  that  Samuel  W.,  being 
dead,  llobert  W.  and  Bingley  could  sue 
jointlj'.  —  KosE  V.  PouLTON,  2  B.  and 
Ad.  822.  Covenant.  Demurrer.  The 
covenant  declared  upon  was,  in  terms, 
with  the  j)laintiffs  and  G.,  jointly  and 
severally.  G.  was  also  one  of  the  cove- 
nantors, but  was  dead  at  the  time  of  the 
bringing  of  the  action.  The  court  held, 
that  whether  or  not  one  of  the  cove- 
nantees could,  if  he  had  chosen,  have 
sued  separately,  the  action,  as  brought, 
was  well  maintainable.  —  Pease  v. 
HiusT,  10  B.  &  C.  122.  A,  wishing  to 
obtain  credit  with  his  bankers,  in  1817, 
prevailed  upon  three  persons  to  join 
him  in  a  promissory  note,  whereby 
they  jointly  and  severally  promised  to 
pay  the  bankers  or  order  £oOO.  Upon 
two  of  the  partners  retiruig  from  the 
banking-house,  a  balance  was  struck 
between  the  old  and  new  firm,  and  the 
promissory  note  was  delivered  to  the 
new  firm,  but  not  indorsed  to  them. 
Held,  that  the  action  was  well  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  surviving  members 
of  the  old  firm.  —  Kitchin  v.  Buckley, 
T.  Raym.  80 ;  1  Lev.  109 ;  s.  c.  1  Sid. 
157 ;  nom.  Kitchin  v.  Compton.  Cove- 
nant for  repairs  against  lessee  for  years. 
One  Randall  demised  the  tenement  to 
the  defendant,  and  afterwards  granted 
a  moiety  of  the  reversion  to  Kitchin, 
and  afterwards  the  other  moiety  to 
Knight.  Kitchin  and  Knight  brought 
tills  action  jointly.  After  verdict  for 
the  plaintiffs,  it  was  moved  in  arrest  of 
judgment,  that  the  plaintiffs,  being  ten- 
ants in  connnon,  ought  not  to  join.  But 
the  court  held  that  the  action  was  prop- 
erly brought,  and  said  :  "  This  is  a  per- 
sonal action  merely,  in  which  tenants 
in  conmion  maij  join."  —  Vaux  v.  Dra- 
per, Styles,  156,  20.3;  1  Roll.  Abr.  31,  pi. 
9.  Assumpsit.  The  several  cattle  of  the 
two  plain  iffs  having  been  distrained, 
defendant,  in  consideration  of  XIO  paid 


to  him  by  the  plaintiffs,  promised  to  pro- 
cure the  cattle  to  be  redelivered  to  them. 
Held,  on  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment, 
that  the  joint  action  was  good,  llolle, 
C.  J.,  said  :  "  The  consideration  given  is 
entire,  and  cannot  be  divided,  and  there 
is  no  inconvenience  in  joining  the  action 
in  this  case  ;  but  if  one  had  brought  the 
action  alone,  it  might  have  been  question- 
able." Jerman,J.,  dissented,  and  thought 
several  promises  should  be  intended. 

American  Cases.  —  Smith  v.  Tall- 
COTT,  21  Wend.  202.  In  an  agreement 
under  seal  for  the  sale  of  lands,  hus- 
band, wife,  and  trustee  of  the  wife, 
were  parties  of  the  first  part.  The 
trustee  did  not  execute  the  deed  — 
though  by  an  indorsement  on  the  back 
(under  seal)  he  bound  himself  to  do 
what  should  be  necessary  on  his  part 
to  carry  the  contract  into  effect.  Held, 
that  an  action  against  the  parties  of  the 
second  part  was  properly  brought  in 
the  joint  names  of  husband,  wife,  and 
trustee.  —  Pearson  v.  Parker,  3  N.  H. 
306.  Plaintiffs,  being  sureties  for  de- 
fendant, discharged  the  debt,  in  part, 
with  money  raised  upon  the  joint  note 
of  the  plaintiffs,  and  in  part  with  their 
joint  note  given  directly  for  the  resi- 
due. Held,  that  their  action  against  the 
principal  debtor  was  well  brought  joint- 
ly. —  Wright  v.  Post,  3  Conn.  142. 
Twenty  persons,  desirous  to  support  a 
public  right  of  fishery,  entered  into  an 
agreement  to  defend  such  right  through 
a  trial  at  law,  each  promising  to  pay  his 
proportion  of  the  expense  to  such  of 
them  as  should  be  sued  for  occupying 
the  fishery.  Three  of  them  were  sued 
jointly,  and,  after  an  unsuccessful  de- 
fence, each  paid  from  his  private  funds 
one-third  part  of  the  execution.  Held, 
that  these  tiiree  could  maintain  a  joint 
action  against  a  fourth,  to  recover  his 
twentieth  part  of  the  expense  incurred  ; 
the  joint  liability  of  the  plaintiffs,  coupled 
with  defendant's  promise,  and  not  the  pay- 
ment of  the  money,  being  the  cause  of 
action.  —  Haughtox  v.  Bayley,  9  Ired. 
L.  337.     The  two  plaintiffs,  each  out  of 

21 


22 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  22    *  which  is  common  to  them  both.     They  must  be  so  con- 
nected as  to  be  in  some  measure  identified.     They  have  not 


his  own  stock,  delivered  goods  to  defend- 
ant, to  be  peddled,  and  took  a  bond,  pay- 
able to  themselves  jointly,  for  the  faithful 
accounting  therefor.  Held,  that  they 
could  maintain  a  joint  action  upon 
the  bond,  notwithstanding  their  several 
interests.  See  also  Doe  (/.  Campbell, 
V.  Hamilton,  13  Q.  B.  977;  Beer  v. 
Beer,  0  E.  L.  &  E.  468 ;  Magnay  v.  Ed- 
wards, 20  id.  2G4;    Arden  v.  Tucker,  4 

B.  &  Ad.  815;  Powis  v.  Smith,  5  B.  & 
Aid.  850;  Wallace  v.  McLaren,  1  Man. 
&  R.  516  ;  Townsend  v.  Neale,  2  Camp. 
100;  Osborne  v.  Harper,  5  East,  225; 
Midgley  i;.  Lovelace,  Carth.  28'J ;  Yate 
V.  Koules,  1  Bulst.  25 ;  Clement  v.  Hen- 
ley, 2  Roll.  Abr.  22  (F),  pi.  2;  Parker 
V.  Gregg,  3  Foster  (N.  H.),  41(3;  Saun- 
ders V.  Johnson,  Skin.  401. 

2.     In  the  follounnfj  cases  it  was  held  that 
a  several  action  should  have  been  joint. 

Lucas  v.  Beale,  20  Law  Jour.  (n.  s.) 

C.  P.  134,  4  E.  L.  &  E.  358.  Assump- 
sit. The  plaintiff,  acting  on  behalf  of 
the  members  of  an  orchestra,  to  which 
he  himself  Ijclonged,  signed  a  proposal, 
"on  behalf  of  the  members  of  the  or- 
chestra," to  continue  tlieir  services,  pro- 
vided the  defendant  would  guarantee 
certain  salary  then  due  to  them.  The 
defendant  accepted  this  proposition,  but 
failed  to  pay  the  salary  due.  The  plain- 
tiff alone  brought  an  action  for  the 
whole  money  due  to  himself  and  the 
rest,  and  stated  the  contract  to  be  with 
himself  and  the  rest.  The  jury  found 
that  he  acted  on  behalf  of  iiimself  as 
well  as  the  rest.  Held,  that  the  con- 
tract was  joint,  and  that  he  could  not 
recover.  —  Lockhaiit  v.  Bauxaud,  14 
M.  &  W.  G74.  Assumpsit.  A  hand-bill, 
relating  to  a  stolen  parcel,  offered  a 
reward  to  "  whoever  Bhould  give  such 
information  as  should  lead  to  the  early 
apiirehension  of  the  guilty  parties."  The 
information  was  commimicated  first  by 
plaintiff  to  C.  in  conversation,  after- 
wards to  a  constable  by  plaintiff  and  C. 
jointly.  Held,  that  C.  ought  to  have 
joined  in  the  a(;tion  for  the  reward.  — 
Hoi-KiNsov  V.  Lee,  0  Q.  B.  0(54.  [For 
an  al)stract  of  this  case,  and  for  the  com- 
ments made  upon  it  by  the  Court  of 
E.xchequer,  see  note  (/)  sujmi.]  — Byrne 
V.  FiTZHifMi,  5  Tyr.  51 ;  s.  c.  1  C,  M.  &  R. 
013.  Before  Pattcson,  J.,  and  Ciiryiei/, 
B.  The  agreement  of  (Ufi'nd.'int  was 
that,  in  consiilcration  of  ]il:iintiff  and  B. 
using  their  endeavors  to  charter  shii)s 
and    procure    passengers   on    board    of 

22 


them,  and  not  engaging  with  any  other 
emigrant  broker,  they,  the  defendants, 
undertook  to  pay  plaintiff  and  B.  a  com- 
mission of  £b  per  cent  on  the  amount 
of  the  net  passage-money  made  by  the 
ships,  one-half  to  be  paid  to  plaintiff, 
and  the  other  half  to  B. ;  Lane  v.  Drink- 
water,  being  cited,  held,  that  plaintiff, 
suing  without  B.,  should  be  non-suited. 
—  Hatsall  v.  Griffith,  4  Tyr.  487. 
A  broker  was  employed  to  sell  a  ship 
belonging  to  three  part-owners,  two  of 
whom  communicated  with  him.  To 
them  he  paid  their  shares  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sale;  but,  after  admitting 
the  third  part-owner's  share  to  be  in  his 
hands,  refused  to  pay  it  to  him  without 
the  consent  of  the  other  two.  An  ac- 
tion of  assumpsit  having  been  brought 
by  the  third  part-owner  for  the  share, 
held,  that  he  was  not  entitled  to  recov- 
er. —  Petrie  v.  Bury,  3  B.  &  C.  353, 
Covenant.  Demurrer.  The  covenant 
declared  upon  was  with  the  plaintiff 
and  two  others,  for  the  use  of  a  third 
party.  The  declaration  averred  that 
the  two  other  covenantees  had  never 
sealed  the  deed.  Held,  notwithstand- 
ing, that  as  all  might  sue,  all  must  sue, 
and  that  the  declaration  was  bad.  — 
SooTHCOTE  V.  HoARE,  3  Taunt.  87. 
Covenant  upon  an  indenture  of  three 
parts,  //eld,  on  demurrer,  that  a  cove- 
nant with  A  and  B,  and  with  every  of 
them,  is  joint,  though  A  is  party  of  tlie 
first  part,  and  B  party  of  the  second 
part,  to  the  deed.  —  (juidox  v.  Rob- 
son,  2  Camp.  302.  Action  by  the  draw- 
er and  payee  of  a  bill  of  exchange 
against  the  acceptor.  The  bill  sued 
upon  was  drawn  j)ayable  to  Guidon  & 
Hughes,  under  which  firm  the  plaintiff 
traded.  There  was  no  one  a^ssociated 
with  him  as  partner  ;  but  lie  had  a  clerk 
named  Ilughes,  and  l^ord  Kllcnhomurjh 
held  that  such  clerk  siiould  liave  been 
joined.  —  SMXGsnv's  Case,  5  Rep.  18 
b. ;  8.  c.  3  Leon.  100  ;  s.  c.  2  Leon.  47  ; 
s.  c.  Jenk.  Cent.  262.  R.  B.  by  deed  cov- 
enanted with  four  persons  and  their  as- 
signs, tt  (id  tt  cum  fjunlibct  forum,  that  he 
was  lawfully  and  solely  seized  of  a  rec- 
tory. Two  of  the  covenantees  brought 
covenant  against  R.  B.  and  held  ill,  be- 
cause it  was  a  joint  covenant,  and  the 
others  ought  to  have  joined.  The  court 
said :  "  When  it  appears  by  the  decla- 
ration that  every  of  the  covenantees 
liatli,  or  is  to  have,  a  several  interest  or 
estate,    there,    wiien    the    covenant    is 


CH.  II.] 


OF    JOINT    PARTIES. 


23 


several  and  *  respective  shares,  which  being  united   make    *  23 
a  whole ;   but  these  together  constitute  one  whole,  which. 


made  with  the  covenantees,  et  cum  quo- 
libet  eorum,  these  words,  cum  quolibet 
eorum  make  the  covenant  several  in 
respect  of  their  several  interests.  As 
if  a  man  by  indenture  denuses  to  A 
black  acre,  to  B  wliite  acre,  to  C  green 
acre,  and  covenants  witli  tliem,  and 
quolibet  eorum,  tliat  he  is  lawful  owner 
of  all  the  said  acres,  &c.,  in  that  case  in 
respect  of  tlie  said  several  interests,  by 
the  said  words  et  cum  quolibet  eorum,  the 
covenant  is  made  several ;  but  if  he  de- 
mises to  tliem  the  acres  jointly,  then 
these  words,  cum  quolibet  eorum,  are  void, 
for  a  man  by  his  covenant  (unless  in 
respect  of  several  interests),  cannot 
make  it  first  joint  and  then  make  it  sev- 
eral by  the  same  or  the  like  words,  cum 
quolibet  eorum ;  for,  although  sundry  per- 
sons may  bind  themselves  et  quemlibet 
eorum,  and  so  the  obligation  shall  be 
joint  or  several  at  the  election  of  the 
obligee,  yet  a  man  cannot  bind  himself 
to  three,  and  to  each  of  them,  to  make 
it  joint  or  several  at  the  election  of  sev- 
eral persons  for  one  and  the  same  cause, 
for  the  court  would  be  in  doubt  for 
which  of  them  to  give  judgment,  which 
the  law  would  not  suffer,  as  it  is  held  in 
3  H.  6,  44  b."  See  also  Bradburne  v. 
Botfield,  14  M.  &  W.  559  ;  Sorsbie  v.  Park, 
12  M.  &  W.  140 ;  Lane  v.  Drinkwater,  5 
Tyr.  40,  1  C,  M.  &  R.  599 ;  English  v. 
Blundell,  8  C.  &  P.  332;  Decharms  v. 
Horwood,  10  Bing.  526 ;  Hill  v.  Tucker, 
1  Taunt.  7  ;  Anderson  v.  Martindale,  1 
East,  497 ;  Spencer  v.  Durant,  Comb. 
115;  Thimblethorp  v.  Hardesty,  7  Mod. 
116;  Chanter  v.  Lcese,  4  M.  &  W.  295; 
Wetherell  v.  Langston,  1  Exch.  034;  Foley 
V.  Addenbrooke,  4  Q.  B.  197 ;  Teed  v.  Ell- 
worthy,  14  East,  210 ;  Scott  v.  Godwin, 
1  B.  &  P.  07. 

American  Cases.  —  Saveigart  v.  Berk, 
8  S.  &  R.  308.  Seven  of  ten  joint  obli- 
gees brought  an  action  (living  the  other 
obligees)  against  the  obligor.  Held,  that 
it  could  not  be  maintained.  Semble,  an 
action  could  not  have  been  maintained 
by  one,  altliough  brought  in  respect  of 
separate  interests.  —  Dob  v.  Halsey,  16 
Johns.  34.  Assumpsit  by  D.  &  D.,  part- 
ners, against  11.  M.  being  shown  to  be  a 
member  of  the  firm,  held,  that  he  ouglit 
to  have  been  joined  as  plaintiff.  —  Sims 
V.  Harris,  8  B.  Mon.  55.  Debt  on  a  penal 
bond.  Tlie  bond  was  executed  by  the 
defendant  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  and 
several  others,  as  joint  obligees.  The 
plaintiff  brought  the  action  alone  to  re- 


cover the  penalty.  Held,  that  the  action 
was  not  well  brought.  Aliter,  if  the  ac- 
tion had  been  covenant  on  the  bond  ;  for 
in  that  case,  so  far  as  each  of  tlie  obli- 
gees in  the  bond  has  a  separate  interest 
in  the  performance  of  its  stipulations, 
the  cause  of  action  is  several,  and  not 
joint.  See  Pearce  v.  Hitchcock,  2  Comst. 
388.  —  Tapscott  v.  Williams,  10  Ohio, 
442.  Where  lands  descended  to  copar- 
ceners, with  warranty,  and  they  were 
evicted  before  severance,  it  was  held  that 
one  of  them  could  not  sue  alone  on  the 
warranty  for  his  share  of  the  damages. 

3.  In  the  folloivimj  cases  a  several  action 
was  held  to  be  properhj  brouqht. 

Keightley  v.  Watson,  3  Exch.  716. 
[For  an  abstract  of  this  case  see  note  (/) 
supra.] — JoxES  v.  Robinson,  1  Exch. 
454.  The  declaration  stated  that  the 
plaintiff  and  A  B  carried  on  business  in 
copartnership  ;  and  in  consideration  that 
they  would  sell  defendant  tlicir  business, 
and  become  trustees  for  liiui  in  respect 
of  all  debts,  &c.,  due  to  plaintiff  and 
A  B  in  respect  thereof,  defendant  prom- 
ised plaintiff'  to  pay  him  all  the  money 
lie  had  advanced  in  respect  of  the  co- 
partnership, and  for  which  it  Mas  ac- 
countable to  plaintiff,  and  also  promised 
plaintiff  and  A  B  that  he  would  dis- 
charge all  the  debts  due  from  the  plain- 
tiff and  A  B  as  such  copartners,  and  all 
liabilities  to  which  tliey  are  subject. 
The  declaration  then  averred  that  plain- 
tiff and  A  B  did  sell  the  business  to 
defendant  and  became  trustees  for  him 
in  respect  of  all  debts,  &c.,  due  to  plain- 
tiff and  A  B  in  respect  tliereof,  and  that, 
at  the  time  of  the  promise,  plaintiff  had 
advanced  a  certain  sum,  for  tlie  non-pay- 
ment of  which  the  action  was  brought. 
On  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  the 
defendant  contended  that  tiie  considera- 
tion moved  from  the  plaintiff  and  A  B 
jointly,  and  therefore  (as  the  considera- 
tion is  the  essential  part  of  a  contract, 
without  which  the  promise  is  nothing), 
A  B  should  have  been  joined  as  co-plain- 
tiff ;  but  the  court  held  tliat  tlie  separate 
interest  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  partner- 
ship fund  was  the  consideration  upon 
which  the  promise  sued  upon  in  this 
case  was  founded  ;  and,  tlierefore,  tlic 
rule  for  which  the  defendant  contended 
did  not  apply. — Palmer  v.  Sparshott, 
4  Man.  &  G.'  137.  By  an  agreement,  not 
under  seal,  between  defendant  of  tlie 
one  part,  and  plaintiff  and  F.  of  the  other 
part  —  reciting    that    plaintiff    and    F. 


24 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I 


*  24    whether  it  be  an  mterest  *  or  an  obligation,  belongs  to  all. 
Hence   arises   an  implied  authority  to  act  for  each  other, 


liad  assigned  certain  property  to  defen- 
dant for  .£150  apiece,  and  that  it  had 
been  a<ireed  that  defendant  sliould  re- 
tain .CiJU  out  of  eacli  .£loO  — the  defen- 
dant, in  consideration  of  the  two  several 
sums  of  .CjO  and  .£50  so  retained,  agreed 
with  plaintiff  and  F.,  tiieir  executors, 
&c.,  to  indemnify  j^laintiff  and  F.,  and 
each  of  them,  their  heirs,  executors,  etc., 
and  their,  and  each  and  every  of  their, 
estates  and  effects,  from  tlie  costs  of 
a  certain  action.  ILId,  that  phiintiff 
might  maintain  assumpsit  upon  tliis  agree- 
ment without  joining  F.  —  Poole  v. 
Hill,  G  M.  &  W.  835.  Covenant.  By 
articles  of  agreement,  reciting  that  the 
defendant  had  contracted  with  J.,  as  the 
agent  of  tlie  phiintiff  and  the  other 
owners  of  thei)ro])erty,  for  the  purchase 
of  the  hinds  tlierein  mentioned,  the  de- 
fendant covenanted  with  the  plaintiff, 
and  the  several  other  parties  beneficially 
interested,  to  perforin  such  contract  by 
paying  the  purchase-money  on  a  certain 
day,  &c.  Held,  that  this  covenant  was 
several,  and  tliat  the  plaintiff  might  sue 
alone  for  the  non-payment  of  his  share 
of  the  purchase-money,  without  joining 
the  other  parlies  beneficially  interested. 

—  Place  v.  Delegal,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  420. 
Assumi)sit.  One  Evans,  as  attorney  for 
plaintiffs,  executors  of  Miers,  having 
sold  an  estate,  to  a  share  of  the  proceeds 
of  which  W.  was  entitled  as  legatee,  and 
defendant  claiming  W.'s  share  of  such 
proceeils,  under  an  agreement  with  W. 
plaintiffs  paid  the  amount  to  defendant, 
on  receiving  from  him  a  guaranty  in 
these  terms  :  "  Mr.  John  Evans,  and  also 
Messrs.  Place  &  Meabry  (the  i)Iaintiff's], 
as  the  executors  of  the  will  of  the  late 
Mr.  Jolin  Miers :  In  consideration  of 
your  having  jjaid,  &c.,  I  hereby  undertake 
to  indemnify  and  save  you  and  each  of 
you  harmless,  &c.  C.  Delegal."  Ilrld, 
that  plaintiffs  might  sue  on  this  guar- 
anty without  joining  Evans.  — Thacker 
1-.  SiiKi'iiEKD,  2  Chitt.  052.  The  plaintiff 
and  one  R.,  being  insurance  brokers 
and  partners,  effected  a  policy  of  in- 
surance on  the  defendant's  ship.  The 
I)reniium  was  not  jiaid  to  the  underwri- 
ter till  after  U.  had  become  baidtrupt, 
when  it  was  paid  by  the  plaiiUiff  alone 
out  of  his  private  property.  Tlie  plain- 
tiff brought  this  aition  alone  to  recover 
the  amount  of  tlie  i)rcmiam  thus  paid. 
Held,  that  the  action  was  well  brought. 

—  Glossop  r.  Coi.MAN,  1  Siark.  25.  As- 
sumpsit.    Plaintiff  had  held  out  bis  son 

24 


as  his  partner,  and  had  made  out  bills 
and  signed  receipts  in  their  joint  names  ; 
but  ludd  by  the  court  of  K.  B.  that  he 
was  not  jirecluded  from  maintaining  his 
action  by  showing  that  his  son  was  not  in 
fact  his  partner.  —  Davexpout  v.  Kack- 
STROw,  1  C.  &  P.  89.  Hullock,  B.,  S.  P. 
—  Kell  v.  Nainby,  10  B.  &  C.  20  S.  P. 
"  A  party  with  whom  the  ccmtract  is 
actually  made  may  sue  without  joining 
others  with  whom  it  is  apparently  made." 
Parke,  J.  —  Garret  v.  Taylor,  1  Esp. 
Nisi  Prius,  117.  "  Three  persons  had 
employed  the  defendant  to  sell  some 
timber  for  them,  in  which  they  were 
jointly  concerned.  Two  of  them  he  had 
paid  their  exact  proportion,  and  they  had 
given  him  a  receipt  in  full  of  all  demands. 
The  third  now  brought  his  action  for 
the  remainder,  being  his  share ;  and 
it  was  objected,  that  as  this  was  a  joint 
employment  by  three,  one  alone  could 
not  bring  his  action.  But  it  was  ruled 
by  Lord  Mansjidd,  that  where  th<re  Iiad 
been  a  secerance  as  above  stated,  that  one 
alone  might  sue.  4  G.  3  MS."  —  Kirk- 
man  V.  Newstead,  1  Esp.  Nisi  Prius,  117. 
"  Action  for  the  use  and  occupation  of  a 
house.  It  appeared  that  the  house  was 
the  jiroperty  of  six  tenants  in  conmion, 
to  all  of  whom,  except  the  plaintiff,  the 
defendant  had  j)aid  his  rent ;  and  this 
action  was  for  his  share  of  the  rent.  It 
was  objected  that  one  tenant  in  conmion 
alone  could  not  bring  this  action,  but 
that  all  ought  to  join  ;  but  Lord  Mans- 
field overruled  the  objection,  and  the 
l)laintiff  recovered.  Sitt.  AVestm.  M. 
1770,  ISIS."  [The  above  two  cases  from 
Espinasse's  Nisi  Prius  are  of  doubtful 
authority.  See  note  to  Ilatsall  ;•.  Grif- 
fith, 4  Tyr.  488,  and  Walford  on  Parties, 
400.]  —  WoTTOx  V.  Cooke,  Dyer,  337  b. 
Covenant.  Three  i)urchased  lands  jointly 
in  fee  and  covenanted  each  irith  the  others 
and  their  heirs,  il  eoriiin  utrupie,  to  convey 
to  the  heirs  of  those  who  lir.])pened  to 
die  first,  their  respective  tiiird  parts. 
Two  of  the  three  having  died,  the  heir 
of  one  of  them  brought  this  action 
against  the  survivor,  alleging  that  he  had 
not  conveyed  to  him  according  to  his 
covenant.  It  was  moved,  in  arrest  of 
judgment,  that  the  covenant  was  joint, 
aixl  not  several,  for  the  word  "  utriqae  " 
in  Latin  is  ronjunclim,  and  not  separalim; 
sed  non  al/oeainr,  and  judgment  was  given 
f(jr  the  plaintiff. 

American    Cases. —  IIall  I).  Leioii,   8 
Crauch,  60.    Plaintiff  and  P.  consigned 


CH, 


II.] 


OP   JOINT   PARTIES. 


*25 


which  is  in  some  cases  carried  *  very  far.     Thus,  if  several 
plaintiffs  sue  for  a  joint  demand,  and  the  defendant  pleads 


25 


to  defendant  a  quantity  of  cotton,  of 
which  they  were  joint  owners.  Tiiey 
gave  defendant  separate  and  different 
instructions  for  the  disposition  of  their 
respective  moieties,  each  distinctly  con- 
fining his  instructions  to  his  own  moiety. 
Held,  reversing  judgment  of  circuit  court, 
that  plaintiff  could  maintain  an  action 
for  the  violation  of  his  instructions,  with- 
out joining  P.  —  Swett  v.  Patrick,  2 
Fairf.  179.  Defendant  conveyed  land 
with  warranty  to  A,  B,  and  C.  Held,  on 
demurrer,  that  a  several  action  on  the 
warranty  was  well  brought  by  A.  — 
Sharp  v.  Conkling,  16  Vt.  354.  Cove- 
nant. By  indenture  between  the  plaintiff 
and  others,  of  the  first  part,  and  the  de- 
fendant of  the  other  part,  the  defendant 
covenanted  with  the  parties  of  the  first 
part  that  he  would  turn  from  its  natural 
channel  a  certain  stream  of  water  which 
flowed  over  the  land  of  the  covenantees  ; 
and  whereas,  the  water,  when  diverted, 
would  pass  over  the  land  of  the  plain- 
tiff, that  he  would  so  convey  it  as  not 
to  injure  said  land.  The  plaintiff  brought 
the  action  without  joining  the  other  cove- 
nantees, and  alleged  breaches  of  both 
covenants.  Held,  that  he  might  recover 
on  the  second  covenant,  but  not  on  the 
first.  Eedjield,  J.,  said  the  court  were  will- 
ing to  abide  by  the  rule  that,  where  the 
interest  in  the  subject-matter  secured 
by  the  covenant  is  several,  although 
the  terms  of  the  covenant  will  more 
naturally  bear  a  joint  interpretation, 
yet,  if  they  do  not  exclude  the  infer- 
ence of  being  intended  to  be  several, 
they  shall  have  a  several  construction 
put  upon  them.  See  also  Catlin  r.  Barn- 
ard, 1  Aik.  9 ;  Harrold  v.  Whitaker,  10 
Jur.  1004;  Mills  v.  Ladbrooke,  7  Man. 
&  G.  218;  Simpson  v.  Clayton,  4  Bing. 
N.  C.  758  ;  Withers  v.  Bircham,  3  B.  &  C. 
254;  Johnson  v.  Wilson,  Wllles,  248; 
Lloyd  V.  Archbold,  2  Taunt.  324 ;  Story 
V.  Richardson,  0  Bing.  N.  C.  123  ;  Owston 
V.  Ogle,  13  East,  538 ;  Lahy  v.  Holland, 
8  Gill,  445, 

4.  In  the  foUoirinrj  cases  it  was  held  that 
a  joint  action  should  have  been  sererol. 

Seaton  v.  Booth,  4  A.  &  E.  528. 
Assumpsit.  A,  B,  &  C,  being  interested 
in  certain  lands,  but  having  no  common 
legal  interest  in  any  portion  of  them, 
agreed  together,  according  to  their  re- 
spective interests,  to  put  them  up  for 
sale,  and  the  lands  were  so  put  up,  imder 
the  direction  of  tlicir  agents,  in  lots. 
Each  lot  was    described  in  a  separate 


paper,  containing  the  conditions  of  sale, 
in  which  it  was  stijiulated,  among  other 
things,  that  if  the  purchaser  should  be 
let  into  the  premises  before  payment  of 
the  purchase-money,  he  should  be  consid- 
ered tenant  at  will  to  the  vendors,  and 
pay  interest  at  the  rate  of  four  per  cent 
on  the  amount  of  purchase-money,  as 
and  for  rent.  Defendant  bought  four  of 
the  lots,  and  was  let  into  possession,  and 
held  for  several  years  without  paying  the 
purchase-monej' ;  whereupon  the  vendors 
brought  their  joint  action  against  him, 
to  recover  rent.  Their  declaration  con- 
tained two  counts  :  one  upon  the  contract 
between  the  plaintiffs  and  defendant  for 
the  sale  of  the  property ;  the  other  for 
use  and  occupation.  Held,  that  the  ac- 
tion could  not  be  sustained  on  either 
count ;  not  on  the  first,  because  no  joint 
contract  with  all  the  plaintiffs  was 
proved ;  not  on  the  second,  because  no 
joint  ownership  in  the  plaintiffs,  and 
occupation  under  them  was  proved.  — 
Wilkinson  v.  Hall,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  713. 
Action  of  debt  against  lessee  for  double 
value,  under  stat.  4  Geo.  II  c.  28,  for 
holding  over.  Held,  that  tenants  in  com- 
mon could  not  maintain  such  action 
jointly  where  there  had  been  no  joint 
demise.  "  If  there  be  no  joint  demise, 
there  must  be  several  actions  for  rent,  for 
a  joint  action  is  not  maintainable  except 
upon  a  joint  demise."  Tindal,  C.  J.  — 
Servante  v.  James,  10  B.  &  C.  410.  Cove- 
nant. The  defendant,  who  was  master 
of  a  vessel,  covenanted  with  the  plain- 
tiff and  others,  part-owners,  and  their 
several  and  resjiective  executors,  adminis- 
trators, and  assigns,  to  pay  certain  monej's 
to  them  and  to  their  and  every  of  their 
several  and  respective  executors,  adminis- 
trators, and  assigns,  at  a  certain  banker's, 
and  in  such  penis  and  proportions  as  were 
set  against  their  several  and  respective 
names.  The  action  was  brought  by  all 
the  covenantees  jointly.  Held,  that  the 
covenant  was  several,  and  so  the  action 
not  well  brought,  but  each  covenantee 
should  have  brought  a  separate  action. 
—  Grvham  v.  Robertson,  2  T.  R.  282. 
Plaintiffs,  together  with  A  &  B,  being 
owners  of  one  ship,  and  the  defendant  of 
another,  a  prize  was  taken,  condenmcd, 
and  shared  by  agreement  between  them; 
afterwards  the  sentence  of  condemnation 
was  reversed,  and  restitution  awarded, 
with  costs,  which  was  ])aid  solely  by  the 
plaintiffs,  A  and  B  having  in  tiic  mean 
time  become  bankrupts.    An  action  could 

25 


*9r: 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[BOOK   I. 


*  26    ill  bar  an  accord  and  satisfaction  with  *  one  of  the  plaintiffs, 

but  without  any  allegation  that  the  other  plaintiff's  had 
authorized  the  accord  and  satisfaction,  the  plea  is  nevertheless 
good.  (?f)  For  a  release  of  a  debt,  or  of  a  claim  to  damages, 
by  one  of  many  who  hold  this  debt  or  claim  jointly,  is  a  full  dis- 
charge of  it,  and  this  whether  they  hold  this  debt  or  claim  in  their 
own  right,  or  as  executors  or  administrators,  (a;)  This  has  been 
extended  to  the  case  where  the  release  is  given  by  one  of  joint 
plaintiffs,  who,  although  a  party  to  the  record,  is  not  a  party  in 

interest,  but  whose  name  the  actual  parties  in  interest  were 

*  27    obliged  to  use  with  their  own  in  bringing  the  *  action,  (y) 

Nevertheless,  if  in  such  a  case  the  party  taking  the  release, 
and  pleading  it  in  bar,  is  aware  that  the  party  giving  it  had  no 
interest  in  the  claim  released,  the  court  would  disregard  the 
release  ;  (z)  and  upon  such  facts  as  these  the  court  have  ordered 
the  release  to  be  given  up  and  cancelled,  (a) 

If  two   or  more   are   jointly  bound,  or  jointly  and  severally 


not  be  broujiht  by  the  plaintiffs  alone  for 
a  moiety  of  the  restitution  money  and 
costs,  because  it  was  eitlier  a  partnership 
transaction,  when  A  and  B  ought  to  be 
joined ;  or  not,  when  separate  actions 
should  be  brought  by  each  of  the  persons 
paying.  See  also  Sniitli  v.  Hunt,  2  Chitt. 
142  ;  Brandon  i:  Hubbard,  2  Br.  &  B.  11 ; 
Tippet  V.  Hawkey,  3  Mod.  2G3 ;  Walvc- 
peace  v.  Coutes,  8  Mass.  451,  overruled  in 
Capen  v.  Barrows,  1  Gray,  37G  ;  Brand  v. 
Boulcott,  :J  B.  &  r.  235;  Kelby  v.  Steel, 
5  Esp.  194. 

American  Cases.  —  Boggs  v.  Ctjrtin, 
10  S.  &  R.  211.  Two  firms,  C.  &  B.  and 
J.  &  1).,  liaving  become  sureties  for  A., 
gave  their  joint  and  several  note  for  the 
debt  of  A.  JJfld,  that  tiie  two  firms,  on 
payment  by  them  of  the  note,  could  not 
maintain  a  joint  action  against  A.,  it  not 
appearing  that  the  payment  was  made 
out  of  a  joint  finul  of  the  two  firms. 
'•  The  action  of  assumpsit  must  be  joint 
or  several,  accordingly  as  the  promise 
on  wliicii  it  is  founded  is  joint  or  sev- 
eral. Where  tiie  promise  is  express,  there 
can  be  little  dilticulty  in  determining 
to  which  class  it  belongs,  as  its  nature 
necessarily  ai)i)ears  on  the  face  of  the 
contract  itself;  and  if  it  be  joint,  all  to 
whom  it  is  made  must,  or  at  least  may 
sue  on  it  jointly  .  .  .  But  an  impliod 
I)romise,  being  altogether  i<leal,  and 
raised  out  of  the  consideralinn  only  by  in- 
tendment of  law,  follows  the  nature  of 
the  consideration  ;  and  as  that  is  joint  or 

26 


several,  so  will  the  promise  be."  Gibson, 
J.  —  Cartiirae  v.  Brown,  3  Leigh,  98. 
C.  covenanted  with  B.  &  J.  that  he 
would  pay  B.  and  J.  SSOO,  namely,  to 
each  of  them  one  moiety  thereof.  Held, 
a  several  covenant,  so  that  B.,  as  the 
survivor  of  the  two,  could  not  maintain 
an  action  to  recover  tlie  whole  sum. 
—  Ulmer  v.  Cunningham,  2  Greenl.  117. 
Assumpsit  for  money  had  and  received. 
Goods,  belonging  to  some  and  not  to  all, 
of  sundry  joint  debtors,  were  taken  in  ex- 
ecution and  wasted.  Held,  that  all  the 
debtors  could  not  maintain  a  joint  action 
against  the  sheriff,  and  that  those  only 
ought  to  have  sued  whose  property  was 
actually  wasted. 

(iv)  Wallace  v.  Kensall,  7  M.  &  W. 
264. 

(,r)  Bac.  Abr.  Release,  D.  E. ;  Jacomb 
V.  Harwood,  2  Ves.  Sen.  265;  Murray 
V.  Blatchford,  1  Wend.  583 ;  Napier  v. 
McLeod,  9  Wend.  120 ;  Decker  v.  Living- 
ston, 15  Johns.  479  ;  I'ierson  r.  Hooker,  3 
Johns.  08;  Austin  r.  Hall,  13  Johns.  286; 
Bulkley  i'.  Dayton,  14  Johns.  387  ;  Bruen 
V.  Marquand,  17  Jolms.  58;  Helsey  v. 
Fairbanks,  4  ISIason,  206;  Tuckerman 
V.  Newhall,  17  Mass.  581 ;  Wiggin  v. 
Tudor,  23  Pick.  444. 

(?/)  Wilkinson  v.  Lindo,  7  M.  &  W. 
81 ;  "Gibson  v.  Winter,  5  B.  &  Ad.  96. 

(z)  Gram  v.  Cadwell,  5  Cowen,  489; 
Legh  V.  Legh,  1  B.  &  P.  447. 

(a)  Barker  v.  Richardson,  1  Y.  &  J. 
302. 


CH.  II.]  OP  JOINT  PARTIES.  *  28 

bound,  and  the  obligee  releases  to  one  of  them,  all  arc  dis- 
charged. (5)  Formerly  a  very  strict  and  technical  rule  was 
applied  to  these  cases ;  thus,  where  an  action  was  brought  against 
one  of  three  who  were  bound  jointly  and  severally,  a  plea  in  bar 
that  the  seal  of  one  of  the  others  was  torn  off  was  held  good. 
And  where  three  were  bound  jointly  and  severally,  and  the  seals 
of  two  were  eaten  off  by  rats,  the  court  inclined  to  think  the 
obligation  void  against  all.  (c)  But  if  the  seals  had  remained  on 
until  issue  were  joined,  their  removal  afterwards  would  not  have 
avoided  the  bond,  (c?) 

Where  a  technical  release,  that  is,  a  release  under  seal,  is  given 
to  one  of  two  joint  debtors,  and  the  other  being  sued,  pleads  the 
joint  indebtedness  and  the  release,  it  is  no  answer  to  say  that  the 
release  was  made  at  the  defendant's  request,  and  in  consideration 
that  he  thereupon  promised  to  remain  liable  for  the  debt,  and 
unaffected  by  the  release  ;  (g)  for  this  would  be  a  parol  exception 
to  a  sealed  instrument ;  or  rather  a  parol  renewal  in  part,  of 
a  sealed  instrument  which  was  wholly  discharged.  This  being 
the  reason,  it  should  follow  that  only  a  release  under  seal  should 
have  the  effect  of  excluding  this  answer;  and  the  weight  of 
authority  is  certainly  and  very  greatly  in  favor  of  this  limita- 
tion. (/)  It  has,  however,  been  held  in  this  country,  that 
a  release  which  is  not  under  seal,  to  *  one  of  many  joint  *  28 
debtors,  of  his  share  or  proportion  of  the  debt,  operates  in  '^ 

law  as  a  full  discharge  of  all.  (^)  But  though  the  word  release 
be  used,  even  under  seal,  yet  if  the  parties,  the  instrument  being 
considered  as  a  whole  and  in  connection  with  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  and  the  relations  of  the  parties,  cannot 
reasonably  be  supposed  to  have  intended  a  release,  it  will  be 
construed  as  only  an  agreement  not  to  charge  the  person  or  party 
to  whom  the  release  is  given,  and  will  not  be  permitted  to  have 
the  effect  of  a  technical  release  ;  (li)  for  a  general  covenant  not  to 

{h)  Co.  Lit.  232  a  ;  Bac.  Abr.  Release,  (e)  Brooks  v.  Stuart,  9  A.  &  E.  854; 

G. ;  Vin.  Abr.  Release,   G.    a  ;   Dean  v.  Parker  v.  Lawrence,   Hob.  70. 
Newnali,  8  T.  R.  168 ;  Hutton  z-.  Eyre,  6  [f)  Shaw    v.    Pratt,    22    Pick.    305; 

Taunt.   289;   Lacy   v.   Kynaston,    1  Ld.  Walker   v.    McCulloch,   4   Greenl.   421  ; 

Raym.  GOO;   s.  c.  'l2  Mod.  551;  Clayton  Lunt  v.  Stevens,  24  Me.  534;  Harrison  v. 

V.    Kynaston,    Salk.    574  ;    Milliken    v.  Close,  2  Johns.  448 ;  Rowley  v.  Stoddard, 

Brown,  1  Rawle,  391 ;  Johnson  v.  Collins,  7  Johns.  210  ;  McAUcster  r.  Sprague,  34 

20  Ala.  435.  Me.  29G ;  Pond  v.  Williams,  1  (hay,  030. 

(c)  Baylv   V.   Garford,    March,    125;  (r/)  Milliken  e-.  Brown,  1  Rawle,  391. 

Seaton  ?•.  Henson,  2  Show.  29.  {h)   Solly  v.  Forbes,  2  Br.  &  B.   46; 

((-/)  Nichols  V.  Haywood,  Dyer,  59  pi.  McAllesteriJ.  Sprague,  34  Me.  296;  Burke 

12,  13 ;  Michaell  v.  StoCkworth,  Owen,  8.  v.  Noble,  48  Penn.  St.  168. 

27 


*  29  THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

sue  is  not  itself  a  release  of  the  covenantee,  but  is  so  construed 
by  the  law,  to  avoid  circuity  of  action  ;  and  a  covenant  not  to  sue 
one  of  many,  who  are  jointly  indebted,  does  not  discharge  one  who 
is  a  joint  debtor  with  the  covenantee,  nor  in  any  way  affect  his 
obligation.  (^) 

It  may  be  added,  though  not  strictly  within  the  law  of  con- 
tracts, that  the  effect  of  a  release  of  damages  to  one  of  two 
wrong-doers  is  the  same  as  a  release  of  debt ;  it  is  in  its  opera- 
tion a  satisfaction  of  the  whole  claim  arising  out  of  the  tort, 
and  discharges  all  the  parties.  (j~)  And  in  actions  against  two  or 
more  defendants  for  a  joint  tort,  it  has  been  said  that  damages 
should  be  assessed  against  all  jointly  for  the  largest  amount 
which  cither  ought  to  pay.  (/c)  The  true  rule,  however,  must  be, 
that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  all  the  injury  he 
has  received,  and  for  this  there  should  be  judgment  against  all 
who  joined  in  doing  the  wrong.  Several  damages  should  not 
be  assessed ;  but  if  they  are,  the  plaintiff  may  elect  which  sum 
he  will,  and  remitting  the  others,  enter  judgment  for  this  sum 
against  all.  (?) 

*  29        *  No  release  by  the  party  injured,  or  claimant,  has  the 

effect  of  discharging  all,  although  given  but  to  one,  unless  it 
be  a  voluntary  release ;  for  if  one  of  two  who  owe  jointly,  either 
a  debt  or  compensation  for  a  wrong,  be  discharged  by  operation 
of  law,  without  the  concurrence  or  consent  of  the  party  to  whom 
the  debt  or  compensation  is  due,  he  docs  not  hereby  lose  his  right 
to  enforce  this  claim  against  those  not  discharged,  (m)  But  it  is 
said,  that  if  the  discharge  by  operation  of  law  is  at  the  instance 
of  the  plaintiff,  or  be  caused  by  him,  it  then  operates  as  a  dis- 
charge of  the  other  debtors,  (w) 

The  legal  operation  of  a  release  to  one  of  two  or  more  joint 
debtors  may  be  restrained  by  an  express  provision  in  the  instru- 
ment, that  it  shall  not  operate  as  to  the  other.     For  if  a  release 

(/)  Lane    f.    Owings,   3    Bibb,    247;  croft,  2  Str.  910;  Onslow  v.  Orcbanl,  1 

Shed  V.  Pierce,  17  Mass.  028;  Couch  a.  Str.  422;    Brown   v.    Allen,  4  Esp.  158; 

Mills,  21  Wend.  424  ;  Kowley  i:  Stod.lanl,  Austen  v.  Willward,  Cro.  E.  860;  Smith- 

7  .Johns.  20'.i;   McLeMan  v.   Cumberland  son  v.  Garth,  :}  Lev.  324. 
Bank,  21  Me.  r,m ;  Uauk  of  Caiskill   v.  (/)  .Jolins  v.  Dodsworth,  Cro.  C.  102; 

Mes.senKer,  0  Cowen,  37  ;   Hurell  r.  Wen-  AValsh  r.  Bislio]),  Cro.  C.  213 ;   Ilcvdon's 

dell,  8  N.  II  m'.t;  Bank  of  Chenango  v.  Case,  11  Bej).  5;  Ilalsey  v.  Woodi-uff,  9 

Osgood,  4  Wend.  007;  Lancaster  v.  liar-  Pick.  5o-') ;  Bodney  i-.  Strode,  Carth.  19. 
rison.  G  Bing.  731  ;  s.  c.  4  Mo.  &  P.  501  ;  (in)  Ward  r.  Johnson,  13  Mass.  152. 

Dean  y.  Newhall,  H  T.  B.  I(i8.  (/<)  Koberston    v.    Smith,    18    Johns. 

(  /)  Brown  v.  Marsh,  7  Vt.  320.  459. 

(Ic)  Bull.  N.  P.  15 ;  Lowfield  i-.  Bau- 

28 


CH.  II.]  OF   JOINT   PARTIES.  *  30 

containing  such  a  proviso  be  pleaded  by  the  other  in  bar  to  an 
action  against  both,  a  replication  that  the  action  is  brought  against 
both,  only  to  recover  of  the  other,  is  good,  (o) 

If  an  action  be  brought  against  many,  and  to  this  an  accord 
and  satisfaction  by  one  be  pleaded  in  bar,  it  must  ])e  complete, 
covering  the  whole  ground,  and  fully  executed.  It  is  not  enough 
if  it  be  in  effect  only  a  settlement  with  one  of  the  defendants  for 
his  share  of  the  damages ;  nor  would  it  be  enough  if  it  were  only 
this  in  fact,  although  in  form  an  accord  and  satisfaction  of  the 
whole  claim,  (jy) 

Joint  trustees  are  not  necessarily  liable  for  each  other,  or 
bound  by  each  other's  acts.  Each  is  liable  for  the  acts  of  others, 
only  so  far  as  he  concurred  in  them,  or  connived  at  them,  actively 
or  negligently.  Each  is,  in  general,  responsible  only  for  money 
which  he  has  himself  received ;  and  if  he  signs  a  receipt  with  the 
others,  because  the  receipt  would  have  no  force  without  his  signa- 
ture, he  may,  at  least  in  equity  (unless  he  is  himself  in  default), 
show  that  he  did  not  receive  the  money,  and  thus  remove  or 
limit  his  liability  ;  but  if  this  be  not  shown,  the  joint  receipt 
is  evidence  against  all.  {q')  A  trustee  may  thus  *  explain  *  30 
his  receipt,  because  he  is  obliged  to  join  with  the  others  in 
giving  one ;  but  a  co-executor  not  being  under  this  necessity,  it 
is  said  that  he  is  bound  by  the  receipt  he  signs,  (r)  And,  in  gen- 
eral, any  co-executor  or  co-trustee  who  does  jointly  with  the  others 
any  act  which  it  is  not  necessary  for  him  to  do,  is  bound  thereby 
to  any  party  who  shall  suffer  therefrom,  (s) 

If  two  or  more  persons  are  bound  jointly  to  pay  a  sum  of 
money,  and  one  of  them  dies,  at  common  law  his  death  not  only 
severs  the  joinder,  but  terminates  the  liability  which  belonged  to 
him,  so  that  it  cannot  be  enforced  against  his  representatives  ;  Q} 
but  if  they  were  bound  jointly  and  severally,  the  death  of  one  has 

(o)  Twopenny  v.  Young,  3    B.  &    C.  Eden,  3G0 ;  Griffin   v.  Macaulay,  7  Gratt. 

211 ;  s.  c.  5  Dow.  &  R.  201  ;  Lancaster  v.  476. 

Harrison,  4  Mo.  &  P.  561  ;  s.  c.  6  Bing.  (r)  Sadler  v.  Hobbs,  2  Br.    Ch.  114 ; 

726  :  Solly  '•.  Forl)cs,  2  Br.  &  B.  38  ;  North  Chambers  v.  Minchin,  7  Ves.  198. 
V.  Wakefield,  13   Q.   B.    530.     See  jwsl,  (s)  Brice    v.    Stokes,    11    Ves.    310  ; 

p.  *285.  Sadler  i'.  Hobbs,  2  Br.  Ch.  95,  and  note 

{]>)    Anderson    v.    Turnpike    Co.,    16  to  Ara.  ed. 
Johns.  87 ;  Clark  v.  Dinsmore,   5  N.    H.  {f)  Bac.  Abr.  Obligations,  T>.  4  ;  Os- 

136  ;  Rayne  r.  Orton,  Cro.  E.  305  ;  Lynn  borne  v.  Crosbern,  1  Sid.  238  ;  Caldcr  v. 

V.  Bruce,  2  H.  Bl.  317.  Eutherford,  3  Br.    &  B.  302  ;    Foster  v. 

(q)  Fellows  v.  Mitchell,  1  P,  Wms.  83,  Hooper,  2  Mass.  572 ;  Yorks  v.  Peck,  14 

and   Cox's  note ;    Westly   v.   Clarke,   1  Barb.  644. 

29 


*31  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

not  this  effect.  (?*)  If  bound  jointly,  the  whole  debt  becomes  the 
debt  of  the  survivors  alone,  and  if  they  pay  the  whole,  they  can 
have  at  law  no  contribution  against  the  representatives  of  the 
deceased,  because  this  would  be  an  indirect  revival  of  a  liability 
which  death  has  wholly  terminated,  (v)  But  where  the  debt  was 
made  joint  by  fraud  or  error,  equity  will  relieve  by  granting  con- 
tribution ;  as  it  will  if  the  debt  were  for  money  lent  to  both  and 
received  by  both,  so  that  both  actually  participate  in  the  bene- 
fit, (w)  K  the  last  survivor  dies,  leaving  the  debt  unpaid,  his  rep- 
resentatives alone  are  chargeable,  and  have  no  contribution  against 
the  representatives  of  the  other  deceased  obligor. 

Such  were  the  rules  of  the  common  law ;  but  in  most  of  the 
United  States  these  rules  are  changed  by  statute.  The  represen- 
tatives of  the  deceased  continue  to  be  bound  by  his  obligation. 
If  the  debtors  were  jointly  bound,  the  creditor  could  l)ring  but  one 
action  when  all  were  alive,  and  that  against  all ;  and  then  obtain- 
ing judgment  and  taking  out  execution  against  a^  he  might  levy 
it  on  all  or  either  as  he  chose,  leaving  them  to  adjust  their 
*  31  proportion  by  contribution.  After  the  death  of  a  *  joint 
debtor,  the  creditor  cannot  join  the  survivors  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  deceased  in  one  action,  even  if  the  statute  gives 
the  creditor,  where  one  of  many  joint  debtors  dies,  the  same 
remedy  by  action  as  if  the  contract  were  joint  and  several ;  inas- 
much as  an  executor  cannot  be  joined  with  the  survivors  in  an 
action  upon  a  contract  which  was  originally  joint  and  several, 
because  one  would  be  charged  de  boriis  testatork,  and  the  other  de 
bonis  jjrojyriis,  which  cannot  be ;  (a;)  but  the  creditor  may  elect 
which  to  sue.  (^)  He  may  sue  either,  or  both,  in  distinct  actions, 
and  may  levy  his  executions  upon  cither  or  both.  But  he  can 
get,  in  the  whole,  only  the  amount  of  his  debt ;  and  the  survivors 
and  the  rf]»rcscntativcs  of  the  deceased,  or  the  representatives  of 
all  the  debtors,  if  all  are  deceased,  have  against  each  other  a  claim 
for  contribution,  if  either  pay  more  than  a  due  proportion,  (z) 

If  one  or  more  of  several  joint  obligees  die,  the  right  of  action 
is  solely  in  the  survivors,  and  if  all  die,  the  action  must  be  brought 

(ii)  Towers    v.    Moore,   2   Vern.   99;  (.r)  Kemp   r.    Andrews,   Carth.    171 

May  V.  Woodward,  Freem.  '^48.  Hall  v.   Iluffani,  2  Lev.  228. 

((,•)  See  note  ('l.p.  ii2,  post.  (ij)  May  v.   Woodward,  Freem.   248 

(w)  Waters  v.  Kiley,  2  liar.  &  G.  313 ;  Enys  v.  Donnithorne,  2  Bur.  1190. 
Simpson  r.  Vaufilian,  2  Atk.  33;  Yorks  y.  (;:)  Peaslee  v.  Breed,  10  N.  H.  489 

Peck,  14  Barl).  044.  Bachelder  v.  Fiske,  17  Mass.  464. 

30 


CH.  II.] 


OF  JOINT   PARTIES. 


32 


by  the  representatives  of  the  last  survivor,  (a)  But  if  the  right 
under  the  contract  be  several,  the  representatives  of  the  deceased 
party  may  sue,  although  the  other  o])ligecs  arc  living,  (i) 


SECTION  III. 


OF   CONTRIBUTION. 


Where  two  or  more  persons  are  jointly,  or  jointly  and  severally, 
bound  to  pay  a  sum  of  money,  and  one  or  more  of  them  pay  the 
whole,  or  more  than  his  or  their  share,  and  thereby  relieve  the 
others  so  far  from  their  liability,  those  paying  may  recover  from 
those  not  paying,  the  aliquot  proportion  which  they  ought 
to  pay.  (c)  Some  things  have  been  said  about  thi^  *  right  to  *  32 
contribution,  in  the  preceding  section ;  we  add  that  the  per- 
sons not  paying,  but  being  relieved  from  a  positive  liability  by  the 
payment  of  others  who  were  bound  with  them,  are  held  by  the  law 
as  under  an  implied  promise  to  contribute  each  his  share  to  make 
up  the  whole  sum  paid.  («i)     And  this  rule  applies  equally  to 


(a)  Rolls  r.  Yate,  Yelv.  177;  Ander- 
son r.  Martindale,  1  East,  497 ;  Stowell's 
Admr.  v.  Drake,  8  Zabr.  310. 

(b)  Shaw  V.  Sherwood,  Cro.  E.  729. 

(c)  Harbert's  Case,  13  Eep.  13  a,  15  b  ; 
Layer  v.  Nelson,  1  Vern.  456  ;  Toussaint 
V.  Martinnant,  2  T.  R.  104 ;  Kemp  v.  Fin- 
den,  12  M.  &  W.  421 ;  Browne  v.  Lee,  6 
B.  &  C.  689;  Sadler  i-.  Nixon,  5  B.  &  Ad. 
936 ;  Holmes  v.  Williamson,  6  M.  &  Sel. 
159 ;  Blackett  v.  Weir,  5  B.  &  C.  387 ; 
Lanchcster  v.  Tricker,  1  Bing.  201 ;  Boul- 
ter V.  Peplow,  9  C.  B.  193.  In  Offley  and 
Johnson's  case,  2  Leon.  166  [1584],  the 
Court  of  King's  Bench  held  that  one 
surety  had  no  right  at  common  law  to 
recover  contribution  from  a  co-surety. 
"  The  first  case  of  the  kind  in  which  the 
plaintiff  succeeded  was  before  Gould,  J., 
at  Dorchester."  Buller,  J.,  2  T.  R.  105.  — 
The  action  for  money  paid  to  recover 
contribution  is  founded  upon  the  old  writ 
dc  conlributione  faciendd.  TIndal,  C.  J., 
Edger  v.  Knapp,  5  Man.  &  G.  758,  citing 
Fitzherbert's  Natura  Brevium,  378,  in 
the  edition  of  1794,  p.  162.  From  the 
passage  in  Fitzherbert,  as  the  English 
version  is  amended  by  the  learned  repor- 
ter of  Edger  v.  Knapp,  5  Man.  &  G.  758, 
759,  it  seems  that  a  parcener  distrained 


upon  is  entitled  to  contribution  without 
any  express  agreement  on  the  part  of  her 
coparceners,  while  to  entitle  a.  joint  feoffee 
to  contribution,  under  similar  circum- 
stances, the  other  feoffees  must  have 
agreed  to  contribute.  In  analogy  to  the 
case  of  feoffees,  one  partner,  in  order  to 
entitle  himself  to  recover  contribution  of 
his  copartner,  is  bound  to  show  a  contract 
independent  of  the  relation  of  partner : 
rindal,  C.  J.,  5  ]Man.  &  G.  759.  It  is  not 
sufficient  for  him  to  show  that  the  pay- 
ment made  on  account  of  his  copartners 
was  made  iy  compulsion  of  law.  Sadler  v. 
Nixon,  5  B!  &  Ad.  9:]Q'.  —  In  Hunter  v. 
Hunt,  1  C.  B.  300,  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ant respectively  were  under-lessees,  at 
distinct  rents,  of  separate  portions  of 
premises,  the  whole  of  which  were  held 
under  one  original  lease,  at  an  entire 
rent.  Plaintiff,  having  paid  the  whole 
under  a  threat  of  distress,  brougiit  an 
action  agamst  defendant  to  recover  the 
proportion  of  rent  due  from  him,  as  for 
money  paid  to  his  use  :  Held,  tliat  the 
action  was  not  maintainable.  See  Sprin- 
ger V.  Springer,  43  Penn.  St.  R.  518. 

(d)  Contribution  was  at  first  enforced 
only  in  equity,  and  Lord  Eldon  regretted 
(not  without  reason,  in  tlie  opinion  of 

31 


33 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  T. 


those  who  arc  bound  as  original  co-contractors,  and  to  those  who 
are  bound  to  pay  the  debt  of  another  or  answer  for  his  default,  as 

co-sureties,  (e) 
*  33        *  The  payment,  to  establish  a  claim  for  contribution,  must 

be  compulsory.  Hence,  if  one  of  many  wlio  must  pay  a  cer- 
tain debt,  might  show  if  sued  that  he  was  bound  to  pay  only  a  cer- 
tain proportion  and  could  defend  himself  against  a  further  claim, 
his  payment  of  more  than  his  share  gives  him  no  claim  for  con- 
tribution. (/)  But  this  does  not  mean  that  there  must  be  a  suit, 
but  only  a  fixed  and  positive  obligation.  (^)  The  law  requires  no 
one  to  wait  for  a  suit,  if  he  has  no  defence ;  and  not  always,  even 
if  he  has  a  defence,  (li)     And  if  he  resists  a  suit  in  which  he  has 


Baron  Parke,  6  M.  &  W.  168),  that  courts 
of  law  ever  assumed  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject.  It  is  universally  admitted  that 
the  duty  of  contribution  originates  in  the 
equitable  consideration  that  those  who 
have  assumed  a  common  burden  ought  to 
bear  it  equally ;  from  this  equitable  obli- 
gation the  law  implies  a  contract,  since 
all  who  have  become  jointly  liable  may 
reasonably  be  considered  as  mutually 
contracting  among  themselves  with  ref- 
erence to  the  duty  in  conscience.  Lord 
Eldon,  Craytliorne  v.  Swinburne,  14  Ves. 
160,  IGO  (adopting  the  view  taken  by 
Romilly  argnetulu)  ;  Campbell  v.  Mesier,  4 
Johns.  Ch.  334 ;  Lansdale  v.  Cox,  7  Monr. 
401  ;  Fletcher  v.  Grover,  11  N.  H  3G8 ; 
Jolinson  V,  Johnson,  11  Mass.  359  ;  Chaf- 
fee V.  Jones,  19  Pick.  2C)i;  Horbach  v. 
Elder,  18  Penn.  33 ;  Powers  v.  Nash.  37 
Me.  322 ;  Holmes  v.  Weed,  19  Barb.  128  ; 
Yates  V.  Donaldson,  5  Md.  389. — As- 
sumpsit for  money  paid  is  the  usual  ac- 
tion for  enforcing  contribution,  and  its 
propriety,  before  taken  for  granted,  was 
confirmed  in  Kemp  v.  Finden,  12  M.  &  W. 
421. 

(e)  The  payee  of  a  note,  given  by 
the  defendant's  testator  as  principal, 
neglected  to  present  it  to  the  executor 
within  two  years  after  the  original  grant 
of  administration,  and  was  by  statute 
barred  of  his  a(;tion  against  him.  Tlie 
plaintiff  who  signed  the  note  as  surety 
was  held  not  to  be  discharged  by  the 
creditor's  neglect  to  present  his  claim, 
and  liaving  [lai'l  the  note  was  entitled 
to  recover  the  amount  of  the  executor. 
Sibley  v.  McAllaster,  8  N.  II.  389.  See 
also  Cliii)man  i:  Morrill,  20  Cal.  1.30. 
Bachelder  v.  Fiske,  17  Mass.  404,  was 
perhaps  the  earliest  case  where  the  ex- 
ecutor of  a  deceased  co-debtor  was  held 
liable  at  law  for  contribution.  The  court 
tliere  met  the  technical  objections  that 

32 


were  raised,  with  the  maxim,  Ubi  jus  ibi 
remedinm.  And  see  McKenna  v.  George, 
2  Rich.  Eq.  15;  Riddle  v.  Bowman,  7 
Foster  (N.  H.),  236. 

The  surviving  surety  on  a  joint  ad- 
ministration bond,  on  account  of  which 
he  was  compelled  to  make  large  pay- 
ments, sought  to  recover  contribution 
from  the  representatives  of  a  deceased 
co-surety  :  it  was  held,  that  in  the  case  of 
a  joint  bond,  the  remedy  at  law  survives 
against  the  surviving  obligor,  and  is  lost 
against  the  representatives  of  him  who 
dies  first ;  that  where  all  the  obligors  are 
principals,  equity  will  enforce  contribu- 
tion though  the  remedy  at  law  is  gone, 
but  in  case  of  a  surety  it  will  not  inter- 
fere to  charge  him  beyond  his  legal  lia- 
bility in  the  absence  of  fraud,  accident, 
or  mistake ;  that  although  a  surety  who 
has  paid  the  debt  may  compel  his  living 
co-surety  to  contribute,  he  has  no  such 
right  either  at  law  or  in  equiti/,  against  the 
estate  of  a  deceased  co-surety,  because 
the  liability  of  the  creditor  was  termi- 
nated by  his  death  and  cannot  be  indi- 
rectly revived.  Waters  r.  Riley,  2  liar. 
&  G.  305.  But  see  the  able  dissenting 
opinion  of  Archer,  J. 

(/■)  Lucas  v.  Jefferson  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cow. 
035.  See  also  Mutual  Safety  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Hone,  2  Comst.  235. 

(7)  Pitt  V.  Purssord,  8  M.  &  W.  538; 
May  dew  r.  Forrester,  5  Taunt.  615; 
Davies  v.  Humphreys,  6  M.  &  W.  153; 
Lord  7\enyon,  Child  r.  jMorlcy,  8  T.  R. 
014;  Frith  i\  Spraguo,  14  Mass.  455; 
Russell  ;•.  Failer,  1  O.  St.  .327.  ' 

(/))  It  has  been  held  that  a  surety  pay- 
ing when  he  had  a  good  defence,  which 
defence,  however,  was  not  available  to 
the  ])rincipal  if  he  had  been  sued  by  the 
creditor,  may  recover  of  the  principal. 
Shaw  V.  Loud,  12  Mass.  4G1. 


CH.  II.] 


OF    JOINT    PARTIES. 


34 


no  sufficient  defence,  he  cannot,  generally,  recover  from  the  party 
for  whom  he  pays,  the  costs  of  this  suit.  (^)  And  where  a 
contract  is  broken,  the  surety  may  *  pay  without  suit  and  *  34 
hold  the  principal,  and  a  co-surety  may  pay  and  hold  the  co- 
sureties to  contribution,  (j/')  And  the  right  to  contribution  arises 
although  the  co-surety  paid  the  debt  after  giving  a  bond  for  it 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  co-sureties.  (A;) 


(()  Whether  contribution  can  be  re- 
covered for  the  costs  of  a  suit  sustained 
in  resisting  payment,  is  left  in  doubt  by 
tiie  autiiorities.  Lord  Tenterden  ruled 
against  contribution  for  costs  in  Koach  i'. 
Thompson,  Mo.  &  M.  489;  Gillet  v.  Rip- 
pon,  id.  406 ;  Knight  v.  Huglies,  id.  247  ; 
in  the  latter  case  intimating  that  there 
might  be  a  distinction  between  a  case  be- 
tween two  sureties  (the  case  before  him) 
and  a  case  of  surety  against  principal. 
But  in  Kemp  v.  Findcn,  12  M.  &  W.  421, 
where  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  had  ex- 
ecuted as  sureties  a  warrant  of  attorney, 
given  as  collateral  security  for  a  sum  of 
money  advanced  on  mortgage  to  the  prin- 
cipals, and,  on  default  being  made  by  the 
principals,  judgment  was  entered  up  on 
the  warrant  of  attorney,  and  execution 
issued  against  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held 
that  he  was  entitled  to  recover  from  the 
defendant  as  his  co-surety  a  moiety  of 
the  costs  of  such  execution.  Parke,  B., 
said  :  "  They  were  costs  incurred  in  a  pro- 
ceeding to  recover  a  debt  for  which,  on 
default  of  the  principals,  both  the  sure- 
ties were  jointly  liable  ;  and  the  plaintiff 
having  paid  the  whole  costs,  I  see  no  rea- 
son wliy  the  defendant  should  not  pay 
his  proportion."  —  A  surety  to  a  note  was 
subjected  to  costs  in  consequence  of  its 
non-payment  by  the  principal ;  there  was 
an  agreement  in  writing  to  save  him 
harmless  ;  held,  that  he  was  entitled  to 
recover  the  costs  so  paid  by  him  in  an 
action  against  the  principal.  Bonney  v. 
Seely,  2  Wend.  481.  In  Cleveland  v. 
Covington,  3  Strob.  L.  184,  it  was  held 
that  as  a  general  rule  a  principal  was 
liable  for  costs  incurred  by  the  suretj', 
and  was  therefore  incompetent  as  a  wit- 
ness in  an  action  against  him.  Where  a 
judgment,  recovered  against  an  insolvent 
princ;ipal,  and  his  two  sureties,  was  paid 
by  one  of  them,  held,  that  he  could  recover 
of  his  co-surety  one  half  of  the  costs. 
Davis  V.  Emerson,  17  Me.  64.  And  in 
Fletcher  v.  Jackson,  23  Vt.  593,  the  right 
of  a  co-surety  to  recover  costs  and  ex- 
penses is  said  to  depend  altogether  upon 
the  question  whether  the  defence  was 
made  under  such  circumstances  as  to  be 
regarded  as  hopeful  and  prudent ;  if  so, 

VOL.  I. 


the  expenses  of  defence  may  always  be 
recovered.  —  But  not  if  the  surety  be 
notified  tliat  there  is  no  defence.  Beck- 
ley  V.  Munson,  22  Conn.  299.  —  In  Board- 
man  V.  Page,  UN.  H.  431,  where  an 
action  was  commenced  by  the  holder  of  a 
note  against  all  the  co-signers,  Sii\d  judg- 
ment was  recovered  against  one  only,  it 
was  held  that  upon  payment  of  damages 
and  costs  of  the  judgment,  the  party 
against  wliom  the  judgment  was  recov- 
ered was  not  entitled  to  contribution  from 
the  other  co-signers  in  respect  to  the 
costs  —  the  same  not  being  a  burden 
common  to  all  the  co-signers  of  the 
note.  —  It  would  seem  not  unreasonable 
to  conclude,  notwithstanding  the  nisi 
prins  decisions  of  Lord  Tenterden,  that 
where  the  party  from  whom  contribu- 
tion is  sought  was  at  the  time  of  the 
former  action  directly  liable  for  th.e  debt 
to  the  creditor,  so  that  if  the  latter  had 
chosen  he  might  have  been  sued  by  him, 
contribution  may  be  recovered  for  the 
costs  of  the  judgment,  though  not  per- 
haps for  costs  incurred  in  resisting  pay- 
ment of  the  judgment.  Yet  in  the  late 
case  of  Henry  v.  Goldney,-  15  M.  &  W. 
494,  496,  an  action  ex  contractu  being 
brought  against  A,  and  he  pleading  in 
abatement  the  pendency  of  another  ac- 
tion for  the  same  cause  against  B,  it  was 
contended  that  the  plea  ought  to  be  sus- 
tained, to  prevent  A  from  being  twice 
vexed  for  the  same  cause  ;  but  Alderson, 
B.,  observed :  "  How  is  A  vexed  by  an 
action  being  brought  against  B  ?  B  can- 
not recover  against  A  his  proportion  of  the 
costs." 

(j)  It  has  been  held  in  Kentucky 
that  the  principal  must  be  insolvent  to 
render  a  co-surety  liable  to  contribute  to 
another  who  has  paid  the  debt.  Pearson 
V.  Duckham,  3  Litt.  386  ;  Daniel  v.  Bal- 
lard, 2  Dana,  296.  But  this  is  opposed 
to  the  prevailing  doctrine.  Cowell  v. 
Edwards,  2  B.  &  P.  268;  Odin  v.  Green- 
leaf,  8  N.  H.  270. 

(k)  Dunn  V.  Slee,  Holt,  399;  where 
it  was  also  held  by  Parke,  J.,  that  time 
given  to  one  surety  is  no  bar  to  an  action 
afterwards  by  that  surety  against  a  co- 
surety. 

3  33 


35 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


If  a  plaintiff  in  an  action  ex  contractu  recorcrs  judgment  and 
takes  out  an  execution,  a  defendant  upon  satisfying  the  execution 
makes  out  a  claim  for  contribution  against  other  parties,  by  show- 
ing cither  that  such  parties  were  co-defendants  in  the  action,  or 
that  they  were  jointly  liable  in  fact  for  the  debt  which  was 
*  35  made  a  cause  of  action  against  him  alone.  (V)  But  *  in 
the  latter  case  the  joint  liability  must  not  be  a  liability  as 
copartners,  (m) 

At  law  a  surety  can  recover  from  his  co-surety  only  that  co- 
"i^  surety's  aliquot  part,  calculated  upon  the  whole  number,  without 
reference  to  the  insolvency  of  others  of  the  co-sureties ;  (n)  but  in 
equity  it  is  otherwise,  (o) 

If  one  co-surety  takes  security  from  the  principal  for  his  pro- 
portion of  the  burden,  or  for  the  whole,  the  other  co-surety  shall 
share  in  the  benefit  of  it.  (jp) 

The  contract  of  contribution  is  a  several  contract.  Qq)  .  And 
hence  a  surety  may  release  one  of  his  co-sureties  without  barring 
his  right  of  action  against  the  rest ;  for  a  release  of  one  surety 
discharges  the  others  only  from  such  a  proportion  of  the  debt  as 
they  would  be  entitled  to  have  recourse  to  the  discharged  party 
for,  upon  their  payment  of  the  whole  debt,  (r)    But  if  two  co-sure- 


(/)  In  Murray  v.  Bogert,  14  Johns. 
318,  it  was  held  that  where  A  who  claims 
contribution  of  B  &  C,  on  the  ground  of 
liaving  paid  a  judgment,  sliows  neither 
that  B  &  C  were  parties  to  the  judgment, 
nor  that  the  debt  was  a  joint  one,  not  aris- 
ing out  of  a  partnersliip  transaction,  he 
must  be  nonsuited.  The  reporter's  ab- 
etract  seems  incorrect,  in  so  far  as  it  rep- 
resents the  court  as  holding  that  the  mere 
absence  of  proof  that  the  ilefendants  were 
parties  to  the  judgment  was  fatal  to  the 
claim  of  contri])ution.  Sucli  a  doctrine 
would  he  direcllv  in  the  face  of  Holmes 
V.  Williamson,  G  M.  &  Sel.  158;  Burnell 
V.  Minot,  4  Moore,  340 ;  Boardman  v. 
Paige,  n  N.  H.  431. 

(m)  Sadler  v.  Nixon,  5  B.  &  Ad.  0-30; 
Edgar  r.  Knapp,  5  Man.  &  G.  758;  Mur- 
ray i\  Bogert,  14  Johns.  318;  I'earson  v. 
Skelton,  1  M.  &  W.  504,  wliere  the  former 
action  was  ex  delicto.  But  where  the 
joint  contractors  were,  together  with 
many  others,  partners  in  a  joint-stock 
cf)n)pany,  of  which  they  were  the  con- 
tract connnittee  men,  contribution  was 
enforced  between  them  on  account  of  the 
joint  liability  incurred  by  them  as  such 
committee.   LSoulter  r.  IVpiow, ',/  C.  B.  403. 

(n)   Browne  i-.   Lee,  U  B.   &   C.   ^b\) ; 

^4 


Cowell  V.  Edwards,  2  B.  &  P.  268.  —  Shaw, 
C.  J.,  Chaffee  v.  Jones,  19  Pick.  2G5  ;  Cur- 
rier V.  Fellows,  7  Foster  (N.  H.),  360. 

[o]  Peter  v.  Rich,  1  Chanc.  34;  Cow- 
ell r.  Edwards,  2  B  &  P.  268.  —  And  in 
Vermont  the  rule  of  equity  has  been  held 
to  be  the  rule  of  law  also.  Mills  v.  Hyde, 
19  Vt.  59.  So  also,  Henderson  v.  McDuf- 
fee,  5  N.  H.  38,  but  there  the  decision 
went,  partly  at  least,  on  the  necessity  of 
the  case,  there  being  no  court  to  adminis- 
ter equitable  relief.  It  has  been  decided  in 
South  Carolina,  that  co-sureties  who  are 
not  within  the  jurisdiction,  as  well  as  in- 
solvent co-sureties,  are  to  be  excluded  in 
the  calculation  of  the  proportion  to  be 
contributed  by  those  against  whom  pay- 
ment can  he  enforced.  McKenna  v. 
George,  2  Kich.  I^q.  15. 

(p)  Miller  v.  Sawyer,  30  Vt.  412; 
Parham  v.  Green,  64  N.  C.  436. 

(q)  Ke^by  r  Steel,  5  Esp.  194  ;  Gra- 
ham V.  Koi)ertsun,  2  T.  11.  282 ;  Brand  v. 
Boulcott,  3  B.  &  P.  235 ;  Birkley  v.  Pres- 
grave,  1  East,  220;  Parker  v.  Ellis,  2 
Sandf.  223. 

(r)  Crowdus  v.  Shelby,  6  J.  J.  Marsh. 
61;  Fletcher  v.  Grover,  11  N.  II.  368; 
Fletcher  v.  Jackson,  23  Vt.  681. 


CH.  II.]  OF   JOINT   PARTIES.  *  36 

ties  pay  the  debt  out  of  a  joint  fund,  their  right  of  action  against 
the  principal,  and  as  it  would  seem  against  other  co-sureties,  is 
joint,  (s) 

The  contract  on  which  the  assumpsit  is  founded  dates  from  the 
time  when  the  relation  of  co-surety  or  co-obligor  is  entered  into  ;  al- 
though the  cause  of  action  does  not  arise  till  the  payment. 
*  Hence  the  discharge  of  one  of  the  joint  debtors  (by  what-  *  36 
ever  cause)  from  his  direct  liability  to  the  creditor,  does  not 
relieve  him  in  law,  any  more  than  in  equity,  from  his  obligation  to 
indemnify  such  of  the  remaining  joint  debtors  as  have  borne 
more  than  their  original  proportion  of  the  debt.  (^) 

The  undertaking  which  is  to  serve  as  the  foundation  of  a  claim 
of  contribution  must  be  joint,  not  separate  and  successive,  {tt') 
Thus,  the  second  indorser  of  a  promissory  note  is  not  liable  to  the 
first,  though  neither  be  indorser  for  value  ;  (u)  unless  there  is 
an  agreement  between  the  indorsers  that,  as  between  themselves 
there  shall  be  co-sureties  ;  (y)  and  this  is  true  even  if  they  are 
indorsers  of  accommodation  paper,  (w)  And  a  guarantor  cannot 
be  compelled  to  contribute  in  aid  of  a  surety,  (re) 

Directors  of  an  association  who  have  authority  to  contract  debts 
on  the  credit  of  members  of  the  corporation,  those  debts  being 
reasonable  and  necessary  for  carrying  on  the  business,  may  have 
a  bill  in  equity  against  the  members  for  contribution  towards  the 
payment  of  these  debts  ;  but  not  for  costs  and  expenses  of  suits 
instituted  against  them  by  creditors  of  the  association  ;  unless  a 

(s)  Osborne  v.  Harper,  5   East,  225;  (v)  Weston  v.  Chamberlain,  7  Cush. 

Boggs  «.  Curtln,  10  S.  &  R.  211;   Pearson  404;  Hogue  v.  Davis,  8   Gratt.  4.     See 

y.  Parker,  3  N.  H.  366;  Jewett  v.  Corn-  also  Westfall  v.  Parsons,  16  Barb.  646; 

forth,  3  Oreenl.  107  ;  Fletcher  v.  Jackson,  Pitkin  v.  Flanagan,  23  Vt.  160. 
23   Vt.  6f»3;    Cohira,   Gould   v.  Gould,  8  (w)   McNelly  v.  Patchin,  23  Mo.  40; 

Cowen,  168.     But  Kolby  v.  Steel,  5  Esp.  Dunn  v.  Wade,  id.  207. 
194,  on  the  authority  of  which  this  case  (a-)  Longley  v.  Griggs,  10  Pick.  121. 

seems  to  have  been  decided,  is  quite  dis-  In  Harris  v.  Warner,  13   Wend.  400,  it 

tinguishable  from  Osborne  v.  Harper.  was  held  that  the  defendant,  who  was  tlie 

(t)  Accordingly  where  the  liability  of  last  of  four  sureties   for  H.   in  a  joint 

one  joint  maker  of  a  promissory  note  was  promissory  note,  was  not  bound  to  make 

comiuued  by  partial  payments  within  six  contribution  to  the  plaintiff  who  was  the 

years,  but  the  remedy  of  the  holder  against  first  surety  and  had  paid  the  debt,  the 

the  otlier  was  barred  by  the  statute  of  defendant  having  qualified  his  undertak- 

limitations,  the  debtor  who  continued  lia-  ing  by  adding  to  his  signature  the  words 

ble  could  notwithstanding  recover  contri-  "  surety  for  the  above  names."     In  Keith 

bution  from  the  other  after  paying  the  v.  Goodwin,  31  Vt.  2G8,  it  was  held  that 

debt.     Peaslee  v.  Breed,  10  N.  H.  489  ;  the  guarantor  of  a  note  on  which  sureties 

Boardman  v.  Paige,  11  N.  H.  431 ;  Howe  had  already  signed,  stood  in  relation  to 

V.  Ward,  4  Greenl.  195.  those   who   had    signed    before   him    as 

(tl)  Prescott  V.  Perkins,  16  N.  H.  305.  surety  for  them  jointly,  not  jointly  with 

(u)  McDonald    v.    Magruder,   3  Pet.  them. 
470  ;  Decreet  v.  Burt,  7  Cush.  651. 

35 


*  37  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

due  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  association  required  a  defence 
against  those  suits.  (2:0;) 

Tlie  right  of  contribution  exists  against  all  who  are  sureties  for 
the  same  debt,  although  their  primary  liability  depends  upon  dif- 
ferent instruments.  Where  two  bonds,  for  example,  are  given  for 
the  performance  of  the  same  duty,  and  A  and  B  sign  as  sureties  in 
one,  and  C  and  D  in  the  other,  A,  if  he  pay  the  debt,  may  in  equity 
recover  one  fourth  of  the  whole  from  each  of  the  rest.  (?/) 

A  party  acquires  a  right  to  contribution  as  soon  as  he  pays 
more  than   his  share,  but  not  until   then  ;  {z)  and  conse- 

*  37    quently  *  the  statute  of  limitations  does  not  begin  to  run 

until  then,  (a) 
The  law  does  not,  generally  at  least,  raise  any  such  implied 
promise,  or  right  to  contribution,  among  wrong-doers,  or  where 
the  transaction  was  unlawful,  (b)^  If  money  be  recovered  in  an 
action  grounded  upon  a  tort  it  gives  no  ground  for  contribu- 
tion, (c)  Still,  however,  contribution  is  sometimes  enforced  where 
he  who  is  to  be  benefited  by  it  did  not  know  his  act  to  be  illegal, 
or  where  it  was  of  doubtful  character,  (c^) 

(xx)    Tyrrell  v.    Washburn,   6  Allen,  having  sold  ten  casks  of  goods  and  sent 

466.  them  to  the  plaintiffs  to  deliver  to  buyer, 

(y)  Deering  v.  Winchelsea,  2  B.  &  P.  subseqUL'ntly  ordered  the  plaintiffs  to  do- 

270;    Mayhew   v.   Crickett,     2    Swanst.  liver  a  portion  of  tlieni  to  another  per- 

184 ;  Craythorne  v.  Swinburne,   14  Ves.  son,  which  order  they  obeyed.     It  was 

160.     Semble,  the  same  principle  may  be  held,   that   a   promise   to  indemnify   tiie 

applied  at  law  ;   Branson,  C.  J.,  Norton  v.  plaintiffs  might  be  implied  from  the  facts, 

Coons,   3    Denio,    130,    132 ;    Chaffee   v.  on   wliich   they    could    recover   for   the 

Jones,  19  Pick. -260,  2G4  ;   Enicks  v.  Pow-  injury  sustained  in    consequence  of  ful- 

ell,  2  Strob.  Eq.  19G.  filling  the  order,  although  tliey   had  no 

(2)  Davies  v.  Humphreys,  6  M.  &  W.  riglit  to  detain  the  goods  or  change  tlieir 

153;  Lord  Eldon,  Ex  parte  GlEord,  6  Yes.  destination  —  the   general    rule  that  be- 

808;  Lytle  r.  Pope,  11  B.  Mon.  297.  tween    wrongdoers   there  is   neither  in- 

(a)  Davies  v.  Humphreys,  6  M.  &  W.  dcmnity    nor  contribution    not  applying 

153 ;  Ponder  >•.  Carter,  12  Ired,  L.  242.  wliere    tlie   act  is   not    clearly  illegal  in 

(6)  Pitcher  v.  Bailey,  8  East.  171;  itself,  and  is  done  Jwirr  fide. — In  Adam- 
Booth  V.  Hodgson,  6  T.  R.  405.  But  in  son  v.  Jarvis,  4  Hing.  60.  72,  B>'Kt.  C.  J., 
Bailey  v.  Bussing,  28  Conn.  455,  it  is  said  said  :  "It  was  certainly  decided  in  Merry- 
that  this  rule  has  so  many  exceptions  weather  v.  Ni.xan,  that  one  wrong-doer 
that  it  can  hardly  with  propriety  be  coidd  not  sue  another  for  contribution  ; 
called  a  gi^'ncral  rule.  See  Atkins  v.  Lord  Kem/on,  however,  said,  '  that  the 
Johnson,  43  Vt.  78.  decision  would  not  affect  cases  of  indfin- 

(c)  Merryweather  v.  Nixan,  8  T.  R.  nitii,  where  one  man  employed  another  to 
186 ;  Farebrother  v.  Ansley,  1  Camp,  do  acts,  not  unlawful  in  tliemselves,  for 
313;  Wilson  l-.  Milner,  2  Camp.  452;  the  purpose  of  asserting  a  right.'  This 
Thweatt  v.  Jones,  1  Rand.  328.  is  the  oidy  decided  case  on  the   subject 

(d)  Betts  V.  Gibbins,  2  A.  &  E.  57,  4  that  is  intel/ii/ible.  Tliere  is  a  case  of 
Nev.    &   M.   64.     Tlierc    the   defendants  Walton  v.  Ilanbury  and  others  (2  Vern. 

'  When  acts,  wliich  are  not  apparently  illegal,  are  done  by  one  person  at  the 
request  of  another,  a  promise  to  indemnify  may  be  inferred.  Dugdale  u.  Lovering, 
L.  R.  10  C  P.  190. 

36 


CH.  II.] 


OP    JOINT    PAKTIES. 


The  implied  promise  and  the  right  to  contribution  resting  upon 
it,  may  be  controlled  by  circumstances  or  evidence  showing  a 
different  understanding  between  the  parties ;  thus,  a  surety 
cannot  exact  contribution  of  one  who  became  co-surety  at  his 
request,  (c)^ 

*  The  commercial  law  of  France,  and  of  continental  Eu-  *  38 
rope  generally,  admits  the  right  to  contribution,  and  regu- 
lates it  much  as  the  law  of  England  and  this  country,  (/)  The 
civil  law  wholly  rejects  it.  (^)  But  by  a  decree  of  the  Emperor 
Hadrian,  a  co-surety  being  sued,  might  require  the  plaintiff  to  pro- 
ceed against  all  liable  jointly  with  him.  He  could  not  therefore 
be  compelled  to  pay  the  whole  unless  through  his  own  neglect.  (A) 


592),  but  it  is  so  imperfectly  stated,  that 
it  is  impossible  to  get  at  the  principle  of 
the  judgment.  The  case  of  Philips  v. 
Biggs  (Hardres,  164),  was  never  de- 
cided ;  but  the  Court  of  Chancery  seemed 
to  consider  the  case  of  two  sheriffs  of 
Middlesex,  where  one  had  paid  the  dam- 
ages in  an  action  for  an  escape,  and  sued 
the  other  for  contribution,  as  like  the  case  of 
two  joint  obligors.  From  the  inclination 
of  the  court  in  this  last  case,  and  from 
the  concluding  part  of  Lord  Kenyan's 
judgment  in  Merry  weather  r.  Nixan,  and 
from  reason,  justice,  and  sound  policy, 
the  rule  that  wrong-doers  cannot  have 
redress  or  contribution  against  each 
other,  is  confined  to  cases  where  the  per- 
son seeking  redress  must  be  presumed  to 
have  known  that  he  was  doing  an  unlaw- 
ful act."— Woolcy  v.  Batte,  2  C.  &  P. 
417  ;  a  party  having  recovered  damages 
in  case  against  one  of  two  joint  coach 
proprietors  for  an  injury  sustained  by 
the  negligence  of  tlieir  servants ;  held, 
that  such  proprietor  (he  proving  that  he 
was  not  personally  present  when  the 
accident  happened)  might  maintain  an 
action  against  his  co-proprietor  for  con- 


tribution. See  also  Ives  v.  Jones,  3  Ired. 
L.  538.  But  thei"e  can  be  no  recovery  in 
such  case  if  the  two  proprietors  are  part- 
ners. Pearson  v.  Skelton,  1  M.  &  W. 
504.  See  Thweatt  v.  Jones,  1  Rand. 
328. 

(e)  Turner  v.  Davies,  2  Esp.  478 ; 
Byers  v.  McClanahan,  6  G.  &  J.  256; 
Daniel  v.  Ballard,  2  Dana,  296 ;  Taylor 
V.  Savage,  12  Mass.  98,  103.  And  see 
Thomas  v.  Cook,  8  B.  &  C.  728;  Harris 
V.  Warner,  13  Wend.  400;  Robison  v. 
Lyle,  10  Barb.  512  ;  Keith  v.  Goodwin, 
31  Vt.  268.  But  such  an  agreement 
cannot  be  shown  by  parol  evidence  when 
the  guaranteed  obligation  is  in  writing. 
Norton  ?•.  Coons,  2  Seld.  33. 

(/)  Code  Civ.  Art.  2033  ;  1  Pothier  on 
Obhgations,  by  Evans,  291. 
.  (g)  Dig.  46,  1,  39. 

(/()  Inst.  3,  21,  4.  If  the  surety,  on 
pa3nng  the  debt,  took  the  precaution  to 
obtain  a  subrogation,  he  might  exercise 
the  actions  of  the  creditor  against  his 
co-sureties ;  1  Pothier  on  Obligations, 
by  Evans,  291;  Cod.  8,  41,  11;  Dig. 
46,  1,  39. 


1  Contra,  Bagott  v.  Mullen,  32  Ind.  332.  Paul  v.  Berry,  78  111.  158,  and  Robertson 
r.  Deatherago,  82  111.  511,  are  to  the  effect  that  sureties  may  by  agreement  terminate 
the  right  to  contribution. 

37 


39  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I, 


*39  *  CHAPTER  III. 

AGENTS. 

Sect.  I.  —  Of  Agency  in  General. 

The  law  of  agency  is  now  of  very  great  importance.  Such  is 
the  complexity  of  human  affairs  in  civilized  society,  that  very  few 
persons  are  able  to  transact  all  their  business,  supply  all  their 
wants,  and  accomplish  all  their  purposes,  without  sometimes 
employing  another  person  to  represent  them,  and  act  for  them, 
and  in  their  stead.  Such  person  becomes  their  agent,  and  the 
person  employing  an  agent  is  his  principal. 

There  are  two  principles  in  relation  to  the  law  of  agency,  on 
one  of  which  it  is  founded,  while  the  other  measures  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  principal  for  the  acts  of  an  agent.  The  first  of  these 
is,  that  the  agent  is  but  the  instrument  of  the  principal,  who  acts 
by  him ;  and  a  principal  assumes  the  relations,  acquires  the 
rights,  and  incurs  the  obligations  which  are  the  proper  results  of 
his  acts,  equally,  whether  he  does  these  mediately,  or  directly ; 
whether  he  uses  an  unconscious  and  material  instrument,  or  a 
living  and  intelligent  instrument ;  whether  he  signs  his  name  by 
a  pen  which  he  takes  from  the  table,  or  by  a  man  whom  he 
requests  to  sign  his  name  for  him.  In  either  case,  the  thing  done 
is  the  act  of  the  principal ;  and,  to  a  considerable  extent,  the  law 
identifies  the  agent  with  the  principal,  although  for  some  purposes, 
and  in  some  respects,  the  agent  incurs  his  own  share  of  responsi- 
bility, or  acquires  his  own  rights,  by  the  act  which  he  performs  as 
the  act  of  another.  The  second  of  these  principles  is,  that,  as 
between  the  principal  and  a  third  party  who  has  supi)oscd  himself 
to  deal  with  a  principal  by  means  of  one  purporting  to  be 
*  40  liis  agent,  the  principal  is  responsible  *  for  and  is  bound  by 
the  acts  of  his  agent  on  either  of  two  grounds,  which  may 
co-exist,  and  may  not.  One  of  these  is,  that  he  has  actually 
created  this  agency  ;  the  other  is,  that  he  has,  by  words  or  acts, 
38 


CH.  III.]  '  AGENTS.  *  41 

fully  authorized  the  third  party  to  believe  the  person  to  bo  his 
agent.  If  he  has  justified  the  belief  of  the  third  party,  that  this 
person  had  from  him  sufficient  authority  to  do,  as  his  agent,  that 
precise  thing,  it  is  no  answer,  on  his  part,  to  say  that  the  agent 
had  no  authority,  or  one  which  did  not  reach  so  far,  and  that  it 
was  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  third  party.  It  may  have  been 
his  mistake,  but  the  question  then  is,  whether  the  principal  led 
this  third  party  into  the  mistake.  And  in  deciding  this  question, 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction,  and  especially  the 
customary  usages  in  relation  to  such  transactions,  come  into 
consideration. 

This  principle  applies  to,  and  may  indeed  be  said  to  create,  the 
distinction  between  a  general  agent  and  a  particular  agent,  (a) 
A  general  agent  is  one  authorized  to  transact  all  his  principal's 
business,  or  all  his  business  of  some  particular  kind.  A  par- 
ticular agent  is  one  authorized  to  do  one  or  two  special  things. 
But  it  is  not  always  easy  to  find  a  precise  rule  which  determines 
with  certainty  between  these  two  kinds  of  agency.  A  manufac- 
turing corporation  may  authorize  A  to  purchase  all  their  cotton, 
and  he  is  then  their  general  agent  for  this  special  purpose, 
or  to  purchase  all  the  cotton  they  may  *  have  occasion  to  *  41 
buy  in  New  Orleans,  and  then  he  may  be  called  their 
general  agent  for  this  special  purpose  in  that  place.  Or  to 
purchase  the  cargoes  that  shall  come  from  such  a  plantation,  or 
shall  arrive  in  such  a  ship  or  ships,  or  five  hundred  bales  of 
cotton,  and  then  he  should  rather  be  regarded  as  their  particular 
agent  for  this  particular  transaction. 

(a)  See  Jacques  v.  Todd,  3  Wend.  83;  except  for  those.  In  the  case  of  a  par- 
Anderson  V.  Coonley,  21  Wend.  279 ;  ticular  agent,  the  scope  of  authority  is 
Savage  v.  Rix,  9  N.  H.  203 ;  Whitehead  measured  by  the  express  directions  lie 
V.  Tuckett,  15  East,  400.  The  term  has  received ;  in  the  case  of  a  general 
Agency  seems  to  imply  two  quite  distinct  agent  the  law  permits  usage  to  enter  in 
things,  namely,  a  contract  between  prin-  and  enlarge  the  liability  of  the  principal, 
cipal  and  agent,  and  the  legal  means  by  This  usage,  however,  is  not  a  uniform, 
which  the  principal  is  made,  without  his  imvarying  rule ;  in  other  words  there  is 
direct  participation,  a /)«?f^  to  a  contract  no  common  scope  of  authority  prcdicable 
with  a  third  person.  No  advantage,  but  of  every  general  agent.  To  say  of  a 
only  cjnfusion,  seems  to  result  from  certain  one  that  he  is  a  general  agent  is 
blending  these  two  things.  If,  in  con-  not  enough  to  describe  his  powers,  or  to 
sidering  agency  in  the  latter  aspect,  the  determine  the  extent  of  his  principal's 
domestic  contract  between  principal  and  liability  ;  it  is  next  to  be  ascertained  for 
agent  could  be  excluded  from  the  mind,  what  particular  business  lie  is  thus  gcn- 
and  reserved  for  separate  observation,  it  eral  agent.  This  done,  the  agency  is 
might  conveniently  be  laid  down  as  the  brought  within  a  class,  and  the  qualities 
rule  of  law  that  the  principal  is  in  ail  attach  to  it  wliich  the  law,  using  the 
cases  bound  for  acts  of  the  agent  done  light  of  mercantile  custom,  affixes  to  the 
within  the  scope  of  his  authority,  and  necer  class  at  large. 

39 


41 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


But  there  is  a  material  distinction  between  authority,  and 
instructions  uncommunicated,  and  not  intended  to  be  com- 
municated to  the  third  party  dealing  with  the  agent.  Such  in- 
structions qualify  the  liability  of  the  principal  neither  in  the  case 
of  a  general  agency  nor  of  a  particular  agency,  (aa)  ^ 


{an)  The  sound  rule  of  law  is  set  forth 
by  Parker,  C.  J.,  giving  the  judgment  of 
the  court  in  Ilatcli  v.  Taylor,  10  N.  H. 
538 :  "  It  is,  we  think,  apparent  enough, 
that  all  which  may  be  said  to  a  special 
agent,  about  the  mode  in  which  his 
agency  is  to  be  executed,  even  if  said  at 
the  time  tliat  the  authority  is  conferred 
or  the  agency  constituted,  cannot  be 
regarded  as  part  of  the  authority  it- 
self, or  as  a  qualification  or  limitation 
upon  it.  There  may  be,  at  all  times, 
upon  the  constitution  of  a  special  agency, 
and  tiiere  often  is,  not  only  an  authority 
given  to  the  agent,  in  virtue  of  which  he 
is  to  do  the  act  proposed,  but  also  cer- 
tain communications,  addressed  to  the 
private  car  of  the  agent,  although  they 
relate  to  the  manner  in  which  the  author- 
ity is  to  be  executed,  and  are  intended  as 
a  guide  to  direct  its  execution.  Tiiese 
connnunications  may,  to  a  certain  extent, 
be  intended  to  limit  the  action  of  the 
agent ;  that  is,  tiie  principal  intends  and 
expects  that  they  shall  be  regarded  and 
adiiered  to,  in  tlie  execution  of  the 
agency ;  and  should  the  agent  depart 
from  them,  he  would  violate  the  instruc- 
tions given  him  by  the  principal  at  the 
time  when  he  was  constituted  agent,  and 
execute  the  act  he  was  expected  to  jjer- 
form  in  a  ca<e  in  which  the  principal  did 
not  intend  tliat  it  sliould  be  done.  And 
yet,  ill  sucli  case  he  ma}'  have  acted  en- 
tirely within  tiie  scope  of  the  authority 
given  him,  and  the  principal  be  bound  by 
ills  acts.  This  could  not  be  so,  if  those 
communications  were  limitations  upon 
the  authority  of  tlie  agent.  It  is  only 
because  tliey  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
part  of  the  authority  given,  or  a  limita- 
tion upon  tliat  autliority,  that  tlie  act  of 
tlie  agent  is  valid,  altiiough  done  in  vio- 
lation of  them;  and  the  matter  depends 
ujion  tlic  character  of  the  communica- 
tions tlius  made  by  the  pri!icii)al,  and 
disregarded  by  the  agent.  Thus,  where 
one  person  employs  another  to  sell  a 
liorse,  and  instructs  him  to  sell  him  for 
$100,  if  no  more  can  be  obtained,  but  to 
get  the  best  price  he  can,  and  not  to 
sell  him  for  less  than  that  sum,  and  not 
to  state  how  low  he  is  authorized  to  sell, 


because  that  will  prevent  him  from  ob- 
taining more.  Such  a  private  instruction 
can  with  no  projiriety  be  deemed  a  limi- 
tation upon  ills  authority  to  sell,  because 
it  is  a  secret  matter  between  the  princi- 
pal and  agent,  which  any  person  pro- 
posing to  purchase  is  not  to  know,  at 
least  until  the  bargain  is  completed. 
And  if  no  special  injunction  of  secrecy 
was  made,  tlie  result  would  be  the  same; 
for  from  the  nature  of  the  ease,  such  an 
instruction,  so  far  as  regards  the  mini- 
71111111  price,  must  be  intended  as  a  private 
matter  between  the  principal  and  agent, 
not  to  be  communicated  to  the  persons 
to  whom  he  proposed  to  make  a  sale, 
from  its  obvious  tendency  to  defeat  the 
attem])t  to  obtain  a  greater  sum,  which 
was  the  special  duty  of  the  agent.  It 
will  not  do  to  say  that  the  agent  was  not 
authorized  to  sell,  unless  he  could  obtain 
that  price.  That  is  the  very  question, 
whether  such  a  private  instruction  limits 
the  authority  to  sell."  pp.  545-547  .  .  . 
"  No  man  is  at  liberty  to  send  another 
into  the  market  to  buy  or  sell  for  him  as 
his  agent,  with  secret  instructions  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  he  shall  execute 
his  agency,  which  are  not  to  be  commu- 
nicated to  those  with  whom  he  is  to  deal ; 
and  then,  when  his  agent  has  deviated 
from  those  instructions,  to  say  that  he 
was  a  special  agent, —  that  the  instruc- 
tions were  limitations  ujion  his  autliority, 
—  and  that  those  with  whom  he  dealt,  in 
the  matter  of  his  agency,  acted  at  their 
peril,  because  they  were  bound  to  in- 
quire, where  inquiry  would  have  been 
fruitless,  and  to  ascertain  that  of  which 
they  were  not  to  have  knowledge.  It 
would  render  dealing  with  a  special  agent 
a  matter  of  great  hazard.  If  the  princi- 
pal deemed  the  bargain  a  good  one,  the 
secret  orders  would  continue  sealed  ; 
but  if  his  oi)inion  was  otherwise,  the  in- 
junction of  secrecy  would  be  removed, 
and  the  transaction  avoided,  leaving  the 
party  to  such  remedy  as  he  might  enforce 
against  the  agent.  From  this  reasoning, 
we  deduce  tlie  general  principle,  that 
wlu-re  i>rivate  instructions  are  given  to  a 
spcc'ial  agent,  resjiecting  the  mode  and 
manner  of  executing  his  agency,  intended 


1  See  Fatman  v.  Leet,  41  Ind.  133 ;  Cruzan  v.  Smith,  ib.  288. 

40 


CH.  III.] 


AGENTS. 


42 


The  importance  of  the  distinction  between  a  general  agent  and 
a  special  or  particular  agent,  lies  in  the  rule,  that  if  a  particular 
agent  exceed  his  authority,  the  prineijml  is  not  bound  ;  (J) 
but  if  a  general  agent  exceed  his  authority  the  *  principal  *  42 
is  bound,  ((?)  ^  provided  the  agent  acted  within  the  ordinary 
and  usual  scope  of  the  business  he  was  authorized  to  transact,  and 
the  party  dealing  with  the  agent  did  not  know  that  he  exceeded 
his  authority,  (c?)  ^ 

Any  specific  authority  must  be  strictly  pursued  ;  as,  for 
example,  one  known  to  be  an  agent  to  settle  claims,  and  with 
specific  authority  to  this  effect,  cannot  be  supposed  to  have 
authority  to  commute  them,  (g)  ^    Nor  can  the  agency  be  enlarged 


to  be  kept  secret,  and  not  communicated 
to  those  with  whom  he  may  deal,  such 
instructions  are  nut  to  be  regarded  as 
limitations  upon  his  authority  ;  and  not- 
withstanding he  disregards  tliem,  liis  act, 
if  otherwise  witliin  the  scope  of  liis 
agency,  will  be  valid,  and  bind  his  em- 
ployer." pp.  548,  549.  See  also  Berth- 
old  r.  Goldsmith,  24  How.  530,  where 
one  who  had  been  employed  as  a  special 
agent  for  a  particular  purpose  in  refer- 
ence to  sales  of  property,  in  the  profits 
of  which  he  was  to  share,  was  declared 
in  regard  to  other  transactions  of  his 
own  relating  to  the  disposal  of  the  same 
property,  not  to  be  a  partner  as  to  third 
parties,  and  neither  a  general  nor  special 
agent.  Trickett  v.  Tomlinson,  13  C.  B. 
(n.  s.)  663;  Edmunds  v.  Bushell,  Law 
Eep.  1  Q.  B.  97. 

(b)  Flemyng  v.  Hector.  2  M.  &  W. 
178 ;  Todd  v.  Emly,  7  M.  &  W.  427 ;  8 
id.  505 ;  East  India  Co.  v.  Hensley,  1  Esp. 
Ill ;  Woodin  v.  Burford,  2  Cr.  &  M.  301 ; 
Jordan  v.  Norton,  4  M.  &  W.  155;  Sykes 
V.  Giles,  5  M.  &  W.  645 ;  Waters  v.  Brog- 
den,  1  Y.  &  J.  457  ;  Daniel  v.  Adams, 
AiTibl.  495.  And  see  Reaney  v.  Culbert- 
son,  21  Pcnn.  St.  507. 

(c)  Duke  of  Beaufort  v.  Neeld,  12  CI. 
&  F.  248,  273;  Nickson  v.  Brohan,  10 
Mod.  109  ;  Monk  v.  Clayton,  MoUoy,  B. 
2,  ch.  10,  §  27. 


[d)  Forman  v.  Walker,  4  La.  An.  409; 
Campbell  v.  Hicks,  4  H.  &  N.  (Exch.)  851. 

(e)  Kingston  v.  Kiucaid,  1  Wash.  C. 
C.  454.  That  the  authoritj'  given  to  the 
agent  must  in  all  cases  be  stricily  pur- 
sued, see  Robertson  v.  Ketchum,  11  Barb. 
652,  and  Cooley  v.  Willard,  34  111  69. 
The  exception,  extending  the  principal's 
liabilit}'  in  favor  of  third  parties,  is  only 
made  where  such  third  parties  are  igno- 
rant that  restrictions  have  been  imposed 
upon  the  agent.  In  Attwood  v.  Munnings, 
7  B.  &  C.  283,  Buyley,  J.,  said  :  "  This 
was  an  action  upon  an  acceptance  im- 
porting to  be  by  procuration,  and,  there- 
fore, uny  person  taking  the  bill  would 
know  that  he  had  not  the  security  of  the 
acceptor's  signature,  but  of  the  part}-  pro- 
fessing to  act  in  pursuance  of  an  autlior- 
it.y  from  him.  A  person  taking  such  a 
bill,  ought  to  exercise  due  caution,  for  he 
must  take  it  upon  the  credit  of  the  party 
who  assumes  the  authority  to  accept,  and 
it  woidd  be  only  reasonable  prudence  to 
require  the  production  of  that  authority." 
The  authority  in  that  case  was  contained 
in  two  powers  of  attorney,  and  it  was 
decided  that,  taking  the  proper  construc- 
tion of  them,  the  agent  liad  exceeded  his 
nuth.ority,  and  so  the  princi])al  was  not 
bound.  This  case  is  confirmed  by  With- 
ington  V.  Herring,  5  Bing.  442.  Goods 
were  shipped  on  board  of  plaintiff's  ship, 


1  Thus  where  a  general  agent  gave,  witliout  authority,  a  lease  under  seal  in  his 
principal's  name,  and  received  rent  thereunder,  its  surrender  to  him  is  a  good  defence 
to  the  principal's  action  for  further  rent.  Amory  v.  KanuofEsky,  117  Mass.  351.  See 
Thu^ber  v.  Anderson,  88  111.  167. 

2  This  is  true  although  the  agent  was  expressly  forbidden  to  do  the  act  in  question, 
Bell  V.  Offutt,  10  Bush,  6.32  ;  Mintcr  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.  41  Mo.  503. 

8  Nor  does  an  agent's  authority  to  draw  bills  of  exchange  on  time  or  sight  include 
the  drawing  of  post-dated  bills.  New  York  Iron  Mine  v.  Citizens'  Bank,  44  Mich. 
344. 

41 


43 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


SO  as  to  hold  any  principal  but  the  one  employing  the   agent; 

thus,  the  agent  of  a  partnership  is  not  the  agent  of  the 
*  43   members  severally,  {ee)     The  *  rule  is,  as  to  the  public,  that 

the  authority  of  a  general  agent  may  be  regarded  by  them 
as  measured  by  the  usual  extent  of  his  general  employment.  (/) 
The  obvious  reason  for  this  is,  that  the  public  may  not  be 
deceived  to  its  injury  by  previous  acts  which  the  agent  was  fully 
authorized  to  do.  By  such  authority  the  principal  does,  as  it  were, 
proclaim  and  publicly  declare  him  to  be  his  agent,  and  must  abide 
the  responsibility  of  so  doing.  It  would  not  be  right  for  the  prin- 
cipal to  say  to  one  who  dealt  with  his  general  agent :  "  you  knew 
that  he  was  my  general  agent,  for  I  authorized  you  and  everybody 
else  to  believe  this,  but  in  this  particular  instance  I  had  revoked  or 
limited  the  authority,  and  the  revocation  or  limitation  shall  affect 
you  although  you  did  not  know  it."  But  a  principal  may  well 
say  to  one  who  dealt  with  an  agent  for  a  particular  purpose,  it 
was  your  business  first  to  ascertain  that  he  was  my  agent,  and 
then  to  ascertain  for  yourself  the  character  and  extent  of  his 
agency.  (J) 

We  think  the  distinction  between  a  general  agency  and  a  spe- 
cial agent  useful,  and  sufficiently  definite  for  practical  purposes. 


and  by  the  bills  of  lading,  which  were  in- 
dorsed to  the  defendants,  were  to  be  deliv- 
ered on  puipnenl  of  freKjht.  The  bills  were 
indorsed  hy  the  defendants  to  their  fact- 
ors, to  whom  the  goods  were  delivered, 
and  the  freight  charged.  Assumpsit  was 
brougiit  against  tiic  defendants  on  the 
bankruptcy  of  the  factors,  but  was  not 
sustained  on  the  ground  that  authority 
to  receive  the  goods  was  given  only  on 
immediate  payment  of  the  freiglit.  Tobin 
V.  Crawford,  5  M.  &  W.  235.  And  see 
Hogg  ;;.  Snaith,  1  Taunt.  847  ;  Acey  v. 
Fernie,  7  M.  &  W.  157 ;  Esdaile  v.  La 
Nauze,  1  Y.  &  Coll.  304;  Maanss  v.  Hen- 
derson, 1  East,  335;  Murray  c.  East  India 
(V).,  5  B.  &  Aid.  204;  Gardner  v.  Baillie, 
f)  T.  R.  501 ;  with  which  compare  Howard 
r.  Baillie,  2  H.  BI.018;  Stainback  ?■.  Bank 
of  Virginia,  11  fJratt.  200;  Same  v.  Read, 
id.  281.  The  ruling  of  llojitli,  J.,  in  Hicks 
;;.  Ilankins,  4  Esp.  114,  seems  to  admit  of 
question.  For  instance,  wliore  the  au- 
thority of  a  general  agent  has  been  cir- 
cumscribed, see  Odiorne  v.  Maxcy,  13 
Mass.  178;  White  ".  Westport  Cotton 
Man.  Co.  1  Pick.  215;  Salem  Bank  v. 
CJlouccster  Bank,  17  Mass.  1  ;  Wvman  v. 
HallowfU  &  Augusta  Bank,  14  Mass.  58; 
Kerns  v.  I'iper,  4  Watts,  222 ;    Terry  v. 

42 


Fargo,  10  Johns.  114  ;  Reynolds  v.  Row- 
ley, 4  La.  An.  400.  Except  the  tnaster  of 
a  vessel  and  an  acceptor  for  honor,  no 
agent  can  borroio  money  on  his  principal's 
account  without  special  authority.  Haw- 
tayno  v.  Bourne,  7  M.  &  W.  595.  See 
post,  pp.  *  81  &  *  82. 

(ee)  Johnston  v.  Brown,  18  La.  An. 
330. 

(/)  Pickering  r.  Busk,  15  East,  38; 
Whitehead  v.  Tuckett,  15  East,  400.  But 
if  an  injury  is  to  result  to  one  man  from 
the  omission  or  neglect  of  an  agent  of 
another,  the  princi))al  nnist  be  held  liable. 
And  when  the  drfcndants  si'Ut  their  agent 
to  employ  the  i^laintiff,  who  was  a  physi- 
cian, to  visit  a  boy  who  had  been  injured 
while  in  their  service,  directing  the  agent 
to  tell  the  plaintiff  that  they  would  pay 
him  for  his  first  visit,  and  the  agent 
neglected  so  to  do,  and  emjiloyed  the 
plaintiff  generally  to  attend  the  boy  so 
long  as  he  iniglit  neeil  medical  aid,  and 
the  plaintiff  attended  upon  the  boy  on 
the  credit  of  defendants,  held,  that  de- 
fendants were  liable  to  the  plaintiff  for 
his  services  in  attending  the  boy.  Barber 
V.  Briton  &  Hall,  2G  Vt.  112. 

(ff)  Barry  v.  Anderson,  22  Ind.  .36-, 
Davenport  v.  Peoria  Ins.  Co.  17  la.  27G. 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  44 

although  it  may  have  been  pressed  too  far,  and  relied  upon  too 
much  in  determining  the  responsibility  of  a  principal  for  the  acts 
of  an  agent.  It  may  indeed  be  said,  that  every  agency  is,  under 
one  aspect,  special,  and  under  another,  general.  No  agent  has 
authority  to  be  in  all  respects  and  for  all  purposes  an  "  alter 
ego  "  of  his  principal,  binding  him  by  whatever  the  *  agent  *  44 
may  do  in  reference  to  any  subject  whatever ;  and  therefore 
the  agency  must  be  special  so  far  as  it  is  limited  by  place,  or  time, 
or  the  extent  or  character  of  the  work  to  be  done.  On  the  other 
hand  every  agency  must  be  so  far  general,  that  it  must  cover 
not  merely  the  precise  thing  to  be  done,  but  whatever  usually  and 
rationally  belongs  to  the  doing  of  it. 

Of  late  years,  courts  seem  more  disposed  to  regard  this  distinc- 
tion and  the  rules  founded  upon  it,  as  altogether  subordinate  to 
that  principle  which  may  be  called  the  foundation  of  the  law  of 
agency ;  namely,  that  a  principal  is  responsible,  either,  when  he 
has  given  to  an  agent  sufficient  authority,  or,  when  he  justifies  a 
party  dealing  with  his  agent  in  believing  that  he  has  given  to  this 
agent  this  authority.  (^) 

Where  the  agency  is  implied  from  general  employment,  it  may 
survive  this  employment,  and  will  be  still  implied  in  favor  of 
those  who  knew  this  general  employment,  but  have  not  had  notice 
of  the  cessation  of  the  employment,  and  cannot  be  supposed  to 
have  knowledge  thereof.  (Ji)  Hence  the  common  and  very  proper 
practice  of  giving  notice  by  public  advertisement  when  such  an 
agency  is  revoked. 

In  order  to  judge  correctly  of  the  extent  of  an  agent's  author- 
ity, the  distinction  must  be  noticed  between  those  acts  which  are 
within  his  authority^  and  those  which  are  only  within  an  ajypear- 
ance  of  authority,  for  which  the  principal  is  not  responsible ;  for 
a  principal  is  responsible  only  for  that  appearance  of  authority 
which  is  caused  by  himself,  and  not  for  that  appearance  of  con- 
formity to  the  authority  which  is  caused  only  by  the  agent.  An 
agent's  authority  is  that  which  is  given  by  the  declared  terms  of 

(fj)  In  Mechanics  Bank  v.  N.  Y.  &c.  quite  insufficient  to  solve  a  great  variety 

R.  Co.  3  Kernan,  632,  it  is  said  by  Com-  of  cases.    It  is  unprofitable  to  dwell  ui)()n 

stock,  J.,  in  giving   the   decision  of  the  that  distinction." 

court  of  appeals,  "  There  are  in  the  books,  (/()  v.  Harrison,  12  Mod.  346; 

many  loose  expressions   concerning   the  Monk  v.  Clayton,  Molloy,  B.  2,  ch.  10,  § 

distinction  between  a  general  and  a  spe-  27,  cited  ;jer-c"r/nm,  10  Mod.  110;  Emmett 

cial    agency.     The    distinction    itself    is  i;.  Norton,  8  C.  &  P.  506. 
highly  unsatisfactory,  and  will  be  found 

43 


*  45  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

his  appointment,  notwithstanding  secret  instructions  ;  or  that  with 

which  he  is  clothed  by  the  character  in  which  he  is  held  out  to  the 

world,  although  not  within   the  words  of  his  commission. 

*  45    Whatever  is  done  under  an  authority  *  thus  manifested,  is 

actually  within  the  authority,  and  the  principal  is  bound  for 
that  reason ;  for  he  is  bound  equally  by  the  authority  which  he 
actually  gives,  and  by  that  which,  by  his  own  acts,  he  appears  to 
give.  But  it  is  obvious  that  an  agent  may  clothe  his  act  with  all 
the  indicia  of  authority,  and  yet  the  act  itself  may  not  be  within 
either  the  real  or  apparent  authority.  The  appearance  of  the 
authority  is  one  thing ;  and  for  that  the  principal  is  responsible 
only  so  far  as  he  has  caused  that  appearance.  The  appearance  of 
the  act  is  another ;  and  for  that  it  seems  the  agent  alone  is 
responsible.  It  is  a  fundamental  proposition,  that  one  man  can 
be  bound  only  by  the  authorized  acts  of  another.  He  cannot  be 
charged  because  another  holds  a  commission  from  him,  and 
falsely  asserts  that  his  acts  are  within  it.  (^)  This  distinction 
has  been  well  illustrated  by  recent  adjudications.  Thus  a  master 
of  a  ship  is  the  general  agent  of  the  owners  to  perform  all  things 
relating  to  the  usual  employment  of  his  ship,  and,  among  other 
things,  to  sign  bills  of  lading  for  goods  put  on  board,  and  ac- 
knowledge the  nature,  quality,  and  condition  of  the  goods.  But 
if  he  signs  a  bill  of  lading  for  goods  which  have  never  been 
sliipped,  he  exceeds  his  authority ;  and  although  the  act,  judged 
by  its  appearance  and  the  representation  of  the  agent,  is  strictly 
within  the  authority,  yet  the  principal  is  not  bound.  (Jc)  ^  So,  if 
the  master  signs  a  bill  of  lading  for  a  greater  quantity  of  goods 
than  those  on  board,  the  same  principle  applies.  (?)  And  where 
the  servant  of  a  wharfinger  fraudulently  signed  a  receipt,  purport- 
ing to  be  an  acknowledgment  that  certain  wheat  had  been  deliv- 
ered at  his  employer's  wharf,  no  such  wheat  having  in  fact  been 
delivered,  and  thereby  wilfully  induced  one  C  to  pay  the  price 
thereof  to  the  pretended  vendor  ;  it  was  held  that  the  wharfinger 
was  not  liable,  the  servant  having  authority  only  to  give  receipts 
for  goods  which  had  in  fact  been  delivered  at  the  wharf,  (m) 
Again,  where  a  railroad  corporation  appointed  an  agent  to  issue 

(/)  Per  Comstock,  J.,  in  Meclianics  Bank  (/)   Ilultbcrsty  v.  Ward,  8  Exch.  330. 

V.  N.  Y.  &c.  U.  Co.  3  Kornan,  r/)!».  [m]  Coleman  v.  Riches,  16  C.  B.  104. 

(k)  Grant  v.  Norway,  10  C.  B.  G05. 

1  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilkens,  44  Md.  11. 
44 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  46 

certificates  for  stock,  upon  a  transfer  on  the  company's  books  by 
a  previous  owner,  and  a  surrender  of  that  owner's  certificate  ; 
and  the  agent  fraudulently  issued  *  certificates  for  his  own  *  46 
benefit,  without  a  compliance  with  either  of  the  above  condi- 
tions, his  acts  were  held  to  be  beyond  the  scope  of  his  authority, 
and  his  principals  not  bound,  (w)  And  where  an  agent  author- 
ized in  writing  to  purchase  goods  to  a  certain  amount,  had  ex- 
ceeded the  amount,  but  assured  a  seller  that  he  had  not,  and  the 
seller  sold  the  goods  on  this  assurance,  it  was  held  by  a  majority 
of  the  court  (^  Wilde,  J.,  dissenting),  that  the  principal  was  not 
held,  (o)  1  We  have  some  doubts  of  the  last  decision ;  and,  cer- 
tainly, care  must  be  taken  not  to  extend  this  principle  too  far. 
Thus,  an  agent  may  be  authorized  to  give  notes  for  his  principal 
in  order  to  raise  money  to  be  used  in  the  business  of  the  latter. 
A  third  person  may  inspect  the  power,  advance  the  money  in  good 
faith,  and  the  agent  appropriate  it  to  his  own  use ;  and  this  the 
agent  may  have  intended  at  the  time.  In  such  a  case,  the  prin- 
cipal would  be  responsible,  not  because  the  act  of  the  agent  ap- 
peared  to  be  within  the  authority,  but  because  the  power  actually 
included  the  transaction.  A  power  given  to  an  agent  to  borrow 
money,  upon  notes  or  otherwise,  implies  that  the  money  may  be 
paid  to  him,  and  so  the  whole  transaction  is  strictly  and  literally 
authorized.  The  misappropriation  of  the  proceeds  by  the  agent 
is  a  mere  breach  of  trust,  relating  to  money  in  his  hands,  and 
upon  the  principles  of  trust,  his  intention  to  misappropriate  would 
not  affect  an  innocent  party.  But  suppose  the  power  to  give  the 
note  is  on  its  face  conditional.  It  then  has  no  existence  until 
the  condition  has  been  actually  fulfilled.  And  if  one  advances 
money  to  the  agent  on  his  declaration  that  the  conditions 
have  been  fulfilled,  and  it  turns  out  that  the  conditions  had 
not  occurred  on  which  the  exercise  of  the  power  depended,  then 
he  was  trusting  to  the  representation  of  the  agent,  and  must  look 
to  him  alone.  As  the  principal  never  authorized  the  transac- 
tion at  all,  he  is  bound  neither  by  the  contract  nor  by  the 
representation,  (p) 

(n)  Mechanics  Bank  v.  N.  Y.  &c.  R.  Bank  v.  N.  Y.  &c.  R.  Co.  3  Keman,  599. 

Co.  3  Kernan,  599.  See  North  River  Bank  v.  Aymar,  3  Hill, 

(o)  Mussey  v.  Beecher,  3  Cush.  511.  262. 
(p)    Per    Comstock,   J.,  in    Mechanics 

1  In  Palmer  v.  Cheney,  35  la.  281,  the  principal  was  declared  Uable  in  such  a  case. 

46 


*  47  THE   LAW   OP   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

It  has  been  held  that  "  a  general  and  special  agent  to 

*  47    transact  *  all   manner   of  business,"  though  created   by  a 

power  of  attorney  under  seal,  does  not  necessarily  include 
therein  authority  to  sell.  Such  a  power  is  regarded  as  a  vague 
and  indefinite  instrument,  under  which  a  prudent  man  would  not 
accept  a  title  to  property,  {q) 

For  the  power  of  the  agent  to  submit  questions  in  which  his 
principal  is  interested,  to  arbitration,  see  the  section  on  Arbitra- 
tion in  the  second  volume. 


SECTION  n. 

IN  WHAT  MANNER   AUTHORITY  MAY  BE   GIVEN   TO   AN   AGENT. 

The  facts  being  undisputed,  the  question  whether  the  alleged 
agent  had  sufficient  authority,  is  a  question  of  law.  (^qq)  An 
agent,  generally,  may  be  appointed  by  parol,  and  so  authorized  to 
do  any  thing  which  does  not  require  him  to  execute  a  deed  for  his 
principal,  (r)  ^  The  rule  of  the  common  law,  that  an  agent  can- 
not affix  a  seal  for  his  principal,  unless  his  authority  to  do  this  is 
under  seal,  is  still  generally  recognized  as  in  force,  (rr)  He  may 
be  authorized  by  parol  to  make  and  sign  contracts  in  writing,  and 
it  seems  to  be  now  settled  that  he  may  be  authorized  without 
writing,  to  make  even  those  contracts  which  are  not  binding  upon 
his  principal  unless  in  writing  signed  by  him.  (s)  And  even  a 
parol  ratification  is  equivalent  to  an  orignal  authority,  (f) 

(q)  Hodge  V.  Coombs,  1  Black,  192.  under  seal,   could  not   be    admitted  in 

(77)  (iulick  V.  Grovcr,  4  Vroom,  463.  evidence  in  an  action  of  assumpsit  against 

(r)  2  Kent,  Com.  Gl'i.     The  receipt  of  the  principal.     But  see  contra,  Cooper  v. 

an  autliorized  agent  is  tlie  receipt  of  tlie  Rankin,  5  Binn.  613,  and  page  *  52,  infra, 

principal.     Mackersy  i\  Ramsays,  9  CI.  notes  (m),  (0). 

&  F.  818,  80O.  —  A  tender  made  "to  an  au-  (.s)  Shaw  v.  Nudd,  8  Pick.  9  ;  Ewinp 

thorized  agent  is  as  if  made  to  liis  prin-  v.  Tees,  1  Binn.  450 ;  Clinen  v.  Cooke,  1 

cipal.     Moffat  i'.  Parsons,  5  Taunt.  .•]07.  Sch.  &  L.  22  ;  Coles  v.  Trecothick,  9  Ves. 

(rr)   Rowe  v.  Ware,  30  Ga.  278  ;  F.chols  234,  250.  —  But  by  an  express  provision 

V.  Cheney,  28  Cal.  157.     See  also  Morri-  of  the  Statute  of   Frauds,  an   agent,  to 

son  V.  Bowman,  29  Cal.  337 ;  Gordon  v.  grant  or  assign   a   term  for   more   than 

Bulkeley,  14  S.  &  R.  331.     And  in  Ban-  three   years,   or   an   estate  of   freehold, 

orgee  v.  Ilovey,  6  Mass.  11,  it  was  hrlrl  must  be   authorized   thereto  in   writing. 

(Sewell,  ,T.,  dissenting),  that  a  sealed  in-  29  Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  3. 
struinent  executed  in   the  name  of  the  {t)  Maclean  v.  Dunn,  4  Bing.  722. 

principal  by   an   agent,   not   authorized 

1  Manhattan  Ins.  Co.  v.  La  Pert,  52  Tex.  504. 

46 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  48 

An  authority  is  presumed  or  raised  by  implication  of  law,  on 
the  ground  that  the  principal  has  justified  the  belief  that  he  has 
given  such  authority,  in  cases  where  he  has  employed  a  person  in 
his  regular  employment ;  (u)  ^  as  where  one  sends  goods 
*  to  an  auctioneer,  or  to  a  common  repository  room  for  *  48 
sale,  the  bailee  has  an  implied  authority  to  sell,  (w )  And 
such  presumptions  frequently  arise  in  the  case  of  a  wife ;  {tv^  or 
of  a  domestic  servant ;  (a;)  or  of  a  son  who  has  been  permitted 
for  a  considerable  time  to  transact  a  particular  business  for  the 
father,  (.y)  ^  as  to  sign  bills,  &c.  ;  or  where  one  has  been  repeat- 
edly employed  to  sign  policies  of  insurance  for  another,  (z)  So 
the  acceptance  of  the  agency  by  the  agent  may  be  inferred  from 
his  acting  under  it ;  and  this  has  been  held  even  where  he  writes 
to  his  principal  refusing  the  agency.  (22) 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  an  agent  employed  for  a 
special  purpose,  derives  from  this  no  general  authority  from  his 

(m)  Dows   v.    Greene,   16    Barb.   72;  (z)  Brockelbank  v.  Sugrue,  5  C.  &  P. 

Lyell  V.  Sanbourn,  2  Mich.  109 ;  Thomp-  21 ;  Haughton  i'.   Ewbank,  4  Camp.  88, 

son  V.  Bell,  10  Exch.  10.  wliere  it  was  lield  sufficient  proof  of  an 

(v)   Lord    Ellenhorough,    Pickering    v.  agent's  authority  to  subscribe  a  policy  of 

Busk,  15  East,  38.  insurance  for  an  insurer,  that  the  insurer 

(w)  Prestwick  v.  Marshall,  7  Bing  was  in  the  habit  of  paying  losses  upon 
565 ;  Huckman  i;.  Fernie,  3  M.  &  W.  505 ;  policies  so  subscribed  by  him,  without 
Att'y-Gen.  v.  Riddle,  2  Cr.  &  J.  493;  producing  the  power  of  attorney  under 
Plimmer  v.  Sells,  3  Nev.  &  M.  422. —  which  the  agent  testified  that  he  acted. — 
After  separation,  the  wife  is  still  her  An  authority  to  draw  is  not  an  authority 
liusband's  agent  for  the  procurement  of  to  indorse  ;  Eobinson  v.  Yarrow,  7  Taunt, 
such  things  as  are  reasonable  and  neces-  455;  yet  the  fact  that  a  confidential 
sary  for  herself.  Emmett  v.  Norton,  8  clerk  had  been  accustomed  to  draw, 
C.  &  P.  506.  So  where  the  person  co-  taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that 
habited  with  is  only  a  mistress,  and  his  master  had  in  one  instance  author- 
known  to  be  in  fact  only  a  mistress,  if  ized  him  to  indorse,  and  on  two  other 
she  is  allowed  to  pass  ostensibly  as  wife,  occasions  had  received  money  obtained 
Ryan  v.  Sans,  12  Q.  B.  460.  by   liis    indorsement,  is    evidence    from 

(.r)  A  master  is  not  responsible  for  a  which  a  jury  may  infer  a  general  author- 
contract  entered  into  by  a  servant  to  ity  to  indorse.  Prescott  v.  Flynn,  9 
whom  he  had  always  given  cash  for  Bing.  19.  As  to  what  will  amount  to 
making  purchases.  Rusby  v.  Scarlett,  5  proof  of  an  implied  authority  to  a  clerk 
Esp.  75.  So  with  any  particular  agent  in  a  mercantile  house  to  sign  shipping 
who  obtains  on  credit  goods  which  the  papers  in  the  names  of  his  principals, 
principal  gave  him  money  to  purchase,  see  Dows  v.  Greene,  32  Barb.  490. 
Lord  AUnrjpr,  C.  B.  Flemyng  v.  Hector,  (zz)  George  v.  Sandel,  18  La.  An. 
2  M.  &  W.  181.  535. 

(y)  Watkins  v.  Vince,  2  Stark.  368. 

1  But  not  if  the  former  employment  was  without  the  principal's  knowledge, 
Cobb  V.  Hall,  49  la.  366  ;  nor  if  a  mere  temporary  employment,  nearly  a  year  before, 
Green  v.  Hinkley,  52  la.  633 ;  nor  to  sell  from  tlie  fact  that  a  purcha^sing  clerk  was 
employed  fifteen  months  before  to  make  a  single  sale.  Cupples  ".  Whelan,  61  Mo. 
583.     See  Wilcox  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  24  Minn.  269 ;  Whelan  v.  Reilly,  61  Mo.  565. 

2  A  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  by  a  son,  as  clerk,  in  a  public  house  kept  by  his 
father,  will  warrant  the  conviction  of  the  latter  for  an  illegal  sale.  Commonwealth 
V.  Holmes,  119  Mass.  195. 

47 


*  49  THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

principal,  (a)  ^  Where  the  bchcf  of  the  authority  of  an  agent 
arises  only  from  previous  action  on  his  part  as  an  agent,  the 
persons  so  treating  with  him  must,  on  their  own  responsibil- 
ity, ascertain  the  nature  and  extent  of  his  previous  employ- 
ment. (6)     This  may  be  such  as  to  estop  the  principal  from 

*  49    *  denying  his  authority  in  the  particular  transaction  ;  but 

if  not,  then  they  have  no  remedy,  unless  against  the  agent 
himself  who  misled  them,  (c) 


SECTION  III. 

SUBSEQUENT   CONFIRMATION. 

As  agency  may  be  presumed  from  repeated  acts  of  the  agent, 
adopted  and  confirmed  by  the  principal  previously  to  the  contract 
in  which  the  question  is  raised,  (c?)  so  agency  may  be  confinned 
and  established  by  a  subsequent  ratification  ;  the  common  law 
having  adopted  the  civil  law  maxim,  '•'•omnis  ratihahitio  retrotrahi- 
tur  et  mandato  ceq\uparatur.''\e)  ^     The  rule  may  be  stated  thus  : 

(a)  Rcyncll  v.  Lewis,  15  M.  &  W.  517 ;  agreed  with  the  holder  of  the  note  of  a 

Dawson  n.  ^Morrison,  16  L.  J.  C.  P.  240;  firm,  tliat  it  should  he  renewed  upon  part 

Cox  f.  Midland  Itailway  Co.  3  Exch.  268;  payment   at   maturity   and  a  new    note 

Rusby  V.  Scarlett,  5  Esp.  75 ;  Burness  v.  given  for  the  balance,   such  agreement 

Pennel,  2  H.  L.  Cas.  519;  Kaye  v.  Brett,  will  be   an  authority  to  one  of  the  part- 

5  FjXcIi.  269;  Thatcher  v.  Bank  of  New  ners,  after  the  dissolution,  to  give  a  new 

York,  5  Sandf.  121.  note  in  tlie  firm   name   in  renewal,  and 

(6)  Schimmcli)ennich  v.  Bayard,  1  the  termination  of  the  partnership  is  not 
Pet.  204  ;  Parsons  v.  Armor,  3  id.  413  ;  a  revocation  of  such  authority. 
Blane  v.  Proudfit,  3  Call,  207  ;  Kilgour  (r)  Pourie  v.  Fraser,  2  Bay,  200. 
r.  Finlyson,  1  H.  Bl.  155,  where  a  power  (d)  Townsend  ».  Liglis,  Holt,  278; 
given,  on  the  dissolution  of  a  partner-  Haughton  r.  Ewbank,  4  Camp.  88;  Bar- 
ship,  to  one  of  tlie  partners  to  receive  all  bcr  r.  Gingell,  3  F^sp.  60.  There  the 
debts  owing  to,  and  to  discharge  all  apparent  acceptor  of  a  bill  of  exchange, 
claims  against  the  late  partnership,  was  setting  up  as  a  defence  tliat  his  signa- 
held  not  to  authorize  him  to  indorse  a  ture  had  been  forged,  it  was  held  a  good 
bill  of  exchange  in  the  partnership  name,  answer  that  the  defendant  had  paid  otlier 
though  drawn  by  him  in  that  name,  and  bills  of  the  drawer  under  similar  circum- 
accepted  by  a  debtor  of  the  partnership  stances.  And  see  Brigham  v.  Peters,  1 
after  the  dissolution.     In   Kicliardson  v.  Gray,  147. 

Moies,  31   Mo.  430,  it  is  said  tliat   wlien  (f)   1«  Vin.  Abr.  Ratihahitio;  Lucena 

the  partners  had,  prior  to  tlie  dissolution,  v.  Craufurd,  1  Taunt.  325 ;   Clark's  Ex- 

1  Thus  a  horse-car  conductor  cannot  agree  to  give  a  free  passage,  Wakefield  v.  So. 
Boston  R.  Co.  117  Mass.  544;  nor  an  engineer  contract  for  a  railroad,  Gardner  v. 
Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  70  Me.  181  ;  nor  a  passenger  agent  make  freight  contracts,  Tay- 
lor V.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  74  111.  80.     See  Reed  v.  Ashburnliam  R.  Co.  120  Mass.  43. 

2  Ratification  may  be  inferred  from  a  principal's  acts,  Bearce  i-.  Bowker,  115 
Mass.  129;  Gibson  v.  Norway  Bank,  G9  Me.  579;  as  whtre  an  agent  to  sign  notes  in 

48 


CH.  III.] 


AGENTS. 


49 


where  any  one  contracts  as  agent,  —  but  not  unless  he  contracts 
as  agent,  (/)  — without  naming  a  principal,  his  acts  enure  to  the 
benefit  of  the  party,  although  at  the  time  uncertain  or  unknown, 
for  whom  it  shall  turn  out  that  he  intended  to  act,  provided 
the  party  thus  entitled  to  be  principal  ratify  the  contract.  (^)  ^ 


ecutors  v.  Tan  Riemsd_vk,  0  Cranch.  158; 
Fleckner  v.  United  States  Bank,  8  Wheat. 
363  ;  Bell  v.  Cunningham,  3  Pet.  81  ;  Hooe 
V.  Oxle.v,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  19;  Moss  v.  Ros- 
sie  Lead  Mining  Co.  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  137  ; 
Rogers  v.  Kneehind,  10  Wend.  218  ;  Marsh 
V.  Keating,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  108 ;  Bigelow  i-. 
Dennison,  23  Vt.  565.  —  If  any  stranger, 
in  the  name  of  the  mortgagor  or  his  heir 
(without  liis  consent  or  privity),  tender 
the  money,  and  the  mortgagee  accepteth 
it  [which,  however,  he  is  not  hound  to  do], 
this  is  a  good  satisfaction,  and  the  mort- 
gagor or  his  heir,  agreeing  tliereunto, 
may  re-enter  into  the  land.  Co.  Lit. 
206  b. 

(/)  Collins  V.  Suau,  7  Rob.  623. 

Ig)  Wilson  v.  Tumman,  6  Man.  &  G. 
242.  "  Ratum  quis  habere  non  potest  quod 
ipsius  nomine  non  est  qestiim."  See  also 
Saunderson  v.  Griffiths,  5  B.  &  C.  909; 
and  Routh  r.  Thompson,  13  East,  274 ; 
Foster  v.  Bates,  12  M.  &  W.  226  ;  Hull  v. 
Pickersgill,  1  Br.  &  B.  282.  This  doc- 
trine has  frequent  application  in  cases 
of  marine  insurance.  See  Hagedorn  v. 
Oliverson,  2  M.  &  Sel.  485;  Finney  v. 
Fairhaven  Ins.  Co.  5  Met.  192.  —  A  nolice  to 
quit,  given  by  an  unauthorized  agent,  can- 
not be  made  good  by  an  adoption  of  it  by 
tiie  principal  after  the  proper  time  for  giv- 
ing it,  the  agent  having  acted  in  his  own 
name  in  giving  the  notice,  nor  it  seems,  if 
he  acted  in  the  name  of  the  principal. 
Doe  r.  Goldwin,  2  Q.  B.  143 ;  Right  v. 
Cuthell,  5  East,  491.  —  In  Bird  r.  Brown, 
4  Exch.  786,  a  very  important  distinction 
was  taken  by  the  Court  of  Exchequer. 


A,  a  merchant  at  Liverpool,  sent  orders 
to  B,  at  New  York,  to  purchase  certain 
goods,  whicli  were  shipped  accordingly  in 
five  ships  and  consigned  to  A,  who,  after 
the  receipt  of  tlie  goods  by  one  of  them, 
stopped  payment  on  the  7th  of  April, 
1840.  B,  pursuant  to  directions  from  A, 
had  drawn  bills  for  the  goods  partly  on  A, 
and  partly  on  C,  with  whom  A  had  deal- 
ings. I),  a  merchant  at  Liverpool,  and 
who  also  had  a  house  of  business  at  New 
York,  purchased  there  several  of  the  bills, 
which  were  drawn  at  sixty  days'  sight, 
and  dated  some  on  the  28th,  and  others  on 
the  30th  of  March,  1846.  On  the  8th  of 
May,  a  fiat  in  bankruptcy  issued  against 
A,  and  his  assignees  were  appointed. 
The  other  four  vessels  arrived  respect- 
ively on  the  4th,  5th,  7th,  and  10th  of  that 
month,  and  immediately  on  the  arrival 
of  each,  and  while  the  transitus  of  the 
goods  on  board  continued,  D,  on  behalf 
of  B,  but  not  being  his  agent,  and  with- 
out any  authority  from  him,  gave  notice 
to  the  masters  and  consignees,  claiming 
to  stop  the  goods  in  trunsitu.  On  the  lltli 
of  May  the  assignees  made  a  formal  de- 
mand of  the  goods  still  on  board  and 
undelivered,  from  the  master  and  consign- 
ees of  each  of  the  four  ships,  at  the  same 
time  tendering  the  freight ;  but  they 
refused  to  deliver  them,  and  on  the  same 
day  delivered  the  whole  to  D.  On  the 
next  day  the  assignees  made  a  formal 
demand  of  the  goods  from  him,  but  he 
refused  to  deliver  them  up.  On  the  28th 
of  April,  B  heard  at  New  York  that  A 
had  sto[iped  payment,  and  on  the  next 


his  principal's  absence  so  signs  after  the  latter's  return  as  an  indorser,  and  the  prin- 
cipal with  knowledge  receives  a  dividend  thereon  from  the  bankrupt  maker,  and 
agrees  to  hold  him  harmless,  Harrt)d  v.  McDaniels,  126  Mass.  413;  as  by  acceptance 
of  a  policy,  of  an  agent's  execution  of  a  premium  note.  Monitor  Ins.  Co.  v.  Buffuni, 
115  Mass.  343;  as  by  their  appearance  as  witnesses  of  the  parties  to  an  arbitration, 
of  the  submission  signed  by  attorney,  Blakely  v.  Graham,  111  Mass.  8;  as  the  failure 
to  objejt  by  the  only  stockholder  not  previously  informed,  of  the  corporation  sujjcr- 
intendent's  purchase  of  goods,  Lyndeborough  Glass  Co.  v.  Mass.  Glass  Co.  Ill  Mass. 
315 ;  as  by  acceptance  of  the  consideration  with  knowledge,  of  an  agent's  release  of 
a  mortgage,  Tooker  v.  Sloan,  3  Stewart,  394 ;  or  as  by  acceptance  of  rents  there- 
under, of  an  unauthorized  lease  of  a  mining  right,  Chamberlin  r.  CoUinson,  45  la. 
429.  An  insured's  ratification,  after  a  loss,  of  unauthorized  insurance  is  sufficient. 
Excelsior  Ins.  Co.  r.  Roj-al  Ins.  Co.,  7  Lansing,  138.  See  Fort  ;•.  Coker,  11  Ileiskell, 
579,  as  to  a  conditional  ratification;  Owensboro  Bank  i-.  Western  Bank,  13  Bush, 
526,  as  to  ratifying  an  agent's  taking  of  insufficient  security. 

1  Williams  i-.  North  China  Ins.  Co.  1  C  P.  D.  757 ;  Francis  v.  Kerker,  85  HI.  190. 
VOL.  I.  4  49 


51 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


50 


51 


And,  on  the  other  *  hand,  if  the  principal  accept,  receive, 
and  hold  the  proceeds  or  beneficial  results  of  such  a  contract, 
he  will  be  estopped  from  *  denying  an  original  authority,  or 


day  lie  executed  a  power  of  attorney  to 
E,  of  Liverpool,  authorizing  him  to  stop 
the  geods  m  transitu.  This  was  received 
by  E  on  the  loth  of  May,  who  on  that 
day  adopted  and  confirmed  the  previous 
stoppage  by  1).  B  afterwards  adopted 
and  ratified  all  which  had  been  done  both 
by  E  and  D.  Ildd,  that  the  title  of  A  to 
the  goods  was  not  devested  by  the  above 
stoppages  {>}  transitu,  and  consequently  that 
trover  for  them  was  maintainable  by  tlie 
assignees  against  B.  Pollock,  C.  B.,  deliv- 
ering the  judgment,  said  :  "  The  doctrine 
'  omnis  ratiliahitio  retrolrahitur  et  mandato 
afjuiparatur,'  is  one  intelligible  in  principle, 
and  easy  in  its  application  when  applied  to 
cases  of  contract.  If  A.  B.,  unauthorized 
by  me,  makes  a  contract  on  my  behalf 
with  J.  S.,  which  I  afterwards  recognize 
and  adopt,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  dealing 
with  it  as  having  been  originally  made  by 
my  authority.  J.  S.  entered  into  the  con- 
tract on  the  understanding  that  he  was 
dealing  with  me,  and  when  I  afterwards 
agree  to  admit  that  such  was  the  case, 
J.  S.  is  precisely  in  the  condition  in  which 
lie  meant  to  be ;  and  if  he  did  not  believe 
A.  B.  to  be  acting  for  me,  his  condition 
is  not  altered  by  my  adoption  of  the 
agency,  for  he  may  sue  A.  B.  as  princi- 
pal at  his  option,  and  has  the  same  equi- 
ties against  me  if  I  sue,  that  he  would 
have  had  against  A.  B.  In  cases  of  tort 
there  is  more  difficulty.  If  A.  B.  pro- 
fessing to  act  by  my  authority,  does  that 
which  jirima  facie  amounts  to  a  trespass, 
and  I  afterwards  assent  to  and  adopt  his 
act,  there  he  is  treated  as  having  from 
the  beginning  acted  by  my  authority,  and 
I  become  a  trespasser,  unless  I  can  justify 
the  act  which  is  to  be  deemed  as  having 
been  done  by  my  previous  sanction.  So 
far  there  is  no  difficulty  in  applying  the 
doctrine  of  ratification  even  in  cases  of 
tort  —  the  y)arty  ratifying  becomes  as  it 
were  a  trespasser  by  estoppel  — he  cannot 
conqdain  that  he  is  deemed  to  have  au- 
thorized that  which  he  admits  himself  to 
have  authorized.  The  authorities,  how- 
ever, go  much  further,  and  show  tliat  in 
some  cases  where  an  act,  which  if  unau- 
thorized would  amount  to  a  trespass,  has 
been  done  in  the  name  and  on  beiialf  of 
another,  and  without  previous  authority, 
there  a  subsequent  ratification  may  cnablo 
tlie  party  on  wliose  behalf  the  act  was 
done,  to  take  advantage  of  it,  and  to 
treat  it  as  liaving  been  done  by  his  direc- 

50 


tion.  But  this  doctrine  must  be  taken 
with  the  qualification  that  the  act  of  rati- 
fication must  take  place  at  a  time,  and 
under  circumstances,  when  the  ratifying 
party  might  have  himself  lawfully  done 
the  act  which  he  ratifies.  Thus  in  Lord 
Audli'ii's  case,  a  fine  with  proclamations 
Avas  levied  of  certain  land,  and  a  stranger 
within  five  years  afterwards,  in  the  name 
of  him  who  had  right,  entered  to  avoid 
the  fine  ;  after  the  five  years,  and  not 
before,  the  party  who  had  the  right  to 
the  land  ratified  and  confirmed  the  act  of 
the  stranger ;  this  was  held  to  be  inopera- 
tive, though  such  ratification  within  the 
five  years  would  probably  have  been 
good.  Now  the  principle  of  this  case, 
which  is  reported  in  many  books,  Cro.  E. 
561 ;  Moore,  457,  pi.  G30 ;  "Poph.  108,  pi.  2, 
and  is  cited  witii  approbation  by  Lord 
Coke  in  Margaret  Podrjer's  case  (9  Rep. 
106  a),  appears  to  us  to  govern  the  pres- 
ent. There  the  entry  to  be  good  must 
have  been  made  within  the  five  years ;  it 
was  made  within  that  time,  but  till  rati- 
fied it  was  merely  the  act  of  a  stranger, 
and  so  had  no  operation  against  the 
fine ;  by  the  ratification  it  became  the 
act  of  the  party  in  whose  name  it  was 
made,  but  that  was  not  until  after  the 
five  years  —  he  could  not  be  deemed  to 
have  made  an  entry  till  he  ratified  the 
previous  entry  —  and  he  did  not  ratify 
until  it  was  too  late  to  do  so.  In  the 
present  case  the  stoppage  could  only  be 
made  during  the  transitus  ;  during  that 
period,  the  defendants,  without  authority 
from  Illiiis,  made  tlie  stoppage.  After 
the  transitus  was  ended,  but  not  before, 
Illins  ratified  what  the  defendants  had 
done ;  from  that  time  the  stoppage  was 
the  act  of  Illins.  But  it  was  then  too 
late  for  him  to  stop ;  the  goods  had 
already  become  the  property  of  the  plain- 
tiffs, free  from  all  right  of  stojipage. 
We  are  therefore  of  o])inion  that  there 
must  be  judgment  for  the  plaintiffs."  — 
It  is  somewhat  remarkable,  in  view  of 
the  present  state  of  the  law,  that  it  was 
at  one  time  strenuously  contended  that 
the  doctrine  of  ratification  readied  less 
broadh-  \n  contract  than  in  tori;  and  that 
although  a  jjrincipal  unknown  at  the  time 
could  afterwards  adopt  the  act  of  the 
agent  in  the  latter  case,  he  could  not  in 
the  former.  See  Hagedorn  r.  Oliverson, 
2  M.  &  Sel.  485,  and  per  Parke,  J.,  in 
Hull  V.  Pickersgill,  1  Br.  &  B.  287. 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  52 

a  ratification.  (A)  ^  And  if  a  party  does  not  disavow  the  acts 
of  his  agent  as  soon  as  he  can  after  they  come  to  his  knowl- 
edge, he  makes  these  acts  his  own.  (e)  ^  Nor  will  the  delay  of 
a  third  party  to  assert  his  rights  against  the  principal  for  the 
acts  of  the  agent,  discharge  the  former  from  his  liability,  if  the 
relative  position  of  principal  and  agent  have  not  in  the  mean 
time  been  altered.  But  the  failure  of  the  principal  to  notify  the 
agent  of  his  dissent,  does  not,  as  between  them,  ratify  the  act ;  (/c) 
for  the  agent  knew  his  own  want  of  authority.  An  adoption  of 
the  agency  in  part,  adopts  it  in  the  whole,  because  a  principal  is 
not  permitted  to  accept  and  confirm  so  much  of  a  contract 
made  by  one  *  purporting  to  be  his  agent,  as  he  shall  think  *  52 
beneficial  to  himself,  and  reject  the  remainder.  (Z)  ^ 

{h)  Holt,  C.  J.,  in  Bolton   v.  Killers-  &c.  Co.  v.  Danrlridge,  8  G.  &  J.  248,  323; 

den,  1  Ld.  Raym.  224,  225;  Thorold  v.  Hays  v.  Stone,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  128;  Cope- 

Smitli,  11  Mod.  72;  Byrne  v.  Doughty,  land  v.  Mercantile  Ins.  Co.  6  Pick.  198. — 

18  Ga.  46;  Johnson  v.  Smith,  21  Conn.  Conduct    which    would   be   sufficient    to 

627.     The   principal,  when  he  has  once  charge  an   individual   as  principal,  may 

affirmed  a  contract  made  by  the  agent  not  amount  to  ratification  in  the  case  of 

without  authorit\%  and  even  fraudulently,  a  State.     Delafield  v.  Illinois,  26  Wend, 

cannot  afterwards  disaffirm  it;  bringing  102  ;  Warden  r.  Eichbaum,  3  Grant,  42; 

assumpsit  against  the  third  party  is  an  Drennen  r.  Walkifr,  21  Ark.  539. 

affirmance.     Smith   v.   Hodson,  4  T.  R.  (/)  Bredin  v.  Dubarry,  14  S.  &  R.  27  ; 

211,217.     Yet  if  the  party,  alleged  to  be  Veazie  v.  Williams,  8  IIow.  134;  Bene- 

principal,  after  denying  that  the   agent  diet  v.  Smith,  10  Paige,  12() ;  McCulloch 

had   authority   from    him    to    purchase  v.  McKee,  16  Penn.  289 ;  Brigham  v.  Pe- 

goods,  receive  them   from  the  agent  in  ters,  1  Gray,  139. 

payment  of  a  debt  due  from  the  latter,  (/.)  Lewin  v.  Dille,  17  Mo.  64. 

the  original  seller  (whatever  other  rem-  (/)  Wilson    r.   Poulter,   2   Stra.    859; 

edy  he  may  have)  cannot  hold  such  sup-  Smith  v.  Hodson,  4  T.  R.  211  ;  Hovil  v. 

posed  principal  liable  as  having  ratified  Pack,  7  East,  164 ;  Brewer  v.  Sparrow, 

the  purchase  made  by  the  agent.     Hast-  7  B.  &   C.    310 ;   Wright   v.   Crookes,    1 

ings  V.  Bangor  House,  18  Me.  436.  —  The  Scott,  N.   R.  685  ;  Hovey  v.  Blanchard, 

ratification  of   an    act   of   an    agent,    in  13   N.    H.    145 ;    Farmers    Loan    Co.   v. 

order  to  bind  the  principal,  must  be  with  Walworth,  1  Comst.  447  ;  N.  E.  Marine 

a    full   knowledge    of    all   the   material  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Wolf,  8  Pick.  56 ;  Culver 

facts.      Freeman    v.    Rosher,    13    Q-    B.  i'.  Ashley,   19  id.   300;    Bigelow  v.  Den- 

780 ;  Owings  v.  Hull,  9  Pet.  607 ;  Penn.,  nison,  23   Vt.   565 ;    Hodnet   v.   Tatum, 

1  Perkins  v.  Boothby,  71  Me.  91. 

2  If  a  principal  receives  money  borrowed  on  notes  given  in  his  name  by  his  agent 
without  authority  and  fails  to  disavow  the  same  within  a  reasonable  time  after 
demand,  he  will  be  held  to  have  ratified  the  act  and  to  be  bound  by  the  notes.  Gold 
Mining  Co.  v.  National  Bank,  96  U.  S.  640.  So  where  an  attorney  without  authority 
received  a  bond  in  settlement  of  a  debt  due  his  principal,  and  the  hitter's  silence 
would  tend  to  mislead  him.  Maddux  v.  Bevan,  39  Md.  485.  Bosseau  v.  O'Brien, 
4  Bissell,  395,  decided  that  a  principal's  failure  to  answer  his  agent's  letters  or  in- 
quiries as  to  a  sale  is  not  a  ratification.  A  principal  must  disavow  within  a  "  reas- 
onable time"  or  "promptlj',"  Saveland  r.  Green,  40  Wis.  431 ;  Daniell  v.  Griffin,  46 
Ala.  520;  or  as  soon  as  he  can,  Kelsey  r.  Crawford  Bank,  69  Penn.  St.  426;  Peck  v. 
Ritchey,  66  Mo.  114;  otherwise  he  will  be  bound,  Western,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McElwee, 
6  Heiskell,  208 ;  Walker  v.  Walker,  7  Baxter,  260. 

3  IMundorff  v.  Wickersham,  63  Penn.  St.  87 ;  Seago  v.  Martin,  6  Heiskell,  308, 
in  which  latter  case  the  cash  proceeds  of  certain  sales  of  corn  save  one  were 
accepted. 

51 


52 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


A  ratification  is  too  late  if  it  defeats  the  intervening  rights  of 
a  third  ])arty.  (Z^) 

Wliere  the  party  who  undertakes  to  act  as  agent  has  affixed  a 
seal  to  an  instrument  which  did  not  need  a  seal,  a  parol  ratifica- 
tion will  make  the  instrument  obligatory  upon  the  principal  as  a 
simple  contract,  (rn)  ^  And  where  one  acting  as  agent  has, 
without  authority,  entered  into  a  contract  in  writing  required  by 
the  Statute  of  Frauds  to  be  in  writing,  the  principal  is  bound  by 
an  oral  ratification,  (ri)  But  it  has  been  held,  that  a  parol  ratifi- 
cation cannot  make  that  the  deed  of  the  principal  which  origi- 
nally did  not  bind  him  fi'om  the  agent's  want  of  an  authority 
imder  seal,  (o)  ^ 

It  may  be  stated  as  a  general  rule,  that  no  act  operates  a 
ratification,  unless,  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  circumstances,  it 
was  intended  so  to  operate,  or  unless  it  was  such  an   act   as 


9  Geo.  70 ;  Elam  v.  Carruth,  2  La.  An. 
375 ;  Cook  v.  Bank  of  Louisiana,  id. 
.324.  It  seems  the  delivery  of  money 
to  the  agent  for  j)ayment  by  liim  to  a 
person  witii  wliom  tlie  agent  had  con- 
tracted without  authority,  is  sucli  a 
ratification  (tliough  the  delivery  of  the 
money  be  not  made  known  to  the  other 
contracting  party),  that  if  the  agent 
embezzle  the  money,  the  principal  is 
still  bound  by  the  contract.  Lord  FA- 
lenhowiujh,  in  Kusby  v.  Scarlet,  5  Esp. 
77.  —  In  Burn  v.  Morris,  4  Tyr.  485, 
trover  was  maintained  against  the  finder 
of  a  bank-note  for  £20  by  the  owner. 
The  defendant  got  the  note  changed  at 
the  Bank  of  England,  and  afterwards, 
being  taken  Ijcfore  the  Lord  Mayor,  .£7 
(being  part  of  the  proceeds  of  the  note) 
were'found  u])on  her  and  were  restored 
to  the  plaintiff.  It  was  contended  that 
this  receipt  of  the  £7  was  a  ratification 
of  the  defendant's  act,  and  precluded  the 
plaintiff  from  treating  it  as  a  conversion  ; 
aixl  Brewer  r.  Sparrow,  7  B.  &  C.  ;!l(l. 
was  cited.  But  Lord  Liindlturst,  C.  B., 
said:  "  In  that  case  the  whole  proceeds 
of  the  sale  were  taken  ;  tliis  is  an  adop- 
tion of  the  act :  here  the  receipt  of  the 
j£7  docs  not  ratify  the  act  of  the  parties. 


it  only  goes  in  diminution  of  damages." 
—  If  the  principal,  upon  being  informed 
of  what  has  been  done,  by  one  acting  as 
his  agent,  does  not  give  notice  of  dissent 
in  a  reasonable  time,  his  assent  shall  be 
presumed.  Cairnes  c.  Bleecker,  12  Johns. 
'JOO ;  Bichmond  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Stark,  4 
Mason,  296;  Crans  v.  Hunter,  28  N.  Y. 
380. 

(//)  Stoddart's  case,  4  Court  of  Claims, 
511. 

(ill)  Hunter  v.  Parker,  7  M.  &  "W. 
.322  ;  Despatch  Line  v.  Bellamy  Manuf. 
Co.  12  N.  H.  205;  Worrall  v.  Munn,  1 
Seld.  220;  Bandall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19 
Johns.  01  ;  Bank  of  Metropolis  v.  Gutt- 
schlick,  14  Pet.  20;  Mitchell  v.  St.  An- 
drew's, &c.  Co.  4  Fla.  200  ;  Wood  v.  A.  R. 
R.  R.  Co.  4  Seld.  100 ;  Crozier  v.  Carr,  11 
Tex.  .376.  But  see  Wheeler  v.  Nevins,  34 
Me.  54. 

(h)   Maclean  v.  Dunn,  4  Bing.  722. 

(o)  Steiglitz  V.  Egginton,  Holt,  141, 
per  (!ih1>s,  C.  J.  ;  Stetson  v.  Patton,  2 
(Jrocnl.  358;  Despatch  Line  v.  Bellamy 
Manuf.  Co.  12  N.  H.  205;  Parke,  B., 
Hunter  v.  Parker,  7  M.  &  W.  343.— 
In  Blood  V.  Goodrich,  9  Wend.  77,  Sav- 
aqe,  C.  J.,  advanced  the  opinion  that  a 
ratification  in  writing  might  suffice. 


1  State  V.  Spartanburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  8  S.  C.  129. 

2  The  unauthorized  execution  of  a  deed,  whether  of  an  individual  or  a  partner- 
ship, may  be  ratified  by  parol.  Holbrook  ;-■.  Chamberlin,  116  ^L•^ss.  155.  See  also 
Bartlett  v.  Drake,  100  Mass.  174.  So  the  taking  possession  of  land  ratifies  a  mort- 
gage executed  without  authority  by  an  agent.  Pouch  v.  Wilson,  59  Ind.  0-3.  But 
Pollard  V.  Gibbs,  55  Ga.  45,  was  to  the  effect  that  an  imauthorized  execution  under 
seal  of  a  crop  lien  must  be  ratified  under  seal. 

52 


CH.  III.] 


AGENTS. 


*52 


justifies  third  parties  who  are  interested  in  the  question,  in  be- 
lieving that  it  was  a  ratification,  (oo)  i  And  the  ignorance  of  the 
principal,  although  it  arose  from  his  own  negligence,  will  invali- 
date the  ratification,  (ojo)  The  evidence  of  ratification  should  be 
as  clear  as  that  required  for  an  original  authority,  (o^) 

The  ratification  of  the  tort  of  an  agent  does  not,  in  general, 
relieve  the  agent  from  liability ;  although  by  such  ratification  in 
tort  as  well  as  in  contract,  a  liability  is  incurred  by  the  princi- 
pal. (|>) 


(oo)  Gillie  v.  Bailey,  17  N.  H.  18; 
Dickenson  v.  Conway,  12  Allen,  487 ; 
Hazc4ton  v.  Batchelder,  44  N.  H.  40; 
Coombs  V.  Scott,  12  Alien,  493  ;  Holde- 
nien  v.  Baker,  44  N.  H.  414 ;  Brass  v. 
Worth,  40  Barb.  648 ;  Johnson  v.  Craig, 
21  Ark.  539. 

(op)  Coombs  I?.  .Scott,  12  Allen,  493. 

(oq)  Wisconsin  Bank  v.  Morlev,  19 
Wis.  62. 

(/>)  It  appears  indeed  to  be  said  in  2 
Greeiil.  Evid.  §  68,  that  a  man  cannot 
become  a  trespasser  by  ratification.  "  If 
the  act  of  the  agent  was  in  itself  unlaiv- 
fal,  and  directly  injurious  to  another,  no 
subsequent  ratification  will  operate  to 
make  the  principal  a  trespasser;  for  an 
authority  to  commit  a  trespass  does  not 
result  by  mere  implication  of  law.  The 
master  is  liable  in  trespass  for  the  act  of 
his  servant,  only  in  consequence  of  his 
previous  express  command."  But,  as  it 
seems,  the  cases  recognize  no  greater 
diflBculty  in  becoming  a  trespasser  by 
ratifying  the  trespass  of  the  agent,  than 
in  becoming  liable  ex  contractu  by  ratify- 
ing the  agent's  contract.  In  neither  case 
can  the  principal  be  made  liable,  unless 
the  agent,  at  tlie  time  of  the  tort  or  the 
contract,  undertook  to  act  for  him ;  but 
if  the  agent,  though  without  any  pre- 
cedent authoritj%  did  undertake  to  act 
for  the  principal,  and  he  subsequently 
ratify,  "  in  that  case,"  in  the  language  of 
Tindal,  C.  J.,  Wilson  v.  Tumman,  0  Man. 
&  G.  242,  "  the  principal  is  bound  by  the 
act,  whether  it  be  for  his  detriment  or 
his  advantage,  and  ichether  it  he  founded 
on  a  tort  or  a  contract,  to  the  same  extent, 
as,  by,  and  with  all  tlie  consequences 
which  follow  from,  the  same  act  done  by 
his  previous  authority.  Wilson  v.  Tum- 
man was  an  action  of  trespass  against 
T.,  who  had  ratified  the  trespass  of 
agents ;  but  they  in  committing  the  tres- 
pass had  not  acted  for   T.,  but  for  an- 


other person ;  and  on  this  account  it  was 
held  that  T.  was  not  liable.  In  Barker 
?•.  Braham,  3  Wils.  376,  De  Grey,  C.  J., 
said  explicitly,  "  one  assenting  to  a  tres- 
pass after  it  is  done  is  a  tresi)asser."  In 
Co.  Lit.  180  b,  it  is  stated,  that  "  if  A 
disseize  one  to  the  use  of  B,  who  knowetli 
not  of  it,  and  B  assent  to  it,  in  tliis  case, 
till  the  agreement,  A  was  tenant  of  the 
land,  and  after  the  agreement,  B  is  ten- 
ant of  tlie  land,  but  both  of  them  be  dis- 
seizors;  ioT  omnis  ratihahitio  relrotra'  itur  ft 
mandato  aquiparalur."  And  where  a  bailiff 
seized  a  beast  for  a  heriot  where  none 
was  due,  and  the  lord  agreed  to  the  seiz- 
ure and  took  the  beast,  the  whole  court 
agreed  that  the  lord  was  liable  in  tres- 
pass, and  the  only  question  made  was, 
whether  the  plaintiff  miglit  elect  to  bring 
trover  instead.  Bisliop  v.  .Montague,  Cro. 
E.  824.  See  also  Wilson  v.  Barker,  4  B. 
&  Ad.  614,  616,  where  4  Inst.  317,  is 
cited  bv  ["arke.  J. ;  Hull  v.  Tickersgill, 
1  Br.  &  B.  282,  286 ;  Pollock,  C.  B.,  Bird 
V.  Brown,  4  Exch.  786,  cited  «»;»■</,  p.  *49, 
note  (I.  Tiiis  matter  of  trespass  by  rati- 
fication was  very  thoroughly  discussed, 
and  the  law  respecting  it  settled  substan- 
tially as  it  has  ever  since  remained,  so 
early  as  38  Ed.  3,  18;  Lib.  Ass.  223,  pi. 
9,  s.  c. ;  and  see  the  resolution  of  the 
court  stated  Bro.  Abr.  EJectione  Custodie, 
pi.  5,  8,  Trespass,  pi.  113,  256.  —  As  to 
trespass  with  battery,  or  a  trespass  consti- 
tuting a  statutory- offence,  see  Bishop  v. 
Montague,  Cro.  E.  824  ;  Hawk.  P.  C,  B. 
2,  Ch.  29,  §  4 ;  but  with  tiiis  last  compare 
Gould,  42;  Moore,  53,  pi.  155;  and  Co. 
Lit.  180  b,  note  4. 

An  interesting  and  important  question 
arose  in  Buron  v.  Dcnman,  2  Exch.  167. 
The  defendant,  a  naval  conmiander,  sta- 
tioned on  the  coast  of  Africa,  with  in- 
structions for  the  suppression  of  the 
slave  trade,  went  beyond  his  instructions 
in  firing  the  baracoons  of  the  plaintiff,  a 


1  See  Phosphate  Co.  v.  Green,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  43. 


53 


*  53  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

*  53        *  An  agent  who  has  the  power  to  appoint  a  sub-agent,  may 

ratify  his  act,  and  thereby  make  it  binding  on  the  agent's 
principal,  (g-)  ^ 


*54  *  SECTION   IV. 

SIGNATURE    BY    AN    AGENT. 

The  manner  in  which  an  agent  should  sign  an  instrument  for 
his  principal  has  given  rise  to  some  controversy.  There  has 
been  a  tendency  to  discriminate  in  this  respect ;  to  say,  for  in- 
stance, that  if  A  signs  "  A  for  B,"  this  is  the  signature  of  A,  and 
he  is  the  contracting  party,  although  he  makes  the  contract  at  the 
instance  and  for  the  benefit  of  B.  But  if  he  signs  "  B  by  A," 
then  it  is  the  contract  of  B  made  by  him  through  his  instrument 
A.  In  the  first  case  A  is  the  principal;  in. the  second,  B  is  the 
principal  and  A  his  agent.  But  the  recent  cases,  and  the  best 
reasons,  are,  for  determining  in  each  instance  and  with  whatever 
technical  inaccuracy  the  signature  is  made,  from  the  facts  and 
the  evidence,  that  a  party  is  an  agent  or  a  principal,  in  accordance 
with  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  contract ;  if  the  Avords  are 
sufficient  to  bear  the  construction,  (r)  ^     But  it  is  still  requisite 

Spanisli  subject,  and  carrying  off  certain  dinary  case  of  ratification  by  subsequent 

slaves   of  wliich  he    was  there   lawfully  authority    between    private    individuals, 

possessed.     The  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  If  an  individual  ratifies  an  act  done  on 

and  the  Secretaries  of  State  for  the  for-  his  behalf,  the  nature  of  tlie  act  remains 

eign   and   colonial   departments,   respec-  unchanged,  it  is  still  a  mere  tresjiass,  and 

lively,    by   letter,  adopted    and    ratified  the  party  injured  has  his  option  to  sue 

what  the  defendant  had  done.     IIclJ,  by  either ;  if  the  crown  ratifies  an  act,  the 

Aldcmon,  Plait,  and  Rol/e,  BB.,  that  such  character  of  the  act  becomes  altered,  for 

ratification    was    equivalent    to   a   prior  tlic  ratification  does  not  give  the   party 

connnand,  and  rendered   what  otherwise  injured    the   double   ojition   of  bringing 

wouhJ  have  Ijeen  a  trespass  on  the  part  his  action  against    tiie  agent   who  com- 

of    the   defendant,   an   act   of   state   for  mitted  the  trespass  or  the  principal  who 

which  the  crown  was  alone  responsible,  ratified    it,   but   a   reniedy   against    the 

]'<irke,  15.,  doubted  :  "I  do  not  say  that  crown  only  (sucli  as  it  is),  and  actually 

1  dissent ;  but  I  express  my  concurrence  exempts  from  all  liability  the  person  who 

witli  some  doubt,  because,  on  reflection,  commits  the  trespass." 
there  apj)ears  to  me  a  considerable  di.s-  (7)  Isewton  v.  Bronson,  .3  Kern.  587. 

tinction  Ijetween  the  present  and  the  or-  (;)   See  Mechanics  Bank  i".  Bank   of 

^  The  ratification  of  an  unauthorized  sub-agent's  acts  binds  the  principal  equally 
as  if  authorized,  as  in  tJie  CDJleclion  of  money,  Strickland  v.  Hudson,  55  Miss.  235; 
but  such  ratification  does  not  render  tlie  principal  liable  to  pay  for  the  sub-agent's 
services,  Iloman  r.  Brooklyn  Lis.  Co.  7  IMo.  App.  22.  See  also  Grace  v.  American  Ins. 
Co.  IG  Blatchford,  4-33 ;  Danaher  v.  Garlock,  33  Mich.  295,  as  to  sub-agents.  j 

2  Thus  a  draft  headed  by  the  name  of  an  msurance  company  and  designating  in 

54 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  55 

that  the  name  of  the  principal  appear  as  such  in  the  signature  of 
a  deed,  (s)  It  has  been  regarded  as  an  established  principle, 
that  no  person  is  held  to  be  the  agent  of  another  in  making  a 
written  contract,  unless  his  agency  is  stated  in  the  instrument 
itself,  and  he  therein  stipulates  for  his  principal  by  name.  (^)  ^ 
In  Stackpole  v.  Arnold,  (u)  *  Chief  Justice  Parker  considers  *  55 
this  rule  as  applicable  to  every  written  contract.  But  the 
rule  is  qualified,  if  not  contradicted  by  authorities  of  much  weight, 
and  we  do  not  regard  it  as  of  great  force  except  in  cases  of 
sealed  instruments,  (v)  Indeed,  Chief  Justice  Parker,  in  the 
later  case  of  New  England  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  De  Wolf,  (w)  seems 
to  confine  it  to  these  cases.  The  rule  stated  by  Mr.  Smith 
(2  Leading  Cases,  note  to  Thompson  v.  Davenport),  is  this :  parol 
evidence  may  always  be  admitted  to  charge  an  unnamed  principal ; 
but  not  to  discharge  the  actual  signer.  Good  reasons  may  be 
given  for  this  rule ;  but  it  is  not  sustained  by  all  the  authorities. 

Columbia,  5  Wheat.  326,  337;  Long  v.  Courtney,  5   Pet.   319,   350.     See   Beck- 
Colburn,  11  Mass.  97 ;  Abbey  v.  Chase,  ham  v.  Drake,  9  M.  &  W.  79. 
6Cush.  54;  Sheldon  v.  Kendall,  7  Cush.  [t]  Long    v.    Colburn,   11   Mass.    97; 
217  ;  Wilks  r.  Black,  2  East,  142 ;  Wil-  Magill  ;;.  Hinsdale,  0  Conn.  464 ;    Han- 
burn  V.  Larkin,  3  Blackf .  55 ;  Hunter  v.  cock  v.  Fairfield,  30  Me.  299. 
Miller,   6   B.    Mon.    612;    Whitciiead   v.  [u)  11  Mass.  27. 

Eeddick,  12  Ired.  L.  95;  McCall  r.  Clay-  (v)  Evans   v.   Wells,   22  Wend.   324; 

ton,  1  Busb.  L.  422;  Sydnor  v.  llurd,  8  Pinckney  v.  Hagadorn,  1  Duer,»89;  An- 

Tex.  98;  Giddens  v.  Byers'  Heirs,  12  id.  drews  v.  Estes,  2  Fairf.  207.     The  undis- 

75;    Johnson   v.    Smith,   21    Conn.   627;  closed    principal,    however,    can    never 

Rogers  v.  March,  33  Me.  106 ;  Southern  come  in  and  take  advantage  of  a  written 

Ins.  Co.  V.   Gray,  3  Flor.  262 ;  Hicks  i'.  contract  entered  into  by  his  agent  in  a 

Hinde,  9  Barb.  528.   But  see  Moss  v.  Liv-  case  where  the  latter  has  distinctly  de- 

ingston,  4  Comst.  208;  Lennard  i-.  Rob-  scribed  himself  in  the  writing  t/s /)7(Hc;";;a/. 

inson,   5   El.    &    Bl.    125.     In   Pinckney  Lucas  v.  De  La  Cour,  1  M.  &  Sel.  249; 

V.  Hagadorn,  1  Duer,  89,  an  auctioneer  2   Greenl.    Evid.   §   281.      In   Humble   v 

had  signed  his  own  name  to  a  receipt  for  Hunter,  12  Q.  B.  310,  which  was  an  ac- 

the  deposit  made  upon  the  purchase  of  tion  of  assumpsit  on  a  charter-party  exe- 

real  estate  sold  to  the  ])laintiff  at  auction  ccuted,    not   by    the   plaintiff,  but  by  a 

"for  which  a  good  and  sufficient  title  is  third    person   who    in    the   contract   de- 

to  be  given  by  J.  H.  and  others  ;  "  it  was  scribed  liimself  as  the  "owner"  of   the 

held,  that  this  was  a  sufficient  signing  by  ship,  it  was  held,  that  evidence  was  not 

J.  H.  within  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  although  admissible  to  show  that  such  person  was 

his    signature    did    not    appear   in    the  the  plaintiff's  agent. 

subscription.  (?")  8  Pick.  56;  Northampton  Bank  v. 

(.-!)  Bac  Abr.  Leases,  I.  10;  Clarke  v.  Pepoon,  11  Mass.  288,  292. 

print  in  the  margin  the  signers  as  its  general  agents,  drawn  upon  the  company  in 
payment  of  a  claim,  is  the  draft  of  the  company  and  not  of  the  agents,  although 
signed  by  them  in  their  own  names.  Chipman  v.  Foster,  119  Mass.  189.  "We  have 
this  day  sold  to  you,  on  account  of  M.  &  Co.,  2,000  cases  of  oranges,"  signed  "  H.  & 
Co."  witiiout  more,  does  not  bind  "  H.  &  Co."  personally.  Gadd  v.  Houghton,  1  Ex. 
D.  357.  See  Cutler  v.  Ashland,  121  Mass.  588.  Lacy  v.  Dubuque  Lumber  Co.  43  la. 
510,  held  a  principal  bound,  although  the  agent's  name  and  designation  appeared 
only  by  initials. 

1  A  deed  signed  "A.  B.  by  C.  D.  his  attorney  in  fact,"  is  a  sufficient  execution 
without  reciting  the  fact  in  the  body  of  the  deed.     Tidd  v.  Rines,  26  Minn.  201. 

55 


56 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


We  give  in  our  note  the  cases  on  this  subject,  (re)  ^     As  be- 
*  56    twecn  an  undischarged  principal  and  a  tliird  *  party,  a  letter 


(x)  In  favor  of  this  rule  may  be  cited 
Humble  v.  Hunter,  12  Q.  B.  310  ;  Hig- 
gins  r.  Senior,  8  M.  &  W.  884;  Trueman 
V.  Loder,  11  A.  &  E.  59-4.— In  Beckham 
V.  Drake,  9  M.  &  W.  79,  where  it  was  de- 
cided that  a  partner  might  be  held  liable 
upon  a  written  contract,  signed  by  his 
copartners,  but  in  which  his  name  did 
not  ap{)ear.  Lord  Ahinger,  C.  B.,  and 
Parke,  B.,  took  occasion  to  consider  the 
case  upon  the  principles  of  Agency. 
They  admitted  that  in  tiie  case  of  a  bill 
of  exchange  or  promissory  note,  none  but 
the  parties  named  in  the  instrument  by 
their  name  or  firm,  can  be  made  liable 
to  an  action  upon  it,  but  were  of  opinion 
tiiat  all  otlier  written  contracts,  not  un- 
der seal,  stand  upon  the  same  footing 
with  regard  to  the  parties  who  may  be 
sued  upon  them,  as  contracts  not  written. 
Tiie  weiglit  of  American  authority  is  as 
yet  opposed  to  the  admission  of  parol 
evidence  to  charge  an  unnamed  party. 
Many  of  the  cases  in  which  this  broad 
doctrine  was  laid  down  by  our  courts, 
were  cases  of  mercantile  paper,  3'et  the 
decisions  evidently  were  not  rested  upon 
the  peculiar  character  of  this  class  of 
instruments.  Whether  American  courts 
will  be  inclined  hereafter  to  follow  the 
P>nglish  judges,  and  draw  a  line  of  dis- 
tinction which  shall  leave  ordinary  writ- 
ten contracts  open  to  the  admission  of 
new  parties,  remains  to  be  seen.  It  is 
certain,  however,  that  considerations 
deserving  great  attention  may  be  urged 
against  the  admissibility  of  parol  evi- 
dence to  charge  witii  liability  upon  a 
written  contract  a  party  not  referred  to 
be  in  it.  See  Long  i\  Colburn,  11  Mass. 
97;  Lerned  o.  Johns,  9  Allen,  419; 
Stackpole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  27  ;  Brad- 
lee  V.  Boston  Glass  Co.  10  Pick.  3u0; 
Savage  v.  Rix,  9  N.  H.  263 ;  Minard  v. 
Mead,  7  Wend.  68 ;  Spencer  v.  Field, 
10  Wend.  87 ;  United  States  v.  Parmele, 
i'aine,  C.  C.  252 ;  Fenly  v.  Stewart, 
•')  Sandf.  101.  In  Finney  v.  Bedford  Com- 
mercial Ins.  Co.  8  Met.  348,  it  was  held, 
that  when  a  part-owner  of  a  vessel  or 


its  outfits  effects  insurance  thereon  in 
his  own  name  only,  and  nothing  in  the 
policy  shows  that  the  interest  of  any 
other  person  is  secured  thereby,  an  ac- 
tion on  the  policy  cannot  be  maintained 
in  the  names  of  all  the  owners,  upon  pa- 
rol evidence  that  such  part-owner  was 
their  agent  for  procuring  insurance  and 
that  his  agency  and  their  ownership 
were  known  to  the  underwriters,  and 
that  the  underwriters  agreed  to  insure 
for  them  all,  and  that  it  was  the  inten- 
tion of  all  the  parties,  in  making  the 
policy,  to  cover  the  interest  of  all  the 
owners.  And  with  this  recent  case 
agrees  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  Graves  v.  Boston  Mar.  Ins. 
Co.  2  Cranch,  419,  439.  But  in  Hunt- 
ington ('.  Knox,  7  Cush.  371,  which  was 
an  action  by  tlie  plaintiff  to  recover  the 
price  of  certain  bark  sold  and  delivered 
to  the  defendant  under  a  contract  in 
writing,  by  which  one  Geo.  H.  Hunting- 
ton acknowlegcd  to  have  received  of  the 
defendant  a  partial  payment  of  $2.5,  and 
in  consideration  thereof,  agreed  to  deliver 
to  the  defendant  the  bark  in  question,  it 
was  decided  that  the  plaintiff,  Mehitabel 
Huntington,  might  show  by  parol  evi- 
dence that  the  contract  was  made  by 
Geo.  H.  Huntington  on  her  account,  and 
that  the  bark  delivered  was  her  property, 
and  that  she  was  entitled  to  recover  on 
the  contract.  Shaiv,  C.  J.,  relics  upon  the 
case  of  Higgins  w.  Senior,  and  states 
the  principle  broadly  thus  :  "  Where  a 
contract  is  made  for  the  benefit  of  one 
not  named,  though  in  writing,  the  latter 
may  sue  on  the  contract  jointly  with 
others  or  alone,  according  to  the  interest. 
The  riglits  and  liabilities  of  a  principal 
upon  a  written  instrument  executed  by 
his  agent  do  not  depend  ujjon  the  fact  of 
the  agency  ai)pearing  on  the  instrument 
itself,  but  upon  the  facts,  first,  that  the 
act  is  done  in  the  exercise,  and  second, 
within  the  limits  of  the  powers  delegated  ; 
and  these  are  necessarily  inquirable  into 
b}'  evidence."  Considerable  stress  is 
however    laid    upon  the  fact    that    this 


^  Chaniller  v.  Coo,  54  N.  H.  501,  decided  that  such  evidence  was  admissible  to 
charge  an  unknown  but  not  a  known  principal,  but  inadmissible  to  discharge  the 
agent,  wiiether  the  principal  was  known  or  unknown.  A  principal  may  sue  in  his 
own  name  on  a  non-negotiable  promissory  note  made  in  his  behalf  and  for  his  bene- 
fit, although  in  terms  payable  to  the  agent.  National  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  IIG  Mass. 
398.  Under  an  unsealed  lease  signed  by  an  agent  in  his  own  name  as  "  agent  as 
landlord,"  the  landlord  may  sue  for  rent  in  liis  own  name.  Nicoll  v.  Burke,  78 
N.  Y.  580. 

56 


CH.  HI.] 


AGENTS. 


57 


of  the  agent  informing  the  principal  of  his  action  with  the  reply 
of  the  latter  approving  thereof,  will  be  evidence  of  the  agent's 
authority  ;  even  though  the  terms  stated  in  the  *  letter  .be    *  57 
not  precisely  those  of  the  transaction,  if  the  latter  be  not 
unreasonable  nor  unusual  and  in  substance  the  same,  (y) 

The  case  of  an  attorney  for  a  corporation  executing  a  deed  of 
their  land,  under  his  own  name  and  seal,  is  considered  in  the 
chapter  on  Corporations,  (^yy) 

The  case  sometimes  occurs  where  a  person  holding  some  office, 
signs  his  name,  adding  to  it  the  name  of  his  office,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  representing  himseK  as  an  official  agent,  and  preventing 
his  personal  liability.  But  this  mere  addition  seldom  has  this 
effect,  being  usually  regarded  only  as  a  word  of  description.  (2) 


action  was  not  brought  upon  the  writ- 
ten contract  itself,  but  for  the  price  of 
goods  sold  by  the  agent,  from  wliich 
the  promise  to  pay  implied  by  law,  al- 
thougli  prima  fucie  to  tlie  agent,  might 
be  controlled  by  parol  evidence  tliat  the 
contract  was  for  tiie  sale  of  property 
belonging  to  the  principal,  and  sold  by 
her  through  her  agent.  Upon  tliis  dis- 
tinction this  case  may  be  reconciled  with 
Finney  v.  Bedford  Commercial  Ins.  Co., 
which  was  not,  however,  alluded  to  in 
tlie  case.  Newcomb  v.  Clark,  1  Denio, 
226,  was  an  action  by  C.  upon  an  agree- 
ment in  writing  with  P.,  who,  it  was  in 
proof,  was  C.'s  agent.  Held,  that  an  ac- 
tion upon  an  express  contract  (not  being 
a  negotiable  instrument),  must  be  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  party  with  whom  it 
was  made  ;  and  it  is  not  competent  to 
show  by  parol  that  the  promisee  was  the 
agent  of  another  person  for  the  purpose 
of  enabling  sucli  person  to  maintain  an 
action.  And  in  Fenly  v.  Stewart,  5 
Sandf.  101,  which  was  an  action  of  as- 
sumpsit to  charge  the  defendants  as 
principals  upon  a  contract  with  A.  W. 
Otis  &  Co.,  to  deliver  2-5,000  bushels  of 
oats  to  the  plaintiiis,  and  in  which  the 
Messrs.  Otis  were  introduced  and  testi- 
fied that  at  the  time  tlie^'^  signed  the 
written  agreement  for  the  sale  and  deliv- 
ery of  the  oats  in  their  own  name,  they 
were  the  agents  of  the  defendants  ;  it 
was  decided  that  the  plaintiffs  could  not 
recover,  and  tlie  court  denying  the  dictum 
of  Baron  Parke,  in  the  case  of  Higgins  v. 
Senior,  that  it  is  competent  by  parol 
proof  to  charge  a  party  upon  a  contract 
in  writing  made  by  another  person  in  his 
own  name,  stated  the  rule  to  be,  "  that 
where  a  contract  is  reduced  to  writing, 
whether  in  compliance   with   the  requi- 


sitions of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  or  not, 
and  it  is  necessary  to  sue  upon  the 
writing  itself,  there  you  cannot  go  out 
of  the  writing,  or  contradict  or  alter  it 
by  parol  proof,  and  consequently  can- 
not recover  against  a  party  not  named 
in  the  writing ;  but  where  the  contract 
of  sale  has  been  executed  so  that  an 
action  may  be  maintained  for  the  price 
of  the  goods  irrespective  of  the  writ- 
ing, there  the  party  who  has  had  the 
benefit  of  the  sale  may  be  held  liable, 
unless  the  vendor,  knowing  who  the 
principal  is,  has  elected  to  consider  the 
agent  his  debtor."  The  true  principle 
upon  whicli  this  seeming  contrariety  of 
opinion  may  be  reconciled,  would  appear 
to  be  that  laid  down  in  the  case  of  Fenly 
V.  Stewart,  and  may  be  stated  thus  : 
where  a  contract  is  reduced  to  writing, 
and  an  action  is  brought  upon  the  writ- 
ing itself,  no  other  persons  can  be  made 
parties  than  those  named  in  the  instru- 
ment, but  when  a  right  of  action  exists 
independent  of  the  writing,  wliich  is 
merely  offered  as  evidence  tending  among 
other  things,  to  establish  that  right,  then 
the  party  having  the  legal  interest  or  li- 
ability, and  for  whom  the  contract  was 
actually  made,  may  sue  or  be  sued,  al- 
tliough  not  named  in  the  writing.  But 
Hubbert  v.  Borden,  6  Whart.  79  ;  Violett 
V.  Powell,  10  B.  iMon.  347;  Brooks  v. 
Minturn,  1  Cal.  481 ;  and  Cothay  v.  Fen- 
nell,  10  B.  &  C.  671,  are  authorities  to 
show  that  an  unnamed  principal  may 
come  in  to  take  the  benejil  of  a  written 
contract  with  an  agent,  who  acted  in  his 
own  name. 

(y)    Campbell    v.    Ilicks,   4   H.   &  N. 
(Ex'ch.),  851. 

(yy)  See  poxt,  p.  *  140  and  note. 

[z)  Mare  v.  Charles,  5  E.  &  B.  978.     See 

67 


*  57  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

So  if  he  adds  only  the  word  "  trustee,"  or  even  "  agent,"  it  has 
been  said  that  he  is  held  personally ;  but  this  is  sometimes  de- 
nied, (zz)  1  If  the  plaintiff  knew  that  the  agent  acted  only  in  the 
official  capacity  which  he  designates,  and  accepted  the  contract  as 
such,  the  agent  would  not  be  held  personally,  (za)  A  general 
rule  may  be  drawn  from  the  cases  to  this  effect ;  one  signing  as 
"  agent,"  without  giving  the  name  of  his  principal,  is  himself 
bound.  But  if  he  gives  the  name  of  his  principal,  he  is  himself 
bound  only  as  agent.  (zJ)) 

See  further  as  to  the  form  of  the  signature,  chapter  sixth,  on 
Attorneys. 

post,  p.  *  122.     Venable  &  Co.  v.  Curd  &  111.  238 ;   Bingham  v.  Stewart,  13  Minn. 

White,  2  Head,  582.     In  this  last  case  it  106  ;  Pratt  v.  Beaupre,  13  Stewart,  187. 

•was  lii-ld  that  the  acts  of  officers  de  facto  Held,  that  he  may  sign  the  name  of  his 

are  valid  when  they  concern  the  public  or  principal  first,  and  add  his  own  as  agent 

the  rights  of  third  persons  who  have  an  thus  :     "  A,  by   B,  agent,"   in   Smith  v. 

interest  in  the  act  done.     But  a  different  Morse,  9  Wall.  76. 

rule   prevails   where   the  act  is  for  the  {za)  Randal  v.  Snyder,  1  Laws.  163. 

benefit  of  the  officer,  because  he  cannot  {zb)  See  Williams  ;■.  Robbins,  16  Gray, 

be  allowed  to  take  advantage  of  his  own  77,  and  compare  Means  v.  Swomestedt, 

wrong.  32  Ind.  87,  with  Button  v.  Marsh,  L.  R.  6 

(zz)  Bickford    v.  First,  &c.  Bank,  42  Q.  B.  361. 

1  An  instrument  in  the  form  of  a  note  beginning,  "  We  as  trustees  but  not  indi- 
viduallj'  promise  to  pay,"  and  signed  "  A.  B.  and  C.,  trustees,"  secured  by  a  mort- 
gage given  by  A.  B.  and  C.  as  trustees,  does  not  bind  tiiem  personally.  Shoe  & 
Leather  Bank  v.  Dix,  123  Mass.  148.  A  mortgage  assignment  from  a  loan  associa- 
tion, concluding,  "  In  witness  whereof  the  said  association,  by  J.  S.,  its  president, 
<i\i\y  authorized  for  this  purpose,  has  hereunto  set  its  seal,  and  the  said  J.  S., 
president  as  aforesaid,  has  heretmto  set  his  hand,"  signed  "J.  S.,  president  of" 
(giving  the  association  name),  and  sealed,  is  in  form  executed  by  the  association. 
Murphy  v.  Welch,  128  Mass.  489.  But  a  ciiarter-party  signed  by  A.  &  B.  as  "  agents 
to  merchants,"  binds  them  personally  for  failure,  under  a  trade  usage,  to  disclose 
their  principal  within  a  reasonable  time.  Hutchinson  v.  Tatham,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  482. 
See  Fleet  v.  Murton,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  126.  A  note  signed  by  "A.,  agent,"  Bartlett  v. 
Hawley,  120  Mass.  92 ;  by  "A.,  receiver,"  Towne  v.  Rico,  122  Mass.  07;  by  "A., 
treasurer,"  Mellen  v.  Moore,  68  Me.  390;  by  "A.,  administratrix,"  Harrison  v. 
McCleUand,  57  Ga.  531 ;  by  "  A.  &  B.,  school  trustees,"  Cahokia  Trustees  v.  Rauten- 
berg,  S8  111.  219 ;  by  "  A.  &.  B.,  trustees  of  the,  &c.  Clmrch,"  Hayes  v.  Matthews,  03 
Ind.  412;  or  by  "A.,  vestryman,  Grace  Church,"  Tilden  ;,'.  Barnard,  43  Mich.  376, 
binds  the  signer  personally.  A  person,  who  describes  himself  in  the  body  of  a  con- 
tract "  as  agent,"  and  signs  his  name  without  more,  is  liable  personally.  Paice  v. 
Walker,  L.  R.  5  Ex.  173;  but  not  if  he  there  deacribes  himself  as  contracting  "on 
account  of."     Gadd  v.  Houghton,  1  Ex.  D.  357. 

58 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  58 

SECTION  V. 

DURATION  AND  EXTENT  OF  AUTHORITY. 

Where  there  is  an  authority  expressly  given  or  implied  by  law, 
it  is  important  to  determine  its  extent,  scope,  and  duration. 
Where  a  principal  has  held  one  out  as  his  general  agent,  or 
authorized  parties  so  to  regard  him  by  continued  acquiescence 
and  confirmation,  we  have  said  that  the  principal  cannot  limit  or 
qualify  his  own  liability  by  instructions,  or  limitations,  given  by 
him  to  his  agent,  and  not  made  known  in  any  way  to  parties  act- 
ing with  such  agent,  (a)  And  whore  an  agent  is  employed  to 
transact  some  specific  business,  and  only  that,  yet  he  binds  his 
principal  by  such  subordinate  acts  as  are  necessary  to,  or  are  usu- 
ally and  properly  done  in  connection  with  the  principal  act, 
or  to  carry  the  same  into  effect.  (5)  ^    And  he  has  a  *  rea-    *  58 

(a)  Pickering  i\  Busk,  15  East,  38;  461;  Lord  EUenhoroxuih,  Helyear  v. 
Whitehead  v.  Tuckett,  15  East,  400;  Hawke,  5  Esp.  75;  Withington  v.  Her- 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Kortright,  22  Wend,  ring,  5  Bing.  442  ;  Goodson  v.  Brooke,  4 
348  ;  Munn  v.  Commission  Co.  15  Jolins.  Camp.  163 ;  Barnett  v.  Lambert,  15  M.  & 
44  ;  Hatch  v.  Taylor,  10  N.  H.  538  ;  Lob-  W.  489  ;  Uenman  v.  Bloomer,  11  111.  177; 
dell  V.  Baker,  1  Met.  193  ;  Nickson  v.  Franklin  v.  Ezell,  1  Snced,  497.  So  where 
Brohan,  10  Mod.  109;  Runquist  y.  Ditch-  the  government  is  the  principal  and  a 
ell,  3  Esp.  64 ;  Precious  v.  Abel,  1  Esp.  statute  the  letter  of  authority.  United 
350;  Howard  v.  Howard,  11  How.Pr.  80;  States  v.  Wyngall,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  16.  — 
Lloyd  V.  West  Branch  Bank,  15  Penn.  If  a  party  authorizes  a  broker  to  buy 
St.  172  ;  Chouteaux  v.  Leach,  18  Penn.  St.  shares  for  him  in  a  particular  market, 
224. — E  converso,  it  would  seem  that  a  where  the  usage  is,  that  when  a  pur- 
third  part}'  dealing  with  an  agent  cannot  chaser  does  not  pay  for  his  shares  within 
have  the  benefit  against  the  principal  of  a  given  time,  the  vendor,  giving  the  pur- 
a  private  arrangement  between  the  lat-  chaser  notice,  may  resell  and  charge  liim 
ter  and  the  agent,  of  which  such  third  with  the  difference ;  and  the  broker, 
party  neither  knew  nor  was  entitled  to  acting  under  the  authoritj%  buys  at  such 
know.  See  Acey  v.  Fernie,  7  M.  &  W.  market  in  his  own  name  ;  such  broker,  if 
151.  compelled    to   pay   a   difference   on   llie 

(6)  Tredwen  v.   Bourne,  6  M.  &  W=  shares  through  neglect  of  his  principal 

1  Thus  a  mercantile  firm  is  liable  for  the  necessary  horse-hire  of  an  agent  selling 
by  sample,  although  the  latter  was  furnished  with  money  for  that  purpose  and  was 
forbidden  to  pledge  the  firm's  credit,  Bentley  v.  Doggett,  61  Wis.  224 ;  a  person 
held  out  as  manager  of  a  hotel  binds  the  hotel-keeper  by  his  purchases  of  necessary 
supplies  on  credit,  Beecher  v.  Venn,  35  Mich.  406 ;  an  oral  contract  of  insurance 
made  by  a  local  agent  binds  the  company,  Putnam  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  123  Mass.  324; 
a  railroad  agent,  authorized  to  issue  bills  of  lading,  binds  the  railroad  by  issuing  one 
on  a  forged  warehouse  receipt,  no  goods  being  in  fact  received.  Armour  v.  Mich.  &c. 
R.  Co.  65  N.  Y.  Ill  ;  and  an  agent  for  the  sale  of  a  horse  for  a  fixed  sum  without 
further  restriction  binds  the  owner  bj'  a  warranty,  Tice  v.  Gallop,  5  Tiiomp.  &  C.  51. 
To  the  same  effect,  see  Newman  v.  British,  &c.  Co.  113  Mass.  362;  Knicht  v.  Luce, 
116  Mass.  586 ;  St.  Louis,  &c.  Co.  v.  Parker,  59  111.  23 ;  Rice  v.  Groffmaun,'^56  Mo.  434. 

69 


59 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


sonablc  discretion  as  to  the  execution  of  his  authority.  Thus, 
an  agent  employed  by  government  to  collect  debts,  may,  in 
the  exercise  of  this  discretion,  give  the  debtor  reasonable  in- 
dulgence as  to  the  time  of  payment,  (c)  But  no  officer  of  the 
United  States  can  enter  into  a  submission  to  arbitration  which 
shall  bind  them,  unless  authorized  by  an  act  of  Congress,  (d) 
But  an  agent  is  not  at  liberty  to  exercise  this  discretion  in  the 
choice  of  a  mode  of  performing  the  duty  imposed  upon  him,  if 
some  one  mode,  and  that  only,  is  fixed  either  by  usage  or  by  the 
orders  of  his  principal,  if  he  is  a  general  agent ;  or  if  he  is  a  par- 
ticular agent,  by  his  principal's  orders  alone ;  for  then  he  must 
adopt  that  very  mode  and  no  other,  (e)  An  authority  to  sell 
does  not  carry  with  it  authority  to  sell  on  credit,  unless  such  be 
the  usage  of  the  trade ;  but  if  there  be  such  usage,  then  the  agent 
may  sell  on  credit  unless  specially  instructed  and  required  to  sell 
only  for  cash.  (^)  And  if  he  sells  for  credit,  having  no  authority 
to  do  so,  he  becomes  personally  responsible  to  his  principal 
*  59    for  the  whole  debt.  (Ji)     So  is  he  also  if  *  he  blends  the 


to  supply  funds,  may  sue  the  principal 
for  nionuv  paid  to  liis  use.  Polloclc  v. 
Stables,  12  Q.  B.  7C5 ;  Bayliffe  v.  Butter- 
worth,  1  Excli.  425.  See.  on  tlie  limita- 
tion of  general  powers,  Blum  v.  Robert- 
son, 24  Cal.  127. 

(c)  United  States  v.  Hudson,  3  Mc- 
Lean, loO. 

(d)  United  States  v.  Ames,  1  Woodb. 
&  M.  70,  89. 

(e)  Daniel  v.  Adams,  Ainbl.  495.  And 
the  incidental  means  the  agent  resorts  to 
in  carrying  out  Iiis  autliority  must  be 
those  wliich  usuailij  attend  an  agency  of 
that  kind :  if  an  extraordinary  exigence 
occur  he  has  no  right  to  have  recourse 
to  extraordinary  means  to  meet  it.  liaw- 
tayne  v.  Bourne,  7  M.  &  W.  505. 

(v)  lloU,  C.  .J.,  Anon.  12  Mod.  514; 
Lord  Ellftiiboroit'ih,  Wiltshire  v.  Sims,  1 
Camp.  258;  Van  Allen  v.  Vanderpool, 
6  Johns.  00;  llobertson  v.  Livingston,  5 
Cowen,  473;  .James  v.  Mcf'redie,  1  Bay, 
204;  Delafield  v.  Illinois,  2(5  Wend.  22:i; 
Stod<lard  v.  Mcllwain,  7  Rich.  L.  525; 
Mdlm, .].,  in  (ireely  v.  Bartlett,  1  Grccnl. 
172,  170,  stated  the  rule  of  the  law  mer- 
chant to  be  tliat  a  factor  may  sell  the 
goods  of  his  principal  on  a  reasonable 
credit  unless  restrained  by  instructions  or 
a  special  usage. 

(A)  Barlcidale  v.  Brown,  1  Nott  & 
McC.  517;  Walker  v.  Smith,  4  Dallas, 
380.     And  the  principal  may  also  main- 

GO 


tain  trover  against  the  vendee.  Holt, 
C  J.,  Anon.  12  Mod.  514 ;  and  see  Wilt- 
shire V.  Sims,  1  Camp.  258.  —  An  agent 
to  sell  has  no  power  to  barter,  and  if  he 
undertake  to  do  so,  the  principal  may 
recover  the  goods,  although  the  party 
receiving  them  was  ignorant  that  the 
agent  was  not  the  owner.  Gnerreiro  v. 
Reile,  3  B.  &  Aid.  GIG.  —  A  simple  au- 
thority to  sell  will  not  authorize  a  sale 
at  auction.  Towle  v.  Leavitt,  3  Foster 
(N.  H.),  360.  —  And  it  seems  an  au- 
thority to  sell  at  auction  will  not  support 
a  private  sale,  although  more  is  thus 
obtained  than  the  agent  was  limited  to 
in  case  of  an  auction  sale.  Daniel  v. 
Adams,  Ambl.  405.  —  At  coiumon  law 
an  agent  cannot  pledge  the  goods  of  his 
principal  without  special  authority.  Pat- 
erson  v.  Tash,  2  Stra.  1178  ;  Daubigny  v. 
Duval,  5  T.  R.  004;  De  Bouchout  '?. 
Goldsmid,  5  Ves.  211 ;  Rodriguez  r.  Ilcff- 
ernman,  5  Johns.  Ch.  417  ;  Bott  v.  McCoy, 
20  Ala.  578.  This  has  been  modified  in 
England  by  various  statutes  (4  Geo.  IV. 
c.  83;  6  Geo.  III.  c.  94 ;  5  &  0  Vict.  c. 
39).  See  Navulshaw  v.  Brownrigg,  2 
De  G.,  M.  &  G.  411.  And  in  several 
States  of  this  Union  stattitory  enactments 
have  been  made  i)rovidiiig  that  any  con- 
signee, agent,  or  factor,  having  possession 
of  merchandise  with  authority  to  sell 
the  same,  or  having  possession  of  any 
bill  of  lading,  permit,  certificate,  or  order 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS,  ♦  69 

accounts  of  his  principal  with  his  own,  or  takes  a  note  payable 
to  himself.  (^')  If  an  agent  to  whom  goods  are  intrusted  for  a 
particular  purpose,  sell  the  same  to  a  person,  or  in  a  manner  not 
within  the  scope  of  his  authority,  the  principal  may  disaffirm  the 
sale  and  recover  the  goods  of  the  vendee,  if  he  have  not  justified 
the  vendee  in  believing  that  the  agent  had  such  authority.  (^) 
Even  a  general  agent,  appointed  and  authorized  to  transact  busi- 
ness in  the  most  general  terms,  cannot  bind  his  principal  in  any 
matter  which  does  not  fairly  fall  within  the  business.  (Jclc)  ^  So 
an  authority  to  buy  a  certain  lot  of  land  or  other  special  thing, 
does  not  authorize  the  agent  to  sell  or  exchange  it,  (kV)  ^  or  buy 
more  or  less,  (kni) 

If  the  power  of  an  agent  be  given  by  a  written  instrument, 
which  instrument  is  known  to  the  party  contracting  with  him, 
such  instrument  must  be  followed  strictly,  and  the  power  given 
by  it  cannot  be  varied  or  enlarged  by  evidence  of  usage ;  (l)  ^ 

for  the  delivery  of  merchandise  with  the  vided   the  pledgee   make   the   advances 

like  authority,  shall  be  deemed  the  true  in  good  faith  believing  that  the  agent 

owner  thereof  so  as  to  give  validity  to  had  authority  to  enter  into  the  contract, 

the  sale,  disposition,   or   pledge  of  such  — If   the    merchandise   was   pledged   to 

merchandise    as    security   for    any   ad-  secure   antecedent   advances,    the  pledgee 

vances,   negotiable  paper,  or  other  obli-  acquires  no  other  right  or  interest  in  the 

gation  given   on  faith  tliereof.      Maine  pledge  than  was  possessed  or  could  have 

R.    S.    (1841),    ch.    43,    sect.    2;    Mass.  been  enforced  by  the  agent  or  factor  at 

Sup.  to  R.  S.  ch.  216,  §  3,  Pub.  Laws  the  time  of  making  the  pledge.     Me.  R. 

of  R.   I.    (1844),  p.  280,  sect.   2  ;  N.  Y.  S.  (1841),  ch.  43,  sect.  3;  Mass.  Sup.  to 

R.    S.  (1846),  vol.   ii.   part  2,  ch.  4,  tit.  R.  S.  ch.  216,  sect.  4;  Pub.  Laws  of  R.  L 

V.   §   1-3;    Laws   of    Penn.   (1846),   ch.  (1844),  p.  280,  sect.  3 ;  N.  Y.  R.  S.  (1846) 

ccccxvii.   3  — By  the   statutes  of  some  vol.  ii.  part  2,  ch.  4,  tit.  5,  §4;  Laws  of 

of  the  States  the  pledgee  cannot  retain  Penn.  (1846),  ch.  ccccxvii.  4. 
the  merchandise  if   he  had  notice  that  ((')   Symington  v.  McLin,  1  Dev.  &  B. 

the  factor  was  not  the  true  owner  before  291.     See  post,  p.  *95,  n.  (w). 
he   made   the   advances,  for  which   the  (k)  Peters  v.   Ballistier,  3  Pick.  495; 

merchandise    was   pledged   as    security.  Nash  v.  Drew,  5  Cush.  422. 
But    the   statute   of  Massachusetts   pro-  [kk)  Weston    v.  Alley,  49  Maine,  94. 

vides  that  the  pledgee  shall  hold  good.  But  see  State  v.  Atherton,  16  N.  H.  203 ; 

"  notwithstanding    the    person    making  Stevenson  v.  Hoy,  43  Penn.  St.  191. 
such  advances  upon  the   faith  of   such  (kl)  Tod  v.  Benedict,  15  la.,  591. 

deposit  or  pledge  may  have  had  notice  (knt)   Olyphant  v.  McNair,    41    Barb, 

that   the    person   with   whom   he   made  416;  Rice  y.  Tavernier,  8  Minn.  248. 
such  contract  was  only  an  agent,"  pro-  (/)  Delafield  v.  Illinois,  26  Wend.  192. 

'  An  agent  authorized  to  give  a  note  for  borrowed  raonej',  cannot  embody  therein 
an  agreement  to  pay  an  attorney's  fee  if  not  paid  at  maturitj-.  Trenton  Bank  v. 
Gay,  63  Mo.  33.  That  a  general  agent  to  borrow  money  and  purchase  supplies  may 
give  the  ordinary  securities,  see  Hatch  v.  Coddington,  95  U.  S.  48. 

'^  So  one  employed  to  sell  land,  cannot  exchange  it,  Lumpkin  v.  Wilson,  5  Heiskell, 
555;  nor  an  agent  to  collect,  release  debts,  Herring  v.  Hottendorf,  74  N.  C.  588.  See 
also  Silliman  v.  Fredericksburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  27  Gratt.  119;  Wanless  v.  McCandless, 
38  la.  20;  Baxter  v.  Lamont,  60  111.  237  ;  Meade  v.  Brothers,  28  Wis.  689. 

3  Where  a  principal  sends  a  written  order  capable  of  two  interpretations,  and  the 
agent  bona  fide  acts  upon  one  of  them,  the  principal  cannot  be  released  from  his  con- 
tract on  the  ground  that  he  intended  it  to  bear  the  other.  Ireland  v.  Livingston, 
L.  R.  5  H.  L.  395. 

61 


*  60  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

because  the  effect  of  usage  is  properly  limited  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  power  is  to  be  exercised ;  and  even  in  this  respect  it 
cannot  control  the  language  of  the  instrument,  although  it  may 
aid  in  construing  its  words,  or  in  supplying  some  that  are  needed. 
But  an  agent  authorized  to  make  a  certain  contract,  may  bind  his 
principal  by  one  which  while  it  differs  in  its  precise  terms  is  of 
the  same  legal  effect ;  especially  if  it  secures  additional  benefits 
to  his  principal.  (^11} 

An  agent  employed  to  answer  particular  questions,  and  with- 
holding some  facts  material  to  the  contract,  about  which 

*  60    *  no  questions  are  asked,  does  not  thereby  vitiate  the  con- 

tract ;  (Tn}  it  would  be  otherwise  if  such  agent  were  em- 
ployed to  make  the  contract,  (n)  A  mere  power  to  sell  land 
gives  the  agent  no  power  to  convey,  (wn)  ^ 

]t  has  been  held  that  a  power  to  sell  carries  with  it  a  power  to 
warrant ;  (o)  ^  but  we  think  it  the  better  rule,  that  an  agent  em- 
ployed to  sell,  without  express  power  to  warrant,  cannot  give  a 
warranty  which  shall  bind  the  principal,  unless  the  sale  is  one 
which  is  usually  attended  with  warranty,  in  which  case  he 
may  ;  (;? )  '"^  thus  an  auctioneer  has,  in  general,  no  implied  author- 

(//)  Simonils  v.  Clapp,  16  N.  H.  222.  sell  goods  at  wliolesale  is  an  autliorit.y  to 

{ill)  Huckiuan  v.  Fernie,  3  M.  &  W.  sell  by  sample.     Andrews  v.  Ivneeland, 

505.  6  Cowen,  354.     An  agent  to  sell  a  horse 

(n)  Everett   v.   Desborough,   5   Bing.  may  warrant  his  somidness.     Alexander 

503;  Fitzherberti;.  Mather,  1  T.  R.  12.  v.   Gibson,   2   Camp.    555;    Bradford    v. 

(nn)  Force  i'.  Dutcher,  3  Green,  401.  Bush,  10  Ala.  386.     See  Brady  v.  Todd, 

(o)  Nelson  v.  Cowing,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  9    C.    B.    (n.  s.)  592.     In    Alabama,   an 

•336;  Woodford   v.   McClenahan,   4   Gil-  authority  to  sell  a  slave  has  been  held  to 

man,  85 ;  Hunter  v.  .Jameson,  6  Ired.  L.  imply  an  authority  to  warrant.     Skinner 

252;    Franklin    v.   Ezell,   1    Sneed,  497;  v.  Gunn,  9    Port.    (Ala.)  305;    Gaines  v. 

Schuchardt  v.  Aliens,  1  Wall.  359.  McKinley,  1  Ala.  440.     But  an  agent  to 

(p)  Gibson  v.  Colt,  7  Johns.  390;  Hel-  deliver    has    no     authority    to    warrant. 

year   v.   Hawke,   5   Esp.   72;    Croom  v.  Woodin   v.  Burford,  2  Cr.  &  M.  291,  4 

Shaw,  1  Flor.  211;  Smith  v.  Tracy,  36  Tyr.  264.    In  . judicial   sales  there  is  no 

N.  Y.  79.     A  sale  by  sample  is  a   war-  warranty  express  or  implied.    The  Monte 

ranty  that  the  bulk  shall  correspond  with  AUegre,  9  Wheat.  616. 

the  sample  ;  and  a  general  authority  to 

1  Lyon  V.  Pollock,  99  U.  S.  068. 

2  See  Randall  r.  Keldor,  60  Me.  37,  as  to  the  authorit}'  of  a  commission  merchant 
to  warrant  the  condition  of  flour. 

^  A  special  agent  to  sell  a  horse  is  not  thereby  authorized  to  warrant  its  quality, 
Cooley  I'.  Perrine,  12  Vroom,  322 ;  s.  c.  13  Vroom,  623.  But  a  general  agent  for  the 
sale  of  reapers  may  warrant  them,  Murray  v.  Brooks,  41  la.  45.  See  Pitsinowsky  v. 
Beardsley,  37  la.  9.  Wiiere  one  adopts  a  sale  made  by  another  as  his  agent,  he 
cannot  repudiate  a  warranty  which  is  an  essential  part  of  the  contract.  Cliurchill 
V.  Palmer,  115  Mass.  310;  Eadie  v.  Ashbaugh,  44  la.  519.  See  generally,  Anderson 
V.  Bruner,  112  Mass.  14;  Boothbv  v.  Scales,  27  Wis.  626;  Morris  v.  Bowen,  52 
N.  H.  416;  Pahner  i-.  Hatch,  46  Mo.  585;  Fay  v.  Richmond,  43  Vt.  25;  Applegate 
V.  Moffitt,  60  Ind.  104 ;  Baker  v.  Arnot,  07  N.  Y.  448 ;  Harrison  v.  Shanks,  13  Bush, 
620. 

62 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  61 

ity  to  sell  with  warranty  of  the  quality  of  what  he  sells,  (^q) 
But  even  where  usage  would  permit  a  warranty,  if  the  principal 
gives  his  agent  express  instructions  not  to  warrant,  and  the  agent 
does  warrant,  although  it  has  been  said  that  such  warranty  is  not 
binding  on  the  principal,  on  the  general  ground  that  no  princi- 
pal is  bound  by  the  acts  of  his  agent  if  such  acts  transcend  his 
authority,  (r)  yet  the  better  opinion  is  that  the  principal  is  bound 
by  such  warranty,  where  the  buyer  was  justified  by  the  nature  of 
the  case  in  believing  that  this  authority  was  given,  and  had  no 
means  of  knowing  the  limitation  of  the  authority  of  the  agent,  (s) 

An  agent  for  collection  of  negotiable  paper  is  a  holder  for  pur- 
poses of  protest,  and  is  held  to  the  obligations  of  a  holder,  (ss)  ^ 

*  The  usage  of  the  trade  or  business  is  of  great  import-  *  61 
ance  in  determining  all  these  questions  ;  but  this  important 
distinction  seems  to  be  taken  between  the  case  of  a  written 
authority  and  that  of  an  oral  authority,  namely,  —  where  the 
authority  is  oral  and  is  known  to  the  party  dealing  with  the 
agent,  usage  may  enlarge  and  affect  the  authority,  or  the  con- 
tract ;  but,  as  has  been  already  stated,  usage  has  not  this  power 
where  the  whole  authority  is  in  writing,  and  this  is  known  to  the 
party  dealing  with  the  agent,  (f) 

If  a  principal  sells  goods  by  an  agent,  and  the  agent  makes  a 
material  misrepresentation  which  he  believes  to  be  true,  and  his 
principal  knows  to  be  false,  this  is  the  falsehood  of  the  principal 
and  avoids  ihe  sale,  (w)  ^ 

(7)  Blood   V.    French,  9    Gray,    197 ;  a  stranger  to  a  fair  with  express  direc- 

Brady  v.  Todd,  9  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  592.  tions  not  to  warrant  tlie  horse,  and  the 

(7)  Lord  Keni/on,  Fenn  v.  Harrison,  3  Latter   acted  contrary  to  the  orders,  the 

T.  R.    760 ;    Dodderidge,   C.   J.,  Seignior  purcliaser  could  only  have   recourse  to 

and  Woliner's  case,  Godb.  361.  the  person  who  actually  sold  the  horse, 

(s)  Ashliurst,  J.,  Fenn  v.  Harrison,  3  and  the  owner  would  not  be  liable  on  the 
T.  K.  760,  who  said  :  "  I  take  the  dis-  warranty,  because  the  servant  was  not 
tinction  to  be  that  if  a  person  keeping  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  employ- 
livery  stables,  and  having  a  horse  to  sell,  ment."  So  per  Bayley,  J.,  Pickering  v. 
directed  his  servant   not  to  warrant  him,  Busk,  15  East,  45. 

and  the  servant  did  nevertheless  warrant  (ss)  State  Bank  v.  Bank  of  the  Cap- 

him,  still  the  master  would  be  liable  on  itol,  41  Barb.  343. 

the  warranty,  because   the  servant   was  [t)  Attwood  v.  Munnings,  7  B.  &  C. 

acting  within  the   general  scope  of   his  278 ;  s.   c.   1  Man.  &  R.  66 ;    Schimmel- 

authority,  and  the  public  cannot  be  sup-  pennich  v.  Bayard,  1  Pet.  264. 
posed  to  be  cognizant  of  any  private  con-  (u)  Schneider  v.  Heath,  3.  Camp.  506. 

versation  between  the  master  and  servant;  And  this  is  true  altiiough  the  represen- 

but  if  the  owner  of  a  horse  were  to  send  tations  are  of  such  a  character  that  the 

1  But  an  agent  to  collect  a  note,  cannot  sell  it.     Smith  v.  Johnson,  71  Mo.  382. 

2  The  representation  must  be  in  a  matter  of  fact,  and  not  in  point  of  law. 
Beattie  v.  Lord  Ebury,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  777.     See  Upton  v.  Tribilcock,  91  U.  S.  46,  to  the 

63 


62 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTKACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  62  *  An  agent's  acts  in  making  or  transferring  negotiable 
paper  (especially  if  by  indorsement),  are  much  restrained. 
It  seems  that  they  can  be  authorized  only  by  express  and  direct  au- 
thority, or  by  some  express  power  which  necessarily  implies  these 
acts,  because  the  power  cannot  be  executed  without  them,  (v)  ^ 
But,  to  this  extent,  the  principal  will  be  held.  Thus,  if  a  prin- 
cipal supply  an  agent  with  his  acceptances  in  blank,  as  to  date, 
amount,  time,  and  place  of   payment,  but  payable  to   the  order 


principal  is  not  bound  by  tliem  ;  for,  as 
was  said  by  Lord  Ahinqer  in  Cornfoot  v. 
Fowke,  6  M.  &  "W.  386 :  "  It  does  not 
follow  that  because  he  is  not  bound  by 
the  representation  of  an  agent  witiiout 
authority,  lie  is  therefore  entitled  to 
bind  anotlier  man  to  a  contract  obtained 
by  the  false  representation  of  that  agent. 
It  is  one  thing  to  say  tliat  lie  may  avoid 
a  contract  if  his  agent,  without  his  au- 
thority, has  inserted  a  warranty  in  the 
contract :  and  another  to  say  that  he 
may  enforce  a  contract  obtained  by 
means  of  a  false  representation  made 
by  his  agent,  because  the  agent  had  no 
authority."  Cornfoot  v.  Fowke,  6  M.  & 
W.  oo8,  was  an  assumpsit  for  the  non- 
performance of  an  agreement  to  take  a 
ready-furnished  liouse.  Tlie  plaintiff  had 
employed  C.  to  let  the  house  in  question, 
and  the  defendant  being  in  treaty  with 
C.  for  taking  it,  was  informed  by  liim 
that  there  was  no  objection  to  the  house  ; 
but  after  entering  into  the  agreement, 
discovered  that  the  adjoining  house 
was  a  brothel,  and  on  that  account  de- 
clined to  fulfil  tlie  contract.  It  appeared 
that  the  plaintiff  knew  of  the  existence 
of  the  brothel  before,  but  C,  the  agent, 
did  not.  The  majority  of  tlie  court  hrld, 
contrary  to  the  opinion  of  Lord  Ahinger, 
C.  B.,  that  these  facts  furnished  no 
ground  of  defence  to  the  action.  This 
case  has  been  very  much  questioned 
from  the  first,  and  was  overruled  in 
Fuller  V.  Wilson,  3  Q.  B.  58.  The 
judgment  in  the  latter  case  was  indeed 
reversed  in  the  Exchequer  Cliamber,  3 
Q.  B.  68,  but  not  on  this  point :  Lord 
Abinr/er  there  saying,  3  Q.  B.  76:  "The 
judgment  of  the  Court  of  Qtieen's  Bench 
on  the  motion  to  enter  a  verdict  was  not 
given  upon  the  facts  now  before  us.  We 
shall  not   reverse  that  if   we   give  judg- 


ment now  for  the  plaintiff  in  error."  In 
tills  country,  Cornfoot  v.  Fowke  was 
denied  to  be  law  by  the  court  in  Fitz- 
simmons  v.  Joslin,  21  Vt.  129.  And  in 
Crump  V.  U.  S.  Mining  Co.  7  Gratt.  352, 
where  the  plaintiffs  authorized  tlieir 
agent  to  procure  subscriptions  to  a  pro- 
spectus in  the  form  of  a  subscriptiim 
paper  for  the  sale  of  stock  in  their  gold 
mining  company  upon  the  terms  pre- 
scribed in  sucli  prospectus,  representing 
the  mines  to  be  in  full  and  successful  oper- 
ation, with  several  particulars  of  descrip- 
tion and  recommendation,  and  referring 
to  tlie  last  report  of  the  directors  of  the 
company  for  a  full  description  of  tiie 
mines,  buildings,  and  machinery,  which 
paper  was  signed  by  the  defendants ;  it 
was  held  that  they  miglit,  in  an  action 
upon  the  contract,  prove  that  the  agent 
at  the  time  of  procui'ing  their  subscrip- 
tions, made  representations  in  addition 
to  those  contained  in  the  prospectus  and 
reports  of  the  company,  upon  the  faith 
of  which  the  defendants  became  subscrib- 
ers, but  w'.iich  representations  were  false 
and  fraudulent ;  althougli  it  was  insisted 
by  the  plaintiffs  that  the  authority  of 
their  agent  was  limited  and  defined  by 
the  prospectus  and  report. 

((')  Paige  V.  Stone,  10  Met.  160;  Ros- 
siter  V.  Ros.siter,  8  Wend.  494.  An  assur- 
ance by  an  agent  that  bills  will  be 
accepted  by  his  principal,  though  acted 
upon  by  the  party  assured,  is  not  as 
between  the  latter  and  the  principal  to  he 
treated  as  equivalent  to  an  acceptance  of 
the  bills,  so  as  to  vest  in  the  principal 
legal  rights  from  the  time  such  assurance 
is  given.  Iloare  v.  Dresser,  7  H.  L  Cas. 
290;  Harrop  v.  Fisher,  10  C.  B.  n.  s.  196. 
But  see  Layet  v.  Gano,  17  Ohio,  466; 
Forsyth  v.  Day,  46  Maine,  176. 


effect  that  one,  induced  to  subscribe  for  stock  by  an  agent's  fraudulent  misrepre- 
eentations,  must  repudiate  the  transaction  seasonably. 

i  The  treasurer  of  a  savings  bank  has  no  authority  to  indorse  its  name  on  a 
promissory  note ;  and  a  vote  of  the  corporation  to  sell  notes  held  by  it  does  not  con- 
fer such  authority.     Bradlee  v.  Warren  Savings  Bank,  127  Mass.  107. 

64 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  62 

of  that  correspondent,  though  part  of  these  acceptances  may 
bear  upon  their  face  that  they  are  the  second  of  exchange,  yet 
if  the  correspondent  fraudulently  negotiate  those  marked  second, 
the  acceptor  will  be  liable  to  an  innocent  holder  for  value  for  the 
amount  which  they  represent,  (w)  ^  An  express  power  to  indorse 
does  not  imply  a  power  to  receive  notice  of  dishonor,  (x^  It  may 
be  stated  as  a  general  rule  that  retaining  money  procured  l)y  an 
indorsement  will  be  regarded  as  a  ratification  of  the  authority  to 
indorse,  (^xx') 


SECTION  VI. 

THE   RIGHT   OP   ACTION   UNDER   A   CONTRACT   MADE   BY   AN   AGENT. 

In  contracts  by  deed  no  party  can  have  a  right  of  action  under 
them  but  the  party  whose  name  is  to  them ;  (?/)  but  in  the  case  of 
a  simple  contract  an  undisclosed  principal  may  show  that  the 
apparent  party  was  his  agent,  and  may  put  himself  in  the  place 
of  his  agent,  (s)  ^  but  not  so  as  to  affect  injuriously  the  rights  of 


{iv)   Bank   of    Pittsburg   v.   Neal,   22  The  Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Worthy,  1  Camp. 

How.  96.  337  ;  Garrett  v.  Handley,  4  B.  &  C.  664  ; 

(.r)  Bank  of   Mobile  v.  King,  9  Ala.  Davis  y.  Boardman,  12  Mass.  80;  Rutland 

279.  Railroad   v.   Cole,   24   Vt.   33  ;   Higgins 

(xx)  National  Bank  i-.  Fassett,  42  Vt.  v.  Senior,  8  M.  &  W.  834 ;  Whitmore  v. 

432.  Gilniour,  12  M.  &  W.  808,  where  a  bank- 

(y)    Green    v.    Home,    1    Salk.    197 ;  rupt,   under  the    circumstances    of    the 

Frontin  v.  Small,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1418.  case,  was   considered   agent   for  his   as- 

(r)   Skinner  v.    Stocks,   4   B.  «&  Aid.  sicnees.     See  Oelricks  v.  Ford,  20  Md. 

437;  Cothay  v.  Fennell,  10  B.  &  C.  671;  489. 

1  See  Coburn  v.  Webb,  56  Ind.  96. 

2  As  in  the  case  of  a  claim  against  a  decedent's  estate,  although  proved  by  his 
agent  in  his  own  name  and  attached  after  collection  as  the  latter's  property.  Gage  v. 
Stimson,  26  Minn.  64.  A  principal  may  sue  on  a  non-negotiable  note  made  for  his 
benefit  but  payable  to  his  agent.  National  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  116  Mass.  398;  but  not 
on  a  negotiable  instrument.  Chandler  v.  Coe,  54  N.  H.  561.  One,  not  mentioned  in 
an  insurance  policy  procured  for  liim  by  a  broker  in  his  own  name,  may  bring  suit 
iipon  it.  Browning  v.  Provincial  Ins.  Co.  L.  R.  5  P.  C.  263;  as  well  as  the  agent, 
Provincial  Ins.  Co.  v.  Leduc,  L.  R.  6  P.  C.  224.  A  wife  is  liable  as  undisclosed  prin- 
cipal for  goods  bought  for  her  by  her  husband,  although  his  note  was  taken  in  pay- 
ment. Lovell  V.  Williams,  125  Mass.  489.  See  Armstrong  v.  Stokes,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B. 
598;  Irvine  v.  Watson,  5  Q.  B.  D.  102.  But  an  undisclosed  principal  is  not  liable 
for  breach  of  an  agreement  under  seal  to  purcliase  real  estate,  Briggs  i'.  Partridge, 
64  N.  Y.  357 ;  nor  on  the  stipulations  of  an  instrument  under  seal  made  by  an  agent 
in  his  own  name  without  mention  of  the  principal,  although  the  other  party  knew  of 
the  latter's  interest  and  had  received  part  payment  from  him.  Pickering's  Claim, 
L.  R.  6  Ch.  525.     Where,  however,  a  lease  is  signed  by  agents  of  a  corporation,  but 

VOL.  I.  5  65 


*  63  THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

the  other  party,  (a)  Thus  a  purchaser  for  an  unknown  principal, 
whom  he  does  not  disclose,  is  himself  liable  for  the  price,  (aa) 
Nor  can  the  unknown  principal  adopt  a  contract  as  made  by  his 
agent,  in  part  only  and  for  so  much  as  benefits  him ;  he  must 
adopt  it   as   a  whole   if   at   all.  (a6)     How   far  this   rule 

*  63    *  is  affected  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds  will  be  considered 

hereafter.  (6)  By  parity  of  reasoning,  an  undisclosed  prin- 
cipal, subsequently  discovered,  may  be  made  liable  on  such  con- 
tract ;  (c)  1  but  in  general,  subject  to  the  qualification  that  the 
state  of  the  account  between  the  principal  and  agent  is  not 
altered  to  the  detriment  of  the  principal,  (c^)  ^  It  might  be  sup- 
posed that  the  party  dealing  with  an  agent  whose  agency  is 
concealed,  does  not  lose  his  election  to  have  recourse  either  to 
the  agent,  or  to  his  discovered  principal,  if  the  principal  has  pre- 
maturely settled  with  his  agent,  even  without  fraud ;  as  where  the 
agent  bought  on  one  month's  credit  and  the  principal  paid  him 

(a)  George  v.  Clagett,   7  T.  R.  359;  La.  64;  Hyde  ij.  Wolf ,  4  La.  234 ;   Bacon 

Sims  V.  Bond,  5  B.  &  Ad.  389;  Warner  v.  v.  Sondley,  3  Strob.  L.  542;    Bownell  v. 

McKay,  1  M.  &  W.  591;    Huntington  v.  Briggs,  45  Barb.  470. — The  party  deal- 

Knox,  7  Cusli.  371 ;    Violett   v.  Powell,  ing  with  the  agent  may,  when  he  discov- 

10  B.  Mon.   349.     And   see    Harrison   v.  ers   the   principal,  charge   either   at   liis 

Roscoe,  15  M.    &  W.  231 ;  Woodruff   v.  election.     Thompson  v.  Davenport,  9  B. 

M'Gehee,  30  Ga.  158.  &  C.  78;  Wilson  v.  Hart,  7  Taunt.  295; 

(aa)  Fierce  v.  Joiinson,  34  Conn.  274.  Kailton  v.  Hodgson,  4  Taunt.  570,  n.  (a) ; 

(ab)  Elwell  v.  Chamberlin,  31  N.  Y.  Robinson  v.  Gleadow,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  161; 
671.     See  ante,  p.  *52.  Patterson  v.  Gandasequi,  15  East,  62;  Hig- 

{b)  And  see  p.  *54,  note  (?•),  nupra.    See  gins  v.  Senior,  8  M.  &  W.  834.    But  where 

also  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Lyman,  20  a  vendor  takes  the  note  of   the  agent, 

Vt.  600,  673,  674,  where  the  doctrine  of  which  shows  him  to  rely  upon  the  agent, 

Lord  Abinger  and  Baron  Parke  in  Beck-  he  cannot  afterwards  sue  the  principal, 

ham  V.  Drake,  9  M.  &  W.  79,  was  recog-  Patterson   v.    Gandasequi,    15   East,  62 ; 

nized  by  Prentiss,  J.  Hyde  v.  Paige,  9  Barb.  150;  Bate  v.  Burr, 

(c)  Thompson  v.  Davenport,  9B.  &  C.  4  Harring.  130. 
78;    Cothay  v.  Fennell,  10  B.  &  C.  671 ;  [d]  Thompson  v.  Davenport,  9  B.  &  C. 

Thomas   v.   Edwards,  2   M.    &  W.  210;  78;    Lord  Ellenboroucjh,  Kymer  v.  Suwer- 

Beebe   v.  Robert,  12  Wend.  413;   Upton  cropp,  1  Camp.  109;  Smuthurst  v.  Mitch- 

V.  Gray,  2  (ireenl.  373;  Nelson  v.  Powell,  ell,  1  E.  &  E.  022. 
3  Doug.  410;    Hopkins  v.  Lacouture,  4 

with  nothing  in  the  lease  to  show  that  fact,  and  the  corporation  enters  under  it  and 
occupies  tiie  premises,  it  is  bound  by  the  lease.  Carroll  v.  St.  John's  Society,  125 
Mass.  505.  As  to  charter-parties,  see  Christoffersen  i;.  Hansen,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  509 ; 
Pederson  v.  Lotinga,  28  L.  T.  207. 

i  Sec  preceding  note.  The  mere  filing  of  a  proof  of  claim  against  the  estate  of 
an  insolvent  agent  of  an  undisclosed  principal,  after  the  latter's  discovery,  is  not  a 
conclusive  election  to  treat  the  agent  as  the  debtor.  Curtis  v.  Williamson,  L.  R.  10 
Q.  B.  57.  But  taking  the  agent's  note  in  payment,  intending  to  give  him  exclusive 
credit,  is  such  election.  Perkins  i'.  Cady,  HI  Mass.  318.  The  agent  or  principal, 
however,  cannot  compel  an  election.  Beymer  v.  Borisall,  79  Penn.  St.  298.  See 
Calder  t-.  Dobell,  L.  R.  0  C.  V.  486. 

2  Tiiomas  v.  Atkinson,  38  Ind.  248,  258,  follows  and  cites  the  text  with  ap- 
proval. 

66 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  64 

before  the  credit  had  expired,  (e)  ^  But  it  may  be  open  to  ques- 
tion whether  such  settlement  by  the  principal,  although  prema- 
ture, if  perfectly  bond  fide,  in  the  course  of  business,  and  free 
from  all  suspicion  that  it  had  been  hastened  for  the  purpose  of 
interfering  with  the  seller,  would  not  discharge  the  principal. 
We  think  it  would. 

Where  the  name  of  the  principal  is  disclosed  at  the  time  the 
contract  is  made  by  the  agent,  the  former  is  the  proper  party  to 
sue  upon  the  contract.  This  is  so  whether  he  be  a  citizen  of 
another  State  than  that  where  his  agent  resided  and  made  the 
contract  or  not.  This  doctrine  is  contrary  to  the  rule  laid  down 
in  Story's  Agency  as  to  contracts  made  for  residents  in  a  foreign 
State,  and  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  doctrine  of  the 
English  cases  at  that  time.  But  the  doctrine  has  more  *  re-  *  64 
cently  been  explained  by  the  English  courts,  and  Judge 
Story's  rule  rejected.  The  doctrine  never  was  generally  received 
in  this  country,  and  in  a  recent  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  it  was  directly  disavowed.  (^) 


SECTION  VII. 

LIABILITY   OP   AN   AGENT. 

An  agent  is  not  personally  liable,  unless  he  transcends  his 
agency,  or  departs  from  its  provisions,  (A)^  or  unless  he  expressly 

(f)   Kymer   v.   Suwercropp,  1    Camp.  Johnson  r.  Ogilby,  3  P.  Wms.  279  ;  Jones 

109;    Waring  r.   Favenck,   1    Camp.  85;  r.  Downman,  4  Q.  B.  2o5,  n.  («).     The  de- 

Heald  f.  Kenworthy,  10  Exch.  739.  cision  of  the  Queen's  Bench  in  tliis  case 

{g)  Oelricks  v.  Ford,  23  How.  49.  See  was  afterwards  reversed  in  the  E.xchcquer 
also  2  Kent  Com.  630,  631,  n. ;  Allen  v.  Chamber  on  a  special  ground,  but  tlie 
Merchants  Bank  of  N.  Y.,  22  Wend.  224;  doctrine  of  law  does  not  seem  to  be  inl- 
and Green  v.  Cope.  pugned.  —  But    the   departure   from   au- 

(A)   Feeter  v.  Heath,   11  Wend.  477;  thoritj^  to  charge  the  agent,  must  not  be 

1  Where  an  agent  in  bu3'ing  goods  discloses  that  he  has  a  principal  but  does  not 
give  his  name,  tlic  seller  may  resort  to  the  principal  though  he  has  bona  Jide  paid 
the  agent,  unless  the  seller's  conduct  is  such,  as  by  delay,  &c.,  to  justify  the  conclu- 
sion that  he  looks  only  to  the  agent,  Irvine  v.  Watson,  5  Q.  B.  D.  102,  414;  but  not 
if  the  principal  has  bona  Jide.  paid  the  agent  at  a  time  when  the  seller  still  gave  credit 
to  the  agent  and  knew  of  no  one  else  as  principal.  Armstrong  v.  Stokes,  L.  R.  7 
Q.  B.  598;  see  Hutton  v.  Bulloch,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  331 ;  affirmed  in  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  572. 

2  An  agent  will  be  liable  unless  the  party  dealing  with  him  understood,  or  as  a 
reasonable  man  ought  to  have  understood,  that  he  was  dealing  with  him  as  agent. 
Worthington  v.  Cowles,  112  Mass.  30. 

67 


65 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


pledges  his  own  liability,  (0  ^  in  which  case  he  is  liable  although 
he  describes  himself  as  agent,  (A;)  or  unless  he  conceals  his  char- 
acter of  agent,  (?)  ^  or  unless  he  so  conducts  as  to  render 
*  65  *  his  principal  inaccessible  or  irresponsible,  (w)  or  unless 
he  acts  in  bad  faith.  If  a  sealed  instrument  is  executed  by 
an  agent,  and  it  contain  covenants  which  expressly  purport  to  be 
those  of  the  principal,  and  the  agent  in  executing  it  calls  himself 


known  to  the  other  contracting  party. 
Story  on  Agency,  §  26-3,  recognized  by 
Loni  Denmait,  in  Jones  v.  Downuian,  4 
Q.  B.  230. 

((')  If  an  agent,  executing  a  contract  in 
writing,  use  language  vvliose  legal  effect 
is  to  charge  liiin  personally,  it  is  not  com- 
petent for  him  to  exonerate  himself  by 
showing  that  he  acted  for  a  principal,  and 
that  the  oilier  contracting  party  knew 
this  fact  at  the  time  when  the  agreement 
was  made  and  signed.  Magee  v.  Atkin- 
son, 2  M.  &  W.  440 :  Jones  v.  Littledale, 
6  A.  &  E.  486 ;  Iliggins  v.  Senior,  8  M.  & 
W.  834;  Appleton  v.  Binks,  5  East,  148, 
which  was  the  case  of  a  contract  under 
seal;  Chadwick  v.  Maddon,  12  E.  L.  &  E. 
180;  Tanner  v.  Christian,  4  E.  &  B.  591 ; 
Hancock  v.  Fairfield,  30  Me.  209.  See 
also  Duvall  v.  Craig,  2  Wheat  56 ;  Tip- 
pets V.  Walker,  4  Mass.  595;  Forstcr  v. 
Fuller,  6  Mass.  58;  White  v.  Skinner,  13 
Johns.  307;  Stone  v.  Wood,  7  Cowen, 
453;  Andrew  v.  Allen,  4  Harring.  452; 
Potts  V.  Henderson,  2  Cart.  (Ind.)  327; 
Fash  V.  Ross,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  294. 

(Ic)  Seaver  v.  Cohurn,  10  Cush.  .324; 
Tanner  v.  Christian,  4  E.  &  B.  591 ;  Len- 
nard  v.  Kobinson,  5  E.  &  B.  125 ;  Taylor 
V.  Slid  ton,  30  Conn.  122. 

(/)  Franklyn  ?•.  Lamond,  4  C.  B.  637, 
where  it  was  held  that  the  fact  of  selling 
as  nucftonecirs  was  not  such  an  indication 
of  agency  as  to  absolve  the  defendants 
from  j)ersonal  responsibility. —  In  an  ac- 
tion for  use  and  occupation  of  laii<ls  by 
the  sufferance  and  permission  of  the 
plaintiffs,  it  appeared  that  the  lands  were 
let  by  auction  by  the  plaintiffs,  E.  &  T., 
who  were  auctioneers,  to  the  defendant, 
under  conditions  which  stated  the  letting 
to  be  "  By  E.  &  T.,  auctioneers."    One  of 


the  conditions  was,  "  The  rent  is  to  be 
paid  into  the  hands  of  E.  or  T.,  auction- 
eers, or  to  their  order,  at  two  payments," 
&c.  At  the  foot  of  the  document  was 
written,  "  approved  by  me,  David  Jones." 
Jones  was  the  tenant  at  the  time  of  the 
sale.  Nothing  else  appeared  in  the  con- 
ditions to  show  on  wiiose  behalf  the  let- 
ting was.  The  plaintiffs  gave  evidence 
to  show  that  Jones,  being  indebted  to 
them,  had  autiiorized  them  to  let  the 
lands  as  above,  pay  the  rent  due  to 
Jones's  landlord,  and  retain  any  surplus 
in  satisfaction  of  their  own  debt.  Evi- 
dence to  a  contrary  effect  was  given  by 
the  defendant.  The  judge  in  summing 
up  left  it  to  the  jury  whether  the  plain- 
tiffs had  let  the  lands  on  their  own  behalf 
and  as  creditors  of  Jones,  or  merely  as 
his  agents.  Tlie  jury  found  a  letting  by 
the  plaintiffs  on  lluir  own  behalf.  Held, 
that  tlie  conditions  imported  a  letting  by 
Jones,  E.  and  T.  acting  as  his  agents  ;  and 
that  the  document  ought  to  have  been  so 
explained  to  the  jury.  And  a  new  trial 
was  granted.  Evans  v.  Evans,  3  A.  &  E. 
1.32.  —  The  agent  is,  perhaps,  in  like 
manner  liable  (at  the  option  of  the  party 
contracting  with  him)  if  he  do  not  state 
the  name  of  the  principal,  and  notwith- 
standing the  other  contracting  party  have 
the  means  of  knowing  the  principal. 
Thompson  v.  Davenport,  9  B.  &  C.  78; 
Owen  V.  Gooch,  2  Esp.  567  ;  Raymond  v. 
Proprietors  of  Crown  and  Eagle  Mills, 
2  Met.  319;  Winsor  r.  Griggs,  5  Cush. 
210;  Taintor  v.  Prendergast,  3  Hill  (N. 
Y.),  72. 

(m)  Ashhirst,  J.,  Fenn  v.  Harrison,  3 
T.  R.  761  ;  Savage  i-.  Rix,  9  N.  H.  263 ; 
Sydnor  v.  Hurd,  8  Tex.  98;  Keener  v. 
Harrod,  2  Md.  63. 


1  Thus  an  agent,  as  party  to  a  charter-party,  is  liable  for  delay  in  loading,  where 
he  stipulated  that  his  liability  was  to  "  cease  as  soon  as  he  had  shipjied  "  a  cargo, 
Christoffersen  r.  Hansen,  E.  R.  7  Q.  B.  509;  or  a  real  estate  agent,  by  contracting 
to  sell  land  and  signing  a  receipt  in  his  own  name  for  a  deposit,  and  the  owner  after- 
wards declines  t(j  complete  tiie  purchase.  Long  v.  Millar,  4  C.  P.  D.  450.  See 
Guernsey  v.  Cook,  117  .Mass.  548. 

2  An  agent  must  disclose  his  agency,  to  render  his  principal  liable.  Nixon  v. 
Downey,  49  la.  166.  It  is  not  enougii  tiiat  the  party  with  whom  lie  deals  has  the 
means  of  ascertaining  the  principal.     Cobb  v.  Kuapp,  71  N.  Y.  621. 

68 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  Go 

an  agent,  he  is  not  liable  on  those  covenants ;  (w)  ])iit  if  they  arc 
not  expressly  the  principal's  covenants,  the  agent  is  lialdc  on 
them,  (o)  1  If  a  person  dealing  with  an  agent,  knows  his  agency, 
his  rights  and  obligations  will  be  the  same  as  if  the  agent  disclosed 
it,  (jt?)  unless  the  agent  purposely  represents  himself  as  a  principal 
and  assumes  the  responsibility  of  one.  And  if  the  agent's  act  be 
open  to  two  constructions,  one  of  Avhich  binds  him,  and  the  other 
binds  the  principal,  it  is  said  that  the  law  prefers  the  latter.  (^) 

If  a  party  dealing  with  an  agent  as  agent,  and  knowing  that 
the  principal  is  bound,  takes  the  agent's  note,  it  is  held  that  the 
})rincipal  is  discharged,  (r) 

If  one  describes  himself  as  agent  for  some  unnamed  princi- 
pal, he  is  of  course  liable  if  proved  to  be  the  real  princi|)al.  (&) 
So  he  is  if  he  signs  as  agent  of  a  company  which  has  no  ex- 
istence, or  has  no  power  to  make  the  contract.  (&s)  ^  And  one 
acting  as  agent  is  liable  personally,  if  it  be  shown  that  he 
acts  without  authority.  (^)  ^     But  it  seems  to  be  law,  that  an 

(w)  Hopkins  v.  Mehaffy,  11  S.  &  R.  B  to  be  agent  for  C  in  the  matter,  enter 

126.  with  him  into  a  contract  which  is  illegal 

(o)  Hancock  v.  Hodgson,  4  Bing.  269;  if  the  contract  of  C,  but  is  not  illegal  if 

Stone  V.  Wood,  7  Cowen,  453;  Spencer  B's   personal   contract,  and  it    turn  out 

V.  Field,  10  Wend.  87.  that  B  acted  without  authoritj',  the  ille- 

(p)  Chase  v.  Debolt,  2  Oilman,  371.  gality  of  the  supposed  contract  is  no  bar 

(g)  Dyer  f.  Burnham,  25  Me.  1-3.  to  an  action  by  A  against    B ;    for  the 

(?■)  Paige  V    Stone,  10  Met.  160;  Wil-  contract  acUialli/  made  contained  no  ille- 

kins  V.  Reed,  6   Greenl.   220;    Green    v.  gality.     Parke,  B.,  Thomas   v.  Edwards, 

Tanner,  8  Met.  411.  2  M.  &  W.  217. —  It  is  perhaps  doubtful 

(s)  Schmalz  v.  Avery,  16  Q.  B.  655;  whether  or  not  a  party  contracting,  with- 

Carr  v.  Jackson,  7  Exch.  382.  out  authority,  as  agent  for  another,  and 

(ss)  Woodburj'  v.  Blair,  18  la.  572.  giving  the   name   of   the  principal,   can 

(t)  Dusenberry  v.  Ellis,  3  Johns.  Cas.  afterwards  himself  enforce  the  contract 

70;  Byars  v.  Doores,  20  Mo.  284;  Bai/lei/,  as  principal.     Strictly,  it  would  seem,  he 

B.,  Thomas  v.  Hewes,  2  Cr.  &  M.  530,  n.  cannot.     Even  admitting  that  the  agent 

(«) ;  CoUen  v.  Wright,  7  E.  &  B.  301,  af-  thus  acting  without  authority,  might  be 

firmed  in    8  E.  «&  B.  647.     And   a   sub-  held  liable  upon  the  contract  as  principal, 

sequent   ratification    it    seems   will    not  because  he  acted  in  his  own  wrong,  yet 

(always  at  least)  excuse  him.     Rossiter  it  does  not  follow  that  he  himself  should 

V.  Rossiter,  8  Wend.  494 ;  Palmer  v.  Ste-  be    allowed   to   take    advantage   of    the 

phens,  1  Denio,   471.  —  If  A,  supposing  wrong.     And  this  ajipears  to  have  been 

1  Where  one,  purporting  to  act  for  an  academy,  makes  a  deed  containing  per- 
sonal covenants  of  warranty,  in  which  he  is  so  described  as  grantor,  but  signs  and 
seals  in  his  own  name,  it  is  his  deed,  Snow  v.  Orleans,  126  Mass.  453;  so  where 
agents  contracted  for  a  company  under  their  own  names  and  seals.  Quigley  v-  Ue 
Haas,  82  Penn.  St.  267. 

2  Or  is  irresponsible,  as  "  Captain  of  Co.  I.  49th  Reg't  Mo.  Vols."  Blakely  v. 
Bennecke,  59  Mo.  193. 

3  "  Persons  who  induce  others  to  act  on  the  supposition  that  they  have  authority 
to  enter  into  a  binding  contract  on  behalf  of  third  persons,  on  it  turning  out  that 
they  have  no  such  authority,  may  be  sued  for  damages  for  the  breach  of  an  implied 
warranty  of  authoritv."  Cocklmrn,  C  J.,  in  Pichardson  i'.  Williamson,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B. 
276.     See  also  Weeks  v.  Propert,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  427. 

69 


*  Q6  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

*  6Q    *  agent  is  not  responsible  to  third  parties  for  mere  neglect 

or  omission  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty,  for  they  must 
look  to  the  principal,  (w) 

Whether  an  agent  makes  himself  liable  who  transcends  his 
authority,  or  acts  without  authority,  but  believes  in  good  faith 
that  he  has  such  authority,  may  not  be  absolutely  settled.  It 
must  de})cnd  upon  the  question  whether  he  is  regarded  as  always 
impliedly  warranting  his  possession  of  authority.  Where  an 
agent  fraudulently  misrepresents  his  authority,  with  the  purpose  of 
deception,  there  it  is  as  clear  that  he  is  liable  legally  as  it  is  that 
he  is  liable  morally.  But  where  he  verily  believes  himself  to 
possess  the  authority  under  which  he  acts,  but  is  mistaken  on  this 
point,  then  a  deciding  test  of  his  liability  may  perhaps  be  found 
in  his  means  of  knowledge.  If  he  could  have  known  the  truth, 
and  did  not  through  his  own  fault,  then  he  is  ignorant  by  his 
own  wrong.  And  if  an  injury  is  to  result  from  this  ignorance, 
either  to  a  third  party  or  to  him,  and  the  third  party  is  wholly 
innocent,  it  ought  to  fall  on  him  who  so  represented  himself  as 
agent,  because  he  was  not  therein  wholly  innocent.     He  was  not 

guilty  of  intentional  deception,  but  he  was  guilty  of  dccep- 

*  67    tion  in  fact,  and  if  this  was  caused  *  by  his  want  of  care  or 

want  of  diligence,  or  by  his  negligence  in  any  way,  he 
must  bear  the  burden  of  it.  And  this  is  wiiat  we  should  iirfer 
from  some  of  the  cases  in  which  it  is  said  that  an  agent  who 
states  that  which  he  does  not  know  to  be  true,  places  himself 
under  the  same  liability  as  one  Avho  states  what  he  knows  to  be 
not  true.     We  think  this  principle  just,  only  if  it  be  meant  that 


the  view  of  Lorrl  FJlenhoroufih,  C.  J.,  and  liimsolf  principal  in  the  transaction,  and 
Ahboit,  .J.,  ill  Bicktrlun  v.  Burrell,  5  M.  &  not  agent  for  .J.  &  T.)  brought  an  action 
Sel.  383 ;  tliongh  tiie  decision  in  tiiat  in  his  own  name  against  tiic  buyers  for 
case  was  i)ut  on  the  narrower,  and  some-  refusing  to  accept  tlic  remainder.  At 
wliat  unsatisfactory  ground,  tliat  tlie  w/s('/»/».s  tlie  jury  were  instructed  tiiat  if 
l)laintiff  liad  not  nutiji<d  tiie  defendant,  the  defendants  received  the  first  portion 
previous  to  liringing  tiie  action,  of  iiis  of  goods,  witii  ]<nowledge  tiiat  tlie  plain- 
claim  to  tlie  eiiaracter  of  principal.  —  If  tiff  was  the  real  sellcT,  and  all  parties 
the  otiier  party,  after  knowledge  of  Die  tlien  treated  the  contract  as  one  made 
true  state  of  the  matter,  elect  to  act  un-  with  the  plaintiff  as  principal  in  the 
der  tiie  contract,  it  is  clear  that  lie  has  transaction,  tlie  plaintiff  was  entitled  to 
waived  liis  riglit  to  object  tliat  it  was  recover,  and  upon  tliis  instruction  a  ver- 
not  made  originally  with  the  plaintiff  as  diet  liaving  been  rendered  for  the  plain- 
principal.  Ill  Hayiier  v.  Grote,  15  M.  &  tiff,  the  court  held  that  the  case  was 
W.  350,  the  plaintiff  maile  a  written  con-  properly  left  to  the  jury,  and  refused  to 
tract  for  the  sale  of  goods,  in  wliicli   lie  disturl)  tlie  verdict. 

described  himself  as  tiie  agent  of  J.  &  T. ;  (;/)  Colvin  v.  llolbrook,  2  Comst.  126; 

tlie  buyers  accepted  part  of  tiie  goods,  Denny  v.  Manhattan  Co.  2  Denio,  118. 
and   the   plaintiff   (wlio   in   reality   was 

70 


CH.  III.] 


AGENTS. 


G7 


he  is  thus  liable,  who  states  what  he  does  not  know  to  be  true, 
and  by  proper  diligence  and  care  might  have  known  to  be  not 
true.  But  the  question  still  remains,  whether  the  agent  is  liable 
where  he  himself  has  been  deceived  wholly  without  his  fault, — 
as  by  a  forged  letter  which  he  could  not  detect.  The  case  must 
be  very  rare  in  fact,  where  one  acting  as  an  agent  is  wholly 
without  the  means  of  ascertaining  his  own  agency.  But  we 
incline  to  the  opinion,  as  resting  on  the  better  reason,  that  he 
would  still  be  held.  If  he  and  the  third  party  with  whom  he 
deals,  are  both  perfectly  innocent,  and  a  loss  occurs,  and  a  loss 
results  from  his  want  of  authority,  this  loss  must  fall  somewhere ; 
and  it  seems  just  that  it  should  rest  on  him  who  has  assumed, 
innocently  but  yet  falsely,  that  he  possessed  this  authority,  (v) 
But  a  party  cannot  hold  him  liable,  if  the  agent  acted  in  good 
faith,  and  the  contract  and  all  the  facts  were  known  to  that 
party,  (yv^ 


(v)  In  Polhill  V.  Walter,  3  B.  &  Ad. 
114,  the  riglit  of  action  is  held  to  be 
grounded  on  an  affirmation  of  autliority 
which  tiie  aflBrmer  knew  to  be  false  ;  and 
if  he  acted  under  an  authority  which  was 
forged,  but  which  he  believed  genuine, 
he  would  not  be  responsible.  Story 
(Agency,  §  126.3,  n.  2),  says,  "  the  distinc- 
tion of  Lord  Tenterden  (in  the  above 
case)  is  entirely  overthrown  bv  Sniout  v. 
Ilbery,  10  M.  &  W.  7."  We'do  not  so 
understand  this  case.  Tliere  the  family 
of  Mr.  Ilbery  was  supplied  with  provi- 
sions by  Smout.  Ilbery  was  lost  in  a 
voyage  to  India,  in  October,  1839 ;  the 
provisions  were  supplied  both  before  and 
after  his  death ;  and  the  action  was 
brought  against  the  widow.  A  principal 
question  was,  whether  she  was  liable  for 
the  provisions  supplied  after  the  death  of 
Ilbery,  and  before  it  was  known.  Alder- 
son,  B.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
says,  "There  is  no  ground  for  saying, 
that  in  representing  her  authority  as  con- 
tinuing, she  did  any  wrong  whatever. 
There  was  no  mala  fides  on  her  part  — 
no  want  of  due  diligence  in  acquiring 
knowledge  of  the  revocation  —  no  omis- 
sion to  state  any  fact  within  her  knowl- 
edge relating  to  it,  and  tlie  revocation 
itself  was  by  the  act  of  God."  On  this 
groimd  she  was  held  not  liable.  But  he 
says  previously,  "  that  where  a  party 
making  the  contract  as  agent,  bona  fide 
believes  that  such  authority  is  vested  in 
him,  but  has  in  fact  no  such  authority, 
he  is  still  personally  liable.  In  these 
cases,  it  is  true,  the  agent  is  not  actuated 


by  any  fraudulent  motives,  nor  has  he 
made  any  statenient  which  he  knows  t© 
be  untrue.  But  still  his  liability  depends 
on  the  same  principles  as  before.  It  is  a 
wrong  differing  only  in  degree,  but  not 
in  its  essence,  from  tlie  former  case,  to 
state  as  true  what  the  individual  making 
such  statement  docs  not  know  to  be  true, 
even  tliough  he  does  not  know  it  to  be 
false,  but  believes  without  sufficient 
grounds,  tliat  the  statement  will  ulti- 
mately turn  out  to  be  correct."  It  can- 
not be  doubted,  however,  that  the  court 
intend  to  confine  the  liability  of  the  sup- 
posed agent  to  tlie  case  where  he  not 
only  had  no  authoritj-,  but  miglit  have 
known  that  lie  had  none.  Tliis  may  not 
only  be  inferred  from  the  decision,  but 
the  court  say  afterwards,  "  If,  then,  the 
true  principle  derivable  from  the  cases 
is,  that  tliere  must  be  some  wrong  or 
omission  of  riglit  on  the  part  of  the 
agent,  in  order  to  make  him  personally 
liable  on  a  contract  made  in  the  name  of 
his  principal,  it  will  follow  that  the  agent 
is  not  responsible  in  sucli  a  case  as  the 
present.  And  to  this  conclusion  we  have 
come."  We  doubt,  however,  the  law  of 
this  case,  and  prefer  the  view  stated  in 
the  text ;  the  widow  had  received  the 
provisions,  and  when  she  paid  for  them 
tliere  would  be  no  loss  anywhere.  See 
Taylor  v.  Ashton,  11  M.  &  W.  401;  Col- 
lins V.  Evans,  .5  Q.  B.  820;  Lewis  i\  Nich- 
olson, 18  Q.  B.  503 ;  Carr  v.  Jackson, 
7  Exch.  .382. 

(yy)  Aspinwall  v.  Torrance,  1  Lansing, 
381. 

71 


68 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book 


*  68        *  The  question  then  occurs,  whether  in  such  a  case  the 

agent  can  be  held  on  the  cotitract,  and  in  some  cases  it  has 

*  69    been  so  decided,  (^iv)     *  But  we  think  it  the  better  opinion 


(iv)  This  question  has  been  very  re- 
cently' discu.ssed  in  the  Queen's  Bench, 
in  the  ease  of  Jenkins  i'.  Hutchinson,  13 
Q.  IJ.  Hi.  That  was  an  action  of  as- 
sumpsit on  a  charter-party,  wliich  pur- 
ported to  be  made  between  the  plaintiff 
on  tlie  one  part,  and  one  T.  A.  Barnes  of 
the  other  part,  and  was  signed  "Kalph 
Hutchinson,  for  T.  A.  Barnes."  It  aji- 
peared  that  Hutchinson  had  no  author- 
ity to  enter  into  tiie  charter-party  for 
Barnes,  and  it  was  therefore  contended 
tiiat  lie  was  personally  liable  as  principal 
in  this  action,  but  the  court  held  other- 
wise. Lord  Dctiman  said  :  "  It  is  not  pre- 
tended that  the  defendant  had  any 
interest  as  principal ;  he  signed  as  agent, 
intending  to  bind  a  principal,  and  in  no 
other  character.  That  he  may  be  liable 
to  the  plaintiff  in  another  form  of  action, 
for  any  damage  sustained  by  his  represent- 
ing himself  to  be  agent,  wlien  lie  was  not, 
is  very  possible;  but  tlie  question  is  liere, 
whether  he  can  be  sued  on  the  charter- 
party  itself,  as  a  party  to  it.  No  reported 
case  has  decided  that  a  party  so  circum- 
stanced can  be  sued  on  the  instrument 
itself.  Mr.  .Justice  Story,  in  his  book  on 
the  Law  of  Agency,  states,  that  the  deci- 
sions in  the  American  courts  are  conflict- 
ing on  this  point,  and  that '  in  England  it 
is  held,  that  the  suit  must  be  by  a  special 
action  on  the  case;'  citing  Polhill  v. 
Walter,  3  B.  &  Ad.  114.  That  case  does 
not,  perhaps,  establish  tiie  broad  proposi- 
tion ;  for  the  contract  was  a  bill  of  ex- 
change—  an  instrument  differing  in  many 
respects  from  ordinary  contracts.  In  the 
absence  of  any  direct  authority,  we  think 
that  a  party  who  executes  an  instrument 
in  the  name  of  another,  whose  name  he 
puts  to  tiie  inslrum'-iit,  and  adds  his  own 
name  only  as  agent  for  that  other,  can- 
not be  treated  as  a  party  to  that  instru- 
ment, and  be  sued  upon  it,  unless  it  be 
siiown  that  lie  was  tiie  reAil.  princijial." 
See  also  Lewis  v.  Nicholson,  18  Q.  B. 
003.  —  The  law  is  so  held  in  IMassachu- 
setts.  Long  v.  Colljurn,  11  Mass.  07; 
Ballou  V.  Talbot,  1(5  Mass.  401 ;  Jefts  v. 
York,  4  Cusii.  371.  And  in  Abbey  v. 
Cliase,  G  Cusii.  50,  the  view  taken  in  the 
text  is  confirmed.  Tiie  court  say :  "  It 
docs  not  necessarily  follow  that  a  con- 
tract made  by  an  authorized  agent, 
which  does  nrjt  bind  the  principal,  be- 
comes the  agent's  contract,  and  makes 
him  answerable  if  it  is  not  jierformed. 
This  depends  upon  the  legal  effect  of  the 

72 


terms  of  the  contract.  If  the  agent  em- 
ploys such  terms  as  legally  import  an 
undertaking  by  the  princiiKil  only,  the 
contract  is  the  principal's,  and  he  alone 
is  bound  by  it.  But  if  the  terms  of  the 
contract  legally  import  a  personal  under- 
taking of  the  agent,  and  not  of  the  prin- 
cipal, then  it  is  the  contract  of  the  agent, 
and  he  alone  is  answerable  for  a  breach 
of  it.  So  when  one  who  has  no  authority 
to  act  as  another's  agent,  assumes  so  to 
act,  and  makes  either  a  deed  or  a  simple 
contract  in  the  name  of  the  other,  he  is 
not  personally  liable  on  the  covenants  in 
the  deed,  or  on  the  promise  in  the  simple 
contract,  unless  it  contain  apt  words  to 
bind  him  personally.  The  only  remedy 
against  him  in  this  commonwealth,  is  an 
action  on  the  ease  for  falsely  assuming 
authority  to  act  as  agent."  In  Maine, 
Harper  v.  Little,  2  Greenl.  14 ;  Stetson 
V.  Patton,  id.  358.  In  Connecticut,  Ogdon 
V.  Raymond,  22  Conn.  385.  In  Indiana, 
Mc Henry  v.  Duffield,  7  Blackf.  41.  And 
in  Pennsylvania,  Hopkins  v.  Mehaffy,  11 
S.  &  R.  120.  In  this  case,  Gibson,  J., 
says  :  "  No  decision  can  be  found  in  sup- 
port of  the  position,  that  what  appears 
on  the  face  of  the  deed  to  be  the  proper 
covenant  of  the  principal,  but  entered 
into  through  the  agency  of  an  attorney, 
shall  be  taken  to  be  the  proper  covenant 
of  the  attorney,  whenever  he  had  no 
authority  to  execute  the  deed,  How 
could  he  be  declared  against  ?  If  in  the 
usual  and  proper  manner  of  pleading  it 
were  alleged  that  the  agent  iiad  cove- 
nanted, it  would  appear  by  the  produc- 
tion of  the  instrument  that  he  had  not, 
but  that  his  principal  had  covenanted 
through  his  means;  whic'h,  on  non  est 
Jactum  being  pleaded,  would  be  fatal." 
But  in  New  York  the  courts  have  held 
the  agent  personally  liable  on  the  con- 
tract in  such  cases.  Dusenbury  v.  Ellis, 
?j  Johns.  Cas.  70 ;  White  r.  Skinner,  13 
Johns.  307 ;  Randall  v  Van  Vechten,  19 
id.  GO;  Meech  v.  Smith,  7  Wend.  315; 
Palmer  v.  Stephens,  1  Denio,  471.  But 
see  Walker  r.  i5ank  of  the  State  of  New 
York,  13  Barl).  039,  contra.  The  agent 
is  held  liable  on  the  contract  in  New 
Jersey;  Bay  v.  Cook,  2  N.  J.  343.  In 
New  Hampshire  the  court  seem  to  have 
taken  a  middle  course.  It  is  there  held 
that  if  a  person,  having  no  authority  to 
act  as  agent,  undertakes  so  to  act  in 
making  a  contract,  and  the  contract 
which   he   makes,  rejecting  what  he   was 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  70 

that  the  contract  is  wholly  void.  It  is  not  the  contract  of  the 
principal,  because  he  gave  no  authority  to  the  supposed  agent. 
It  is  not  the  contract  of  the  agent,  for  he  professed  to  act  for  the 
principal.  So,  if  one  forges  a  signature  to  a  note,  and  obtains 
money  on  that  note,  he  cannot  be  held  on  it  as  on  his  promise  to 
pay.  But  in  all  such  cases  the  supposed  agent  may  be  reached  in 
assumpsit  if  money  be  paid  to  him  or  work  and  labor  done  for 
him  under  such  supposed  contract,  or  in  trespass  for  special  dam- 
ages for  so  undertaking  to  act  for  another  without  authority, 
or  in  some  other  appropriate  action;  but  not  on  the  contract 
itself. 

An  agent  who  exceeds  his  authority  renders  himself  liable  to 
the  whole  extent  of  the  contract,  although  a  part  of  it  was  within 
his  authority,  (^x)  It  may,  however,  be  said,  that  where  an  agent 
exceeds  his  authority,  what  he  does  within  it  is  valid,  if  that  part 
be  distinctly  severable  from  the  remainder. 


SECTION  VIII. 

REVOCATION  OP  AUTHORITY. 

It  is  a  general  principle,  that  an  authority  is  always  revocable  ; 
the  principal  may  at  any  time  put  an  end  to  the  relation  between 
himself  and  his  agent  by  withdrawing  the  authority,  unless 
the  authority  is  coupled  with  an  interest,  or  given  for  a  *  val-    *  70 
uable  consideration,  (^z)  ^    Notice  of  revocation  is  not  neces- 

not  authorized  to  put  to  it,  contains  apt  blank  note  exceed  his  authority,  and  the 
words  to  charge  himself,  he  is  personally  third  party  receive  the  note  witli  knowl- 
liable.  Woodes  v.  Dennett,  9  N.  II.  55 ;  edge  that  the  authority  has  been  trans- 
Savage  V.  Rix,  id.  263;  Moor  v.  Wilson,  cended,  the  note  will  not  be  void  in  toto, 
0  Foster  (N.  H.),  382.  but  only  for  the  excess  beyond  the  sum 

(.r)  Feeter  v.   Heath,   11  Wend.  477.  which  was  authorized. 
—  But  in  Johnson  v.   Blasdale,  I  Sm.  &  (y)  It   is   to   be    noticed,   that   many 

M.   1,   the   Court  of  Appeals  of  Missis-  cases  which  in  England  might  be  under- 

sippi  held  that  if  an  agent  in  filling  up  a  stood  as  examples  of  an  authority  irrevo- 

1  Thus  the  agency  of  one,  intrusted,  without  consideration,  with  money  to  settle 
a  lawsuit,  can  be  revoked  at  any  time  before  the  settlement  is  completed.  Phillips  v. 
Howell,  60  Ga.  411.  One  intrusting  money  to  another  to  be  paid  to  a  creditor,  may 
revoke  before  the  creditor  assents  ;  and  such  assent  may  be  presumed  from  the  lat- 
ter's  knowledge.  Simonton  v.  Minneapolis  Bank,  24  Minn.  216.  The  authority  of 
a  person  to  procure  donations  for  a  railroad  extension,  a  portion  of  which  was  to  be 
allowed  him  for  his  services,  is  revocable  at  pleasure.  Smith  v.  Cedar  Falls,  &c.  R. 
Co.  30  la.  244. 

73 


*71 


TUE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


saiy,  where  the  agent  had  only  a  special  authority  to  do  a  special 
act,  and  this  authority  is  exhausted.  (?/?/)  But  where  third  parties 
have  dealt  with  an  agent  clothed  with  general  powers,  whose  acts 
have  therefore  bound  his  principal,  and  the  principal  revokes  the 
authority  he  gave  his  agent,  such  principal  will  continue 
*  71    to  be  *  bound  by  the  further  acts  of  his  agent,  unless  the 


cable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  principal, 
because  coupled  with  an  interest,  would 
not  in  tliis  country  be  classed  under  that 
head,  owing  to  the  general  adoption  here 
of  the  definition  of  a  "  power  coupled 
with  an  interest,"  given  in  Hunt  v.  Rous- 
manier,  8  Wiieat.  201  [see  post,  note 
{d  )].  All  such  cases,  it  seems,  can  be 
considered  instances  where  the  authority 
cannot  be  revoked  because  of  the  valuable 
consideration  moving  from  the  agent ;  as 
where  the  agent  had  begun  to  act  under 
the  authority,  and  would  be  damnified  by 
its  recall,  or  where  the  authority  is  part 
of  a  security.  Walsh  v.  Whitcomb,  2 
Esp.  505  ;  Gaussen  v.  Morton,  10  B.  &  C. 
731 ;  Hodgson  v.  Anderson,  3  B.  &  C. 
842;  Broomlev  v.  Holland,  7  Ves.  28; 
Marryat  i'.  Broderick,  2  M.  &  W.  371 ; 
Eltham  v.  Kingsman,  1  B.  &  Aid.  684 ; 
Yates  V.  Iloppe,  9  C.  B.  541  ;  Ware,  J., 
United  States  v.  Jarvis,  2  Ware,  278. 
And  see  Brown  v.  McGran,  14  Pet.  479, 
495 ;  Story  on  Agency,  §§  4GG,  461,  408, 
where  the  opinions  of  the  civilians  are 
cited ;  but  comi)are  2  Kent  Com.  044. 
Fabens  i'.  The  Mercantile  Bank,  23  Pick. 
330,  seems  to  be  the  case  of  a  power  ir- 
revocable b}"^  the  principal,  botli  because 
given  for  consideration  and  because 
coupled  with  an  interest  in  the  sense 
of  Chief  Justice  Marshall.  Whether 
after  advances  made  by  a  factor,  his 
authority  to  sell  the  goods  of  the  prin- 
cipal to  the  extent  of  those  advances,  is 
revocable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  principal, 
is  a  question  upon  which  the  autliorities 
are  not  agreed.  In  Brown  v.  McGran, 
14  Pet.  479,  it  was  held  that  the  authority 
to  sell  is  not  revocable  in  such  a  case. 
The  decisions  in  tlie  State  courts,  so  far 
as  they  go,  appear  to  be  in  substantial 
agreement  witii  Brown  v.  McGran.  If 
tlie  original  authority,  on  consideration 
of  wliich  the  advances  were  made,  was 
an  authority  to  sell  at  a  limited  price,  it 
seems  plain  tiiat  the  fact  of  the  advances 
does  not  alter  that  authority.  It  continues 
an  authority  to  sell  on  certain  terms,  and 
as  such,  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  may  be  held  irrevocable  to  the 
extent  of  the  consideration  given  for  it, 
that  is,  to  the  amount  of  tlie  advances. 
Some  of  the  State  courts  have  gone  a 

74 


step  further  in  this  direction,  and  held 
that  an  authority  to  sell  at  a  limited 
price  may  be  converted  into  a  (jeneral 
authority  to  sell,  by  the  fact  of  advances 
in  conjunction  witii  the  fact  of  the  ne- 
glect of  the  consignor,  after  reasonable 
notice,  to  repay  the  advances.  Parker  v. 
Brancker,  22  Pick.  40 ;  Erothingliam  v. 
Ever  ton,  12  N.  H.  239.  See  also  Blot 
V.  Boiceau,  3  Comst.  78.  This  subject 
has  recently  come  before  the  Court  of 
Common  Bench  in  England  in  Smart  v. 
Sandars,  5  C.  B.  895,  where  it  was  de- 
cided that  a  factor's  authority  to  sell  is 
revocable  at  the  will  of  the  consignor, 
notwithstanding  advances  to  the  full 
value,  and  a  request  of  repayment  un- 
complied  with.  Brown  v.  McGran  had 
been  cited  in  the  a  rgument ;  Wiide,  C. 
J.,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  court, 
said  (p.  918):  "  In  the  present  case  the 
goods  are  consigned  to  a  factor  for  sale. 
That  confers  an  implied  authority  to  sell. 
Afterwards  the  factor  makes  advances. 
This  is  not  an  authority  coupled  with  an 
interest  but  an  independent  authority, 
and  an  interest  subsequently  arising. 
The  making  of  such  an  advance  may 
be  a  good  (!onsideration  for  an  agreement 
that  the  authority  to  sell  shall  be  no 
longer  revocable  ;  but  such  an  effect  will 
not,  we  think,  arise  indei^endently  of 
agreement.  There  is  no  authority  or 
principle,  in  our  law,  that  we  are  aware 
of,  wliich  leads  us  to  think  it  will.  If 
such  be  the  law,  where  is  it  to  be  found  ? 
It  was  said  in  argument,  that  it  was  tlie 
connnon  practice  of  factors  to  sell,  in 
order  to  repay  advances.  If  it  be  true 
that  there  is  a  well-iuiderstood  practice 
with  factors  to  sell,  that  practice  might 
furnish  a  ground  for  inferring  that  the 
advances  were  made  n])on  the  footing  of 
an  agreement  that  the  factor  should  have 
an  irrevocable  authority  to  sell,  in  case 
the  principal  made  default.  Such  an  in- 
ference might  be  a  very  reasonable  and 
proi)erone;  but  it  would  be  an  infer- 
ence of  fact,  and  not  a  conclusion  of 
law."  See  also  Raleigh  v.  Atkinson,  6 
M.  &  W.  670 ;  Hutchins  v.  Hebbard,  34 
N.  Y.  24. 

(!J!j)  Watts  V.  Kavanagh,  35  Vt.  34. 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  71 

third  parties  have  knowledge  of  the  revocation,  or  unless  he  does 
what  he  can  to  make  the  revocation  as  notorious  and  generally 
known  to  the  world  as  was  the  fact  of  the  agency.  (/)  ^  This  is 
usually  done  by  advertising,  and  usage  will  have  great  effect  in 
determining  whether  such  principal  did  all  that  was  incumbent  on 
him  to  make  his  revocation  notorious.  And  third  parties  who 
never  dealt  with  such  agent  before  such  revocation,  if  they,  as  a 
part  of  the  connnunity  were  justified  in  believing  such  agency  to 
have  existed,  and  had  no  knowledge  and  no  sufficient  means  of 
knowledge  of  the  revocation,  may  hold  the  principal  liable  for  the 
acts  of  the  agent  after  revocation ;  (a)  as  in  the  case  of  a  partner- 
ship, where  the  dissolution  or  change  of  parties  was  not  properly 
made  known,  (h) 

A  revocation  of  authority  may  be  made  either  expressly  or  by 
any  action  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter,  which  is  manifestly 
irreconcilable  with  a  continuance  of  the  authority.  (hF)  2    And  it 

(z)  Hazard  v.   Treadwell,  Stra.   506 ;  thority  implied  from  cohabitation,  joined 

V.  Harrison,    12   Mod.    346;  Buller,  witli  the   previous   sanction   of   acts   of 

J.,  Salte  V.  Field,  5  T.  K.  215;  Spencer  agency   performed   by   the   person  held 
V.  Wilson,  4  Munf .  130 ;  Morjran  v.  Stell,  forth  as  wife.     Tliat  the  tradesman  fur- 
6  Binn.  305.  —  Where  an  agency  consti-  nishing   the  goods  in   such   a   case   has 
tuted  by  writing  is  revoked,  but  the  writ-  knowledge   that    the   woman    is   only   a 
ten  authority  is  left  in  the  hands  of  the  mistress,   does   not    affect   his   right    to 
agent,  and  he  subsequently  exhibits  it  to  notice  of  separation.     Ryan  v.  Sams,  12 
a  third  person   who  deals  with  him  as  Q.  B.  460,  where  Munro  v.  De  Chemant, 
agent  on  the  faith  of  it  without  any  no-  4  Camp.  215,  was  commented  on.     Tier 
tice  of  the  revocation,  the  act  of  the  agent,  v.  Lanipson,  35  Vt.  179. 
within  the  scope  of  the  authority,  will  (a)  See  last  note, 
bind    the    principal.     Beard  v.   Kirk,   11           (h)  Graham  v.   Hope,   1  Peake,  154; 
N.    H.  397.      This    necessity   for   actual  Parkin  v.  Carruthcrs,  3  Esp.  248 ;  Ward- 
notice  of  revocation,  or  a  general  noto-  well  r.  Haight,  2  Barb.  549. 
riety  equivalent  to  notice,  has  been  held         {bh)  Potter    v.    Merchants    Bank,  28 
to  exist  in  full  force  in  the  case  of  an  au-  N.  Y.  641. 


1  Payment  to  an  agent  before  such  notice  releases  the  debt.  Packer  v.  Hinckley 
Works,  122  Mass.  484  ;  Ins.  Co.  v.  McCain,  96  U.  S.  84 ;  Meyer  v.  Hehner,  96  III. 
400;  Ulrich  v.  McCormick,  66  Ind.  243;  Braswell  v.  Am.  Ins.  Co.  75  N.  C.  8.  So  a 
business  agent  continues  to  bind  his  principal  as  to  those  wont  to  deal  with  him, 
before  notice  of  revocation.  Claflin  v.  l^enhcim,  Q6  N.  Y.  301.  A  mere  advertise- 
ment for  proposals  to  furnish  supplies  is  not  sufficient  notice  of  the  discharge  of  one 
authorized  to  purchase  such  supplies.  Fellows  v.  Hartford,  &c.  Co.  38  Conn.  197. 
See  Eadie  v.  Ashbaugh,  44  la.  519;  Hatch  v.  Coddington,  95  U.  S.  48;  Barkley  v. 
Rensselaer,  &c.  R.  Co.  71  N.  Y.  205. 

2  As  by  a  principal's  parting  with  his  right  in  the  subject-matter  of  an  agency 
before  the  agent  has  acted.  Gilbert  v.  Holmes,  64  111.  548.  So  the  delivery,  by  an 
agent  to  purchase  land,  of  tlie  papers  to  his  principal,  and  receiving  from  him  an 
instalment  of  the  purchase-money  and  pay  for  his  services.  Moore  v.  Stone,  40  la. 
259.  So  payment  to  an  agent  to  do  a  particular  thing  for  his  services.  Reed  v. 
Latham,  40  Conn.  452.  But  if  one  is  employed  as  sole  agent  for  a  time  certain, 
neither  his  principal's  sale  of  his  business  before  that  time,  Rhodes  v.  Forwood,  1 
App.  Cas.  256;  nor  his  bankruptcy,  Orr  r.  Ward,  73  111.  318;  nor  liis  discontinuance 
from  business  voluntarily,  entitles  him  to  indemnity,  Ex  parte  Maclure,  L.  R,  5  Ch. 

75 


72 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


has  been  held  that  a  principal  revoking  an  authority  may  compel 
the  former  agent  to  deliver  up  the  paper  conferring  authority,  (he) 
A  mere  appointment  of  another  agent  to  do  the  same  thing  is  not 
of  itself  a  revocation  of  the  first  appointment,  (bd) 

The  death  of  the  principal  operates  per  se,  as  a  revocation  of 

the  agency,  (e)  ^     But  not  if  the  agency  is  coupled  with  an 

*  72    *  interest  vested  in  the  agent,  (c?)     Then  it  survives,  and 


(be)  Spear  v.  Gardner,  16  La.  An.  380. 

(hd)  Darrol  v.  Quiniby,  11  Allen,  208. 

(c)  Co.  Litt.  §  OG  ;  Hunt  v.  Ilousnia- 
nier,  8  Wheat.  201 ;  Watson  v.  Khifj,  4 
Camp.  272 ;  Lepard  v.  Vernon,  2  Ves. 
&  B.  51  ;  Smout  f.  Ilber}-,  10  M.  &  W.  1 ; 
Bu.xton  V.  Jones,  1  Man.  &  G.  84 ;  Cam- 
panari  u.  Woodburn,  15  C.  B.  4 ;  Rigs  v. 
Cage,  2  Hunii)]i.  (Tenn.)  350;  Ferris  v. 
Irving,  28  Cal.  G45.  In  Cassidav  v.  Mc- 
Kenzie,  4  W.  &  S.  282,  it  was' held,  in 
opposition  to  the  current  of  authority, 
that  a  payment  made  by  an  agent,  after 
the  death  of  his  principal,  he  being  ig- 
norant thereof,  was  valid  as  an  act  of 
agen('}^  Lunnry  of  the  principal  revokes, 
but  the  better  opinion  (according  to  Ch. 
Kent,  2  Com.  G45)  is,  that  the  fact  of  the 
existence  of  lunacy  must  have  been  pre- 
viously established  by  inquisition  before 
it  could  control  the  operation  of  the  pow- 
er ;  and  see  Bell,  Com.  on  the  Laws  of 
Scotland,  §  413.  —  In  Davis  v.  Lane,  10 
N.  n.  156,  it  was  held,  that  the  authorit}-- 
of  an  agent,  where  the  agency  is  revo- 
cable, ceases,  or  is  suspended,  by  the  in- 
sanity of  the  principal,  or  his  incapacity 
to  exercise  any  volition  upon  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  agency,  in  consequence  of 
an  entire  loss  of  mental  power ;  but  that 
if  the  principal  has  enabled  the  agent  to 
hold  himself  out  as  having  authority,  by 
a  written  letter  of  attorney,  or  by  a  pre- 
vious employment,  and  the  incapacit}'  of 
the  ))rincipal  is  not  known  to  those  who 
deal  with  the  agent  within  the  scope  of 
tlie  authority  he  appears  to  possess,  the 
principal   and   those   who   claim    under 


him,  may  be  precluded  from  setting  np 
the  insanity  as  a  revocation.  The  court 
in  this  case  also  held,  that  the  principle, 
that  insanity  operates  as  a  revocation, 
cannot  apply  where  the  power  is  coupled 
with  an  interest,  so  that  it  can  be  exer- 
cised in  tiie  name  of  the  agent.  Whether 
it  is  applicable  to  the  case  of  a  power 
which  is  i)art  of  a  security,  or  executed 
for  a  valuable  consideration,  was  left 
undecided.  See  Jones  v.  Noy,  2  Myl.  «S; 
K.  125  ;  Waters  v.  Taylor,  2  Ves.  &  B. 
301 ;  Huddlestone's  case,  2  Ves.  Sen.  34, 
1  Swanst.  514,  n. ;  Sayer  v.  Bennett,  1  ' 
Cox's  Cas.  107.  —  Bankruptcy  of  the  priri' 
cipal  revokes  the  authority.  Parker  v. 
Smith,  16  East,  382;  Minett  v.  Forres- 
ter, 4  Taunt.  541.  Defendant  being  in 
tlie  employment  of  J.  in  his  trade,  sold, 
bond  fide,  some  goods  belonging  to  J., 
after  J.  had  committed  an  act  of  bank- 
ruptc}',  of  which  defendant  was  ignorant. 
The  sale  was  more  than  two  months  be- 
fore the  connnission  issued.  Defendant 
acted  under  a  general  authority.  The 
assignee  brought  trover.  Held,  on  a  plea 
of  not  guilty,  that  defendant,  having  sold 
under  a  general  authority  only,  had  been 
guilty  of  a  conversion.  Pearson  r.  Gra- 
ham, 6  A.  &  E.  8!)0.  —  Marriage  of  feme 
sole  princifial  revokes.  White  v.  Gifford, 
1  Rol.  Abr.  Authoritie  E.  pi.  4;  Charnley 
V.  Winstanley,  5  East,  266. 

(d)  See  ante,  p.  *70,  n.  (y).  Hunt 
V.  Rousmanicr,  8  Wheat.  201 ;  Bergen 
V.  Bennett,  1  Caines'  Cas  1  ;  Smvtb  r. 
Craig,  3  W.  &  S.  14  ;  Cassiday  v.  McKen- 
zie,  4  W.  &  S.  282 ;  Knapp  v.  Alvord,  10 


737,  contra,  Lewis  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  61  Mo.  534 ;  unless  there  is  an  agreement  to  pay 
the  agent  a  certain  sum  if  he  lost  his  place.  Ex  parte  Logan,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  14i).  Nor  is 
a  broker  who  was  to  find  a  purchaser  of  land  within  a  montli,  and  whose  agency  is 
revoked  before  the  end  of  the  month,  entitled  to  his  commission,  though  he  found  the 
purchaser  within  the  month.     Brown  v.  Pforr,  38  Cal'  550. 

1  As  an  agency  to  occupy  land,  Lincoln  v.  Emerson,  108  Mass.  87;  to  receive  a 
deposit  of  money,  Davis  7-,  Windsor  Bank,  46  Vt.  728;  and  to  measure  and  deliver 
corn,  Cleveland  ;;.  Williams,  20  Tex,  204.  A  person  who  has  given  his  wife  authority 
to  deal  with  a  tradesman  and  to  pledge  his  credit,  is  liable  to  the  tradesman  for 
goods  supplied  to  the  wife  during  l)is  Rul)sequent  insanity,  the  tradesman  having  no 
knowledge  of  his  insanity.  Drew  c.  Nunn,  4  Q.  B.  D.  661.  Per  Brtlt  and  Bramweli, 
L.  JJ.,  that  insanity  revokes  an  agent's  authority,  ib. 

76 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  73 

the  agent  may  do  all  that  is  necessary  to  realize  his  interest  and 
make  it  beneficial  to  himself.  Such  an  agency  is  not  revocable 
at  tlie  pleasure  of  the  principal  in  his  lifetime,  (g)  and  if  the 
agent  dies  the  agency  passes  over  to  his  representatives.  (/)  To 
determine  whether  the  agency  be  thus  irrevocable,  it  is  an  impor- 
tant if  not  a  decisive  question,  whether  the  act  authorized  could 
be  performed  by  the  agent  in  liis  own  name,  or  only  by  him  as  an 
agent,  and  in  the  name  of  the  principal.  In  the  first  case,  if  an 
interest  were  coupled  with  the  agency,  the  authority  would  sur- 
vive the  death  of  the  principal,  and  the  agent  might  perform 

*  the  act  in  the  same  manner  after  the  death  as  before.  In  *  73 
the  latter  case,  as  he  could  no  longer  use  the  name  of  the 
principal,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  one  who  is  dead  can  no 
longer  act,  it  would  seem  that  his  right  must  be  limited  to  that  of 
requiring  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  to  perform  the  act 
necessary  for  his  protection. 

•  Unless  the  authority  is  thus  coupled  with  an  interest,  it  would 
seem  the  word  "  irrevocable  "  does  not  take  away  the  power  of 
revocation,  (ff^ 

The  revocation  is  not  prevented  by  any  interest  in  the  money 
to  come  from  the  exercise  of  the  authority ;  ^  ])ut  the  inter- 
Paige,  205.  The  important  question  is  of  Lord  Ellmboroiigh,  in  Watson  v.  King, 
what  constitutes  an  authoiitij  coupled  witli  4  Camp.  272,  tliat  deatli  revokes  even  a 
an  interest  ;  and  licre  there  is  some  di-  power  coupled  witli  an  interest.  Sec 
versity  in  judicial  definition.  In  Hunt  ante,  note  (//).  A  warrant  of  attorney  to 
V.  Rousmanier,  8  Wlieat.  201,  it  was  held  confess  judgment  is  not  revocable ;  and 
(Marshall,  C.  J.,  giving  the  opinion  of  though  determinahle  by  death,  yet,  at 
the  court),  that  the  interest  which  can  common  law,  as  a  judgment  entered  up 
protect  a  power,  after  the  death  of  the  during  any  term,  or  the  subsequent  va- 
person  who  creates  it,  must  be  an  inter-  cation,  related  to  the  first  day  of  such 
est  in  the  thing  itself  on  which  the  power  term,  a  warrant  of  attorney  might  be 
is  to  be  exercised,  and  not  an  interest  in  made  available  after  the  death  of  the 
that  which  is  produced  by  the  exercise  principal,  by  entering  up  judgment  with- 
of  the  power.  —  In  Smart  v.  Sandars,  5  in  the  term  and  vacation  in  wliich  the 
C.  B.  895,  917,  Wilde,  C  J.,  said  that,  death  occurred.  Lord  Holt,  Oades  v. 
"  Where  an  agreement  is  entered  into  on  Woodward,  1  Salk.  87 ;  Fuller  r.  Joce- 
a  sufficient  consideration,  whereby  an  lyn,  2  Stra.  882;  Heapy  f.  Parris,  G  T.  R. 
authority   is   given   for   the   purpose  of  368. 

securing  some  benefit  to  the  donee  of  the  (e)  Gaussen  v.  Morton,   10  B.  &  C. 

autliority,  such  an  authority  is  irrevoca-  731  ;  Walsh  v.  Whitcomb,  2  Esp.  565 ; 

ble.     This  is  what  is  iisually  meant  by  Allen  v.   Davis,  8  Eng.   (Ark.)  29.     See 

an  authority   coupled  with  an  interest : "  also  Marfield  v.  Goodhue,  3  Comst.  62 ; 

—  that  is,  irrevocable  except  by  the  death  Houghtaling  v.  Marvin,  7  Barb.  412;  Wil- 

of  the  principal;  for  the  dictum,  as  the  son  i'.  Edmonds,  4  Foster  (N.  H.),  517. 

whole  case  shows,  is  to  be  taken  in  con-  {/)  2  Kent  Com.  643. 

nection  with  the  doctrine,  understood  still  (jf)  McGregor  v.  Gardner,  14  la.  326. 
to  prevail  in  England,  on  the  authority 

1  As  by  way  of  a  commission,  in  the  surplus  proceeds  of  land  to  be  sold.  Haw- 
ley  V.  Smith,  45  Ind.  183. 

77 


*  73  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

est  must  be  in  the  property  on  which  the  power  is  to  be  ex- 
ercised. (/^) 

Tlie  authority  is  revoked  by  the  death  of  the  agent.i  Hence,  if 
a  firm  be  the  agent,  and  one  of  them  dies,  his  estate  cannot  be 
charged  for  the  subsequent  misuse  of  the  authority  by  the  sur- 
viving partner.  (/A) 


SECTION   IX. 

HOW   THE   PRINCIPAL   IS   AFFECTED    BY   THE   MISCONDUCT   OF   HIS 

AGENT. 

A  principal  is  liable  for  the  fraud  or  misconduct  of  his  agent,  so 
far,  that,  on  the  one  hand,  he  cannot  take  any  benefit  from  any 
misrepresentation  fraudulently  made  by  his  agent,  although  the 
principal  was  ignorant  and  innocent  of  the  fraud ;  (^)  and  on 
the  other  hand,  if  the  party  dealing  with  the  agent  suffer  from 
such  fraud,  the  principal  is  bound  to  make  him  compensation 

(fr/)  Hartley's  Appeal,   53  Penn.  St.  because  it  is  not  a  question  of  criminal 

202  ;    I3arr  v.    Schroeder,   32    Cal.   GOO  ;  responsibility  wliich  is  here  raised  by  the 

Blackstone  v.  Buttermore,   53  Penn.  St.  facts.     The  agent  could  not  commit  the 

286.  principal  to  any  criminal  purpose,  if  the 

{ JTi)  Johnson  r.  Wilcox,  25  Ind.  182.  principal  did  not  know  it,  and  had  not 

(fj)  Attorney-General    v.    Ansted,    12  eitlier  given  him  an  authority  or  adopted 

M.  &  \V.  520 ;  Fitzherbert  v.  Mather,  1  his  act  when  he  did  know  it.     But  as  to 

T.  It.  12 ;  Seaman  v.  Fonercau,  2  Stra.  the  civil  effect  of  vitiating  the  contract 

1183;  Fitzsinimons  i:  .loslin,  21  Vt.  129.  made  upon  tliat  false  representation,   I 

"  I  have  no  doubt  that  if  an  agent  of  a  have  no   doubt  whatever  that  it  would 

party,  say  of  Mr.  Attwood  in  this  case,  vacate  it  just  as  much,   with  the   igno- 

without  his  knowledge,  made  a   wilfully  r.ance   of    the  principal,    as    if   lie    were 

false  representation  to  tlie   British   Iron  cliarged  with  knowing  it,  and  as  if  the 

Company,    upon    which    representation  agent  had  been  an  agent  for  this  pur- 

they   acted,    '  adliihrutes    fidfim,'   and   on  pose."     Lord    Brougham    in    Attwood   i\ 

tliat  confidence  liad  formed  a  contract;  Small,  G  CI.    &   F.448.     Sec    also  Tay- 

—  I  have  no  hesitation  whatever  in  say-  lor  ;■.  Green,  8  C.  &  P.  310;  Olmsted  v. 

ing,  tliat    against    that   contract,    equity  Ilotailing,    1  Hill  (N.  Y.),    317;    Veazie 

would  relieve  just  as  nnich  as  if  there  v.   Williams,   8   How.  134,  s.  c.  3  Story, 

was  the  scienter  of  the  principal  proved  ;  611;  Smith  v.  Tracy,  36  N.  Y.  79. 

^  Tlie  death  of  an  agent  with  the  power  of  substitution,  revokes  the  authority  of 
a  substitute,  whose  presentation  of  the  principal's  certificates  of  loan  thereafter  will 
not  justify  a  corporation  in  making  a  transfer.  Lehigh  Coal  Co.  v.  Mohr,  83  Penn. 
St.  228.  See  .lackson  Ins.  Co.  v.  Partee,  9  Heiskell,  20G.  That  war  revokes  an 
agency,  see  Howell  v.  Gordon,  40  Ga.  .302  ;  Blackwell  v.  Willard,  65  N.  C.  555  ;  contra, 
Jones  V.  Harris,  10  Heiskell,  98;  Darling  v.  Lewis,  11  Heiskell,  125;  Maloney  y. 
Stephens,  11  Heiskell,  738.  That  the  tender  of  an  insurance  premium  during  the 
rebellion  to  a  former  agent  resident  in  Virginia  does  not  bind  an  insurance  company, 
see  Ins.  Co.  i;.  Davi".,  95  U.  S.  425;  contra,  Sands  v.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co.  50  N.  Y.  026;  Man- 
hattan Ins.  Co.  V.  Warwick,  20  Gratt.  614.     See  Fretz  v.  Stover,  22  Wall.  198. 

78 


CH.  III.] 


AGENTS. 


74 


for  tlie  injury  so  sustained ;  (A)  ^  and  tliis  although  the 
*  principal  be  innocent,  (t)  ^  provided  the  agent  acted  in  *  74 
the  matter  as  his  agent,  and  distinctly  within  the  line  of  the 
business  intrusted  to  him.  ( A;)  ^  And  though  there  be  no  actual 
fraud  on  the  part  of  the  agent,  yet  if  he  makes  a  false  representa- 
tion as  to  matter  peculiarly  within  his  own  knowledge  or  that  of 
his  principal,  and  thereby  gets  a  better  bargain  for  his  princijjal. 


(h)  Holt,  C.  J.,  in  Hern  v.  Nichols,  1 
Salk.  289,  and  Ellenhorough,  C.  J.,  in 
Crockford  v.  Winter,  1  Camp.  124,  lay 
down  the  broad  doctrine  that  a  principal 
is  answerable  civ'diter,  though  not  crimi- 
naliter,  for  the  fraud  of  his  agent.  Jef- 
frey V.  Bigelow,  13  Wend.  518,  illustrates 
the  general  doctrine.  There  the  defend- 
ants had  been  in  partnership  with  one 
Hunt,  for  speculation  in  sheep,  they  con- 
tributing funds,  and  he  time  and  services. 
Hunt  purchased  some  sheep  diseased 
witli  the  scab,  knowing  the  fact,  and 
mixed  them  with  a  larger  number  be- 
longing to  the  partnership.  Subsequently 
Hunt  assigned  his  interest  to  defendants, 
who  employed  S.  to  sell  the  sheep.  The 
flock  was  purchased  from  S.  by  the 
plaintiff,  and  mixed  with  the  sheep  he 
before  owned.  The  scab  broke  out 
among  them  and  destroyed  many  sheep, 
of  his  old  stock  as  well  as  of  those  pur- 
chased from  S. ;  and  considerable  ex- 
pense was  incurred  in  the  attempt  to 
arrest  the  disease.  S.  was  aware  of  the 
infected  condition  of  the  flock,  but  no 
actual  knowledge  was  proved  upon  the 
defendants.  Field,  that  the  plaintiff  was 
entitled  to  maintain  his  action,  and  could 
recover  damages  for  the  loss  both  of  the 
sheep  purchased  and  of  the  other  sheep 
receiving  the  infection,  and  all  other 
damages  necessarily  and  naturally  flow- 
ing from  the  act  of  the  defendants' 
agent.  Semble,  the  liability  of  the  de- 
fendants woulfl  have  been  the  same  if 
S.  had  been  ignorant  of  the  state  of  the 


flock  ;  the  knowledge  of  Hunt  when  he 
bought  the  diseased  sheep  being  con- 
structively the  knowledge  of  his  partners, 
and  his  assignment  of  his  interests  to  the 
defendants,  before  the  sale  to  the  plain- 
tiff, making  no  difference,  as  to  their  re- 
sponsibility. See  also  Johnston  v.  South- 
western Railroad  Bank,  3  Strob.  Eq. 
263;  Mitchell  v.  Minis,  8  Tex.  0;  Udell 
V.  Atherton,  7  H.  &  N.  172  ;  Sweetland 
V.  111.  &c.  Tel.  Co.  27  la.  433;  Fawcett  v. 
Bigley,  59  Penn.  St.  411. 

(;')  Irving  v.  Motley,  7  Bing.  543 ;  Doe 
V.  Martin,  4  T.  R.  89,  QQ;  Edwards  v. 
Footner,  1  Camp.  530.  Where  an  .attor- 
ney's clerk  had  simulated  the  court  seal 
upon  a  writ,  by  taking  an  impression 
from  the  seal  upon  another  writ,  the 
writ  and  all  proceedings  thereon  were 
set  aside,  and  the  attorney,  although  per- 
sonally blameless,  was  compelled  to  pay 
the  costs.  Dunkley  v.  Farris,  11  C.  B. 
457,  285;  Hunter  v.  Hudson  River,  &c. 
Co.  20  Barb.  493. 

(/.■)  Peto  V.  Hague,  5  Esp.  135;  Huck- 
man  v.  Fernie,  3  M.  &  W.  505.  —  In 
AVoodin  i-.  Burford,  2  Cr.  &  M.  392, 
Bayley,  B.,  said :  "  What  is  said  by  a 
servant  is  not  evidence  against  the  mas- 
ter, unless  he  has  some  aiUhorifi/  (jiven  him  to 
make  the  representation."  It  is  not  meant, 
as  the  case  shows,  that  there  must  be  an 
express  authority  to  make  that  particu- 
lar representation  ;  but  the  authority  may 
be  implied  as  incident  to  a  general  author- 
ity.    Sharp  V.  New  York,  40  Barb.  256. 


^  If  insurance  agent  cheats  the  insured  into  signing  the  preliminary  papers  and 
paying  the  premium,  and  the  policy  is  issued  on  the  agent's  false  statements,  the 
company  is  bound.  Eilenberger  r.  Protective  Ins.  Co.  89  Penn.  St.  464.  But  if  an 
insurance  agent  fraudulently  settles  a  loss  by  fire  with  a  member  of  a  firm,  the  firm 
must  restore,  or  offer  so  to  do,  the  amount  received  before  bringing  suit  on  the  policy. 
Brown  v.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  117  Mass.  479. 

2  Where  a  husband  as  his  wife's  agent  fraudulently  procured  insurance  on  her 
life,  the  company  can  recover  the  money  paid  to  her  administrator,  although  she  was 
innocent  of  the  fraud.     National  Ins.  Co.  v.  Minch,  5  Thomp.  &  C.  545. 

3  A  principal  is  bound  by  the  representations  of  an  agent,  made,  while  so  acting, 
as  true  of  his  own  knowledge,  but  wliicli  prove  to  be  false,  although  not  known  by 
him  to  be  so,  and  although  the  principal  neither  authorized  or  knew  that  he  was  to 
make  them.  Jewett  v.  Carter,  132  Mass.  335.  See  McGowan  v.  Dyer,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B. 
141. 

79 


*  75  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

such  principal,  although  innocent,  cannot  take  the  benefit  of  the 
transaction.  But  the  third  party  may  rescind  the  contract,  and 
recover  back  any  money  lie  may  have  paid  the  principal,  by  reason 
of  his  confidence  in  such  misrepresentation.  (Q  And  it  has  been 
held,  that  if  an  agent,  permitted  by  his  principal  to  hold  himself 
out  as  owner  of  land,  sells  it  for  the  agent's  own  interest,  the  sale 
binds  the  principal.  (11}  The  declarations  of  an  agent  are  not 
admitted  as  evidence  against  his  principal,  unless  they  are  a  part 
of  the  res  gestce.  (Ini) 


SECTION  X. 

OF   NOTICE   TO    AN   AGENT. 

A  principal  is  affected  by  notice  to  his  agent,  respecting  any 
matter  distinctly  within  the  scope  of  his  agency,  when  the  notice 

is  given  before  the  transaction  begins,  or  before  it  is  so 
*  75    far  *  completed   as   to   render  the   notice   nugatory,  (m)  ^ 

The  notice  to  the  agent  may  be  implied  as  well  as  express. 


(/)  Willes   V.  Glover,  4  B.  &  P.   14 ;  lands  to  himself  and  wife,  of  a  prior  un- 

Ashlutrst,  J.,  Fitzherbert  v.  Mather,  1  T.  registered  mortgage,  it  was  licld  not   to 

R.  IG  ;  Franklin  v.  Ezell,  1  Sneed,  407 ;  operate  as  notice  to  the  wife,  so  as  to 

National  Exchange  Co.  v.  Drew,  2  Macq.  give  the  mortgage  a  preference  in  respect 

103 ;  Carpenter  v.  Amer.  Ins.  Co.  1  Story,  to  her  title  ;  especially  as  she  had  paid 

57.     And  it  seems  the  purchaser,  without  the  consideration  for  the  conveyance  out 

rescinding    the   contract,   may   maintain  of  her  separate  estate.     Snyder  r.  Spon- 

case   for   deceit    against    the    principal,  able,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  5(57;  s.  c.  affirmed  in 

Fuller  I'.  Wilson,  3  Q.  B.  58.  error,  7  Hill,  427.     It  seems  a  principal 

(//)  Calais  Co.  v.  Van  Pelt,  2  Black,  is   chargeable    with    notice    of    what   is 

372.  known  to  a  suh-mjcnt,  liow  many  degrees 

(Im)  Green  r.  Gonzales,  2  Daly,  412.  soever  removed,   such    sub-agent   being 

(m)  Bank   of  U.   S.  v.  Davis,  2   Hill  appointed  by   his  authority.     See  Boyd 

(N.  Y.),  451.     Notice  to  one  of   several  v.  Vandcrkemp,  1  Barb.  Cl'i.  287.     As'to 

joint   purchasers,   whatever  be  the   nat-  the  time  when  notice  may  be  given,  see 

ure   of  the   estate  they    take,    is   not  in  Tourville  »•.  Naisli,  3  P.  Wms.  307  ;  Story 

general  notice  to  the  rest,  \mless  he  who  r.  Lord   Windsor,  2  Atk.  030 ;    More  ik 

receives  tlie  notice  be  their  agent ;    and  Mayhew,    1    Chanc.   Cas.    34 ;    Wigg   v. 

where  notice  was  given   to  a  husband,  Wigg,  1  Atk.  384. 
at  the  time  of  taking  a  conveyance  of 

^  Thus  notice  to  an  agent  for  that  purpose  of  the  day  chosen  to  fix  the  price  of 
wheat  sold  to  iii.s  princii)al,  Owens  r.  Koljcrts,  3G  Wis.  258;  or  to  a  bu^'er's  agent 
of  the  non-payment  of  a  check  for  the  jjdce  of  land.  Farmer  v.  Willard,  71  N.  C.  284  ; 
but  not  notice  to  an  auctioneer  of  an  action  against  his  principal  respecting  the  prop- 
erty for  sale,  Ilinton  v.  Citizens'  Ins.  Co.  63  Ala.  488.  See  Sooy  v.  State,  12  Vroom, 
304;  Houseman  v.  Girard  Ass.  81  Penn.  St.  250;  Day  v.  AVamsley,  33  Ind.  145; 
Chouteau  v.  Allen,  70  Mo.  200. 

80 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  76 

Knowledge  obtained  by  the  agent  in  the  course  of  that  very  trans- 
action is  notice ;  ^  and  it  has  been  said,  that  knowledge  obtained 
in  another  transaction,  but  so  short  a  time  previous  that  the 
agent  must  be  presumed  to  recollect  it,  is  also  notice  affecting 
the  principal ;  (n)  but  this  is  questionable,  (o)  This  matter  has 
been  most  discussed  in  cases  where,  in  consequence  of  the  em- 
ployment of  solicitors  or  counsel  in  the  purchase  of  real  estate, 
the  question  has  arisen  how  far  the  clients  are  affected  with 
notice  of  incumbrances,  or  defects  of  title,  which,  by  a  more  or 
less  strong  presumption,  must  be  taken  to  have  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  their  agents.  Two  propositions  seem  to  be  well 
settled :  the  first,  that  the  notice  to  the  solicitor,  to  bind  the 
client,  must  be  notice  in  the  same  transaction  in  which  the  client 
employs  him,  or  at  least,  during  the  time  of  the  solicitor's 
employment  in  that  transaction  ;  (^)  the  other,  that  where 
a  *  purchaser  employs  the  same  solicitor  as  the  vendor,  he  *  76 
is  affected  with  notice  of  whatever  that  solicitor  had  notice 
of,  in  his  capacity  of  solicitor  for  either  vendor  or  purchaser,  in 
the  transaction  in  which  he  is  so  employed,  (jf)     The  first,  it  is 

(n)  Lord  Langdale,  M.  R.,  Hargreavcs  a  subsequent   purchaser   in  an   indepen- 

V.  Rothwcll,  1  Keen,  159.    And  see  Mount-  dent   and    unconnected    transaction,    his 

ford  v.  Scott,  3  Madd.  84.  previous  knowledge  is  not  notice  to  such 

(o)  N.  Y.   Cent.  Ins.   Co.  v.  National  other  person  for  wlioni  lie  acts.     "  Tiie 

Ins.  Co.  20  BarJb.  468.  reason  is  [per  Seriieani,  J.,  delivering  the 

(/))    Wirpam,  V.  C,  Fuller  v.  Bennett,  opinion  of  the  court],  tliat  no  man  can 

2  Hare,  402,  403.     And  Lord  Hardwicke,  he  supposed  alwaj's  to  carry  in  his  mind 

in  declaring  tlie  same  doctrine,  in  Wors-  the  recollection   of  former  occurrences ; 

ley   V.   Scarborough,  3  Atk.  392,  said  it  and  moreover,  in  the  case  of  the  attor- 

would   be  very    mischievous   if  it  were  ney  or  counsel,  it  might  bo  contrary  to 

otherwise,  for  the  man  of  most  practice  his  duty  to  reveal  the  confidential  cora- 

and    greatest   eminence    would   then   be  munications  of  his  client.     To  visit  the 

the  most  dangerous  to  employ.     And  see  principal    with  constructive  notice,  it  is 

Warrick    ?•.    Warrick,   3    Atk.    294.      In  necessary    that    the   knowledge    of    the 

Hood  V.  Fahnestock,  8  Watts,  489,  it  was  agent  or  attorney  should  be  gained,  in 

hid  that  if  one  in  the  course  of  his  busi-  the   course  of  the  same   transaction   in 

ness   as   agent,  attorney,  or  counsel  for  which  he  is  emploj-ed  by  his  client."     8. 

another,   obtain  knowdedge  from   which  p.  Bracken  v.  iMiller,  4  W.  &  S.  102. 
a  trust  would  arise,  and  afterwards  be-  {q)    Wiijrurn,  V.  C.,  Fuller  v.  Bennett, 

comes  the  agent,  attorney,  or  counsel  of  2  Hare,  402. 

1  Knowledge  of  a  managing  tenant  in  common  affects  his  co-tenants,  Ward  v. 
Warren,  82  N.  Y.  265;  and  of  an  attorney  of  the  intention  of  an  insolvent  to  com- 
mit a  fraud  under  the  bankrupt  law  is  imputable  to  his  client,  Eogers  r.  Palmer,  102 
U.  S.  263  ;  but  a  -wife  is  not  affected  by  her  husband's  knowledge  of  incumbrances  on 
land  purchased  by  her,  Pringle  v.  Dunn,  37  Wis.  449.  So  a  buyer's  intention,  known 
to  a  seller's  agent,  to  evade  a  liquor  law,  affects  the  seller,  S>iit  v.  Woodhall,  113  INlass. 
391;  but  contra,  Stanley  v.  Chamberlin,  10  Vroom,  565,  affirmed  in  11  Vroom,  379, 
to  the  effect  that  a  principal,  without  actual  knowledge  of  the  proposed  illegal  use 
of  property,  could  disown  the  agent's  act  and  recover  for  such  use.  See  further, 
Hoover  v.  Wise,  91  U.  S.  808;  Greentree  v.  Rosenstock,  61  N.  Y.  583:  Farrington  v. 
Woodward,  82  Penn.  St.  259;  Tagg  v.  Tennessee  Bank,  9  Heiskell,  479. 
VOL.  I.  6  81 


*  77  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

evident,  is  so  far  qualified  by  the  second,  that  where  the  circum- 
stance of  the  solicitor's  being  employed  for  two  parties  is  in  the 
case,  a  purchaser,  in  the  language  of  Sir  J.  Wlgram^  may  be 
affected  with  notice  of  what  the  solicitor  knew  as  solicitor  for 
the  vendor,  although  as  solicitor  for  the  vendor  he  may  have 
acquired  his  knowledge  before  he  was  retained  by  the  purchaser 
—  whatever  the  solicitor,  during  the  time  of  his  retainer,  knows 
as  solicitor  for  either  party,  may  possibly  in  some  cases  affect 
both,  without  reference  to  the  time  when  his  knowledge  was  first 
acquired.  Any  other  qualification  of  the  principal  limiting  the 
client's  liability  to  notice  acquired  in  the  same  transaction,  the 
distinguished  judge  referred  to  does  not  acknowledge,  (r)  If, 
however,  one  assume  to  act  as  agent  of  another,  and  cause  an  act 
to  be  done  for  him  of  which  the  latter  afterwards  takes  the 
benefit,  he  must  take  it  charged  with  notice  of  such  matters  as 
appear  to  have  been  at  the  time  within  the  knowledge  and  recol- 
lection of  the  agent,  (s) 

Notice  to  a  servant  of  the  principal,  or  one  employed  by  the 
principal,  affects  the  principal,  only  when  given  about  the  very 
thing  that  servant  is  employed  to  do.^  Thus,  notice  to  a  general 
clerk  in  a  mercantile  house,  not  to  furnish  goods,  does  not  bind 
the  house,  (f)  ^ 

On  the  other  hand,  knowledge  possessed  by  a  principal  affects 
a  transaction,  although  the  transaction  took  place  through  an 
agcnt>to  whom  the  knowledge  was  not  communicated.  It  cer- 
tainly has  this  effect  if  the  knowledge  of  the  principal  could  have 
been  and  should  have  been  communicated  to  the  agent.  But  it 
may  not  be  certain  that  the  knowledge  of  the  principal  is  the 
knowledge  of  the  agent  the  moment  the  principal  acquires  it, 
f  without  any  reference  to  the  duty  or  the  possibility  of  the 
principal's    imparting    that   knowledge    to    the    agent,    in 

*  77    season  *  for  him  to  be  influenced  by  it.  (w)     In  some  cases 

(r)  See  Fuller  v.  Bennett,  2  Hare,  402,  (/)  Grant  v.  Cole,  8  Ala.  519. 

where  the  cases  are  reviewed  and  much  (u)  In  Willis  v.  Bank  of  En^jland,  4 

discussed.  A.  &  E.  21,  39,  tlie  doctrine  of  notice  was 

(s)  liovey  v.  Blancliard,  13  N.  H.  145.  thus  stated  by  Lord  Denman:  "  The  gen- 

1  Thus  a  servant's  knowledge  of  the  disposition  of  a  vicious  dog  in  his  cliarge  is 
the  knowledge  of  the  master.     Baldwin  v.  Casella,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  325. 

2  Nor  is  the  knowledge  by  a  janitor  of  a  city  school-house  of  a  defect  in  the  high- 
way in  front  of  the  same,  notice  to  the  city.  Foster  v.  Boston,  127  Mass.  290;  nor 
is  notice  to  a  station  agent,  notice  to  a  railroad  company  of  the  assignment  of  a,  chose 
in  action.    Lambreth  v.  Clarke,  10  Heiskell,  32. 

82 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  77 

the  rights  of  the  principal  arc  certainly  to  be  determined  by  his 
own  knowledge  only ;  as,  if  a  principal  knew  of  defences  to  a 
promissory  note  available  only  against  a  purchaser  with  knowl- 
edge, and  this  principal  bought  the  note  by  an  agent,  who  had  no 
knowledge  of  these  defences,  they  might  still  be  enforced  against 
the  principal. 

Much  question  has  arisen  as  to  the  effect  on  a  corporation,  of 
notice  to  one  who  is  a  member  or  officer  of  it.  By  some  it  is  held 
that  the  notice  must  be  made  formally  to  the  corporation,  (v)  and 
it  has  been  contended  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  notice  is 
enough  if  given  to  any  director,  or  any  member  of  a  board  which 
manages  the  affairs  of  the  corporation,  (w)  We  consider  these 
views  extreme  and  inaccurate ;  and  should  state  as  the  rule  of 
law  that  a  notice  to  a  corporation  binds  it,  only  when  made  to  an 
officer,  whether  president,  director,  trustee,  committee-man,  or 
otherwise,  whose  situation  and  relation  to  the  corporation  imply 
that  he  has  authority  to  act  for  the  corporation  in  the  particular 
matter  in  regard  to  which  the  notice  is  given,  (a;)  ^ 

oral  rule  of  law  is    that   notice   to  tlie  rule.    Certainly,  Ma3'hcw  v.  Eames,  3  B. 

principal   is    notice    to   all    his    agents.  &  C.  601,  cited  by  the  learned  chief  jus- 

Mayhew  v.  Eames ;  at  any  rate  if  there  tice,  is  very  far   from   establishing   the 

liff  reasonable  time,  as  there  was  here,yo;-  naked  doctrine  that  notice  to  the  princi- 

the  prinrijial  to  communicate  that  notice  to  i)al  is  notice  eo  instanti  to  the  agent. 

his  af/ents,  lie/ore  the  event  ichich  i-aises  the  (v)  Louisiana  Bank  v.  Scnecal,  13  La. 

question    liappens.    .    .    .    We    have    been  525. 

pressed  witl)  the  inconvenience  of  requir-  {»•)  Bank  of   U.   S.  v.  Davis,  2  Hill 

ing  every  trading  company  to  communi-  (N.  Y.),  451;  North  River  Bank  v.  Ay- 

cate  to  their  agents  everywhere  whatever  mar,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  262. 

notices   they  may  receive;    but   the   ar-  (t)   See  Bowles  v.  Page,  3  C.  B.  16; 

gument   ab   inconrenienti   is    seldom    enti-  Porter  v.  Bank  of  Rutland,  19  Vt.  410, 

tied   to   mucli   weight   in  deciding  legal  425 ;    Fulton   Bank    r.   N.    Y.    &c.  Co.  4 

questions;  and,  if  it  were,  other   incon-  Paige,  127;  National  Bank  v.  Norton,  1 

veniences  of  a  more  serious  nature  wouUl  Hill  (N.  Y.),575;  New  Hope,  &c.  Co.  v. 

obviously  grow  out  of  a  different   deci-  The  Phoeni.x  Bank,  3   Comst.   156,  166 ; 

sion."     It  may  be  considered  worth  in-  Banks  v.  i\Iartin,  1  Met.  308;  Story  on 

quiry  whether  the  clause  we  have  put  Agency,  §§  140  a,  140  d. 
in  italics  is  not  an  essential  part  of  the 

1  Thus  if  a  director  of  a  bank,  who  acts  for  the  bank  in  discounting  a  note, 
knows  that  the  note  was  procured  by  fraud,  the  bank  is  affected  with  his  knowledge. 
Security  Bank  v.  Cushman,  121  Mass.  4fl0 ;  but  a  director  who  offers  a  note,  which 
he  owns,  to  his  bank  for  sale  or  discount,  if  he  does  not  act  with  the  board  in 
making  the  discount,  is  regarded  as  a  stranger  in  so  doing,  and  docs  not  affect  the 
bank  witli  his  knowledge  of  a  defect  in  its  consideration.  Hightstown  Bank  v. 
Christopher,  11  Vroom,  435;  Atlantic  Bank  v.  Savery,  82  N.  Y.  291.  See  Smith  v. 
Ayer,  101  U.  S.  820  ;  West  Boston  Sav.  Bank  v.  Thornpson,  124  Mass.  506;  Barnes 
V.  Trenton  Gas  Co.  12  C.  E.  Green,  33.  The  knowledge  of  an  insurance  agent  who 
issues  the  policy,  of  incumbrances  on  the  property  omitted  from  the  application, 
will  not  prevent  a  recovery.  Harriman  r.  Queen  Ins.  Co.  49  Wis.  71.  Likewise  an 
insurance  agent's  failure  to  state  the  nature  of  an  applicant's  interest.  Miaghan  v. 
Hartford  Ins.  Co.  24  Hun,  59.  See  further  as  to  corporation  agents,  Slater  v.  Irwin, 
38  la.  261. 

83 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK    I. 


SECTION  XI. 

OF   SHIPMASTERS. 

A  master  of  a  ship  has,  by  the  pohcy  of  the  law-merchant,  some 
authority  not  usually  implied  in  other  cases  of  general 
*  78  *  agency,  (y)  Thus,  he  may  borrow  money,  if  the  exigen- 
cies and  necessities  of  his  position  require  it,  and  make  his 
owner  liable,  and  pledge  the  ship  (by  bottomry  for  the  most  part) 
for  the  repayment,  (z)  But  this  authority  does  not  usually 
extend  to  cases  where  the  principal  can  personally  act,  as  in  the 
home  port,  (a)  or  in  a  port  where  the  owner  has  a  specific  agent 
for  this  purpose,  (5)i  and  by  parity  of  reason  not  in  a  port  so 
near  the  owner's  home  that  he  may  be  consulted,  without  incon- 
venience and  injurious  delay,  (c)  So,  too,  under  such  circum- 
stances, he  may,  without  any  special  authority,  sell  the  property 
intrusted  to  him,  in  a  case  of  extreme  necessity,  and  in  the 
exercise  of  a  sound  discretion.  Nor  need  this  necessity  be  actual^ 
in  order  to  justify  the  master  and  make  the  sale  valid.  If  the 
ship  was  in  a  peril,  which,  as  estimated  from  all  the  facts  then 
within  his  means  of  knowledge,  was  imminent,  and  made  it  the 
only  prudent  course  to  sell  the  ship  as  she  was,  without  further 
endeavors  to  get  her  out  of  her  dangerous  position,  this  is  enough, 
and  the  sale  is  justified  and  valid,  although  the  purchasers 
succeed  in  saving  her,  and  events  prove  that  this  might  have  been 
done  by  the  master.     But  it  must  be  a  case  where  a  sudden  and 

(.y)  Whether  an  action  maybe  main-  (a)  Lister  v.  Baxter,  Stra.  605;  Pat- 

tained     against     an     owner,     wiiich     is  ton    v.    Tiic   Randolph,    Gilp.  457 ;  Ship 

grounded  on  tlie  exorcise  of  this  pecu-  Lavinia  v.  Barclay,  1   Wash.  C.  C.  49 ; 

liar  and  extraordinary  authority  by  one  Lord  Abinrjer,  Arthur  v.  Barton,  6  M.  & 

who  was  not  the  master  on  tlie  register,  W.  138. 

hut  by   appointment  of  the   owner  had  {!>)  Pritchard  v.  Schooner  Lady  Hora- 

virtually    acted   as    master,   qucere:    see  tia,  Bee,  Ad.  167. 

Stonehouse   v.    Gent,   2    Q.   B.   431,   n.;  (c)  Johns    v.    Simons,   2   Q.    B.   425; 

Smith  V.  Davenport,  34  Me.  520.  Arthur  v.  Barton,  6  M.  &  W.  138  ;  Mac- 

(z)  Barnard  V.  Bridgeman,  Moore, 018;  kintosh  r.  Mitcheson,  4  Exch.  175;  Bel- 

Weston  V.  Wright,  7  M.  &  W.  300;  Ar-  don   (-•.    Campbell,   6   Exch.    886,    where 

thur   V.   Barton,  6  M.  &   W.  138;    The  Robinson  ».  Lyall,  7  Price,  592,  was  ques- 

Gratitudine,  3  Rob.  Ad.  240  ;  Stainbank  tioned. 
V.  Fenning,  11   C.  B.  51  ;  13  C.  B.  n.  s. 
418;  The  Fortitude,  3  Sumner,  228. 

^  Gunn  V.  Roberta,  L.  R.  9  C.  V.  331. 

84 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  79 

entire  change  of  wind  or  weather,  or  some  other  favoralile  cir- 
cumstance which  no  one  at  the  time  could  have  rationally 
expected,  became  the  means  of  her  safety  ;  for  although  the 
powers  and  duty  of  the  master  should  not  depend  on  mat- 
ters which  are  alike  beyond  control  and  foresight,  (t?)  *  it  *  79 
is  still  certain  that  the  sale  of  a  ship  by  the  master  can  be 
justified  and  made  valid  only  by  a  strict  necessity. 

The  general  rights  and  duties  of   ship-masters  are  more  fully 
considered  in  our  chapter  on  the  Law  of  Shipping. 


SECTION  XII. 

OP   AN    ACTION    AGAINST   AN    AGENT   TO    DETERMINE   THE  EIGHT   OP 

A    PRINCIPAL. 

It  is  a  rule  of  law  in  respect  to  all  agencies,  that  where  money 
is  paid  to  one  as  agent,  to  which  another  as  principal  has  color  of 
right,  the  right  of  the  principal  cannot  be  tried  in  an  action 
brought  by  the  party  paying  the  money  against  the  agent  as  for 
money  had  and  received  to  the  use  of  such  part}' ;  but  such 
action  should  be  brought  against  the  principal,  (e)  i     *  For    *  80 

(d)  The  Brig  Sarah  Ann,  2  Sumner,  the  principal,  or  done  something  equiva- 

206 ;  Hunter  ;;.  Parker,  7  M.  &  W.  322.  lent   to  it ;   and   the  mere    entering  the 

{p)  Baraford   v.    Shuttlewortli,    11  A.  amount  to   the   credit  of   the  principal, 

&E.  926;  Sadler  t'.  Evans,  4  Burr.  198-4 ;  or    making    a    rest,    is    not    equivalent 

Horsfall  v.  Handley,  8  Taunt.  136;  Cos-  to   payment  over.      BuUer   v.  Harrison, 

tigan  V.  Newland,  12  Barb.  456.     Yet  if  Cowp.  565 ;  Cox  v.  Prentice,  3  M.  &  Sel. 

notice  not  to  pay  over  has  been  given.  344.     But   upon  these  cases  Mr.   Smith 

then    the    agent    may    be   sued.      Lord  comments  as   follows :    "  It  will   be   ob- 

il/ans;?r/c?,  Sadler  r.  Evans,  4  Burr.  1986;  served    tliat    in    neitlier  of    these   cases 

Edwards    v.    Hodding,     5    Taunt.    815;  could  the  principal  himself  ever  by  pos- 

Hearsey  v.  Pruyn,  7  Johns.  179;  Elliott  sibility  have  claimed  to  retain  the  money 

V.  Swartwout,  10  Pet.  137  ;  Bend  r.  Hoyt,  for   a  single  instant,  had  it  reached  his 

13   id.   263;    La   Farge   v.    Kneeland,   7  hands,  the  payment  having  been  made 

Cowen,   456.     See,   however,    as    to  the  by  the  plaintiff  under   pure  mistake  of 

liability   of   collectors    of    the   customs,  facts,  and  being  void  (ib  initio,  as  soon  as 

Cary   v.   Curtis,  3    How.   236.  —  And  in  that  mistake  was  discovered,  so  tliat  the 

some  cases   it   has  been  held  that  even  agent   would   not    have   been    estopped 

without  notice,  the  agent  may  be  held  from  denying  his  principal's  title  to  the 

liable  for  money  had  and  received,  if  he  money,  any  more  than  the  factor  of  J. 

have  not  actually  paid  over  the  money  to  S.  of  Jamaica,  who  has  received  money 

1  But  Shipherd  v.  I^nderwood,  55  111.  475,  decided  that  if  a  seller  of  real  estate 
intended  to  palm  off  a  defective  title  on  a  purcliaser,  the  latter  might  sue  the  seller's 
agent  to  recover  back  the  deposit  money  before  it  was  paid  over  to  the  seller, 
although  the  purchaser  knew  the  agent's  capacity. 

85 


80 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


a  party  who  deals  with  an  agent  (acting  as  such,  and  within 
the  scope  of  his  authority)  has,  in  general,  no  right  to  separate 
him  from  his  principal,  and  hold  him  liable  in  his  personal  capa- 
city. The  agent  owes  an  account  of  his  actions  to  his  principal, 
and  that  he  may  be  able  to  render  that  account,  the  law,  except 
under  special  circumstances,  refuses  to  impose  upon  him  a  duty 
to  any  third  party. 

We  here  close  all  that  was  proposed  to  be  said  of  agents  as 
parties  to  contracts  entered  into  by  them  in  their  representative 
capacity.  The  relation  between  agent  and  principal  constitutes 
itself  a  distinct  contract,  and  the  considerations  growing  out  of  it 
might,  in  a  strictly  accurate  division,  find  a  place  in  that  part  of 
this  work  which  treats  of  the  Subject-Matter  of  contracts.  But  it 
has  been  deemed  expedient  in  this  instance,  as  in  some  others,  to 


paid  to  him  under  tlic  supposition  of  iiis 
employer  being  J.  S.  of  Trinidad,  would 
be  estopped  from  retaining  tliat  money 
against  his  employer,  in  order  to  return 
it  to  the  person  who  paid  it  to  him.  Be- 
sides which,  in  Buller  v.  Harrison,  had 
the  agent  paid  the  money  he  received 
from  the  underwriter  in  discharge  of  the 
foul  loss,  over  to  his  principal,  he  would 
have  rendered  himself  an  instrument  of 
fraud,  which  no  agent  can  be  obliged  to 
do.  ICxcept  in  such  cases  as  these,  the 
ma.xiin,  resjiomleal,  suj)crior,  has  been  ap- 
plied, and  the  agent  lield  responsible  to 
no  one  but  his  princii)al."  Merc.  Law, 
B.  1,  c.  5,  §  7.  In  Snowdon  v.  Davis,  1 
Taunt.  359,  a  sheriff  had  issued  a  warrant 
on  mesne  process,  to  distrain  the  goods 
of  A;  the  bailiff  levied  the  debt  upon 
the  goods  of  B,  and  ])aid  it  over.  Held, 
that  money  liad  and  received  would  lie 
against  the  bailiff.  Mansjidd,  C.  J., 
said  :  "  The  baililf  pays  the  money  over 
to  the  sheriff,  and  the  sheriff  to  the  ex- 
chequer, and  it  is  objected,  that  as  it  has 
been  paid  over,  the  action  for  money  had 
and  received  does  not  lie  against  the 
bailiff;  and  this  is  compared  to  the  case 
of  an  agent,  and  the  authorities  are  cited 
of  Sadler  v.  Evans ;  Campbell  v.  Hall,  1 
Cowp.  204  ;  Buller  v.  Harrison,  2  id.  505, 
and  several  others.  In  the  case  of  Sad- 
ler ('.  ICvans,  the  money  was  paid  to  the 
agent  of  Lady  Windsor,  for  Lady  Wind- 
sor's use  ;  in  that  of  Buller  v-  Harrison, 
the  money  was  paid  to  the  broker,  ex- 
pressly for  the  benefit  of  the  assured.  In 
Pond  r.  Un(lerwo(^d,  tlie  money  was  paid 
for  the  use  of  tiie  administrator.  Can  it 
in  this  case  be  said  with  ;iny  ])r()iiricty, 
that  the  money  was  paid  to  tlie  bailiil  for 

80 


the  purpose  of  paying  it  to  the  sheriff,  or 
to  the  intent  that  the  sheriff  might  pay  it 
into  the  exchequer  ?  The  i)laintiff  pays 
it  under  the  terror  of  process,  to  redeem 
his  goods,  not  with  an  intent  that  it 
should  be  delivered  over  to  any  one  in 
particular."  But  this  case  has  been  re- 
garded by  high  authority  as  establishing 
a  stronger  doctrine  than  that  on  which 
Sir  James  Mansfield  appears  to  have 
placed  it.  In  Smith  v.  Sleap,  12  M.  & 
W.  688,  Parke,  B.,  referring  to  Snowdon 
V.  Davis,  said  :  "  It  was  there  held  that 
a  ])arty  who  had  received  money  wrong- 
fully could  not  set  up  as  a  defence  tiiat 
he  had  received  it  for,  and  i)aid  it  over 
to,  a  tiiird  person."  In  the  same  case 
a  dictum  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer  is 
reported,  to  the  effect  that  a  payment  to 
A,  expressly  as  the  agent  of  B, for  the 
purpose  of  redeeming  goods  wrongfully 
detained  by  B,  and  a  receipt  by  A  ex- 
pressly for  B,  would  make  a  case  upon 
which  an  action  against  A  for  money 
had  and  received,  could  be  maintained. 
And  in  the  case  of  Parker  v.  Bristol  and 
I'.xeter  Railway,  0  Exch.  702,  where  the 
defendants  had  refused  to  deliver  the 
plaintiff's  goods  until  he  ])aid  an  excess 
over  tlie  proper  amount  due  for  freight 
money,  it  was  lield  that  he  might  main- 
tain an  action  to  recover  this  excess  from 
the  defendants,  although  they  received  a 
portion  of  it  only  as  agents  for  the  Great 
Western  Railway  Company  ;  the  princi- 
ple being  "  that  an  action  for  money  had 
and  received  lies  to  recover  back  n)oney 
which  has  been  obtained  through  compul- 
sion even  although  it  has  been  received 
by  an  agent  who  acted  for  the  princi- 
pal." 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  81 

sacrifice  logical  order  to  the  convenience  of  the  reader ;  and  such 
observations  as  seem  to  be  required  by  the  contract  of  Agency, 
properly  so  called,  are  subjoined  in  the  following  section. 


SECTION  XIII. 

THE  RIGHTS   AND    OBLIGATIONS   OP   PRINCIPAL   AND   AGENT   AS  TO 

EACH   OTHER. 

An  agent  with  instructions  is  bound  to  regard  them  in  every 
point ;  nor  can  he  depart  from  them,  without  making  him- 
self *  responsible  for  the  consequences.  (<;)  ^  If  he  have  no  *  81 
instructions,  or  indistinct  or  partial  instructions,  his  duty 
will  depend  upon  the  intention  and  understanding  of  the  parties. 
This  may  be  gathered  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  es- 
pecially, from  the  general  custom  and  usage  in  relation  to  that 
kind  of  business.  Qi')  But  he  cannot  defend  himself  by  showing 
a  conformity  to  usage,  if  he  has  disobeyed  positive  instructions. 

(9)  Leverick  v.  Meigs,  1  Cowen,  645  ;  a  severe  application  of  tlie  general  rule, 

Marshall,    C.    J.,   Manella    v.    Barry,    3  see  Hays  v.  Stone,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  128. 

Cranch,  415,  439;  Kingston  r.  Kincaid,  (/()  Marzetti  v.  Williams,  1  13.  &  Ad. 

1  Wash.  C.   C.  454;    Kundle  v.   Moore,  415;  Sutton  v.  Tatham,  10  A.  &  E.  27; 

8  Johns.  Cas.  36 ;  Loraine  v.  Cartwright.  Sykes  v.  Giles,  5  M.  &  W.  645  ;  Kingston 

3  Wash.  C.  C.  151 ;  Ferguson  v.  Porter,  3  v.  Wilson,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  315.  —  And  if 

Fla.   27.  —  "And    no   motive    connected  the   agent  is  employed  to  act  in   some 

with  the  interest  of  the  principal,  how-  particular  business  or  trade  he  may  bind 

ever   lionestly   entertained,    or   however  liis  principal  by  following  the  usages  of 

wisely  adopted,  can  excuse  a  breach  of  that    trade,   whether    the    principal    is 

the    instructions."       Washington,    J.,    in  aware  of  them  or  not.     Pollock  v.  Sta- 

Courcier  v.  Ritter,  4  Wash.'  C.   C.    549,  bles,  12   Q.  B.  765  ;  Bayliffe   v.   Butter- 

551 ;   but  compare   Forrestier    v.  Board-  worth,    1    Exch.   425 ;    there    Parke,   B., 

man,  1    Story,  43.  —  If  in  obedience  to  distinguishing   the   case   of    Bartlett    v. 

the    instructions,   the   agent   do   an    act  Pentland,  10  B.  &  C.  7G0,  said  :  "  That 

which    is    illegal   in    fact,   though    not  however  is  a  different  question  from  the 

clearly   in   itself   a  breach   of   law,   nor  present,    which  is  one   of  contract.     In 

known  by  the  agent  to  be  so,  he  is  enti  the  case  of  a  contract  which  a  person  or- 

tled  to  be  indemnified  by  the  principal  dcrs  another  to  make  for  him,  he  is  bound 

for  tlie  consequences.     Betts  r.  Gibbins,  by  that  contract  if  it  is  made  in  the  usual 

2  A.  &  E.  57  ;  Adamson  v.  Jarvis,  4  Bing.  way." 
66,  72 ;  Ives  v.  Jones,  3  Ired.  L.  538.     For 

1  Thus  where  the  security  of  payment  was  to  be  "unquestionably  good,"  and  the 
purchaser's  notes  were  worthless,  Robinson  Machine  Works  v.  Vorse,  52  la.  207  ; 
Clark  v.  Roberts,  26  Mich.  506 ;  or  the  agent  takes  insufficient  or  worthless  security, 
Owcnsboro'  Bank  v.  Western  Bank,  13  Busli,  526.  See  Nicolai  v.  Lyon,  8  Oreg.  56. 
—  On  the  other  hand,  a  principal  must  make  good  an  agent's  losses  in  fulfilling  his 
instructions,  as  by  a  sale  of  worthless  bonds.  Maitland  v.  Martin,  86  Pcnn.  St.  120; 
or  where  the  agent  was  obliged  to  allow  for  the  defective  packing  of  cotton,  Beach 
V.  Branch,  57  Ga.  362. 

87 


*  82  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

If  loss  ensue  from  his  disregard  to  his  instructions,  he  must 
sustain  it ;  if  profit,  he  cannot  retain  it,  but  it  belongs  to  his 
principal,  (i) 

A  principal  discharges  his  agent  from  responsibility  for  devia- 
tion from  his  instructions,  when  he  accepts  the  benefit  of  his 
act.  (^)  ^    He  may  reject  the  transaction  altogether ;  (?)  and 

*  82    *  if  he  advanced  money  on  goods  which  his  agent  purchased 

in  violation  of  his  authority,  he  is  not  bound  to  return  the 
goods  to  the  agent  when  he  repudiates  the  sale,  but  has  his  lien  on 
them,  and  may  hold  them  as  the  property  of  the  agent,  (w)  But 
he  must  reject  the  transaction  at  once,  and  decisively,  as  soon  as 
fully  acquainted  with  it.  For  if  he  delays  doing  this,  that  he  may 
have  his  chance  of  making  a  profit,  or  if  he  performs  acts  of  own- 
ership over  the  property,  he  accepts  it,  and  confirms  the  doings  of 
the  agent,  (w) 

The  question  has  arisen,  whether  a  principal  is  bound  by  the 
act  of  an  agent,  who  executes  his  commission  in  part  only ;  as  if 
being  directed  and  authorized  to  buy  two  houses,  he  buys  one 
only ;  or  to  buy  fifty  shares  of  stock,  he  buys  twenty-five ;  or  to 
buy  one  hundred  bales  of  cotton,  he  buys  fifty.  It  has  been  said 
that  the  principal  is  bound  by  the  partial  execution  of  the  agent's 
authority,  (o)  But  it  is  plain  that  cases  which  present  this  ques- 
tion may  differ  essentially.  If  one  is  made  agent  to  purchase  a 
lot  of  woodland  and  a  saw-mill,  and  purchases  either  alone,  it 
would  be  a  hardship  upon  the  principal  to  be  compelled  to  take 
that,  when  it  might  be  nearly  valueless  to  him  without  the  other. 
But  if  the  authority  which  he  gave  his  agent  to  buy  both,  was  in 
such  a  form  that  the  seller  of  one,  after  due  inquiry,  was  perfectly 

(0  Catlin  r.  Bell,  4  Camp.  184;  Park-  Ambl.   740;    Vanada  v.   Hopkins,    1   J. 

ist  y.  Alexander,  IJolms.  Ch.  394;  Segar  J.  Marsh.  285,  294;  Sugdcn  on  Powers, 

V.  Edwards,  11  Leigh,  213.  ch.    9,  §  8. —  And  in   some  cases  it  has 

(k)   Clarke  v.  Perrier,   2  Freem.   48;  been  held  «/ A/fc  that  an  agent  transccnd- 

Prince  y.  Clark,  1  B.  &  C.  186.  ing  his  authority  in  part,  binds  liis  prin- 

(/)  Koe  V.  Prideaux,  10  East,  158.  —  eij)al  for  the  part  which  was  performed 

If,  however,  an  agent  has  done  more  than  in  accordance  with  the  authority.     Gor- 

lie  was  authorized  to  do,  the  execution,  don  v.  Buchanan,  5  Yerg.  71 ;  Johnson  v. 

though  void  as   to   the   excess,  may  be  Blasdale,  1  Sm.  &  M.  17.  —  See  Wintle  u. 

held  good  for  tlie  rest,  at  least  in  equity.  Crowther,  1  Cr.  &  J.  31G. 

But  it  is  necessary  in  such  a  case   that  (m)  Lord  Ilardwickr,  Cornwall  v.  Wil- 

the   boundaries  between  the  excess    and  son,  1  Yes.  Sen.  510;  Lord  Eldun,  Kemp 

the   execution   of   the  power  should    be  v.  Pryor,  7  Ves.  240,  247. 

clearly     distinguishable.       Sir      Thowns  (n)  Prince  v.  Clark,  1    B.  &  C.  186; 

Clarke,   V.  C,  Alexander    v.  Alexander,  Cornwall  v.  Wilson,  1  Ves.  Sen.  509. 

2   Ves.    Sen.  644 ;   Campbell  v.   Leach,  (o)  Gordon  v.  Buchanan,  5  Yerg.  81. 

1  Or  ratifies  the  same,  Bray  v.  Gunn,  53  Ga.  144. 


CH,  III.]  AGENTS.  *  83 

justified  in  believing  the  agent  authorized  to  buy  either  separately, 
the  principal  should  be  held.  We  should  say,  that  the  principal 
might  generally  be  held ;  but  would  not  be,  where  he  could  show 
that  the  things  embraced  wiiliin  the  authority  he  gave  were  united 
in  that  authority,  and  in  his  intention,  and  that  it  would  be  a  detri- 
ment to  him  to  take  a  part  only. 

Some  conflict  appears  to  exist  as  to  the  right  of  an  agent  to 
delegate  his  authority.  On  the  one  hand,  the  general  principle, 
that  delegatus  non  jjotest  delegare,  is  certain.  (|))  An  agent 
can  *  do  for  his  principal  only  that  which  his  principal  au-  *  83 
thorizes  ;  and  if  the  principal  appoint  an  agent  to  act  for  him 
as  his  representative  in  any  particular  business,  this  agent  has  not 
thereby  a  right  to  make  another  person  the  representative  of  his 
principal.  The  employment  and  trust  are  personal ;  they  may 
rest  on  some  ground  of  personal  preference  and  confidence,  and 
on  the  knowledge  which  the  principal  has  of  his  agent's  ability, 
and  the  belief  he  has  of  his  integrity.  But  if  the  agent,  merely 
by  virtue  of  his  agency,  may  substitute  one  person  in  his  stead,  he 
may  another,  or  any  other,  and  thus  compel  the  principal  to  be 
represented  by  one  whom  he  does  not  know,  or  be  bound  by  obli- 
gations cast  upon  him  by  one  he  does  know,  and  because  he  knows 
him  would  refuse  to  employ.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  princi- 
pal may,  if  he  chooses,  give  this  very  power  to  his  agent,  (q)     In 

ip)  Combe's  Case,  9  Rep.  75  b,  7G  a.  —  Ess  v.  Truscott,  2  M.  &  TV.  385.  —  A  bro- 

This    maxim    has    frequent    application  ker  cannot  delegate  liis  autliority.     Hen- 

in  cases  of  powers.     Ingram  v.  Ingram,  derson    v.    Barnewall,    1    Y.    &  J.   387 ; 

2  Atk.  88;  Alexander   v.   Alexander,   2  Cockran  v.  Irlam,  2  M.  &  Sel.  301,  n. — 

Ves.    Sen.    043 ;    Hamilton   v.    Koyse,  2  Nor  can  a  factor.     Solly  v.  Rathbone,  2 

Sch.  &  L.  330.     A  notice  to  quit  given  by  M.  &  Sel.  298;  Catlin  v.  Bell,  4  Camp, 

an   agent  of   an  agent,  is  not   sufficient  183.  —  A  distinction,   however,  is  to  be 

without  a  recognition  by  the  principal,  taken  between  the  emploj'mcnt  of  a  ser- 

Doe  V.  Robinson,  3  Bing.  N.  C.    G77. —  vant  and  the  delegation  of  the  authority. 

An  attachment  tor  non-payment  of  costs  An  agent,  like  another  person,  may  act 

cannot  be  supported  by  a  demand  of  the  by  the  hand  of  a  servant  as  well  as  by 

costs  by  a  third   person,  authorized  by  his  own  hand,  in  cases   where  the  act  is 

the  attorney  to  receive  them.     Clark  v.  merely    physical,  or   where   mind  enters 

Dignum,  3  M.  &  W.  319.  —  In  an  action  into  it  so  little  that  it  would  be  absurd  to 

on  an  agreement  for  the  sale  of  goods,  at  say  that  the  difference  between  one  mind 

a  valuation   to  be  made  by  A,  the  issue  and  another  could  be  of  any  moment, 

was,  wliether  a  valuation  was  made  by  Lord   Ellenborough,    Mason   v.   Joseph,    1 

A.     It  appeared  that  tlie  goods  were  in  Smith,  40G.     See  also  Powell  v.  Tuttlc,  3 

fact  valued  by  B,  A's  clerk.     Hehl,  that  Comst.  39G ;    Moor  v.   Wilson,  G  Foster 

the  defendant  was  not  bound  by  it,  unless  (N.  H.),  332;  Comm.  Bank  of  Penn.  v. 

it  were  shown  that  it  was  agreed  between  Union  Bank  of  N.  Y.,  1  Kern.  203.     See 

the  parties  that  B's  valuation  should  be  also  Williams  v.  Woods,  IG  Md.  220. 
taken  as  A's;  and   that  the  fact  of  the  (7)  Palliser   v.    Ord,  Bunb.    IGG.  —  A 

defendant's  seeing  B  valuing,  and  making  power  cojipled  with  an  interest,  givcu  to  A 

no  obje(Hion  imtil  Btold  him  the  amount,  and  his  assigns,  passes  with  the  interest  to 

was  not    evidence   of    such  agreement.  A's  devisee,  to  the  executor  of  that  de- 

89 


*  84  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

the  common  printed  forms  of  letters  of  attorney,  we  usually  find 
the  phrase,  "  with  power  of  substitution,"  and  after  this  a  promise 
to  ratify  whatever  the  attorney,  "  or  his  substitute,"  may  lawfully 
do  in  the  premises.  That  the  agent  has  this  power,  when  it  is 
given  to  him  in  this  way,  cannot  be  doubted.  But  it  must  be  as 
certain  that  the  principal  may  confer  the  same  power  other- 

*  8-i    wise ;  and  not  only  by  other  *  language,  but  without  any 

express  words  whatever,  (r)  And  there  are  many  acts 
which  an  agent  must  necessarily  do  through  the  agency  of  other 
persons,  and  which  are  valid  when  so  done,  (s)  If  a  principal 
constitutes  an  agent  to  do  a  business  which  obviously  and  from  its 
very  nature  cannot  be  done  by  the  agent  otherwise  than  through 
a  substitute,  or  if  there  exists  iin  relation  to  that  business  a  known 
and  established  usage  of  substitution,  in  either  case  the  principal 
would  be  held  to  have  expected  and  have  authorized  such  substi- 
tution, {t)  1  So  too,  where  an  agent  without  authority  appoints  a 
substitute,  the  principal  may,  either  by  words  or  acts,  so  confirm 
and  ratify  such  substitution,  as  to  give  to  it  the  same  force  and 
effect  as  if  it  had  been  originally  authorized,  (w) 

A  substitute  of  an  agent  who  had  no  authority  to  appoint  him, 
cannot  be  held  as  the  agent  of  the  original  principal,  but  is  only 
the  agent  of  the  agent  who  employs  him,  (v)  ^  and  avIio  is  accord- 
ingly his  principal ;  and  the  person  so  employed  is  bound  only  to 

visce,  and  to  the  assignee  of  the  devisee,  quantities,  which  work  was   to  be   paid 

&c. ;  for  tlie  word  assigns  includes  both  for  by  tlie  successful  competitor  for  the 

assignees  in  law    and  in  fact.     How  ?'.  building  contract ;  the  jury  found  a  usage 

Whitefield,  1    Vent.  /'."W,   IV-i'd ;    s.   c.    as  for   arcliitects   to   have  their   quantities 

How  V.  Whitebanck,  1  Freem.  476.  made  out  by  surveyors  :  it  was  held  that 

(/•)  Moon  V.  Guardians  of  Whitney  the  plaintilt  was  entitled  to  recover  corn- 
Union,  P,.  Bing.  N.  C.  814;  Gillis  v.  Bailey,  pensation  from  the  defendants.  Moon  v. 
1  Foster  (N.  H.),  149.  Guardians  of  Whitney  Union,  3  Binii.  N. 

(s)  Rossiter  v.  Trafalgar  Life  A.  A.,  C.  814  ;  Ledou.v  v.  Goza,  4  La.  An.  KiO. 
27  Beav.  377.  («)   Timlal,  C.  J.,  Doe  v.  Robinson,   3 

(<)  An  architect  employed  by  defend-  Bing.    N.  C.  677,679;  Mason  v.  Joseph, 

ants  to  draw  a  specification  for  a  build-  1  Smith,  400. 

ing     projjosed    to    be    erected,    himself  (c)   ('obb  ?;.  Becke,  6  Q.  B.  930;  Rob- 
employed  the  plaintiff  to  make  out  the  bins  v.  Fennell,  11  id.  248. 

1  An  insurance  agent  may  authorize  his  clerk  to  do  various  acts,  as  sign  and 
issue  policies  and  receive  premiums.  Bodine  ?;.  Ex(;hange  Ins.  Co.  51  N.  Y.  117; 
Grady  v.  Am.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  GO  Mo.  IIG.  See  also  Norwich  Univ.  v.  Denny,  47  Vt. 
13  ;  Chase  v.  Ostrom,  GO  Wis.  040. 

2  In  such  a  case  tlie  agent  is  responsible  for  the  sub-ngent's  acts:  as  where  a  col- 
lection agency's  attorney  lost  a  note  sent  to  him  for  collection,  Swett  v.  Southworth, 
12')  Mass.  417;  Morgan  ;•.  'IVner.  8:1  I'cnn.  St.  805;  or  fiiiled  to  pay  over  collections, 
Bradstreet  r.  Everson,  72  Penn.  St.  124;  set-  Sanger  v.  Dun,  47  Wis.  015;  or  a  bank 
sent  a  draft  for  collection  to  a  Ijaiikcr  who  r('C('ive<l  payment  and  failed  before  mak- 
ing a  remittance.     Kent  v.  Dawson  Bank,  13  Blalchford,  237. 

90 


CH,  III.]  AGENTS.  *  85 

his  immediate  employer,  and  can  look  only  to  him  for  compensa- 
tion, (z^)  1  But  a  substitute  appointed  by  an  agent,  who  h'ls  this 
power  of  substitution,  becomes  the  agent  of  the  original  princij)al, 
and  may  bind  him  by  his  acts,  and  is  responsible  to  him  as  his 
agent,  and  may  look  to  him  for  compensation. 

An  agent  is  bound  to  great  diligence  and  care  for  his  princi- 
pal ;  not  the  utmost  possible,  but  all  that  a  reasonable  man  under 
similar  circumstances,  would  take  of  his  own  affairs,  {x}  ^  And 
where  the  instructions  arc  not  specific,  or  do  not  cover  the 
*  whole  case,  there,  as  we  have  already  stated,  he  is  to  con-  *  85 
form  to  established  usage,  as  that  which  was  expected  from 
him.  (_y)  This  usage  may  be  generally  proved  by  ordinary  means; 
but  in  some  instances,  as  In  relation  to  negotiable  bills  and  notes, 
it  is  required  and  defined  by  the  law ;  and  here  it  must  be  followed 
precisely,  (s)     And  an  agent  is  bound  to  possess  and  exert  the 

{w)  Cleaves    v.    Stockwell,    33    Me.  bility  may  be  limited  by  the   particular 

341.  understanding  of  the  parties ;  as  for  in- 

(.t)  Co.  Litt.  89  a ;  Chapman  v.  Wal-  stance,    where    an    agent    dealing    with 

ton,  10  Bing.  57;    Lawler  v.   Keaquick,  negotiable  paper,  has  been  accustomed  to 

1  Johns.  Cas.  174 ;  Kingston  v.  Kincaid,  do   business   in   a  certain    way   different 

1  Wash.  C.   C.   4-54  ;    Babcock  v.   Orbi-  from  that  which  the  law  would  otherwise 

son,   25   Ind.    75.  —  Less    than   ordinary  require,  and  the  princij)al  enii)lo3'ing  him 

diligence  is  required  of  one  who  acts  as  may  from  the  circumstances  i)e  supposed 

agent    gratuitously;    unless    indeed    he  to  know  this;    Mills  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.  11 

hold  himself  out  as  a  person  exercising  Wheat.  431  ;   Allen  v.  Merchants  Bank, 

one  of  certain  privileged  professions  or  22  Wend.  215 ;    East  Iladdam  Bank   v. 

trades,  as  that    of    an    attorney.     Door-  Scovil,  12  Conn.  303.     And  an  agent  in- 

man  v.  Jenkins,  4  Nev.  &  M.  170,  s.  c.  2  trusted    with    a    negotiable    instrument, 

A.  &  E.  2-56;  Dartnall  v.  Howard,  4  B.  &  and  failing  to  fulfil  his  duty  with  respect 

C.  345.     See  infra,  n.  (a).  to  it,  is  only  liable  like  oilier  agents    to 

(v)  Ante,   p.  *  81,  note  (/;) ;  Wiltshire  the  extent  of  the  loss  he  has  caused,  and 

V.   Sims,  1   Camp.  258.  —  And  the  usage  docs  not  have  to  assume  the  responsibil- 

if  followed  (in  the  case  where  there  are  ities    which    the    law-nu'rchant    imposes 

no  express  instructions),  is  a  defence  to  upon     a     negligent    partij    to    the    bill, 

the    charge   of    negligence.      Russell   v.  Mars/id/J,    C.   J.,    Hamilton    v.    Cunning- 

Hankey,    6  T.  R.    12.      As  to    the    fac-  ham,  2  Brock.  367.     And  see  Van  Wart 

tor's  duty  to   insure,  see    Smith  ??.  Las-  v.  WonUoy,  3  B.  &.  C.  430,  and  Van  Wart 

celles,   2  T.  R.  189;   Tickei  v.  Short,  2  i;.  Smith,  1  Wend.  219.     An  agent,  acting 

Ves.  Sen.  239.  witli  ordinary  diligence,  is  not  liable  for 

(z)  Crawford  y.  Louisiana  State  Bank,  injuries  caused  by  his  mistake  in  a  doubt- 

1  Mnrt.  N.  s.  214;  Miranda  v.  City  Bank  ful  matter  of   law.     Mechanics  Bank  v. 

of  New  Orleans,  6  La.    740 ;    Smedes  v.  Merchants  Bank,  6  Met.  13. 
Utica  Bank,  20  Johns.  372.     Yet  this  lia- 

'  Thus  the  individual  members  of  a  band  whose  leader  contracted  to  play  at  a  fair 
must  look  to  the  leader  alone  for  their  pay.     Corbett  v.  Schumacker,  83  III.  403. 

2  On  this  principle,  a  broker  to  sell  raisins,  which  were  to  be  of  "fair  average 
quality  in  opinion  of  selling  broker,"  is  not  liable  if  they  turn  out  to  be  not  of  the 
requisite  qualitj'-,  Pappa  v.  Rose,  L.  R.  7  C.  V.  32,  525;  nor  are  stockbrokers  liable 
for  failure  to  take  security  for  the  return  of  a  deposit.  Glieen  r.  Johnson,  90  Benn. 
St.  38.  —  Where  a  princi])al  expresses  a  wish  for  "registered"  bonds,  l)ut  leaves  the 
broker  to  purcliase  "as  your  own  good  sense  dictates,"  the  broker  is  not  liable,  if  he 
a(;ts  in  good  faith,  for  a  loss  on  unregistered  bonds  purchased  by  him.  Matthews  v. 
FuUer,  123  Mass.  446. 

91 


86 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


skill  and  knowledge  necessary  for  the  proper  performance  of  the 
duties  which  he  undertakes,  (a) 

The  responsibility  of  an  agent,  whether  for  positive  misconduct, 
or  for  deviation  from  instructions,  is  not  measured  by  the  extent 

of  his  commission  or  compensation,  but  by  the  loss  or 
*  86    *  injury  which  he  may  cause  to  his  principal.  (5)  ^     And  in 

general,  a  verdict  against  a  principal  for  the  act  of  his  ser- 
vant, is  the  measure  of  the  damages  which  the  former  may 
recover  against  the  latter,  (c)  And  the  agent  is  responsible  if 
the  loss  could  not  have  happened  but  for  his  previous  misconduct, 
although  it   was   not  immediately  caused   by   it.  (t?)      But  the 


(«)  One  who  undertakes  to  act  in  a 
professional  or  other  clearly  defined  ca- 
pacity, as  that  of  carpenter,  blacksmith, 
or  the  like,  is  bound  to  exercise  the  skill 
appropriate  to  such  trade  or  profession ; 
and  this,  it  seems,  although  the  under- 
taking be  gratuitous.  Dartnall  r.  How- 
ard, 4  B.  &  C.  345 ;  Shiells  v.  Blackburne, 
1  H.  Bl.  161 ;  Bourne  v.  Diggles,  2  Chitt. 
311  ;  Tindul,  C.  J.,  Lamphier  v.  Phipos, 
8  C.  &  P.  479;  Denew  v.  Daverell,  3 
Camp.  451 ;  Leighton  v.  Sargent,  7  Fos- 
ter (N.  H.),  4G0.  In  Wilson  v.  Brett,  11 
M.  &  W.  113,  it  was  lirdd  that  a  person 
who  rides  a  horse  gratuitously  at  the 
owner's  request,  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing him  for  sale,  is  bound,  in  doing  so,  to 
use  such  skill  as  he  actually  possesses ; 
and  if  proved  to  be  a  person  conversant 
witli  and  skilled  in  horses,  he  is  equally 
liable  with  a  borrower  for  injury  done  to 
the  horse  while  riddi'U  by  him.  R-olfe,  B., 
said  :  "  The  distinction  I  intended  to  make 
was,  that  a  gratuitous  l)ailee  is  only 
bound  to  exercise  such  skill  as  he  pos- 
sesses, whereas  a  hirer  or  borrower  may 
reasonably  be  taken  to  re[)reseiit  to  the 
part}'  who  lets,  or  from  whom  he  bor- 
rows, that  he  is  a  person  of  comjietent 
skill.  If  a  person  more  skilled  knows 
that  to  be  dangerous  which  another  not 


so  skilled  as  he,  does  not,  surely  that 
makes  a  difference  in  the  liability.  I 
said  I  could  see  no  difference  between 
negligence  and  gross  negligence  —  that  it 
was  the  same  tiling,  with  the  addition  of 
a  vituperative  epithet ;  and  I  intended 
to  leave  it  to  the  jury  to  say  whether 
the  defendant,  being,  as  appeared  by  the 
evidence,  a  person  accustomed  to  the 
management  of  horses,  was  guilty  of  cul- 
pable negligence."  But  Parke,  B.,  only 
went  so  far  as  to  say  that,  "  In  the  case 
of  a  gratuitous  bailee,  where  his  j'rofession 
or  situation  is  swh  as  to  imply  the  /lossession 
of  competmt  skill,  he  is  equally  liable  for 
the  neglect  to  use  it."  See  post,  chapter 
on  Bailments,  section  II. 

(/()  Sivewright  v.  Richardson,  10  Law 
Times,  10 ;  Hamilton  v.  Cunningham,  2 
Brock.  350 ;  Arrott  r:  Brown,  6  Wliart.  9 ; 
Frothingham  r.  Everton,  12  N.  H.  239; 
Allen  V.  Suydam,  20  Wend.  321.  Yet  the 
principal  may  maintain  an  action  against 
the  agent  for  a  breach  of  the  contract  be- 
tween them,  and  recover  nominal  dam- 
ages, although  there  be  no  actual  loss. 
Marzetti  v.  Williams,  1  B.  &  Ad.  415; 
Frothingliam  r.  Everton,  12  X.  H.  2.39. 

(c)  Mainwaring  v.  Brandon,  8  Taunt. 
202 ;  s.  c.  2  Moore,  125. 

(d)  Davis  v.   Garrett,  6   Bing.   716; 


^  Thus  an  agent  cannot  recover  compensation  for  an  act  done  in  violation  of  his 
duty,  In  re  Owens,  Ir.  K.  7  Eq.  235,  424  ;  nor  contrary  to  instructions  in  the  absence  of 
ratification.  Iloyt  v.  Shipherd,  70  111.  309.  An  agent  procuring  insurance,  in  his 
own  name,  contrary  to  his  princi[)ars  orders,  thereby  invalidating  it,  is  liable  for 
actual  damages.  Sawyer  v.  Mayhew,  51  Me.  398.  But  it  has  been  held  that  if  a 
broker  employed  to  buy  as  cheap  as  possible  accepts,  without  the  knowledge  or 
sanction  of  his  principal,  a  coinmission  from  the  seller's  broker  under  an  arrange- 
ment but  for  which  the  i)rice  would  have  been  less,  he  is  liable  to  his  iirincijjal  for 
such  commission,  .Morison  c. 'I'homiison,  L.  U.  9  Q.  B.  480;  and  that  an  agent  to 
sell  a  note  and  Tiiortgage  who  does  not  disclose  an  offer  received  by  him,  but  subse- 
quently buys  them  himself  for  a  sum  less  than  the  offer,  must  account  to  his  princi- 
jjal  for  the  difference.     Mason  v.  Bauman,  02  111.  7G. 

92 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  87 

loss  must  be  capable  of  being  ascertained  with  reasonable  cer- 
tainty, (e) 

An  agent  may  not  dispute  the  title  of  his  principal.  This  is 
■well  established  as  a  general  rule ;  but  it  has  been  held  that  the 
agent  may  do  this,  if  the  principal  has  obtained  the  property  by 
fraud,  (ee) 

It  may  be  regarded  as  a  prevailing  principle  of  the  law,  that 
an  agent  must  not  put  himself,  during  his  agency,  in  a  position 
which  is  adverse  to  that  of  his  principal.  (/)  ^  For  even  if  the 
honesty  of  the  agent  is  unquestioned,  and  if  his  impartiality  be- 
tween his  own  interest  and  his  principal's  might  be  relied  upon, 
yet  the  principal  has  in  fact  bargained  for  the  exercise  of  all  the 
skill,  ability,  and  industry  of  the  agent,  and  he  is  entitled  to 
demand  the  exertion  of  all  this  in  his  own  favor.  (^)  This  prin- 
ciple is  recognized  to  some  extent  at  law ;  {h}  but  most  cases  of 
this  kind  come  before  courts  of  equity.  Thus,  an  attorney  may 
not  take  a  gift  from  his  client,  although  there  be  not  the  least 
suspicion  of  fraud,  (z)  ^  But  the  rule  is  applied  not  so  much 
to  those  who  act  as  servants,  or  instruments  for  some 
*  particular   thing,  as    to    persons    whose    employment    is    *  87 

Short  V.  Skipwith,  1  Brock.   103;   Mai-  Myl.  &C.  134;  Huguenin  r.  Baseley,  14 

lough  V.  Barber,  4  Camp.  150;  Park  r.  Ves.  273;  Woodhouse  v.  Meredith,  1  Jac. 

Hamond,  id.   344;   s.    c.  6  Taunt.  495;  &  W.  24;  Barker  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  2 

Smith  V.  Lascelles,  2  T.  R.  187  ;  Bell  v.  Mason,  369;  Church  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  1 

Cunningham,  3  Pet.  84,  85  ;  De  Tastett  id.  344 ;  Parkist  v.  Ale.xander,  1  Johns.  Ch. 

V.  Crousillat,  2  Wasli.  C.  C.  132  ;  Morris  394 ;  Shepherd  v.  Percy,  4  Martin  (y.  s.), 

V.  Summcrl,  id.  203.  267 ;  Crook  v.  Williams,  20  Penn.  St.  342  ; 

(e)  Webster  v.  De  Tastet,  7  T.  R.  157 ;  Coles  v.  Trecothick,  9  Ves.  234. 
The    Amiable    Nancy,   3    Wheat.    560;  (g)  Thompson  r.  Havelock,  1  Camp. 

Smith  V.  Condry,  1  How.  28;  Tidewater  527";  Diplock  v.  Blackburn,  3  id.  43. 
Canal  Co.  i-.  Archer,  9  G.  &  J.  479.  (h)  See  infra,  note  (o). 

(ee)  Hardman  v.  Wilcox,  9  Bing.  382,  (/)  Lord  Erskine,  C,  Wright  v.  Proud, 

n.  (a).  13  Ves.  138;  Montesquieu  v.  Sandys,  18 

(/)  Lees  V.  Nuttall,  2  Myl.  &  K.  819;  id.  308;  see  Ker  v.  Dungannon,  1  Dru. 

Knave  v.  Ternot,  16  La.  An.    1-32 ;  Lees  &  War.  542 ;  Middleton  v.  Welles,  4  Bro. 

V.  Nuttall,  1  Russ.  &  M.  53 ;  Dunbar  v.  P.  C.  245.     See  also  Cutts  v.  Salmon,  12 

Tredennick,  2  Ball  &  B.  319;  Norris  v.  E.  L.  &  E.  316;  Holman  v.  Loynes,  27  id. 

Le  Neve,  3  Atk.  38 ;  Taylor  v.  Salmon,  4  168  ;  Broughton  v.  Brougliton,  31  id.  687. 

1  Thus  the  agreement  of  a  railroad  agent  whose  duty  it  is  to  select  a  route,  to 
choose,  for  a  consideration  paid  to  himself,  a  particular  route,  is  void.  Ilolladay  v. 
Davis,  5  Oreg.  40;  and  an  agent  in  ciiarge  of  land  cannot,  vvlien  it  is  sold  for  ta.xcs, 
gain  by  its  purchase  a  valid  tax  title.  Bowman  r.  Officer,  53  la.  640;  Curts  v.  Cisna, 
7  Bissell,  260.  See  Dunne  v.  English,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  524;  Hughes  v.  Washington,  72 
111.  84;  Tynes  v.  Grimstead,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  508;  Kansas  City  Bank  v.  Mills,  24  Kan. 
604. 

2  Nor  can  an  attorney,  at  the  sale  of  his  client's  land,  under  a  power-of-sale  mort- 
gage, buy  it  either  for  himself  or  another.  Dyer  v.  Shurtleff,  112  Mass.  165;  nor  can 
he  buv  his  client's  land  at  a  tax  sale.  Wright  v.  Walker,  30  Ai^.  44.  But  see  Gueat 
V.  Smythe,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  551. 

93 


*  87  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

rather  a  trust  than  a  mere  service.  Thus,  one  holding  property 
for  another,  which  it  is  his  duty  to  sell,  cannot  himself  purchase 
it ;  {k}  1  or  if  he  be  employed  to  buy,  he  cannot  sell.  (?)  ^  A 
technical  reason  given  for  this  is,  that  the  same  person  cannot 
both  buy  and  sell.^  But  if  employed  to  sell,  where  he  would 
not  himself  convoy  or  transfer  the  property  as  agent,  because  the 
principal  would  do  this  himself,  still  the  agent  cannot  bind  the 
principal  to  make  the  transfer  to  him  or  for  his  benefit,  by  a^i) 
contract  which  he  makes  as  his  agent.  As  agent  to  sell,  it  is  his 
duty  to  get  the  highest  fair  price ;  and  this  duty  is  incompatible 
with  his  wish  to  buy ;  and  so,  vice  versa,  if  he  is  an  agent  to  pur- 
chase. At  one  time  it  was  understood  to  be  necessary  to  show 
that  a  trustee  had  taken  undue  advantage  of  his  position,  in 
order  to  set  aside  a  purchase  by  him  of  that  which  he  was  a 
trustee  to  sell,  (m)  But  this  is  not  so  now.  (n)  At  present,  the 
rule  in  equity  appears  to  be,  that  any  act  by  an  agent  with  respect 
to  the  subject-matter  of  the  agency  injurious  to  his  principal,  may 
be  avoided  by  the  principal.  If  an  agent  to  sell  become  the  pur- 
chaser, or  if  an  agent  to  buy  be  himself  the  seller,  a  court  of 
chancery,  upon  the  timely  application  of  the  principal,  will  pre- 
sume that  the  transaction  was  injurious,  and  will  not  permit  the 
agent  to  contradict  this  presumption;  —  unless,  indeed,  he  can 

(Jc)  Lowther  v.  Lowtlier,  13  Ves.  103  ;  (n)  Ex  parte  Lacy,   6  Ves.  G27 ;    Ex 

Wren  v.  Kirton,  8  id.  502  ;  Morse  v.  Royal,  parte  Bennett,    10  Ves.    385  ;    Davoue  v. 

12  id.  355 ;  Charter  v.  Trevelyan,  11  CI.  Fanning,    2    Johns.    Ch.  2.52  ;    Brothers 

&  F- 714.  V.    Brodiers,    7    Ired.    Eq.  150 ;  Harrison 

(/)  Lees  V.  Nuttall,  2  Myl.  &  K.  819 ;  v.  McHenrv,  9  Ga.  164  ;  Sturdevant  v. 
Taylor  v.  Salmon,  4  Myl.  &  C.  139;  Pike,  1  Cart.  (Ind.l  277  ;  Mason  i-.  Mar- 
Bunker  r.  Miles,  30  Me.  431.  tin,  4Md.  124. 

(/«)   Lord    fjOHijhhorou'jh,  Whichcote  v. 
Lawrence,  3  Ves.  750. 

1  Bain  o.  Brown,  56  N.  Y.  285;  Jeffries  v.  Wiester,  2  Sawyer,  135.  Not  even  if 
the  price  be  stipulated,  Ruckinan  r.  Hergholz,  8  Vrooni,  437 ;  unless  the  principal 
assents  after  full  information  in  regard  to  it,  Ingle  v.  Ilartnian,  37  la.  274.  But  a 
real  estate  agent  after  the  termination  of  his  agency  may  purchase  the  property  sold 
by  him  as  agent.  Walker  v.  Derby,  5  Bissell,  1:34;  Walker  v.  Carrington,  74  111. 
446. 

2  Not  even  in  good  faith  and  for  the  market  price.  Sharman  v.  Brandt,  L.  R. 
6  Q.  B.  720;  Taussig  v.  Hart,  68  N.  Y.  425;  Tewksbury  v.  Spruance,  75  111. 
187. 

3  A  broker  acting  for  both  parties  to  a  sale  or  exchange  can  recover  compensa- 
tion from  neither,  unless  each  knows  his  employment  and  agrees  to  pay,  Rice  v. 
Wood,  113  Mass.  133;  Rowe  v.  Stevens,  53  N.  Y.  621  ;  Alexander  v.  N.  W.  Univ. 
67  Ind.  466;  Meyer  v.  Hancliett,  39  Wis.  419;  43  Wis.  246;  notwithstanding  liis 
good  faitli,  Scribner  r.  Collar,  40  Mich.  375;  nor  if  in  accordance  with  a  custom  or 
usage.  Raisin  v.  Clark,  41  Md.  158.  See  generally,  Carman  v.  Beach,  03  N.  Y. 
97;  Shirland  v.  Monitor  Iron  Works  Co.  41  Wis.  162:  Lynch  v.  Fallon,  11  R.  L 
311.  ' 

94 


CH.  III.] 


AGENTS. 


show  that  the  principal,  when  furnished  with  all  the  knowledge  he 
himself  possessed,  gave  him  previous  authority  to  be  such  buyer 
or  seller,  or  afterwards  assented  to  such  purchase  or  sale,  (o) 
And  even  where  the  sale  is  a  judicial  sale,  under  a  title 
superior  to  that  of  the  trustee  or  the  cestui  que  *  trust,  one  *  88 
standing  as  trustee  in  respect  to  such  property  in  his  i)os- 
session  is  not,  it  seems,  permitted  to  purchase  and  hold  for  his 
own  benefit.  ( jo)  ^ 

Among  the  obvious  and  certain  duties  of  an  agent,  is  that  of 
keeping  a  correct  account  of  all  money  transactions,  and  render- 
ing the  same  to  the  principal  with  proper  frequency,  or  whenever 


(o)  Lord  Eldon,  Coles  v.  Trecotliick, 
9  Ves.  234,  247  ;  Lord  Erskine,  Lovvther 
r.  Lowther,  13  id.  103  ;  Ex  parte  Hughes, 
6  id.  617  ;  Murphy  v.  O'Shea,  2  Jones 
Law,  422 ;  E.  I.  Comp.  v.  Henchman,  1 
Ves.  Jr.  289 ;  Ex  parte  Bennett,  10  Ves. 
385;  Oliver  r.  Court,  8  Price,  127  ;  Fox 
V.  Mackreth,  2  Bro.  Ch.  400 ;  Tlie  York 
Buildings  Co.  v.  Mackenzie,  8  Bro.  P.  C. 
42  ;  Molony  v.  Kernan,  2  Dm.  &  War. 
31 ;  Davoue  v.  Fanning,  2  Johns.  Ch. 
252;  McConnell  t-.  Gibson,  12  111.  128; 
Pensonneau  v.  Bleakley,  14  id.  15 ; 
Dwight  V.  Blackmar,  2  Mich.  330  ;  Clute 
V.  Barron,  id.  192 ;  Allen  v.  Bryan,  7 
Ired.  Eq.  276 ;  Moore  v.  Moore,  1  Seld. 
256;  Conger  v.  Ring,  11  Barb.  350; 
White  V.  Trotter,  14  Sm.  &  M.  30;  Mi- 
choud  v.  Girod,  4  How.  503 ;  Green  v. 
Sargeant,  23  Vt.  466;  Cumberland  Coal 
and  Iron  Co.  v.  Sherman,  30  Barb.  553 ; 
Buell  V.  Buckingham,  16  la.  284.  Unless 
the  principal  object,  the  transaction 
stands  good ;  and  a  third  party  cannot 
open  it.  Jackson  v.  Van  Dalfscn,  5 
Johns.  43 ;  Jackson  v.  Walsh,  14  id.  407 ; 
Williams's  Ex'rs  v.  Marshall,  4  G.  &  J. 
376 ;  Litchfield  v.  Cudworth,  15  Pick.  31 ; 
Pitt  V.  Petway,  12  Ired.  L.  69.  How 
far  a  court  of  law,  at  the  instance  of  the 
principal,  will  go  in  avoiding  such  sales 
or  purchases  by  the  agent  for  his  own 
'uenefit  is  not  quite  clear.  Probably  in 
no  jurisdiction  where  chancery  powers 
have  existed  from  the  beginning,  and 
where  courts  of  law  have  not  been  com- 
pelled to  act,  in  order  to  prevent  parties 
from  being  without  remedy,  would  it  be 
held  that  a  sale  by  an  agent  to  himself 


is  avoided  at  laxv  by  the  mere  dissent  of 
the  principal,  without  proof  of  fraud,  or 
breach  of  a  positive  instruction  to  make 
sale  to  some  tiiird  party.  From  the  lan- 
guage of  the  court  in  Jackson  ;;.  Walsh, 
14  Johns.  414,  415,  it  may  be  inferred 
that  if  A,  as  executor,  sell  land  to  B,  and 
B  on  the  same  day  reconvcy  to  A,  the 
legal  title  is  vested  in  A,  in  the  absence 
of  actual  fraud.  And  there  is  a  strong 
intimation  in  Williams  v.  Marshall,  4  G. 
&  J.  37e'p,  380,  that  even  if  it  be  a  chattel 
interest  that  is  sold,  the  principal,  desir- 
ing to  set  aside  the  sale  merely  on  the 
ground  that  the  agent  was  himself  the 
purchaser,  must  resort  to  equity.  And 
so  it  seems  to  be  held  in  Massachusetts : 
Harrington  v.  Brown,  5  Pick.  521,  per 
curiam ;  Shelton  v.  Homer,  5  Met.  467. 
In  Perkins  v.  Thompson,  3  N.  H.  144,  it 
was  decided  that  a  deputy-sheriff,  who  on 
selling  goods  seized  upon  an  execution, 
was  himself  the  purchaser,  thereby  be- 
came guilty  of  a  conversion,  and  was  lia- 
ble in  trover;  but  the  amount  paid  for 
the  goods  was  allowed  to  be  given  in  ev- 
idence in  mitigation  of  damages.  At 
that  time,  however,  the  New  Hampshire 
courts  possessed  no  equitable  jurisdic- 
tion. And  see  Lessee  of  Lazarus  v. 
Br^son,  3  Binn.  54.  In  New  Jersey,  the 
court,  in  order  to  giA'e  relief  at  law,  held 
that  a  sale  to  himself  by  an  executor, 
administrator,  or  trustee,  intrusted  with 
the  sale  of  real  estate,  must  be  consid- 
ered absolutely  void  by  common  law. 
Den  V.  Hammel,  3  Harrison,  74,  81.  See 
Mackintosh  r.  Barber,  1  Bing.  50. 
(p)  Jewett  V.  Miller,  6  Seld.  402. 


1  An  express  contract  between  the  director  of  a  corporation  and  his  cestui  que  trust 
is  not  void,  but  voidable  at  the  option  of  the  cfstui  que  trust  if  exercised  within  a 
reasonable  time ;  but  it  will  not  be  enforced  at  law  or  equity  against  the  latter's 
resistance.     Stewart  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  9  Vroom,  505. 

95 


*  89  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

called  on.  (q)  ^     The  court  has  compelled  the  rendering  of  such 
account  after  twenty  years  had  ela])sed.     But,  in  general,  after 
a  considerable  time  has  elapsed,  and  there  are  no  circumstan- 
ces  to    repel    the    presumption  of    an    account    rendered, 

*  89    *  accepted,  and  settled,  the  jury  are  instructed  to  make  that 

presumption,  (r)  The  agent  of  an  agent  is  generally  ac- 
countable only  to  his  own  principal,  and  not  to  the  principal  of 
the  party  for  whom  he  acts  ;  that  is,  only  his  immediate  employer 
can  call  him  to  account,  (s)  And  a  sub-contractor  cannot  pass 
by  his  immediate  employer  and  sue  the  principal  or  proprietor  of 
the  work,  (f) 

If  an  agent,  without  necessity,  has  mixed  the  property  of  his 
principal,  with  his  own,  in  such  a  w^ay  that  he  cannot  render  an 
accoimt  precisely  discriminating  between  the  two,  the  whole  of 
what  is  so  undistinguishable  is  held  to  belong  to  the  princi- 
pal ;  (w)  for  it  was  the  duty  of  the  agent  to  keep  the  property  and 

(9)  Topham  i-.  Braddick,  1  Taunt.  (r)  Topham  v.  Braddick,  1  Taunt.  571. 
572;  Lord  Chedwortli  v.  Edwards,  8  (s)  Stephens  v.  Badcock,  3  B.  &  Ad. 
Ves.  49;  White  v.  Lady  Lincohi,  8  354,  where  it  was  hehl  tliat  money  had 
Ves.  363 ;  Lord  Hardwicke  v.  Vernon,  and  received  couhl  not  be  maintained 
14  Ves.  510;  Lady  Ormond  v.  Ilutchin-  against  an  attorney's  clerk,  wlio,  in  the 
son,  13  Ves.  47 ;  Lupton  v.  White,  15  absence  of  his  master,  and  autliorized  by 
Ves.  436 ;  Pearse  v.  Green,  1  Jac.  &  W.  him,  received  certain  money  due  to  the 
135;  Motley  v.  Motley,  7  Ired.  Eq.  211.  plaintiff  which  the  attorney  had  been 
See  as  to  the  classes  of  persons  whom  employed  by  the  plaintiff  to  collect ; 
equity  will  compel  to  account,  Terry  v.  although  the  absence  of  the  attorney 
Wacher,  15  Sim.  448. — It  seems  that  (who  proved  to  be  in  a  state  of  insol- 
where  the  agent  has  made  a  mistake  in  vency)  continued,  and  the  defendant  had 
the  account  he  will  not  be  bound  by  the  not  paid  over  the  money  to  him  or  his 
account  as  given,  although  his  principal  estate.  The  agent  when  he  received  the 
has  acted  upon  the  presumption  of  its  money  had  given  a  receipt  signed  "  for 
correctness  in  his  dealings  with  third  par-  Mr.  S.  J.  [the  attorney],  J.  B."  [the  de- 
tics —  provided  there  was  ground  from  fendant].  See  also  Pinto  v.  Santos,  5 
which  the  principal  might  reasonably  Taunt.  447;  Myler  v.  Fitzpatrick,  Mad. 
have  inferred  the  existence  of  the  error.  &  G.  360. 

In  the  case  adjudged,  the  principal,  like  (/)  Lake  Erie   R.   Co.   i;.   Eckler,   13 

the  agent,  was  a  broker,  and  the  mistake  Ind.  67. 

in  the  account  was  one  which  a  knowledge  (m)  Lupton    v.    White,   15    Ves.    436, 

of  the  usage  of  the  stock  market  might  440;  Chedwortli  r.  Edwards,  8  Ves.  46; 

have   enabled   him    to   detect.     Dails   v.  Wren   r.    Kirton,   11    Ves.  377 ;    Hart  v. 

Lloyd,  12  Q.  B.  531.  Ten  Eyck,  2  Johns.  Ch.  62,  108. 

'  Even  for  the  proceeds  of  certain  sales  which  as  between  the  principal  and  the 
purchaser  are  illegal  and  void.  Baldwin  v.  Potter,  46  Vt.  402.  A  selling  agent  who 
refuses  to  account  for  or  to  sell  goods  when  directed,  and  unlawfully  retains 
possession,  is  guilty  of  a  conversion,  Coleman  r.  Pearce,  20  Minn.  123;  and  is 
liable  for  their  market  value  at  the  time  the  order  to  sell  was  received.  Wlielan 
V.  Lynch,  60  N.  Y.  460.  See  Monitor  Ins.  Co.  v.  Young,  111  Mass.  537.  If  an 
agent,  pursuant  to  instructions,  delivers  to  a  common  carrier  moneys  of,  consigned 
to,  and  to  be  transported  to,  his  principal,  he  ceases  thereafter  to  have  any  title  or 
interest  therein,  and  cannot  sue  the  carrier  therefor.  Thompson  v.  Fargo,  03  N.  Y. 
479. 

96 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  90 

the  accounts  separate,  and  he  must  bear  the  responsibility  and 
the  consequences  of  not  doing  so. 

As  the  principal  is  entitled  to  receive  from  the  agent  property 
intrusted  to  him,  with  its  natural  increase,  (v)  ^  he  may  charge 
the  agent  with  interest  for  balances  in  his  hands,  unless  the 
nature  of  the  transaction,  or  evidence,  direct  or  circumstantial, 
shows  that  the  intention  of  the  parties  was  otherwise,  (w)  This 
may  be  inferred,  for  instance,  where  there  has  been  a  long  accu- 
mulation, and  the  money  has  lain  useless  in  the  agent's  hands, 
and  the  principal  has  known  this,  and  made  no  objection.  (2;) 

It  is  a  general  rule,  that  all  profits  or  advantages  made  by  an 
agent  in  the  business  of  his  agency,  beyond  his  due  compensation, 
belong  to  his  principal,  (rra;)  ^ 

If  an  agent  employed  for  any  special  purpose,  discharges 
his  *  duty  and  does  all  he  was  required  to  do,  he  is  entitled  *  90 
to  full  compensation,  although  the  principal  declines  or 
refuses  to  take  advantage  of  the  agent's  act,  or  even  to  adopt  it. 
Thus,  if  an  agent  employed  to  sell  land,  succeeds  in  finding,  for 
his  principal,  a  buyer  on  the  stipulated  terms ;  but  the  principal 
refuses  to  make  the  sale  and  rescinds  the  authority,  the  agent 
may  have  his  action  for  his  services ;  and  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages (which  would  be  a  matter  of  law),  would,  generally,  be  his 
regular  commission  on  the  sale.  (?/) 

It  has  been  held  to  be  the  duty  of  an  agent  appointed  to  collect 
money,  to  give  immediate  notice  when  any  is  collected,  (z) 

(v)  Brown  v.  Litton,  1.  P.  Wms.  141  ;  (x)  Lord  Kenyan,  seems  to  have  been 

Massey  v.  Davies,  2  Ves.  Jr.  317  ;  Dip-  of  opinion  in  Rogers  v.  Boclim,  2  Esp. 

lock  V.  Blacliburn,  3  Camp.  43 ;  Short  v.  704,  tliat  neither  at  law  nor  in  equity,  if 

Skipwith,  1  Brock.  103.  money  had  been  remitted  to  an  agent, 

{w)  Dodge   V.   Perkins,   9   Pick.    368,  and  lie  suffered  it  to  remain  dead  in  his 

388.     "  Upon  the  principles  of  the  com-  hands,  could  he  be  made  liable  for  inter- 

mon  law,  we  think  it  clear  that  interest  est ;    tiiough  he    should    be    chargeable 

is  to  be  allowed,  where  the  law  by  impli-  with   interest  if    he   mixed    the   money 

cation  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  party  to  with  his  own,  or  made  any  use  of  it. 

pay  over  the  money  to  the  owner,  witii-  {xx)  Laffcrty  v.  Jelley,  22  Ind.  471. 

out  any  previous  demand  on  Ids  part."  iy)  Prickett  v.  Badger,  1  C.  B.  (n.  s.) 

Putnam,  J.    As  to  receivers,   see v.  290. 

Jolland,  8  Ves.  72,  (z)  McMahan  v.  Pranklin,  38  Mo.  548. 

1  One  of  several  heirs  who  agrees  to  purchase  stock  on  joint  account,  each  to 
contribute  his  proportion  of  the  purchase-money,  is  liable,  on  his  refusal  to  account 
and  adjust  the  matter,  to  each  for  his  share  of  the  dividends.  Colt  v.  Clapp,  127 
Mass.  470. 

2  Thus  an  agent  to  whom  a  ship  was  consigned  for  sale,  and  who  bought  her  him- 
self at  the  price  fixed,  and  resold  her  for  double  the  money,  must  account  for  the 
difference.  De  Bussche  v.  Alt,  8  Ch.  I).  286.  See  Dutton  v.  Willner,  62  N.  Y.  312 ; 
Dodd  V.  Wakeman,  11  C.  E.  Green,  484. 

TOL.  I.  7  97 


90  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 


SECTION   XIV. 

OF   PUBLIC   AGENTS. 

A  public  agent,^  as,  for  example,  a  collector,  has  been  held 
liable  for  the  acts  of  his  deputy  in  exacting  illegal  compensation, 
notwithstanding  he  believed  the  compensation  authorized  by  law 
and  accounted  for  it  to  the  treasury,  (a) 

If  he  gives  a  promissory  note  purporting  to  bind  a  public 
body,  as  a  school  district,  which  he  has  no  authority  to  bind,  he 
is  liable  on  it  himself,  (i) 

He  cannot  act  for  the  body  whom  he  represents  in  lending 
money  to  himself,  (c) 

Public  agents  are  not  liable  for  injury  sustained  by  an  innocent 
but  mistaken  exercise  of  their  discretion,  unless  it  amounts  to 
their  own  personal  negligence,  (d)  Nor  for  the  negligence  of 
workmen  properly  employed  by  them,  (e)  But  a  public  body, 
although  acting  gratuitously  for  the  public,  is  responsible  for 
their  own  personal  negligence,  and  for  wanton  or  malicious  in- 
jury. (/)  Although  a  private  agent,  acting  within  the  scope  of 
a  general  authority,  but  violating  private  instructions,  unknown 
to  the  party  with  whom  he  acts,  binds  his  principal,  the  rule  is 
held  otherwise  as  to  a  public  agent ;  because  his  authority  is 
matter  of  record  in  the  books  of  a  corporation,  or  of  some  public 
record,  and  may  be  inquired  into  and  ascertained.  (^)  And 
municipal  corporations  are  to  be  regarded  rather  as  agents  than 
as  principals,  and  as  responsible  to  their  constituents.  (A) 

A  public  agent  acting  for  the  government  is  not  personally 
responsible ;  and  this  has  been  held,  although  the  contract  was 

(a)  Ogden  v.  Marsliall,  3  Blatchford,  (e)  IloUiday  v.  St.   Leonard,  11  C.  B. 

319.  (n.  s.)  102. 

ih)  Weave  V.  Gove,  44  N.  IL  196.  ( /)  Clothier   v.   Webster,   12    C.    B- 

(c)  Holderness    v.    Baker,   44    N.   H.  (n.  s  )  790. 

414.  (q)  Baltimore  i-.  Reynolds,  20  Md.  1. 

(d)  Yealy  v.  Fink,  43  Penn.  212.  (k)  Idem. 

1  The  government  is  not  bound  by  the  act  or  declaration  of  its  agent,  unless  it 
manifestly  appears  that  he  acted  within  the  scope  of  his  authority,  or  was  employed 
in  his  capacity  as  a  public  agent  to  do  the  act  or  make  the  declaration  for  the  gov- 
ernment. Clifford,  J.,  in  Whiteside  v.  United  States,  93  U.  S.  247,  257.  A  pur- 
chasing agent  cannot  bind  the  govfrnment  before  actual  delivery  of  the  goods. 
Noble  V.  United  States,  11  Ct.  of  CI.  008. 

98 


CH.  III.]  AGENTS.  *  90 

under  his  seal.  But  if  the  credit  given  liiin  were  not  within  the 
line  of  his  duty,  and  covered  by  his  authority,  he  is  personally 
liable,  (i)  ^  And  the  presumption  derived  from  his  office  or  em- 
ployment, may  be  overcome  by  evidence  of  the  intention  of  the 
parties  to  make  the  contract  on  his  personal  responsibility,  (y) 

Public  agents,  where  they  stand  in  the  relation  of  trustees,  are 
treated  of  in  the  subsequent  chapter  on  Trustees. 

(?)  Yulee  I'.  Canora,  11  Fla.  9.  {j)  Lapsley  v.  McKinstry,  38  Mo.  245. 

*  An  agent  of  a  foreign  government  is  not  liable  ])ersonally,  nor  can  a  creditor 
indirectly  sue  such  a  government  by  bringing  an  action  against  tiie  agent,  Twy- 
cross  r.  Urej'fus,  5  Ch.  D.  G05 ;  nor  will  a  promise  by  a  public  agent  to  pay  a  dei)t 
when  he  receives  money  from  his  principal  make  him  personally  liable.  Brazelton 
V.  Colyar,  2  Baxter,  234.  A  State  may,  however,  by  statute  ratify  an  agent's  act  in 
selling  its  property  in  excess  of  his  authority  and  receiving  a  note  in  payment,  and 
may  then  enforce  payment  the  same  as  an  individual.     State  v.  Toriuus,  20  Mum.  1. 

99 


*  91  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 


*91  *  CHAPTER  lY. 

FACTORS   AND   BROKERS. 

Sect.  I.  —  Who  is  a  Factor^  and  who  a  Broker. 

Factors  and  Brokers  are  both  and  equally  agents  ;  but  with  this 
difference :  the  Factor  is  intrusted  witli,  the  property,  which  is 
the  subject-matter  of  the  agency ;  the  Broker  is  only  employed  to 
make  a  bargain  in  relation  to  it.  The  compensation  to  both  is 
usually  a  commission;  and  when  the  agent  guarantees  the  pay- 
ment of  the  price  for  which  he  has  sold  the  goods  of  his  principal, 
then  the  commission  is  larger,  as  it  includes  a  compensation  for 
this  risk.  In  this  case  he  is  said  in  the  books  to  act  under  a 
del  credere  commission.  But  this  phrase  is  seldom  used  in  this 
country,  nor  indeed  is  the  word  factor  often  employed  by  mercan- 
tile men.  The  business  of  factors  is  usually  done  by  commission 
merchants,  who  are  generally  called  by  that  name,  and  who  do  or 
do  not  charge  a  guaranty  commission  as  may  be  agreed  upon  by 
the  parties.  But  the  charge  of  a  guaranty  commission  gives  the 
factor  no  increased  authority  over  the  property,  (a) 


SECTION  II. 

OF   FACTORS   UNDER   A    COMMISSION. 

Whether  a  factor  who  sells  under  a  del  credere  or  guaranty 

commission  becomes  thereby  a  principal  debtor  to  his  prin- 

*  92    cipal,  *  or  only  a  surety,  has  been  somewhat  doubted  ;  (6)  if 

he  be  a  principal  debtor,  his  employer  may  demand  the  price 

(a)  Morris   v.   Cleasby,  4  M.   &  Sel.  (b)  Grove    v.  Dubois,   1   T.   R.   112; 

5GG ;   Thompson    v.    rerkins,   3   Mason,     Loverick  v.   Meigs,  1  Cowen,  G45,   603, 
232.  664. 

100 


CH.  IV.]  FACTORS   AND   BROKERS.  *  93 

of  him  without  looking  to  the  buyer.  If  he  be  only  a  surety,  he 
is  bound  to  pay  only  if  the  buyer  does  not.  It  appears  to  be  now 
settled  that  he  is  still  only  a  surety,  and  that  recourse  must  be 
had  first  to  the  principal  debtor,  on  whose  default  only  the  factor 
is  liable ;  (c)  ^  not  that  the  employer  must  sue  the  buyer  before  he 
sues  the  factor,  but  that  he  can  sue  the  factor  only  because  the 
buyer  neglects  or  refuses  to  pay,  and  when  he  so  neglects  or  re- 
fuses. It  seems,  however,  to  be  still  held,  that  the  promise  of  the 
factor  to  guarantee  the  debt  is  not  within  the  Statute  of  Frauds, 
as  a  promise  to  pay  the  debt  of  another,  (c?)  If  he  takes  a  note 
from  the  purchaser  of  the  goods,  this  note  belongs  to  his  principal. 
But  if  he  takes  depreciated  paper  he  must  make  it  good,  (c)  If 
money  be  paid  him,  and  he  remits  it,  he  does  not  guarantee  its 
safe  arrival,  but  is  bound  only  to  use  proper  means  and  proper 
care  in  sending  it ;  (/)  unless  it  is  agreed  that  he  shall  guarantee 
the  remittance,  and  may  charge  therefor  a  commission ;  in  which 
case  he  is  liable  although  he  does  not  charge  the  commis- 
sion. (^)  He  has  the  same  claim  on  *  his  principal  for  *  93 
advances  as  if  he  did  not  charge  a  commission.  (K) 

(c)  Hougton    V.  Matthews,  3  B.  &  P.  also  purchased  another  bill  of  one  Im- 

485;  Morris  v.  Cleasby,  4  M.  «&  Sel.  566;  bert,   which   they   also   remitted   to   the 

Gall  V.  Comber,  7  Taunt.  558;  Peele  v.  plaintiff,  in  part  payment  for  sales  of  his 

Northcote,    7  Taunt.   478  ;    Couturier   v.  goods.     Walters  and  Imbert  failed,   and 

Hastie,  8  Exch.  40  ;  Bradley  i'.  Richard-  the  bills  were  protested  ;  and  this  action 

son,  23  Vt.  720 ;  Thompson   v.  Perkins,  was  brought  to  recover   the  amount  on 

3  Mason,  232  ;  Wolff  v.  Koppell,  5  Hill  the   defendants'   guaranty.      Washington, 

(N.    Y.),  458.     See  Wolff  v.   Koppell,  2  J.:  "  The  guaranty  of  the  defendants  ex- 

Denio,   368,    where    conflicting   opinions  tended  no  further  than  to  the  sales  and 

are  given  on  this  question  by  Porter  and  receipts  of  the  money  arising  from  them. 

Hand,  Senators.  As  to  Imbert's  bill,  therefore,  there  is  no 

{(I)  Swan    V.   Nesmith,  7    Pick.   220;  pretence    for    charging    the    defendants 

Wolff  r.  Koppell,  5  HiTl  (N.  Y.)  458;  s.  c.  with    that,    as  it  was   a   bill   purchased 

2    Denio,    368 ;    Couturier    v.    Hastie,    8  by  the  defendants  from  a  man   in  good 

Exch.   40 ;    Bradley    v.    Richardson,   23  credit,  and  it  was  purchased  for  the  pur- 

Vt.  720.  pose  of  a  remittance,  as  the  defendants 

(r)  Dunncll  v.  Mason,  1  Story,  543.  had    been    directed.     But   the   guaranty 

(/)  Lucas  V.  Groning,  7  Taunt.  164;  extends  to  Walters'  bill  which  was  not 
in  Muhler  r.  Bohlens,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  purchased  with  the  proceeds  of  the  plain- 
378,  the  defendants  received  consign-  tiff's  goods,  but  was  given  by  the  pur- 
ments  from  the  plaintiff,  and  engaged  chaser  of  those  goods  instead  of  money, 
to  sell  them  on  a  del  credere  commission.  If  the  defendants  were  bound  to  guaran- 
and  to  guarantee  the  debts.  They  sold  tee  the  paj-mcnt  of  this  debt  when  con- 
to  one  Walters  part  of  the  goods,  and  tracted,  the  guaranty  continues,  because  a 
when  the  money  for  which  the  goods  bill  which  is  disiionored  is  no  payment." 
were  sold  became  due,  they  took  Wal-  (g)  Henbach  v.  Mollman,  2  Duer, 
ters'  bill  of  exchange  for  the  amount  and  227. 
remitted  the  same  to  the  plaintiff.     They          (/()  Graham  v.  Ackroyd,  10  Hare,  192. 

1  Contra,  Lewis  v.  Brehme,  33  Md.  412,  429. 

101 


*  93  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

SECTION    III. 

OP  THE   DUTIES    AND    THE   RIGHTS    OF   FACTORS   AND    BROKERS. 

A  broker  or  factor  is  bound  to  ordinary  care,  and  is  liable  for 
any  nc,i2:ligcnce,  error,  or  default,  incompatible  with  the  care  and 
skill  properly  belonging  to  the  business  that  he  undertakes,  (i) 
It  is  his  business  to  sell ;  but  the  power  to  sell  does  not  necessarily 
include  the  power  to  pledge.  This  rule  was  formerly  applied  with 
great  severity ;  (j)  but  it  seems  to  be  now  the  law,  aided  by  some 
statutes  both  of  England  and  of  this  country,  (^)  that  he  may 
pledge  the  goods  for  advances  made  in  good  faith  for  his  principal, 
and  perhaps  otherwise  if  distinctly  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the 
principal,  (Z)  ^  or  for  advances  made  to  himself  to  the  extent  of 
his  lien ;  (m)  or,  perhaps,  if  the  owner  has  clothed  the  factor 
with  all  the  indicia  of  ownership  so  as  to  enable  him  to  mislead 
others,  and  the  pledgee  had  no  notice  or  knowledge  that  he  was 
not  owner,  (w)  ^     But  this  has  been  denied  in  this  country,  (ww) 

(i)  Vere  v.  Smith,  1  Vent.  121.  which  regulate  the  power  of  the   factor 

(/■)  The     factor    cannot    pledge    the  to  pledge  the  goods  of  his  principal.    For 

goods  of   his   principal   as   security    for  interpretations  of  these  acts  see  Stevens 

his  own  debt.     Patcrson  v.  Tasli,  2  Str.  v.  Wilson,  6  Hill   (N.  Y.),  512;    s.  c.    3 

1178.     The  principal  may  recover  goods  Denio,    472 ;     Zachrison    v.    Ahnian,    2 

pledged  by  the  factor,  by  tendering  to  Sandf.  68 ;  Jennings  i\  Merrill,  20  Wend, 

liiin  tlie  sum  due  to  liim,  without  any  ten-  1  ;  Navulshaw  v.  Brownrigg,  2  De  G.,  M. 

der  to  the  pawnee.     Daubignj' ;'.  Duval,  5  &  G.  441. 

T.  K.  604;  M'Combie  v.  Davies,  7  East,  (/)  Mann    v.    Shiffner,   2   East,    523; 

5;  Solly  v.  Rathbone,  2  M.  &   Sel.   298.  M'Combie  r.  Davies,  7  East,  5;  Solly  i;. 

See  also    De   Bouchout   ;;.   Goldsmid,    5  Rathbone,  2  M.  &    Sel.  298 ;  Pultney  v. 

Ves.  211;  Martini  ik  Coles,  1  M.  &  Sel.  ,  Keymer,   3  Esp.    1-82.     "A  factor  may 

140 ;    Fielding   v.    Kymcr,    2    Br.    &   B.  deliver  the  possession  of  goods  on  which 

63!);   Quciroz    v.  Trueman,    3   B.    &   C.  he    lias    a   lien  to   a    tliird    person,    with 

342;    Kuidcr    v.    Sliaw,    2    Mass.    398;  notice  of  thij  lim  and  with  a  declaration 

Odiorne  v.  Maxcy,  13  Mass.  178  ;  Bowie  tlint   the    transfer  is  to   such   person    as 

V.  Napier,  1  McCord,  1 ;  Van  Amringe  v.  agent  of  the  factor,  and  for  his  benefit." 

Peabody,    1    Mason,  440  ;    Whltaker   on  Kent,  C.  J.,  Urquliart  v.  Mclver,  4  Johns. 

Lien,  123,  136;  Rodriguez    r.  Iloffernan,  108,116. 

5   Joi)ns.   Ch.    429;  Nowell    v.    Pratt,  o  (m)  Id. 

Cush.  111.     lie  cannot  barter  the  goods  (n)   Boysnn  v.  Coles,  6  M.  &  Sel.  14; 

of  his  principal,  but  must  sell  tliem  out-  Williams  v.  J^arton,  3  Bing.  139. 

right.     Gucrroiro!-.  Peilc,  3  B.  &  Aid.  610.  (»»)   Micrhigan  State  Bank  y.  Gardner, 

(k)  See  ante,  p.*  58,  n.  (/)),  for  statutes  15  Gray,  362. 

1  But  a  factor  has  no  authority  to  pledge  the  goods  of  his  principnl  as  a  security 
for  his  own  debt,  even  though  the  creditor  has  no  notice  of  his  cliaracter  as  a  factor, 
and  the  goods  were  invoiced  to  him  as  a  purchaser.  Gray  v.  Agnew,  95  III.  315. 
Nor  will  tiie  pledge  be  good  for  the  amount  of  the  factor's  charges  against  his  prin- 
cipal at  the  time.  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Trenliolm,  12  Heiskell,  520.  See  Cole  v. 
Northwestern  Bank,  L.  R.  9  C  P.  470;  City  Bank  ;•.  Barrow,  6  App.  Cas.  664. 

2  See  Johnson  v.  Credit  Lyounais  Co.  3  C.  P.  D.  32. 

102 


CH.  IV.]  FACTORS   AND    DROKERS.  *  94 

The  power  of  a  factor  to  pledge  for  his  own  benefit  the  goods  of 
a  consignor  cannot  be  considered  as  settled  in  this  country. 
But  it  seems  that  *he  may  pledge  negotiable  paper  intrusted    *  94 
to  him  by  his  principal,  to  a  party  who  has  no  notice  or 
knowledge  of  his  want  of  title,  (o) 

A  broker  employed  to  sell  has  no  authority  to  receive  pay- 
ment ;  1  and  in  a  case  in  New  York  it  was  not  permitted  to  over- 
come this  rule  by  proof  of  usage,  (oo) 

A  principal  docs  not,  in  general,  lose  his  property  in  his  goods 
by  any  act  of  the  factor,  as  long  as  he  can  trace  and  identify  them, 
either  in  the  factor's  hands,  or  into  the  hands  of  any  representa- 
tive of  the  factor,  who  holds  them  only  in  the  factor's  right,  and 
not  in  his  own  independent  right,  as  purchaser,  pledgee,  &g.  (p) 

He  is  bound  to  obey  positive  instructions  precisely,  but  not 
mere  wishes  or  inclinations ;  (q}  and  will  be  justified  in  departing 
from  precise  instructions  if  an  unforeseen  emergency  arises,  and 
he  acts  in  good  faith  and  for  the  obvious  and  certain  advantage 
of  his  principal,  (r) 

If  a  factor  buys  goods  at  a  price  exceeding  the  limit  set  by  his 
principal,  or  otherwise  in  disregard  of  his  instructions,  and  the 
principal  repudiates  the  contract,  the  goods  become  the  property 
of  the  factor,  and  the  principal  is  not  liable  for  them,  (rr) 

Factors  or  brokers  must  conform  to  the  usages  of  the  business ; 
and  they  have  the  power  such  usages  would  give  them,  and  can 
bind  the  principal  only  to  a  usual  obligation.  A  factor  need  not 
advise  insurance,  still  less  make  insurance ;  but  having  possession 
of  the  goods  he  may  insure  them  for  the  owner,  (s)  ^     A  factor 

(o)  Collins  V.  Martin,  1  B.  &  P.  648;  Ekins  v.  Marklisli,   Ambl.  184;  Lucas  v. 

Treuttell  r.  Barandon,  8  Taunt.  100.  Groninjc,  7  Taunt.  104. 

{oo}  Higgins  y.  Moore,  34  N.  Y.  417.  (r)  Judson    v.    Sturges,   5  Day,    556; 

ip)  "Warner  v.   Martin,  11  How.  209;  Drummond   ;;.    Wood,    2    Caines,    310; 
Beach  v.  Forsyth,  14  Barb.  400 ;  Black-  Liotard  i-.  Graves,  3  Caines,  220 ;  Law- 
man r.  Green,   24  Vt.  17;  Benny   v.   Pc-  ler  v.  Keaquiek,  1  Johns.  Cas.  174;  For- 
gram,    18  Mo.  191.     Sec   Fahnestock   v.  restier  v.  Bordman,  1  Story,  43. 
Bailey,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  48,  which  is  a  strong  (rr)  The  Sally  Magee,  3  Wall.  451. 
case  upon  this  point.                                             (s)  Dc  Forest  v.  The  Fire  Insurance 

(7)  Brown  v.  McGran.   14   Pet.   479  ;  Co.  1  Hall,  84. 

1  Nor  to  submit  to  arbitration  so  as  to  bind  his  principal,  Ingraham  v.  Whitniore, 
75  111.  24  ;  nor  to  deliver  a  bill  of  lading  without  tlie  payment  of  an  accompanying 
bill  of  exchange,  when  authorized  so  to  do  only  upon  such  payment.  StoUenwerck 
V.  Thacher,  115  Mass.  224. 

-  If  a  factor  promises  to  insure,  or  if  so  ordered  or  if  usage  imposes  that  duty 
upon  him  he  fails  to  do  so,  he  is  liable  himself  as  insurer,  and,  in  the  event  of  a  loss, 
is  entitled  to  credit  for  premiums  that  he  should  have  paid.  Shoenfeld  v.  Fleisher, 
73  m.  404. 

103 


*  95  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

has  discretionary  power  in  regard  to  the  time,  mode,  and  circum- 
stances of  a  sale ;  but  he  must  exercise  this  discretion  in  good 
faith,  and  if  he  hastens  a  sale  improperly,  and  without  good  rea- 
son, it  is  void,  {f) 

If  he  has  any  instructions  how  to  dispose  of  the  goods,  and 
has  made  no  advances  on  them,  he  is  certainly  bound  by  these 
instructions,  (w) 

A  factor  for  commission  must  account  to  him  from  whom  he 
received  the  goods,  until  an  adverse  claimant  establishes  his  right 
to  them,  (mm) 

*  95        *  A  factor  is  a  general   agent  from  the  nature  of  his 

employment ;  and  if  he  be  known  as  a  general  commission 
merchant  or  factor,  he  binds  the  principal  who  employs  him, 
although  for  the  first  time,  by  any  acts  fairly  within  the  scope 
of  his  employment,  even  if  they  transcend  the  limits  of  his 
instructions ;  if  the  party  dealing  with  him  had  no  knowledge 
of  those  limits. 

If  he  sends  goods  to  his  principal,  contrary  to  order  or  to  his 
duty,  the  principal  may  refuse  to  receive  them,  and  may  return 
them,  or  if  the  nature  of  the  goods  or  other  circumstances  make 
it  obviously  for  the  interest  of  the  factor  that  they  should  be  sold, 
the  principal  may  sell  them  as  his  agent,  (v) 

If  he  has  no  del  credere  commission,  he  may  still  be  personally 
liable  to  his  principal ;  as  where  he  makes  himself  liable  by  ne- 
glect or  default ;  or  if  he  sells  the  goods  of  several  principals  to 
one  purchaser,  on  credit,  taking  a  note  to  himself,  and  getting 
the  same  discounted,  (w)  Or  if  he  sells  on  credit,  and  when  that 
expires  takes  a  note  to  himself.  (.?:)  But  if  he  sell  on  credit  and 
at  the  time  takes  a  negotiable  note  which  is  not  paid,  the  loss 
falls  on  the  principal;  and  the. factor  is  not  bound  to  pay  it,  if 


(t)  "  But  it  seems,  if  the  sale  be  hur-  (m)  Marfield    v.   Goodhue,   3    Conist. 

ried    in   order   to   enable   the   factor   to  62;     Brown    v.   McGran,   14    Pet.   479; 

realize  his  advances,  and  it  is  not  made  Smart  v.  Sandars,  5  M.  G.  &  S.  895. 

in   due   course    of    business,   it   will   be  (iin)  Bain  v.  Clark,  .39  Mo.  352. 

void."  .  .  .  The   agents,    "  were    bound  (?•)  Kemp   v.   Pryor,  7    Ves.   Jr.   237, 

as  factors  to  sell  at  reasonable  and  fair  240,   247 ;    Cornwall   v.   Wilson,    1   Ves. 

prices;     and    it  would    be    contrary    to  Sen.  509. 

their  duty,  and  a  fraudulent  proceeding  (w)  Jackson  v.  Baker,  1  Wash.  C.  C. 

on    their   part    to   sell   the    goods   at   a  394 ;   s.  c.   445 ;    Johnson  v.   O'llara,   5 

greatly   reduced    price,   or    in   common  Leigh,    456.      But    not    necessarily    so. 

parlance,  to  sacrifice  them,  in  order  the  Goodcnow    i-.    Tyler,  7   Mass.  36  ;   Cor- 

more   hastily    to  realize   the   proceeds."  lies  v.  Gumming,  6  Cowen,  181. 

Shaw,  C.  J.,   Shaw    t;.   Stone,  1   Cash.  (x)  Hosmer  t>.  Beebe,  2  Martin  (n.  8.) 

228, 248.  368. 

104 


CH.  IV.]  FACTORS   AND   BROKERS.  *  96 

he  has  no  guaranty  commission,  although  the  note  be  made  pay- 
able to  the  factor,  (y) 

A  foreign  factor  is  one  who  acts  for  a  principal  in  another 
country;  a  domestic  factor  acts  in  the  same  country  with  his 
principal.  A  foreign  factor  is,  as  to  third  parties,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  a  principal.^  And  though  his  principal  may  sue 
such  third  parties,  they  cannot  sue  his  principal,  for  they  act  with 
the  factor  only,  and  on  the  factor's  credit.  But  it  seems  to  be 
otherwise  with  the  domestic  factor.  A  third  party  dealing  with 
him  may  have  a  claim  on  his  principal,  unless  it  can  be  shown 
that  credit  was  given  to  the  factor  exclusively.  (2)  That 
is,  in  the  case  of  a  foreign  factor  the  presumption  *  of  law  *  96 
is,  that  credit  was  given  to  him  exclusively ;  in  the  case  of 
a  domestic  factor,  that  credit  is  given  to  his  principal ;  but  the 
presumption  may  be  said  to  exist  only  in  the  absence  of  evidence ; 
for  the  intention  of  the  parties,  to  be  drawn  from  the  terms  of 
the  contract  and  from  circumstances,  will  determine  whether  the 
party  dealing  with  the  factor  dealt  with  him  as  agent  or  as  prin- 
cipal, (a)  It  seems  very  nearly  and  perhaps  quite  settled,  that 
for  the  purpose  of  this  rule,  our  States  are  not  foreign  countries 
to  each  other,  (5)  although  for  most  purposes  of  the  law-mer- 
chant they  are  so. 

(y)  Messier  v.  Amery,  1  Yeates,  540 ;  Scotland,    but    did    not    mention    their 

Goodenow  v.  Tyler,  7  Mass.  36.  names.     The  seller  did  not  inquire  who 

(z)  Paterson  v.  Gandasequi,  15    East,  they  were,  and  debited   the   party   pur- 

62;    Addison    v.   Gandasequi,   4   Taunt,  chasing;  and  it  was  held  tliat  he  might 

574.     The   following    autiiorities   distin-  afterwards    sue   the    principal    for    the 

giiish  the  foreign  and  domestic  factors :  price.      Lord     Tenterden,     C.    J.,     said  : 

Gonzales  v.  Sladen,  Bull.  N.  P.  130;  De  "  There  may  be  another  case,  and  that 

Gaillon    v.    L'Aigle,    1    B.    &    P.    368;  is  where   a   British   merchant   is   buying 

Thomson  v.  Davenport,  9   B.  &  C.    78;  for  a  foreigner.     According  to  the  univnr- 

Kirkpatrick  v.  Staincr,  22  "Wend.  244.  sal  understanding  of  merclumts,  and  of  ail 

[a]  Green  !'.  Kopka,  2  Jur.  (n.  s.)  1049.  persons  in  trade,  the  credit  is  then  con- 
In  this  case  it  is  declared  that  "  there  is  sidcred  to  be  given  to  the  Britislt  buyer, 
no  rule  of  law  that  a  person  contracting  and  not  to  the  foreigner.  In  this  case, 
in  England  as  agent  of  a  foreign  prin-  the  buyeis  lived  at  Dumfries  ;  and  a 
cipal  is  personally  liable  on  the  contract,  question  might  have  been  raised  tor  the 
In  all  cases,  whether  the  principal  or  consideration  of  the  jury,  whether,  in 
agent  is  liable  is  a  question  of  inten-  consequence  of  their  living  at  Dumfries, 
tion,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  terms  of  it  may  not  have  been  understood  among 
the  contract  and  the  surrounding  circum-  all  persons  at  Liverpool,  where  there 
stances."  are   great  dealings   with   Scotch   houses, 

{b)  In  Thomson   r.   Davenport,   9  B.  that    the   plaintiffs  had  given    credit   to 

&  C.   78,  a  purchaser  in  Liverpool  rep-  M'Kune  onl}',  and  not  to  a  person  living, 

resented  that  he  bought  for  persons  in  though  not  in  a  foreign  country,  yet,  in 

"•  Thus  in  England,  by  usage  of  trade,  credit  is  given  to  the  factor,  and  his  foreign 
principal  can  neither  enforce  nor  is  bound  bv  the  contract.  Elbinger  Co.  v.  Claye, 
L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  313;  Hutton  v.  Bulloch,  L.  R.  8'Q.  B.  33L 

105 


*9T 

*97 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  The  factor  and  the  principal  may  sometimes  have  con- 
flicting claims  against  a  purchaser ;  as  the  factor  for  his  lien 


that  part  of  the  king's  dominions  which 
renJered  hira  not  amenable  to  any  pro- 
cess of  our  courts.  But  instead  of  direct- 
ing tlie  attention  of  the  Recorder  to  any 
matter  of  that  nature,  the  point  insisted 
upon  by  the  learned  counsel  at  the  trial 
was,  that  it  ought  to  liave  been  part  of 
the  direction  to  the  jury,  that  if  tliey 
were  satisfied  the  plaintiffs,  at  tlie  time 
of  tlie  order  being  given,  knew  tliat 
M'Kune  was  buying  goods  for  anotlier, 
even  though  liis  principal  might  not  be 
made  known  to  them,  they,  by  afterwards 
debiting  M'Kune,  had  elected  him  for 
tiieir  debtor.  The  point  made  l)y  tiie 
defendant's  counsel,  therefore,  was,  that 
if  the  plaintiffs  knew  that  M'Kune  was 
dealing  with  them  as  agent,  thougli  they 
did  know  the  name  of  the  principal 
they  could  not  turn  round  on  him. 
The  Recorder  thought  otherwise :  he 
thought  that  though  they  did  know  that 
M'Kune  was  bu^'ing  as  agent,  j-et  if  they 
did  not  know  who  liis  principal  really 
was  so  as  to  be  able  to  write  him  down 
as  their  debtor,  the  defendant  was  lia- 
ble, and  so  he  left  the  question  to  the 
jury,  and  I  think  he  did  right  in  so  doing. 
The  judgment  of  tlie  court  below  must 
therefore  be  affirmed." — In  Kirkpatrick 
V.  Stainer,  22  Wend.  244,  an  nijpnt  of 
a  /orei(/n  mercantile  house  who  induced  a 
mercliant  Iiere  to  make  a  shipment  of 
goods  to  his  principals,  to  be  sold  on 
commission,  and  em/ajed  that  insurance 
should  be  effected  eitlier  here  or  in  Eu- 
rope on  the  projierty  sliipped,  had  been 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  not  to  be 
personally  liable  for  a  breach  of  the 
agreement  to  insure;  the  action,  if 
maintainable,  lay  oidy  against  the  ])rin- 
cipals.  Tills  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  was  confirmeil  by  tiie  Court  of 
Errors,  Cliancellor  Walworth,  with  some 
other  members  of  the  court,  dissenting 
for  reasons  wliicli  certainly  seem  to  liave 
nmch  weight,  although  tliey  did  not  suf- 
fice to  convince  a  majority  of  the  Court 
of  Errors.  On  the  precise  question  be- 
fore us,  tlie  Chancellor  says:  "Upon  a 
careful  examination  of  the  law  on  this 
subject,  I  have  arriveil  at  the  conclusion 
that  there  is  a  well-settled  distinction  be- 
tween the  personal  liability  of  an  agent, 
who  contracts  for  the  benefit  of  a  do- 
mestic principal,  and  one  who  contracts 
for  a  principal  who  is  domiciled  in  a 
foreign  country.  I  do  not  think  that  by 
our  commercial  usage  it  is  api)lica})lo  to 
the  case  of  a  principal  who  is  domiciled 

106 


in  another  State  of  the  Union ;  as  the  in- 
terests of  trade  do  not  seem  to  require  it. 
Besides,  it  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
applied  in  England  to  the  case  of  a  prin- 
cipal residing  in  Scotland;  although  in 
the  case  of  Thomson  v.  Davenport,  be- 
fore referred  to,  Lord  Tenterden  supposed 
it  might  have  been  a  proper  subject  of 
inquiry  for  the  jury,  whether  there  was 
not  a  tisage  of  trade  at  Liverpool  to  give 
tiie  credit  to  the  agent  where  the  prin- 
cipal resided  in  Scotland.  So  far  as  the 
law  is  settled  on  the  subject,  however,  it 
only  applies  to  a  principal  domiciled  in  a 
foreign  country ;  or,  in  the  language  of 
tlie  common  law,  '  beyond  the  seas.' " 
Senator  Verplaiick  gave  the  only  other 
opinion.  He  thought  the  Supreme  Court 
right,  and  the  majority  of  the  Court  of 
Errors  agreed  with  him.  But  he  rests 
his  opinion  on  the  ground,  that  the  Eng- 
lish rule,  that  the  factor  of  a  foreign 
principal  is  himself  liable  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  principal,  rests  entirely  upon 
the  custom  of  trade  in  England,  and  is  no 
part  of  the  common  law,  nor  of  the  law- 
merchant  generally;  and  is  not  the  law 
of  this  country,  unless  a  particular  cus- 
tom could  be  proved  which  should  give 
that  effect  to  the  contract.  And  there- 
fore, in  the  absence  of  such  evidence  of 
custom,  the  principal  is  liable  as  in  any 
other  cases  of  contracts  by  an  agent  for  a 
principal.  Such  would  seem  to  be  the 
authority  of  this  case;  but  we  neverthe- 
less hold  the  rule  to  be  as  stated  in  our 
text.  In  Taintor  v.  I'rendergast,  3  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  72,  Cowen,  J.,  says,  "This  suit 
was  brought  to  recover  a  sura  of  money 
advanced  to  the  defendant,  a  citizen  of 
this  State,  in  part  payment  for  a  quan- 
tity of  wool  which  he  agreed  to  deliver  to 
the  plaintiff's  agent.  The  contract  was 
made  by  the  latter  without  disclosing  the 
name  of  his  principal,  wlio  was  a  mer- 
chant residing  at  Hartford,  Connecticut. 
The  agent  was  a  resident  of  this  State. 
The  wool  was  not  delivered  as  agreed, 
and  the  question  is,  whether  an  action 
can  be  maintained  by  the  principal.  It 
may  be  admitted,  as  was  urged  in  the 
argument  that  whether  the  principal  be 
considered  a  foreigner  or  not,  his  agent 
omitting  to  disclose  his  name,  would  be 
personally  liable  to  an  action.  Even  in 
case  of  a  foreign  principal,  however,  I 
apprehend  it  would  be  too  strong  to  say, 
that  when  discovered  he  would  not  be 
liable  for  the  price  of  the  commodity 
purchased   by  his  agent.     This   may  in- 


CH.  IV.]  FACTORS   AND    BROKERS.  *  08 

for  advances,  &c.,  and  the  principal  for  his  price.  In  general  it 
may  be  said  that  a  purchaser  Avho  pays  to  either,  will  be  protected 
against  the  other,  if  he  has  no  notice  or  knowledge  of  any  valid 
claim  or  right  belonging  to  the  other,  (c)  But,  excepting  when 
such  rights  exist  in  the  factor,  the  principal  has  a  higher  right 
than  he,  and  may  enforce  a  contract  with  a  third  party  for  his 
own  benefit. 

*  A  factor  may  buy  and  sell,  sue  and  be  sued,  collect  *  98 
money,  receive  payments,  give  receipts,  &c.,  in  his  own 
name  ;  but  a  broker,  only  in  the  name  of  his  principal,  {d}  ^  A 
factor  has  a  lien  on  the  property  in  his  hands,  for  his  commis- 
sions, advances,  and  expenses ;  (e)  ^  but  whether  the  possession 
of  a  bill  of  lading  duly  indorsed,  gives  the  factor  a  right  to  take 

deed  be  said,  when  a  clear  intent  is  credit  was  given  exclusively  to  the  agent, 
shown  to  give  an  exclusive  credit  to  the  and  this  we  think  the  true  rule, 
agent.  I  admit  tliat  such  intent  may  be  (c)  Drinkwater  v.  Goodwin,  Cowper, 
inferred  from  the  custom  of  trade,  where  251 ;  Atkyns  v.  Amber,  3  Esp.  493 ;  Cop- 
the  purchaser  is  known  to  live  in  a  for-  pin  v.  Craig,  7  Taunt.  243;  Hudson  v. 
eign  country.  No  custom  was  shown  or  Granger,  5  B.  &  Aid.  27. 
pretended  in  tlie  case  at  bar;  and  where  {d)  Baring  i-.  Corie,  2  B.  &  Ahl.  143; 
the  parties  reside  in  different  States  Hearshy  r.  Hichox,  7  Eng.  (Ark.)  125. 
under  the  same  confederation,  tliis  has  (e)  Williams  v.  Littlefield,  12  Wend, 
been  held  essential  to  exonerate  tlie  prin-  362  ;  Holbrooke  v.  Weight,  24  Wend.  169. 
cipal.  Thomson  v.  Davenport,  0  B.  &  C.  Tlie  factor  lias  a  general  lien,  to  secure 
78.  It  will  be  seen  by  tliis  case  and  all  advances  and  liabilities,  upon  all  goods 
others  referred  to  by  it,  that  the  usual  which  come  to  his  hands  as  factor.  God- 
and  decisive  indication  of  an  exclusive  in  v.  London  Ass.  Co.  1  Burr.  494 ;  Hol- 
credit  is,  where  the  creditor  knows  there  lingworth  v.  Tooke,  2  H.  Bl.  501  ;  Cowel 
is  a  foreign  principal,  but  makes  liis  v.  Simpson,  16  Ves.  276;  Stevens  v.  Rob- 
charge  in  account  against  the  agent.  If  ins,  12  Mass.  180;  Bryce  v.  Brooks,  26 
the  seller  be  kept  in  ignorance  that  he  is  Wend.  367;  The  Frances,  8  Cranch,  419; 
selling  to  an  agent  or  factor,  I  am  not  Dixon  v.  Stansfield,  10  C.  B.  398.  And 
aware  of  a  case  which  denies  a  concur-  the  factor  obtains  an  interest  sufficient 
rent  remedy."  We  understand  the  court  to  support  his  lien,  upon  accepting  a  draft 
to  mean,  that  where  the  principal  pur-  drawn  upon  the  faith  of  the  goods.  Ne- 
chascr  is  known,  and  is  known  to  live  in  smith  i;.  Dyeing,  &c.  Co.  1  Curtis,  130; 
a  foreign  country,  there  the  existing  cus-  Bank  of  Rochester  v.  Jones,  4  Comst. 
tom  of  trade  leads  to  the  inference  that  497  ;  Vail  v.  Durant,  7  Allen,  408. 

^  A  broker  cannot  sue  in  his  own  name  upon  contracts  made  by  him  as  a  broker, 
Fairlie  r.  Fenton,  L.  R.  5  Ex.  169;  nor,  although  signing  a  contract  note  as  selling 
as  broker  for  an  undisclosed  princii)al,  can  he  sue  as  principal  in  the  contract. 
Sharman  i-.  Brandt,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  720.  Likewise  a  broker,  signing  a  contract  note  in 
terms,  "  I  have  this  day  sold  by  your  order  and  for  your  account  to  my  principals," 
is  not,  in  the  absence  of  usage,  personally  liable  on  the  contract.  Southwell  v.  Bow- 
ditch,  1  C.  P.  D.  374. 

-  Commission  merchants  making  advances  on  goods  insured  by  them  which  are 
burned  without  their  fault,  have  the  same  lien  on  the  insurance  money  when  col- 
lected as  they  had  on  the  goods.  Johnson  v.  Campbell,  120  Mass.  449.  Also  where 
an  agent  has  advanced  money  or  incurred  liability  for  a  principal,  and  the  latter  be- 
comes insolvent  while  the  agent  has  in  his  possession  or  within  reach  the  proceeds 
or  fruit  of  the  advances,  he  has  a  lien  upon  them  before  they  come  into  the  princi- 
pal's actual  possession.  Muller  v.  Pondir,  55  N.  Y.  325.  See  Brown  r.  Coombs,  63 
N.  Y.  598 ;  Daniel  v.  Swift,  54  Ga.  113. 

107 


*  99  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

possession  of  the  goods  and  hold  them  by  his  lien,  is  uncertain. 
We  should  doubt  whether  the  bill  of  lading,  alone,  would  give 
him  such  a  right.  (/)  ^  But  a  factor  who  accepts  a  bill  drawn  on 
goods,  which  goods  are  in  the  hands  of  a  third  person  to  be  de- 
hvered  to  the  factor,  acquires  undoubtedly  a  lien  on  the  goods  as 
against  an  attaching  creditor.  (^)  The  consignor  may  always 
transfer  the  goods  to  a  third  person  free  from  any  lien  or  claim 
of  the  factor  on  them  to  secure  his  debt,  if  he  transfers  them 
before  they  come  into  the  hands  of  the  factor.  (A)  Nor  has  a 
factor  any  lien  on  goods  in  his  hands,  unless  they  came  to  him  as 
factor,  (z) 

It  may  be  doubted,  whether,  in  England,  a  factor  can  sell  the 
goods,  against  the  orders  of  the  principal,  even  if  the  principal 
expressly  refuses  to  pay  or  secure  his  debt  to  the  factor,  (j) 
Here,  the  factor  certainly  may  sell  enough  to  cover  his  balances, 
if  the  principal,  after  proper  demand,  refuses  to  pay  or  secure 
them ;  but  the  factor  must  protect  the  principal's  interest,  as  to 
the  time  and  manner  of  the  sale.  (^)  ^  And  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  denies  that  a  consignor,  having  received 

*  99    advances,  has  any  right,  by  any  orders,  to  suspend  or  *  con- 

trol the  factor's  right  of  sale,  except  as  to  the  surplus  of  the 
goods  beyond  the  factor's  advances  or  liabilities.  (?)  ^ .  But  instruc- 
tions or  an  agreement  as  to  this  right  of  sale  will  be  enforced.  (W) 
Nor  need  a  factor  make  a  sale ;  but  after  reasonable  delay  and 
endeavors  to  sell,  he  may  maintain  an  action  against  his  principal 
for  his  commissions  or  charges,  (wi)  *     As  to  the  measure  of  dam- 

(/)  See,  however,  Rice  ?;.  Austin,  17  230;  Parker  i\   Brancker,  22  Pick.  40; 

Mass.  197 ;   Patten  v.  Thompson,  6  M.  &  Marfield  v.  Goodhue,  3  Comst.  62 ;    Blot 

Sel.  350.  V.  Boiceau,  1  Sandf.  Ill,  and  3  Comst.  78 ; 

(.9)  Ncsmith  r.  Dyeing  Co.  1  Curtis,  130.  Blackmar  v.  Tiiomas,  28  N.  Y.  67.     See 

{h)  Bank   of    Rochester   v.  Jones,    4  aiite,  p.  *  70,  n.  (?/). 
Comst.  497.  (/)   Brown  v.  McGran,  14  Pet.  479. 

(/)     Elliot   V.  Bradley,    23    Vt.   217;  HI)  Milliken  r.  Dehon,  27  N.  Y.  364. 

Dixon  V.  Stansfield,  10  C.  B.  398.  (m)  Frothingham    v.   Everton,   12   N. 

(  /  )  See  Smart  v.  Sandars,  supra.  H.  239  ;  Upham  v.  Lefavour,  11  Met.  174. 

(k)  Frothingham  v.  Everton,  12  N.  H. 

1  The  mere  possession  of  bills  of  lading  of  cotton  confers  no  lien  on  the  factors 
to  whom  it  was  sliippcd  as  against  an  attaciinicnt.  Saunders  v.  Bartlett,  12  Heiskell, 
816 ;  Oliver  v.  Moore,  12  ib.  482 ;  CliafEraix  v.  Harper,  26  La.  An.  22.  IBut  delivery 
of  cotton  to  a  factor's  agent  and  the  placing  it  on  the  factor's  drays  gives  such  a  lien 
as  against  an  attachment  put  on  the  cotton  while  still  on  the  drays.  Burrus  v.  Kyle, 
56  Ga.  24. 

2  But  before  selling  to  repaj'  himself,  the  consignee  must  give  the  consignor 
reasonable  notice  to  repay  him.     Hallowell  v.  Fawcett,  30  la.  491. 

3  Mooney  v.  Musser,  45  Ind.  115  ;  Howard  v.  Smith,  56  Mo.  314,  to  the  same  point. 
♦  A  factor  who  has  made  large  advances  to  his  principal  on  account  of  goods  not 

108 


CH.  IV.]  FACTORS   AND    BROKERS.  *  99 

ages  in  actions  against  factors  for  wrongful  sales,  see  second 
volume. 

Possession  is  necessary  to  give  a  lien,  and  a  broker  has  there- 
fore no  lien,  (w)  i  In  the  transactions  of  business  these  relations 
are  sometimes  confounded,  and  it  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish 
between  the  factor  and  the  broker.  The  best  test,  however,  is 
in  the  fact  of  possession ;  but  even  one  who  has  possession  may 
sometimes  be  held  to  be  a  broker,  (o)  Neither  can  delegate  his 
authority.  (^)  The  broker  may  certainly  be  the  agent  of  both 
parties,  and  often  is  so ;  but  it  would  seem  from  the  nature  of  his 
employment,  that  the  factor  can  be,  generally  at  least,  the  agent 
only  of  the  party  who  employs  him.  The  whole  subject  of  the 
lien  of  a  factor  and  the  rules  and  principles  applicable  to  it,  are 
considered  in  our  chapter  on  Liens ;  and  the  distinction  between 
a  factor  and  broker,  in  respect  to  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  is  stated 
in  the  section  on  Bought  and  Sold  Notes. 

Neither  has  a  right  to  his  commissions,  as  a  general  rule,  until 
the  whole  service,  for  which  these  commissions  are  to  compensate, 
is  performed,  {q)'^     But  where  the  service  is  begun,  and  an  im- 

(n)  See  Jordan  w.  James,  5   Ham.  99,  {p)  Catlin    v.  Bell,  4    Camp.     183; 

where  the  several  classes  of  liens  are  dis-  Solly  v.  Rathbone,  and  Cockran  v.  Irlam, 

cussed,  and  the  cases  cited.     But  it  is  of  2  M.  &  Sel.  298,  n.  (a). 
the  very  essence  of  a  lien  that  possession  (q)  Plamond    v.  Holiday,   1    C.  &    P. 

accompanies  it.  S84  ;    Dalton  v.  Irving,  4  C.  &  P.  289; 

(o)  Pickering  v.  Busk,  15  East,  38.  Broad  v.  Thomas,  7  Bing.  99. 

eold,  wliich  have  been  on  hand  for  several  months,  may  sue  him  for  such  advances 
•without  waiting  until  all  the  goods  are  sold,  although  it  was  agreed  that,  if  upon 
settlement,  after  all  the  goods  were  sold,  any  balance  was  found  due  the  factor,  the 
principal  was  to  pay  it.  Dolan  v.  Thomi)son,  llrlG  Mass.  183.  But  to  recover  from 
his  principal  any  deficit  arising  from  the  sale  of  goods  for  less  than  his  advances  and 
charges,  a  factor  must  show  that  he  faithfully  followed  his  principal's  orders.  Strong 
V.  Stewart,  9  Hciskell,  137. 

1  But  a  broker  may  have  a  lien  upon  the  proceeds  in  his  hands  of  a  sale  of  a 
cargo  of  sugar,  for  his  commissions  arising  from  that  sale,  although  he  cannot 
retain  the  amount  of  his  entire  claim  against  the  owners.  Barry  v.  Boninger,  46 
Md.  59. 

2  Nor  for  unsuccessful  efforts,  unless  the  failure  is  due  to  the  principal.  Sibbald 
V.  Bethlehem  Iron  Co.  83  N.  Y.  378.  But  a  real  estate  broker  is  entitled  to  his  com- 
missions if  he  procures  a  purcliascr,  although  his  principal  concludes  the  sale  him- 
self, Timberman  v.  Craddock,  70  Mo.  ()38;  Arrington  v.  Gary,  5  Ba.xter,  G09;  Dolan 
V.  Scanlan,  57  Cal.  261 ;  but  such  purchaser  must  be  ready  to  carry  out  the  terms 
agreed  on  between  his  principal  and  himself,  Fraser  v.  Wyckoff,  (33  N.  Y.  445; 
McArthur  i'.  Slauson,  53  Wis.  41 ;  or  be  acceptable  to  him,  Coleman  v.  Meade,  13 
Bush,  358 ;  nor  can  the  principal,  by  changing  such  terms,  prevent  the  recovery  of 
such  commissions,  Bash  v.  Hill,  62  111.  216;  Stewart  r.  Mather,  32  Wis.  344;  or  by  a 
refusal  to  ratify  a  sale,  Bailey  v.  Chapman,  41  Mo.  536.  If,  however,  a  broker 
breaks  off  negotiations,  his  principal  can  afterwards  renew  and  coinj)lete  them  with- 
out entitling  the  broker  to  a  commission.  Wylie  v.  Marine  Bank,  61  N.  Y.  415. — 
A  broker  to  sell  is  also  entitled  to  comj)ensation  when  he  finds  one  who  makes  a 
written  contract  for  the  property,  Veazie  v.  Parker,  72  Me.  443 ;  though  never  carried 

109 


*  100  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

portant  part  performed,  and  the  factor  or  broker  is  prevented 
by  some  irresistible  obstacle  from  completing  it,  and  is  himself 
without  fault,  there  it  would  seem  that  he  may  demand  a  pro- 
portionate compensation,  (r)  ^  So  a  broker,  employed  to  sell  land 
and  making  a  proper  bargain,  has  been  held  entitled  to  his  com- 
mission although  the  purchaser  refused  to  take  the  land  from  a 
defect  in  the  title,  {rr')  ^  And  if  he  makes  a  contract  for  the  pur- 
chase of  goods  to  arrive,  he  may  recover  his  commissions  although 
the  goods  do  not  arrive,  (rs)  Neither  factor  nor  broker  can  have 
any  valid  claim  for  his  commissions  or  other  compensation  if 
he  has  not  discharged  all  the  duties  of  the  employment 

*  100    which  he  has  undertaken,  with  proper  care  and  *  skill,  and 

entire  fidelity,  (s)  ^  And  for  his  injurious  default,  he  not 
only  loses  his  claim,  but  the  principal  has  a  claim  for  damages,  (t) 
He  must  account  for  all  the  profits  made  from  contracts  entered 
into  on  behalf  of  his  principal,  (tt^  And  if  he  has  stipulated  to 
give  his  whole  time  to  his  employer,  he  will  not  be  permitted  to 


(r)  Ilamond    v.    Holiday,    1  C.  &   P.  Pick.  328.     Sec  also   Shaw   v.  Arden,  9 

384 ;  Broad  v.  Tliomas,  7  Bing.  99  ;  Read  Bing.  287  ;   Hill  v.  Featherstonhaugh,  7 

V.  Rann,  10  B.  &  C.  438.  Bing.  569.     As  to  his  duty  to  keep  ac- 

(it)  Doty    i:   Miller,  43     Barb.    529;  counts,  see  White  ?;.  Lady  Lincoln,  8  Ves. 

Middleton  v.  Findler,  25  Cal.  76 ;    Knapp  363.     He  must  not  confound  the  princi- 

V.  Wallace,  4   N.  Y.  477 ;    Schwartze  v.  pal's  property  with  liis  own.     Lupton  v. 

Yearly,  31  Md.  270.     See  as  to  tlie  rights  White,  15  Ves.  432.     He  cannot  recover 

of  a  sliip-broker,  Cook  v.  Fiske,  12  Gray,  his  compensation  if  he  has  embezzled  the 

491,  and  Cook  t-.  Welch,  9  Allen,  350.  principal's  funds,  although  it  exceeds  the 

(rs)  Paulsen  v.  Dallett,  2  Daly,  40.  aijiount  embezzled.     Turner  v.  Robinson, 

(s)  Denew  v.  Davcrell,  3   Camp.  451 ;  6  C.  &  P.  16.  n.  (g). 
Hamond  ;-.  Holiday,  1  C.  &  P.  384;  White  (t)  See  note  (b),  p.  *86. 

V.  Chapman,!  Stark.  113;  Hurst  v.  Hold-  («)  Payne  v.  Waterston,  16  La.  An. 

ing,  3  Taunt.  32;   Dodge  v.  Tileston,  12  239. 


out.  Pearson  ij.  Mason,  120  Mass.  53.  —  A  broker,  leaving  copies  of  a  written 
authority  to  i)rocure  a  loan  with  several  persons,  one  of  wiiom  without  the  broker's 
knowledge  lends  tlie  money,  is  entitled  to  his  commissions.  Derrickson  v.  Quimby, 
14  Vroom,  373.  But  wliere  the  broker's  advertisement  attracted  a  purchaser  to 
wiiom  the  principal  made  a  sale,  the  broker  was  held  to  recover  not  even  his  out- 
lays, in  Charlton  v.  Wood,  11  Heiskell,  19.  —  A  broker  to  sell  a  colliery,  who  was  to 
rei-eive  as  a  commission  all  he  could  get  above  a  certain  sum,  was  held  entitled  to 
such  excess,  although  very  largelj'  above  such  sum.  Morgan  c.  Elford,  4  Ch.  D. 
3.52.  —  A  broker,  in  the  absence  of  agreement,  is  entitled  to  the  customary  rate  of 
commissions.     Potts  v.  Aechternacht,  98  Penn.  St.  138. 

1  Or  if  he  opens  a  negotiation,  and  his  princi[)al  completes  the  sale,  he  can 
recover  the  proper  proportion  of  the  commission.  Martin  c.  Silliman,  53  N.  Y.  615. 
See  Thomas  v.  Lincoln,  71  Ind.  41,  to  the  effect  that  a  broker  can  receive  a  com- 
mission only  on  the  actual  completion  of  a  sale  of  personal  property. 

2  Gonzales  v.  Broad,  57  Cal.  224;  rontm,  Rockwell  v.  Newton,  44  Conn.  3.33. 

'  As  in  Fislier  v.  Dynes,  62  Ind.  .'548,  where  a  broker  negotiating  an  exchange  of 
land,  negligently  omitted,  until  the  time  limited  for  the  exchange  had  expired,  to 
inform  one  party  that  the  other  refused  to  take  one  lot  because  the  taxes  were  not 
paid. 

110 


CH.  IV.]  FACTORS    AND    BROKERS.  •  100 

derive  any  compensation  for  services  rendered  elsewhere,  (m) 
Neither  the  factor  nor  broker  can  acquire  any  claim  by  services 
which  are  in  themselves  illegal  or  immoral,  or  against  public 
policy,  (v)  1 

A  factor  to  whom  goods  were  sent  for  sale,  cannot  be  sued 
until  after  demand  or  instructions  to  remit,  (w) 

A  broker  to  whom  a  certificate  of  shares  has  been  intrusted 
with  special  instructions,  can  make  no  disposition  of  them  which 
these  instructions  do  not  permit ;  nor  can  evidence  of  a  contrary 
usage  be  received ;  ^  and  if  he  does  this,  he  is  liable  for  what  was 
the  market  price  of  the  shares  on  the  day  when  he  violated  his 
instructions,  {vw^ 

A  commission  merchant  cannot  detain  proceeds  of  a  sale  from 
his  principal,  in  favor  of  claims  or  equities  between  a  third  party 
and  the  principal,  in  which  the  commission  merchant  has  no 
interest,  (^vx) 

If  a  factor  with  power  to  sell,  has  made  advances  to  his  princi- 
pal, it  may  not  be  quite  certain  whether  these  advances  take  from 
the  principal  the  power  of  revocation.  From  the  cases  it  would 
seem  that  the  prevailing  if  not  the  settled  rule  in  this  country  is 
against  the  power  of  the  principal  to  revoke  an  authority  which 
has  thus  become  coupled  with  an  interest.  But  in  England  it 
seems  to  be  otherwise,  (w) 

(«)  Thompson  v.  Havelock,  1   Camp.  (vv)  Burns  v.  Pilsbury;  10  Gray,  362. 

527,  and  cases  cited  in  note;    Massey  v.  (vw)  Parsons  i'.  Martin,  11  Gray,  111. 

Davies,    2    Ves.    Jr.    317 ;     Gardner    v.  (vx)  Aubery  v.  Fiske,  36  N.  Y.  47. 

M'Cutcheon,  4  Beav.  534.  (w)  See  note  (?/),  p.  *  70,  in  which  tlie 

(v)  Haines   v.  Buslc,    5    Taunt.    521;  cases  on  tliis  question  are  given  in  con- 
Josephs  V.  Pebber,  3  B.  &  C.  639 ;  Wyburd  nection  with  tiie  more  general  subject  of 
r.  Stanton,  4  Esp.  179;   Buck  i;.  Buck,  1  a  revocation  of  an  authority  coupled  with 
Camp.  547;  and  Rex  y.  Shatton,  in  note;  an  interest. 
Armstrong  v.  Toler,  11  Wheat.  258. 

'  Thus  a  broker  cannot  recover  premiums  paid  for  illegal  insurance,  Allkins  v. 
Jupe,  2  C.  P.  T>.  375 ;  nor  money  advanced  to  cover  losses  in  stock-gambling,  nor  his 
commissions  therein.  Fareira  v.  Gabell,  89  Penn.  St.  89.  But  a  broker  carrying 
stocks  on  a  margin,  is  entitled  to  his  expenditures,  especially  where  he  informs  his 
principal  frequently  of  the  state  of  his  accounts,  and  the  latter,  knowing  the  custom, 
makes  no  objection  until  called  upon  to  pay.     Robinson  v.  Norris,  51  How.  Pr.  442. 

-  A  usage  of  brokers  that  one,  on  receipt  of  an  order  to  buy  stocks  on  a  margin, 
assumes  the  contract  himself,  instead  of  making  it  with  a  third  person,  is  illegal. 
Commonwealth  v.  Cooper,  130  Mass.  285. 

Ill 


101  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 


*101  *  CHAPTER  Y. 

SERVANTS. 

In  England  the  relation  of  master  and  servant  is  in  many  re- 
spects regulated  by  statutory  provisions,  and  upon  some  points 
is  materially  affected  by  the  existing  distinction  of  ranks,  and  by 
rules  which  have  come  down  from  periods  when  this  distinction 
was  more  marked  and  more  operative  than  at  present.  In  this 
country  we  have  nothing  of  this  kind.  With  us,  a  contract  for 
service  is  construed  and  governed  only  by  the  general  principles 
of  the  law  of  contracts. 

The  word  servant  seems  to  have  in  law  two  meanings.  One  is 
that  which  it  has  in  common  use,  when  it  indicates  a  person  hired 
by  another  for  wages,  to  work  for  him  as  he  may  direct. 

We  may  call  such  a  person  a  servant  in  fact ;  but  the  word 
is  also  used  in  many  cases  to  indicate  a  servant  by  construc- 
tion of  law ;  it  is  sometimes  applied  to  any  person  employed  by 
another,  and  is  scarcely  to  be  discriminated  in  these  instances 
from  the  word  agent.  This  looseness  in  the  use  of  the  word 
is  the  more  to  be  regretted,  because  it  seems  to  have  given  rise 
to  some  legal  difficulties  and  questions  which  might  have  been 
avoided. 

There  are  important  consequences  flowing  from  the  relation 
of  master  and  servant,  and  it  is  therefore  an  important  question, 
where  this  relation  exists,  and  how  far  it  extends.  Thus,  if  one 
wishes  to  build  or  repair  a  house,  and  contracts  with  another  to 
do  this,  and  the  contractor  with  another,  and  this  other  with  still 
a  third,  for  perhaps  a  part  of  the  work,  or  the  supply  of  materials, 
and  the  servant  of  the  third  by  his  negligence  injures  some  per- 
son, has  the  injured  party  his  right  of  action  against  the  owner  of 
the  land  or  of  the  house  ?  Undoubtedly,  if  all  employed  about 
the  house  were  his  servants,  but  not  otherwise.  So  if  an 
*  102  owner  of  coaches  lets  one  with  the  horses  *  and  the  coach- 
man for  a  definite  time  or  a  definite  journey,  and  while  the 
112 


CH.  v.]  SERVANTS.  *  1 02 

hirer  is  using  the  coach  the  coachman  by  his  negligence  injures  a 
person ;  has  the  injured  party  now  an  action  against  the  owner  ? 
Yes,  if  the  coachman  were  at  the  time  of  the  wrongful  act  his  ser- 
vant, and  not  otherwise.  Hence,  when  a  master  gives  general 
directions  to  his  servant,  trusting  to  his  discretion,  the  master 
may  be  liable  for  the  servant's  misuse  of  his  discretion;  but  if  lie 
gives  specific  directions,  and  the  servant  transcends  them,  the 
master  is  not  liable,  (a)  Again,  if  one  employs  a  person  to  drive 
home  for  him  cattle  which  he  has  bought,  and  gives  the  cattle  up 
to  the  driver,  going  elsewhere  himself,  and  the  driver,  or  a  person 
employed  by  the  driver,  by  his  negligence,  injures  any  one,  the 
injured  person  has,  we  think,  as  in  the  other  instances,  an  action 
against  the  original  party,  if  the  party  who  did  the  wrong  were  at 
the  time  his  servant,  and  not  otherwise.  So  one  was  held  respon- 
sible, who  employed  a  day  laborer  to  clean  out  a  drain,  in  doing 
which  he  broke  up  the  highway,  whereby  the  plaintiff  was  in- 
jured. (6)  The  general  principle  is,  that  a  master  is  responsible 
for  the  tortious  acts  of  his  servant,  which  were  done  in  his  service.^ 
It  is  certain  and  obvious  that  a  master  is  not  responsible  for  all 
the  torts  of  his  servant ;  for  those,  for  instance,  of  which  the  ser- 
vant is  guilty,  when  they  are  entirely  aside  from  his  service,  and 

(a)  Oxford  v.  Peter,  28  111.  434.  (h)  Sadler  i;.  Henlock,  4  E.  &  B.  570. 

1  This  is  so  although  the  servant  is  reckless,  lacks  judgment,  or  yields  to  passion, 
causing  an  unjustifiable  injury,  Cohen  v.  Dry  Dock,  &c.  R.  Co.  69  N.  Y.  170;  or  acts 
wantonly  or  even  wilfully.  Mott  v.  Consumers'  Ice  Co.  73  N.  Y.  543.  —  The  owner 
of  a  cab,  the  driver  of  which  on  his  way  back  to  the  stables  drives  furiously  and 
runs  over  a  person,  is  liable  for  the  driver's  negligence,  Venables  v.  Smith,  2  Q.  B.  I). 
279;  and  equally  so  a  stevedore,  whose  foreman  was  to  superintend  the  ship])ing  of 
rails  after  a  carman  had  unloaded  them,  and  who,  being  dissatisfied  witli  the  latter's 
unloading,  so  unloaded  some  as  to  injure  a  passer-by.  Burns  v.  Poulson,  h.  It.  8 
C.  P.  ^63.  In  Bay  ley  ;•.  Manchester,  &c.  R.  Co.  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  415,  affirmed  in  L.  R. 
8  C.  P.  148,  a  railway  company  was  declared  responsible  for  the  act  of  a  porter  in 
violcntlj'  pulling  a  passenger  out  of  a  railway  carriage,  under  an  erroneous  impres- 
sion that  the  passenger  was  in  a  wrong  carriage,  as  being  an  act  done  in  the  course 
of  his  duty,  a  part  of  which  was  to  prevent  people  from  travelling  in  wrong  car- 
riages.—  But  a  master  is  not  liable  in  exemplary  danuiges  unless  the  servant  was 
wantonly  negligent.  Hawes  i'.  Knowles,  114  Mass.  518;  Clcghorn  v.  N.  Y.  &c.  R. 
Co.  56  N.  Y.  44  ;  Wade  v.  Thayer,  40  Cal.  578.  —  If  a  person  is  injured  by  the  com- 
bined negligence  of  master  and  servant,  o  fortiori  the  master  is  liable.  Tuel  y. 
Weston,  47  Vt.  634.  —  The  owner  is  not  liable  for  damage  caused  by  his  runaway 
horse,  if  the  driver  was  not  careless.  Holmes  v.  Mather,  L.  R.  10  Ex.  261  ;  nor  while 
in  use  by  a  borrower  in  other  than  the  owner's  business.  Ilerlihy  v.  Smith,  116 
Mass.  265. — A  carman  whose  duty  is  to  deliver  beer  with  a  hor.«e  and  cart  and  col- 
lect the  empty  casks,  and  who  uses  the  horse  and  cart  on  an  errand  of  his  own,  does 
not  by  reason  of  picking  up  some  casks  on  his  return  so  re-enter  his  master's  em- 
ployment as  to  render  the  latter  liable  for  an  accident  then  occurring.  Haj-ner  v. 
Mitchell,  2  C.  P.  D.  357.  —  The  knowledge  of  a  servant  put  in  charge  of  a  dog  of  his 
ferocious  character,  is  the  knowledge  of  the  master.  Baldwin  i'.  Casella,  L.  R.  7  Ex. 
325. 

VOL.  I.  8  113 


102 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


have  no  connection  with  his  duties,  or  with  the  command  or  the 
wish  of  his  master ;  (W)  as  if  he  should  leave  his  master's  house 
at  night  and  commit  a  felony.  There  must,  then,  be  some  prin- 
ciple which  limits  and  defines  the  rule,  respondeat  superior.  And 
we  think  it  may  be  clearly  seen  and  stated.  It  is  this :  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  master  grows  out  of,  is  measured  by,  and  begins 
and  ends  with,  his  control  of  the  servant.  (<?)     It  is  true  that  the 


(bb)  Evansville,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Baum, 
26  Ind.  70. 

(c)  On  this  ground  rests  the  distinc- 
tion now  well  established,  between  the 
neglicjence  of  the  servant,  and  his  wilful 
and  malicious  trespass;  the  act  in  eitlier 
case  being  done  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ploy. For  the  former  the  master  must 
answer;  for  the  latter  he  is  held  not 
liable,  unless  tlie  trespass  is  proved  to 
have  been  autliorized  or  ratified  by  him. 
McManus  ;'.  Crickett,  1  East,  106 ;  Croft 
I'.  Alison,  4  B.  &  Aid.  590;  Lyons  v.  Mar- 
tin, 8  A.  &  E.  512;  Goodman  v.  Kennell, 
1  Mo.  &  P.  241,  s.  c.  3  C.  &  P.  167  ;  Sad- 
ler V.  Henlock,  4  El.  &  Bl.  570  ;  Foster 
V.  Essex  Bank,  17  Mass.  479;  Wright  v. 
Wilcox,  19  Wend.  343;  Vanderbilt  ij. 
Richmond  Turnpike  Co.  2  Comst.  479 ; 
Corbin  v.  American  Mills,  27  Conn.  274. 
But  it  seems  that  where  the  duty  of  the 
master  to  the  party  whose  property  is  in- 
jured, is  not  merely  that  which  every 
man  owes  to  his  neighbor,  but  a  peculiar 
duty  arising  from  a  special  relation,  there 
that  special  relation  may  occasion  a 
liability  even  for  the  wilful  tort  of  the 
servant.  As  where  the  relation  is  one  of 
bailment.  In  Sinclair  u.  Pearson,  7  N.  11. 
227,  Parker,  J.,  giving  the  judgment, 
said :  "  It  is  evident,  therefore,  tliat  the 
liability  of  a  bailee,  for  a  loss  occasioned 
by  tlie  act  of  a  servant,  cannot  be  made 
to  depend  uj)on  the  question  whether  the 
act  was  wilful  or  ochcrwise ;  or  whether 
the  servant,  in  committing  it,  was  doing, 
or  forbearing  wliat  his  master  had  direct- 
ed ;  for  if  that  were  the  criterion,  the 
bailee  would  never  be  liable  for  the  act 
or  neglect  of  his  servant,  unless  done  by 
his  command,  either  exjirossed,  or  in  fact 
to  be  inferred  ;  but  it  must  depend  upon 
the  question  whether  the  degree  of  care 
and  diligence  required  about  tiie  preserva- 
tion, safe-keeping  &c.,  of  the  thing  bailed, 
has  been  exercised  bv  master  and  ser- 
vant." And  Ellis  V.  Turner,  8  T.  R.  531, 
was  referred  to,  where  a  loss  of  part  of 
a  cargo  liaving  occurred  in  consequence 
of  the  misconduct  of  the  master  of  the 
vessel,  and  an  action  iiaving  been  brouglit 
by  the  owner  of    the  goods  against  the 

114 


owners  of  the  vessel,  Lord  Kemjon  said : 
"  Though  the  loss  happened  in  con- 
sequence of  the  misconduct  of  the  de- 
fendants' servant,  the  superiors  (the 
defendants)  are  answerable  for  it  in  this 
action.  The  defendants  are  responsible 
for  tiie  acts  of  their  servant  in  those, 
things  that  respect  his  duty  under 
them,  though  they  are  not  answerable 
for  his  misconduct  in  those  things  that 
do  not  respect  his  duty  to  them  :  as 
if  he  were  to  commit  an  assault  upon  a 
third  person  in  the  course  of  his  voyage." 
— The  rule  established  in  McManus  v. 
Crickett,  is  criticised  by  Reeve,  Dom. 
Rel.  357 ;  and  in  the  case  of  The  Druid, 
1  Wm.  Rob.  485,  Dr.  Luslwvjton  com- 
mented in  forcible  terms  upon  the  hard- 
ship of  the  rule,  and  expressed  regret  at 
its  adoption.  —  If  a  master  give  general 
directions  which  naturally  occasion  the 
commission  of  a  tort  by  the  servant 
executing  them,  the  master  is  liable,  not- 
withstanding he  never  commanded  that 
particular  act.  Rex  v.  Nutt,  Fitzg.  47  ; 
Lord  Tenterden,  Rex  v.  Gutch,  Mo.  &  M. 
437,  4-38;  Attorney-General  v.  Siddon,  1 
Tyr.  49;  Gregory  v.  Piper,  9  B.  &  C. 
591 ;  Lord  Lonsdale  v.  Littledale,  2  H.  Bl. 
267,  299 ;  Sly  v.  Edgley,  6  Esp.6  ;  Holmes 
V.  Onion,  2  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  790.  In  Powles 
V.  Hider,  6  E.  &  B.  208,  the  owner  of  a 
cab,  plying  in  London,  was  held  liable  for 
goods  lost  by  the  negligence  of  the  cab- 
driver,  although  the  driver  paid  the  owner 
every  day  a  certain  sum  for  the  use  of 
tlie  cab  and  horses.  And  where  the  ser- 
vant is  in  the  employ  of  the  master,  and 
the  acts  complained  of  are  done  in  the 
course  of  the  employment,  the  master 
is  responsible,  altliough  the  acts  were 
done  in  a  way  directly  contrary  to 
his  instructions.  Philadelphia,  &c.  R. 
Co.  V.  Derby,  14  How.  468  ;  Southwick 
V.  Estcs,  7  Cush.  385.  —  But  in  cases 
where  the  master  is  held  liable  ou  the 
ground  of  an  implied  authority  to  the 
servant  to  do  the  particular  act  for  him, 
if  tlie  tort  is  a  trespass  on  the  ])art  of  tlie 
servant,  tlie  master  must  not  be  sued  in 
trespass,  but  case.  Gordon  v.  Rolt,  4 
Exch.  365 ;  Sliarrod  v.  London,  &c.  Iv.  Co. 


CH.  v.]  SERVANTS.  *  103 

policy  of  holding  a  master  to  a  *  reasonable  care  and  dis-  *  103 
cretion  in  the  choice  of  a  servant  may  cause  a  liberal  con- 
struction of  the  rule  in  respect  to  an  injured  party,  and 
may  therefore  be  satisfied  in  some  instances  with  a  *  slight  *  104 
degree  of  actual  control ;  but  of  the  soundness  and  general 
applicability  of  the  principle  itself,  we  do  not  doubt ;  nor  do  we 
see  any  greater  difficulty  in  the  application  of  the  principle  than 
may  always  be  apprehended  from  the  variety  and  complexity  of 
the  facts  to  which  this  and  other  legal  principles  may  be  applied. 
The  master  is  responsible  for  what  is  done  by  one  who  is  his 
servant  in  fact,  for  the  reason  that  he  has  such  servant  under 
his  constant  control,  and  may  direct  him  from  time  to  time  as  he 
sees  fit ;  and  therefore  the  acts  of  the  servant  are  the  acts  of  the 
master,  because  the  servant  is  at  all  times  only  an  instrument ; 
and  one  is  not  liable  for  a  person  who  is  a  servant  only  by  con- 
struction, excepting  so  far  as  this  essential  element  of  control 
and  direction  exists  between  them.  We  should  therefore  say 
that,  in  the  instances  we  have  before  supposed,  the  owner  of  the 
land  or  the  house  was  not  responsible  for  the  tort  of  the  servant 
of  the  sub-contractor,  nor  would  he  have  been  for  the  tort  of  the 
sub-contractor  or  of  the  first  contractor.  They  were  not  his  ser- 
vants in  any  sense  whatever ;  they  were  to  do  a  job,  and  when 
this  was  done  he  was  to  pay  the  party  whom  he  had  promised  to 
pay ;  and  this  was  all ;  for  if,  although  a  contractor  be  employed, 
by  the  terms  of  the  contract  control  is  left  with  the  owner,  lie 
is  still  liable,  (cc)  Nor  is  the  contractor  held  if  he  properly 
executes  the  plan  and  follows  the  direction  of  an  architect  em- 
ployed to  direct  him,  and  injury  occurs  through  the  fault  of  the 
plan,  (^cd)  In  accordance  with  this  rule  it  is  declared  that  where 
the  negligent  party  exercises  a  distinct  and  independent  calling, 

4  Exch.  580 ;  where  a  railway  train,  driven  ing  the  servant  to  drive  at  sncli  a  rate  as 

at  the  rate  of  forty  miles  an  hour,  accord-  to  interfere  with  the  rigiit  of  the  slieep  to 

ing  to  the  general  directions  of  the  com-  be  on   tiie  railway.     It  was  observed  in 

pany  to  the  driver,  ran  over  and  killed  the  judgment,  that,  notwithstanding  the 

some  sheep  which  had  strayed  upon  the  order  to  the  driver  to  proceed  at  a  great 

line  in  consequence  of  the  defective  fences  speed,  it  did  not  follow  as   a   luccssary 

of  the  company.     It  appeared  tliat  if  tlie  consequence   that  the   engine  would  in- 

driver  (running  the  engine  at  the  speed  fringe  on  the  plaintiff's  cattle  ;  and  the 

directed)  had  seen  the   sheep,  he   could  ease  was  distinguished  from   Gregory  v. 

not   have   stopped   the   train  in  time  to  Piper,  9  B.  &  C.  591,  on  this  ground.     See 

prevent   the   collision.     Held,    that    the  Howe  v.  Newmarch,   12  Allen,  49;   Du 

company  were  not  liable  in  trespass  for  Pratt  v.  Lick,  38  Cal.  691. 
the  injury  ;    but  that  the  action  should  [cc.)  Schwartz  v.  Gilmore,  45  111.  455. 

have  been  case,  either  for  permitting  the  [cd)  Daegling  v.  Gilmore,  49  III.  248. 


fences  to  be  out  of  repair,  or  for  direct 


115 


*  105  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

his  cmplo3^er  is  not  liable,  (c^)  and  if  the  negligence  be  committed 
in  the  performance  of  a  piece  of  work  undertaken  in  consequence 
of  a  special  contract,  in  such  case  the  contractor  is  solely  respon- 
sible, (e)  ^  Nor  does  it  make  any  difference  if  the  contractor  be, 
in  matters  beside  the  contract,  the  servant  of  the  other  con- 
tracting party.  (/)  And  the  party  with  whom  the  contractor 
engages  is  not  liable,  although  acts  arc  done  by  the  contractor  or 
his  servants  amounting  to  a  public  nuisance,  so  long  as  the  act 
contracted  for  is  not  in  itself  a  nuisance,  (g)  But  if  an  employer 
interferes  with  the  contractor  and  gives  special  directions,  and 
the  mischief  is  done  while  the  contractor  is  obeying  them,  the 
employer  would  be  liable,  (gcf')  If  the  act  to  be  done  be  itself 
an  unlawful  one,  or  necessarily  involves  in  its  performance  the 
commission   of   a   public   nuisance,   the   employer   is  not 

*  105    discharged  from  liability  on  the  ground  that  the  *  party 

employed  was  a  contractor,  because  in  such  case  he  has 
sufficient  control,  and  expressly  commands  the  act  to  be  done,  {h)  ^ 

(of)  Milligan   v.  Wedge,  12    A.    &    E.  contractor's  servant.    Where  a  company, 

787  ;    Martin   v.  Temperley,  4  Q.  B.  208  ;  empowered  hy  act  of  parliament  to  con- 

De  Forrest  v.  Wright,  2  Mich.  368;  Pierce  struct  a  railway  contracted  with  certain 

w.  O'Keefe,  11  Wis.  180;  Butler  y.  Hmiter,  persons   to  make  a  portion  of   the  line, 

7  II.  &  N.  826.  and  by  the  contract  reserved  to   them- 

(e)  Allen    i\    Hay  ward,  7  Q.  B.  960;  selves  the  power  of    dismissing  any  of 

Gayford  v.  Nicholls,  9  Exch.  702.  the  contractor's  workmen   for   incompe- 

(/)   Knight  ('.  Fox,  5  Exch.  72.  tence  ;  and  the  workmen,  in  constructing 

(7)  Overton  ('.  Freeman,  3  Car.  &K.  49.  a  bridge  over  a  public  highway,  negli- 

(grj)   Hefferman  v.  Benkard,  1  Rob.  4-'32.  gently   caused    the   death   of    a    person 

(Vi)  Peachey  v.  Rowland,  13  C.  B.  182;  passing  beneath  the  liighway  by  allowing 

Ellis  V.  Siieffield  Gas  Co.  2  El.  &  Bl.  767.  a  stone  to  fall  upon  him :    Held,  in  an 

—  It  is  a  consequence  from  tlie  princij)les  action   against  tlio  company,  iipon  stat. 

stated  in  the  text,  that  if  a  contractor  9  &  10  Vict.  c.  93,  by  the  administratrix 

himself  employ  a  servant,  he  and  not  the  of  the  deceased,  that  they  were  not  liable: 

original  employer  is  liable  for  the  con-  and   that    the   terms  of    the  contract  in 

duct  of  that  servant.     And  the  general  question    did   not   make   any   difference. 

emi)loyer  does  not  become  liable  even  if  Reedie  v.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  4  Excdi.  244. 

he  have  a  degree  of  control  over  the  ser-  Yet  a  man  is  none  the  less  liable  for 

vant,  and  tlio  jjower  of  removal,  provided  the  negligence  of    his  own  servants  be- 

tliis  authority  is  not  so  extensive   as   in  cause  they    were    not  directly   employed 

effect  to  render  the  servant  no  longer  the  by  him,  but  mediately,  through  the  inter- 

'  Thus  the  owner  of  a  house,  employing  a  carpenter  to  raise  it  and  put  another 
story  under  it  complete,  is  not  liable  for  an  injury  to  an  adjoining  house  during  the 
work,  unless  the  carpenter  is  unskilful  or  imsuitable,  or  the  work  creates  a  nuisance. 
Conners  v.  Hennessey,  112  Mass.  96.  See  Robinson  v.  Webb,  11  Bush,  464.  But 
Bower  v.  Peate,  1  Q.  B.  D.  ."21,  decided  that  if  a  house-owner  employs  a  contractor 
to  ))\ill  the  house  down,  excavate  the  foimdations,  and  rebuihl  it,  he  is  liable  for  an 
injury  thereby  caused  to  an  adjoining  house,  on  the  ground  that  the  owner  was 
bound  to  see  to  it  that  no  accident  happened,  although  the  contractor  undertook  to 
sujijiort  the  adjoining  house  as  far  as  might  be  necessary. 

^  Thus  by  employing  a  person  to  fill  an  ice-house  by  the  cord,  the  employer  can- 
not escape  liability  for  injuries  caused  by  an  obstruction  of  the  street  in  so  doing. 
Darmstaetter  v.  Moynahan,  27  Mich.  188. 

116 


CH.  v.] 


SERVANTS. 


lOG 


A  contractor  to  build  houses,  employing  a  sub-contractor  has 
been  held  liable  for  injury  caused  by  the  sub-contractor's  negli- 
gence, {hh}  Some  exceptions  seem  to  be  made  on  the  ground  of 
public  policy,  although  the  case  could  hardly  come  within  the 
law  or  reason  of  nuisance ;  as  where  railroads  have  their  work 
done  by  contract,  and  are  yet  held  liable,  (i)  And  a  railroad 
company  has  been  held  liable  for  an  injury  caused  by  the  wilful 
misconduct  of  its  engineer,  (u)  And  mortgagees  of  a  railroad 
who  are  in  possession  and  who  manage  the  road,  are  liable  for 
the  negligence  of  their  servants.  (?}*)  So,  too,  a  distinction  seems 
to  be  taken  between  an  injury  caused  by  the  manner  of  doing 
a  work,  and  one  caused  by  the  work  itself.  As,  for  exam- 
ple, a  *  municipal  corporation  building  a  sewer,  would  not  *  lOG 
be  liable  for  the  negligent  act  of  a  workman  employed  by 
the  contractor;  but  would  be  liable  for  an  accident  caused  by 
the  sewer  being  left  open  at  night,  and  improperly  lighted  and 
guarded,  (y)     So  commissioners  of  emigration  are  not  responsible 


vention  of  another,  whom  he  has  author- 
ized to  appoint  servants  for  him.  And 
Liitledale,  J.,  in  the  able  opinion  so  much 
cited,  instances  several  cases  where  the 
liability  exists,  although  the  master  has 
neitlier  tiie  direct  appointment  nor  the 
superintendence  of  the  servants ;  as  the 
liability  of  a  shipowner  for  the  crew 
selected  and  governed  bj'  the  master;  of 
the  owner  of  a  farm,  who  conducts  its 
operations  through  a  bailiff,  for  the  in- 
ferior working  men  hired  by  the  bailiff ; 
and  of  the  owner  of  a  mine  for  the  work- 
men employed  by  his  steward,  and  paid 
by  him  on  behalf  of  the  master.  To 
which  may  be  added  the  liability  of  the 
owner  of  a  chartered  ship  for  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  crew  while  under  the 
immediate  direction  of  the  charterer. 
See  Fenton  v.  Dublin  Steam  Packet  Co. 
8  A.  &  E.  835.  The  following  conven- 
ient tests  for  ascertaining  in  a  particular 
case  whether  a  certain  person  was  the 
master  of  the  servants  in  question,  are 
suggested  by  Coleridrje,  J.,  7  Jur.  152 : 
Had  he  tne  power  of  selecting  them  ?  — 
was  he  the  party  to  pay  them  ?  —  were 
they  doing  his  work  ?  —  were  they  doing 
that  work  under  his  control  in  the  or- 
dinary way  ?  — Where  the  otlier  elements 
of  liability  exist,  it  is  no  defence  that 
the  master,  voluntarily  performing  part 
of  his  work  by  means  of  servants,  was 
obliged  by  law  to  take  those  servants 
from   a   prescribed    class.     Whether    lie 


would  be  liable  where  the  law  absolutely 
forbade  him  to  do  that  part  of  his  busi- 
ness himself,  and  still  allowed  him  to 
select  out  of  a  class  more  or  less  nu- 
merous, is  perhaps  unsettled,  liut  the  prob- 
ability is  he  would  still  be  held.  Where 
there  is  this  personal  prohibition,  and 
also  an  obligation  by  law  to  take  a  par- 
ticular wdividual,  and  thus  no  liberty  of 
choice  whatever  is  permitted,  it  seems 
the  master's  liabilitv  ceases.  See  Martin 
V.  Temperlcv,  4  Q.  13.  208 ;  The  Agricola, 
2  Wm.  Rob.' 10;  The  Maria,  1  Wm.  Rob. 
95;  Lucy  r.  Ingram,  G  M.  &  W.  302; 
Yates  ('.  Brown,  8  Pick.  23 ;  Stone  v. 
Codman,  15  Pick.  297 ;  Lowell  v.  Boston, 
&c.  R.  Co.  23  Pick.  24  ;  Sproul  v.  Pleming- 
way,  14  Pick.  1 ;  Ruffin,  C.  J.,  in  Wiswall 
V.  Brinson,  10  Ired.  L.  5(33 ;  Blake  v. 
Ferris,  1  Scld.  48;  Stevens  r.  Armstrong, 
2  id.  435 ;  Kelley  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
York,  1  Kern.  432. 

(hh)  Creed  v.  Hartman,  29  N.  Y.  591, 
and  8  Bosw.  12.3. 

(/)  See  some  of  the  cases  cited  in 
preceding  note,  and  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
York  V  Bailey,  2  Denio,  445;  Ililliard  r. 
Richardson,  3  Gray,  352.  See  also  Camus 
V.  Citizens  Co.  40  Barb.  380. 

(ii)  New  Orleans  R.  Co.  v.  AUbritton, 
.38  Miss.  242. 

((■/)  Ballou  V.  Farnum,  9  Allen,  47. 

(}■)  Storrs  V.  City  of  Utica,  17  N.  Y. 
104.  This  case  throws  some  doubt  on 
Blake  v.  Ferris,  1  Seld.  48. 

117 


106 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


for  the  good  conduct  of  persons  whom  they  lawfully  license,  (^y) 
And  the  city  of  New  Bedford  was  not  liable  for  injury  caused 
by  negligence  of  firemen  appointed  and  paid  under  a  statute ;  it 
was  held  that  the  action  would  not  lie.  {jk)  If  the  contracting 
party  employs  persons  to  do  the  work,  not  on  a  contract,  but  on 
day's  wages,  he  would  still  retain  the  power  of  directing  them 
from  day-  to  day  in  their  work ;  and  this  might  render  him  liable. 
But  we  should  still  hold  that  if  the  work  done  at  day  wages  were 
such  as  to  carry  with  it  no  implication  or  probability  of  actual 
supervision  or  control,  and  none  such  were  proved  in  fact,  the 
employer  would  not  be  liable.  For  the  same  reason  we  should 
say  that  the  owner  and  letter  of  a  coach,  horses,  and  coachman, 
was  or  was  not  responsible  to  one  injured  by  the  negligence  of 
the  coachman,  as  the  terms  of  the  hiring  and  the  circumstances 
of  the  case  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  coachman  was  or  was 
not  at  the  time  of  the  negligence  the  servant  of  the  owner  or 
of  the   hirer   of   the   coach.  (A;)  ^     The   owner   might   doubtless 


( // )  Murphy  v.  Commissioners,  &e. 
28  N.  Y.  134. 

(jk)  Hafford  v.  New  Bedford,  16 
Gray,  297. 

(k)  A  party  who  is  not  the  general 
master  of  a  servant  may  make  him  his 
servant  in  a  particular  transaction,  by 
specially  directing  him  thereto,  or  by  a 
subsi-'quent  adoption  of  what  he  lias 
done ;  and  in  this  way  a  special  liability 
may  lie  incurred.  And  in  Quarman  v. 
Burnett,  6  M.  &  W.  508,  the  owners  of 
the  carriage  having  provided  the  driver 
with  a  livery  which  he  left  at  their  house 
at  the  end  of  each  drive,  and  the  injury 
in  question  being  occasioned  by  his  leav- 
ing the  hf)rscs,  while  so  depo.siting  the 
livery  in  tlicir  house,  the  court  acknowl- 
edged that  if  it  had  appeared  that  the 
coachman  went  into  the  house  to  leave 
his  livery  on  that  occasion  under  a  spe- 
cial order  of  the  owners,  or  under  a  gen- 
eral order  to  do  so  at  all  times,  without 
h'aving  any  f)ne  at  the  horses'  heads,  a 
liability  would  have  been  incurred.  In 
the  course  of  the  judgment,  Baron  Parke 
observed :  "  It  is  undoubtedly  true  tliat 
there  may  be  special  circum.stances 
whicb  may  render  the  hirer  of  job-horses 
and  servants  responsible  for  the  neglect 


of  a  servant,  though  not  liable  by  virtue 
of  the  general  relation  of  master  and  ser- 
vant. He  may  become  so  by  his  own  con- 
duct, as  by  taking  the  actual  management 
of  the  horses,  or  ordering  the  servant  to 
drive  in  a  particular  manner,  which  occa- 
sions tlie  damage  complained  of,  or  to 
absent  himself  at  one  particular  moment, 
and  the  like."  See  also  Burgess  v.  Gray, 
1  C.  B.  578.  —  Where  question  is  not 
made  of  the  fact  of  service,  but  simply 
whether  it  is  a  service  of  that  party  whom 
it  is  attempted  to  charge  —  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  servant  cannot  have, 
with  respect  to  the  same  act  of  service, 
two  unconnected  masters.  Two  persons 
may  be  joint  masters,  and  thereby  sub- 
ject to  a  joint  liability  ;  and  such  joint 
liability  may  be  converted  into  a  several 
one  by  the  election  of  the  plaintiff  to 
sue  one  separately  —  which  the  law  al- 
lows to  be  done  in  actions  of  tort ;  but 
"  two  persons  cannot  be  made  separately 
liable  at  the  election  of  the  party  suing, 
wilfss  in  cases  where  tliey  would  bo 
jointly  liable."  Liitlcdale,  J.,  Lauglier  v. 
Pointer,  5  B.  &  C.  559.  This  principle 
serves  as  a  test  in  that  difficult  class  of 
cases  where  the  negligent  servant  seems 
to  be  in  some  respects  in  the  employment 


'  In  Omoa,  &c.  Co.  v.  Huntley,  2  C.  P.  D.  464,  it  was  decided  that  an  owner  who 
charters  a  vessel  for  certain  specified  objects,  but  who  engages  and  pays  the  master 
and  crew,  is  liable  for  the  loss  of  the  cargo  through  their  negligence. 

118 


CH.  v.]  •     SERVANTS.  *  107 

be  held  responsible  *  to  the  hirer,  if  the  injured  party  com-  *  107 
pelled  him  to  make  compensation,  and  it  could  bo  shown 
that  the  owner  had  knowingly  employed  an  insufficient  and  dan- 
gerous servant,  for  this  would  be  only  to  hold  him  responsible  for 
his  own  negligence.  The  rule  we  have  given  would  not  require 
the  tort  to  be  committed  in  the  master's  presence  in  order  to  hold 
him  responsible.  It  is  enough  if,  when  the  tort  was  committed,  the 
wrong-doer  was  in  the  service  of  the  master,  and  w^as  then  acting 
as  his  servant.  And  this  question  has  been  held  to  be  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury.  (V)  If,  however,  the  servant,  when  doing  the 
wrong,  was  employed  in  the  service  of  the  master,  it  is  no  defence 
for  the  master,  that  he  was  also,  and  in  some  degree,  acting  in 
his  own  business,  (iii) 

There  seems  to  be  some  extension  of  the  responsibility  of  the 
master,  when  the  work,  in  the  doing  of  which  the  injurious  negli- 
gence occurred,  related  to  real  estate ;  on  the  ground  that  the 
owner  of  such  property  is  bound  to  be  careful  how  his  use  of  it, 
or  acts  in  relation  to  it,  affect  third  parties  or  the  public ;  but 
the  limits  of  this  extension  are  not  well  settled.  If  it  have  any 
foundation  whatever,  it  must  rest  upon  the  maxim  sic  utere  tuo  ut 
alienum  non  Icedas,  which,  while  it  imposes  a  certain  restriction 
upon  the  use  of  all  property,  may  be  held  perhaps  to  apply  more 
especially  to  lands ;  and  whoever  permits  anything  to  be 
done  upon  his  ground,  to  the  positive  damage  *of  another,  *  108 
may  be  responsible  for  the  nuisance.     Thus  it  has  been 

of  one  party,  and  in  some  respects  in  that  vant  among  many.  "  If  the  driver  be 
of  another.  In  such  a  case,  as  soon  as  it  tlie  servant  of  the  job-master,  we  do  not 
is  ascertained  that,  as  to  the  transaction  think  he  ceases  to  be  so  by  reason  of  the 
in  question,  he  is  the  servant  of  eitlicr  owner  of  the  carriage  preferring  to  be 
one,  it  follows  immediately  that  he  can-  driven  by  tliat  particular  servant,  wiiere 
not  be  regarded  as  the  servant  of  the  there  is  a  choice  amongst  more,  any 
other,  who  therefore  is  not  liable  for  his  more  than  a  hack  post-i)oy  ceases  to  be 
negligence.  Hence  in  the  great  case  of  the  servant  of  an  innkeeper,  where  a 
Laugher  v.  Pointer,  5  B.  &  C.  547,  it  was  traveller  has  a  particular  preference  of 
hekf  by  Ahhott,  C.  J.,  and  Littledule.  J.  one  over  the  rest,  on  account  of  his  sobri- 
(whose  opinion  has  since  been  authorita-  cty  and  carefulness.  If,  indeed,  the  de- 
tively  approved),  in  opposition  to  the  fendants  had  insisted  upon  the  horses 
view  of  Bayleij  and  Ilolroijd,  JJ.,  that  being  driven,  not  by  one  of  tiie  regular 
where  the  owner  of  a  carriage  hired  of  a  servants,  but  by  a  stranger  to  the  job- 
stable-keeper  a  pair  of  horses  to  draw  it  master,  appointed  liy  themselves,  it  would 
for  a  day,  and  the  owner  of  the  horses  have  made  all  the  difference."  See  also 
provided  a  driver,  through  whose  negli-  Quarman  v.  Burnett,  (5  INI.  &  W.  508 ; 
gent  driving  an  injury  was  done  to  a  Stevens  v.  Armstrong,  2  Scld.  435 ;  Dal- 
horse  belonging  to  a  "third  person,  the  yell  v.  Tyrer,  El.,  Bl.  &  El.  899. 
owner  of  the  carriage  was  not  liable  to  (/)  Per  Lord  Abiwjer,  at  nisi  prius, 
be  sued  for  such  injury.  And  the  case  is  Brady  y.  Giles,  1  Mo.  &  K.  494. 
not  affected  though  the  owners  of  the  (m)  Patten  v.  Rea,  2  C.  &  B.  605. 
carriage   asked  for  that  particular  ser- 

119 


*  109  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

..decided  that  one  who  has  directed  his  servant  to  remove  snow 
and  ice  from  the  roof  of  his  house,  is  responsible  for  an  injury 
received  by  a  passer,  whether  the  negligence  was  that  of  the  ser- 
vant or  of  a  stranger  employed  by  the  latter  or  of  one  who  volun- 
teered to  assist  him.  (m)  This  duty,  however,  cannot  extend  so 
far  as  to  oblige  the  owner  of  land  to  see  to  it  in  all  cases  that  a 
nuisance  is  not  erected  thereon.  The  measure  of  his  responsi- 
bility must  be  his  reasonable  power  of  control,  and  therefore  it 
should  be  sufficient  for  his  exculpation,  that  he  never,  either  ex- 
pressly, or  impliedly,  sanctioned  the  nuisance.  But  if  he  let  his 
land  with  a  nuisance  upon  it,  he  would,  on  the  same  principle,  be 
liable  for  its  continuance,  as  well  as  for  its  erection,  although  he 
had  reserved  to  himself  no  right  to  enter  upon  the  land  and  abate 
the  nuisance.  And  so  if  he  let  land  for  a  particular  use  which 
must  result  in  a  nuisance,  he  should  be  liable  therefor,  (o)  But 
the  general  doctrine,  that  the  owner  of  fixed  property  was  liable 
for  injury  caused  by  mismanagement  thereof  by  any  one,  in  a 
manner  quite  distinct  from  that  in  which  the  owner  of  a  chattel 
would  be  held,  although  once  in  much  favor,  (jw)  is  now  quite 

often  disregarded,  {q') 
*  109        *  Of  the  general  principles  of  the  law  of  contracts,  appli- 

(n)  Althorfe  v.  Wolfe,  22  N.  Y.  355.  care  to  prevent  the  doing  of  acts  which 

(o)  See  Rich  v.  Basterficld,  4  C.  B.  783;  it  was  his  duty  to  prevent,  whether  done 

Rex  V.  Pedley,  1  A.  &  E.  822, 3  Nev.  &  M.  by   his   servants   or   others.     If,  for   In- 

627;  Fish  v.  Dodge,  4  Denio,  311;    Carle  stance,  a  person  occupying  a  house  or  a 

V.   Hall,  2  Met.  353.     And  this  doctrine  field  should  permit  another  to  carry  on 

may  enter  into  the  decision  in  Burgess  v.  there  a  noxious  trade,  so  as  to  be  a  nui- 

Gray,  1  C.  B.  578,  above  referred  to.  sance  to  his  neighbors,  it  may  be  that  he 

(p)  Liitlcddle,  J.,  Laugher  v.  Pointer,  5  would   be    responsible,    though    the   acts 

B.  &  C.  5G0 ;  Quarman  v.  Burnett,  6  M.  complained  of  were  neither  his  acts  nor 

&  W.  510.  the  acts  of  his  servants.     He  would  have 

(7)    See  Allen    v.    Hay  ward,   7   Q.  B.  violated  the  rule  of  law,  '  Sic  iitfre  tuo  ut 

S60;   and  in  Iteedie  f.  London,  &c.  R.  Co.  alienum  non  Iwdas.'"     Bush  v.    Steinman, 

4  Exch.  244,  this  doctrine  was  expressly  1  B.  &  P.  404 ;    Randleson   v.  Murray,  8 

overruled.     There  Itolfe,   B.,  giving  the  A.  &  E.  100,  and  other  cases  of  that  class, 

judgment,  said  :    "On  full  consideration,  must  be  regarded  as  substantially  over- 

wc    have   come  to    the   conclusion,  that  ruled ;    and  such   American  decisions  as 

there  is  no  such  distinction,  unless  per-  were  made  before  the  recent  investiga- 

liaps  the  act  complained  of  is  such  as  to  tions,  in    deference    to    those  cases,  will 

amount  to  a  nuisance.    ...    It  is  not  ne-  not,  it  is  presumed,  be  adhered  to.     De 

cessary  to  decide  whether  in  any  case  the  Forrest  v.   Wright,  2   Mich.  368.       See, 

owner  of  real  propert}',  such  as  land  or  however.    Mayor,  &c.    of     New  York  v. 

houses,  may  be  responsible  for  nuisances  Bailey,  2  Denio,  433;  and  Buffalo  v.  Hol- 

occasioned   by  the   mode    in    which    his  loway,    14    Barb.    101  ;    cases    which    it 

property  is  used  by  others  not  standing  seems  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  cur- 

in  tlie  relation  of  servants  to  him,  or  part  rent  of   recent   English   decisions.     See 

of  l)is  family.     It  may  be  that  in  some  also  Lowell  11.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  23  Pick, 

case    he    is    so    responsible.      But  then,  24;     Gardner    v.    Heartt,   2    Barb.    165; 

liis    liability    must  be   founded   on   the  Stone  v.  Codman,  15  Pick.  297. 
principle    that   he    has  not   taken     due 

120 


CH.  v.]  SERVANTS.  *  109 

cable  to  the  contract  of  service,  we  have  already  considered 
some  under  the  head  of  Agency  ;  and  we  shall  defer  the  consider- 
ation of  others,  and  of  the  questions  which  they  present,  to  the 
third  Book  of  this  Part,  which  relates  to  the  subject-matter  of 
contracts,  and  to  the  chapter  upon  the  topic  of  the  Hiring  of 
Personal  Service. 

121 


no 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTEACTS. 


[book  I. 


110 


*  CHAPTER  VI. 


OF   ATTORNEYS. 

Attorneys  are  made  so  by  a  letter  or  power  of  attorney,  (a)  or 
they  are  Attorneys  of  Record. 

It  is  a  general  rule,  that  one  acting  under  a  power  of  attorney, 
cannot  execute  for  his  principal  a  sealed  instrument,  unless  the 
power  of  attorney  be  sealed.  (&)  ^     And  where  a  statute  prescribes 


(a)  "Few  persons  are  disabled  to  be 
private  attorneys  to  deliver  seizin ;  for 
monks,  infants,  femes  covert,  i^ersons 
attainted,  outlawed,  excommunicated, 
villains,  aliens,  &c.,  may  be  attorneys. 
A  ferae  ma}'  be  an  attorney  to  deliver 
seizin  to  lier  husband,  and  the  husband 
to  the  wife."  Co.  Lit.  52  a.  An  infant 
cannot  execute  a  power  coupled  xvWl  an 
interest.  Hearle  v.  Greenbank,  3  Atk.  695, 
^14. 

(6)  Harrison  v.  Jackson,  7  T.  R,  209; 
Elliot  V.  Davis,  2  B.  &  P.  338  ;  Berkeley 
V.  Hardy,  5  B.  &  C.  355 ;  Stetson  v.  Pat- 
ton,  2  Greenl.  358.  — If  a  partner  seal  for 
himself  and  copartner,  in  the  presence  of 
the  copartner,  it  is  sufficient,  though  his 
authority  be  onl.y  by  parol.  Ball  v.  Dun- 
sterville,  4  T.  *R.  313. —In  Brutton  v. 
Burton,  1  Chitt.  707,  it  was  held  that  a 
warrant  of  attorney  under  seal,  executed 
by  one  person  for  himself  and  partner  in 
the  absence  of  the  latter,  but  with  his 
consent,  was  a  sufficient  autliority  for 
signing  judgment  against  both;  on  the 
ground  tliat  a  warrant  of  attorney  to 
confess  judgment  need  not  be  under  seal. 
—  And  Hunter  v.  Parker,  7  M.  &  W.  322, 
contains  another  aj)plication  of  the  same 
equitable  and  reasonable  principle.  (Com- 
pare Banorgee  v.  Hovoy,  5  Mass.  11,  24. 
— An  instrument  to  which  the  agent  of  a 
corporation  has  affixed  his  seal,  may  be 
evidence  of  the  contract  in  an  action  of 
assumpsit  against  the  corporation  ;  fortlie 
seal  of  the  agent  of  a  corporation,  unlike 
that  of  the  agent  of   a  natural  person, 


never  can  be  the  seal  of  his  principal. 
Randall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns.  60; 
Damon  v.  Inhabitants  of  Granby,  2  Pick. 
345 ;  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Patterson's 
Admr.  7  Cranch,  299.  But  see  Bank  of . 
Middlebury  v.  Rut.  &  W.  R.  R.  -30  Vt.  159. 
—  There  is  a  class  of  Partnership  cases,  in 
which  it  has  been  held  that  anj'  express 
ratification  though  parol,  by  a  partner  of 
a  contract  under  seal  entered  into  for  the 
firm  by  his  copartner,  makes  the  instru- 
ment the  deed  of  the  firm.  Darst  v.  Roth, 
4  Wash.  C.  C.  471 ;  Mackay  v.  Bloodgood, 
9  Johns.  285 ;  Drumright  v.  Philpot,  16 
Ga.  424.  —  The  dicta  of  several  judges 
have  extended  this  exception  to  include 
an  original  parol  authority.  See  Skinner 
V.  Dayton,  19  Johns.  513,  where  the 
decision  seems  to  be  too  broadly  stated 
in  the  reporter's  note.  Some  decisions 
also  go  to  tliis  extent,  as  Gram  v.  Seton, 

1  Hall,  262. -In  Cady  v.  Shepherd,  11 
Pick.  400,  the  cases  are  reviewed,  and 
among  others  Brutton  v.  Burton,  1  Chitt. 
707  (see  supr<i),  the  decision  in  which  it  is 
stated  nakedly,  witliout  the  addition  of 
the  reason  by  which  the  Court  of  Queen's 
Bench  appear  to  have  been  governed,  and 
which  goes  to  reconcile  it  witli  the  author- 
ities. McDonald  &  Mills  v.  Eggleston, 
Barker  &  Co.,  26  Vt.  156,  is  also  to  the 
same  effect.  And  see  Hunter  v.  Parker,  7 
M.  &  W.  331,  .332,  .344;  Price  v.  Alexander, 

2  Greene  (la.),  427  ;  Cady  v.  Shepherd  and 
McDonald  &  Mills  v.  Eggleston,  Barker 
&  Co  ,  however,  must  be  taken  to  decide 
the  law  for  Massachusetts  and  Vermont 


1  A  power  not  under  seal  may  l)e  sufficient  to  authorize  the  sale  of  land,  but  not 
to  make  a  conveyance.     Watson  v.  Sherman,  84  111.  263. 

122 


CH.  VI.]  OF   ATTORNEYS.  *  HI 

*  certain  formalities,  and  makes  them  requisite  for  the  *  111 
execution  of  an  instrument,  a  power  to  make  that  instru- 
ment, must,  in  general,  be  itself  executed  with  similar  formali- 
ties, (c)  But  as  oral  or  written  powers  are  equally  parol,  one 
by  oral  authority  may  sign  the  name  of  his  principal  with- 
out a  seal  thereto ;  and  so  he  may  be  authorized  orally  to  Ijhid 
his  principal  by  written  contracts,  where  the  Statute  of  Frauds 
requires  a  writing  signed  by  the  parties  sought  to  be  charged, 
as  the  foundation  of  an  action,  (c?) 

The  effect  of  a  written  authority  in  limiting  the  power  of  an 
attorney  precisely  within  what  is  written,  may  be  illustrated  by 
the  execution  of  a  deed  by  one  person  for  another.  If  a  grantor 
requests  a  person  in  his  presence  to  sign  for  him  his  (the  gran- 
tor's) name  to  a  deed,  and  the  person  thus  requested  writes  the 
name  of  the  grantor  without  writing  his  own,  or  adding  any 
words  to  indicate  that  the  grantor  acted  by  attorney,  this  would 
seem  to  be  nevertheless  the  signature  of  the  grantor,  and  the 
deed  would  be  valid.  But  if  the  grantor  has  given  to  A  a 
power  of  attorney  in  the  ordinary  form,  authorizing  him  to  exe- 
cute a  deed  for  him  as  his  attorney,  and  this  person  writes 
the  *  name  of  the  grantor  in  his  absence,  without  saying    *  112 

to  be,  that  a  partner  may  bind  his  co-  &  W.  215,  citing  Hudson  v.  Eevett,  5  Bing. 

partner  by  a  contract  under  seal,  made  368 ;    Blood  v.  Goodrich,  12  Wend.  525, 

in  the  name  and  for  the  use  of  the  firm,  9  Wend.  68  ;  Bragg  v.  Fessenden,  11  111. 

in  the  course  of  the  partnership  business,  544.     And    besides,    on   the   doctrine   of 

provided   the   copartner   assents    to    the  estoppel,  a  principal,  by  admitting  that  to 

contract  previously  to  its   execution,  or  be  his  deed  which  was  executed  by  his 

afterwards   ratifies   and   adopts   it ;    and  agent,   might  be  held  to  have  disabled 

this  assent  or  adoption  may  be  by  parol,  himself  to  say  that   the  agent   was  not 

Whether  the  doctrine  of    these  cases  is  duly  authorized.     As  yet,  however,  the 

to  be  extended  to  other  than  partnership  law  must  certainly  be  taken  to  be  that 

cases,  is  open  to  doubt ;  the  probability  is  even  a  parol  ratification  does  not  make 

that  it  will  not.     It  is  worthy  of  notice,  in  an  instrument  under  seal,  executed  by  an 

the  absence  of  clear  and  consistent   ad-  agent  who  had  not  an  authority  under 

judication,  that  parol  ratification,  though  seal,  the  deed  of  the  principal.     Where, 

frequently  confounded  in  the  cases  with  hov.'ever,  a  partner  makes  a  mortgage  of 

an  "lif/inat  parol  autlwriti/,  stands  on  quite  personal  property  in  the  name  of  the  firm 

a  different  footing  and  may  be  defended  and  seals  it,  the  seal  being  unnecessary, 

by  reasons  which   do  not  apply  to  the  the  mortgage  binds  the  firm.     jMilton  v. 

other.     It  is  delivery  that  completes  the  Mosiier,   7    Met.   244 ;    see   also  ante,  p. 

deed,   and    a    subsequent    parol    assent,  *52,  note  (?n). 

or  contemporaneous   parol   assent,   may  {c)   Gage  v.  Gage,  10    Foster  (N.  H.), 

amount   to   delivery,   though    a   previous  420 ;  Clark  v.  Graham,  6  Wheat.  577. 
assent,  by  the  nature  of  things,  as  well  {d)  Shaw  v.  Nudd,  8  Pick.  9;  Coles  i;. 

as  by  common  law,  never  can.    The  deed  Trecothick,  9  Ves.  2:34  ;   Clinen  >:  Cooke, 

must  exist  before  it  can  be  delivered  ;  and  1  Sch.  &  L.  22 ;    McComb  v.  Wright,  4 

it  may  be  delivered  at  anytime  after  it  Johns.  Ch.  659;    Graham  v.  Musson,  5 

once  does  exist  in  a  complete  form.     See  Bing.  N.  C.  607.     See  Baum  v.  Dubois, 

Byers   v.   McClanahan,  6   G.  &  J.  250 ;  43  Penn.  St.  260. 


Parke,  B.,  Hibblewhite  v.  McMorine,  6  M. 


123 


♦112 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


"  by  A,  his  attorney,"  or  writing  his  own  name ;  this  would  not 
seem  to  be  a  sufficient  execution  of  the  deed.  Because  A  had 
no  other  power  to  act  for  the  grantor  than  that  which  the  letter 
of  attorney  gave  him ;  and  that  did  not  give  him  any  other  power 
than  to  act  as  the  grantor's  attorney ;  that  is,  to  sign  the  deed 
himself,  declaring  that  the  grantor  signed  it  by  him.  In  the  first 
case,  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  authority  under  which 
the  signature  was  made ;  and  when  this  exhibits  the  grantor  as 
present,  and  as  authorizing  the  signature  made  in  that  way,  then 
it  becomes  the  signature  of  the  grantor  made  by  another  hand 
than  his  own.^  But  in  executing  a  deed  by  attorney,  the  power 
being  delegated  to  the  attorney  is  with  him,  and  the  deed  takes 
effect  from  his  act ;  and  therefore  the  instrument  which  gives  the 
power  is  to  be  strictly  examined  and  construed,  (e)     It  is  how- 


(e)  This  point,  upon  which  there 
seems  to  be  no  express  decision,  arose 
in  tlie  case  of  Wood  v.  Goodridge,  6 
Cush.  117.  Tliis  was  tlie  case  of  a 
mortgage  deed  and  note  made  under  a 
power  of  attorney  under  seal,  by  sim- 
ply signing  the  name  of  the  principal 
opposite  to  a  seal,  in  the  case  of  the 
deed,  and  in  the  case  of  the  note,  by 
simply  writing  the  principal's  name  at 
the  foot.  It  was  not  necessary  to  de- 
cide the  point,  the  court  being  of  opin- 
ion that  the  power  tlioiigli  verj'  general 
in  its  terms,  did  not  confer  authority  to 
mortgage,  nor  to  borrow  money  and 
bind  the  principal  by  a  promissory 
note.  But  the  question  of  the  manner 
of  execution  was  much  considered,  and 
the  court,  per  hlHcher,  J.,  signified  an 
inclination  to  hold,  that  where  an  at- 
torney signs  tlie  name  of  his  principal 
to  an  instrument  wliicli  contains  noth- 
ing to  indicate  that  it  is  executed  by 
attorney,  and  without  adding  his  own 
signature  as  such,  it  is  not  a  valid  exe- 
cution. —  A  deed  was  signed  in  the 
presence  and  by  the  direction  of  P.  G. 
(and  in  the  prcsenc^e  of  an  attesting 
witness),  thus:  "P.  G.  by  M.  G.  G." 
It  was  objected  that  M.  G.  G.,  signing  in 
that  manner  for  the  principal,  sliould 
have  had  a  power  under  seal ;  but  the 
deed  was  held  valid.  Gardner  v.  Gar- 
ner, 5  Cush.  48:3.  In  delivering  the 
judgment  in  this  case,  Shmi\  C.  J., 
said :  "  The  name  being  written  by 
another  hand,  in  the  presence  of  the 
grantor,  and  at  her  request,  is  her  act. 


The  disposing  capacity,  the  act  of 
mind,  whicli  are  the  essential  and  effi- 
cient ingredients  of  the  deed,  are  hers ; 
and  she  merely  uses  the  liand  of  another, 
through  incapacity  or  weakness,  instead 
of  her  own,  to  do  the  physical  act  of 
making  a  written  sign.  Whereas,  in 
executing  a  deed  by  attorney,  the  dispos- 
ing power,  though  delegated,  is  with  the 
attorney,  and  the  deed  takes  effect  from 
his  act ;  and  tlierefore  the  power  is  to 
be  strictly  examined  and  construed."  — 
Perliaps  it  will  still  bo  regarded  as  an 
open  question  whether  the  simple  signing 
of  the  principal's  name,  without  evidence 
on  the  face  of  the  instrument  that  tlie 
execution  is  by  an  agent,  may  not  be 
sufficient.  From  a  passage  in  Dixon  on 
Title  Deeds,  vol.  ii.  p.  533,  it  may  be  in- 
ferred that  the  author's  view  is  similar 
to  that  now  taken  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Massachusetts.  On  tlie  other  hand 
the  books  contain  numerous  intimations 
that  it  has  not  generally  been  supposed, 
heretofore,  that  any  other  form  is  neces- 
sary to  tlie  valid  execution  of  a  deed 
by  attorney  than  is  requisite  when  the 
principal  makes  a  deed  in  his  ]>roper 
person.  See  1  Prest.  Abstr.  2d  cd. 
203,  294;  Smith,  Mor.  Law,  B.  I.  eh. 
5,  §  4 ;  Wilks  V.  Back,  2  East,  142, 
145;  Elliot  r.  Davis,  2  B.  &  P.  338; 
Bac.  Abr.  Leases,  J.  §  10 ;  also,  Han- 
son V.  Howe,  6  Foster  (N.  H.),  327.  It 
seems  the  better  opinion  that,  even  since 
tlie  Statute  of  Frauds,  a  xirjning  is  not  es- 
sential to  a  deed.  Aveline  v.  Whisson, 
4   Man.  &  G.  801;    Cherry  v.  Homing, 


1  See  Mutual  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brown,  3  Stewart,  193,  and  reporter's  note. 

124 


CH.  VI.] 


OF    ATTORNEYS. 


113 


ever  held,  that  a  deed  which  is  inoperative  at  Law  from  a  defective 
execution  by  an  attorney,  is  nevertheless  valid  in  equity  if  the 
attorney  had  authority  to  make  the  deed,  (ce)  And  also  that  if 
the  seal  of  a  corporation  be  afhxed  to  its  deed,  it  will  be  held 
valid  without  signature ;  and  a  presumption  of  authority  to  affix 
the  seal  will  arise  from  the  seal  itself,  (e/) 

*  An  attorney  of  record,  more  commonly  called  an  attor-  *  113 
ney  at  law,  is  one  who  has  been  duly  admitted  by  conii)e- 
tent  authority  to  practise  in  the  courts.  An  attorney  at  law,  by 
his  admission  as  such,  acquires  rights  of  which  he  cannot  be 
deprived  at  the  mere  discretion  of  a  court.  (/)  Such  an  attorney 
need  not  prove  his  authority  to  appear  for  any  party  in  court, 
and  act  for  him  there,  unless  his  authority  be  denied,  and  some 
evidence  be  offered  tending  to  show  that  he  has  no  such 
authority,  (jg)     But  *  a  person  who  is  not  an  attorney  at    *  114 


4  Exch.  631 ;  Shep.  Touch,  by  Preston, 
66,  n.  If  this  be  so,  it  may  be  considered 
going  very  far  to  hold  that  tlie  addition 
of  tlie  name  of  the  principal,  by  the 
hand  of  an  authorized  attorney,  invali- 
dates an  instrument  which  would  have 
been  perfectly  good  without  any  signa- 
ture at  all.  in  some  States  the  Statutes 
of  Conveyance  modify  the  connnon  law  in 
this  particular,  and  require  signing  as 
well  as  the  affixing  of  a  seal.  With  re- 
spect to  instruments  not  under  seal,  the 
opinion  seems  equally  to  have  prevailed 
that  an  authority  to  sign  for  a  principal 
is  well  executed  by  the  mere  subscription 
of  the  principal's  name.  Chitty  on  Bills, 
9th  ed.,  33;  Byles  on  Bills,  6th  ed.,  26.  — 
An  auctioneer  or  auctioneer's  clerk  per- 
forms his  implied  authority  by  simply 
writing  the  purchaser's  name  in  the  mem- 
orandum of  sale.  Bird  v.  Boulter,  4  B. 
&  Ad.  443.  This  indeed  is  of  no  great 
weight  in  itself,  since  that  case  might  be 
viewed  as  falling  within  the  class  ex- 
pressly distinguished  by  the  Supremo 
Court  of  Massachusetts,  namely,  where 
the  signature  is  made  in  the  pn'senre  of 
the  principal,  and  by  his  immediate  di- 
rection :  j'et  there  is  a  case  of  White  v. 
Proctor,  4  Taunt.  209,  where  the  ob- 
jection was  expressly  taken  that  the 
name  of  the  auctioneer  ought  to  appear 
as  well  as  that  of  the  purchaser.  There 
Best,  Serjeant,  referring  to  Emerson  i'. 
Helis,  2  Tavmt.  38,  said  that  in  that 
case  the  auctioneer  wrote  his  own  name 
in  the  heading  of  the  paper,  and  that  the 
decision  was  given  on  that  ground.  But 
Mansfield,  C.  J.,  replied  :   "  In  that  case 


there  was  no  argument  upon  the  circum- 
stance that  the  auctioneer  had  signed, 
nor  was  the  case  at  all  decided  upon  that 
ground  :  his  saying  '  sold  btf  John  Wriqht' 
did  not  make  him  agent  for  the  bujer ; 
the  only  question  was  whether  Ids  sifjn- 
i)H/  the  purchaser's  name  iras  done  hi/  him 
as  agent  for  the  purchaser ."  Tlie  power 
of  one  partner  to  bind  the  firm  by  a 
note  or  bill  has  been  referred  to  prin- 
ciples of  agency  ;  and  it  is  well  estab- 
lished that  the  signature  of  the  firm 
name  without  more  is  a  complete  exe- 
cution. See  Norton  v.  Si'ymour,  3  C. 
B.  7'j2;  Kirk  v.  Blurton,  9  M.  &  W. 
284.  —  Watkins  v.  Vince,  2  Stark.  3GB, 
though  meagrely  reported,  seems  to  be 
a  case  where  Lord  Elleiihorongh  enter- 
tained no  doubt  that  the  signing  of 
the  principal's  name,  by  an  agent  hav- 
ing authority  to  contract  in  his  behalf, 
was  a  suflicient  signature.  And  see 
Ilclmsley  v.  Loader,  2  Camp.  450,  which 
is  somewhat  more  explicit. 

(f()  Love  V.  Sierra  Nevada,  &c.  Co. 
32  Cal.  630. 

{ef)  Shechan  v.  Davis,  17  O.  St.  571. 

(■/■)  Fletcher  v.  Daingerfield,  20  Cal. 
427;  Cohen  u.  Wright,  22  Cal.  203;  Ex 
parte  Yale,  24  Cal.  241. 

(rj)  Osborn  r.  U.  S.  Bank,  9  Wheat. 
738,  830 ;  where  this  rule  of  evidence 
was  applied  in  the  case  of  an  attorney 
assuming  to  act  in  behalf  of  a  corpora- 
tion. See  also  Jackson  v.  Stewart,  6 
Johns.  34;  Denton  r.  Noyes,  id.  296; 
Hardin  v.  Hoyoi)onubby's  Lessee,  27  Miss. 
567;  Henckr.  Todhunter,  7  Har.  &  J. 
275;  Huston,  J.,  Lynch  v.  Commonwealth, 

125 


*  114  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

law,  and  who  offers  to  appear  for  another  in  court,  by  special 
authority,  must  prove  such  authority  if  requested.  (A) 

The  power  of  the  court  to  disbar  an  attorney  is  not  unfre- 
quently  exercised.  And  it  is  said  that  tlie  court  is  bound  to 
prefer  charges  against  an  attorney,  whenever  satisfied  that 
the  ends  of  justice  require  this.  (Jilt)  But  an  attorney  should 
not  be  disbarred,  unless  a  case  of  malpractice  is  proved  with 
certainty,  (hi)  And  where  a  statute  declares  the  causes  for 
which  an  attorney  may  be  disbarred,  it  is  said  that  he  may  not 
be  for  a  cause  not  declared  in  the  statute,  (hj) 

An  attorney  who  places  his  client's  money  in  the  hands  of  his 
own  banker,  on  his  own  private  account,  though  he  does  this 
lond  fide,  and  has  money  of  his  own  in  the  hands  of  the  same 
banker,  is  liable  for  the  loss  thereof  by  the  bankruptcy  of  the 
banker,  (i}  But  it  seems  that  he  is  not  liable  if  he  deposits  the 
money  as  the  property  of  the  owner,  and  opens  a  special  account 
specifying  whose  it  is.  (/)  His  implied  duty  to  use  reasonable 
skill,  care,  &c.,  is  the  same  as  that  of  other  persons  to  whose  care 
and  skill  any  thing  is  intrusted ;  which  will  be  spoken  of  here- 
after. (^)  He  is  not  responsible  for  mistake  in  a  doubtful  point 
of  law,  (Z)  or  of  practice,  (m)  nor  for  the  fault  of  counsel  retained 
by  him.  (w)     But  the  estate  of  an  attorney  was  held  liable  after 


IGS.  &R.  369;  Woodbun/,  J.,  Hastman  v.  [k)  Titt  v.  Yalden,  4  Burr.  2000; 
Coos  Bank,  1  N.  H.  23;  Manchester  Baikie  v.  Chandk-ss,  3  Camp.  17,  19; 
Bank  v.  Fellows,  8  Foster  (N.  H.),  302;  Shilcock  v.  Passman,  7  C.  &  P.  289; 
Williams  v.  Butler,  35  111.  544. —The  Godefroy  y.  Dalton,  6  Bing.  460;  Meggs 
authority  from  tlie  client  need  not  in  gen-  r.  Binns,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  625;  Lynch  i'. 
eral  bo  in  writing ;  yet  an  oral  authority  Commonwealth,  16  S.  &  R.  368  ;  Dear- 
to  appear  in  a  cause  is  not  sufficient  to  born  v.  Dearborn,  15  Mass.  316;  Var- 
enable  the  attorney  to  release  the  inter-  num  v.  Martin,  15  Pick.  440 ;  Wilson  v. 
est  of  a  witness.  Murray  v.  House,  11  Coffin,  2  Cush.  316;  Cooper  v.  Stephen- 
Johns.  464.  As  to  the  evidence  required  son,  12  E.  L.  &  E.  403;  Parker  v.  KoUs, 
to  support  a  claim  for  services  rendered  28  id.  424.  See  (i}iti',p.  *84,  note  (.r).  See 
by  an  attorney  to  his  client,  see  Burgliart  for  a  full  discussion  of  dutii's  of  counsel, 
V.  Gardner,  3  Barb.  64;  Wilson  v.  WW-  Swinfen  v.  Lord  Chelmsford,  5  H.  &  N. 
son,   1  Jac.  &  W.  ^bl.  —  Solicitor  is  the  890. 

legal    designation  of  one   who    fills    tlie  (/)    Kemp  v.  Burt,  4  B.    &  Ad.   424 ; 

place  in  a  court  of  equity  corresponding  8.  c.  1  Nev.  &  M.  262 ;    Elkington  v.  IIol- 

to  that  of  an  attorney  in  a  court  of  law.  land,  9  M.  &  W.  659;   Pitt  v.  Yalden,  4 

Mauglian,  c.  1,  §  1.  Burr.  2060. 

(h)  Marshall,  C.   J.,  Osborn   v.   U.  S.  (m)  Laidler  r.  Elliott,  3  B.  &  C.  738. 

Bank,  9  Wheat.  829.  («)  Lowry  r.  Guilford,  5  C.  &  P.  234. 

(Iili)  In  re  Percy,  36  N.  Y.  651.  — Yet  an  attorney  cannot  by  consulting 

(hi)  People  i'.  Harvej',  41  111.  277.  his  counsel,  shift  from    himself   the  re- 

(hj)  E.v  parte  Smith,  28  Ind.  47;  Ked-  sponsibiiity  of  a  matter  presumed  by  the 

man  v.  State,  ib.  205.  biw    to   lie  within   his   own    knowledce. 

(i)  Robinson  v.  Ward,  2  C.  &  P.  59.  Tindal,  C.  J.,  Godcfroy  v.  Dalton,  4  Mo. 

0)  Abbott,  C.  J.,  Robinson  v.  Ward,  2  &  P.  149;  8.  c.  6  Bing.  460. 
C.  &  P.  60. 

12G 


CH.  VI.] 


OF   ATTORNEYS. 


115 


his  death,  for  erroneous  advice  given  to  a  client  in  ignorance 
of  a  recent  change  of  the  law.  (ww)  He  is  liable  for  disclos- 
ing privileged  communications,  (o)  If  discharged  by  one 
party,  *  he  may  act  for  an  opposite  party,  provided  he  *  115 
makes  no  improper  use  of  knowledge  obtained  by  him 
while  acting  for  the  first  party,  (p)  But  it  seems  that  he  may 
not  act  for  an  opposite  party  if  discharged  by  his  first  client  for 
misconduct,  (g^)  If,  being  employed  about  a  purchase  of  land, 
he  buys  an  adverse  or  outstanding  title,  he  is  held  to  buy  it  for 
his  client,  if  his  client  so  elects,  (^qq) 

The  law  implies  a  contract  on  the  part  of  the  client,  to  pay 
his  attorney  the  legal  fees,  or  statute  rate  of  compensation,  (r) 
And  if  the  client  asserts .  that  the  services  were  to  be  rendered 
for  a  less  compensation,  the  burden  rests  on  him  to  prove  this 


{nn)  A.  B.'s  estate,  1  Tuck.  247. 
(o)  And  his  liability  is  not  removed 
by  the  fact  that  he  was  previously  re- 
tained for  the  party  to  whom  the  disclos- 
ures were  made,  and  that  his  employer 
knew  of  that  former  retainer.  Taylor  v. 
Blacklow,  3  Bin^.  N.  C.  235.  In  Thomas 
I'.  Rawliiigs,  27  Beav.  140,  a  solicitor  de- 
clined answering  on  the  ground  that 
he  had  obtained  his  information  while 
acting  as  the  solicitor  of  his  co-defend- 
ant. —  Held,  that  he  had  not  brought 
himself  within  the  rule  as  to  profes- 
sional privilege.  His  reply  that  he  had 
obtained  his  information  "  either  as  a 
creditor  or  as  the  solicitor"  of  his  client 
was  taken  most  strangely  against  the 
solicitor ;  and  he  was  held  bound  to 
give  the  discovery.  In  Hall  v.  Renfro, 
3  Met.  (Ky.)  51, 'it  is  held  that  an  at- 
torney is  a  competent  witness  for  or 
against  his  client  in  all  cases  except  con- 
cerning any  communication  made  to  him 
by  his  client  in  that  relation,  or  his  ad- 
vice thereon  ;  and  in  this  with  the  client's 
consent.  Such  communications  to  be 
privileged  must  have  been  addressed  to 
the  attorney  in  his  professional  character 
with  a  view  to  legal  advice  which,  as  an 
attorney,  it  was  his  duty  to  give.  Borum 
V.  Fonts  et  al.  15  Ind.  50.  See  also 
Shaugnesty  v.  Fogg,  15  La.  An.  330. 
But  in  King  v.  Barrett,  11  O.  St.  261,  it 
was  held  that  if  a  party  to  a  suit  offers 
himself  as  a  witness  and  gives  evidence 
generally  in  a  case,  he  thereby  loses  the 
privilege,  and  under  the  code  of  civil  j^ro- 
cedurc  consents  to  the  examination  of  his 
attorney  touching  such  admissions  as  are 
pertinent  to  the  issue.  In  De  Wolf  v. 
Strader,  26  111.  225,  it  is  said  that  a  re- 


tainer or  fee  paid  is  necessary  to  consti- 
tute the  relation  of  attorney  and  client, 
and  that  an  attorney  who  is  requested  to 
prepare  a  deed  or  mortgage,  no  legal  ad- 
vice being  required,  is  not  privileged. 

(/))  Bricheno  v.  Thorp,  1  Jac.  300.  — 
It  is  not  clear,  however,  if  it  be  distinctly 
shown  that  confidential  disclosures  have 
been  made  to  the  attorney  or  solicitor, 
which  if  communicated  to  the  other 
party  must  be  directly  prejudicial  to  the 
former  client,  that  a  court  of  equity 
would  not  forbid  the  acceptance  of  the 
second  retainer,  although  the  attorney 
was  dismissed  for  no  misconduct.  Lord 
Eldun,  Bricheno  v.  Thorp,  1  Jac.  303. 
304;  Cholmondeley  v.  Clinton,  19  Ves. 
261,  275.  In  the  latter  case  Lord  El  don 
said  :  "  My  opinion  is  that  he  [the  attor- 
ney] ought  not,  if  he  knows  anything 
that  may  be  prejudicial  to  the  former 
client,  to  accept  the  new  brief,  though 
that  client  refuse  to  retain  him." — In 
Johnson  v.  Marriott,  4  Tyr.  78,  where 
the  court  refused  to  restrain  an  attorney, 
who  (without  his  misconduct)  had  been 
dismissed  from  the  employment  of  the 
plaintiffs,  from  acting  for  the  defendant, 
the  judges  rested  their  decision  on  the 
ground  that  there  was  no  affidavit  by  the 
plaintiffs  that  the  attorney,  while  in 
their  employment,  had  obtained  a  confi- 
dential knowledge  of  particular  facts, 
which  it  would  be  prejudicial  to  their 
case  to  communicate  to  the  defendant. 

[q)  Lord  Eldon,  Cholmondeley  v. 
Clinton,  19  Ves.  201 ;  Guniey,  B.,  John- 
son V.  Marriott,  4  Tyr.  78. 

(77)  Smith  r.  Brotlierline,  02  Penn.  St. 
461. 

(r)  Brady  v.  Mayor,  &c.  1  Sandf.  669. 

127 


*  116  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

bargain,  (s)  If  a  bargain  be  proved,  the  attorney  cannot  recover 
more  by  showing  that  his  services  were  worth  more,  (t)  And 
even  if  he  shows  that  the  case  was  deemed,  with  good  reason, 
a  desperate  one,  this  will  not  sustain  his  claim  for  an  excessive 
compensation ;  as  half  the  sum  recovered,  (u)  If,  during  the  suit, 
an  attorney  make  a  contract  with  his  client,  which  is  void  for 
champerty,  he  may  still  recover  a  proper  compensation  for  ser- 
vices rendered  before  the  illegal  bargain,  (v) 

An  attorney  cannot  maintain  an  action  for  compensation  for 

services,  merely  by  proof  that  the  services  were  rendered ;   but 

must  go  farther  and  show  that  they  were  requested,  or,  in  other 

words,  that  he  was  retained  as  attorney  or  counsel,  (w)  ^     And 

his  own  pocket  or  office  docket  book,  in  which  he  has 

*  116    entered  *  the  name  of  the  suit  and  the  parties  in  question, 

is  not  of  itself  evidence  that  the  services  were  either 
requested  or  rendered,  (x) 

An  attorney  cannot  recover  his  bill  against  his  client,  if  his 
client  has  received  no  benefit  whatever  from  his  services  by  rea- 
son of  his  want  of  care  and  skill.  (;y)  But  if  the  client  has 
received  any  bcnelit,  he  must  in  England  pay  the  bill,  and  may 
then  have  an  action  for  damages,  (z)  It  has  been  there  held, 
however,  that  a  jury  may  discriminate  between  the  several  Hems 
in  an  account,  and  reject  those  for  work  entirely  useless ;  (a) 
and  it  may  be  supposed,  that  in  America  the  client  might  reduce 
the  attorney's  claim,  by  showing  the  little  value  of  the  benefit 
received,  by  the  fault  of  the  attorney,  as  in  actions  for  other 
services. 

An  attorney  has  a  lien  on  the  judgment  he  recovers,  and  on 
the  papers  of  the  case,  for  his  costs  and  fees  ;  (J)')  and  it  will  pre- 

(s)  Id.  Ill;   Bracey  v.  Carter,  12  A.  &  E.  373; 

(/)  Coopwood  I'.  Wallace,  12  Ala.  790.  Hill  r.  Featherstonliaugh,   7    Bing.   560; 

(h)  Chri.«ty  I'.  Douglas,  Wright,  485.  Hopping   v.  Quinn,  12  Wend.  517.     See 

(v)   Thurston  r.  Percival,  1  Pick.  415;  llunyan  v.  Nichols,  11  Johns.  547. 
Rust  r.  Larue,  4  Litt.  417 ;    Caldwell  v.  (z)  Templar  v.  McLachlan,  2  B.  &  P. 

Shepherd,  0  Monr.  392 ;  Smith  i'.  Thomp-  136. 
son,  7  B.  Mon.  305.  (a)  Shaw  ?•.  Ardon,  9  Bing.  280. 

(w)  Burghart  r.  Gardner,  3  Barh.  64.  (J,)   Mooney  t^  Lloyd,  5  S.  &  P.  412; 

(r)  Briggs  V.  Georgia,  15  Vt.  61.  Dubois'  Appeal,  38  Pcnn.  St.  231;  Gray 

(y)  Huntley  v.  Bulwer,  G  Bing.  N.  C  y.  Brackenridge,  2  IVnn.  75,  2  Greenl.  Ev. 

'  In  fixing  the  value  of  an  attorney's  services,  his  professional  skill  and  standing, 
his  experience,  the  nature  of  the  controversy,  both  in  regard  to  the  amount  involved 
and  the  nature  of  the  questions  raised,  as  well  as  the  result,  must  all  be  taken  into 
consideration.     Eggleston  v.  Boardman,  37  Mich.  14. 

128 


CH.  VI.]  OF  ATTORNEYS.  *  116 

vail  against  a  set-off  acquired  by  the  judgment-debtor  after  the  ren- 
dition of  the  judgment ;  (bb')  but  it  seems  to  be  settled  that  a  set- 
off in  ordinary  course  prevails  over  the  lien ;  (ic)  and  he  has  no 
lien  on  a  claim  for  unliquidated  damages  in  tort,  until  after  a 
judgment,  (ic?)  In  most  of  our  States  this  rule  applies  to  bar- 
risters, counsellors,  attorneys,  and  proctors  in  admiralty  {be') 
equally.  But  it  has  been  said  that  an  attorney's  lien  covers 
only  his  costs  and  expenses,  and  his  fees  as  attorney,  but  not 
his  fees  as  counsellor,  nor  incidental  expenses  not  taxable,  (c)  ^ 
We  think  this  is  not  law.  The  lien  of  an  attorney,  its  extent 
and  its  limitations,  are  considered  more  fully  in  our  chapter  on 
Liens. 

An  attorney  is,  in  general,  personally  liable  on  an  agreement 
made  by  him  in  his  own  name,  although  only  professionally  con- 
cerned in  the  matter,  (c?) 

§  144,  n.  4;  McGregor  v.  Comstock,  28  for  liis  fees  and  disbursements.    Dunklce 

N.  Y.  237;  Newbert  v.  Cunningham,  50  r.  Locke,  13  Mass.  525;  Potter  v.  Mayo, 

Me.  281 ;   Myers  v.  McHugh,  16  la.  335 ;  3  Grcenl.  34 ;  Gammon  v.  Cliandler,  30 

Waters  v.  Grace,  23  Ark.  118 ;   Hursh  v.  Me.    152;    Ocean   Ins.   Co.   v.  Kider,  22 

Sheets,  21  la.  501.  Pick.  210 ;  Hobson  v.  Watson,  34  Me.  20. 

(bb)  Warfield  )?.  Campbell,  38  Ala.  527.  And    even   without    statute    provisions. 

(be)  DeFiganierey.Young,  2  Rob.  670.  Sexton  i-.  Pike,  8  Eng.   (Ark.)   193.     A 

{hd)  AVood  V.  Anders,  6  Bush,  641.  counsel,   who,   with   his  client's  consent, 

{be)  The  Soblomsten,  L.  R.  1  Adm.  &  withch'aws    from    a    case    after    having 

Eccl.  293.  tendered    beneficial    services,    does    not 

(c)  Ileartt    v.   Chipman,  2   Aik.    162.  thereby  lose   his  right  to  compensation 

The  subject   of   the  attorney's  lien  has  for  tiie  services  rendered,  unless  at  the 

been   much   discussed   in    this    country,  time   of    his    withdrawal    he   waives    or 

Wilson  r.  Burr,  25  Wend.  386;    Stevens  abandons    his    claim    to    compensation, 

r.  Adams,  23  id.  57;  Newman  v.  Wash-  Coopwood     v.    Wallace,    12    Ala.    790; 

ington,  Mart.  &  Y.  79  ;  Wells  v.  Hatch,  Stephens   v.  Farrar,   4   Bush,    13. 
4.3^  N.  H.  246.     And  see  Van  Atta  v.  Mc-  (d)  Hall  v  Ashurst,  1  Cr.  &  M.  714; 

Kinney,  1    Harr.  235.     An  attorney  has,  Iveson    v.   Conington,  1     B.   &    C.   160; 

in   some  States,  a  lien  upon  his  client's  Burrell  v.  Jones,  3  B.  &  Aid.  47;  Scrace 

papers  left  with  him,  for  any  general  bal-  v.   Whittington,  2  B.  &   C.   11;  Watson 

anceduehim.     Dennett  ».  Cutts,  11  N.  H.  v.   Murrell,   1    C.    &   P.   307.  — In    New 

163;    Walker   v.   Sargeant,  14  Vt.  247;  Hampshire,  it  is  held  that  where  a  plain- 

alilrr  in  Pennsylvania.     Walton  v.  Dick-  tiff  resides  within  that  State,  and  employs 

erson,  7  Barr,  370.     So  by  statute  in  many  an  attorney  in  his  behalf  to  commence 

States  he  has  a  lien  upon   a  judgment  an    action    for    him,    such    attorney    is 

actually  recovered  in  favor  of  his  client,  authorized  by  the  employment  to  place 

1  The  attorney's  lien  for  costs  and  charges  attaches  to  deeds  or  papers  or  upon 
moneys  received  by  him  on  his  client's  behalf  in  the  course  of  his  employment.  In 
re  Paschal,  10  Wall.  483;  MclMierson  v.  Cox,  96  U.  S.  404;  Bowling  Green  Bank  v. 
Todd,  52  N.  Y.  489,  on  the  ground  tliat  they  are  the  fruits  of  his  own  labor  or 
expense.  Ex  parte  Yalden,  4  Ch.  D.  129.  See  Pilcher  v.  Arden,  7  Ch.  D.  318;  Gen. 
Trust  Co.  V.  Chapman,  1  C.  P.  D.  771.  He  may  also  have  a  lien  on  his  client's 
real  estate.  Perkins  v.  Perkins,  9  Heiskell,  95;  Brown  i".  Biglcy,  3  Tenn.  (Cii.) 
618.  Contra,  Garner  v.  Garner,  1  Lea,  29.  See  Twiggs  r.  Chambers,  56  Ga.  279. 
But  an  attorney  has  no  such  lien  before  judgment  as  will  prevent  his  client  from 
making  a  settlement.  Simmons  v.  Almy,  103  Mass.  33;  Wright  v.  Wright,  70 
N.  Y.  96. 

VOL.  I.  9  129 


*  117  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

If  his  client's  papers  are  stolen  from  him  without  his  fault,  he 
is  not  liable  for  the  loss.  Qdd) 

*  117        *  How  far  an  attorney  at  law  may  bind  his  clients  by  his 

arrangements  in  a  case,  without  special  instructions  or  au- 
thoritv,  may  not  be  quite  certain.  We  take  the  practice  to  be, 
however,  that  his  entries  on  the  docket,  his  agreements  about  con- 
tinuances, about  evidence,  or  the  conduct  of  the  trial,  or,  perhaps, 
about  costs  and  the  like,  would,  in  general,  bind  the  client.  (c?e)  ^ 

According  to  most  American  authorities,  an  attorney  employed 
in  the  usual  way  to  conduct  a  suit,  has,  in  general,  no  authority 
to  enter  into  a  compromise  without  the  sanction  of  his  client,  ex- 
press or  implied  ;  ^  but  it  is  said  that  a  compromise  so  made  will 
not  be  set  aside,  unless  for  reasons  arising  from  the  character  or 
circumstances  of  the  compromise,  (t?/")  An  attorney  cannot  sell 
or  assign  his  client's  claim,  (c?^)  The  liability  of  counsel  has 
recently  been  adjudicated  in  an  important  case  before  the  English 
Court  of  Exchequer,  where  it  was  held  that  no  action  lies  against 
a  counsel  who,  being  employed  to  conduct  a  cause,  enters  into  a 
compromise  of  the  matter  at  issue,  even  though  contrary  to  his 
client's  instructions,  provided  it  is  done  bond  fide,  (e)     He  cannot 

the  name  of  the  pLaintiff  upon  the  writ  ((M)  Hill  i\  Earner,  18  N.  H.  607. 

as  inilorser,  and  to  bind  him  as  sucli ;  (de)  Sampson  y.  Ohleyer,  22  Cal.  200. 

and  in  such  case,  if  the  indorsement  be  For  a  case  strongly  asserting  the  right  of 

thus :  "A,  plaintiff,  Ijy  his  attorney,  B,"  an  attorney  to  manage  a  case,  see  Board 

the  ])laintitl  is  regarded  as  the  indorser,  of  Commissioners   v.   Younger,   29   Cal. 

and  the  attorney  is  not  personally  bound ;  147. 

but  if  the  plaintiff  reside  out  of  the  State,  (df)  Potter  v.  Parsons,   14   la.   286; 

the  attorney  having  no  authority  to  bind  Christie  v.  Sawyer,  44  N.  H.  298. 

the  plaintilf,  is  himself  personally  bound  (dij)  llowland   v.  State,  68  Penn.  St. 

by  such  indorsement,  and  the  writ  accord-  196. 

ingly   is     properly    and    sufficiently    in-  (e)  Swinfen    v.  Lord    Chelmsford,    6 

dorsed.     Pottingill  v.  McGregor,  12  N.  H.  H.  &  N.  590.     See  Fray  v.  Voules,  1  Ell. 

179;  Woods  v.  Blodgett,  15  N.  H.  609.  &  E.  839. 

1  An  attorney  has  no  implied  authority  after  judgment  in  favor  of  his  client  to 
enter  into  an  agreement  on  his  behalf  to  postpone  execution.  Lovegrove  v.  White, 
L.  K.  6  C.  P.  440.  But  an  attorney  to  prosecute  a  suit  to  evict  a  tenant  has  author- 
ity by  his  retainer  to  l)ind  his  client,  the  landlord,  by  an  agreement  with  the  tenant's 
attorney  that,  if  the  latter  will  submit  to  a  default,  execution  shall  not  issue  for  a 
week  afterwards,  or  if  issued,  not  to  be  served  witlun  that  time.  Wieland  r.  White, 
109  Mass.  392.  —  An  attorney  has  authority,  by  virtue  of  his  employment  as  such,  to 
release,  before  judgment,  an  attachment  of  real  estate.  Moulton  v.  Bowkcr,  115 
Mass.  36.  Hut  an  attorney  for  a  party,  in  the  absence  of  a  special  agreement,  is  not 
liable  for  a  stenographer's  services  in  an  action.     Bonynge  v.  Field.  HI  N.  Y.  159. 

2  Wiiipple  V.  Whitman,  i:J  K.  I.  512;  Mandeville  v.  Reynolds,  68  N.  Y.  528; 
Ambrose  v.  McDonald,  .53  Cal.  28;  Fritchev  r.  Bosley,  56  Md.  94;  Levy  v.  Brown,  56 
Miss.  83;  Walden  v.  Bolton,  55  Mo.  405 ;  "Pickett  v.  Memphis  Bank,  32  Ark.  346; 
Koller  V.  Wooldridge,  46  Tex.  4^5.  That  in  England  and  Massacluisetts  an  attorney 
ma^'  in  good  faitii  compromise  a  claim,  see  Butler  v.  Knight,  L.  K.  2  Ex.  109;  Wie- 
land V.  White,  109  Mass.  392. 

130 


CH.  VI.]  OP   ATTORNEYS.  *  Hg 

release  an  interested  witness  without  special  authority  from  his 
client,  (eg) 

If  an  attorney  cannot  by  virtue  of  his  general  authority  bind 
his  clients  by  bargains,  as,  for  compromise  or  settlement  of  a  case, 
still  less  can  he  enter  into  agreements  quite  independent  of  any 
action.  (/)  He  cannot  indorse  for  his  client  a  note  left  with  him 
for  collection,  (ff)  Nor  can  he  receive  anything  but  money  for  a 
debt  left  with  him  for  collection.  (/^) 

It  is  said,  in  many  cases,  that  an  attorney  has  the  right  to  sub- 
mit his  client's  case  to  arbitration.  ((/)  i  But  in  other  cases  this 
power,  for  what  seem  to  us  good  reasons,  is  confined  to  suits 
actually  commenced.  (7i) 

The  right  of  a  party  to  change  his  attorney  in  an  action  has  of 
late  passed  under  adjudication  in  some  cases.  The  lien  of  the  at- 
torney on  the  papers  for  past  services  must  of  course  be  preserved. 
But  otherwise,  the  right  of  the  client  to  change  his  attorney  is 
sometimes  asserted  very  strongly,  (^hh^  The  weight  of  authority 
would  seem,  however,  in  favor  of  the  rule  that  the  consent 
of  the  court  must  be  obtained,  and  will  not  be  given  but  for 
reason.  (/«') 

There  are  many  English  statutes  relating  to  the  powers,  duties, 
and  responsibilities  of  attorneys,  which  have  no  force  in 
*  tills  country.     Most  of  our  courts  liave  their  own  rules  of    *  118 
practice  bearing  somewhat  on  this  subject ;  (z)  but  these 

(ee)  Succession  of  Weigel,  18  La.  Ann.  .31.     And  see  Scarborough  v.  Reynolds, 

49.  12  Ala.   252,   and   Wade   v.  Powell,   31 

(/)  This  subject  is  fully  considered  Ga.  1. 
in   a   recent    English   case.     Swinfen    v.  (lik)  Ilazlett  v.  Gill,  5  Kob.  611. 

Swinfen,  1   C.  B.  (n.  s.)   364.     See  also  (hi)  Wolf  v.  Trochelnian,  5  Rob.  611 ; 

Smith's  Heirs  v.  Dixon,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  438,  Sloo  v.  Law,  4  Blatch.  C.  C.  268 ;  Walton 

for  the  discussion   of   the  extent  of   an  v.  Sugg,  I'liill.  L.  98. 
attorney's  power  to  bind  his  client  under  (0  The  nature  and  scope  of  the  au- 

his  general  authority,  and  independent  of  thority    of    attorneys    at    law    in    this 

any   special  authority  conferred  by   the  country    are    considered    in    Holker    v. 

client.  Tarker,  7  Cranch,  430;  Erwin  v.  Blake, 

(ff)  Child  r.  Eureka  Works,  44  N.  H.  8  Pet.   18;    Union  Bank  of   Georgetown 

354.  V.  Geary,  5  id.  99;  United  States  v.  Curry, 

(/(j)  Weight  V.  Daily,  26  Tex.  730.  6  How.  100 ;  United  States  v.  Yates,  id. 

iff)  Filmer   v.  Delber,  3   Taunt.  486;  605;    Smith   v.  Lamberts,  7  Gratt.   1.38; 

Faviel    v.  Eastern    Co.   R.   Co.  2   Exch.  Lewis   i*.  Gamaee.  1  Pick.  347  ;  Jenney 

344;  Wilson  v.  Young,  9  Barr,  101 :  Hoi-  v.  Delesdernier,~20   Me.   183;   Jewitt   v. 

ker  i\  Parker,  7  Cranch,  436;  Talbot  r.  Wadleigh,    32    id.    110;    Slackhouse    i;. 

M'Gee.  4  Monr.  375.  O'Hara,  14  Penn.  88  ;  Walker  v.  Scott,  8 

(A)  Jenkins  v.  Gillespie,  10  Sm.  &  M.  Eng.  (Ark.)  644;  Smith  v.  Dixon,  3  Met. 

1  Morris  v.  Grier,  76  N.  C.  410 ;  Lee  v.  Grimes,  4  Col.  185. 

131 


*  118  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

have  no  binding  force  in  other  courts.  The  rules  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  are,  however,  binding  on  the  Circuit 
and  District  Courts  of  the  United  States,  so  far  as  they  are 
applicable  to  them. 

(Ky.)  438;  West  v.  Raymond,  21  Ind.  543;  Flanders  v.  Sherman,  18  Wis.  575; 
305;  Ricketson  v.  Conipton,  23  Cal.  G30;  Hathaway  y.  Brady,  26  Cal.  581;  Ryan  i-. 
East  River  Bank  v.  Kennedy,  9  Bosw.     Martin,  18  Wis.  072. 

132 


CH.  VII.]  TRUSTEES.  *  119 


*  CHAPTER  VII.  *119 

TRUSTEES. 

Sect.  I.  —  The  Origin  of  Trusts. 

It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  Trusts  in  the  English  law  had  a 
fraudulent  origin.  It  was  sought,  by  the  intervention  of  a  trus- 
tee, to  evade  the  feudal  law  of  tenures,  and  the  prohibitions  of 
the  statutes  of  Mortmain,  and  to  place  property  where  a  creditor 
could  not  reach  it.  The  practice  became  common ;  and  as  such 
trustee  was  not  accountable  at  common  law,  the  Chancellor,  in 
the  reign  of  Richard  II.,  applied  the  writ  of  subpoena  to  call  him 
before  the  Court  of  Chancery,  where  he  might  be  compelled  to 
do  what  equity  and  justice  required.  "  A  trust,"  said  Sir  Robert 
Atkins,  (a)  "  had  for  its  parents  fraud  and  fear,  and  for  its  nurse 
a  court  of  conscience."  The  obvious  utility  of  trusts  has  made 
them  very  common :  but  almost  the  whole  jurisdiction  over  trus- 
tees has  always  remained  in  the  Courts  of  Equity.  (6)  So  far 
as  they  come  under  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  common 
law,  trustees  are  treated  in  most  respects  as  agents,  and  most  of 
the  principles  and  rules  of  law  in  relation  to  them  have  been 
anticipated  and  stated  under  that  head. 

(a)  Attorney-General  v.  Sands,   Har-  only  a  confidence  and   trust,  for  which 

dres,  491,  arguendo,  "A  trust  is  altogether  he  hath  no  remedy  by  the  common  law, 

the  same  that  a  use  was  before  27  Hen.  but  his  remedy  was  only  by  subpa-na  in 

VIII.,  and  they  have  the  same  parents,  chancery.     If     the    feoffees    would    not 

fraud  and  fear;  and  the  same  nurse,  a  perform    the    order    of    the    chancery, 

court  of  conscience.     By  statute  law,  a  tlien    their    persons    for  the   breach   of 

use,  trust,  or  confidence,  are  all  one  and  the    confidence   were    to   be   imjirisoned 

the  same  thing.     What  a  use  is,  vide  PI.  till   they  did   perform    it." — Foorde   v. 

Com.   352,   and   1   Rep.   in    Chudleigh's  Iloskins,  2  Bulst.  337.     Per  Cokr.  C.  J. : 

case  ;  and  they  are  collateral  to  the  land  ;  "  If  cestui  que  use  desires  the  feoifees  to 

a  cestui  que  trust  has  neither  _;'us  ad  rem  nor  make  the  estate  over,  and  they  so  to  do 

in  re."  refuse,  for  this  refusal  an  action  upon 

{h)  Co.  Lit.  272  b;  Chudleigh's  case,  the  case  lieth  not,  because  for  this  he 

1  Rep.  121.     "  So  that,  he  who  hath  a  use  hath  his  proper  remedy  by  a  subpoena  in 

hath  not  jus,  neque  in  re,  neque  ad  rem,  but  the  chancery." 

133 


*  120  THE  LAW  OP   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK  I. 
*120                                     *  SECTION   n. 

CLASSIFICATION   OF   TRUSTS. 

Trusts  are  simple  when  property  is  vested  in  one  person  upon 
trust  for  another,  without  any  particular  directions  or  provisions ; 
and  then  the  nature  and  operation  of  the  trust  are  determined 
by  legal  construction.  They  are  special,  where  the  purposes  of 
the  trust,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  to  be  accomplished 
are  especially  pointed  out  and  prescribed  ;  and  then  these  express 
provisions  must  be  the  rule  and  measure  of  the  trustee's  rights 
and  duties. 

They  may  be  merely  ministerial,  as  where  one  receives  money 
only  to  pay  the  debt  of  the  giver,  or  an  estate  is  vested  in  him 
merely  that  he  may  convey  it  to  another.  Or  they  may  be  dis- 
cretionary, where  much  is  left  to  the  prudence  and  judgmei;t  of 
the  trustee.  But  in  all  cases,  the  trustee,  by  accepting  the  trust, 
engages  that  he  possesses,  and  that  he  will  exert,  that  degree  of 
knowledge,  intelligence,  and  care,  reasonably  requisite  for  the 
proper  discharge  of  the  duties  which  he  undertakes  to  perform. 

A  trust,  with  a  power  annexed,  is  distinguished  from  a  mixture 
of  trust  and  poioer.  (c)  In  the  former  case,  as  where  lands  are 
vested  in  trust,  with  a  power  in  the  trustees  to  make  leases  of  a 
certain  kind,  or  length,  the  trustee  may  or  may  not  exercise  this 
power,  and  will  not  be  compelled  to  do  so,  unless  his  neglect  to 
exercise  it  be  fraudulent  and  wrongful.  But  in  the  latter  case, 
as  where  lands  or  funds  are  vested  in  trust  for  certain  persons, 
to  be  "  distributed  among  them  according  to  the  best  judgment 
of  the  trustee,"  here  the  distribution  is  of  the  essence  of  the 
trust,  and  must  be  made  ;  although  in  the  manner  of  distribution, 
the  courts  will  not  interfere  unless  to  prevent  fraud  or  other 
wrong. 

*  121        *  Trustees  are  also  private  or  puhlic.     The  former  hold 

property  for  the  benefit  of  an  individual  (the  cestui  que 
trust')  or  more  than  one,  liut  who  are  distinctly  pointed  out,  per- 
sonally, or   by  other  sufficient   description.     Public  trustees  are 
those  who  hold  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  public,  or  for  a  cer- 
(c)  Gower  v.  Mainwaring,  2  Vcs.  Sen.  89 ;  Cole  v.  Wade,  16  Ves.  Jr.  43. 

134 


CH.  VII.]  TEUSTEES.  *  122 

tain  large  part  of  the  public,  as  a  town  or  a  parish ;  and  they  are 
usually  treated  as  official  persons,  with  official  rights  and  respon- 
sibilities. 


SECTION  III. 

PEIVATE   TRUSTEES. 

A  private  trustee  is,  as  we  have  seen,  one  to  whom  property, 
either  real  or  personal,  has  been  given  to  be  held  in  trust  for  the 
benefit  of  others ;  and  the  most  common  instances  are  trustees 
of  property  for  the  benefit  of  children,  or  other  devisees  or 
legatees,  or  for  married  women,  or  for  the  payment  of  the  debts 
of  an  insolvent,  or  for  the  management  and  winding  up  of  some 
business  and  the  like. 

Where  property  is  devised  to  executors  in  trust,  their  relation 
to  the  estate  as  trustees  is  as  distinct  from  their  relation  to  it  as 
executors  as  if  they  were  not  executors,  (cc) 

The  legal  estate  is  in  the  trustee,  and  the  equitable  estate  is  in 
the  cestui  que  trust;  but  as  the  trustee  holds  the  estate,  although 
only  with  the  power  and  for  the  purpose  of  managing  it,  he  is 
bound  personally  by  the  contracts  he  makes  as  trustee,  although 
designating  himself  as  such ;  and  nothing  will  discharge  him  but 
an  express  provision,  showing  clearly  that  both  parties  agreed 
to  act  upon  the  responsibility  of  the  funds  alone,  or  of  some 
other  responsibility,  exclusive  of  that  of  the  trustee ;  or  some 
other  circumstance  clearly  indicating  another  party  who  is  bound 
by  the  contract,  and  upon  whose  credit  alone  it  is  made.  The 
mere  use  by  the  promisor  of  the  name  of  Trustee,  or  of  any  other 
name  of  office  or  employment,  will  not  discharge  him.  Some  one 
must  be  bound  by  the  contract,  and  if  he  does  not  bind 
some  other,  he  binds  himself,  (c?)  *  and  the  official  name  is  *  122 
then  regarded  only  as  describing  and  designating  him.  Qdd} 

{cc)  Parsons  v.  Lyman,  5  Blatchford,  ccpted  by  him  generally,  though  it  was 

170.  drawn    on     account    of     the    company. 

(d)  Thomas    v.   Bishop,   Cas.   Temp.  Childs   v.  Monins,  2   Br.    &  B.   460.    A 

Hardw.   9,  2  Str.   955.      In  this   case  a  promissory  note,  by   which   the    makers, 

cashier  was    held   liable   on    a   bill    ac-  as  executors,  jointly  and  severally  promise 


(dd)  Fullam  v.  West  Brookfield,  9  Allen,  1. 

135 


*  122  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

A  trustee  is  held  not  only  to  careful  management  of  the  trust 
property,  so  that  it  shall  not  be  wasted  or  diminished,  but  he  is 
bound  to  secure  its  reasonable  productiveness  and  increase.  If 
one  of  joint  trustees  permit  by  his  want  of  due  care  another  trus- 
tee to  waste  the  fund,  he  will  be  responsi])le  for  the  loss,  {de) 
If  a  trustee  mingles  the  trust  money  with  his  own,  as  by  deposit- 
ing it  in  a  bank  in  his  own  name,  he  will  be  liable  for  any  depre- 
ciation, (df^  It  has  been  said  that  a  trustee,  by  reason  of  the 
confidence  reposed  in  him,  is  bound  to  take  more  care  of  the 
trust  property  than  of  his  own,  for  he  may  speculate  with  his 
own,  but  must  not  with  what  he  holds  in  trust,  {dg^  He  is 
bound  not  to  make  use  of  the  trust  property  for  his  own  bene- 
fit, (^dh)  If  it  lie  idle  in  his  hands,  without  cause,  he  will  be 
charged  interest,  (e)  In  some  instances  he  is  charged  compound 
interest ;  but  there  is  some  discrepancy  in  the  cases  in  which 
the  question  of  compounding  interest  occurs.  On  the  whole,  we 
think  the  rule  may  be  stated  thus :  Interest  will  be  compounded, 
or  computed  with  annual  rests,  where  the  trustee  is  guilty  of 
gross  delinquency,  or  mingles  the  trust  property  with  his  own 
for  his  own  benefit,  or  employs  it  in  trade,  or  otherwise  so  uses 
the  trust  funds  as  to  justify  the  belief  that  he  has  actually  earned 
interest  upon  the  interest;  and  the  reason  for  charging  com- 
pound interest  is  much  stronger,  when  the  trustee  refuses  to 
exhibit  the  accounts,  which  would  show,  precisely,  what  loss  or 
advantage   he   has   derived   from  the  trust   funds.  (/)     But   he 

to  paj'  on  demand  with  interest,  renders  ((//")  Mason  ^'.  Whithomc,  2  Cow.  242. 

them  personally  liable.  — Eaton  (,'.  Bell,  (f/'/j  King  v.  Talbot,  50  Barb.  453. 

5   B.  &   Aid.   34.      Commissioners   of  a  [dh)  Flagg  r.  Ely,  1  Edm.  206. 

private     inclosure    act,    are    personally  (e)  Green  v.  Winter,  1  Johns.  Ch.  26  ; 

liable    on   drafts  drawn  on   bankers,  re-  Mannings.  Manning,   1  Jolms.  Ch.  527; 

questing  them  to    pay  the  sums  therein  Schietfelin  v.  Stewart,  1  Johns.  Ch.  620. 

mentioned  on   account   of  public   drain-  In  Attorney-General  v.  Alford,  4  De  G., 

age,    and    to   place   the   same    to   their  M.  &  (i.  843,  the  rule  upon  this  point  is 

account,     as     commissioners.  —  Rew     v.  laid  down  thus:  The  measure  by  which 

Pettet,    1    A.    &    E.  196,  3    Nev.    &    M.  the  court  ought  to  charge  a  trustee  inter- 

456.     The    makers  of   a  note    who   sign  est  is,  to  ascertain  what  interest  he  has 

it   *'  as    church-wardens  and   overseers,"  received,  or  ought  to  have   received,  or 

are  personally  liable,  altliough  the  loan  that  lie  is  estopped   from  saying  he  did 

was   for    the    use    of    the    jiarish.  —  Ex  not  receive. 

pane  Buckley,  14  M.  &  W.  400.     It  was  (/')   Jones  r.    Eoxall,    15   Beav.    892; 

held,  in  this  case,  that  there  was  no  sep-  Schieffelin  v.  Stewart,  1  Johns.  Ch.  620; 

arate  right  of  action  against  "  R.  M."  a  Evcrtson   v.  Tappen,  5  Johns.    Ch.    497; 

partner  who  signed  a  promissory  note  for  Luken's  Ajipeal,  7  W.  &  S.  48;  Boynton 

himself  and  his  copartners  thus:    "For  r.  Dyer,  18  I'ick.  1  ;  Turncy  v.  Williams, 

J.  C,  R.  M.,  J.  P.,  and  T.  S.,"  "R.  M."  7  Yerg.  172;  Wrigiit  v.  AVright,2  McCord, 

SeePackardr.  Nye,2Met.47;an<c,p.*65.  Ch.  200;  Bryant  v.  Craig,  12  Ala.  354; 

(f/e)  Schenck    v.    Scheuck,    1    C.    E.  Karr's  Adm'r  w.  Karr,  6  Dana,  3 ;  Rowan 

Green,  174.  v.  Kirkpatrick,  14  111.  1 ;  Barney  v.  Saun- 

136 


CH.  VII.] 


TRUSTEES. 


123 


*  will   not  bo  charged  even  with  simple  interest  until  a    *  123 
reasonable  time  for  investment  has  elapsed ;  and  this  has 
been   held,  in   some   cases,   six    months,   a  year,   or   even   two 
years.  (^) 

A  trustee  must  not  himself  purchase  the  property  which  it  is 
his  duty  as  trustee  to  sell ;  nor  sell  the  property  which,  as  trustee, 
he  purchases.  This  rule  applies,  in  its  whole  extent,  to  all 
agents,  and  the  reasons,  limitations,  and  authorities  for  it,  were 
presented  in  treating  of  that  subject,  {gg^ 

A  purchaser  from  a  trustee  with  knowledge  that  a  trust 
attaches  to  the  property,  holds  it  subject  to  the  trust.  {gK) 


dcrs,  \Q>  How.  535.  See  also  Raphael  v. 
Boeiiin,  11  Ves.  92;  s.  c.  13  Ves.  407, 
51)0 ;  Ashburnliam  v.  Tliompson,  13  Ves. 
402  :  Tebbs  r.  Carpenter,  1  iMadd.  299 ; 
Swiiulall  V.  ISwindall,  3  Ired.  Eq.  285. — 
But  mere  neglect  to  invest  the  money,  or 
an  improper  investment,  without  gross 
delinquency,  Knott  v.  Cottee,  16  Beav. 
77  ;  Robinson  v.  Robinson,  1  De  G.,  M. 
&  G.  147  ;  Scliieffelin  v.  Stewart,  1  Johns. 
Ch.  620;  McCall's  case,  1  Ashm.  357; 
English  V.  Harvey,  2  Rawle,  305;  Har- 
land's  case,  5  Rawle,  323 ;  Findlav  v. 
Smith,  7  S.  &  R.  264;  Dietteridi  (;.  Heft, 
5  Barr,  87,  or  merely  mingling  the  trust 
funds  with  his  own,  is  not  sufficient  to 
charge  him  with  compound  interest. 
Clarkson  v.  De  Peyster,  1  Hopk.  Ch. 
424  ;  s  c.  num.  De  Peyster  v.  Clarkson, 
2  Wend.  77  ;  Stafford,  In  re,  11  Barb. 
353  ;  Ker  v.  Sncad,  Circuit  Court  of  Vir- 
ginia (Oct.  1847)  ;  Scuihnnjh,  J.,  11 
Law  Rep.  217.  In  the  case  of  Fay  v. 
Howe,  1  Pick.  527,  and  Robbins  v.  Hay- 
ward,  cited  in  a  note  to  this  case,  where 
large  sums  of  money  had  come  into  the 
liands  of  a  guardian  of  infants,  there 
being  rents  of  real  estate  and  income 
from  public  stocks  periodically  received, 
and  no  account  having  been  settled  for 
many  years,  it  was  ordered  that  an  ac- 
count should  be  settled  with  a  rest  for 
every  year,  and  the  balance  thus  struck 
should  be  carried  forward,  to  be  again 
on  interest,  whenever  the  sum  should  be 
so  large  that  a  trustee  acting  faithfully 
and  discreetly  would  have  put  it  into  a  pro- 
ductive state.  And  five  hundred  dollars 
was  the  sum  which  the  court  thought 
should  subject  tlie  guardian  to  this 
charge.  But  for  cases  in  which  it  ap- 
pears to  be  doubted  whether  compound 
interest  should  be  charged  to  a  trustee, 
see  McCall's  case,  1  Ashm.  357;  Eng- 


lish V.  Harvey,  2  Rawle,  305 ;  Harland's 
case,  5  Kawle,  323;  Findlay  v.  Smith, 
7  S.  &  R.  264;  Ackerinan  v.  Emott,  4 
Barb.  626.  And  see  Dietterich  v.  Heft, 
5  Barr,  87 ;  Kerr  v.  Laird,  27  Miss. 
544.  See  Pennypacker's  Ajjp.  41  Penn. 
St.  494,  where  it  is  held  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  rests  does  not  apply  to  guard- 
ians, executors,  or  administrators,  who 
admit  or  neglect  to  put  trust-funds  out 
at  interest. 

('/)  In  Karr  v.  Karr,  6  Dana,  3,  two 
years  were  allowed  for  periodical  rests, 
at  the  end  of  whicli  periods  the  interest 
should  be  made  principal.  In  Dunscomb 
r.  Dunscomb,  1  Johns.  Ch.  508,  six  months 
after  receipt  of  the  moneys  was  thought 
a  reasonable  time,  after  which  interest 
should  be  chiyged.  In  Merrick's  Estate, 
1  Ashm.  304,  six  months  was  allowed.  And 
see  Worrell's  App.,  23  Penn.  St.  44.  In 
De  Peyster  r.  Clarkson,  2  Wend.  77,  six 
months  was  allowed.  In  Fox  v.  Wil- 
cocks,  1  Binn.  194,  the  administrator 
was  held  chargeable  with  interest  after 
twelve  months  had  elapsed  from  the 
death  of  the  intestate.  In  Boynton  v. 
Dyer,  18  Pick.  8,  one  year  was  consid- 
ered tlie  proper  period.  In  Scliieffelin 
V.  Stewart,  1  Johns.  Ch.  620,  the  plain- 
tiff was  adn)inistrator,  and  was  allowed 
from  the  8tli  September,  1803,  when 
administration  was  granted,  to  the  6th 
July,  1805,  when  the  last  debt  of  any 
magnitude  was  paid  to  the  estate;  then 
interest  began,  and  the  account  was 
computed  afterwards  with  annual  rests. 

(<iq)  See  also  Morris  i'.  Joseph,  1  W. 
Va.'  '256 ;  Renew  v.  Butler,  30  Ga.  954 ; 
Sypher  v.  McHenry,  18  la.  232.  But  see 
contra,  Birdwell  v.  Cain,  1  Cold.  301. 

('//')  Jones's  Adm'r  v.  Shaddock,  41 
Ala'.  262. 

137 


124  THE  LAW  OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 


SECTION  rv. 

PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 

There  is  an  important  difference  between  these  trustees  and 
private  trustees,  in  respect  to  their  personal  responsibility  for 
tlieir  contracts.  Where  one  acts  distinctly  for  the  public,  and 
in  an  official  or  quani  official  capacity,  although  he  engages 
*  124  tliat  *  certain  things  should  be  done,  he  is  nevertheless 
not  liable  on  this  engagement,  unless  there  be  something 
in  the  contract,  or  some  admissible  evidence  respecting  it,  which 
shows  that  the  parties  understood  and  intended  the  promisor  to 
make  his  promise  personally,  and  to  be  bound  himself,  instead 
of  the  State,  or  in  addition  to  the  State,  for  the  due  performance 
of  the  promise.  (K) 

But  trustees  and  other  officers  are  sometimes  held  personally 
upon  their  contracts,  as  for  payment  of  wages,  materials  supplied, 
&c.,  where  they  have  charge  of  public  works,  and  have  funds 
which  they  may  use  for  those  purposes,  and  especially  where  the 
nature  of  the  transaction  shows  that  the  party  dealing  with  them 
may  well  have  supposed  that  he  was  dealing  with  them  on  their 
own  account,  or  thaWhcy  intended,  although  acting  for  the  pub- 
lic, to  be  responsible  for  the  materials  they  bought  or  the  labor 

(/()  Macbeatli  v.  Haklimancl,  1  T.  R.  part  of  tlie  government.  It  would  be 
172.  Tliis  was  an  action  on  promises  detrimental  to  the  king's  service,  for  no 
against  a  defendant  (who  was  Governor  private  person  would  accept  of  any  cora- 
of  Quebec),  for  work,  labor,  &c.  Duller,  mand  on  such  terms.  The  case  of  Mac- 
J.,  said  :  "  It  is  true  that  he  (tlie  dc-  beath  v.  Ilaldimand  seems  to  govern  the 
fcndant)  gave  tlie  orders  to  Sinclair,  present.  It  was  there  determined  that  a 
ami  that  every  tiling  which  the  plain-  commander  was  not  answerable  for  con- 
tiff  did  was  pursuant  to  directions  from  tracts  entered  into  by  him  on  behalf  of 
the  latter,  wliom  he  was  instructed  to  government.  And  whether  the  contract 
obey;  but  these  orders  did  not  flow  l>e  by  parol  or  by  deed,  it  makes  no  differ- 
froni  the  defendant  in  his  own  personal  ence  as  to  the  construction  to  be  put  on 
character,  but  as  governor  and  agent  it.  Tliat  indeed  was  a  stronger  case  than 
for  the  public;  and  so  the  [ilaintiff  him-  the  present;  because  there  it  was  left 
self  considered  it.  And  in  any  case  open  to  evidence,  from  whence  it  waa 
wliere  a  man  acts  as  agent  for  the  pulv  to  lie  inferred  that  the  contract  was  made 
lie,  and  treats  in  tliat  capacity,  there  is  by  the  defendant  as  the  agent  of  the  gov- 
no  pretence  to  say  that  he  is  personally  ernment,  but  here  it  appears  in  express 
liable."  Unwin  v.  Wolseley,  1  T.  K.  terms  that  the  defendant  entered  into 
074.  Ash/iurst,  J.,  said :  "  It  would  be  this  contract  on  the  behalf  of  govern- 
extremely  dangerous  to  hold  that  gov-  nient."  See  also  Hodgson  v.  Dexter, 
ernors  and  commanders  in  chief  should  1  Craneh,  34.3;  Tucker  v.  Justices,  13 
make  themselves  personally  liable  by  Ired.  L.  4.34 ;  Stephenson  v.  Weeks,  2 
contracts  which   they  enter  into  on  the  Foster  (N.  II.),  257. 

138 


CH.  VII.]  TRUSTEES.  *  125 

they  hired,  (i)    Such  trustees  *  know  the  state  of  the  means    *  125 
in  their  hands,  and  how  far  they  may  rely  upon  a  public 
provision  of  funds,  and  may  contract  accordingly,  while   those 
who  deal  with  them  cannot  know  this  at  all,  or  certainly  not  so 
well.  O') 

The  true  principle  which  runs  through  all  of  these  cases,  and 
applies  alike  to  private  and  public  trustees,  is  this.  To  whom  did 
the  promisee  give  credit,  and  to  whom  did  the  promisor  under- 
stand him  to  give  credit  ?  If  the  promisee  gave  credit  to  the 
promisor  personally,  and  was  justified  in  so  understanding  the 
case,  and  the  promisor  as  a  rational  person  knew  or  should  have 
known  that  the  promisee  trusted  to  him  personally,  and  he  did 
not  guard  the  promisee  from  so  trusting  him,  then  he  cannot 
afterwards  turn  him  over  to  those  whom  he  represents,  because 
he  must  abide  his  responsibility.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
promisor  supposed  the  promisee  to  trust  only  to  those  for  whose 
benefit  he  acted,  or  rather  to  the  funds  and  means  possessed  by 
him  as  trustee,  and  if  he  had  a  right  to  suppose  so,  and  the  prom- 
isee did  not  demand  and  receive  the  assurance  of  his  personal 
liability,  then  no  such  liability  exists,  and  he  is  bound  only  to  act 
faithfully  as  a  trustee  in  the  discharge  of  his  promise. 

An  agent  who  exceeds  his  authority  and  fails  to  bind  his  prin-- 
cipal,  becomes  liable  himself.     On  this  familiar  principle  public 
trustees  or  officers,  as  town  or  parish  officers,  who  enter  into  con- 
tracts in  their  official  capacity,  and  on  behalf  of  the  corporations 
which   they  represent,  if  they  so  deviate  from  or  exceed  their 

{{)  Horsley  i'.  Bell  and  others,  Ambl.  take  care  to  be  provided.     Tliat  the  work- 

769.     An  act  of  parliament  was  passed  men  who  engaged  to  do  the  work  could 

to     make    a    certain     brook    navigable,  not  know  the  state  of  the  fmid,  nor  was  it 

The   defendants,  with   many   other   per-  their  business  to  inquire  ;  tiiey  gave  credit 

sons,  wore  named  commissioners  to  put  to  the  commissioners  "     Cullen  r.  Duke, 

the  act  in  execution.     Certain  tolls  were  of  Queensberry,  1  Bro.  Ch.  lUl,  and  notes, 
to  be  paid  by  vessels  whicii  should  navi-  {J)   Higgins    r.    Livingstone,    4   Dow, 

gate  the  brook,   and   the  commissioners  341,  ;->55.     Lord  Eldon,  in  tiiis  case,  said : 

were   empowered   to   borrow   money  on  "' As  to  the  general  liability  of  parliamen- 

these  tolls.    The  commissioners  employed  tary  trustees,  if  I  were  to  give  an  opinion,  I 

the  plaintiff  to  do  different  parts  of  "the  would  say  that  when  persons  act  under  a 

works,  and  such   of   the   commissioners  parliamentary  trust,  aiul  state  themselves 

as  wcTC  present  at  the  several  meetings,  as  so  acting,  they  arc  not  to  be  held  per- 

made  orders  relative  thereto.     Every  one  sonally   liable.     But   this   also,  I   think, 

of  them  was  present  at  some  of  the  meet-  rests   on   strong    principle,   that   as   the 

ings,  but  no   one  was  present  at  all  the  trustees   must  know   whether  there   are 

meetings.     The  fund  proving  deficient,  it  funds  to  answer  the  purpose,  they,  when 

was  held  that  all  the  acting  commission-  they    contract  with    others,   who  do  not 

ers  were  personally    liable  to  the  plain-  know,  act  as   if  representing   that   they 

tiff.    The  Lord  Chancellor  and  the  judges  had  a  fund  applicable  to  the  object,  and 

agreed  in  opinion.      "  The  cotnmissoners  are    then    personally  bound   to   i)rovide 

had  power  to  borrow  money,  and  ought  to  funds  to  pay  the  contractors." 

139 


*126 


THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


authority  as  not  to  bind  these  corporations,  are  themselves 
*  126    liable.  (A:)    But  whether  they  are  liable  on  the  contract,  *or 

in  case,  must  depend  on  the  character  and  circumstances 
of  the  transaction.  (1} 


(^■)  Sprott  V.  Powell,  3  Bing.  478; 
Leigh  r.  Tavlor,  7  B.  &  C.  491  ;  Heude- 
bourck  V.  Langton,  3  C.  &  P.  571 ;  Kirby 
V.  Bannister,  5  B.  &  Ad.  1009 ;  s.  c.  3 
Xev.  &  M.  119;  Burton  v.  Griffiths,  11  M. 
&  W.  817;  Bay  v.  Cook,  2  N.  J.  343; 
Husbands  v.  Smith's  Adm'r,  14  B.  Mon. 
211.  — Uthwatt  V.  Elkins,  13  M.  &  W. 
772.  Church-wardens  and  overseers  of  a 
parish  having  taken  a  lease  of  land  in 
their  official  capacity,  whicli  they  were 
not  authorized,  by  the  statute  59  Geo. 

140 


III.,  c.  12,  to  hold  in  the  nature  of  a  corpo- 
ration, it  was  held  to  be  a  personal  un- 
dertaking of  their  own,  on  which  they 
were  individually  responsible  for  the 
payment  of  rent.  —  "If  an  overseer  of 
the  poor  contract  with  tradesmen  upon 
account  of  the  poor,  and  upon  his  own 
credit,  as  soon  as  he  receives  so  much  of 
the  poor's  money,  it  becomes  his  own 
debt."  Holt,  C.  J.,  Anon.  12  Mod.  559. 
(/)  See  ante,  p.  *  68,  note  (w). 


CH.  VIII.]  OF  EXECUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS. 


127 


*  CHAPTER  VIII. 


127 


OP  EXECUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS. 

They  act  as  the  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased,  hav- 
ing in  their  hands  his  means,  for  the  purpose  of  discharging  his 
liabilities  or  executing  his  contracts,  and  of  carrying  into  effect 
his  will,  if  he  have  left  one ;  and  in  general,  they  are  liable  only 
so  far  as  these  means,  or  assets  in  their  hands,  are  applicable  to 
such  purpose.  ^  But  they  may  become  personally  liable ;  and  a 
clause  in  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  hereafter  to  be  spoken  of,  refers 
to  this  subject.  In  England  it  is  regarded  as  the  peculiar  province 
of  a  court  of  equity  to  administer  justice  in  cases  of  legacies,  (a) 


(«)  Deeks  v.  Strutt,  5  T.  R.  690,  and 
see  Jones  v.  Tanner,  7  B.  &  C.  542.  But 
it  seems  Dceks  v.  Strutt  is  to  be  under- 
stood as  only  deciding  that  an  action  for 
a  legacy  cannot  be  maintained  upon  an 
assent  of  the  executor  merely  im/ilicd 
from  his  possession  of  sufficient  assets ; 
leaving  it  open  to  say  that  an  action  may 
lie  upon  an  express  promise  by  him  in 
consideration  of  assets,  or  upon  an  ex- 
press admission  by  him  that  he  has 
money  in  his  hands  for  the  payment  of 
such  legacy.  Barber  v.  Fox,  2  Wms. 
Saund.  137  c.  n.  (a),  citing  Atkins  v.  Hill, 
Cowp.  284,  and  Gorton  v.  Dyson,  1  Br.  & 
B.  210.  It  has  been  held  that  where  an 
account  of  the  residuary  estate  of  a  tes- 
tator has  been  made  out  by  the  executors, 
and  signed  by  the  parties  interested, 
under  which  account  all  of  them  have 
been  paid  except  one,  such  one  may  re- 
cover his  proportion,  with  interest,  in 
assumpsit  against  the  executors.  Greg- 
ory V.  Harman,  3  C.  &  P.  205.  Upon 
the  assent  of  the  executor  to  a  bequest  of 
a  specific  chattel,  whether  personal  or 
real,  the  interest  in  it  vests  in  the  legatee, 


and  he  may  recover  it  by  an  action  at 
law.  Doe  i:  Guy,  3  East,  120.  And  see 
Paramour  v.  Yardly,  Plowd.  539.  Whether 
an  executor  has  assented  to  a  bequest 
is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  and 
not  a  matter  of  law  to  be  determined  by 
the  court.  Mason  v.  Farnell,  12  M.  &  W. 
647.  Lord  Holt  is  reported  to  have  said 
in  Ewer  v.  Jones,  2  Salk.  415,  that  a  dev- 
isee may  maintain  an  action  at  conunon 
law  against  a  terre-tenant,  for  a  legacy 
devised  out  of  land  ;  for  where  a  statute, 
as  the  Statute  of  Wills,  gives  a  right, 
the  party  by  consequence  shall  have  an 
action  of  law  to  recover  it.  In  Braith- 
waite  V.  Skinner,  5  M.  &  W.  313,  this 
dictum  was  much  discussed,  and  the 
learned  Barons  were  of  opinion,  that 
it  was  to  be  taken  with  a  material 
qualification,  which  is  thus  stated  by 
Parke,  B. :  "  The  Statute  of  Wills  en- 
ables a  party  to  dispose  by  will  of  the 
property  which  he  might  have  disposed 
of  during  his  lifetime  at  his  free-will  and 
pleasure.  I  think  the  meanmg  of  Lord 
Holt  is  this,  that  if  a  person  gives  an  in- 
terest which   could  be   enforced   by  an 


1  An  executor  may  pledge  the  personal  property  of  his  testator  for  the  general 
purposes  of  the  will,  but  if  the  person  receiving  such  a  pledge  from  an  executor  has 
at  the  time  knowledge  or  notice  that  the  executor  intends  to  misapply  the  money,  or 
is  in  the  very  transaction  applying  it  to  his  own  private  use,  the  pledge  is  not  valid. 
Carter  v.  Lewiston  Bank,  71  Me.  448. 

141 


*128 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


The  law  and  practice  on  this  subject  varies  somewhat  in  different 

States  in  this  country. 
*  128        *  It  is  said  that  the  promise  of  an  executor  to  pay  a  debt, 

"whenever  sufficient  effects  are  received  from  the  estate 
of  the  deceased,"  must  be  construed  to  mean  sufficient  effects 
received  in  the  ordinary  course  of  administration,  according  to 
law.  (by  If  an  executor  or  administrator  receives,  as  such,  a 
promissory  note  or  bill  of  the  deceased,  and  indorses  the  same,  he 
is  liable  upon  it  personally.  ((?)  If  he  makes  a  note  or  bill,  signing 
it  "as  executor,"  he  is  personally  liable,  unless  he  expressly  limits 
his  promise  to  pay,  by  the  words,  "out  of  the  assets  of  my  testa- 
tor," or  "  if  the  assets  be  sufficient,"  or  in  some  equivalent  way ;  (c?)  ^ 


action  at  law,  the  statute  would  give  an 
action  for  it.  Thus,  if  a  person  devised 
by  will  a  right  of  common,  the  devisee 
would  have  a  right  of  action  for  it ;  so  if 
he  devised  a  rent  which  was  not  a  free- 
hold rent  (wliich  could  not  be  the  subject 
of  an  action  at  law),  an  action  would 
lie  for  it.  So  if  he  devised  a  riglit  of 
way,  it  could  be  enforced  by  action  .  or 
if  lie  left  a  term,  the  right  to  it  might  be 
enforced  by  ejectment.  So  if  the  testa- 
tor clearly  meant  to  impose  a  duty  upon 
another  person,  obliging  him  to  i)ay  a  leg- 
acy, an  action  of  debt  would  lie  for  it 
against  the  person  on  whom  the  duty  of 
])aying  tlie  money  was  imposed  :  as  if 
the  testator  left  an  estate  in  fee  to  A,  di- 
recting him  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  to  13, 
I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  an  action 
of  debt  miglit  not  lie  after  A  iiad  accepted 
the  estate,  founded  upon  tlie  duty  cre- 
ated by  the  testator  of  paying  that  sum. 
But  it  is  going  too  far  to  say  that  the 
statute  would  give  a  right  of  action  for 
those  things  which  are  merely  equitable 
interests  ;  as,  for  example,  if  a  testator 
liad  created  a  trust  in  favor  of  a  person, 
it  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  person 
coulil  enforce  the  trust  by  an  action  at 
law."  In  this  case  the  testator  devised 
lands  in  fee,  after  the  determination  of 
certain  life-estates,  to  A,  B,  and  C,  as  ten- 
ants in  common,  sul)ject  to  and  charged 
with  the  payment  of  .£2()(),  which  he 
thereby  bequeatlied  to,  and  to  be  equally 
divided  among,  the  children  of  his  niece  : 
A  and  B,  during  tlie  life  of  one  of  the 
tenants  for  life,  granted  tlieir  reversion 
in  two  imdivided  tliird  parts  of  the  land 
to  mortgagees  for  five  hundred  years. 
It  was  held  that  an  action  of  debt  could 


not  be  maintained  against  the  termors 
for  a  share  of  £200  so  bequeathed,  on 
the  ground  that,  admitting  Lord  IIoll's 
dictum  to  be  correct,  that  where  the  testa- 
tor merely  intended  to  create  a  duty 
from  one  person  to  another,  the  law 
would  give  a  remedy,  —  in  tins  case  no 
duty  was  imposed  upon  tiie  defendants 
towards  the  plaintiff,  which  could  be  en- 
forced by  an  action  of  ddd.  Semble,  no 
action  at  law  could  be  maintained,  but  the 
proper  remedy  was  in  equity.  And  see 
on  this  point  Beecker  y.  Beecker,  7  Johns. 
9!) ;  Van  Orden  v.  Van  Orden,  10  Johns. 
30.  —  In  Connecticut  and  New  Hamp- 
siiire,  it  has  been  held  that  an  action  at 
law  will  lie  against  an  executor  upon  a 
promise  implied  from  the  possession  of 
assets.  Kna])p  v.  Hanford,  (5  Conn.  170 ; 
Pickering  v.  I'ickering,  (5  N.  H.  120.  But 
it  is  believed  tiiat  in  jurisdictions  where 
courts  of  chancery  have  existed,  tiie  doc- 
trine of  the  English  cases  has  been  fol- 
lowed. See  Kent  v.  Somervell,  7  G.  &  J. 
265 ;  Sutton  v.  Crain,  10  G.  &  J.  458.  — 
An  action  at  law  by  a  legatee  for  a  leg- 
acy on  an  executor's  promise,  must  be 
brought  against  the  executor  in  his  per- 
sonal, not  in  ins  rei)resentative  capacity. 
Kayser  v.  Dislier,  9  Leigh,  357. 

(b)  Bowerbank  v.  Monteiro,  4  Taunt. 
844. 

(r.)  Bul/er,  J.,  King  v.  Thorn,  1  T.  R. 
489  ;  Curtis  v.  Bank  of  Somerset,  7  Har. 
&  J.  25. 

(d)  Childs  V.  Monins,  2  Br.  &  B.  460  ; 
King  r.  Thom,  1  T.  II.  489 ;  Woods  v. 
Bidley,  27"  Miss.  119;  Forster  v.  Fuller, 
0  Mass.  58,  where  the  principle  was  ap- 
plied to  the  case  of  a  guardian.  —  As  to 
covenants  by  executors  or  administrators, 


142 


1  Dunne  v.  Decry,  40  la.  251. 


CH.  YIIl.]  OF   EXLCUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS.  *  129 

but  a  note  or  bill  so  qualified  would  not  be  negotiable,  be- 
cause on  condition.  If  an  executor  oi*  administrator  *sub-  *129 
mits  a  disputed  question  to  arbitration,  in  general  terms, 
and  without  an  express  limitation  of  his  liability,  and  the  arbi- 
trators award  that  he  shall  pay  a  certain  sum,  he  is  liable  to  pay 
it  whether  he  has  assets  or  not.  (e)  But  if  the  award  be  merely 
that  a  certain  sum  is  due  from  the  estate  of  the  deceased,  without 
saying  that  the  executor  or  administrator  is  to  pay  it,  he  is  not 
precluded  from  denying  that  he  has  assets.  (/) 

When  there  is  a  contract  with  an  executor  or  administrator, 
by  virtue  of  which  money  has  become  due,  and  the  money  if 
recovered  will  be  assets  in  his  hands,  he  may,  in  general,  sue 
for  it  in  his  representative  capacity.  (,^)  ^  And  so  he  may  be 
sued  as  executor  for  money  paid  for  his  use  in  that  capacity.  (A) 

Executors  should  pay  the  utmost  respect  to  the  directions  in 
the  will  of  their  testator,  but  have  nevertheless  a  certain  discre- 
tion ;  thus  where  a  will  required  the  executor  to  invest  certain 
funds  in  real  estate  securities,  it  was  held  that  he  might,  in  the 
exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  deposit  the  funds  in  a  savings 
bank.  (JiK) 

An  administrator  appointed  to  settle  an  estate  which  a  former 
administrator  or  executor  has  left  unsettled,  is  called  an  admin- 
istrator de  bonis  non,  and  if  there  be  a  will  it  is  annexed  to  his 
appointment  as  administrator.  Among  his  duties  is  that  of 
requiring  and  enforcing  a  transfer  to  himself  from  his  prede- 
cessor of  choses  in  action  belonging  to  the  estate ;  and  for  a  loss 
caused  by  negligence  in  this  respect,  he  is  liable.  (^^) 

With  respect  to  covenants  relating  to  the  freehold,  the  rule  of 
law  is,  that  for  the  breach  of  a  covenant  collateral  or  in  gross, 

made  professedl}'  in   their  capacity   as  But  he  is  only  liable  personally  in  an  ac- 

such,  see  Sumner  v.  Williams,  8    Mass.  tion  for  money  lent  to  him   as  executor, 

162  ;  Thayer  v.  Wendell,  1  Gallis.  o7.  or  had  and  received  by  him  as  executor. 

(c)  Riddel  v.  Sutton,  5  Bing.  '200.  Rose  v.  Bowler,  1  H.  Bl.  108;   Powell  v. 

(f)  Pearson  v.  Henry,  5  T.  R.  6.  Graham,  7  Taunt.  586 ;  Jennings  v.  New- 

{g)  Cowell  r.  Watts,  6  East,  405 ;  King  man,  4  T.  R.  347;    and  see  observations 

V.  Thorn,  1  T.  R.  487 ;  Marshall  v.  Broad-  of  the  judges  in  Ashby  v.  Ashby,  7  B.  & 

hurst,  1  Tyr.  .348,  1  Cr.  &  J.  403 ;    Heath  C.  444  ;  Miles  v.  Durnford,  2  De  G.,  M.  & 

r.  Chilton,  12    M.  &  W.   632 ;    Kane  v.  G.  641. 

Paul,  14  Pet.  33.  (Idi)  Lansing  v.  Lansing,  45  Barb.  182. 

{h)  Ashby  V.  Ashby,  7  B.  &  C.  444.  —  (Id)  Wilkinson  v.  Hunter,  37  Ala.  268. 

1  Thus  the  executors  of  a  deceased  baker  continuing  the  business  under  direc- 
tions in  the  will,  may  recover  in  their  representative  capacity  for  bread  and  flour 
supplied  to  a  customer.     Abbott  v.  Parfitt,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  346. 

143 


130 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


whetlier  such  breach  occur  before  or  after  the  death  of  the  cove- 
nantee, the  personal  representative  must  sue  and  not  the  heir ;  (t) 
for  the  breach  of  a  covenant  wldeh  runs  with  the  land,  the  heir 
must  sue  if  the  breach  occur  after  the  covenantee's  death,  the 
personal  representative  if  it  occur  before.  Qj^  The  doctrine  of  a 
continuing  breach,  for  which  the  heir  or  assignee  may  recover  if 
the  ultimate  and  substantial  damage  is  suffered  by  him,  was  estab- 
lished in  England  by  the  case  of  Kingdon  v.  Nottle,  (Jc)  but 
*  130  it  has  not  been  adopted  in  this  country.  (Z)  *  In  general, 
every  right  ex  contractu,  which  the  deceased  possessed  at 
the  time  of  his  death,  passes  to  his  executor  or  administra- 
tor; (m)^   and   so   strong   is   this   rule,  that   it  prevails  against 


((■)  Lord  Ahinqer,  C.  B.,  Raymond  v. 
Fitch,  2  C,  M.  &"R.  588,  599,  5  Tyr.  985 ; 
Lucy  V.  Levingtoii,  2  Lev.  26,  1  Ventr. 
175;  Bacon's  Abr.  Executors  and  Adminis- 
Irdlors,  N. 

(  /)  Com.  Ditj.  Covenant,  B.  1,  Admin- 
islralion,  B.  13 ;  Morley  v.  Polhill,  2 
Ventr.  56,  3  Salk.  109;  Smith  v.  Si- 
mons, Comb.  (j4. 

(^-)  1  M.  &  Sel.  355;  4  M.  &  Sel.  53; 
King  V.  Jones,  5  Taunt.  418.  Along  with 
the  authority  of  this  case  seems  to  fall 
also  the  doctrine  on  which  it  was 
founded,  and  of  whicli  so  much  is  made 
in  the  books  (see  Williams  on  Executors, 
1st  ed.  519;  1  Lomax  on  Executors,  292), 
that  an  action  can  in  no  case  be  main- 
tained in  the  name  of  the  executor,  un- 
less an  injury  to  the  personal  estate 
appears.  In  England  the  Court  of  Ex- 
ciiequer  have  gone  as  far  as  they  can 
without  quite  overthrowing  Kingdon  v. 
Nottle.  See  the  opinion  of  Lord  Ahinqer 
in  Raymond  v.  Fitch,  2  C,  M.  &  R.  596, 
600,  and  tlie  still  later  case  of  Ricketts  v. 
Weaver,  12  M.  &  W.  718,  where  Pnrke, 
B.,  said :  "  The  question,  therefore,  is  re- 
duced to  this,  whether  an  executor  can  sue 
for  the  breach  of  a  covenant  to  repair  in 
the  lifetii7ie  of  the  lessor,  who  was  tenant 
for  life,  without  averring  special  damage. 
:)m  that  point  liaymond  v.  Fitch,  in  which 
all  tiie  cases  were  consiilered,  is  an  author- 
ity directly  in  point,  and  ought  not  to  be 
shaken.  The  result  oi  that  case  is,  that 
unless  it  be  a  covenant  in  which  the  hdr 


alone  can  sue  (according  to  Kingdon  v. 
Nottle  and  King  r.  Jones)  for  a  breach  of 
the  covenant  in  the  lifetime  of  the  lessor, 
the  executor  can  sue,  unless  it  be  a  mere 
personal  contract,  in  which  the  rule  ap- 
plies that  actio  personalis  moritur  cum  per- 
sona. The  breach  of  covenant  is  the 
damage ;  if  the  executor  be  not  the 
proper  person  to  sue,  the  action  cannot 
be  brought  by  any  one."  In  this  country, 
where  the  courts  are  free  from  the 
shackles  which  the  authority  of  Kingdon 
V.  Nottle  and  kindred  cases  imposes,  it  is 
reasonable  to  believe  that  the  later  doc- 
trine (wliich  is  also  the  older  doctrine)  as 
to  actions  by  executors,  will  be  carried  to 
its  full  extent.  See  Clark  v.  Swift,  3 
Met.  390. 

(/)  Greenby  v.  Wilcocks,  2  Johns.  1 ; 
Mitchell  V.  Warner,  5  Conn.  497;  Beddoe 
V.  Wadsworth,  21  Wend.  120;  Clark  v. 
Swift,  3  Met.  390;  Hacker  v.  Storer,  8 
Greenl.  228,  232  ;  4  Kent,  Com.  472.  — 
The  case  of  Kingdon  v.  Nottle  has,  how- 
ever, been  substantially  followed  in  Ohio 
and  Indiana.  Foote  r.  Burnett,  10  Ohio, 
317  ;  Martin  ;■.  Raker,  5  Blackf.  2:^. 

(m)  Coniyns's  Digest,  Administration, 
B.  13  ;  Bacon's  Abridgment,  Executors 
and  Admi)iistrators,  N. ;  Morley  v.  Polhill, 
2  Ventr.  56,  3  Salk.  109;  Smith  v. 
Simons,  Comb.  64  ;  Lucy  v.  Levington, 
1  Ventr.  170,  2  Lev.  26;  Raymoml  r. 
Fitch,  2  C,  M.  &  R.  588;  Ricketts  v. 
Weaver,  12  M.  &  W.  718;  Carry.  Rob- 
erts, 5  B.  &  Ad.  84,  per  Parke,  J. 


1  The  executrix  of  a  railway  passenger  who,  after  an  interval,  dies  in  consequence 
of  an  accident,  may  recover,  in  an  action  for  breach  of  contract  against  the  railway 
company,  the  damage  to  his  personal  estate  arising  in  his  lifetime  from  medical 
expenses  and  loss  occasioned  by  his  inability  to  attend  to  business,  Bradshaw  v. 
Lancashire,  &c.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  189;  but  not  in  an  action  of  tort.  Pulling 
V.  Gt.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  9  Q.  B.  D.  110.  See  Leggott  v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  Co.,  1  Q. 
B.  D.  599. 

144 


en.  VIII.]  OF   EXECUTORS    AND    ADMINISTRATORS.  *  131 

special  -n^ords  of  limitation  in  the  contract  itself,  (w)  But  con- 
tracts may  be  extinguished  and  absolutely  determined  by  the 
death  of  the  party  with  whom  they  are  made,  (o)  If  money  be 
payable  by  a  bond  to  such  person  as  the  obligee  may  appoint 
by  will,  and  the  testator  makes  no  appointment  by  his  will,  the 
debt  dies,  as  the  executor  is  not  considered  his  appointee  for  that 
purpose.  (^jT)  Nor  could  an  administrator,  where  there  was  no 
will,  claim  the  money. 

The  law  raises  no  implied  promise  to  the  personal  representative, 
in  respect  to  a  promissory  note  held  by  the  deceased,  {q) 

*  Where  the  contract  with  the  deceased  is  of  an  execu-  *  131 
tory  nature,  and  the  personal  representative  can  fairly  and 
sufficiently  execute  all  that  tlie  deceased  could  have  done,  he 
may  do  so,  and  enforce  the  contract,  (r)  ^  But  where  an  execu- 
tory contract  is  of  a  strictly  personal  nature  —  as,  for  example, 
with  an  author  for  a  specified  work,  the  death  of  the  writer  before 
his  book  is  completed,  absolutely  determines  the  contract,  unless 
what  remains  to  be  done  —  as,  for  example,  the  preparing  of  an 


(n)   Devon  v.  Pawlett,  11  Vin.  Abr.  an  action  upon  such  note,  must  declare 

133,  pi.  27.     Somewhat  analogous  to  this  upon  the  promise  to  the  testator  ;   unless 

is  the  point  stated   in   Leonard   Lovies'  an  express  promise  to  the  executor  can  he 

case,  10  Rep.  87  b,  that  a  chattel  interest  shown.  Timniis  v.  Piatt,  2  M.  &  W.  720. 
in  land  cannot  be  entailed.  (r)    Marshall   v.  Broadliurst,    1    Tyr. 

(o)  For  example,  the  right  to  recover  348,   1   Cr.   &  J.   403.      See   Werner  v. 

for  the  breach   of  a  promise   to  marry  Humphreys,  3  Scott,  N.  R.  226.  —  E  con- 

does  not  pass  to  the  executor.    Chamber-  verso,  the  personal  representative  is  bound 

lain  V.  Williamson,  2  M.  &  Scl.  408 ;  Steb-  to  complete  such  a  contract,  and,  if  he 

bins   V.   Palmer,  1  Pick.  71.     And  so  in  does  not,  may  be  made  to  pay  damagea 

other  cases  where  the  injury  is  personal,  out  of  the  assets.     Wentworth  v.  Cock, 

though  accompanying  a  breach  of  con-  10  A.  &  E.  42 ;    Siboni  ?•.  Kirkman,  1  M. 

tract.     Parke,  B.,  Beckham  v.  Drake,   8  &  W.  418,  423.  —  Where  several  persons 

M.  &  W.  854;    Lord  El/eriliorour/h,  C.  J.,  jointly  contract  for  a  chattel,  to  be  made 

Chamberlain  v.  Williamson,  2  M.  &  Sel.  or  procured  for  the   common  benefit  of 

415,  416;    Cook  ik  Newman,  8  How.  Pr.  all,  ."nd  the  executors  of  any  party  d^-ing 

523.     But  see  Knights  v.  Quarles,  2  Br.  are,  by  agreement,  to  stand  in  the  place 

&  B.  104.  of  such  party  dying,  although  the  legal 

ip)  Pease  v.  Mead,  Hob.  9.     And  the  remedy  of  the  party  employed  would  be 

reason  given   is  that  the  payee  in  that  solely  against  the  survivors,  yet  the  law 

case  is  evidently  to  take  for  his  own  use,  v.'il!  imply  a  contract  on  the  part  of  the 

for  the  word    pay   "  carryeth    property  deceased  contractor,  that   his  executors 

with  it;"  whereas  the  executor,  when  he  shall  pay  his  proportion  of  the  price  of 

recovers  as  assignee  in  law  of  the  testa-  the    article   to   be   furnished.      Prior  v. 

tor,  takes  for  the  use  of  the  testator.  Hembrow,  8  M.  &  W.  873,  889. 

(q)  Therefore  the  executor  in  bringing 


1  In  such  a  case,  if  losses  are  sustained  in  the  performance  of  the  intestate's  con- 
tract by  his  personal  representative,  the  latter  must  bear  them  ;  if  profits  are  realized, 
they  belong  to  the  estate,  Smith  v.  Wilmington,  &c.  Co.,  83  111.  498.  But  the  per- 
sonal representative  may  not  bind  the  estate  by  an  executory  contract,  Austin  v. 
Munro,  47  N.  Y.  30. 

VOL.  I.  10  145 


*  132  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

Index,  or  Table  of  Contents,  &c.,  can  certainly  be  done,  to  the 
same  purpose  by  another,  (s) 

One  of  joint  executors  is  not  generally  liable  for  the  wrong- 
doing of  the  other,  without  negligence  or  other  default  on  his 
own  part,  (ss)  ^ 

If  executors  or  administrators  pay  away  money  of  the  deceased 
by  mistake,  or  enter  into  contracts  for  carrying  on  his  business 
for  the  benefit  of  his  personal  estate,  and  to  wind  up  his  affairs, 
they  may  sue  either  in  their  individual  or  their  representative  ca- 
pacities ;  (0  but  they  should  sue  in  the  latter  capacity,  in  order 
to  avoid  a  set-off  against  them  of  their  individual  debts,  (w) 

The  title  of  an  administrator  does  not  exist  until  the  grant 
of  administration,  and  then  reverts  back  to  the  death  of  the 
deceased  ;  but  only  in  order  to  protect  the  estate,  and  not  for 
any  other  purpose,  (v)  And  if  an  agent  sells  goods  of  the 
deceased,  after  his  death,  and  in  ignorance  of  his  decease,  the 
administrator  may  adopt  the  contract  and  sue  upon  it.  (^w) 

On  the  death  of  one  of  several  executors,  either  before  or 

*  132    *  after  probate,  the  entire  right  of  representation  survives 

to  the  others,  (x)  But  if  an  administrator  dies,  (xx)  or  a 
sole  executor  dies  intestate,  no  interest  and  no  right  of  represen- 
tation is  transmitted  to  his  personal  representative.  («/) 

Executors  and  administrators  arc  regarded  as  Trustees,  and 
are  bound  by  the  rules  of  the  law  of  Trust,  and  of  Agency,  so 
far  as  the  same  are  applicable  to  them.     Thus,  neither  can  buy 

(s)  Lord  Lyndlinrst,  C.  B.,  and  Bnyloy,  v.  Ovcracker,  8  Johns.  126;   Winchester 
B.,  Marsliall  v.  Broadliurst,  1  Tyr.  '34U.  v.  Union  Bank,  2  G.  &  J.  79,  80;    Welch- 
See  Siboni  v.  Kirkman,  1  M.  &  W.  42:1  man   v.  Stur<,ns,    13  Q.  B.  552 ;    Bell  v. 
See    also   White   v.   Commonwealth,   39  Speight,  11  Humph.  451. 
Benn.  St.  167.  (w)  Foster  v.  Bates,  12  M.  &  W.  226. 

(s.s)  Wood  V.  Brown,  34  N.  Y.  337.  (.r)  Flanders  v.  Clark,  3  Atk.  509.    So 

[1)  Clark  V.  Hougham,  2  B.  &  C.  149;  in  tlie  case  of  the  death  of  one  of  two  ad- 

Aspinwall  v.  Wake,  10  Bing.  51;    Web-  mimstralors,  the    administration    survives 

ster  V.  Spencer,  3  B.  &  Aid.  360;    Ord  v.  to  tlie  other.     Hudson   v.    Hudson,  Cas. 

P'enwick,  3  East,  104;  Merritt  v.  Seaman,  Temp.  Talb.  127.  —  Tliat  joint  executors 

2  Seld.  108.  are  one  person  in  law,  Shaw  v.  Berry,  35 

(n)  Per  Baijley,  JJolroyd,  and  Best,  JJ.,  Me.  279.      But  see  Smith  v.  Whiting,  9 

Clark  V.  Hougham,  2  B.  &  C.  155,  156,  Mass.  334. 
157.  (rx)   Young  v.  Duhme,  4  Met.    (Ky.) 

(y)  Morgan  v.  Thomas,  8  Exch.  302  ;  239. 
Foster  v.  Bates,  12  I\I.  &  \V.  22  ;    Law-  ()/)  Com.   Dig.   Administrator,   B.   6; 

rence  v.  Wright,  23  Tick.  128 ;   Kattoon  Tingrey  v.  Brown,  1  B.  &  l\  310. 

^  Unless  they  give  a  joint  bond,  Newton  v.  Newton,  53  N.  II.  537.  See  further  as 
to  the  liability  of  one  executor  for  the  acts  of  his  co-executor,  Adair  v.  Brimmer, 
74  N.  Y.  539;  Bryan  i'.  Stewart,  83  N.  Y.  270;  Shreve  v.  Joyce,  7  Vroom,  44; 
Kincade  v.  Conley,  74  N.  C.  387. 

146 


CH.  VIII.]  OP  EXECUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS.  *  132 

what  he  sells  ;  (^yy)  and  either  is  held  responsible  for  loss  to  the 
estate,  caused  by  his  negligence  or  default;  as  of  a  debt  which 
might  have  been  collected  with  due  diligence,  (//z) 

An  executor  de  son  tort  is  one  who  without  right  disposes  of 
or  interferes  with  the  assets  of  the  deceased,  or  otherwise  assumes 
to  act  as  executor.  He  is  liable  for  the  property  taken  by  him, 
and  for  all  damage  caused  by  his  acts,  and  not  only  to  an  action 
by  the  rightful  executor  or  administrator,  but  may  be  sued  by 
a  creditor  of  the  deceased.  (2)  But  mere  acts  of  kindness  and 
charity  touching  the  property  of  one  deceased,  as  taking  care  of 
it,  providing  for  the  family  and  the  like,  do  not  make  one  execu- 
tor de  son  tort,  {zz)  It  is  held  in  England,  that  an  executor  de 
son  tort  of  a  rightful  executor  is  liable  in  the  same  manner  as  a 
rightful  executor  of  the  original  testator,  for  his  debts,  (a)  ^  But 
the  rightful  executor  or  administrator  cannot  be  prejudiced  by 
an  act  or  contract  of  an  executor  de  son  tort.  (5)  And  it  would 
seem,  that  if  an  executor  de  son  tort  be  afterwards  made  admin- 
istrator, he  is  not  bound  by  a  contract  made  by  himself  as  execu- 
tor before  the  grant  of  administration,  (c) 

(t/1/)  Howell  V.  Selving,  1  McCarter,  pressly  promised  to  pay  the  plaintiff  as 

84  ;  Boyd  v.  Blankman,  29  Cal.  19.  soon  as  the  bill  was  made  out.     Probate 

(>/z)  Cooley  V.  Vansycle,  1  McCarter,  was   afterwards   granted   to   B,  tlic  real 

496;  Shaffer's  Appeal,  46  Penn.  St.  131;  executrix,  who  gave  notice  to  the  defend- 

Tuggle  y.  Gilbert,  1  Duvall,  340;  Tomp-  ant  to  pay  the  price  to  her.     Held,  that 

kins  V.  Weeks,  26  Cal.  50.  the  plaintiff  could  not  maintain  an  action 

{z)  Curtis    V.  Vernon,  3   T.   R.   587;  against  the  defendant  for  the  price. — 

Elder  v.  Littler,  15  la.  65.  But  where  the  act  of  the  executor  fie  son 

(zz)  Brown  v.  Sullivan,  22  Ind.  264.  tort  was  done  in  the  due  course  of  ad- 

(a)  Meyrick  v.  Anderson,  14  Q.  B.  719.  ministration,  and  is  one  which  the  right- 

{b)  Buckley  v.  Barber,  6  Exch.  164;  ful  executor  would  have  been  compellable 

Mountford  v.  Gibson,  4  East,  441 ;  Dick-  to  do,  such  act  shall  stand  good.     Grays- 

enson  v.  Naule,  1  Nev.  &  M.  721  ;  wiiere  brook  v.  Fox,  1  Plowd.  282  ;   Thompson 

A  having  proved  a  will,  in   which  slie  v.  Harding,  20  E.  L.  &  E.  145. 

supposed  herself  to  be  appointed  execu-  (c)  Doe  v.  Glenn,  1  A.  &  E.  49;  s.  c. 

trix,  employed  the  plaintiff,  an  auctioneer,  3  Nev.  &  M.  837;  AVilson  v.  Hiidson,  4 

to  sell  the  goods  of    the  testator;    and  Harring.  169.     But  see  contra,  Wahcorth, 

they  were  sold  to  the  defendant,  who,  as  C,  Vroom  v.  Van  Home,  10  Paige,  558 ; 

an  inducement  to  the  plaintiff  to  let  him  Walker  v.  May,  2  Hill,  Cli.  (S.  C.)  23. 

remove  the  goods  without  payment,  ex- 

1  But  the  executor  of  an  executrix  de  son  tort  is  not  liable  for  a  breach  of  contract 
committed  by  the  person  with  whose  property  the  executrix  de  son  tort  has  intermed- 
dled.    Wilson  V.  Hodson,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  84. 

147 


133  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 


*133  *  CHAPTER  IX. 

GUARDIANS. 

Sect.  I.  —  Of  the  kinds  of  Guardians. 

Guardianship  at  common  law  has  fallen  into  comparative 
disuse  in  this  country,  although  many  of  the  principles  which 
determined  the  rights  and  duties  of  that  relation  are  adopted, 
with  various  qualitications,  in  the  guardianships  by  testamentary 
appointment  of  the  father,  or  by  the  appointment  of  courts  of 
probate  or  chancery,  which  prevail  with  us.  We  have  also  by 
statute  provisions,  guardians  of  the  insane,  and  of  spendthrifts. 
All  of  these  rest  upon  the  general  principle,  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
society  to  provide  adequate  care  and  protection  for  the  person 
and  property  of  those  who  are  wholly  unable  to  take  care  of 
themselves. 

So  far  as  relates  to  contracts  to  which  guardians  are  parties, 
we  can  do  little  more  than  refer  to  the  statutes  of  the  several 
States,  in  which  the  obligations  and  duties  of  guardians,  their 
powers,  and  the  manner  in  which  their  powers  may  be  exercised, 
are  set  forth,  usually  with  much  minuteness  and  precision. 

One  principle,  however,  should  be  stated ;  which  is,  that  guar- 
dians of  all  descriptions  are  treated  by  courts  as  trustees  ;  and, 
in  almost  all  cases,  they  are  required  to  give  security  for  the 
faithful  discharge  of  their  duty,  unless  the  guardian  be  appointed 
by  will,  and  the  testator  has  exercised  the  power  given  him  by 
statute,  of  requiring  that  the  guardian  shall  not  be  called  upon 
to  give  bonds.  But  even  in  this  case,  such  testamentary  pro- 
vision is  wholly  personal ;  and  if  the  individual  dies,  refuses  the 
appointment,  or  resigns  it,  or  is  removed  from  it,  and  a  substitute 
is  appointed  by  court,  this  substitute  must  give  bonds. 

It  may  be  added,  that  it  is  better  for  a  guardian  who  proposes 
to  make  any  sale  or  contract  not  certainly  within  his  general 
148 


CH.  IX.] 


GUARDIANS. 


134 


power,  to  go  to  the  proper  court,  by  petition,  for  authority  or 
direction.  And,  generally,  it  is  only  when  the  ward  has  no  other 
means  for  his  support  and  education,  that  the  court  will  authorize 
the  sale  of  his  lands.  The  statutes  regulating  this  matter  some- 
times provide  expressly  for  this,  (z) 


♦SECTION  II. 


134 


OP  THE  DUTY  AND  POWER  OP  A  GUARDIAN. 

The  guardian  is  held  in  this  country  to  have  only  a  naked 
authority,  not  coupled  with  an  interest,  (a)  His  possession  of 
the  property  of  his  ward  is  not  such  as  gives  him  a  personal 
interest,  being  only  for  the  purpose  of  agency.  But  for  the  bene- 
fit of  his  w^ard,  he  has  a  very  general  power  over  it.  He  manages 
and  disposes  of  the  personal  property  at  his  own  discretion,  (5) 
although,  as  we  have  already  intimated,  it  is  safer  for  him  to 
obtain  the  authority  of  the  court  for  any  important  measure ;  he 
may  lease  the  real  estate  (the  lease  not  to  continue  beyond  the 


(2)  Morris  v.  Morris,  2  McCarter, 
239. 

{(i)  Granby  v.  Amherst,  7  Mass.  1,  6. 

(b)  "  I  apprehend  that  no  doubt  can 
be  entertained  as  to  the  competency  of 
the  guardian's  power  over  tlie  disposition 
of  tlie  personal  estate,  including  the 
choses  in  action,  as  between  him  and  the 
bond  fide  purchaser.  The  guardian  in 
socage  of  the  real  estate  may  lease  it  in 
his  own  name,  and  dispose  of  it  during 
the  guardianship  (and  the  cliancery 
guardian  has  equal  authority),  though 
he  cannot  convey  it  absolutely  witliout 
the  special  authority  of  this  court,  be- 
cause tlie  nature  of  the  trust  docs  not 
require  it."  Kent,  C,  Field  v.  Schicffelin, 
7  Johns.  Ch.  154.  This  case  decides  that 
the  purchaser  of  the  ward's  personal 
estate  is  not  responsible  for  the  faithful 
application  of  the  purchase-money  by 
the  guardian,  unless  he  knew  or  had 
sufficient  information  at  the  time  that 
the  guardian  contemplated  a  breach  of 
trust,  and  intended  to  misapply  the 
money ;  or  was  in  fact  by  the  very 
transaction  applying  it  to  his  own 
private  purpose.  —  The  guardian  of  a 
non  compos   meiUis  can  sell  her  personal 


estate  at  his  discretion,  and  her  real 
estate  with  license  from  the  court.  "It 
is  true  the  guardian  ought  not  to  sell  the 
personal  estate,  unless  the  proceeds  are 
wanted  for  tlie  due  execution  of  his 
trust,  or  unless  he  can  by  the  sale  pro- 
duce some  advantage  to  the  estate,  but 
having  the  power  without  obtaining  any 
special  license  or  authority,  a  title  under 
hini  acquired  bond  fide  by  the  purchaser 
will  be  good,  for  he  cannot  know  whether 
the  power  has  been  executed  with  dis- 
cretion or  not."  Parki'T,  C.  J.,  Ellis  v. 
Essex  Merrimac  Bridge,  2  Pick.  243.  — 
The  Court  of  Chancery  may  authorize  a 
sale  of  the  ward's  real  estate.  Dorsey 
V.  Gilbert,  11  G.  &  J.  87.  — Also,  In  re 
Salisbury,  3  Johns.  Ch.  347;  Hedges  v. 
Kiker,  5  id.  163. —  "  The  court  may 
change  the  estate  of  infants  from  real 
into  personal,  and  from  personal  into 
real,  whenever  it  deems  such  a  proceed- 
ing most  beneficial  to  the  infant.  The 
proper  inquiry  in  such  cases  will  be, 
whether  a  sale  of  the  whole,  or  only  of  a 
part,  and  what  part  of  the  premises  will 
be  most  beneficial."  Kctii,  C,  Mills  v. 
Dennis,  3  Johns.  Ch.  3G7. 

149 


*  135  THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

ward's  majority),  if  appointed  by  will  or  by  the  court,  but  the 
guardian  by  nature  cannot ;  (c)  ^  he  cannot  however  sell  it  with- 
out leave  of  the  proper  court.     Nor  should  he,  in  general,  convert 
the  personal  estate  into  real,  without  such  leave.  (cZ)     And 

*  135    where  a  court  of  *  equity  authorizes  a  conversion  of  real 

estate  into  personal,  or  vice  versa,  it  will,  if  justice  requires 
it,  provide  that  the  acquired  property  shall  retain  the  character 
and  legal  incidents  of  the  original  fund,  (e) 

But  where  a  fictitious  character  is  thus  impressed  upon  the 
property  of  a  ward,  it  ceases,  as  a  general  rule,  and  the  property 
resumes  its  true  character,  on  the  majority  of  the  ward.  (/) 

As  trustee,  a  guardian  is  held  to  a  strictly  honest  discharge 
of  his  duty,  and  cannot  act  in  relation  to  the  subject  of  his  trust 
for  his  own  personal  benefit,  in  any  contract  whatever.  And 
if  a  benefit  arises  thereby,  as  in  the  settlement  of  a  debt  due 
from  the  ward,  this  benefit  belongs  wholly  to  the  ward.  (^)  ^ 
And  it  has  been  held  that  if  a  guardian  makes  use  of  his  own 
money  to  erect  buildings  on  the  land  of  his  ward,  without  hav- 
ing an  order  of  the  court  therefor,  he  cannot  charge  the  same  in 


(c)  May    V.   Calder,   2   Mass.   56.     A  Swcezy  v.  Thayer,  1  Duer,  286;   March 

lease  of  an  infant's  land  by  his  father  as  v.  Berrier,  6  Ired.  Eq.  524.     The  above 

natural  <ruardian,  is  void.  cases  illustrate  the  general  principles  of 

{il)  Tiie  cases  cited  (3  Johns.  Ch.  348,  equitable    conversion,    although    all    of 

370.  5  id.   163),  affirm   the  power  of    a  them  are  not  applicable  exclusively  to 

court  to  order  the  minor's  real  estate  to  conversions  by  a  guardian  with  license 

be  converted  into  personal,  or  his  personal  from  court. 

into  real,  but  do  not  expressly  deny  the  (/)  Forman  v.  Marsh,  1  Kern.  544. 

guardian's   authority   to    do   the    latter.  fr/)  Green  v.  Winter,  1  Johns.  Ch.  26; 

See  supra,  note  (h).  Stanley's  Appeal,  8  Church  v.  The  Marine  Insurance  Co.  1 

Barr,  431;    Cooke's  Appeal,  9  id.  608;  Mason,  345;    Holdridge    v.   Gillespie,   2 

Worrell's  Appeal,  23  Penn.  St.  44.  Johns.   Ch.  30 ;    Davoue    v.   Fanning,  2 

(c)  Foster   v.   llilliard,    1    Story,   88;  Johns. -Ch.  252  ;  White  y.  Parker,  8  Barb. 

Wheldale   v.   Partridge,  5   Ves.  Jr.  396;  48;    Ringgold  c  Ringgold,  1   Har.  &  G. 

Craig  V.  Leslie,  3  Wheat.  503,  577  ;  Peter  11 ;  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  1  Hopk.  Ch.  515; 

V.    Bcverlv,    10     Pet.     5-32;     Hawley    v.  Lovell  y.  Briggs,  2  N.  H.  218;  Sparhawk 

James,  5  Paige,  318,  489;    Kane  r.  Gott,  v.    Allen,    1^  Foster    (N.    II.),   9.  —  The 

24  Wend.  060;   Reading  t-.  Blackwell,  1  guardian  is  not  entitled  to  compensation 

Baldw.   100;    Collins    v.   Champ,    15    B.  for  services  rendered  before  his  appoint- 

Mon.  118;  Slumway  v.  Cooper,  15  Barb.  ment.     Clowes  v.  Van  Antwerp,  4  Barb. 

550;    Forman   i-.  Marsh,   1    Kern.    544;  410. 

^  A  guardian  cannot  lease  his  ward's  oil  or  mineral  lands  for  working  and  conse- 
quent impoverishment.  Stoughton's  Appeal,  88  Penn.  St.  198.  Neither  can  a  guard- 
ian sell  or  improve  the  ward's  jiroperty  for  his  own  benefit,  Lane  v.  Taylor,  40  Ind. 
495 ;  iHjr  charge  his  ward's  land  with  the  whole  removal  of  an  encumljrance,  when 
he  has  himself  an  interest  in  the  land.     Bourne  v.  Maybin,  3  Woods,  724. 

2  If,  however,  a  guardian  continues  the  ward's  business  successfully,  the  ward  by 
accepting  the  benefits  after  coming  of  age,  cannot  object.  Hoyt  >'.  Sprague,  103 
U.  S.  013.  But  a  guardian  cannot  charge  a  ward's  business  with  losses  incurred  in 
his  unauthorized  continuation  of  it.     Corcoran  v.  Allen,  11  11.  I.  567. 

150 


CH.  IX.]  GUARDIANS.  *  136 

account  with  his  ward,  or  recover  the  amount  from  the  ward,  (^h') 
But  we  believe  a  rule  so  severe  would  not  be  applied  unless  for 
special  reasons.  He  must  not  only  neither  make  nor  suffer  any 
waste  of  the  inheritance,  but  is  held  very  strictly  to  a  careful 
management  of  all  personal  property,  (i)  He  is  respon- 
sible *  not  only  for  any  misuse  of  the  ward's  money  or  *  136 
stock,  but  for  letting  it  lie  idle  ;  and  if  he  does  so  without 
sufficient  cause,  he  must  allow  the  ward  interest  or  compound 
interest  in  his  account ;  (y)  ^  and  if  he  lends  it  without  security, 
and  without  the  approval  of  the  court,  he  is  liable  for  its  loss,  (jj) 
This  subject  is  more  fully  presented  in  treating  of  the  responsi- 
bility of  Trustees.  (^) 

To  secure  the  proper  execution  of  his  trust,  he  is  not  only 
liable  to  an  action  by  the  ward,  after  the  guardianship  termi- 
nates, (Z)  but  during  its  pendency  the  ward  may  call  him  to 
account  by  his  next  fi'iend,  or  by  a  guardian,  ad  litem.  And  the 
courts  have  gone  so  far  as  to  set  aside  transactions  which  took 
place  soon  after  the  ward  came  of  age,  and  which  were  beneficial 
only  to  the  former  guardian,  on  the  presumption  that  undue 
influence  was  used,  and  on  the  ground  of  public  utility  and 
policy.  (7?i) 

(h)  Hassard    v.   Rowe,   11    Barb.  24.  own  name.     Stanley's  App.  8  Penn.  St. 

See  also  White  v.  Parker,   8  Barb.   48 ;  4.31.  —  He  was  held  liable  for  the  ward's 

Austin    I'.   Lawar,    23    Miss.    189,    and  money  invested  in  the  stock  of  a  naviga- 

Brown  v.  MuUins,  24  Miss.  204.  tion  company,  in  good  credit  at  the  time, 

(i)  Dietterich  v.  Heft,  5  Barr,  87.     If  and  paying  large  dividends  for  a   long 

he    lends  money  on    the  mere  personal  time  afterwards.    Worrell's  App.  9  Penn. 

security  of  one  whose  circumstances  are  St.  508.     See  also   Clark  v.  Garfield,  8 

equivocal,    he    is    responsible    for    the  Allen,  427  ;  Gilbert  v.  M'Eachen,  38  Miss, 

money    lent. —  Stem's    App.    5   Whart.  469;  Bond  r.  Lockwood,  33  111.  212. 
472.    "  Whenever  the  guardian  has  the  (_;')  In    Pennsylvania   it  is  held   that 

fund  and  disposes  of   it  to  another,  he  there  is  a  distinction  as  to  funds  in  the 

must  do  it  with  strict  and  proper  caution,  hands  of    guardians  as  to  making  rests 

and    is    seldom    safe    unless    he    takes  from  the  rule  in  case  of  other  trustees 

security."     Sn-geant,  J.,  Konigmacher  v.  who   neglect   to   invest.     Pcnnypacker's 

Kimmel,  1  Penn.  207 ;  Pirn  v.  Downing,  Appeal,  41  Penn.  St.  494.     See  Hughes 

11  S.  &  R.  6G;  Smith  v.  Smith,  4  Johns.  Anneal,  53  Penn.  St.  500. 
Ch.  281.  — But  he  is  bound   in  general  (jj)  Gilbert  v.  Guptill,  34  111.  112. 

only  to  the  exercise  of  common  prudence  (k)  See  ante,  p.  *  122,  note  (/). 

and  skill.     Johnson's  Appeal,  12  S.  .&  R.  {I)  See  Birch  v.  Funk,  2  Met.  (Ky.) 

317;    Konigmaclier  v.  Kimmel,  1  Penn.  544,  as  to  the  effect  of  lapse  of  time  in 

207.     He   is   liable  for  any    negligence,  barring   a   petition   in  equity  by  wards 

Glover  v.  Glover,  1  McMul.  Ch.  15.3.  —  against  tlieir  guardians. 
Although  expressly  authorized  to  invest  (m)  Archer  v.  Hudson,  7  Beav.  551; 

the  ward's   money  in    bank-stock,  he  is  Gale  v.  Wells,  12  Barb.  84. 
personally  liable  if  he  invests  it  in  his 

^  A  guardian  who  refuses  to  disclose  what  use  he  has  made  of  a  large  surplus  of 
his  ward's  income,  for  which  he  charges  himself  with  interest,  is  not  entitled  to  his 
commissions.    Blake  v.  Pegram,  109  Mass.  541. 

161 


*  137  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

A  guardian  cannot,  by  his  own  contract,  bind  the  person  or 
estate  of  his  ward ;  (n)  ^  but  if  he  promise  on  a  sufficient  consid- 
eration to  pay  the  debt  of  his  ward,  he  is  personally  bound  by  his 
promise,  although  he  expressly  promises  as  guardian,  (o)  ^  And 
it  is  a  sufficient  consideration  if  such  promise  discharge  the  debt 
of  the  ward.  And  a  guardian  who  thus  discharges  the  debt  of 
his  ward  may  lawfully  indemnify  himself  out  of  the  ward's  estate, 
or  if  he  be  discharged  from  his  guardianship,  he  may  have  an 
action  against  the  ward  for  money  paid  for  his  use.  (jy)  An 
action  will  not  lie  against  a  guardian  on  a  contract  made  by  the 
ward,  but  must  be  brought  against  the  ward  and  may  be  defended 
by  the  guardian,  (g*) 

*  137        *  The  guardianship  is   a  trust   so   strictly  personal,  or 

attached  to  the  individual,  that  it  cannot  be  transferred 
from  him,  either  by  his  own  assignment  or  devise,  or  by  inheri- 
tance or  succession. 

A  married  woman  cannot  become  a  guardian  without  the  con- 
sent of  her  husband  ;  but  with  that  she  may.  (r)  It  would  seem, 
but  not  certainly,  that  a  single  woman  who  is  a  guardian,  loses 
her  guardianship  by  marriage  ;  but  she  may  be  reappointed,  (s) 
In  some  States  she  loses  it  by  statute ;  in  others,  not. 

If  there  be  two  guardians,  and  one  has  possession  of  the  ward, 
and  the  other  takes  the  ward  out  of  his  possession  against  his 
will,  it  is  said  in  England  that  the  guardian  losing  the  possession 
may  have  his  action  against  the  other.  (^) 

(n)  Thachcr  f.  Dinsmore,  5  Mass.  299;  Thaclicr  v.  Dinsmore,  5  Mass.  299;  Ex 

Jones  V.  Brewer,  1  Pick.  .314.  parte  Leighton,  14  Mass.  207. 

(o)  Forster  v.  Fuller,  6  Mass.  58.  (?•)  Palmer  v.  Oakley,  1  Doug.  (Mich.) 

Ip)  Thacher  v.  Dinsmore,  5  Mass.  299 ;  433. 

Forster  v.  Fuller,  6  Mass.  58.  (s)  2  Kent,  Com.  225,  n.  (6). 

(q)  Brown    v.    Chase,   4    Mass.   430 ;  (t)  Gilbert  v.  Schevencle,  14  M.  &  W. 

488. 

1  As  for  repairs  to  the  ward's  dwelling-house,  even  after  the  guardian's  death, 
Wallis  V.  Bardwell,  120  Mass.  300,  or  for  the  support  and  care  of  his  ward,  Rollins 
1-.  Marsh,  128  Mass.  110. 

-  Unless  the  creditor  agrees  that  the  guardian's  liability  is  to  be  limited  to  the 
ward's  assets  in  his  hands,  Sperry  v.  Fanning,  80  111.  371. 

152 


CH.  X.]  CORPORATIONS.  *  138 


*  CHAPTER  X.  *138 

CORPORATIONS. 

A  CORPORATION  aggregate  is,  in  law,  a  person  ;  (a)  ^  and  it 
was  an  established  principle  of  the  common  law,  that  corpora- 
tions aggregate  could  act  only  under  their  common  seal ;  (6)  but 
to  this  principle  there  were  always  many  exceptions.  These 
exceptions  arose  at  first  from  necessity,  and  were  limited  by 
necessity.  As  where  cattle  were  to  be  distrained  damage  feasant, 
and  they  might  escape  before  the  seal  could  be  affixed,  (c)  But 
it  was  held  that  the  appointment  of  a  bailiff  to  seize  for  the 
use  of  a  corporation,  goods  forfeited  to  the  corporation,  must 
be  by  deed,  (t^)  A  corporation  is  liable  for  the  tortious  acts  of 
its  agent,  though  he  were  not  appointed  under  seal,  (e)  ^     The 

(a)  See  the  great  case  of  the  Louis-  seal.     The  Mayor  of  Thetford's  case,  1 

ville,  &c.  R.  Co.  I'.  Letson,  2  How.  497,  Salk.  192  ;  Koeliler  v.  Black  Co.  2  Black 

where  it   was   decided  by  the   Supreme  (U.S.),  715;    Richardson  v.  Scott  River 

Court  that  a   corporation   created  by  a  Co.  22  Cal.  150. 

State  and  doing  business  within  the  ter-  {c)  Manby  v.  Long,  3  Lev.  107;   Bro. 

ritory   of    such    State,  though    it    have  Abr.    Corporations,   pi.  2,  47 ;   Dean  and 

members     who     are    citizens    of    other  Chapter  of   Windsor  v.  Gover,  2    Wins. 

States,  is   to   be   treated   in   the   United  Saund.  305,  Plowd.  91.     And  so  it  seems 

States  courts  as  a  citizen  of  that  State,  the  appointment  of  a  bailiff  to  distrain 

—  By   an   act    incorporating   a   railway  for  rent  need  not  be  by  deed.     Cary  v. 

company,  no  action   was  to  be  brought  Matthews,  1  Salk.  191 ;  Taunton,  J.,  Smith 

against  any  person  for  any  thing  done  in  v.  Birmingham  Gas  Co.  1  A.  &  E.  530.  — 

pursuance   of   the   act,   without    twenty  But   a    corporation    cannot,    except    by 

days'  notice   given   to   the  intended  de-  their  seal,  empower  one  to  enter  on  tlicir 

fendant :    Held,  that  the  word  person  in-  behalf    for  condition    broken ;    and   this 

eluded  the  company,  and  that  they  were  though   the    estate   be    only   for    years, 

entitled  to  notice   upon  being   sued  for  Dumper  v,  Symms,  1  Rol.  Abr.  Corpora- 

obstructing  a  way  in  carrying  the  act  in-  tions,  (K). 

to   effect.     Boyd   r.   Croydon   R.    Co.   4  {d)   Horn  v.  Ivy,  1  Vent.  47,  1  Mod. 

Bing.  N.  C.  069.  18,  2  Keb.  507. 

[h)  1  Bl.  Com.  475.  —  Yet  a  corpora-  (e)    Eastern   Co.    R.    Co.   v.   Broom, 

tion  migh'.  do  an  act  upon  record  without  6   Exch.   314 ;    Watson    v.   Bennett,    12 

^  As  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  permitting  only  "  persons  "  who  did  not  aid 
the  rebellion,  to  bring  suit,  U.  S.  v.  Ins.  Cos.  22  Wall.  99;  but  not  for  the  purpose  of 
suing,  as  a  common  informer,  for  a  penalty  recoverable  by  the  "  person  "  informing, 
Guardians,  &c.  v.  Franklin,  3  C.  P.  D.  377.  See  Royal,  &c.  Co.  v.  Braham,  2  App. 
Cas.  381. 

"  Even  to  a  mere  licensee  on  its  premises,  who  is  injured  by  the  wrongful  act 
of  its  servant  in  the  course  of  his  employment.  Tebbutt  i;.  Bristol  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  6 
Q.  B.  73. 

153 


*139 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  139  *  exception  was  afterwards  extended  to  all  matters  of  daily 
or  frequent  exigency  or  convenience,  and  of  no  special 
importance.  (/)  ^  In  this  country,  the  old  rule  has  almost,  if 
not  entirely  disappeared.  (^)  But  in  England  it  seems  to  remain 
in  some  force.  (A)  ^  A  contract  of  a  corporation,  as  of  an  indi- 
vidual, may  be  implied  from  the  acts  of  the  corporation,  or  of 
their  authorized  agents.  (^)  In  general,  if  a  person  not  duly 
authorized  make  a  contract  on  behalf  of  a  corporation,  and  the 
corporation  take  and  hold  the  benefit  derived  from  such  con- 
tract, it  is  estopped  from  denying  the  authority  of  the  agent,  (y)  ^ 
All  duties  imposed  upon  a  corporation  by  law,  raise  an  implied 


Barb.  196;  Burton  v.  Philadelphia,  &c. 
Railroad,  4  Harring.  252  ;  Johnson  )'.  Mu- 
nicipality, 5  La.  Ann.  100;  Goodspeed  v. 
East  Haddam  Bank,  22  Conn.  530.  Es- 
pecially if  the  act  done  was  an  ordinary 
service,  such  as  would  not  be  held  under 
other  circumstances  to  require  an  author- 
ity under  seal.  Smith  v.  Birmingham 
Gas  Co.  1  A.  &  E.  526,  3  Nev.  &  M.  771 ; 
Yarborough  v.  Bank  of  England,  16 
East,  6.  —  And  a  corporation,  like  any 
other  principal,  is  liable  for  acts  of  its 
agent  incidental  to  an  authority  duly 
delegated.  Kennedy  v.  Baltimore  Ins. 
Co.  3  Har.  &  J.  367. 

(  f)  Gibson  v.  East  India  Co.  5  Bing. 
N.  C.  262,  270;  Lord  Denman,  C.  J., 
Church  V.  Imperial  Gas  Co.  6  A.  &  E. 
846.     See  Bro.  Abr.  Corporations,  pi.  49. 

(q)  The  Bank  of  Columbia  u.  Patter- 
son,' 7  Cranch,  299 ;  Bank  of  the  United 
States  V.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  64 ;  Dan- 
forth  V.  Schoharie  Turnpike  Co.  12 
Johns.  227  ;  Commercial  Bank  of  Buffalo 
V.  Kortright,  22  Wend.  348;  American 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Oakley,  9  Paige,  496 ;  Parker, 
C.  J.,  Fourth  School  District  in  Rumford 
V.  Wood,  13  Muss.  199;  Proprietors  of 
Canal  Bridge  v.  Gordon,  1  Pick.  297  ; 
Ches'nut  Hill  Turnpike  v.  Rutter,  4  S.  & 
R.  16;  Union  Bank  of  Maryland  v. 
Ridgtly,  1  liar.  &  G.  324;  Legrand  v. 
Haiiij)(len  Sydney  College,  5  Munf .  324  ; 
Elysviile  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Okisko,  5  Md. 
153. 


(A)  RoJfe,  B.,  Mayor  of  Ludlow  v. 
Charlton,  6  M.  &  W.  823 ;  Gibson  v.  East 
India  Company,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  275 ;  Lord 
Denman,  C.  J.,  Church  v.  Imperial  Gas 
Co.  6  A.  &  E.  861  ;  Williams  v.  Chester, 
&c.  R.  Co.  5  E.  L.  &  E.  497 ;  Diggle  v. 
London,  &c.  R.  Co.  5  Exch.  442 ;  Clark  v. 
Guardians,  &c.  11  E.  L.  &  E.  442.  But  see 
Denton  v.  East  Anglian  R.  Co.  3  Car.  &  K. 
17  ;  Henderson  v.  Australian,  &c.  Co.  5  El. 
&  Bl.  409;  A.  R.  M.  S.  N.  Co.  v.  Marzetti, 
11  Exch.  228. 

(i)  Smith  v.  Proprietors,  &c.  8  Pick. 
178 ;  Kennedy  v.  Baltimore  Ins.  Co.  3 
Ilar.  &  J.  367  ;  Trundy  ;;.  Farrar,  32  Me. 
225;  Ross  v.  Madison,  1  Cart.  (Ind.)  281; 
N.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Bastian,  15  Md.  494  ;  Sea- 
graves  V.  City  of  Alton,  13  111.  366. — 
Beverly  v.  Lincoln  Gas  Co.  6  A.  &  E. 
829;  where  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Queen's  Bench  was  delivered  by  Patteson, 
J.,  in  an  elaborate  opinion.  And  in 
Church  V.  Imperial  Gas  Co.  6  A.  &  E. 
845,  the  same  court  held  that  a  corpora- 
tion, created  for  the  purpose  of  supi)lying 
gas  might  maintain  assumpsit  for  the 
breach  of  a  contract  by  the  defendant  to 
accept  gas  from  year  to  year,  at  a  certain 
price  per  annum,  the  consideration  being 
alleged  to  be  the  promise  of  the  corpora- 
tion to  furnish  it  at  that  price  —  such 
promise  by  the  corporation,  though  not 
under  seal,  being  valid,  and  a  good  con- 
sideration. 

(j)   Episcopal  Charitable   Society  v. 


1  As  in  letting  a  graving-dock,  owned  by  a  municipal  corporation,  to  ships  need- 
ing repairs.     Wells  r.  Kingston-upon-HuU,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  402. 

2  Thus  a  sale  of  tolls  by  a  municipal  corporation,  not  under  its  common  seal  nor 
signed  on  its  behalf  by  any  one  authorized  under  seal  so  to  do,  does  not  bind  the 
purchaser.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Kidderminster  v.  Hardwick,  L.  R.  9  Ex.  1.3.  See  also 
Austin  ;;.  Bethnal  Green  Guardians,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  91;  Hunt  v.  Wimbledon  Local 
Board,  4  C.  P.  I).  48. 

3  As  where  an  agent  leased  land  in  his  own  name,  but  the  corporation  occupied 
it,  Clark  v.  Gordon,  121  Mass.  330;   or  the  secretary  of  an  insurance  company 

154 


CH.  X.]  CORPORATIONS.  *  140 

promise  of  performance,  (^y)  A  corporation  is  a  citizen  of  the 
State  which  creates  it,  as  to  its  right  to  sue  or  be  sued  in 
the  courts  of  the  United  States,  {jk)  But  it  has  no  Hiatus  as 
a  citizen  in  any  other  State,  and  if  it  goes  there  to  do  busi- 
ness, the  State  into  which  it  goes  may  lawfully  discriminate 
against  it  as  between  it  and  domestic  corporations  of  that 
State ;  even  so  far  as  to  compel  it  to  cease  business  in  that 
State.  (yO 

The  question  of  execution  appears  to  stand  upon  somewhat 
different  ground  from  that  of  authority ;  for  while  a  corporation 
is  generally  estopped  from  denying  that  a  contract  or  an  instru- 
ment was  made  by  its  authority,  if  it  receive  and  hold  the  bene- 
ficial result  of  the  contract  or  the  instrument,  as  the  price  for 
property  sold,  or  the  like,  it  may,  or  its  creditors  may,  deny 
that  the  instrument  was  legally  executed,  even  if  the  *  au-  *  140 
thority  were  certainly  possessed.^  Thus,  if  a  conveyance 
purporting  to  be  the  conveyance  of  a  corporation,  made  by  one 
authorized  to  make  it  for  them,  be  in  fact  executed  by  the  attor- 
ney as  his  own  deed,  it  is  not  the  deed  of  the  corporation,  although 
it  was  intended  to  be  so,  and  the  attorney  had  full  authority  to 
make  it  so.  And  if  the  deed  be  written  throughout  as  the  deed 
of  the  corporation,  and  the  attorney  when  executing  it  declares 
that  he  executes  it  on  behalf  of  the  company,  but  says,  "  in 
witness  whereof  I  set  my  Jiand  and  seal^''  this  is,  in  law,  his  deed 
only,  and  does  not  pass  the  land  of  the  corporation,  (h)  ^    And 

Episcopal   Church,   1   Pick.   372;    Ha}'-  (jk)  Ducat  y.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  48 

ward  V.  The   Pilgrim   Society,  21   Pick.  111.  172. 

270;  Randall  v.  Van  Vecliten,  19  Jolins.  {,//)  Hatch  v.   Chicago,  &c.  R.    Co.  6 

60.     And  see  Foster  v.  Essex  Bank,  17  Blatchford,  105 ;    Stevens  ?;.  Phcenix  Ins. 

Mass.   479 ;    Brown  v.  Donnell,  49   Me.  Co.  41  N.  Y.  149. 

421 ;  Allen  v.  Citizens,  &c.  Co.  22  Cal.  28.  {k)    Brinley   v.   Mann,   2   Cush.    337. 

(  //)  New  York  R.  Co.  v.  Schuyler,  34  The  material  parts  of  the  deed  in  this 

N.  Y.  30.  case  were  as  follows  :    "  Know  all  men, 

pledged  its  bonds  with  the  directors'  knowledge  and  acquiescence,  Darst  v.  Gale, 
83  111.  136 ;  Durham  v.  Carbon  Coal  Co.,  22  Kan.  232. 

'  A  deed  to  a  corporation  after  the  granting  of  its  charter,  but  before  organiza- 
tion, and  duly  recorded,  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  accepted  as  soon  as  the  cor- 
poration was  capable  of  contracting.  Kotch's  AVharf  Co.  i'.  Judd,  108  Mass.  224. 
A  corporation  cannot,  however,  ratify  an  act  made  for  its  benefit  before  it  had  an 
existence  as  such.     Melliado  v.  Porto  Alegre,  &c.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  503. 

2  The  assignment  of  a  mortgage  purporting  on  its  face  to  be  tlie  deed  of  the 
corporation,  signed  and  sealed  by  its  president,  duly  authorized  for  that  i)urj)ose, 
and  acknowledged  to  be  its  free  act  and  deed,  is  duly  executed  by  the  corporation. 
Murpliy  V.  Welch,  128  Mass.  489.  And  a  corporation  contract,  scaled  witli  a  private 
seal  of  an  officer  instead  of  the  corporate  seal,  is  binding  if  he  had  authority  so  to 
do,  or  his  act  is  ratified.    Eureka  Co.  v.  Bailey  Co.,  11  Wall.  488. 

155 


141 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  141  a  corporation  must  execute  its  deed  under  its  *  corporate 
seal,  otherwise  the  deed  is  void.  (?)  If,  however,  it  was 
only  a  simple  contract  which  was  executed  in  this  way,  it  might 
be  inferred  from  the  general  principles  of  the  law  of  agency,  that 
it  would  be  valid  as  the  contract  of  the  corporation ;  for  it  would 


&c.,  that  the  New  England  Silk  Com- 
pany, a  corporation  legally  established, 
by  C.  C.  their  treasurer,  in  consideration, 
&c.,  do  hereby  give,  grant,  &c."  "  In 
witness  whereof,  I,  the  said  C.  C,  in  be- 
half of  said  Company  and  as  their  treas- 
urer, hare  hereunto  set  my  hand  and 
seal."  The  certificate  of  acknowledg- 
ment stated  that  "  C.  C,  treasurer,  &c., 
acknowledged  the  above  instrument  to 
be  his  free  act  and  deed."  The  court  held 
that  this  was  not  the  deed  of  the  corpo- 
ration. See  also  Combe's  case,  9  Rep. 
7ti  b ;  Frontin  i:  Small,  2  Stra.  705.  No 
abler  exposition  of  the  doctrine  of  deeds 
by  attorney  is  to  be  found  in  the  books 
than  tliat  of  Lord  Chief  Baron  Gilbert, 
Bac.  Abr.  Leases,  J.  10 :  "  If  one  hath 
power,  by  virtue  of  a  letter  of  attorney, 
to  make  leases  for  years  generally  by  in- 
denture, the  attorney  ouglit  to  make 
them  in  the  name  and  style  of  his 
master,  and  not  in  his  own  name:  for 
the  letter  of  attorney  gives  him  no  inter- 
est or  estate  in  the  lands,  but  only  an 
authority  to  supply  the  absence  of  his 
master  by  standing  in  his  stead,  which 
he  can  no  otherwise  do  than  by  using  his 
name,  and  making  them  just  in  the  same 
manner  and  style  as  his  master  would  do 
if  he  were  present:  for  if  he  should 
make  tliem  in  his  own  name,  though  he 
added  also,  by  virtue  of  the  letter  of  at- 
torney to  him  made  for  that  purpose,  yet 
sucli  leases  seem  to  be  void,  because  tlie 
indenture  being  made  in  his  name  must 
pass  the  interest  and  lease  fi'om  him,  or 
it  can  pass  it  from  nobody  :  it  cannot 
pass  it  from  the  master  inmiediately,  be- 
cause he  is  no  party  ;  and  it  cannot  pass 
it  from  the  attorney  at  all,  because  he 
has  nothing  in  the  lands  ;  and  then  his 
adding  lii/  virtue  of  the  letter  of  atlorneij  will 
not  help  it,  because  that  letter  of  attor- 
ney made  over  no  estate  or  interest  in 
the  land  to  him,  and  consequently,  he 
cannot,  by  virtue  thereof,  convey  over 
any  to  anotlier.  Neitiier  can  sucli  inter- 
est pass  from  the  master  innnediately,  or 
througli  the  attorney  ;  for  then  the  same 
indenture  must  have  tliis  strange  effect 
at  one  and  the  same  instant  to  (Iraw  out 
the  interest  from  the  master  to  the  attor- 
ney, and  from  the  attorney  to  the  lessee, 
which  certainly  it  cannot  do  ;  and  tliere- 
fore  all  such  leases  made  in  that  manner 

156 


seem  to  be  absolutely  void,  and  not  good, 
even  by  estoppel,  against  the  attorne3% 
because  they  pretend  to  be  made  not  in 
his  own  name  absolutely,  but  in  the 
name  of  another,  by  virtue  of  an  author- 
ity which  is  not  pursued.  This  case, 
therefore,  of  making  leases  by  a  letter  of 
attorney  seems  to  differ  from  that  of  a 
surrender  of  a  copyhold,  or  of  livery  of 
seizin  of  a  freehold,  by  letter  of  attor- 
ney ;  for  in  those  cases  when  they  say, 
We  A  and  B  as  attorneys  of  C,  or  by  virtue 
of  a  letter  of  attorney  from  C,  of  such  a  date, 
Sj-c,  do  surrender,  ^-c,  or  deliver  to  you  seizin 
of  such  lands  ;  these  are  good  in  this  man- 
ner, because  they  are  only  ministerial 
ceremonies  or  transitory  acts  in  pais,  the 
one  to  be  done  by  holding  the  court  rod, 
and  the  other  by  delivering  a  turf  or 
twig;  and  when  they  do  them  as  attor- 
neys, or  by  virtue  of  a  letter  of  attorney 
from  tJieir  master,  the  law  pronounces 
thereupon  as  if  they  were  actually 
done  by  the  master  himself,  and  carries 
the  possession  accordingly ;  but  in  a 
lease  for  years  it  is  quite  otherwise,  for 
the  indenture,  or  deed,  alone  conveys  the 
interest,  and  are  the  very  essence  of  the 
lease,  both  as  to  the  passing  it  out  of 
the  lessor  at  first,  and  its  subsistence  in 
the  lessee  afterwards ;  the  very  inden- 
ture, or  deed  itself  is  the  conveyance, 
without  any  subsequent  construction,  or 
operation  of  law  thereupon;  and  there- 
fore it  must  be  made  in  the  name  and 
style  of  him  who  has  such  interest  to 
convey,  and  not  in  tlie  name  of  tlie  at- 
torney, who  has  nothing  therein.  But  in 
the  conclusion  of  such  lease,  it  is  proper 
to  say,  In  icitness  whereof  A  13,  of  such  a 
place,  SfC,  in  pursuance  of  a  letter  <f  attor- 
iiey  hereunto  annexed,  hearing  date  such  a 
day,  hath  ]iut  the  hand  and  seal  of  the  master, 
and  so  write  the  master's  name,  and  de- 
liver it  as  the  act  and  deed  of  the  master, 
in  wiiich  last  ceremony  of  delivering  it 
in  the  name  of  the  master  by  such  attor- 
ney, this  exactly  agrees  with  the  cere- 
mony of  surrendering  by  the  rod,  or 
making  livery  by  a  turf  or  twig,  by  the 
attorney,  in  the  name  or  as  attorney  of 
his  master."  And  see  Porter  v.  Andro- 
scoggin, &c.  n.  Co.  37  Me.  349 ;  Richard- 
son r.  Scott  River  Co.  22  Cal.  1.50. 

(/)  Koehler  v.  Iron  Co.  2  Black,  715. 


CH.  X.]  CORPORATIONS.  *  141 

be  a  contract  made  by  one  as  the  agent  of  another,  and  containing 
the  express  declaration  that  it  was  so  made. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  a  corporation,  as  a  legal  person, 
is  entirely  distinct  from  the  individuals  who  compose  it,  and 
therefore  a  resolution  adopted  by  them  is  not  a  corporate  act, 
nor  is  a  deed  by  trustees  of  the  members  the  deed  of  the 
corporation.  (IV) 

Corporations  to  hold  property  are  generally  limited  as  to  the 
amount  they  may  hold.  It  has  been  held  in  New  York,  that  they 
could  not  take  in  excess  of  their  charter,  (lin)  reversing  the 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  that  they  could  take  and  hold 
until  the  State  interfered  with  them. 

A  corporation  may  employ  one  of  its  members  as  its  agent,  and 
the  same  person,  while  such  agent,  may  also  be  an  agent  for 
the  other  contracting  party,  and  sign  for  him  the  memorandum 
required  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  (rri)  And  the  officers  and 
directors  of  a  corporate  body  are  trustees  of  the  stockholders  and 
cannot  without  fraud  secure  to  themselves  advantages  not  com- 
mon to  the  latter,  (n)  ^  But  a  director  may  make  a  contract  with 
a  corporation,  and  then,  as  to  his  contract,  stands  as  a  stranger 
to  it.  (jin) 

A  corporation  is  the  creature  of  the  law,  and  is  only  what  the 
act  of  incorporation  has  made  it,  and  derives  all  its  powers  from 
that  act.  (no)  Nevertheless,  corporations  authorized  by  their 
charter  to  act  in  a  prescribed  manner  may  to  some  extent  by 
practice  and  usage  make  themselves  liable  on  contracts  entered 
into  in  a  different  way.  (o)  But  it  has  been  decided  that  corpo- 
rations cannot  exceed  the  powers  given  in  their  charters  and 
make  contracts  not  incidental  or  ancillary  to  the  exercise  of  those 
powers,  and  that  they  are  not  estopped  from  setting  up  their  own 

(//)  Gashwiler  v.  Willis,  33  Cal.  11.  {no)    Baltimore  v.  Baltimore,   &c.    K. 

(hn)  Chamberlain  v.  Chamberlain,  43  Co.  21  Md.  60. 
N.  Y.  424.  (o)  Witte  v,  Derby  Fishing  Company, 

(m)  Stoddert  v.   Vestry  of    Port  To-  2  Conn.  260 ;   Bulkley  r.  Derby  Fishing 

bacco  Parish,  2  G.  &  J.  227.  Company,  2  id.  252;  Le  Couteulx  v.  Buf- 

(n)  Koehler  v.  Iron  Co.  2  Black,  715.  falo,  33  iSf.  Y.  333. 

\nn)  Stratton  v.  Allen,  1  Green,  229. 

^  Thus  the  directors  of  a  railroad  cannot  secure,  at  its  expense,  undue  advantages 
to  themselves,  by  the  formation  of  a  new  company  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  original 
one,  with  an  understanding  that  they,  or  some  of  them,  shall  take  stock  in  it,  and 
then  that  valuable  contracts  shall  be  given  to  it  by  the  railroad,  in  the  profits  of 
which  they  are  to  share  as  stockholders  of  the  new  company.  Wardell  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  103  U.  S.  651. 

15T 


*  142  THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

want  of  authority  to  make  such  contracts  by  the  fact  that  they 
have  been  in  the  habit  of  entering  into  and  fulfilling  similar 
engagements,  for  a  long  period.  (  jd)  ^  This  question  may  be 
regarded,  however,  as  not  yet  fully  determined.  The  plea  of 
ultra  vires  as  defined  by  Comstock,  J.,  imports,  not  that  the  cor- 
poration could  not,  and  did  not  in  fact,  make  the  author- 

*  142    ized  contract,  but  that  it  ought  not  *  to  have  been  made. 

The  acquiescence  of  the  shareholders  in  the  abuse  Avill 
prevent  the  interposition  of  such  a  plea,  {q}  ^ 

A  corporation  expressly  authorized  to  transact  business  in 
which  it  is  customary  to  use  negotiable  paper,  or  receiving  or 
using  negotiable  paper  in  the  proper  transaction  of  business  of 
any  kind,  has,  as  a  general  rule,  power  to  make,  indorse,  or 
otherwise  dispose  of  negotiable  paper  in  any  way  not  in  itself 
objectionable.  (5-5-) 

No  stockholder  has  any  claim  to  a  dividend  until  it  be  declared. 
And  when  the  distribution  is  ordered,  it  would  seem  that  it  should 
be  distributed  among  those  who  were  stockholders  at  the  time  of 
the  order,  (gr)  ^     It  is  very  common  to  create  by  will  or  otherwise 

( p)  Governor,  &c.  of  Miners  v.  Fox,  16         (qq)  Farmers  Bank  i-.  Maxwell,  32  N.  Y. 

Q.  B.  229  ^  Hood  v.  New  York,  &c.  R.  Co.  579  ;  Same  v.  Ellis,  id.  583  ;  Same  v.  Wat- 

22  Conn.  502.  son,  id.  583 ;  Wood  v.  Wellington,  30  N.  Y. 

(q)  Bissell  V.  The  M.  R.  Co.  22  N.  Y.  218  ;  Brookman  v.  Metcalf,  32  N.  Y.  591. 
258.  iqr)  Goodwin  v.  Hardy,  57  Me.  14-3. 

^  A  railroad  corporation,  authorized  to  biiild  between  certain  points  and  pay 
interest  on  instalments  on  stock  until  its  completion,  cannot,  on  the  extension  of  the 
road  to  other  points,  continue  to  pay  such  mterest  until  the  extension  is  completed, 
Pittsburg,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  AUcghenj-,  63  Penn.  St.  12G ;  equally  a  lease  by  a  railroad  of 
its  road,  rolling  stock,  and  franchises,  for  which  no  authority  is  given  in  its  charter, 
is  ullm  vires  and  void,  Thomas  v.  Railroad  Co.  101  U.  S.  71 ;  Troy,  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  86  N.  Y.  107.  On  the  same  principle,  neither  a  railroad  corpora- 
tion, nor  one  to  make  and  sell  musical  instruments,  can  guarantee  the  expenses  of  a 
musical  festival  in  expectation  of  an  increase  of  traflHc  or  business,  Davis  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  Co.  131  Mass.  2-58;  Davis  v.  Smith  Organ  Co.  131  Mass.  258;  but  a  glass 
manufacturing  corporation  may  contract  to  buy  glassware  for  its  trade  while  re- 
pairing its  works,  Lyndcborough  Glass  Co.  »•.  Mass.  Glass  Co.  Ill  Mass.  315;  a 
water-power  company,  after  the  extinguishment  of  its  water-power,  may  sell  and 
agree  to  regrade  its  land,  Dupee  v.  Boston  Water  Power  Co.,  114  Mass.  37;  and 
a  tract  society  with  tlie  chartered  right  to  hold  property  for  investment,  may  receive 
money  on  lawful  conditions  securing  it  the  income,  failing  the  performance  of  which 
it  must  return  it,  Morville  v.  Am.  Tract  Soc.  123  Mass.  129.  In  New  York  a  distinc- 
tion is  made  between  an  executory  and  an  executed  contract  of  a  corporation  ultra 
vires,  the  latter  of  which  only  will  be  enforced.  Whitney  Arms  Co.  v.  Barlow,  03 
N.  Y.  62. 

2  It  is  equally  true  that  where  the  shareholders  authorize  the  lending  of  money 
to  the  corporation  bv  its  directors,  the  corporation  will  be  estopped  to  deny  the 
validity  of  the  act.     Hotel  Co.  v.  Wade,  97  U.  S.  13. 

'  And  such  distribution  sliould  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  divi- 
dend is  declared.  Beers  v.  Bridgeport  Spring  Co.  42  Conn.  17.  See  Brundage 
V.  Brundage,  GO  N.  Y.  644.    A  purchaser  of  shares  at  auction,  by  the  terms  of  sale 

158 


CH.  X.]  CORPORATIONS.  *  142 

a  trust,  whereby  the  income  and  dividends  of  certain  stock  is  pay- 
able to  a  person  during  his  life,  the  principal  going  elsewhere  at 
his  death.  If  extra  dividends  are  earned  and  declared,  the  gen- 
eral rule  must  be  that  they  belong  to  the  party  entitled  to  the 
dividends,  (^qs^  But  it  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts,  that  if 
instead  of  paying  out  earnings  as  di^ddends  in  money,  additional 
stock  is  created,  absorbing  those  earnings,  the  shares  thereof  dis- 
tributed to  the  trustee  under  such  a  trust,  must  be  held  by  him  as 
additions  to  the  capital,  and  not  paid  over  to  the  party  entitled 
to  the  dividends,  (^qf)  ^  The  question  is  not  without  its  difficulty. 
Municipal  corporations  created  by  acts  of  incorporation,  are  gov- 
erned and  limited  by  those  acts  quite  as  much  as  private  corpo- 
rations. In  the  older  States  there  are  towns  which  rest  upon 
prescription ;  and  in  all  our  States  there  are  general  laws  appli- 
cable to  all  municipal  corporations.  The  questions  which  have 
arisen  under  the  acts  of  incorporation,  or  the  general  laws  relating 
to  this  subject,  are,  mainly,  questions  concerning  the  right  or 
power  of  the  town  or  city  to  make  certain  by-laws  or  enter  into 
certain  agreements ;  and  the  constitutional  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  confer  certain  powers  upon  these  corporations.  These 
questions  are  indefinitely  diversified ;  but  the  principle  which 
runs  through  all  the  cases  may  be  stated  thus.  A  town  or  city 
has  not  only  the  power  of  making  by-laws  or  contracts  expressly 
permitted  by  law,  but  all  such  as  can  be  reasonably  considered 
incident  to  the  powers  expressly  given,  or  as  necessary  for  the 
proper  exercise  of  those  powers ;  and  in  determining  what  powers 
are  thus  necessary  much  regard  is  paid  to  the  nature  of  these  cor- 
porations and  the  purposes  for  which  they  exist ;  and  a  liberal 
though  not  a  lax  construction  is  given  to  provisions  intended  to 
promote  the  interests  of  the  public. 

(qs)  Woodruff's  Estate,  1   Tuck.   58.  See,  as  somewhat  modifying  the  law  of 

The   authorities   are  fully  examined  in  this  case,  Leland  v.  Hayden,  102  Mass. 

this  case.  542. 

(qt)    Minot  V.   Paine,  99  Slass.   101. 

of  which  a  deposit  was  to  be  made  at  once,  and  the  remainder  of  the  purchase-money 
paid  at  a  future  time,  is  entitled  to  a  dividend  meanwhile  declared.  Black  v.  Hom- 
ersham,  4  Ex.  D.  24. 

1  Band  v.  Hubbell,  115  Mass.  461.  It  is  equally  true  that  compensation  for  land 
of  a  corporation  taken  by  eminent  domain,  if  distributed  as  a  dividend  among  tlie 
shareholders,  goes  to  the  capital,  and  not  the  income  of  such  a  trust  fund,  Heard  v. 
Eldredge,  109  Mass.  258;  or  if  the  entire  property  of  a  corporation  be  sold  and  dis- 
tributed, Gifford  V.  Thompson,  116  Mass.  478. 

159 


*  142  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

By  way  of  illustration  of  this,  it  may  be  said,  that  in  Illinois  it 
is  held  that  the  legislature  may  authorize  municipal  bodies  to  take 
stock  in  railroads,  without  a  vote  of  the  inhabitants,  (qu')  In 
Massachusetts,  an  ordinance  of  a  city  prohibiting  projecting  awn- 
ings was  sustained  ;  (qv)  and  another  prohibiting  any  person  from 
permitting  swine  under  his  care  to  go  upon  a  sidewalk,  (^qtv')  In 
Georgia,  it  is  held  that  a  city  cannot  obstruct  the  streets  by  the 
erection  of  any  building,  however  necessary,  (qx}  In  Illinois,  a 
city  council  having  by  charter  a  power  to  establish  and  regulate 
markets,  has  no  authority  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  vegetables  out- 
side the  market  limits,  (qjj)  In  Iowa,  a  city  may  construct  a 
bridge  across  a  stream  dividing  streets,  and  issue  its  bonds  to  pay 
for  the  same,  (gs)  but  has  no  power  to  erect  a  toll-bridge,  (qa) 

In  the  absence  of  special  provisions  in  the  charter,  or  of  by- 
laws lawfully  made,  the  corporate  acts  of  a  corporation  are  the 
acts  of  a  majority  at  a  regular  meeting,  whether  those  present 
were  or  were  not  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  corporation,  (r) 
And  these  corporate  acts  are  binding  upon  all  the  members,  (s) 
It  does  not  seem  to  have  been  positively  decided  whether  this  must 
be  a  majority  of  all  the  members  present,  or  may  be  only  a  major- 
ity of  all  present  and  voting.  But  we  hold  that  it  may  be  the 
latter.  Otherwise,  persons  not  voting  would  be  counted  as  voting 
against  the  measure.  As  a  majority  of  all  present  binds  all  the 
members,  because  all  the  members  might  be  present,  and  perhaps 
because  it  is  their  duty  to  be  present,  so  a  majority  of  those  pres- 
ent and  voting  should  have  the  same  force,  because  it  is  within 
the  right  and  power  and  perhaps  the  duty  of  all  present  to  vote, 
and  so  to  express  their  dissent  from  any  measure  which  they  do 

iqn)  Keithsburg  v.  Frick,  34  111.  405.  v  Bcllringer,  4  T.  R.  810;  Rex  r.  Miller, 

(qv)  Pedrick  v.  Bailey,  12  Gray,  101.  G  id.  268;   Rex  v.  Bower,  1  B.  &  C.  492; 

{f]w)  Commonwealth  v.  Curtis,  9  Al-  Ex  parte  Willcocks,  7  Cowen,  402.  —  The 

len,  266.  rule  is  perliaps  the  same  wlicre  the  act  is 

{qx)  Columbus  I'.  Jaqucs,  30  Ga.  506.  to  be  done  by  the  corporation,  when  that 

(7^)  Caldwell  v.  Alton,  33  111.  41G.  consists    of    a    definite    number.     Lord 

(qz)  Mullasky  ;;.  Cedar   Falls,  19   la.  Kevi/nn,  Rex  v.  Bellringer,  4  T.  R.  822. 

21.  At  common   law,  the   corporation   may 

{qa)  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  la.  199.  delegate  to  a  select  body  in   itself,   its 

(r)  Attorney-General  v.  Davy,  2  Atk.  power  of   electing  members   or  officers. 

212.  Rex  ".  Westwood,  7  Bing.  I.  — In  a  cor- 

(a)  Rex  r.  Varlo,  Cowp.  248 ;   Field  u.  poration  composed  of   different  classes, 

Field,  9  Wend.  304.  —  But  where  the  act  a  majority  of  each  class  must  consent 

is  to  be  done  by  a  body  within  the  cor-  before   the   charter  can    be    altered,   if 

poration,   and   consisting    of    a    definite  there  be  no  provision  in  the  charter  re- 

numVxT,  a  majority  of    that  bodj/  must  spccting  alterations.     Case  of  St.  Mary's 

attend,   and   then   a   majority   of   tiiose  Church,  7  S.  &  R.  617. 

thus  assembled  will  bind  the  rest.     Rex 

160 


CH.  X.]  CORPORATIONS.  *  143 

not  approve.  The  individuality  of  members  is  merged  in  that  of 
the  corporation,  and  therefore  at  common  law  no  member  is  liable 
personally  for  the  debt  of  the  corporation.  But  in  some  States 
the  private  property  of  any  member  of  a  city  or  town  or  school 
district,  or  a  territorial  (not  a  poll)  parish,  may  be  taken  on  exe- 
cution against  the  corporation  and  he  has  his  remedy  over  against 
the  corporation ;  (t}  and  in  many  of  our  States  it  is  now  provided 
by  law  that  members  of  Banking  Corporations,  of  Manufacturing 
Corporations,  and,  in  a  few  instances,  of  some  other  corpo- 
rations, are  responsible  for  the  debts  of  the  corporations 
in  *  whole  or  in  p^rt.  (tt)  The  various  statutory  pro-  *  143 
visions  on  this  subject  are  usually  precise  and  definite. 
It  has  been  held  that  as  this  personal  liability  depends  wholly  on 
the  provisions  of  positive  law,  it  is  to  be  construed  strictly,  (m) 
and  where  the  certificate  of  the  officers  of  a  corporation  in  due 
form  was  sworn  to  and  recorded  as  the  law  required,  it  exempted 
the  stockholders  from  personal  liability  without  reference  to  the 
truth  of  the  statements  in  the  certificate,  (v )  And  in  a  later 
case,  it  was  held  that  the  officers  of  a  manufacturing  company 
were  not  made  liable  by  their  false  statement  that  the  capital  stock 
was  paid  in,  unless  the  statement  was  wilfully  false,  (w) 

Negotiable  paper  may  be  made,  indorsed,  or  otherwise  disposed 
of  by  corporations  generally,  by  the  presidents  or  cashiers  writing 
their  names  with  their  titles  of  office ;  especially  if  making  or 
dealing  with  such  paper  is  within  the  scope  of  the  proper  business 
of  the  corporation,  (a;) 

(0  Gatehill's  case,  5  Dane,  Abr.  158;  v.  Santvord,  34  N.  Y.  208.     A  corporation 

Parxmis,  C.  J.,  in  7  Mass.  187  ;  Gaskill  v.  carrying  on  a  prohibited  business,  cannot 

Dudley,  6  I\Iet.  546.  interpose   their  corporate   privileges    to 

(//)  The  following  cases  relate  to  this  prevent   the    liabilities   of    stockholders, 

subject:    Utley    v.    Union   Tool    Co.    11  Richmondville    Seminary   v.   McDonald, 

Gray,  139 ;    Medill    v.   Collier,  16   Ohio,  34  N.  Y.  379. 

509;    McIIose  v.  Wheeler,  45  Penn.  St.  (u)  Gray  v.  Coffin,  9  Cush.  199. 

32  ;  French  v.  Teschemaker,  24  Cat.  518;  (v)   Stedman  v.  Eveleth,  6  Met.  114. 

Allibone    v.   Hager,    46    Penn.    St.    48;  (w)  Stebbins  y.  Edmunds,  12  Gray,  203. 

Baker  v.  Backus,  32  111.  79.     As  to  who  (x)  State    Bank     v.   Fox,   3    Blatch- 

is  a  stockholder,  see  Lathrop  v.  Knceland,  ford,  431 ;  Patten  i'.  Moses,  49  Me.  255 ; 

46  Barb.  4?2.     That  stockholders  are  not  Olcott   v.  Tioga   R.  Co.  27   N.  Y.   546 ; 

liable  in  another  jurisdiction,  unless  by  s.  c.  40  Barb.  179;  Goodrich  v.  Kcynolds, 

force  of  some  positive  law,  see  Merrick  31  III.  490. 

VOL.  I.  11  161 


144  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 


*144  *  CHAPTER   XL 

JOINT-STOCK   COMPANIES. 

In  England  the  statute  of  7  &  8  Victoria,  cli.  110,  has  the  effect 
of  making  joint-stoclv  companies,  formed  and  registered  in  a  cer- 
tain way,  quasi-corporations.  In  this  country,  wherever  there  are 
no  similar  statutory  provisions,  joint-stock  companies  are  rather 
to  be  regarded  as  partnerships.  The  English  statute  above  re- 
ferred to  defines  a  joint-stock  company  as  "  a  partnership  where- 
of the  capital  is  divided  or  agreed  to  be  divided  into  shares,  and 
so  as  to  be  transferable  without  the  express  consent  of  all  the 
copartners."  (a)  And  this  definition  may  be  considered  as  appli- 
cable to  such  companies  in  this  country.  Although  a  joint-stock 
company  is  certainly  not  a  corporation,  yet  it  differs  in  some 
respects  from  a  common  partnership.  A  member  of  a  partner- 
ship may  assign  his  interest  in  the  property  of  the  firm  ;  but  the 
assignee  does  not  become  a  partner  unless  the  other  copartners 
choose  to  admit  him ;  and  the  interest  so  assigned  being  subject 
to  all  the  debts  of  the  partnership,  it  may  be  withheld  by  the  part- 
ners for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  affairs  of  the  firm,  and  until 
it  is  certain  that  there  is  a  balance  belonging  to  the  partners,  and 
until  the  share  belonging  to  the  assigning  partner  may,  in  whole 
or  in  part  be  paid  over  to  his  assignee  without  injury  to  the  cred- 
itors of  the  firm.  (J)  But  in  a  joint-stock  company  pro- 
*  145  vision  is  made  beforehand  for  such  transfer,  *  and  this  is 
a  principal  object  and  effect  of  the  division  into  shares. 

(a)  7  &  8  Vict.  c.  110,  §  2.     The  same  Act  (6  Geo.  I.  c.  18),  made  during  the 

section   proceeds  to  include  also  within  excitement  produced  by  the  South  Sea 

tiie  term  Joint-Stock  Company,  all  Life,  Company,  having  been  repealed  by  the 

Fire  and  Marine   In.surance  Companies,  statute  G  Geo.  IV.  c.  01,  it  was  held  in 

and  every  partnership  consisting  of  more  Garrard  v.  Ilardcy,  5  Man.  &  G.  471,  that 

than  twenty-five  members.  the  formation  of  a  corn))aiiy,  tlie  stock 

{!>)  See  Pratt  v.  Hutchinson,  15  East,  in  which  should  be  transferable,  was  not 

511;  Kcx  f.  Webb,  14  East,  40G;  Josephs  an    offence    at   common    law.     And    the 

V.  Pobrcr,  3  B.  &  C.  O-jO;  Fox  ;•.  CMfton,  doctrine  was    reaffirmed    in    Harrison   v. 

0  Bing.  115;  s.  c.  U  id  770.     The  Bubble  Ileathorn,  G  Man.  &  G.  81. 

1G2 


CH.  XI.]  JOINT-STOCK    COMPANIES.  *  146 

In  other  respects  the  differences  between  the  law  of  joint-stock 
companies  and  that  of  partnerships  (which  is  our  next  topic),  arc 
not  very  many  nor  very  important,  (e) 

Some  question  has  arisen  as  to  the  power  of  a  managing  com- 
mittee to  pledge  the  credit  of  the  members  of  a  society ;  and  it  is 
held  that  this  must  depend  upon  the  rules  and  by-laws  of  the 
society.  (cZ)  Such  a  case  is  not  likened  to  that  of  a  partnership, 
but  is  governed  by  the  law  of  principal  and  agent,  (g)  Nor  has  a 
member  of  a  joint-stock  company  any  implied  authority  to  accept 
bills  in  the  name  of  the  directors  or  of  the  company.  (/)  The 
effect  of  becoming  a  subscriber  to  an  intended  company,  in  regard 
to  the  creation  of  a  partnership  between  the  members  as  well 
among  themselves  as  in  reference  to  the  public,  has  been  before 
the  courts ;  and  it  has  been  held  that  an  application  for  shares 
and  payment  of  the  first  deposit  did  not  suffice  to  constitute  one  a 
partner,  where  he  had  not  otherwise  interfered  in  the  concern  ;  (^) 
and  that  the  insertion  of  his  name  by  the  secretary  of  the  com- 
pany in  a  book  containing  a  list  of  the  members  was  not  a  holding 
of  himself  out  to  the  public  as  a  partner,  (^h')  And  this  on  the 
ground  that  such  person  does  not  thereby  acquire  a  right  to  share 
in  the  profits. 

But  though  there  be  some  want  of  the  necessary  formalities  or 
acts  of  a  party  to  make  himself  legally  a  member,  yet  if  he  inter- 
pose aucl  act  as  a  member  or  director,  (z)  attend  meetings,  accept 
office,  or  otherwise  give  himself  out  to  the  public  as  such,  either 
expressly,  or  by  sufficient  implication,  then  he  will  make  him- 
self liable  as  a  partner.  (/)  And  this  even  if  the  com- 
pany *  originated  in  fraud,  to  which  he  is  not  a  party,  nor  *  146 
privy ;  (A;)  or  if  a  deed  expressly  required  by  the  printed 
prospectus  to  make  him  a  partner  has  not  been  signed  by  him ;  (Z) 

(c)  See  the  remarks  of  Lord  Campbell,  (/)  Lord  Dennian,  Bell  v.  Francis,  9  C. 

in  Burness  v.  Pennell,  2  H.  L.  Cas.  497.  &  P.  0(j. 

((I)  Flemj-ncr  v.  Hector,  2    M.  &   W.  { /)  Doublcday    v.   Muskett,    7    Bing. 

172.     And  see  Keynell  v.  Lewis,  15  M.  &  110 ';    Tredwcn   v.  Bourne,   6   M.   &    W. 

W.  517.  4(51 ;    Maudslay  v.  Le  Blanc,  2  C.  &   P. 

{,')  Id.  409,  note;   Braithwaite  v.  Skofield,  9  B. 

( f)  Bramah  v.  Roberts,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  &  C.  401 ;  Peel  v.  Thomas,  15  C.  B.  714. 

90.3;  Dickinson  r.  Valpy,  10  B.  &  C.  128;  And  see  Harrison  v.  Heathorn,  6  Scott, 

Steele  V.  Harmer,  14  M.  &  W.  831.  N.  H.  735. 

(7)  Pitchford  v.  Davis,  5  iM.  &  W.  2 ;  (k)  Ellis   v.  Schmoeck,  5   Bing.  521; 

Fox  V.  Clifton,  4  Mo.  &  P.  676,  6  Bing.  8.  c.  3  Mo.  &  P.  220. 

776.     Same  case  sent  down  for  a  third  (/)  Maudslay  v.  Le  Blanc,  2  C.  &  P. 

trial,  9  Bing.  115.     And  see   Bourne   v.  409,  n.     And   see  Ellis   v.  Schmoeck,  6 

Freeth,  9  B.  &  C.  632.  Bing.  521. 


(/))  Fox  V.  Clifton,  4  Mo.  &  P.  G7G. 


163 


146 


THE  LAW  OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


or  even  if  the  company  has  never  been   regularly  and   finally 
formed ;  (??i)  or  has  been  abandoned  ;  (>i)  or  is  insolvent,  (o) 

It  seems  tliat  a  member  of  such  a  company  may  sue  the  com- 
pany for  work  and  labor  done,  and  money  expended  by  him  in 
their  behalf.  (  p') 


(vi)  Abbott,  C.  J.,  Keasley  v.  Codd,  2  C. 
&  P.  408, 11. 

(n)  Doubleday  v.  Muskett,  7  Bing.  110. 

(o)  Keasley  v.  Codd,  2  C.  &  P.  408. 

(/))  Garden  v.  General  Cemetery  Co. 
5  Bing.  N.  C.  253.  But  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  this  was  so  held  with  reference  to 
an  incorporated  joint-stock  company  ;  and 
some  stress  was  laid  in  the  decision  upon 
the  particular  provisions  of  the  act  of 
incorporation.  And  see  Pcrring  ik  Hone, 
4  Biug.  28.  —  A  member  of  a  joint-stock 

164 


company,  like  a  member  of  an  ordinary 
partnership,  may  recover  compensation 
for  service  rendered  to  the  company 
previous  to  his  having  become  a  member 
of  it.  Lucas  V.  Beach,  1  Man.  &  G.  417. 
In  general,  however,  an  action  cannot  be 
maintained  by  a  member  against  the 
company,  or  by  the  company  against  a 
member,  on  a  contract  between  him  and 
the  company.  Neale  v.  Turton,  4  Bing. 
149;  Wilson  v.  Curzon,  15  M.  &  W.  532; 
Holmes  i'.  Higgins,  1  B.  &  C.  74. 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  147 


*  CHAPTER   XII.  *147 

PARTNERSHIP. 

Sect.  1.  —  What  constitutes  a  Partnership. 

A  PARTNERSHIP  cxists  wlicii  two  or  more  persons  combine  their 
property,  labor,  and  skill,  or  one  or  more  of  them,  in  the  transac- 
tion of  business,  for  their  common  profit,  (a)  A  copartnership 
is  not  a  corporation,  nor  a  joint-tenancy,  nor  a  co-tenancy.  Some 
of  its  qualities  and  characteristics  are  similar  to  those  of  these 
other  modes  of  joint-interest.  But  it  lias  its  own  system  of  rules 
and  principles  of  law  which  must  govern  all  the  questions  arising 
under  it ;  and  mistakes  have  arisen  from  attcmj)ting  to  bring 
rules  from  these  other  modes  of  joint-interest,  to  control  ques- 
tions of  partnership. 

A  partnership  is  presumed  to  be  general  when  there  are  no 
stipulations,  or  no  evidence  from  the  course  of  business,  to  the 
contrary.  (5)  But  it  may  be  created  for  a  specific  purpose,  or 
be  confined  by  the  parties  to  a  particular  line  of  business,  or  even 
a  single  transaction.  When  the  partnership  is  formed  by  written 
articles,  it  is  considered  as  beginning  at  the  date  of  the  articles, 
unless  they  contain  a  stipulation  to  the  contrary,  (e) 

(a)  Noycs   V.  Cushman,   25  Vt.   390.  partncrsliip  in  his  business  a  person  who 

For  a  discussion  of  tlie  principles  of  law  liad  not  then  been  admitted  as  attorney, 

ap])licable    to   partnerships   between   at-  and  therefore  could  not  be  lawfully  re- 

torneys  at  law,  and  the  responsibilities  ceived.     No   time  being  expressly  fixed 

growing  out  of    them,   and    as    to    the  for  the  commencement  of  the  partuersliip, 

effect  of  the  dissolution  of  the  firm  by  the  court  held  that  it  was  an  agreement 

the  death  of    one   of    its   members,  see  for  a  present  partnership,  and  that  parol 

McGill '•.  iMcGill,2  Met.  (Ky.)  258.  evidence   was    not   admissible    to    show 

(/))  There   is   nothing  in   the   law   to  that    it   was    a    conditional    agreement, 

prevent  its  being  a  universal  partnership,  which   was    not   to   take   effect  till    the 

however    rare   and   difficult   sutdi   cases  person  to  be  received  was  achnitted  as  an 

nnist  be  in  fact.     See  Goesele  v.  IJimeler,  attorney,  and  that  it  was  therefore  void. 

14  How.  58!).     On  the  other  hand  a  ])art-  See  Dix  v.  Otis,  5  Pick.  :]S.  —  But  jjarties 

nership  may  l)e  limited  to  one  particular  may  agree  to  form  a  partnership  at  some 

subject.     Ripley  v.  Colby,  o  Foster  (N.  future  time,  and  until  it  arrives  they  will 

II.),  438.  not   be   liable   as   partners,    unless   they 

(c)  Williams  i:  Jones,  5  B  &  C.  108.  have  held  themselves  out  as  such.     Dick- 

An  attorney  entered  into  a  written  con-  inson  v.  Valpy,  10  B.  &  C.  128;  Avery  v 

tract,  whereby  he  agreed  to  take  into  Lauve,  1  La.  Ann.  457. 

165 


*  148  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

In  general,  persons  competent  to   transact  business  on  their 
own  account  may  enter  into  partnership ;  the  disabilities  of  cover- 
ture, infancy,  and  the  lilve,  applying  equally  in  both  cases.  ^     But 
interesting  questions  have  been  raised  as  to  the  rights  and 

*  148    *  liabilities  of  those  who  represent  infants.     The  personal 

liability  of  such  a  party  would  seem  to  depend  upon  the 
question  whether  he  has  claimed  and  exercised  the  right  of  with- 
drawing any  part  of  the  capital,  or  of  receiving  a  share  of  the 
profits.  Perhaps  if  he  had  by  agreement  the  right  to  do  this, 
and  more  certainly  if  he  had  actually  withdrawn  capital  or  pro- 
fits, he  would  be  held  personally  responsible  for  the  debts  of 
the  partnership,  {d)  It  is  often  said  that  whether  persons  who 
engage  in  joint  transactions  are  partners,  depends  upon  their 
intentions ;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  by  this  is  meant 
their  intentions  as  legally  expressed  or  ascertained,  (dd) 

Usually,  the  partners  own  together  both  the  property  and  the 
profits ;  but  there  may  be  a  partnership  in  the  profits  only.  For 
as  between  themselves  the  property  may  belong  wholly  to  one 
member  of  the  partnership,  although  it  is  bound  to  third  parties 
for  the  debts  of  the  firm ;  as  when  it  is  bought  wholly  by  funds 
of  one  partner,  and  the  other  is  to  use  only  his  skill  and  labor 
in  disposing  of  it,  for  a  share  of  the  profits,  (e) 


{d)  Barklie  v.  Scott,  1  Hud.  &  B.  83.  or  profits  as  trustee  for  his  son,  nor  in 

A  invested  a  sum  of  money  for  liis  in-  fact  drawn  any. 
fant  son  in  a  partnersliip  on  its  forma-  {d,l)  Salter  v.  Ham,  31  N.  Y.  321. 

tion,  and  it  was  stipulated,  in   a  letter  (c)  So  where  a  broker,  employed  by  a 

written   by   the   other   partners    of    tlie  merchant   to  purchase   goods,   with    the 

house,  that  they  should  correctly  account  funds  of  the  merchant,  was   to  be  one 

witli  A,  as  the  trustee  of  liis  son,  for  one  third   interested    in    them,    and    not    to 

tliird  profit  of  his  son's  capital,  or  any  cliari^e  connnissions,  and  the  corrcspond- 

loss  that  might  accrue,  and  be  governed  ence   Ijetween    him    and    the    merchant 

and  directed  by  his  advice  in  all  matters  described    the    transaction    as    a    joint 

relative  to  the  business.     Held,  tliat  this  concern,    tlie    broker    was    held    to    be 

letter  did    not    constitute    A   a   partner,  interested  as  a  partner  in  the  goods,  and 

the  jury  having  found   tluit   the   money  could  ])ledge  tlie  whole  of    them.     Held 

was  not  invested  by  A  for  his  own  benefit,  i'.    Ilollinsliead,  4   B.  &  C.  8(57.     A'lhott, 

and  that  he  had  not  reserved  to  himself  C.  J.:    "Such    a    partnership    may  well 

the  power  of  drawing  out  the  principal  exist,  although  the  whole  price  is  in  tlie 


1  A  married  woman  cannot  enter  into  a  partnership  not  in  relation  to  her  separate 
property,  but  in  so  doing,  even  with  her  husband's  consent,  the  latter  is  regarded  as 
the  partner.  Swasey  v.  Antram,  24  Ohio  St.  87.  See  Todd  v.  Clapp,  118  Mass.  495; 
Silveus  V.  I'orter,  74  Penn.  St.  448;  Newman  >•.  Morris,  52  Miss.  2-"l9;  Bradford  v. 
Johnson,  44  Te.x.  3»1.  If  however  she  acts  under  a  secret  trust  for  her  husband,  she 
may  sue  for  a  dissolution  and  an  accounting.  Bitter  v.  Kathman,  01  N.  Y.  512. 
As  to  corporations  forming  a  partnersliip,  see  Allen  r.  Woonsocket  Co.  11  R.  I. 
288;  Butler  v.  American  Tov  Co.  4(i  Conn.  i;3();  Dalfon  City  Co.  v.  Dalton  Mf'g 
Co.  33  Ga.  243 ;  Aigen  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  132  Mass.  423. 

16G 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  149 

SECTION   IT. 

OF   THE   REAL   ESTATE   OP   A    PARTNERSHIP. 

All  kinds  of  property  may  be  held  in  partnership ;  and  there 
may  be  a  partnership  to  trade  in  land,  (/)  ^  or  to  cultivate 
land  *  for  the  common  profit ;  (g')  but  real  estate  is  still  *  149 
subject,  to  a  certain  extent,  to  the  rules  which  govern  that 
kind  of  property .2  There  has  been  much  conflict  and  uncertainty 
as  to  some  of  the  rights  and  remedies  of  partners  and  creditors 
in  respect  to  real  property  belonging  to  the  partnership,  both 
in  England  and  in  this  country.  But  we  consider  the  established 
and  the  just  rule  to  be,  that  when  real  estate  is  purchased  with 
partnership  funds,  for  partnership  purposes,  it  will  be  treated  as 
partnership  property,  and  held  like  personal  property,  chargeable 
with  the  debts  of  the  firm,  and  with  any  balance  which  may  be 
due  from  one  partner  to  the  other,  upon  the  winding  up  of  the 


first  instance  advanced  by  one  partner,  and  the  other  labor,  mutual  interest  in 
the  otlior  contributing  Ids  time  and  skill  the  profits  alone  will  not  render  the 
and  security  in  the  selection  and  purchase  latter  liable  to  the  former  for  contriVm- 
of  the  commodities."  But  where  the  tion  for  any  loss  of  capital  in  the  ad- 
broker  merely  acts  as  agent,  and  in  lieu  venture.  Heran  v.  Hall,  1  B.  Mon.  159. 
of  commissions  is  to  receive  a  certain  See  also  Berthold  v.  Goldsmith,  24  How. 
proportion  of  the  profits  arising  from  the  53G. 

sale,    and   bear  a  certain  proportion   of  (f)  Campbell    v.    Colhoun,    1    Penn. 

the  losses,  the  property  in  the  subject  of  140;  Fall  Kiver  Wharf  Co.  i:.  Borden,  10 

the  sale  does  not  vest  in  him  as  a  partner,  Cush.  458;  Clagett  v.  Kilbourne,  1  Black, 

although  he  may  be  liable  as  sucli  to  third  346. 

persons.     Smith  r.  Watson,  2  B.  &  C.  401.  (g)  Allen  v.  Davis,  13  Ark.  28. 
So  where  one  partner  furnishes  capital, 

^  Such  a  partnership  mav  be  created  orall}^  Chester  v.  Dickerson,  54  N.  Y.  1 ; 
Holmes  r.  McCrav,  51  Ind.  358;  Ilirbour  c.  Reeding,  3  Montana,  15.  See  AVillianis 
V.  Gillies,  75  N.  Y."  197. 

-  If  purchased  by  partnership  funds  for  partnership  purposes,  such  real  estate  is 
firm  propertv,  whether  one  or  all  the  partners  hold  the  legal  title,  Davies  r.  Games, 
12  Ch.  I).  813;  Offutt  v.  Scott,  47  Ala.  104;  Bopp  v.  Fox,  03  111.  54;  Johnson  i-. 
Clark,  18  Kan.  157;  Whitmore  )'.  Shiverick,  3  Nev.  288;  Collins  v  Decker,  70  I\Ie. 
23;  Ross  v.  Henderson,  77  N.  C.  170;  Knott  v.  Knott,  6  Oreg.  112;  West  Hickory 
Ass.  r.  Reed,  80  I'enn.  St.  38;  Lime  Rock  Bank  v.  Phetteplace,  8  R.  I.  50;  Fairchild 
r.  Fairchild,  04  N.  Y.  471;  if  not  so  purchased,  it  belongs  to  the  partners  individu- 
alh-,  Homer  r.  Homer,  107  Mass.  82;  Price  v.  Hicks,  14  i^la.  505;  Morgan  v.  Olvey, 
53  Ind.  6.  Such  real  estate  nuist  satisfy  firm  in  preference  to  individual  creditors. 
Iliscock  V.  Phelps,  49  N.  Y.  97  ;  Rose  v.  Izard,  7  S.  C.  442.  A  surviving  partner 
can  sell  tlie  firm  real  estate,  and  equity  will  compel  the  heir  holding  the  legal 
title  to  convey  it.  Murphy  v.  Abranis,  50  Ala.  293;  Mathews  v.  Hunter,  07  Mo. 
293;  whether  necessary  to  pay  debts  or  not,  Solotnan  v.  I'itzgerald,  7  lleiskell, 
552. 

16T 


150 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


affairs  of  the  firm.  (7i)  But  it  seems  to  be  the  prevailing 
*  150  rule  in  this  country,  *  that  as  between  the  personal  repre- 
sentative and  the  heirs  of  a  deceased  partner,  his  share 
of  the  surplus  of  the  real  estate  of  the  partnership,  after  all 
its  debts  arc  paid,  and  the  equitable  claims  of  its  members  are 
adjusted,  will  be  considered  and  treated  as  real  estate,  (i)     It 


{h)  Goodburn  v.  Stevens,  5  Gill,  1; 
Buuhan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch.  165,  197- 
207,  where  several  leading  cases  are  re- 
viewed;  Buckley  v.  Buckley,  11  Barb. 
44  ;  riatt  v.  Oliver,  3  McLean,  27  ;  Rice 
V.  Barnard,  20  Vt.  479 ;  Overliolt's  Ap- 
peal, 12  Penn.  St.  222;  Moderwell  v. 
Mullison,  21  id.  257  ;  Buck  v.  Winn,  11 
B.  Mon.  322 ;  Owens  v.  Collins,  23  Ala. 
837;  Cox  v.  McBurney,  2  Sandf.  501; 
Buffum  V.  Buffum,  49  Me.  108;  Dewey 
V.  Dewev,  35  Vt.  555 ;  Robertson  v. 
Baker,  1 1  Fla.  192 ;  Shearer  v.  Shearer, 
98  Mass.  107.  "  So  far  as  the  partners 
and  tlieir  creditors  are  concerned,  real 
estate  belonging  to  the  partnership  is 
treated  in  equity  as  personal  property, 
and  subjected  to  the  same  general  rules." 
Assistant  V.  C,  Delmonico  v.  Guillauinc, 
2  Sandf.  Ch.  3UG.  And  where  the  real 
estate  is  purchased  for  partnership  pur- 
poses on  partnership  account,  it  is  im- 
material whether  the  purchase  is  made 
in  the  name  of  one  partner  or  of  all, 
or  of  a  stranger.  Boyers  v.  Elliott,  7 
Humph.  204 ;  lio.xie  v.  Carr,  1  Sunnier, 
182.  In  this  last  case,  Storij,  J.,  says  : 
"A  question  often  arises,  whether  real 
estate,  purchased  for  a  partnership,  is  to 
be  deemed  for  all  purposes  personal  es- 
tate like  other  effects.  That  it  is  so,  as 
to  the  payment  of  the  partnership  debts, 
and  adjustment  of  partnership  rights, 
and  winding  up  the  ])artnorsliip  concerns, 
is  clear,  at  least  in  the  view  of  a  court  of 
equity.  But,  whetlier  it  becomes  personal 
estate  as  between  the  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator of  a  deceased  partner  and 
his  heir  or  devisee,  is  quite  a  different 
question,  upon  which  learned  judges  have 
entertained  opposite  oi)inions.  Tlie  whole 
doctrine  as  l)etween  such  claimants,  must 
turn  upon  the  presumed  intention  of  the 
deceased  partner;  wiiether  by  leaving  it 
in  the  state  of  being  real  property  he 
meant,  as  lietween  his  personal  represent- 
atives and  his  heirs  and  devisees,  that  it 
should  retain  its  true  and  original  charac- 
ter; or  whether  having  appropriated  it 
as  partnership  property,  it  shotild  assume 
the  artificial  character  belonging  to  the 
other  personal  funds  of  the  firm."  See 
Sigourney  v.  Munn,  7  Conn.  11.  —  In 
Buchan  v.  Sunnier,  already  cited,  Chan- 

168 


cellor  Walworth,  states  it  to  be  the 
English  rule,  "  That  real  estate  belong- 
ing to  the  firm,  unless  there  is  something 
in  the  partnership  articles  to  give  it  a 
different  direction,  is  to  be  considered,  in 
equity,  as  personal  property;  and  tliat 
it  goes  to  the  personal  representative  of 
the  deceased  partner,  who  was  beneficially 
interested  therein."  —  Wooldridge  v.  Wil- 
kins,  3  How.  ( Miss. )  372.  After  reviewing 
Greene  ?;.  Greene,  1  Hamm.  244,  and 
Tiiornton  v.  Dixon,  3  Bro.  Ch.  199,  the 
court  say  :  "  The  result  of  these  cases 
we  take  to  be,  that  lands  purchased  by 
partners,  under  an  agreement  that  they 
shall  be  sold  for  the  benefit  of  the  part- 
nership, will  be  regarded  as  joint  stock, 
and  will  be  likewise  so  considered,  though 
there  be  no  agreement,  if  there  be  such 
an  application  or  use  of  them  to  the  pur- 
poses of  the  concern,  as  evidences  an 
original  understanding  of  the  parties 
that  tliey  are  to  be  treated  as  such,  and 
not  as  an  estate  in  connnon."  See  Dyer 
V.  Clark,  5  Met.  562  —  See  West  c.  Skip, 
1  Ves.  Sen.  242;  Phillips  v.  Thillips,  1 
Myl.  &  K.  063.  Sir  John  Lxich,  M.  R., 
in  this  last  case  said,  that  notwithstanding 
older  authorities,  he  considered  it  to  be 
settled  that  all  property,  whatever  might 
be  its  nature,  purchased  with  partnership 
caj)ital  for  tlie  purposes  of  tlie  jiartncrship 
trade,  (■ontinued  to  be  partnershij)  capital, 
and  to  have  to  every  intent  the  quality 
of  personal  estate.  And  this  is  confirmed 
in  Broom  v.  Broom,  3  Myl.  &  K.  443. 
See  Pugh  v.  Currie,  5  Ala.  (n.  s.)  440. 
—  In  Pierce  v.  Trigg,  10  Leigii,  427, 
Tucker,  P.,  after  reviewing  the  Virginia 
cases,  adds:  "Upon  tlie  whole  I  am  of 
opinion  that  the  late  Knglish  cases  pro- 
pound the  true  rule,  and  that  real 
estate,  purchased  with  partnership  funds 
and  for  partnership  pur])oses,  must  be 
regarded  as  i)artnership  stock,  and  treat- 
ed as  personalty."  See  also  liUdlow  r. 
Cooi)er,  4  Ohio  {■s.  S.),  1  ;  Duhring  r.  Duh- 
ring,  20  Mo.  174;  Moreau  r.  Siiffarans, 
3  Sneed,  595;  Galbraith  v.  Gedge,  Hi 
B.  Mon.  031 ;  Coder  v.  Iluling,  27  Penn. 
St.  84. 

(t)  Goodwin  V.  Richardson,  11  Mass. 
409.  In  this  case  an  estate  was  mort- 
gaged to  two  partners,  who  acquired  an 


en.  XII.] 


PAETNERSHIP. 


*151 


has  been  held,  that  the  real  estate  of  a  partnership  does  not 
acquire  the  incidents  or  liabilities  of  personal  estate,  unless  there 
be  an  ag-rccment  of  the  partners  to  that  eft'cct ;  and  that  then 
this  change  in  the  legal  nature  of  the  property  results  from 
this  agreement ;  (y)  but  we  doubt  the  *  accuracy  of  this  *  151 
ruling ;  unless  it  is  admitted  that  such  agreement  may  be 
inferred  from  the  purchase  of  the  property  by  partnership  funds, 
and  the  use  of  it  for  partnership  purposes.  It  seems  that 
improvements  made  with  partnership  funds  on  real  estate  belong- 
ing to  one  of  the  partners,  will  be  treated  as  the  personal  prop- 
erty of  the  partnership.  (A;) 


absolute  title  by  foreclosure,  and  the 
court  held  that  it  therebj^  vested  in  them 
as  tenants  in  common,  and  on  the  dcatli 
of  one  jjartner  was,  as  to  his  moiety,  to 
be  treated  as  his  separate  estate.  See 
Hoxie  V.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  185,  where 
Story,  J.,  says  tliat  this  decision  "  turns 
upon  a  mere  point  of  local  law,  under 
a  local  statute,  and  does  not  dispose  of 
the  equities  between  the  parties  resulting 
from  general  principles."  In  Yeatman 
V.  Woods,  C  Yerg.  20,  it  was  held  that 
real  estate  held  by  partners,  for  partner- 
ship purposes,  descends  and  vests  in  the 
heir  at  law  of  a  deceased  partner,  as  real 
estate  in  other  cases.  In  Deloney  v. 
Hutcheson,  2  Rand.  183,  it  is  said  that 
"  The  surviving  partner,  if  he  be  a 
creditor,  can  have  no  other  remedy 
against  the  real  estate  than  any  other 
creditor  can  have."  In  Lawrence  r. 
Taylor,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  Ill,  it  is  said: 
"Out  of  the  Court  of  Chancery,  real 
estate,  though  belonging  to  partners  and 
employed  in  the  partnership  business  — 
the  title  standing  in  their  joint  names  — 
is  deemed  to  be  holden  by  them  as 
tenants  in  common,  or  joint-tenants  for 
all  purposes."  See  also  Lang  v.  Waring, 
25  Ala.  (i25 ;  Matlock  v.  Matlock,  5  Ind. 
403. 

(  /)  In  Coles  V.  Coles,  15  Johns.  1-59 ; 
Thornton  (;.  Dixon,  3  Bro.  Ch.  199;  Bell 
V.  riiynn,  7  Ves.  453 ;  Balmain  v.  Shore, 
9  id.  500,  language  is  used  which  might 
have  this  interpretation.  In  Smith  r. 
Jackson,  2  Edw.  Ch.  28,  the  Vice-Chan- 
cellor said  :  "  If  at  the  time  of  forming 
the  i)artnership,  the  parties  agree  to  in- 
vest a  part  of  their  capital  in  the  pur- 
chase of  real  estate  for  partnersliip 
purposes,  or  should  at  any  time  after- 
wards find  it  expedient  to  do  so,  and 
agree  between  themselves  that,  upon  the 
dissolution,  the  real  as  well  as  personal 
estate    shall    be  sold    and    turned    into 


money  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the 
partnership  debts  and  closing  their  joint 
concerns,  there  the  Court  of  Chancery, 
acting  upon  the  agreement,  and  consider- 
ing that  as  done  which  was  agreed  to  be 
executed,  is  warranted  in  regarding  the 
whole  as  personalty  either  in  reference 
to  the  claims  of  creditors,  or  the  rights 
of  the  heir  or  next  of  kin  of  a  deceased 
partner.  .  .  .  But  if  a  purchase  be  made, 
and  a  conveyance  taken  to  partners,  as 
tenants  in  common,  without  any  agree- 
ment to  consider  it  as  stock,  although  it 
be  paid  for  out  of  tlieir  joint  fund,  and 
to  be  used  for  partnership  purposes,  I  am 
of  opinion  it  must  still  be  deemed  real 
estate."  But  see  Colhmd  v.  Head,  24  N. 
Y.  (10  Smith)  505.  Ripley  v.  Water- 
worth,  7  Ves.  425.  (1802.)  Lord  Eldon  in 
tills  case  held  to  the  effect  that  if  an  in- 
tention to  convert  the  real  property  of 
the  partnership  can  be  gathered  from  the 
general  tenor  of  the  partnership  deed, 
coupled  with  the  nature  of  the  partner- 
ship dealings,  that  intention  must  prevail 
to  the  full  extent  of  converting  the  real 
property,  as  between  the  real  and  per- 
sonal representatives  of  the  deceased 
partner ;  although  the  property  might 
not  liave  been  purchased  with  partner- 
ship funds,  and  no  conversion  might  be 
necessary  for  the  payment  of  the  part- 
nership debts.  Collyer,  Part.  §  142; 
Selkrig  v.  Davies,  2  Dow,  242.  (1814.) 
Lord  EUhm :  "  My  own  individual  opin- 
ion is,  that  all  property  involved  in  a 
partnership  concern  ouglit  to  be  consid- 
ered as  personal."  See  also  the  judg- 
ment of  Lord  Eldon  in  Crawshay  v. 
Maule,  1  Swanst.  521,  and  Towui^end  v. 
Devaynes,  1  Montague  on  Partnership, 
App.  n.  (2  A).  And  see  upon  this  point 
the  case  of  Jarvis  v.  Brooks,  7  Foster 
(N.  II.),  .37  ;  North  Ponn.  Coal  Co.'s  Ap- 
peal, 45  Penn.  St.  181. 

(k)  Averill   v.  Loucks,   6  Barb.    28; 

169 


*152 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


The  widow  has  her  dower  in  the  estate  after  the  debts  are  paid, 
but  not  until  then.  (1}  ^  Although  the  legal  title  is  protected, 
the  party  having  such  title  is  held,  if  necessary,  as  trustee  for 
partnership  purposes,  or  for   the  surviving   partner.     And   if   a 

partner  buys  land  out  of  partnership  funds,  and  takes 
*152    title  *to   himself,   he   may   be   held   as   trustee    for   the 

partnership,  (t^i)     It   is   to   be   remembered,   however,  as 


Buckley  v.  Bucklev,  11  Barb.  43;  King 
V.  Wilcomb,  7  Barb.  263. 

(/)  Goodburn  v.  Stevens,  5  Gill,  1  ; 
Greene  v.  Greene,  1  Hamni.  244  ;  Rich- 
ardson V.  Wyatt,  2  Desaus.  471;  Wool- 
dridge  v.  Wilkins,  3  How.  (Miss.)  360. 
371 ;  Burnside  v.  Merrick,  4  Met.  541  ; 
Dyer  v.  Clark,  6  Met.  562.  In  this  last 
case,  the  liabilities  of  partnership  prop- 
erty to  partnership  creditors  were  elabor- 
ately considered  in  the  decision  of  the 
court,  the  purport  of  which  is  given  in 
the  head  note  as  follows  :  "  When  real 
estate  is  purchased  by  partners,  with  the 
partnership  f unfls,  for  partnership  use  and 
convenience,  although  it  is  conveyed  to 
thetn  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  them 
tenants  in  common,  yet  in  the  absence  of 
an  express  agreement,  or  of  circum- 
stances showing  an  intent  that  such  es- 
tate shall  be  held  for  their  separate  use,  it 
will  be  considered  and  treated,  in  equity, 
as  vesting  in  them,  in  their  partnership 
capacity,  clothed  with  an  implied  trust 
that  they  shall  hold  it,  until  the  purposes 
for  which  it  was  so  purchased  shall  be 
accomplished,  and  that  it  shall  be  ap- 
plied, if  necessary,  to  the  payment  of 
the  partnership  debts."  Upon  the  disso- 
lution of  the  partnership,  by  the  death 
of  one  of  the  partners,  the  survivor  has 
an  equitable  lien  on  such  real  estate  for 
his  indenmity  against  the  debts  of  the 
firm,  and  for  securing  the  balance  that 
may  be  due  to  him  from  the  deceased 
partner,  on  settlement  of  the  partnership 
accounts  between  them  ;  and  the  widow 
and  heirs  of  such  deceased  partner  have 
no  beneficial  interest  in  such  real  estate, 
nor  in  the  rent  received  therefrom  after 
his  death,  until  the  surviving  partner  is 
so  indenmified.  See  Howard  v.  Priest,  5 
Met.  582  ;  Peck  v.  Fisher,  7  Gush.  386 ; 
Arnold  v.  Wainwright,  6  Minn.  358; 
Smith  V.   Smith,   5    Ves.   189.     The   es- 


tates in  this  case  were  held  subject  to 
dower,  having  been  purchased  with  the 
partnership  fund,  but  conveyed  to  one 
partner  under  a  specific  agreement  that 
they  should  be  his,  and  he  should  be 
debtor  for  the  money.  Lord  Chancellor 
Loitf/hbowugh  said  :  "  If  these  estates  had 
only  been  conveyed  to  one  partner,  hav- 
ing been  purchased  with  partnership 
funds,  they  would  have  been  part  of  the 
partnership  property.  But  that  was  not 
the  nature  of  the  transaction.  The  dis- 
tinction is,  the  agreement  as  to  the  pur- 
chase of  these  houses  was  specific.  Upon 
that  they  never  could  be  specifically  di- 
vided, as  if  they  were  part  of  the  part- 
nership stock  ;  but  when  they  came  to 
settle,  the  houses  were  Robert  Smith's, 
and  he  was  debtor  for  so  mucli  money." 

(m)  Pierce  v.  Trigg,  10  Leigh,  406, 
Tucker,  P.  (with  whom  C'abtll,J.,  agreed), 
after  a  review  of  the  English  cases  said  : 
"  I  think,  then,  the  doctrine  laid  down  in 
Gow  on  Partnership,  51,  and  3  Kent, 
Com.  37,  may  now  be  taken  as  settled  in 
England ;  namely,  that  real  estate  pur- 
chased for  partnership  purposes  with 
partnership  funds,  and  used  as  a  part 
of  the  stock  in  trade,  is  to  be  considered 
to  every  intent  as  personal  property,  not 
only  as  between  the  members  of  the  part- 
nership respectively,  and  their  creditors, 
but  also  as  between  the  surviving  partner 
and  the  representatives  of  the  deceased. 
The  legal  title  may,  indeed,  be  in  the 
heir,  but  let  the  legal  title  be  in  whom  it 
may,  it  is  in  equity  deemed  partnership 
propertj\  and  the  partners  are  deemed 
ccstitis  que  trust  thereof,  while  the  holder 
of  the  legal  title  is  but  a  trustee  for  the 
partnership."  In  Pugh  v.  Currie,  5  Ala. 
(n.  s.)  446,  the  court  say  :  "  It  can  make 
no  difference  whatever  that  the  land  was 
entered  in  the  name  of  the  deceased  part- 
ner —  the  heirs  will,  in  a  court  of  equity, 


^  So  of  a  right  to  a  homestead  exemption.  Robertshaw  v.  Ilanway,  52  Miss.  713. 
But  a  conveyance  of  partnership  real  estate  for  a  firm  debt  bars  dower.  Simpson 
V.  Leech,  86  111.  286.  Mowry  v.  Bradley,  11  R.  I.  370,  was  to  the  effect  that  the 
wife  of  a  partner  whose  interest  in  the  firm  real  estate  was  simply  equitable  could 
claim  dower  in  the  surplus  proceeds  of  its  sale  after  payment  of  firm  debts. 

170 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


153 


before  stated,  that  this  rule  extends  only  so  far  as  may  be  made 
necessary  by  the  business  or  debts  of  the  partnership,  and  as 
soon  as  this  necessity  ceases,  any  remaining  real  estate  has 
all  the  incidents  of  real  property,  as  to  conveyance, 
inheritance,  and  dower.  And  where  the  land  *  purchased  *  153 
with  the  partnership  funds  is  afterwards  sold  by  the  part- 
ner who  has  the  legal  title  to  the  whole,  or  to  a  part  as  tenant 
in  common,  neither  the  firm  nor  its  creditors  have  any  lien  on 
the  land  for  partnership  purposes,  against  a  purchaser  without 
notice  or  knowledge,  where  the  deed  to  the  partners  did  not 
describe  them  as  members  of  a  firm,  or  partners,  or  otherwise 
indicate  the  fact  that  the  land  was  purchased  as  partnership 
property,  (n)     But  a  purehaser  with  actual  or  constructive  notice 


be  considered  as  trustees  of  the  surviving 
partner."  In  tlie  case  of  Burnside  v. 
Merrick,  4  Met.  541,  Shaw,  C.  J.,  liaving 
stated  the  question  to  be,  wlictlier  real 
estate,  purchased  by  partners,  for  part- 
nership business,  and  witli  partnersliip 
funds,  but  conveijcd  to  them  hy  such  a  deed 
as,  in  case  of  other  parties,  would  make  thcih 
tenants  in  common,  would  be  considered  as 
partnership  stock,  said  :  "  Though  there 
has  been  much  diversity  of  judicial  opin- 
ion upon  the  subject,  we  think  the  pre- 
vailing opinion  now  is,  that  real  estate, 
60  acquired,  is  to  be  considered  at  law  as 
the  several  property  of  the  partners,  as 
tenants  in  common :  yet  that  it  is  so  held, 
subject  to  a  trust,  arising  by  implication 
of  law,  by  wliich  it  is  liable  to  be  sold, 
and  the  proceeds  brought  into  the  part- 
nership fund,  as  far  as  is  necessary  to 
pay  the  debts  of  the  firm,  and  to  pay  any 
balance  which  n\a.y  be  due  to  the  other 
partners,  on  a  final  settlement ;  and  can- 
not be  held  by  the  separate  owner,  except 
to  the  extent  of  his  interest  in  such  final 
balance.  And  it  follows  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  that  when  the  firm  is  insol- 
vent, the  whole  of  the  property,  so  held, 
must  be  brought  into  the  partnership 
fund,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  partnership 
creditors,  as  far  as.it  will  go  for  that  pur- 
pose." See  Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb. 
Ch.  165 ;  Smith  v.  Tarlton,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
23(>;  McGuire  v.  Ramsey,  4  Eng.  (Ark.) 
518;  Hoxie  v.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  182.  In 
the  case  of  Phillips  v.  Crammond,  2 
Wash.  C.  C.  445,  ]Vashinr/ton,  J.,  in  de- 
livering his  opinion,  said  :  "The  general 
principle  is,  that  if  a  receiver,  executor, 
factor,  or  trustee,  lay  out  the  money 
which  he  holds  in  his  fiduciary  char- 
acter, in  the  purchase  of  real  property, 


and  take  the  conveyance  to  himself,  he 
who  is  entitled  to  the  money,  which  has 
been  thus  invested,  may  follow  the  same, 
and  consider  the  purchase  as  made  for 
his  use,  and  the  purchaser  a  trustee  for 
him.  Upon  the  same  principle,  I  con- 
ceive that  a  resulting  trust  would  arise 
to  a  partnership  concern  in  lands  pur- 
chased by  one  of  the  partners,  and  paid 
for  out  of  tlie  joint  funds.  .  .  .  But  this 
species  of  resulting  trust  is  open  to  cer- 
tain qualifications,  amongst  which  it  is 
proper  to  notice  the  following,  namely, 
that  the  person  whose  money  was  in- 
vested in  the  purchase,  is  not  obliged  to 
take  the  land,  and  to  consider  the  pur- 
chaser as  his  trustee,  but  may  elect  to 
treat  him  as  his  debtor,  and  to  claim  the 
money  instead  of  tlie  property.  As  a 
consequence  of  this,  and  because  the 
claim  to  a  resulting  trust  is  merely  that 
of  an  equity,  founded  upon  the  presump- 
tive intention  of  the  parties,  that  equity 
ma}'  be  rebutted,  even  by  parol  evidence, 
and  circumstances  to  defeat  it.  If,  for 
instance,  the  person  for  whose  benefit  the 
trust  would  otherwise  be  created,  declares 
tliat  the  purchase  was  not  made  for  him, 
or  if  both  parties  treat  it  as  a  purchase 
for  the  use  of  him  to  whom  the  convey- 
ance  was  made,  no  resulting  trust  will 
arise."  But  the  partner  has  no  interest 
in  the  estate  purchased  in  liis  copartner's 
name,  unless  it  was  intended  or  used  for 
partnership  purposes.  Cox  v.  McBurney, 
2  Sandf.  561. 

(n)  It  has  been  held  that  real  estate, 
used  by  the  partners  for  partnership  pur- 
poses, but  convej'ed  to  them  in  fee  as  ten- 
ants in  common,  and  afterwards  mortgaged 
by  one  partner  without  notice  to  the 
mortgagee  of  existing  partnership  debts, 

171 


*  153  THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

that  the  land  is  substantial!}',  although  not  formally,  partnership 
property,  holds  it  chargeable  with  the  debts  of  the  partnership ; 
and  this  is  the  case  even  if  he  had  no  knowledge  what  those  debts 
were,  or  even  of  their  existence,  (o)  ^ 


SECTION  in. 

OF  THE  GOOD-WILL. 

The  good-will  of  an  establishment  is  considered,  at  least  for 
some  purposes,  as  partnership  propeuty.^  Indeed,  in  case  of 
insolvency,  or  for  other  sufficient  reasons,  a  court  will  take  cog- 
nizance of  it,  as  a  valuable  property,  and  order  it  to  be  sold, 


is  to  be  considered  real  estate  as  between  See  also  Forde  v.  Herron,  4  Munf.  32L 
the  mortgagee  and  the  jiartnership  cred-  In  tliis  case,  Roane,  J.,  in  delivering  the 
itors,  and  liable  in  tlie  first  instance  to  judgment  of  the  court,  said  :  "  The  court 
tlic  mortgagee.  McDermont  v.  Laurence,  is  of  opinion  tliat,  altiiougli  real  property, 
7  S.  &  R.  438.  Til/jhman,  C.  J.,  said  :  purchased  witli  the  effects  and  used  for 
"  Land,  except  for  tlie  purpose  of  erect-  tlie  purposes  of  a  mercantile  firm  or  co- 
ing  necessary  buildings,  is  not  naturally  partncry,  may,  in  equity,  be  liable  to  dis- 
an  object  of  trade  or  commerce.  Yet  cliarge  tlie  balance  due  from  the  company 
there  is  no  doubt,  that  by  the  agreement  to  any  partner,  in  preference  to  the  pri- 
of  the  partners,  it  may  be  brought  into  vate  and  individual  debt  of  any  other 
the  stock,  and  considered  as  personal  prop-  partner,  it  is  nevertheless  competent  to 
erty  so  far  as  concerns  themselves  and  the  members  of  such  co-partnery  to  ac- 
tlieir  heirs  and  personal  representatives,  quire  such  property  jointly,  as  individu- 
But  if  a  conveyance  of  land  is  taken  to  als,  or  to  lose  the  lien  aforesaid  (gene- 
partners  as  tenants  in  common,  without  rally  existing  upon  the  social  property), 
mention  of  any  agreement  to  consider  it  by  acts  tending  to  mislead  or  deceive 
as  stock,  and  afterwards  a  stranger  pur-  creditors  or  purchasers  in  this  particu- 
chases  from  one  of  the  partners,  it  would  lar."  See  also  Marvin  v.  Trumbull, 
be  unjust  if  without  notice  he  should  Wright,  386. 
be  affected  by  any  private  agreement."  (o)  Hoxie  v.  Carr,  1  Sumner,  182. 

1  So  with  regard  to  mortgagees.  Cavander  v.  Bnlteel,  L.  E.  9  Ch.  70;  Tliscock  v. 
Phelps,  49  N.  Y.  07;  Hewitt  v.  Rankin,  41  la.  35;  Lewis  v.  Anderson,  20  Ohio  St. 
281.     See  Reynolds  v.  Ruckman,  35  Mich.  80. 

2  The  value  of  the  good-will  is  the  advantage  secured  in  succeeding  to  tlie  busi- 
ness without  reference  to  excluding  any  other  person  from  the  same  business, 
Mcllvaine,  J.,  in  Rammelsberg  v.  Mitchell,  20  Ohio  St.  22,  54.  The  good  will  is 
considered  a  part  of  the  partnership  property,  and  will  be  included  in  its  sale. 
Boon  V.  Moss,  70  N.  Y.  405;  Sheppard  t;.  Boggs,  0  Neb.  257.  AVhere  a  retiring 
partner  has  sold  his  share  of  the  l)usincss  and  good-will,  he  may  carry  on  the  same 
business  in  the  same  place,  but  must  not  solicit  the  customers  of  the  old  business  for 
orders ;  Labouchere  r.  Dawson,  L.  R.  13  Eq.  322 ;  iMoreau  v.  Edwards,  2  Tenn.  Ch. 
347;  or  even  deal  witli  them,  fiinesi  v.  Cooper,  14  Ch.  D.  506.  The  assignment  of 
the  good-will  carries  tlie  exclusive  right  to  use  the  name  of  the  old  firm.  Levy  v. 
Walker,  10  Ch.  D.  436;  Rogers  v.  Painter,  97  Mass.  291;  Carmichel  v.  Latimer,  11 
E..  L  305;  Doake  v.  Dodsworth,  4  Kan.  150. 

172 


^ 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  154 

*  and  restrain  partners  from  pursuing  a  course  which  would  *  154 
destroy  its  value,  (jt?) 

In  one  English  case,  a  distinction  was  taken  between  profes- 
sional partnerships,  in  which  the  pecuniary  value  of  the  good-will 
was  recognized,  and  commercial  partnerships,  in  which  it  was 
intimated  that  the  rule  might  be  otherwise.  (  q)  But  we  doubt 
the  value  of  the  distinction. 

If  the  good-will  could  not  be  attached,  it  might  still  be  assigned 
for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors.  Perhaps  it  would  pass  to  the 
assignees  of  a  bankrupt  or  insolvent,  by  operation  of  law ;  but 
not  so  as  to  carry  with  it  any  obligation  of  further  labor  or 
responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  insolvent,  to  make  the  good-will 
available,  (r) 


SECTION  IV. 

OF  THE  DELECTUS  PERSONARUM. 

The  partnership  must  be  voluntary ;  and  therefore  no  partner 
and  no  majority  of  partners  can  introduce  a  new  member  without 
the  consent  of  the  others.  The  delectus  personarum  is  always 
preserved ;  and  if  one  partner  sells  out  his  interest  in  the  firm, 
this  works  a  dissolution  of  the  partnership,  which  can  only  be 
renewed  by  the  agreement  of  all.  But  such  transfer  may  be  made 
by  a  partner,  and  will  give  to  a  bond  fide  purchaser  all  the  right 
of  the  partner  selling  out,  to  his  share  of  the  surplus  upon 
a  settlement,  (s)  *  And  he  may  have  a  suit  in  equity  for  *  155 
his  share  of  the  profits,  (t) 

(p)  Williams  v.  Wilson,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  Kennedy  v.  Lee,  3  Meriv.  452 ;  Knott  v. 

379.  Morgan,  2  Keen,  213;    Bell  v.  Locke,  8 

(7)  Farr  v.  Pearce,  3  Madd.  70.  Faige,  75.     As  to  the  proper  meaning  of 

(r)  Dougherty  r.  Van  Nostrand,  Hoff.  the  terra  "Good-will,"  as  used  in  trade, 

Ch.  68.     It  has  been  held  that  the  good-  and  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  rights 

will  of  a  partnership  is  not  i)artnership  which    pass    by   an    assignment    of    the 

stock,  and  survives.     Hammond  v.  Doug-  "  Good-will  "  of  a  business,  see  Harrison 

las,  5  Ves.  539.      This  was    doubted   in  v.  Gardner,  2  Madd.  108. 
Crawshay  v.  Collins,  15  Ves.  227.     But  (s)    Gilmore   v.   Black,  2  Fairf.  488; 

Hammond  v   Douglas   was   sustained  in  Griswold  v.  Waddington,  15  Johns.  82  ; 

Lewis   ;■.    Langdon,   7    Sim.   421.       The  Moddewell    v.    Keever,   8   W.    &   S.   63 

good-will  of   an   establishment  is  recog-  The  assignment  of  shares  in  the  stock  of 

nized  as  a  valuable  interest  in  equity,  an  unincorporated  company,  the  certifi- 


(0  Mathewson  i;.  Clarke,  6  How.  122,  141. 

173 


*  155  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

An  assignment  to  trustees  for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors,  does 
not  make  the  creditors  partners,  and  though  the  assignment  pro- 
poses that  the  business  shall  be  carried  on  by  the  assignees  to 
make  the  profits  for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors,  if  they  exercise 
no  control  or  direction  in  the  management  of  the  business,  it 
seems  by  the  latest  decisions  that  they  will  not  be  regarded  as 
partners  therein,  as  to  third  parties ;  the  proper  test  in  such  a  case 
being  whether  the  person  by  whom  the  business  is  actually  carried 
on,  acts  only  in  the  capacity  of  agent  for  those  to  whose  benefit 
the  profits  are  to  accrue,  (w) 


SECTION  V.  • 

HOW   A   PARTNERSHIP   MAY   BE   FORMED. 

A  partnership  may  be  formed  by  deed,  or  by  parol ;  and  with 
or   without   a   written   agreement,  (v)  ^     And   whatever   be   the 

cates  of  which  contained  a  provision  that  ncl,  1  Whart.  381 ;   Putnam  v.  Wise,  1 

they  shoulfl  not  be  assigned  without  the  Hill  (N.  Y.),  234.     See  also  Channel  v. 

consent  of   the   directors   and  treasurer,  Fassitt,  16  Ohio,  166 ;  Crawshay  v.  Maule, 

being   made    witliout   their   assent,  does  1  Swanst.  508;  Treadwell  v.  Williams,  9 

not   make    the   assignee    a    partner,    or  Bosw.  649. 

enable  him  to  bring  a  bill  in  equity  to  (m)  Janes  v.  Whitbread,  11  C.  B.  406 ; 
compel  the  partners  to  account.  King-  Coates  v.  Williams,  7  Exch.  205.  Wheat- 
man  V.  Spurr,  7  Tick.  235.  Parker,  C.  J.,  croft  v.  Hickman,  Cox  v.  Hickman,  8  H. 
said:  "It  is  a  settled  principle,  that  a  L.  Cas.  268,  in  which  cases  it  was  held 
company  or  co-partnership  cannot  be  that  a  deed  of  assignment  to  trustees  of  a 
compelled  to  receive  a  stranger  into  their  debtor's  property  for  the  purpose  of  car- 
league.  These  associations  are  founded  r3'ing  on  his  business,  and  after  paying 
in  personal  confidence  and  di-lediis  person-  all  costs  and  charges  thereof,  of  dividing 
arum.  It  is  even  held,  that  an  executor  the  residue  of  the  net  profits  among  his 
or  heir  of  one  of  the  members  does  not  creditors  in  payment  of  their  debts,  made 
become  a  member,  unless  by  consent  or  the  creditors  who  executed  the  deed, 
by  the  terms  of  the  compact."  Compare  partners  in  the  business  as  to  third 
this  case  witli  Alvord  v.  Smith,  5  Pick,  parties.  Hickman  i'.  Cox,  18  C.  B.  617; 
232.  See  Murray  v.  Bogert,  14  Johns.  Brundred  v.  Muzzy,  1  Dutcher,  268. 
818;  Marquand  v.  N.  Y.  Man.  Co.  17  (v)  Owen,  7ia: /wr/e,  4  l)e  G.  &  S.  351 ; 
Johns.  535.  That  no  partner  can  be  in-  Smith  v.  Tarlton,  2  Barb.  Ch.  336. — 
troduced  by  mere  sale  and  transfer  to  Although  ordinary  partnerships  may  be 
him  of  a  partner's  interest,  see  Mathew-  formed  witliout  any  written  contract, 
son  V.  Clarke,  6  How.  122 ;  Mason  v.  Con-  and  the  acts  and  words  of  the  parties  are 

1  As  to  whether  a  partnership  is  created,  depends  upon  the  meaning  of  the  parties 
as  expressed  in  the  agrecnitnt.  Koss  r.  Parkyns,  L.  P.  20  Kq.  331 ;  Jix  parti-  Tennant, 
G  Ch.  D.  303;  Ratzer  v.  Patzer,  1  Stewart,  136;  Chapman  v.  Eames,  67  Me.  452. 
An  executory  agreement  to  form  does  not  create  a  partnership.  Doyle  v.  Bailey, 
75  111.  418;  Lucas  v.  Cole,  57  Mo.  143;  Ilaskins  v.  Burr,  106  Mass.  48;  Irwin  v. 
Bidwell,  72  Penn.  St.  244;  Baldwin  >•.  Burrows,  47  N.  Y.  199.  See  Beckford  v.  Hill, 
124  Mass.  588 ;  Coolcy  v.  Broad,  29  La.  An.  345. 

174 


en.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


*156 


arrangement  between  the  parties,  one  who  holds  hhnself  out, 
or  permits  himself  to  be  held  out  as  a  partner,  is  liable  as 
such. (uy) 

The  law  will  *  not  give  effect  to  an  agreement  to  form  a  *  156 
partnership  for  illegal  transactions  or  purposes,  {iv^  i  An 
action  cannot  be  maintained  for  the  breach  of  an  agreement  to 
become  a  partner,  unless  the  terms  of  the  intended  partnership 
were  specific  and  are  clearly  proved,  (a;)  But  where  a  partner  in 
an  existing  firm  agreed  that  a  certain  person  should  be  received 
as  a  partner  in  that  firm,  it  was  held  that  an  action  might  be 
maintained  for  a  breach  of  that  agreement,  and  some  uncertainty 
in  the  terms  of  the  agreement  was  not  a  sufficient  defence,  (t/) 


ordinarily  sufficient  for  that  purpose,  yet 
if  tlie  object  of  the  company  be  to  specu- 
late in  tlie  purchase  and  sale  of  land,  the 
positive  rules  of  law  and  the  Statute  of 
Frauds  require  tlie  partnership  agreement 
to  be  in  writing,  and  a  court  of  equity  will 
not  enforce  a  parol  contract  for  such  a 
purpose.  Smith  v.  Burnham,  3  Sumner, 
435 ;  Henderson  v.  Hudson,  1  Munf.  510 ; 
Tlidgway's  App.  15  Penn.  177.  But  this 
is  said  in  a  late  case  to  apply  onl}'  to  the 
contract  between  the  parties,  and  that  as 
to  third  persons  the  partnership  may  be 
proved  like  any  other,  hi  re  Warren, 
Davies,  320.  —  If  articles  of  partnership 
exist,  a  creditor  of  the  firm  may  still 
prove  the  partnership  by  parol.  GriflBn 
V.  Doe,  12  Ala.  783.  But  the  evidence  of 
a  partnership  must  be  submitted  to  the 
jury.  Drake  v.  Elwyn,  1  Caines,  134. 
For  the  existence  of  a  partnersliip  or 
joint  connection  is  a  question  of  fact. 
Beecham  v.  Dodd,  3  Harring.  485. 
Whether  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
and  the  facts  as  found  by  the  jury  con- 
stitute a  partnership,  is  a  question  of 
law.  Id.  ;  Everitt  v.  Chapman,  0  Conn. 
347  ;  Terrill  v.  Richards,  1  Nott  &  McC. 
20;  Gilpin  v.  Temple,  4  Harring.  100. 

{vv)  Moss  V.  Jerome,  10  BosV.  220. 

(w)  Armstrong  v.  Lewis,  2  Cr.  &  M- 
274;   Ewing  v.  Osbaldiston,  2  Myl.  &  C. 


53.  But  where  two  persons  carried  on 
the  business  of  pawnbrokers  under  a 
deed  of  partnership  ;  and  the  business 
was  conducted  solelj'  in  the  name  of  one, 
and  he  only  was  licensed  :  Semble,  that 
although  the  parties  might  have  made 
themselves  liable  to  penalties  imposed 
by  the  statute  39  &  40  Geo.  III.,  c.  99, 
yet,  that  it  being  no  part  of  the  con- 
tract to  carry  on  the  partnership  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  contravene  the 
law,  the  contract  was  not  void.  If, 
liowever,  a  collateral  agreement  so  to 
conduct  the  partnership  had  been  proved, 
its  illegality  would  have  prevented  either 
party  from  acquiring  any  right  under 
the  partnership. 

(.r)  Figes  v.  Cutler,  3  Stark.  139.  In 
an  action  for  breach  of  agreement  to 
enter  into  a  partnership,  a  plea  of  dis- 
honest conduct  by  the  plaintiff  in  Ins 
previous  partnership  relations,  is  no  de- 
fence. Andrewes  v.  Carstin,  100  Eng. 
C.  L.  444. 

(y)  McNeill  v.  Reid,  9  Bing.  G8.  Tin- 
dal,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  The  otiier  point  for 
our  consideration  under  this  head  of 
objection  is,  that  the  contract  is  too 
vague,  too  uncertain,  as  to  the  term  of 
partnersliip,  amount  of  capital  to  be  con- 
tributed, and  the  like,  to  be  the  sub- 
ject of  estimate  by  a  jury.     But  is  that 


1  A  partner  in  an  unlawful  business  is  without  remedy  as  against  his  co-partners, 
Snell  V.  D wight,  120  Mass.  9;  Dunham  v.  Presby,  ib.  285;  Lane  v.  Thomas,  37  Tex. 
157 ;  Watson  v.  Murray,  8  C.  E.  Green,  257 ;  In  re  South  Wales,  &c.  Co.  2  Ch.  D. 
763;  although  an  account  may  be  had  of  that  portion  of  a  firm's  business  that  may 
be  legal,  Anderson  v.  Powell,  44  la.  20.  Tlie  fact  that  a  firm  sold  articles  to  the 
Confederate  States  was  held,  in  Pfciffcr  i\  Maltby,  38  Tex.  523,  not  to  prevent  an 
accounting.  Marsh  v.  Russell,  6(3  N.  Y.  288,  decided  that  a  partnership  formed  to 
furnish  recruits  during  the  civil  war,  with  an  agreement  that  its  members  should  not 
compete  with  each  other  or  furnish  recruits  for  less  than  a  fixed  price,  was  lawful ; 
and  Wallis  v.  Wheelock,  26  La.  An.  246,  held  a  partnership  for  blockade-running 
during  the  civil  war  not  to  be  illegal. 

175 


*157 


THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


A  partnership,  in  general,  is  constituted  between  individuals, 
by  an  agreement  to  enter  together  into  a  general  or  a  particular 

business,  and  share  the  profits  and  the  losses  thereof.  (3)  ^ 
*  157    But  *  the  mere  sharing  of  profits,  without  any  connection 

whatever  in  the  business,  is  not  enough  to  constitute  a 
partnership,  (a)  Thus,  if  one  firm  agrees  with  another,  that  each 
shall  continue  and  carry  on  its  own  business  independently,  but 
that  the  profits  and  losses  of  each  firm  shall  be  divided  between 
the  two,  the  two  firms  do  not  enter  into  partnership,  nor  do  the 
members  of  one  of  the  firms  become  partners  with  the  members 
of  the  other.  (5)  There  need  not,  however,  be  a  community  of 
interest  in  the  property,  if  there  be  in  the  profits,  and  some  con- 
nection in  the  business,  (c)  ^     But  the  setting  apart  of  a  portion 


a  correct  statement  of  the  evidence  ? 
It  is  plain  that  tlie  plaintiff  consiilcred, 
and  tliat  the  defendant  led  him  to  con- 
sider, that  he  was  contracting  for  a  fourth 
part  of  the  defendant's  business,  in  the 
room  of  Muspratt,  who  had  quitted  it ; 
and  that  both  the  defendant  and  his 
agent,  Carstairs,  knew  the  precise  extent 
and  value  of  such  an  interest.  That 
being  so,  the  case  is  clear  of  the  diffi- 
culty which  arose  in  Figes  v.  Cutler, 
where  the  evidence  was  too  indistinct 
to  enable  the  jury  to  come  to  any  con- 
clusion. It  is  unnecessary  to  advert  to 
the  cases  in  equity,  because  this  is  not 
a  proceeding  to  enforce  performance  of 
a  contract,  but  to  obtain  damages  for  the 
breach  of  it. 

(z)  Langdale,  ex  parte,  18  Ves.  300. 
In  this  case,  the  Lord  Chancellor  (El- 
don),  said:  "The  criterion  of  a  part- 
nersliip  is,  whether  the  parties  are  to 
participate  in  ])rofit.  Tliat  has  been 
the  question  ever  since  the  case  of 
Groves  v.  Smith."  If  the  actual  con- 
tract give  a  claim  upon  the  profits,  or 
the  application  of  tliem,  that  is  partner- 
sliiy).  See  Ex  parte  Hamper,  17  Ves. 
40.'i,   Sumner's  ed.    and  note,   p.   *404j 


Cushman  v.  Bailey,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  526; 
Belknap  v.  Wendell,  1  Foster  (N.  H.), 
175;  Catskill  Bank  v.  Gray,  14  Barb. 
474.  —  A  participation  in  the  uncertain 
profits  of  trade,  renders  one  a  copart- 
ner in  respect  to  the  liabilities  of  the 
concern  to  third  persons.  Oakley  v. 
Aspinwall,  2  Sandf.  7.  See  Bucknam 
V.  liarnum,  15  Conn.  67 ;  Cushman  v. 
Bailey,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  526.  See  also, 
on  this  subject,  Mair  v.  Glennie,  4  M. 
&  Sel.  240 ;  Smith  v.  Watson,  2  B.  &  C. 
401 ;  Hesketh  v.  Blanchard,  4  East,  144 ; 
Reid  V.  HoUinshead,  4  B.  &  C.  867; 
Everitt  v.  Chapman,  6  Conn.  347  ;  Hard- 
ing V.  Foxcroft,  6  Grecnl.  76 ;  Thorn- 
dike  V.  De  Wolf,  6  Pick.  124  ;  -Jackson 
V.  Robinson,  3  Mason,  138;  Griffith  v. 
Buffum,  22  Vt.  181;  Duryeas  v.  Whit- 
comb,  31  Vt.  395. 

(n)  Merrick  v.  Gordon,  20  N.  Y.  (6 
Smith)  93;  Fawcett  v.  Osborn,  .S2  111. 
411  ;  Morgan  v.  Stearns,  41  Vt.  397. 

{!>)  Sniith  V.  AVright,  5  Sandf.  11.3. 
And  see  Pattison  v.  Blanchard,  1  Seld. 
186. 

(c)  Briggs  V.  Vanderbilt,  10  Barb. 
222;  Ellsworth  v.  Tartt,  26  Ala.  133; 
Miller  v.  Price,  20  Wis.  117. 


1  A  partnersliip  always  arises  where  a  community  of  profit  and  loss  is  agreed 
on,  McGill  V.  Dowdle,  33  Ark.  311;  Harris  r.  Hillegass,  54  Cal.  463;  Marsh  v. 
Russell,  60  N.  Y.  288;  Falkner  v.  Hunt,  73  N.  C.  571 ;  Kulm  v.  Newman,  49  la.  424; 
Beauregard  v.  Case,  91  U.  S.  134  ;  although  the  parties  expressly  agree  that  there 
shall  be  no  partnership,  Ex  parte  Delhasse,  7  Ch.  D.  611 ;  Moore  v.  Davis,  11 
Ch.  I).  261. 

-  In  the  absence  of  agreement  the  presumption  is  that  there  is  community  of 
interest  in  both  propertv  and  profit  and  loss.  Robinson  v.  Ashton,  L.  R.  20  Eq.  25; 
Whitcomb  v.  Converse,  HO  Mass.  38;  Citizens'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Doll,  35  Md.  89;  Flagg 
V.  Stowe,  85  111.  154  ;  Knight  v.  Ogdcn,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  473;  Ilankey  v.  Becht,  25  Minn. 
212.     See  Svers  v.  Syers,  1  App.  Cas.  174. 

176 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNEESHIP.  *  158 

of  the  profits  to  pay  the  debt  of  a  third  person,  docs  not  make 
him  a  partner,  (c?)  So  too,  a  joint  purchase,  but  for  the  purpose 
of  distinct  and  separate  sales  by  each  party  on  his  own  account, 
does  not  constitute  the  purchasers  partners,  (e)  And  this,  how- 
ever unequal  the  shares  may  be,  and  even  if  one  of  the  parties 
has  no  direct  interest  or  property  in  the  capital  of  the  firm.  If 
one  party  furnishes  material  at  a  certain  price,  and  another  man- 
ufactures it  at  a  certain  price  and  has  charge  of  the  selling  of  the 
articles,  the  two  dividing  the  profits,  this  does  not  make  them 
partners,  as  between  themselves,  (ee)  The  cases  are  quite  numer- 
ous which  turn  upon  the  question  what  facts  suffice  to  create  a 
liability  as  a  partner.  They  are  determined  by  the  special  cir- 
cumstances of  each  case,  and  it  is  difficult  to  draw  general  rules 
from  them,  (ef)  In  the  absence  of  specific  stipulations  or  con- 
trolling evidence,  the  presumption  of  law  is,  that  the  partners 
share  the  profits  equally.  (/) 

The  articles  may  provide  or  omit  a  period  for  the  continuance 
of  the  partnership.  But  if  such  a  period  be  provided  and  the 
time  expires,  and  then  the  partnership  is  renewed  by  agreement, 
it  has  been  held  that  the  new  partnership  is  founded  upon 
the  same  terms  as  the  old  one,  in  the  absence  of  opposing 
testimony.  (^) 

*  It  is  certain  that  persons  may  be  copartners  as  to  third    *  158 

(fl)  Drake  v.  Ramsay,  3  Eich.  L.  37.  the  connection,  transmitted  to  the  com- 
(f)  Banclior  v.  Cillcj^  38  Me.  553 ;  plainant  in  London,  wliere  he  resided, 
Stoallin.s;s  ?•.  Baker,  15  Mo.  481.  tlie  articles  of  copartnership,  with  an  in- 
((e)  Hitchings  v.  Ellis,  12  Gray,  440.  dorsement  of  a  renewal  of  them  for  an- 
{ff)  Tlie  following  are  recent  inter-  other  term  of  seven  years,  to  commence 
estin<^  cases  on  tliis  question :  Pratt  v.  from  the  expiration  of  the  former  one. 
Landon,  12  Allen,  544;  Emmons  v.  The  complainant,  in  answer  to  this  com- 
Westfield  Bank,  97  Mass.  2-30;  Merwin  mnnication,  said  he  would  agree  to  the 
V.  Playford,  3  Rob.  702;  Strong  v.  Place,  proposition,  on  the  happening  of  a  certain 
4  Rob.  38-5.  contingency.  It  did  not  distinctly  appear 
(/)  Peacock  v.  Peacock,  10  Ves.  40;  whether  the  contingency  happened  or  not. 
Farrar  v.  Bcswick,  1  Mo.  &  R.  527  ;  But  it  did  appear  that  the  complainant 
Gould  V.  Gould,  6  Wend.  2G3.  But  see  continued  to  discharge  his  duties  as  a 
Thompson  v.  Williamson,  7  Bligh,  432.  partner  in  the  same  manner  as  formerly. 
See  Story,  Part.  §  24  ad  Jin.  note.  On  this  evidence  the  defendants  con- 
{'/)  Dickinson  v.  Survivors  of  Bolds  tended  that  the  partnership  was  not 
&  Rhodes,  3  Desaus.  501.  This  was  a  renewed  for  seven  years,  but  was  deter- 
bill  in  equity  for  an  account  of  the  minable  at  the  pleasure  of  either  party, 
profits  of  a  copartnersliip.  The  only  But  the  court  held  that  the  complain- 
qucstion  in  the  case  was  as  to  how  ant's  continuing  to  discharge  his  former 
long  the  partnership  continued.  It  duties  on  the  original  terms,  was  a  sub- 
appeared  by  the  original  articles  that  stantial  acceptance  of  the  defendant's 
it  commenced  in  1787,  under  an  agree-  proposition,  and  so  the  partnership  was 
ment  to  continue  seven  years.  After  renewed  for  another  term  of  seven 
the  expiration  of  that  period  the  de-  years, 
fendants,    being    desirous    of    renewing 


VOL.  I. 


12  177 


*  159  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

parties,  and  brought  within  all  the  liabilities  of  partnership  as 
to  them,  who  are  not  partners  between  themselves.  (A)  For 
whether  they  are  partners  as  between  themselves  is  determined 
chiefly  by  reference  to  their  own  intention ;  but  whether  they  are 
partners  in  respect  to  third  parties  is  determined  by  a  considera- 
tion of  this  intention,  and  also  of  that  actual  participation  of 
profits  which  is  held  to  require  of  them  to  participate  in  the 
losses,  because  it  diminishes  the  fund  from  which  the  losses  are 
to  be  paid ;  (^)  and  also  of  the  way  and  degree  in  which  the  per- 
son sought  to  be  charged  as  partner  has  been  held  out  to  the 
world  as  such,  so  that  the  person  seeking  to  charge  him  had  good 
reason  to  believe  a  debt  of  the  partnership  carried  with  it  liis 
responsibility.  (/) 

If  one  lends  money  to  be  used  by  the  borrower  in  his  business, 
the  lender  to  receive  interest,  and  in  addition  thereto  a  sliare  of 
the  profits  of  the  business,  a  question  may  arise  whether  he  is  a 
lender  on  usury  or  a  partner.  He  would  seem  indeed  to  be  both  ; 
only  a  usurer  as  between  the  lender  and  borrower,  but  a  partner 
as  to  third  persons ;  and  it  may  depend  upon  the  manner  in  which 
the  question  is  presented,  whether  the  character  of  a  usurer  is  to 
be  fixed  upon  him.     If  he  sues  the  borrower  for  repayment 

*  159    of  the  money,  it  seems  to  be  competent  *  for  the  borrower 

to  allege  in  his  defence  the  usurious  character  of  the 
loan.  Qk^  But  if  a  third  party  who  is  a  creditor  of  the  borrower, 
upon  a  debt  which  has  arisen  in  the  business  in  which  the  money 
was  lent  to  be  used,  sues  the  lender  as  a  partner,  on  the  ground 
that  he  took  away  profits  to  which  the  creditor  might  look  for  his 
debt,  the  lender  will  be  held  as  such  partner,  and  it  is  not  com- 
petent for  him  to  set  up  his  contract  as  usurious,  for  he  may  not 
rest  his  defence  upon  his  own  wrong.  (^) 

(A)  If  parties  are  so  associated  in  busi-  (/)  As  to  what  participation  of  profits 

ness  as  to  make  them  partners  with  re-  makes  one  a  partner,  sec  infrn,  n.  (;«). 
spect  to  tliird  persons,  hilt  expressly  agree  (J)  Cottrill     v.     Vanrhizen,     22     Vt. 

tliat  a  partnersliip  shall  not  exist,  they  oil  ;    Gilpin  v.   Temple,  4   Ilarring.   90; 

are  not  ])artners  as  between  themselves.  Furber    ;;.     Carter,     11     Humph.     271; 

Gill  V.  Kuhn,  0  S.  &  R.  333;  Ileskith  v.  Grieff  v.  Bondousquie,  18  La.  Ann.  63L; 

Blanchard,   4    East,    144.      If,   liowever,  Sherrod  v.  Langdon,  21  la.  518. 
parties    by   their   conduct,  have    treated  (k)  Morse    v.    Wilson,   4   T.    R.    353. 

their  contract  as  a  partnership,  and  have  See  also  Gilpin  v.  Enderbey,  5  B.  &  Aid. 

60  held  themselves  out  to  the  world,  it  is  954;  s.  c.  5  Moore,  571. 
unnecessary  to  put  a  construction  upon  ^7)  Grace   v.   Smith,   2    W.   Bl.   998; 

the  written   contract,  as  between  them-  Morse  v.  Wilson,  4  T.  K.  353;  Case  of 

selves   ami   others.      Stearns   v.   Haven,  Lane,   Fraser   &   Boylston,    cited   in   17 

14  Vt.  540.     See  also  Drennen  v.  House,  Vesey,  405,  Sumner's  edition.     See  Gib- 

41  Penn.  St.  30.  son  v.  Stone,  43  Barb.  285. 

178 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  160 

A  question  has  frequently  arisen  where  a  clerk,  agent,  or 
salesman  has  been  taken  into  partnership,  to  render  in  fact  the 
same  services  as  before,  or  a  person  received  to  render  such 
services  who  had  not  been  previously  employed,  upon  an  agree- 
ment that  the  services  shall  be  compensated  not  by  a  salary,  but 
by  a  share  of  the  profits.^  Is  such  person  a  partner  as  to  third 
parties  ?  It  will  appear,  by  the  cases  cited  in  the  notes,  that 
there  has  been  some  uncertainty  upon  this  point.  From  many 
of  the  cases  it  would  seem  that  a  rule  of  this  kind  was  adopted ; 
namely,  that  where  the  bargain  was  that  A  should  receive  for 
his  services  one  tenth  of  the  profits  this  made  him  a  partner ; 
but  if  he  was  to  receive  a  salary,  equal  in  amount  to  the  one 
tenth  part  of  the  profits,  this  did  not  make  him  a  partner.  This 
rule  is  somewhat  technical,  but  not  altogether  so ;  and  would 
doubtless  be  applied  to  such  a  contract  now,  if  the  words  used 
were  not  accompanied  by  other  language,  or  by  facts  which 
required,  or  at  least  justified  a  different  interpretation.  Whether 
a  person  were  a  partner  with  others,  should  be  determined  in  this 
as  in  other  cases  by  a  consideration  of  their  intention,  and  of 
the  way  in  which  the  alleged  partner  was  held  forth  to  the  public, 
and  the  interest  and  power  he  had  in  or  over  the  fund  to  which 
the  creditors  of  the  partnership  could  look  for  their  security. 
Where  A  employs  B,  and  agrees  to  give  him,  in  lieu  of  wages, 
or  by  way  of  wages,  a  certain  proportion  of  A's  profits,  this  need 
not  give  B  any  right  to  control  the  business  or  interfere 
therein  in  any  way.  They  are  not  *  then  necessarily  *  160 
partners,  because  there  is  no  reciprocity  between  them: 
unless  some  other  sufficient  reason  exists  for  so  treating  them. 
But  the  reason  usually  alleged  as  that  for  which  he  who  shares 
in  the  profits  is  held  liable  as  a  partner  for  the  debts,  namely, 
that  he  has  diminished  the  fund  from  which  the  debts  are  to  be 

^  The  mere  lending  of  money  for  a  share  of  the  profits  does  not  constitute  a  part- 
nership, Ex  parte  Tennant,  6  Ch.  D.  303 ;  MoUwo,  &c.  Co.  v.  Court  of  Wards,  L.  R. 
4  P.  C.  419 ;  Smith  v.  Knight,  71  111.  148 ;  Harvey  v.  Childs,  28  Ohio  St.  319 ;  Rich- 
ardson V.  Hughitt,  76  N.  Y.  55;  Eager  v.  Crawford,  ib.  97;  contra,  Parker  w.  Canfield, 
37  Conn.  250,  although  there  was  an  express  stipulation  that  the  lender  should  be 
regarded  as  a  creditor ;  nor  membership  in  a  defunct  corporation,  Central  Bank  v. 
Walker,  GO  N.  Y.  424 ;  nor  in  an  incipient  corporation,  although  doing  business  before 
the  capital  is  paid  in,  Salem  Bank  v.  Almy,  117  Mass.  476^  Blanchard  v.  Kaull,  44 
Cal.  440;  not  even  between  themselves,  Ward  v.  Brigham,  127  Mass.  24 ;  nor  cor- 
poration creditors  in  charge,  Beeson  v.  Lang,  85  Penn.  St.  197 ;  nor  farming  on  shares, 
HoUoway  v.  Brinkley,  42  Ga.  226;  Jeter  v.  Penn,  28  La.  An.  230;  Gregory  v. 
Brooks,  1  Hun,  404 ;  Robinson  v.  Haas,  40  Cal.  474 ;  but  see  Autrey  v.  Frieze,  59  Ala. 
587 ;  nor  fishing  on  shaies,  Holden  v.  French,  68  Me.  241. 

179 


*  160  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

paid,  seems  to  be  regarded  as  not  applicable  to  one  who  takes 
wages,  though  they  may  be  measured  by  the  profits ;  and  if  this 
is  the  bargain  in  fact  the  manner  of  its  expression  would  seem 
not  to  be  material.  It  is  certain  that  while  the  salesman  took 
a  thonsand  dollars  a  year  as  wages  for  his  services,  this  did 
not  make  him  a  partner.  The  fund  to  pay  debts  grew  up  in 
some  measure  from  his  services,  and  he  was  entitled  to  be  paid 
out  of  it  for  them ;  and  if  he  now  has,  instead  of  a  fixed  salary, 
a  share  of  the  profits,  it  might  still  be  clear  from  the  contract 
and  circumstances,  that  the  arrangement  was  intended  not  to 
pay  him  more  than  his  services  were  worth,  but  only  to  make 
his  wages  dependent  in  some  degree  upon  his  services,  and  so 
to  stimulate  him  to  make  the  profits,  or  the  general  fund  to 
which  the  creditors  must  look,  as  large  as  possible.  Lord 
Eldon's  reason  for  the  rule  seems  to  be,  "  that  where  the  sales- 
man has  an  amount  of  money  equal  to  one  tenth  of  the  profits, 
this  gives  him  no  action  of  account,  and  therefore  he  is  not  a 
partner ;  but  where  he  is  to  receive  one  tenth  of  the  profits,  this 
gives  him  an  action  of  account,  and  therefore  makes  him  a  part- 
ner ; "  but  this  seems  open  to  the  objection  that  the  question  of 
partnership  is  prior,  and  should  determine  the  right  of  account ; 
whereas  this  reason  would  regard  the  right  of  account  as  prior, 
and  determining  the  question  of  partnership,  (wz)     Lord  Eldon 

(m)  It  seems  to  1)0  well  settled,  that  a  Sandf.  311;  Newman  v.  Bean,  1  Foster 

contract  to  j)ay  one  employed  in  certain  (N.  II.),  9:3;  Reed  i'.  Mur])liy,  2  Greene 

business  a  salary,  efjual  in  amonnt  to   a  (Iowa),    574;    Goode    v.    M'Cartney,    10 

certain  proportion  of  the  profits,  will  not  Tex.  193;  Glenn  i\  Gill,  2  Md.  1;   Drake 

make   such    a    person    a    partner.     Tlie  v.   Kamey,  3    Rich.    L.  37 ;     Rartlett    v. 

question  of  profits  is  of  importance  only  Jones,  2  Strob.  471 ;   Hodges  v.  Dawes,  6 

in    determining   the    amonnt    of    salary.  Ala.    215;    Wilkinson   v.   Jett,    7    Leigh, 

Neither   will  a  certain    salary,   together  115.     I5ut  see  Ilcyhoe  r.   Burge,  9  C.  B. 

with  a  commission  of  a  certain  per  cent  481;  Taylor  ?•.  Terme,  3  liar.  &  J.  505; 

upon   the   profits,  make   the   receiver   a  Everitt  v.  Chapman,  G   Conn.  351.  —  In 

partner.     Miller   v.   Bartlet,  15    S.  &  K.  Bradley  r.  White,  10  Met.  303,  it  was  hold 

137;  Stocker  v.  Brockelbank,  5  E.  L.  &  that  an  agreement  between  D.  and  W.,by 

K.  07 ;  Dunham  v.  Rogers,  1   Barr,  255;  which    1).    was    to    furnish    goods    for    a 

Di-miy  V.  Caliot,  0  Met.  82;  Ilodgman  r.  store,  and  pay  all  the  expenses,  and  W. 

Smith,  13  Barb.  302;    Brockway  v.  Bur-  was  to  transa(!t  the  business  of  the  store 

nap,  10  id.  300;  Atlierton  ;;.  Tilton,  44  and  receive  half  of  the  profits,  as  a  com- 

N.  II.  452.     And  the  better  opinion  seems  jmisation  for  his  si'rrircf:,  did  not  constitute 

now  to  be,  that  an  agreement  by  wliich  a  W.  a  j)arlner,  and  that  in  action  against 

person  is  to  receive  a  certain  portion  of  the.  1).  and  W.  for  goods  sold  and  delivered  to 

pr'ijiis  for  his  salarj/,  does  not  constitute  D.,  W.  was  not  liable.     See  also  Andjler 

a    ijartncrship,    such    person    having    no  v.    Bradky,    0    Vt.    119;     Blanchard    v. 

specific  interest  in  the  profits  themselves,  Coolidge,    22    Pick.    151.     This    question 

as  profits.     See  Loomis   v.  Marshall,  12  also  underwent  nmcli  discussion  in  Diimy 

Conn.   GO;    Burcle   v.    Eckart,    1    Denio,  v.   Cabot,  G  Met.   82.     The   court   there 

337;   8.  c.  3  Comst.  1.32 ;  Vanderburgh  r.  said:     "On  tliis    point    the    distinction 

Hull,  20  Wend.  70;   Ogden   v.  Astor,  4  appears  to   us   to   be  well   established, 

180 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


*161 


says,  "  the  cases  *  have  gone  to  this  nicety,"  and  speaks    *  IGl 
of  the  rule  above  mentioned  as  settled ;  but  we  have  not 


that  a  party  who  participates  in  the 
profits  of  a  trade  or  business,  and  lias 
an  interest  in  tlie  profits,  as  profits,  is 
eliari^eable  as  a  partner  witii  respect  to 
tiiird  persons ;  but  if  lie  is  only  entitled 
to  receive  a  certain  sum  of  money  in 
proportion  to  a  given  quantum  of  the 
profits,  as  a  compensation  for  his  labor 
and  services,  lie  is  not  thereby  liable 
to  be  charged  as  a  partner.  It  is  true 
tiiat  Lord  Eldou  has  expressed  a  doubt 
of  the  soundness  of  this  distinction.  In 
Ex  parte  Hamper,  17  V'es.  404,  he  says, 
'  The  cases  have  gone  to  this  nicety 
(upon  a  distinction  so  thin,  that  I  cannot 
state  it  as  established  upon  due  consid- 
eration), that  if  a  trader  agrees  to  pay 
another  person,  for  his  labor  in  the  con- 
cern, a  sum  of  money,  even  in  proportion 
to  the  profits,  equal  to  a  certain  share 
that  will  not  make  him  a  partner ;  but  if 
he  has  a  specific  interest  in  the  profits 
themselves,  as  profits,  he  is  a  partner.'  He 
admits,  however,  that  the  law  of  partner- 
ship in  thus  settled.  Ex  parte  Watson,  19 
Ves.  45'.) ;  Ex  parte  Eowlaudson,  1  Rose, 
92.  And  this  distinction  has  been  con- 
firmed by  numerous  subsequent  decisions. 
In  Cutler  v.  Windsor,  6  Pick.  335,  it  was 
decided,  that  an  agreement  between  the 
owner  and  master  of  a  vessel  to  divide 
tlie  earnings  of  the  vessel  between  them, 
after  deducting  certain  fixed  charges,  did 
not  render  them  liable  to  third  persons  as 
partners.  In  that  case  the  deduction  was 
from  the  gross  earnings.  And  the  agree- 
ment is  substantially  the  same  in  the 
present  case.  For  altliough,  in  terms, 
the  agreement  was  to  pay  Cooper  one 
third  of  the  net  earnings,  yet  that  is  ex- 
plained by  the  words  immediately  follow- 
ing, by  wiiich  it  apjiears  that  Cooper  was 
entitled  to  one  third  of  the  gross  profits, 
after  deducting  certain  specified  charges ; 
and  that  in  no  event  was  he  to  be  liable 
for  any  losses.  So  the  agreement  in 
tliis  case  is  precisely  similar  to  that  in 
Loomis  V.  Marshall,  12  Conn.  G9.  In  that 
case,  French  and  Hubbell  agreed  with 
Marshall  to  manufacture  his  wool  into 
cloth,  and  he  agreed  to  give  them  for 
their  services,  and  the  materials  they 
sliould  furnish,  a  certain  proportion  of 
'  the  net  procc  eds  of  all  the  cloths,  after 
deducting  incidental  and  necessary  ex- 
penses of  transporting  and  other  proper 
charges  of  sale.'  It  was  not  expressed 
in  terms  to  be  for  such  compensation, 
but  such  the  court  held  was  the  legal 


meaning  of  the  agreement.  This  case 
was  very  ably  discussed  by  the  learned 
judge  who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  and,  as  it  seems  to  us.  the  decision 
is  fully  sustained  by  well  established 
principles.  So  in  Reynolds  v.  Topj)an, 
15  Mass.  .'370,  it  was  agreed  between 
the  master  and  owner  of  a  vessel,  that 
the  latter  was  to  receive  two  fifths  of  the 
net  earnings  of  the  vessel ;  and  it  was 
held  that  this  did  not  render  him  liable 
as  a  partner.  So  in  Vanderburgh  v.  Hull, 
20  Wend.  70,  where  a  person  was  employ- 
ed as  an  agent  in  conducting  the  business 
of  a  foundry,  at  a  salary  of  §300  ;  and  in 
addition  thereto  he  was  to  receive  one 
third  of  the  profits  of  the  foundry,  if 
any  were  made;  and  he  had  nothing  to 
do  with  tlie  losses;  it  was  held,  tiiat  the 
agent  was  not,  either  as  to  his  employers 
or  third  persons,  a  partner.  So  in  Turner 
V.  Bissell,  14  Pick.  1U2,  it  was  agreed  that 
Bissell  was  to  furnish  wool  to  be  worked 
into  satinets  by  Root,  who  was  to  find 
and  pay  for  warjis  for  the  same,  and 
Bissell  was  to  pay  Root  for  working  the 
wool,  finding  the  warps,  &c.,  40  per  cent 
on  the  sales  of  the  satinets.  It  was  held 
that  the  defendants  were  not  partners 
inter  se,  nor  as  to  third  persons."  —  And 
in  further  exposition  of  this  principle,  it 
is  said :  "  If  a  person  stipulate  for  a 
share  in  the  profits,  so  as  to  entitle  hira 
to  an  account,  and  to  give  him  a  specific 
lien,  or  a  preference  in  payment,  over  all 
creditors,  and  giving  him  the  full  benefit 
of  the  profits  of  the  business,  without 
any  corresponding  risk  in  case  of  loss ; 
justice  to  the  other  creditors  would  seem 
to  require  that  he  should  be  holden  to 
be  liable  to  third  persons  as  a  partner. 
But  where  a  party  is  to  receive  a  com- 
pensation for  his  labor,  in  proportion  to 
the  profits  of  the  business,  witliout  hav- 
ing any  specific  lien  upon  sucli  profits,  to 
the  exclusion  of  other  creditors,  there 
seems  to  be  no  reas(m  for  holding  him 
liable  as  a  partner,  even  to  third  persons. 
This  distinction  is  supported  by  Cary,  in 
his  treatise  on  Partnership,  and  Chancel- 
lor Walworth  considers  it  as  a  sound 
one,  in  Champion  v.  Bostick,  18  Wend. 
184.  And  it  is  adopted  with  approbation 
by  Chancellor  Kent,  in  his  Commenta- 
ries, .3  Kent,  Com.  (4th  ed.)  25,  n.  The 
remarks  of  Judge  Story  on  these  dis- 
tinctions are  very  forcible,  and  seem  to 
us  to  be  founded  on  soimd  principles." 
"  The  question  in  all  this  class  of  cases," 

181 


162 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  162  succeeded  in  finding  in  the  *  English  reports,  previous 
cases  or  authorities  which  can  be  regarded  as  establishing 
this  rule.  And  we  regard  it  as  now  an  established  rule  that  if  a 
party  is  paid  for  his  services  as  an  employee  of  the  firm,  whether 
by  a  salary  or  a  share  in  the  profits,  he  is  not  a  partner.  And 
if  a  partner  has  a  right  to  elect  a  salary  for  his  services  instead 
of  a  share  of  the  profits,  and  in  good  faith  elects  a  salary,  he 
ceases  to  be  a  partner,  (mm) 

In  a  recent  English  case  it  is  said  that  the  test  to  determine 
the  liability  of  one  sought  to  be  charged  as  a  partner,  is  whether 
the  trade  is  carried  on  in  his  behalf,  and  the  participation  of 
profits  such  as  to  establish  the  relation  of  principal  and  agent, 
between  the  person  taking  the  profits  and  those  who  carry  on 


he  says,  "is  first  to  arrive  at  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  inter  sese;  and  secondly, 
if  between  tlicmselves  there  is  no  inten- 
tion to  create  a  partnership,  whetlier 
there  is  any  stubborn  rule  of  law,  wliicli 
will  nevertheless,  as  to  third  persons 
make  a  mere  participation  in  the  profits 
conclusive  that  there  is  a  partnership." 
"  It  is  said,  'every  man  who  has  a  share 
in  the  profits  of  a  trade  ought  also  to 
bear  his  share  in  the  loss,  as  a  partner.' 
In  a  just  sense  this  language  is  sufiicient- 
ly  expressive  of  the  general  rule  of  law  ; 
but  it  is  assuming  the  very  point  in  con- 
troversy to  assert  that  it  is  universally 
true,  or  that  there  are  no  qualifications, 
or  limitations,  or  exceptions  to  it.  On 
the  contrary,  the  very  cases  alluded  to 
by  Lord  Eldon,  in  the  clearest  terms 
established  that  such  qualifications,  limi- 
tations, and  exceptions  do  exist."  Story 
on  Part.  §  30.  "Admitting,  however, 
that  a  participation  in  the  profits  will 
ordinarily  establish  the  existence  of  a 
partnership  between  the  parties,  in  favor 
of  third  persons,  in  the  absence  of  all 
other  opposing  circumstances  ;  the  ques- 
tion is,  whether  the  circumstances,  under 
which  the  jiarticipation  exists,  may  not 
qualify  the  presumption,  and  satisfac- 
torily prove  that  the  portion  of  the 
profits  is  taken,  not  in  the  character  of 
a  partner,  but  in  the  character  of  an 
agent,  as  a  mere  compensation  for  labor 
and  services.  If  the  latter  be  the  true 
predicament  of  the  party,  and  the  wliole 
transaction  admits,  nay  requires,  that 
very  interpretation,  where  is  the  rule 
of  law  which  forces  upon  the  transac- 
tion  the  opposite  interpretation,  and  re- 

182 


quires  the  court  to  pronounce  an  agency 
to  be  a  partnership,  contrary  to  the  truth 
of  the  facts,  and  the  intention  of  the 
parties '?  Now  it  is  precisely  upon  this 
very  ground,  that  no  such  aljsolute  rule 
exists,  and  that  it  is  a  mere  presumption 
of  law,  which  jirevails  in  the  absence  of 
controlling  circumstances,  but  is  control- 
led by  them,  that  tlie  doctrine  in  the 
authorities  alluded  to  is  founded;  "  "and 
there  is  no  hardship  upon  third  persons, 
since  the  party  does  not  hold  himself  out 
as  more  than  an  agent.  This  qualifica- 
tion of  tlie  rule  (the  rule  itself  being 
built  upon  an  artificial  foundation),  is 
in  truth  but  carrying  into  effect  the  real 
intention  of  the  parties,  and  would  seem 
far  more  consonant  to  justice  and  equity 
than  to  enforce  an  opposite  doctrine, 
which  must  always  carry  in  its  train  seri- 
ous mischiefs  or  ruinous  results,  never 
contemplated  by  the  parties."  §  38. 
Wiiere  a  broker  bought  wheat  for  E. 
&  II.  with  tlieir  funds,  and  an  agreement 
is  made  between  the  three  that  the 
broker  shall  dispose  of  the  wheat,  and 
that  the  profits  sliall  be  equally  divided, 
the  broker  is  neither  partner  nor  joint 
owner  of  the  wheat,  llanna  v.  Flint,  14 
Cal.  73.  See  also  Holmes  v.  Porter,  39 
Me.  157 ;  Chase  v.  Stevens,  19  N.  H.  465; 
ISLatthews  ".  Felch,  25  Vt.  530 ;  Pott  r. 
Eyton,  3  M.  G.  &  S.  32,  and  Ih-imstreet 
I'.  Howland,  5  Denio,  08.  See  also  Lafou 
V.  Chinn,  0  B.  Mon.  305;  Barry  i:  Nesli- 
am,  3  M.  G.  &  S.  041 ;  Conklin  v.  Barton, 
43  Barb.  435. 

(7n»i)  BidwoU   v.    Madison,    10   Mian. 
13;  Parker  v.  Fergus,  43  III.  437. 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  1G3 

the  business,  (wn)  ^  But  if  two  or  more  persons  carry  on  a 
business,  sharing  the  profits,  and  one  who  is  the  most  active 
partner,  as  salesman  or  the  like,  calls,  in  the  articles,  his  share 
of  the  profits  a  salary,  he  is  nevertheless  a  partner  as  to  third 
persons  ;  the  rule  as  to  wages  or  salary  applying  only  to  those 
who  are  strictly  only  employed  by  the  firm.  (;/«c») 

It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  distinguish  between  partnership 
and  tenancy  in  common ;  and  this  question  is  often  important, 
as  determining  between  the  adverse  rights  of  the  creditors  of 
the  individual  owners,  and  those  of  persons  who  claim  as  partner- 
ship creditors.  In  general,  if  the  property  owned  jointly 
is  so  *  owned  for  the  purpose  of  a  joint  business,  and  is  so  *  163 
used,  and  the  profits  resulting  form  a  common  fund,  it  is 
partnership  property  ;  otherwise  not.  (n)  ^ 

(m?i)  Bullen  v.  Sharp,  L.  R.  1   C.  P.  their  account  in  the  like  proportions  for 

86.  a  voyage,  and  consigned  the  same  to  tlie 

(mo)    Brigham    v.    Clark,    100   Mass.  master  for  sale  and  returns;   it  was  held 

430.  that   they  were   tenants   in   common   of 

(n)  Post  i\  Kiraberly,  9  Johns.  470;  the  cargo,  and  not  partners.  Story,  J.: 
Murray  v.  Bogert,  14  id.  318 ;  Hawes  "  It  does  not  by  any  means  follow  be- 
V.  Tillinghast,  1  Gray,  289.  Where  cause  the  purchase  was  made  for  the 
the  owners  of  land  let  it,  agreeing  with  account  of  all,  or  the  shipiiuiit  was 
the  occupiers  to  receive  one  iialf  of  the  made  in  tiie  names  of  all,  that  tliis  con- 
grain,  &c.,  in  consideration  of  tiie  occu-  stituted  them  partners  in  the  sense  of  a 
pancy,  the  owners  and  occupiers,  to-  joint  interest.  They  might  authorize  a 
gather  with  other  persons  whom  the  common  agent  to  purchase  or  ship  goods 
occupiers  admitted  to  a  share  in  the  for  them  according  to  their  several  and 
grain  in  consideration  of  tlieir  doing  a  separate  interests,  without  involving 
portion  of  the  farm  work,  were  held  to  themselves  in  a  joint  partnersliip  re- 
be  tenants  in  common  of  the  grain.  Put-  sponsibility.  In  my  judgment  there  was 
nam  v.  Wise,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  234;  Caswell  no  connnunity  of  interest  in  the  cargo,  as 
V.  Districh,  15  Wend.  379;  Walker  v.  partners.  It  appears  from  the  admis- 
Fitts,  24  Pick.  191 ;  Frost  v.  Kellogg,  23  sions  of  the  parties,  as  well  as  the  proofs, 
Vt.  308;  Case  v.  Hart,  11  Ohio,  304;  that  they  never  were,  nor  designed  to  be 
Smyth  V.  Tankersly,  20  Ala.  212  ;  Jack-  partners  ;  and  tliat  they  held  their  titles 
son  V.  Robinson,  3  Mason,  138.  A  and  B  to  undivided  portions  of  the  cargo,  not  as 
were  tenants  in  common  with  C  and  D  of  a  common,  but  as  a  separate  interest. 
a  ship  in  certain  proportions,  and  pur-  They  were,  tlierefore,  tenants  in  connnon 
chased   a    cargo,   by   an   agreement,   on  of  the  cargo,  having  no  general  commu- 

1  It  being  stated  that  participation  in  profits  is  merely  cogent  evidence  of  part- 
nership. Holme  V.  Hammond,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  218 ;  Mollwo,  &c.  Co.  v.  Court  of  Wards, 
L.  R.  4  P.  C.  419 ;  Ex  parte  Tennant,  0  Ch.  D.  .303 ;  Harvey  v.  Childs,  28  Ohio  St. 
319;  Eastman  v.  Clark,  53  N.  H.  276;  Pooley  v.  Driver,  5  Ch.  D.  458.  — A  contract 
between  one  of  two  or  more  partners  and  a  tliird  person,  with  tlie  knowledge  and 
assent  of  the  other  partners,  by  which  the  tliird  person  is  to  share  in  tlie  profits  and 
losses,  In  the  firm  business,  of  the  partner  with  whom  he  contracts,  does  not  consti- 
tute such  a  participation  in  the  profits  as  will  make  the  third  person  a  partner,  or 
liable  for  the  partnership  debts.     Burnett  r.  Snj'der,  81  N.  Y.  550. 

2  See  as  to  a  joint  ownership  of  land,  Letorey  ?'.  Korstall,  27  La.  An.  83; 
Steward  v.  Blakew.ay,  L.  R.  6  Eq.  479;  L.  R.  4  Ch.  fi03 ;  as  to  a  joint  ownership  of 
a  steamboat,  Adams  ?•.  Carroll,  85  Penn.  St.  209;  Ward  v.  Bodeman,  1  IMo.  App. 
272.  See  also  Quackenbush  u.  Sawyer,  54  Cal.  439;  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ross,  29 
Ohio  St.  429. 

183 


104 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


SECTION  VI. 

OF  THE   RIGHT   OF   ACTION   BETWEEN   PARTNERS. 

It  is  generally  true  that  one  partner  cannot  sue  a  copartner 
at  law  in  respect  to  any  matter  growing  out  of  the  transactions 
of  the  partnership,  and  involving  the  examination  of  the  partner- 
ship accounts ;  (o)  because  courts  of  law  cannot  do  effec- 
*  16-4    tual  *  justice  to  such  questions  and  interests,  and  resort 
must  be  had  to  courts  of  equity.  (  j:>)     But  it  is  clear  that 


nity  of  tlie  profit  and  loss,  but  only  a  pro- 
portion according  to  their  separate  inter- 
ests. If  either  luid  died,  his  sliare  would 
not  have  survived  to  tlie  others."  Hard- 
ing !•.  Foxcroft,  0  Greenl.  70.  In  this 
case  it  was  held  that  the  joint  owners  of 
a  vessel,  who  agreed  to  send  her  on  a 
foreign  voyage  for  their  mutual  benefit 
—  a  part  of  the  cargo  being  ])urchased 
by  each  separatel}',  and  a  part  by  both 
jointly  —  were  tenants  in  common  of  the 
property,  and  not  partners,  and  that 
therefore  a  creditor  of  both  owners,  for 
cordage  of  the  vessel,  was  not  entitled  to 
priority  in  payment,  out  of  the  vessel 
and  cargo,  against  the  separate  creditors 
of  either.  Mcllen,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  It  is  true 
some  parts  of  the  cargo  were  purchased 
by  the  owners  severall}',  and  put  on 
board,  and  some  parts  were  purcliased  on 
joint  account ;  but  to  constitute  a  part- 
nership, persons  must  not  only  be  jointly 
concerned  in  tlie  purchase,  but  jointly 
concerned  in  the  future  sale."  See 
Tliorndike  v.  I)e  Wolf,  6  Pick.  124. 
Where  one  l)arty  furnishes  a  boat  and 
the  other  sails  it,  an  agreement  to  divide 
tlie  gross  earnings  docs  not  constitute  a 
partnershij).  Bowman  r.  Bailey,  10  Vt. 
170;  Duryeas  r.  Whitcomb,  •.)\'\'i.  .'W5. 

(o)  Bovill  V.  Ilannnond,  (i  B.  &  C. 
W.) ;  Brown  v.  Tapscott,  G  M.  &  W.  119  ; 
Lawrence  v.  Clark,  'J  Dana,  257;  Stone 
V.  Foiisc,  3  Cal.  202  ;  Bennett  v.  Wool- 
folk,  15  Geo.  21-'3.  This  question  is  con- 
sidered in  Lane  v.  Tyler,  40  Me.  252,  and 
in  Siiattuck  v.  Lawson,  10  Gray,  405.  It 
is  lield  otherwise  under  tlio  code  of  In- 
diana, in  Ileavilow  v.  Ileavilow,  20  Ind. 
609. 

(p)  It  is  clear  that  one  partner  has  no 
right  of  action  ag;iinsi  a  copartner  for 
money  or  labor  e.xpendc-d  for  the  l)enefit 
of  the  concern.     See  Goddard  t;.  Hodges, 

184 


1  Cr.  &  M.  37 ;  Holmes  v.  Higgins,  1  B. 
&  C.  74;  Milburn  v.  Codd,  7  id.  410; 
Promont  v.  Coui)lanil,  2  Bing.  170; 
Saddler  t".  Ni.xon,  5  B.  &  Ad.  936  ;  Pear- 
son V.  Skelton,  1  M.  &  W.  504;  Bevans  v. 
Sullivan,  4  Gill,  3b3.  But  one  partner 
may  nuiinlain  an  action  for  money  had 
and  received  against  the  other  partner, 
for  money  received  to  the  separate  use 
of  the  former,  and  wrongfully  carried  to 
the  partnership  account.  Smith  v.  Bar- 
row, 2  T.  II.  47(3.  And  one  partner  may 
have  an  action  against  his  copartner  for 
not  contributing  his  proportion  toward 
the  connnon  stock.  Tims,  where  A 
agrees  to  supply  B  with  a  manuscript 
work,  to  be  printed  by  B,  the  i)rofits  of 
whicli  arc  to  be  eqiuilly  divided,  B  may 
maintain  an  action  against  A  for  refusing 
to  supply  the  manuscript.  This  is  not  an 
action  for  partnership  profits,  but  for 
refusing  to  contribute  tiie  laboc  of  the 
defendant,  towards  the  attainment  of 
profits.  Gale  v.  Leckie,  2  Stark.  107. 
Tlie  same  principle  was  ado])ted  in 
Ellison  V.  Chaj)man,  7  Blackf.  224.  See 
also  Vance  )'.  Blair,  18  Ohio,  532.  —  Tlie 
American  courts  fully  recognize  tlie  doc- 
trine tliat  during  the  existence  of  a  part- 
nersiiip,  or  even  after  its  dissolution,  but 
before  the  business  is  wound  up,  and  the 
final  balance  ascertained,  no  action  at 
law  will  lie  between  partners.  Haskell 
V.  Adams,  7  Pick.  50;  Williams  r.  llen- 
shaw,  12  id.  378;  Fanning  v.  Ciiatlwick, 
3  id.  420;  Capen  x\  Barrows,  1  (Jrav,  370; 
Causten  v.  Burko,  2  Ilarr.  &  (1.  205; 
Chase  i'.  Garvin,  10  Me.  211 ;  Kennedy  v. 
McFaden,  3  Ilarr.  &  J.  104;  Murray  w. 
Bogert,  14  Johns.  318;  Davenport  r.  Gear, 

2  Scam.  405;  Iloberts  v.  Filler,  13  Pcnn. 
St.  205;  Gridley  v.  Dole,  4  Comst.  480. 
After  such  final  balance  is  determined, 
and   a  promise  by  one  partner  to  pay 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNEESHIP. 


1G4 


a  partner  may  sue  a  copartner  on  an  express  agreement,  and  per- 
haps on  an  implied  agreement,  to  do  any  act  not  involving  a  con- 
sideration of  the   partnership  accounts  ;  (5^)  ^   or  on  an  express 


over,  the  other  partner  may  sustain  an 
action  at  hiw.  GuUck  v.  Gulick,  2  Green 
(N.  J.),  578;  Byrd  v.  Fox,  8  Mo.  57-4. 
The  i)roniise  may  be  only  im]3Hed. 
Wray  v.  Milestone,  5  M.  &  W.  21 ;  Nims 
V.  Bigelow,  44  N.  H.  876. 

{(j)  Van  Ness  v.  Forrest,  8  Crancli, 
80 ;  Gibson  v.  Moore,  6  N.  H.  547.  In 
this  case  Parker,  J.,  thus  states  the  prin- 
ciples applicable  to  this  point :  "  As- 
sumpsit may  be  maintained  by  one 
partner  against  another  to  recover  a 
final  balance  upon  the  settlement  of  the 
partnership  account,  where  there  is  an 
express  promise  to  pay.  Casey  v.  Brush, 
2  Gaines,  293 ;  Fromont  v.  Coupland,  2 
Bing.  170.  In  Massachusetts,  the  court 
have  held  that  where  the  partnership  ac- 
counts are  closed,  and  the  balance  struck, 
the  law  raises  an  implied  promise.  Fan- 
ning V.  Chadwick,  o  Pick.  423.  The 
same  doctrine  is  found  in  Rackstraw  v. 
Imber,  Holt,  368.  So  where  the  judg- 
ment will  be  an  entire  termination  of  the 
partnership  transactions,  although  tliere 
has  been  no  settlement  of  the  accounts 
by  the  partners,  nor  an  express  promise 
to  pay,  an  action  may  be  sustained. 
And  if  the  partners  by  an  express  agree- 
ment separate  a  distinct  matter  from  the 
partnership  dealing,  and  one  party  ex- 
pressly agrees  to  pay  the  other  a  specific 
sum  for  tiiat  matter  at  a  given  time,  an 
action  of  assumpsit  will  lie  on  that  con- 
tract, though  the  matter  arose  from  the 
partnership  dealing.  CoUumer  v.  Foster, 
26  Vt.  754;  Williams  v.  Henshaw,  11 
Pick.  82.  Probably  an  action  may  be 
maintained  by  one  partner  against  the 
other,  for  a  balance  due  him  out  of  the 


partnership  transactions,  if  there  be  but 
a  single  item  to  liquidate.  Musier  v. 
Trumpbour,  5  Wend.  274,  1  Stark.  78 ; 
but  see  Bovill  v.  Hammond,  6  B.  &  C. 
140.  Tile  proposition  that  no  action  can 
be  maintained  at  law,  by  one  partner 
ay;ainst  tlie  other,  except  to  recover  a 
final  balance,  must  be  taken  witli  refer- 
ence to  tiie  facts  and  questions  arising  in 
those  cases  in  which  such  language  is 
used.  In  Smith  v.  Barrow,  2  T.  R.  478, 
Mr.  Justice  BulUr  says  :  '  One  partner 
cannot  recover  a  sum  of  money  received 
by  tlie  other,  unless  on  a  balance  struck, 
that  sum  is  found  due  to  him  alone.' 
Similar  language  is  found  in  Ozeas  v. 
Johnston,  1  Binn.  191 ;  Beach  v.  Hotch- 
kiss,  2  Conn.  425;  Murray  v.  Bogert,  14 
Johns.  318;  Westerlo  v.  Evertson,  1 
Wend.  532.  So  in  Moravia  v.  Lev^',  2 
T.  R.  483,  n ,  an  action  was  sustained  for 
the  amount  of  a  balance  struck,  which 
the  defendant  had  promised  to  pay.  The 
articles  contained  a  covenant  to  account 
at  certain  times,  and  it  dues  not  appear 
whether  it  was  a  final  l-Mlance  whicli  was 
recovered.  It  is  undoubtedly  true,  as  a 
general  rule,  that  so  long  as  the  partner- 
ship continues,  and  the  concerns  of  it  re- 
main unadjusted,  the  law  will  raise  no 
implied  promise  by  one  to  pay  tlie  other 
upon  a  partnership  transaction.  The 
reason  is,  tliat  such  ti'ansactions  create 
no  debt  or  duty  to  pay.  The  act  of  one 
party  is  the  act  of  the  other  —  the  pay- 
ment or  receipt  of  money  by  one  is  a 
payment  or  receipt  by  tlie  other  —  and 
no  cause  of  action  can  arise.  In  the 
present  case  there  has  been  no  balance 
struck.     The  settlement  of  the  partner- 


1  A  partner  may  sue  his  copartner  for  contribution  where  a  firm  is  formed  for  a 
single  transaction,  Meason  v.  Kaine,  63  Penn.  St.  335  ;  or  on  a  negotiable  instrument 
given  for  a  balance  ascertained  on  dissolution,  McSherry  v.  Brooks,  46  Md.  103; 
or  on  a  preliminary  contract,  Truitt  v.  Baird,  12  Kan.  420 ;  Morgan  v.  Nuncs,  64  Miss. 
308 ;  or  for  unjiaid  profits  wliere  the  conduct  of  the  business  is  given  over  to  one 
partner,  Wadley  v.  Jones,  55  Ga.  329;  or  on  an  award  on  a  firm  sulimission,  Blakely 
V.  Graham,  111  Mass.  8;  or  on  a  balance  ascertained  on  a  settlement,  Ross  v.  Cornell, 
45  Cal.  133;  Mickle  v.  Peet,  43  Conn.  65;  Scott  v.  Caruth,  50  Mo.  120;  Knew  v. 
Hoffman,  G5  Penn.  St.  126;  Wicks  i'.  Lippman,  13  Nev.  499;  or  on  an  express  prom- 
ise to  repay  advances  made  on  firm  account.  Ganger  v.  Pautz,  45  Wis.  449.  —  Ordi- 
narily, replevin  or  trover  will  not  lie  by  one  partner  against  another,  Crabtree  v. 
Clapham,  67  Me  326;  Bartley  v.  AVilliams,  66  Penn.  St.  329;  see  Danbury  Band  v. 
Bean,  54  N.  II.  524.  —  Where  each  partner  agreed  with  the  rest  to  pay  a  proportion 
of  a  firm  debt  and  save  the  rest  harmless,  it  was  held  that  if  any  partner  neglected 
so  to  do  within  a  reasonable  time  after  due,  any  other  partner  might,  without  await- 
ing an  action,  pay  the  same,  and  the  whole  amount  apportioned  being  paid,  miglit  re- 
cover of  the  delinquent  partner  his  proportion.     Edwards  v.  Remington,  51  Wis.  330. 

185 


*165 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


promise  made  before  the  partnership  began,  in  relation  to  ad- 
vances to  constitute  the  capital  of  the  firm ;  (j^q)  or  on  his  part- 
ner's note  for  advances  made  to  him ;  (^r)  or  for  damage  done 

to  his  private  property  which  was  used  by  the  firm,  (j^s) 
*  165    And  if  partners  finally  balance  all  *  their  accounts,  or  a 

distinct  part  thereof  is  entirely  severed  by  them  from  the 
rest,  a  suit  at  law  is  maintainable  for  the  balance,  (r) 

If  one  of  a  partnership  who  are  plaintiffs  be  also  one  of  a  part- 
nership who  are  defendants,  the  action  cannot  be  maintained ; 
for  the  same  party  cannot  be  plaintiff  and  defendant  of  record, 
in   the  same  action,  (s)  ^     The   rule   may  be  different   in  those 


ship  concerns,  generally,  still  remains  to 
be  made.  But  by  agreement  between 
the  parties,  in  relation  to  a  specific  por- 
tion of  the  partnership  transactions,  a 
final  adjustment  has  been  made.  If  this 
accounting  by  means  of  the  reference 
had  only  been  for  the  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining an  item,  in  order  to  carry  it  into 
the  partnership  account  between  them, 
no  doubt  the  general  rule  would  ap]>ly. 
Tliat  was  the  ease  in  Fromont  v.  Coup- 
land,  2  Bing.  170.  But  such  is  not  the 
fact  here."  See  also  Clark  v.  Dibble,  IG 
Wend.  601 ;  Grisby  v.  Nance,  3  Ala.  347. 
—  And  after  a  dissolution,  an  action  will 
lie  between  partners  to  recover  a  balance 
due,  on  an  implied  promise.  Wilby  v. 
Phinney,  1-5  Mass.  IIG;  Pope  v.  Kan- 
dolpli,  13  Ala.  214.  —  So  to  recover  back 
money  paid  by  mistake  on  an  adjustment 
of  the  partnership  concerns.  Bond  i'. 
Hays,  12  Mass.  34 ;  Chase  v.  Garvui,  19 
Me.  211. 

(77)  Currier  v.  Webster,  45  N.  H.  226; 
Currier  r.  Rowe,  46  N.  II.  72. 

{(ir)  Chamberlain  v.  Walker,  10  Allen, 
429. 

(qs)  Haller  v.  Williamowitz,  23  Ark. 
566. 

(/•),  Clark  V.  Dibble,  16  Wend.  601; 
Gibson  V.  Moore,  6  N.  II.  547  ;  McColl  v. 
Oliver,  1  Stew.  (Ala.)  510;  Fanning  v. 
Chadwick,  3  Pick.  420;  Gulick  v.  Gu- 
lick,  2  Green  (N.  J.), 578;  French  v.  Sty- 
ring,  2  C.  B.  (N.  s.)  357. 

(s)  Portland  Bank  r.  Hyde,  2  Fairf. 
196;  Tindal  v.  Brigiit,  Minor  (Ala.),  103  ; 
Mainwaring  v.  Newman,  2  B.  &  P.  120 ; 
Neale  v.  Turton,  4  Bing.  14^  ;  Teague  v. 
Hubbard,  8  B.  &  C.  345 ;  Bosanquet  v. 
Wray,    0   Taunt.    597.  —  But  see    Kose 


V.  Poulton,  2  B.  &  Ad.  822,  where  the 
facts  were  as  follows  :  B3'  an  indenture 
between  A,  B  and  his  wife,  and  C,  of  one 
part,  and  D,  E,  and  the  same  C,  of  another 
part,  it  was  recited  that  F,  also  jjarty  to 
the  deed,  had  requested  to  have  a  certain 
farm  given  uj)  to  him,  in  wliich  B's  wife 
was  intKTCstcd,  he  (F)  giving  sureties, 
namely,  the  said  D,  E,  and  C,  for  pay- 
ment of  an  annuity  to  B's  wife ;  and  it 
was  thereupon  witnessed  that  in  consid- 
eration of  tiie  covenants  thereinafter  en- 
tered into  by  A,  B  and  his  wife,  and  C, 
and  of  10s.,  the  said  D,  E,  and  C,  and 
eacli  and  every  of  them,  covenanted  with 
A,  B  and  his  wife,  and  C,  to  i)ay  the 
annuity.  There  followed  covenants  by 
A,  B  and  his  wife,  and  C,  severally,  for 
quiet  enjoyment,  and  for  executing  an 
assignment  to  F  when  required.  The 
deed  was  signed  and  sealed  b_v  D,  E,  and 
C,  and  by  F,  but  not  by  A  or  B.  In  an  ac- 
tion brought  b}'  A  and  B,  after  the  death 
of  C,  for  breach  of  the  covenant  to  pay 
the  annuity :  —  Ihid,  First,  that  the  omis- 
sion of  A  and  B  to  execute  tlie  deed  did 
not  disable  them  from  siung  upon  it ;  tliat 
such  omission  did  not  amount  to  a  total 
failure  of  consideration  for  the  covenant 
sued  upon  (supposing  such  total  failure 
to  be  an  answer  to  the  action),  and  that 
the  covenant  to  pay  the  annuity,  and 
those  for  quiet  enjoyment  and  for  assign- 
ing, were  not  mutual  and  de])endent. 
Secondly,  that  at  least  after  C's  death, 
A  and  B  might  sue  D's  executors  (D  and 
E  being  also  dead),  for  non-pa3Mncnt  of 
the  annuity,  though  the  covenan  for 
such  payment  was  entered  into  both  by 
and  to  C.  —  And  where  one  who  is  a 
member  of  two  firms  makes  a  note  in 


1  Blaisdell  v.  Pray,  68  Me.  269.  But  firms  with  a  common  partner  can  sue  each 
other  where  legal  and  equitable  remedies  are  alike,  Douglas  v.  Neil,  37  Tex.  528; 
Kingsland  v.  Braisted,  2  Lansing,  17. 

186 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  166 

States  where  by  statute,  a  copartnership  may  be  sued  by  their 
firm  name,  and  a  garnishee  may  be  proceeded  against  in  the  same 
way.  (s6-) 

One   partner   cannot  without   express   agreement,  charge   the 
firm  for  the  extra  value  or  amount  of  his  services,  (sf)  ^ 

*  Partners  are  bound,  each  to  all  the  others,  to  act  with  *  166 
entire  good  faith,  and  apply  themselves  with  due  diligence 
to  the  business  of  the  concern,  and  in  general  to  do  nothing  for 
their  own  advantage  which  shall  sacrifice  the  interests  of  the 
partnership,  (t")  ^  And  an  action  in  equity,  or  in  some  cases, 
at  law,  is  maintainable  by  the  injured  partners  for  any  loss  sus- 
tained by  a  breach  of  this  obligation,  (w) 


SECTION  VII. 

OF   THE   SHARING   OF   LOSSES. 

Though  partnerships  are  usually  formed  by  a  participation  of 
both  profits  and  losses,  it  may  be  agreed  that  a  partner  shall  have 
his  share  of  the  profits  and  not  be  liable  for  losses,  and  this  agree- 
ment is  valid  as  between  the  parties.  And  this  agreement  will 
be  equally  efficacious  whether  stated  in  articles,  or  proved  by  cir- 

the  name  of  one  of  the  firms,  payable  (t)  Long  v.  Majestre,  1  Johns.  Ch. 
to  a  menihcr  of  the  other  firm,  the  payee  305  ;  Stoufrhton  v.  Lynch,  id.  470  ;  Faw- 
may  sue  and  recover  upon  such  note,  cett  v.  Whitehouse,  1  Rus.  &  M.  132. 
Moore  v.  Gano,  12  Ohio,  300.  See  Baring  See  Lefever  v.  Underwood,  41  Penn.  St. 
V.  Lyman,  1  Story,  396 ;  Banks  v.  Mitch-  505,  as  to  duty  of  partner  to  keep  part- 
ell,  8  Yerg.  111.     See  post,  p.  *253.  nership  funds  unmixed  with  his  own,  and 

(ss)  United  States  Express  Co.  v.  Bed-  within  the  reach  of  all  tlie  partners. 

bury,  34  111.  459.  (m)  Maddeford  v.  Austwick,  1  Sim.  89; 

{st)  Bennett  v.  Russell,  34  Miss.  524;  Terry  v.  Carter,  25  Miss.  168. 

Haller  v.  Williamowitz,  23  Ark.  566.  . 

1  Boardman  v.  Close,  44  la.  428;  Coddington  v.  Idell,  2  Stewart,  204;  Forrer  v. 
Forrer,  29  Gratt.  134;  Mills  v.  Fellows,  30  La.  An.  824;  Heath  v.  Waters,  40  IVIich. 
457  ;  Lee  v.  Davis,  70  Ind.  464.  Neither  can  a  partner  sue  for  services  rendered  before 
the  partnership  of  which  the  firm  takes  advantage,  Dunlap  v.  Watson,  124  Mass.  305. 
See  Cramer  v.  Bachmann,  08  Mo.  310,  to  the  effect  that  the  parties'  intention  governs, 
an  express  agreement  being  unnecessarj'. — A  partner  is  not  entitled  on  settlement 
to  the  natural  depreciation  of  goods  and  fixtures,  being  the  capital  stock  contributed 
by  him.     Tutt  v.  Land,  50  Ga.^339. 

2  Thus  a  partner  cannot  secretly  stipulate  for  his  private  advantage.  Dunne  v. 
English,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  524;  Densmore  Oil  Co.  i'.  Densmore,  64  Penn.  St.  43;  McMaiion 
V.  McClernan,  10  W.  Va.  419.  —  And  a  partner  secretly  renewing  a  firm  lease  in  Ids 
own  name  holds  it  as  a  trustee  for  the  firm,  Mitchell  v.  Reed,  Gl  N.  Y.  123  :  as  well  as 
real  estate  and  life  insurance  policies  bought  with  firm  funds,  Shaler  v.  Trowbridge, 
1  Stewart,  595. 

187 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*1G7 

cumstanccs  or  otherwise.  For  the  partners  inter  se,  may  make 
what  bargain  they  will.  But  no  such  agreement  will  prevent 
such  partner  from  being  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  partnership, 
unless  the  creditor  knew  of  this  bargain  between  the  partners, 
and  with  this  knowledge  gave  the  credit  to  the  other  partners 
only,  (w) 


1C7 


♦SECTION  VIII. 


OF   SECRET   AND   DORMANT   PARTNERS. 

A  secret  partner  is  one  not  openly  and  generally  declared  to  be 
a  partner,  (tf )  and  a  dormant  partner  is  strictly  one  who  takes  no 
share  in  the  transaction  or  control  of  the  partnership  business ; 
but  it  is  often  held  to  mean  one  whose  name  is  not  publicly  men- 
tioned ;  and  the  phrases  secret  partner  and  dormant  partner  are 
sometimes,  but  inaccurately,  used  as  synonymous,  {x}     A  dor- 


(f)  See  Gilpin  v.  Enderbey,  5  B.  & 
Aid.  954 ;  Bond  v.  Pittard,  3  M.  &  W. 
357.  In  this  case,  A  and  B  carried  on 
bnsiness  together  as  solicitors  in  partner- 
ship, and  held  themselves  out  as  such ; 
and  the  defendant  employed  them  in 
that  capacity.  By  the  agreement  under 
which  A  and  B  entered  into  business  to- 
gether, B  was  to  receive  annually  out  of 
the  profits  the  sum  of  .£300,  but  he  was 
not  to  be  in  any  manner  liable  for  the 
losses  of  the  business,  and  was  to  have  a 
lien  on  the  profits  for  any  losses  he  niiglit 
sustain  by  reason  of  his  liability  as  a 
partner  :  I  kid,  tliat  A  and  B  were  prop- 
erly joined  as  plaintiffs  in  an  action  for 
work  and  labor,  as  tlie  money,  when  re- 
covered, would  be  the  joint  property  of 
both  until  the  accounts  were  ascertained 
and  tlie  division  took  ])lace.  In  tliis  case 
Holland,  B.,  said :  "  It  has  been  fully 
establislied  by  numerous  cases  both  at 
law  and  in  equity,  that  third  parties  are 
not  affected  by  the  secret  contracts,  inter 
sc,  of  persons  holding  themselves  out  and 
contracting  as  partners.  That  doctrine 
is  fully  gone  into  in  tlie  case  of  AVangh  v. 
Carver,  2  II.  Bl.  240,  by  Lord  Cliief 
Justice  (Eyre)  De  Grey,  and  is  there 
distinctly  laid  down."  See  Perry  v. 
Bandolph,  0  Sm.  &  M.  385  ;  Hazard  v. 
Hazard,  1  Storv,  371;  Barrett  r.  Swan, 
17  Me.  ISO;  Pollard  v.  Stanton,  7  Ala. 
701 ;   Alderson  v.  Pope,  1  Camp.  40 i,  n.; 

188 


Minnit  v.  Wlnnery,  5  Bro.  P.  C.  489. 
See  also  Brown  v.  Leonard,  2  Chitt. 
120. 

(to)  In  United  States  Bank  v.  Binney, 
5  Mason,  180,  the  following  definition  of 
a  secret  partnership  is  given  :  "  I  under- 
stand the  common  meaning  of  secret  part- 
nership to  be  a  partnership  where  the 
existence  of  certain  persons  as  partners 
is  not  avowed  or  made  known  to  the 
public  by  any  of  the  partners.  Where 
all  the  partners  are  pul^licly  made 
known,  whether  it  be  by  one  or  all  the 
partners,  it  is  no  longer  a  secret  partner- 
ship."    See  s.  c.  5  Pet.  529. 

(x)  In  Mitchell  v.  Dall,  2  Ilarr.  &  G. 
159,  it  is  said  that  in  the  legal  accepta- 
tion of  tho  term  dormant,  as  applied  to 
partners  in  trade,  every  partner  is  con- 
siiU'red  dormant  unless  liis  name  is  men- 
tioned in  the  firm,  or  embraced  under 
general  terms  in  the  name  of  the  firm  or 
company.  See  to  the  same  effect  Kelley 
V.  Ilurlburt,  5  Cowen,  534  ;  Desha  v.  Hol- 
land, 12  Ala.  513;  Hill  v.  Voorhies,  22 
Penn.  St.  08.  —  The  law  relative  to  dor- 
mant partners  seems  to  lie  confined  to 
trade  and  commerce,  and  does  not  ex- 
tend to  speculations  in  tin?  sale  and  pur- 
chase of  land.  Pitts  v.  Waugh,  4  Mass. 
424;  Smith  i;.  Burnliam,  3  Sunnier,  470. 
But  see  Brooke  v.  Washington,  8  Gratt. 
248,  contra. 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


168 


mant  partner  is  liable  when  discovered.  (?/)  But  not  for  a  debt 
contracted  after  he  has  retired,  provided  the  creditor  never  knew 
that  he  was  a  partner,  or  did  know  that  he  had .  retired  before 
credit  was  given  to  the  partnership.  (2) 

If  there  be  a  dormant  and  unknown  partner,  and  credit  is  given 
to  the  ostensible  partner  in  the  business  of  the  firm  and  for 
their  benefit,  all  the  partners  whether  known  or  unknown,  are 
liable,  {zz) 

*  It  is  said  that  a  dormant  partner  cannot  join  as  plain-    *  168 
tiff  in  an  action,  because  there  is  no  sufficient  privity  of 
contract  between  him  and  the  party  who  contracted  with  the 
firm,  (a)     But  he  may  be  sued  and  joined  as  defendant.  (^)  ^ 


[y)  Robinson  ii.  Wilkinson,  3  Price, 
638.  In  this  case  Wilkinson  had  been  a 
dormant  partner  in  a  ship  with  one  Cay, 
but  liad  retired.  Robinson,  the  plaintiff, 
supplied  the  ship  and  the  captain  with 
stores  and  cash  on  account  of  the  ship,  to 
the  amount  of  £1,000  and  upwards.  The 
amount  of  the  debt  at  the  time  of  Wil- 
kinson's retirement  was  £401  16s.  \d. 
Cay  having  become  insolvent,  the  Court 
of  E.xchequer  held  that  Robinson  was 
clearly  entitled  to  recover  against  Wil- 
kinson the  total  sura  of  £401  16s.  \d. 
(with  a  trifling  deduction  on  a  particular 
account),  although,  when  the  goods  were 
supplied,  Robinson  had  no  knowledge 
that  Wilkinson  was  a  partner.  "  A 
party,"  said  Graham,  B.,  "  has  always 
a  riglit  against  a  concealed  partner  of 
whom  he  has  previously  had  no  knowl- 
edge, as  s(jon  as  he  discovers  him,  unless 
that  ignorance  were  his  own  fault ;  as,  if 
he  had  not  used  due  diligence  in  finding 
him."  See  also  Lea  v.  Guire,  13  Sm.  & 
M.  656 ;  Bigelow  v.  Elliott,  1  Clifford,  28. 
—  The  liability  of  a  dormant  partner  to 
creditors  may  be  avoided,  hovvever,  by 
proof  of  fraud  in  the  formation  of  the 
partnership,  if  such  dormant  partner  has 
received  no  share  of  the  funds.  Mason 
V.  Connell,  1  Whart.  381. 

(z)  Grosvenor  v.  Lloyd,  1  Met.  19.  In 
this  case,  Shaw,  C.  J.,  observed,  "  A  dor- 
mant partner  is  liable  for  debts  contracted 
while  he  is  a  partner,  not  because  credit 
is  given  to  him,  but  because  he  is  in  fact 
a  contracting  party,  taking  part  of  the 
profits  of  such  contracts.  But  when  he 
ceases  to  be  in  fact  a  partner,  the  reason 
ceases,  and  he  is  no  longer  liable.  He  is 
not  liable  as  a  contracting  party,  because 


the  partnership  name,  under  which  the 
remaining  partners  continue  to  transact 
business,  no  longer  includes  him,  though 
that  name  may  remain  the  same ;  and  he 
is  not  liable  as  holding  out  a  false  credit 
for  the  firm,  because  the  case  supposes 
that  lie  is  not  known  as  a  partner,  and 
therefore  the  firm  derives  no  credit  whilst 
he  remains  a  secret  or  a  dormant  partner. 
No  customer,  therefore,  or  other  person 
dealing  with  the  firm  can  be  disappointed 
in  any  just  expectations,  if  he  silently 
withdraws  from  the  firm.  A  very  differ- 
ent rule  would  apply  where  one  had  been 
a  known  or  ostensible  partner,  and  held 
himself  out  as  such."  See  also  Kellej'  v. 
Hurlburt,  5  Cowen,  534;  Evans  r.  Drum- 
niond,  4  Esp.  89;  Armstrong  v.  Hussey, 
12  S.  &  R.  315;  Scott  r.  Colmesnil,  7  J. 
J.  Marsh.  416;  Benton  r.  Chamberlain, 
23  Vt.  711  ;  Edwards  v.  McFall,  5  La. 
Ann.  167  ;  Brooke  r.  Enderby,  2  Br.  &  B. 
71  _;  Carter  v.  Whalley,  1  B.  &  Ad.  11.  — 
It  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  a 
person  was  a  dormant  partner,  and  his 
interest  not  in  fact  generally  known,  so 
as  to  excuse  notice  of  liis  retirement 
from  the  firm.  Shaio,  C.  J.,  in  Goddard 
V.  Pratt,  16  Pick.  429.  See  as  to  dormant 
partners  Deford  v.  Reynolds,  36  Penn. 
St.  .325,  where  also  the  doctrine  is  laid 
down  that  one  who  is  a  member  of  a  firm 
known  as  R.  M.  &  Co.  does  not  become  a 
dormant  partner  by  reason  of  the  credit- 
or's ignorance  of  the  name  of  R.  M.'s  co- 
partner. 

(sz)  Richardson  r.  Farmer,  .36  Mo.  35. 

(a)  Wood  ('.  O'Kelley,  8  Cush.  406; 
Jackson  v.  Alexander,  8  Tex.  109. 

(b)  Boardman    r.    Kecler,    2    Vt.   65; 
Lloyd  V.  Arclibowle,  2  Taunt.  324. 


1  That  a  dormant  partner  noed  not  be  joined  as  a  plaintiff,  see  Garrett  v.  Muller,  37 
Tex.  589  ;  Leslie  v.  Wiley,  47  N.  Y.  648.     See  Wright  v.  Herrick.  125  Mass.  154. 

189 


*  169  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I, 

A  secret  partner,  who  conceals  his  interest  in  the  firm  to  pro- 
tect it  from  attachment,  may  have  his  bill  in  equity  for  an  accomit 
against  partners  privy  to  the  concealment.  (65) 


SECTION  IX. 

OF  RETIRING   PARTNERS, 

A  retiring  partner  who  receives  thereafter  a  share  of  the  profits 
is  still  liable ;  but  not  if  he  receives  an  annuity  or  definite  sum 
noways  dependent  on  the  profits.  Tliough  the  remaining  part- 
ners may  look  to  the  partnership  fund  or  to  their  expected 
profits  as  the  means  of  paying  such  annuity,  it  is  still  only  their 
debt  to  him,  and  does  not  involve  him  in  their  responsibility  to 

others,  (c) 
*  169        *  When  a  partner  retires  from  a  firm,  notice  is  usually 

given  by  public  advertisement,  or  by  letters  to  the  custom- 
ers of  the  firm,  or  both ;  and  generally,  in  the  case  of  a  retiring 
partner  as  in  that  of  a  dissolution,  actual  notice  should  be  given 
to  all  customers  of  the  firm,  (cc)  ^  and  also  customary  notice  by 

{hb)  Harvey  v.  Varney,  98  Mass.  118.  of    a   partner  retiring  and   leaving   his 

(c)  See  Young  v.  Axtell,  2  H.  131.  242 ;  capital  in  the  firm,  it  will  he  necessarily 

Holyland  v.   De   Mendez,  3  Meriv.  184.  unsafe  to  reserve  a  usurious  rate  of  in- 

Tliere  it  was  agreed  on  tlie  dissolution  of  terest  for  the   capital   left  in  the  firm; 

a  partnership,  that  the  continuing  partner  though   this   observation,   perhajjs,  only 

should,  in  consideration  of  an  assignment  applies  to  a  usurious  agreement  in  the 

to  him  of  the  partnership  property,  in-  deed  of  dissolution  itself.     For  where  by 

eluding  a  lease  of  the  premises  on  which  a  deed  of  dissolution  between  A,  B,  and 

the  business  was  carried  on,  secure  to  the  C,  A   and  B  covenanted  to  replace  C's 

retiring  partner  the  payment  of  an  annu-  share  of  the  capital  by  instalments,  and 

ity,  "  or  in   case  he  should  at  any  time  afterwards  a  new  agreement  was  entered 

after  the  expiration  of  the  then  existing  into  by  parol,  which  secured  a  usurious 

lease  be  disj)ossessed  of  and  compelled  to  rate  of  interest  to  C,  it  was  held  tluit  tlie 

quit  tlie  premises,  without  an}'  collusion,  effec-t  of  considering  the  latter  agreement 

contrivance,  act,  or  default  of  his  own."  void,  was,  not  to  invalidate,  but  to  set  up 

The   continuing  partner  obtained   a   re-  the    original  agreement   and    make  that 

newal  of  tlie   lease,  and  afterwards  be-  binding  on  the  parties,  for  that  the  sec- 

came  bankrupt,  and  the   renewed   lease  ond  agreement    was  not  a   performance 

passed    under    the    assignment    of     his  of,    but   a   substitution    for   the    former 

estate.     It  was   held,  that   this  was  not  transaction.    See  Parker  v.  Eamsbottom, 

such  an  eviction  or  dispossession  as  was  3  B.  &  C.  257. 

contemplated  by  the  agreement,  in  the  (rr)   Bank  of   the    Commonwealth   v. 

event  of  which  the  animity  was  to  cease.  Mudgett,  45  Barb.  (5(>],  affirmed  in  44  N. 

Under  the  same  circumstances,  namely,  Y.  614;  Ennis  v.  Williams,  SO  Ga.  691. 

1  Austin  V.  Holland,  09  N.  Y.  571 ;  Holtgreve  v.  Wintker,  85  111.  470 ;  Haynes  v. 
Carter,  12  Ileiskell,  7.  —  A  retiring  partner  must  give  actual  notice  to  existing  dealers 

190 


CH. 


XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


169 


advertisement ;  (^cd)  but  sufficient  lapse  of  time  may  supply  the 
want  of  notice,  as  in  one  case  where  eleven  years  had  passed 
since  the  retirement,  (ce)  A  party  having  such  notice  cannot 
hold  the  retiring  partner  to  a  responsibility  for  a  credit  given  to 
the  firm  after  such  retirement  and  notice,  (t?)  ^     It  also  seems 


(cd)  This  question  is  much  considered 
in  Scheifflin  v.  Stevens,  1  Wins.  lOG.  See 
also  Zollar  v.  Janvrin,  47  N.  H.  324. 

(ce.)  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Green,  1 
Vroom,  316. 

(d)  Notice  of  the  withrawal  of  a  dor- 
mant partner  is  not  necessar3\  Magill  v. 
Merrie,  5  B.  Mon.  108 ;  Kennedy  v.  Bo- 
hannon,  11  B.  Mon.  120;  Scott  v.  Colmes- 
nil,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  416  ;  Little  v.  Clarke, 
36  Penn.  St.  114.  —  But  it  is  otlierwise  as 
to  ostensible  partners.  To  affect  a  cred- 
itor who  has  formerly  traded  with  the 
firm,  the  notice  of  tlie  retirement  of  an 
ostensible  partner  must  be  proved  to 
have  been  actual.  Prentiss  v.  Sinclair,  5 
Vt.  149 ;  Simons  v.  Strong,  24  Vt.  642 ; 
Wardwell  v.  Haight,  2  Barb.  549  ;  Clapp 
V.  Rogers,  2  Kern.  283 ;  Hutcliins  v.  Hvid- 
son,  8  Hump.  426 ;  Graves  v.  Merry,  6 
Cowen,  705 ;  Vernon  v.  Manhattan  Com- 
pany, 17  Wend.  527.  In  Pitclier  v.  Bar- 
rows, 17  Pick.  365,  Shaw,  C.  J.,  said,  "  It 
has  sometimes  been  held  that  those  who 
have  been  dealers  and  customers  of  a 
firm  shall  have  actual  notice  of  a  dissolu- 
tion ;  but,"  he  adds,  "  that  may  be  thought 
too  strict.  But  it  has  always  been  held, 
that  in  default  of  actual  and  personal 
notice  to  a  party,  public  notice  in  some 
newspaper  sliall  be  deemed  necessary." 
"  The  doctrine,"  says  Mr.  Chancellor 
Kent,  "  seems  to  be  tliat  merely  taking  a 
newspaper  in  which  a  notice  is  contained 
is  not  suflicient  to  charge  a  party,  for  it 
is  not  to  be  intended  that  he  reads  the 
contents  of  all  the  notices  in  the  news- 
papers which  he  may  chance  to  take. 
The  inference  of  constructive  notice 
from  sucli  a  source  was  strongly  ex- 
ploded in  some  of  the  above  cases." 
(8  Kent,  4th  ed.  67,  n.)  Watkinson  i'. 
Bank  of  Pennsylvania,  4  Whart.  482. 
But  see  Jenkins  v.  Blizard,  1  Stark.  418. 


A  newspaper  notice  accidentally  reach- 
ing a  bank  director  is  not  equivakiit  to 
actual  notice  to  the  bank;  but  it  seems  it 
would  be,  if  the  notice  was  actually 
served  on  him,  witli  directions  to  com- 
municate it  to  tlie  board.  National  Bank 
V.  Norton,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  572.  —  Publish- 
ment of  the  dissolution  in  a  newsjjaper 
will  not  per  se  be  sufficient,  althougli  it 
may  witli  other  circumstances  go  to  the 
jury  as  evidence  of  actual  notice.  See 
Graham  v.  Hope,  1  Peake,  Cas.  154 ; 
Wiiite  V.  Murphy,  3  Rich.  L.  369  ;  Hut- 
chins  V.  Bank  of  Tennessee,  8  Humi^h. 
418  ;  Shurlds  v.  Tilson,  2  McLean,  458  ; 
Grinnan  v.  Baton  Rouge  Mills  Co.  7  La. 
Ann.  638.  As  to  all  persons  who  have 
had  no  dealings,  and  given  no  credit  to 
the  firm,  publishment  of  the  dissolution 
is  suflicient.  Lansing  v.  Gaine,  2  Jolins. 
300 ;  Prentiss  v.  Sinclair,  5  Vt.  149 ; 
Shurlds  V.  Tilson,  2  McLean,  458  ;  Wat- 
kinson c.  Bank  of  Pennsylvania,  4  Wliart. 
482.  In  Mowatt  v.  Howland,  3  Day,  353, 
two  partners  of  a  firm  resided  in  New 
York,  and  tlie  third  in  Norwich  in  Con- 
necticut, tlieir  usual  place  of  doing 
business.  Upon  dissolution,  notice  was 
given,  for  several  weeks  successively,  in 
two  newspapers,  one  printed  at  Norwich, 
and  the  other  at  New  London,  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Norwich.  One  of  the  New 
York  partners  afterwards  indorsed  a  bill 
of  excliange  in  New  York  with  the  com- 
pany name,  but  whether  the  indorsee  liad 
or  had  not  actual  notice  of  the  dissolu- 
tion, did  not  appear,  nor  did  it  appear 
that  he  had  ever  been  a  correspondent  of 
the  company.  It  was  held,  that  these 
facts  constituted  reasonable  notice  to 
him,  and  to  every  person  not  a  corre- 
spondent of  the  company.  See  also  City 
Bank  of  Brooklyn  v.  McChesney,  20  N. 
Y.  (6  Smith)  240. 


with  the  firm,  and  public  notice  to  the  world,  to  entirely  escape  liability.  Polk  v. 
Oliver,  56  Miss.  566. — Any  means  of  fairly  publishing  the  fact  of  dissolution  as 
widely  as  possible,  as  by  advertisement,  public  notice  in  the  manner  usual  in  the 
community,  or  by  a  withdrawal  of  the  exterior  indications  of  the  partnership;  are  to 
be  considered  on  the  question  of  notice.  Lovejoy  v.  Spafford,  93  U.  S.  430.  —  As  to 
notice  generally,  see  Uhl  v.  Harvey,  21  Am.  L.  Reg.  n.  s.  and  the  elaborate  note 
appended  thereto. 

1  A  dormant  partner  on  retiring  need  notify  only  those  who  knew  of  his 
connection  with  the  firm.  Nussbaumer  v.  Becker,  87  111.  281 ;  Vaccaro  v.  Toof. 
9  HeiskeU,  194. 

191 


*  170  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

*  170    to  be  settled  that  *  such  retiring  partner  is  not  held  to 

a  creditor  who  has  no  knowledge  of  such  retirement, 
provided  the  retirement  was  actual  and  in  good  faith,  and  the 
retiring  partner  did  all  that  was  usual  or  proper  to  give  the  pub- 
lic and  customers  notice  of  his  retirement.  But  if  the  retiring 
partner  gives  no  such  notice,  then  a  customer  of  the  firm  accus- 
tomed to  trade  with  the  firm  on  the  responsibility  of  all  the  part- 
ners, including  him  who  has  retired,  and  not  knowing  of  his 
retirement,  may  hold  him  for  a  debt  contracted  with  the  firm 
after  his  retirement.  (^)  Whether  a  neiv  customer  can  so  hold 
him  is  not  so  certain.  Generally,  he  cannot ;  but  if  the  new  cus- 
tomer was  brought  to  the  firm  by  the  responsibility  of  this  part- 
ner, which  responsibility  he  knew  to  have  existed,  and  had  a  right 
to  suppose  existed  still,  which  right  grew  out  of  the  laches  of  the 
retiring  partner,  and  no  negligence  or  want  of  diligence  Avas  im- 
putable to  the  creditor,  it  would  seem  on  general  principles  that 
the  creditor  had  a  right  to  hold  him  responsible  as  a  partner.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  distinguish  on  principle  such  a  case  from  that 
of  a  former  customer  creating  a  new  debt. 

If  a  creditor  of  a  firm,  knowing  of  the  retirement  of  a  partner, 
receives  for  his  debt  the  negotiable  paper  of  the  remaining  part- 
ner or  partners,  the  presumption  is  that  he  intends  to  discharge 
the  retiring  partner.  (/)  •* 

For  the  liability  of  an  incoming  partner,  see  2'>ost,  Sect.  XII. 

(e)  Parkin  y.  Carruthers,  3  Esp.  248;  Avliich  this  responsibility  proceeds,  is  the 
Graham  v.  IIojjo,  1  Peake,  Cas.  154;  negligence  of  the  partners  in  leaving  the 
]5ernar(l  v.  Torrance,  5  G.  &  J.  383;  Lu-  world  in  ignorance  of  the  fact  of  dissolu- 
cas  V.  Bank  of  Darien,  2  Stew.  (Ala.)  tion,  and  leaving  strangers  to  conclude 
280;  Stables  f.  Eley,  1  C.  &  P.  614;  that  the  partnership  is  continued,  and  to 
Taylor  v.  Young,  3  Watts,  339 ;  Ami-  bestow  faith  and  confidence  on  the  part- 
down  u.  Osgood,  24  Vt.  278;  Sinionds  v.  nership  name  in  consequence  of  tiiat  be- 
Strong,  24  Vt.  012;  Burgan  v.  Lyell,  2  lief.  See  3  Kent,  Com.  60;  Princetons. 
Mich.  102  ;  .Johnson  v.  Totten,  3  Cal.  Gulick,  1  Harrison,  161.  See  post,  note 
343.     And  a  partner  whose  name  is  not  (y),  p.  *204. 

used  in  a  firm,  is  still  liable  for  debts  (  /')  Thompson  v.  Percival,  3  Nev.  & 

contracted    subsequently   to    his    retire-  M.  167;  Evans  c.  Drunnnond,  4  Esp.  89; 

ment,   with    persons    who   knew   of    his  Harris  v.  Earnell,  15  E.  L.  &  E.  70,  s.  c. 

previous    connection,    but    who   had   no  15   Beav.   31;    YarncU   v.  Anderson,    14 

notice   of   his  retirement.     Davis   v.   Al-  Mo.    619;    Crocker   v.   Crocker,   62   Me. 

len,  3  Comst.  168.     The  principle  upon  267. 

^  The  giving  of  his  individual  promissory  note,  by  one  partner,  after  dissolution, 
for  a  part  of  a  firm  debt,  is  a  good  consideration  for  an  agreement  by  the  creditor  to 
release  him  from  all  liability  for  the  debt.    Ludington  v.  Bell,  77  N.  Y.  138. 

192 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  171 

*  SECTION  X.  *171 

OF   NOMINAL   PARTNERS. 

A  nominal  partner,  or  one  held  out  to  the  world  as  such  with- 
out actual  participation  of  profit  and  loss,  is  of  course  held,  gen- 
erally, as  responsible  for  the  debts  of  the  partnership.^  But  one 
who  not  being  a  partner,  holds  himself  out  to  certain  persons  as 
a  partner,  is  liable  as  such  only  to  those  who  give  credit  to  the 
firm  in  the  belief  that  he  is  a  partner ;  and  it  is  said  that  this 
belief  may  be  inferred  as  to  any  one  dealing  with  the  firm,  from 
the  general  notoriety  of  his  alleged  partnership.  (^)  It  has  been 
determined  that  where  two  or  more  persons  appear  to  the  public 
as  partners,  and  there  is  a  stipulation  between  them,  that  one  of 
them  shall  not  have  any  share  of  the  profits,  nor  pay  any  portion 
of  the  losses,  he  is  not  liable  to  the  creditor  of  the  firm  who 
before  giving  credit  knew  of  this  stipulation ;  because  such  cred- 
itor has  no  right  to  fix  upon  him  a  responsibility  against  his  bar- 
gain and  intention,  which  bargain  and  intention  were  known  to 
the  creditor.  (^)  An  admission  by  a  person  that  he  is  a  partner 
in  a  firm  is  not  conclusive  against  him,  though  made  to  the  cred- 
itor, if  made  after  the  debt  for  which  it  is  sought  to  make  him 
liable,  was  contracted ;  otherwise,  if  made  before  the  credit  is 
given.  (A) 

(ff)  Wood  V.  Pennell,  51  Me.  52.  answerable  for  more  than  their  subscrip- 

{())  Anderson  v.  Pope,  1    Camp.   404,  tion ;   and   such  partner  be   also   aware, 

n.,  and   Lord    EUenhorough   in   that   case  that  a  particular  individual  is  to  be  sole 

held  that  notice  to  one  member  of  a  firm,  nominal   proprietor  ;    the  firm    of  which 

of  such  a  stipulation,  was  notice   to  the  such  a  partner  is  a  member  (although  he 

wliole  partnership.     It  was  also  held  in  has  not  taken  any  sliare  in  the   paper), 

Batty  17.  McCundie,  3  C.  &  P.  202,  that  cannot  sue  tlie  subscribers  who  have  taken 

if  one  of  several  partners  be  concerned  shares,  for  the  price  of  goods  furnislied 

in   preparing  the   prospectus   of    a   pro-  for  ihe  paper.     See  also  Burnes  v.  Pen- 

jected  newspaper,  which  prospectus  states  nell,  2  House  of  L.  Cas.  497. 
that  he  and  others  will  act  as  treasurers  [li)  Ridgway  v.  Pliilip,  1  C.  M.  &  R. 

and  managers,  and  also  that  the  suliscri-  415.     In  this  case  the  plaintiff  contracted 

bers   are  not  to  be  partners,   nor  to  be  with  one  Brown,  the  patentee  of  a  draining 

1  One  who,  by  representing  himself  to  be  a  partner,  induces  another  to  give  credit 
to  the  supposed  partnership,  is  liable  to  him  as  a  partner,  whether  actually  a  partner 
or  not.  Rice  v.  Barrett,  116  Mass.  312.  —  As  to  nominal  partners  generally,  see  fur- 
ther, Pahlman  v.  Taylor,  75  111.  629;  Peck  v.  Lusk,  38  la.  93;  Dailey  v.  Coons,  64 
Ind.  545;  Dodd  v.  Bishop,  30  La.  An.  1178;  Rittenliouse  v.  Leigh,  57  Miss.  697; 
Gauss  V.  Hobbs,  18  Kan.  500;  Speer  v.  Bishop,  24  Ohio  St.  598;  Cushing  v.  Smith, 
43  Tex.  261 ;  Poillon  v.  Secor,  61  N.  Y.  456. 

VOL.  I.  13  193 


172 


THE  LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


172 


*  SECTION  XI. 


WHEN   A    JOINT  LIABILITY   IS   INCUERED. 


"Where  there  is  no  joint  purchase  or  joint  incurring  of  debt, 
but  a  purchase  by  one  to  whom  alone  credit  is  given,  a  subsequent 
joint  interest  in  the  property  purchased,  and  in  the  business 
and  profits  depending  upon  it,  carries  no  liabihty  for  the  origi- 
nal debt.  (^)     And  where  many  persons  join  in  an  adventure, 


machine,  for  the  erection  of  one  of  those 
machines  on  the  phiintiff's  hinds  in  Cam- 
bridgesliire.  The  draft  of  the  agreement 
being  drawn  up  in  tlie  name  of  Brown  & 
Co.,  the  plaintilf  aslced  Brown  what  other 
persons  beside  himself  composed  tlie  firm, 
upon  wliicli  Brown  wrote  on  the  back  of 
tbeih-aft, "  Jolm  Broadhurst,  Esq.,  and  Dr. 
Wilson  Philip."  The  contract  being  bro- 
ken, the  plaintiff  brought  his  acttion  against 
Philip  and  Broadhurst ;  but  previously  to 
the  action,  his  son  called  on  the  defend- 
ant Broadhurst,  and  asked  him  whether 
Brown  was  correct  in  making  the  indorse- 
ment upon  the  draft  of  the  agreement,  to 
which  Broadhurst  replied  in  the  affirma- 
tive, and  stated  that  he  had  bought  his 
original  interest  from  the  other  defend- 
ant, Dr.  Philip.  Evidence  was  also  given 
at  the  trial,  that  while  the  engine  was  in 
progress,  he  attended  very  frequently  at 
the  manufactory  to  inquire  how  it  was 
going  on,  and  that  he  gave  advice  and 
made  suggestions  with  regard  to  its  con- 
struction. In  answer  to  this,  an  agree- 
ment or  license  from  Brown  and  the 
other  parties  interested  in  the  patent  to 
Broadlmrst,  was  given  in  evidence  on  the 
part  of  tlie  latter,  authorizing  Broad 
hurst  to  use  the  patent  for  the  erection 
of  engines  in  certain  parts  of  Cornwall 
only,  and  it  was  contended  that  the  ad- 
missions of  Broadhurst  were  to  be  taken 
with  reference  to  the  interest  which  he 
thus  possessed  in  the  invention,  and  not 
to  any  participation  either  in  the  patent 
generally,  or  in  the  particular  transaction 
in  question.  Gaxriee,  J.,  who  tried  the 
action,  left  it  to  the  jury  to  say  whether 
Broadhurst,  at  tlie  time  he  made  the 
admission,  was  under  a  mistake ;  and 
whether  the  acts  he  was  proved  to  have 
done  did  or  did  not  afford  a  sufficient 
ground  for  supposing  it  io  be  a  mistake  ; 
and  with  regard  to  those  a'-ts  he  left  it  to 
the  jury  to  gay  whether  they  were  refer- 

194 


able  to  a  partnership  in  the  patent  in 
general,  or  in  this  particular  transac^tion. 
The  jury  found  a  verdict  for  the  defend- 
ants on  the  ground  that  Broadhurst 
was  not  a  partner,  and  the  Court  of  Ex- 
chequer refused  to  grant  a  new  trial. 
See  Gordon  v.  Bankard,  37  111.  147 ;  Bar- 
croft  V.  Snodgrass,  1  Cold.  430. 

(i)  Persons  are  not  to  be  held  jointly 
liable  upon  a  contract  as  partners,  unless 
they  have  a  joint  interest  existing  at 
the  time  of  the  foriuation  of  the  contract. 
The  case  of  Young  v.  Hunter,  4  Taunt. 
582,  well  illustrates  this  iirinciple.  In  an 
action  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  two 
of  the  defendants,  Hunter  and  Rayne3% 
suffered  judgment  to  go  by  default ;  tlie 
other  defendants,  Hoffiiam  &  Co  ,  pleaded 
the  general  issue.  On  trial  it  appeared 
that  Hunter  and  Rayney  had  bought 
goods  of  the  plaintiffs  and  others,  which 
they  intended  to  shi])  for  the  Baltic,  and 
the  defendants,  Holfham  &  Co.  (not  oth- 
erwise partners  of  Hunter  &  Co.),  were 
afterwards  allowed  to  join  in  the  adven- 
ture, and  to  have  a  fifth  share  upon  the 
goods  being  put  on  board.  The  jilaintiffs 
knew  nothing  of  Hoffham  &  Co.,  but 
sold  the  goods  to  Hunter  &  Co.  only. 
The  question  was  whether  this  was  a 
case  of  common  sleeping  partners.  Mans- 
field, C.  J.,  directed  the  jury  to  find  for 
defendant,  with  liberty  for  plaintiff  to 
move  for  a  new  trial ;  a  rule  visi  was  ob- 
tained, on  the  ground  that  Holfiiam  & 
Co.  having  had  the  benefit  of  the  goods, 
were  liable  to  ])ay  for  them,  though  they 
were  originally  furnished  to  Hunter  & 
Co.  only.  On  a  new  trial,  Manxfidd,  C. 
J.,  continued  of  the  same  oi)inion. 
ITrath.  J. :  "The  proposition  of  the  jjlain- 
tiffs,  counsel,  that  if  it  be  shown  that  at 
any  one  period  of  the  transaction  tliere 
was  a  partnership  subsisting,  it  was 
therefore  to  be  inferred  that  thiTC  had 
been  a  partnership  in  the  particular  or- 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


173 


*  each  to  contribute  his  share,  each  is  liable  alone  for  his  *  173 
share  to  the  person  from  whom  he  boiiglit  it.  No  part- 
nership arises  until  the  several  shares  are  brought  together  and 
mixed  up  in  one  common  adventure.  (/)  But  if  the  bargain  was 
for  a  joint  purchase  and  joint  adventure,  there  is  at  once  a  joint 
liability  for  the  original  purchase,  although  it  was  made  by  one 
of  the  partners  alone,  and  he  alone  was  known  to  be  interested, 
and  credit  was  given  to  him  alone,  (/c)     And  the  same  rule  is 


isfiniil  purcliase,  is  wholly  unfounded." 
Cliamhre,  J.,  was  of  the  same  opinion. 
Gibbs,  J. :  "  Tlie  only  possible  ground  for 
a  new  trial  would  be,  if  the  plaintiffs 
could  show  that  at  the  time  of  the  pur- 
chase of  the  goods  from  the  plaintiffs, 
Hoffhani  &  Co.  and  Hunter  &  Rayney 
were  concerned  in  that  purchase  in  their 
joint  account.  It  only  appears  that  they 
were  so  interested  at  the  time  of  ship- 
ment. It  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  the 
fact  that  Iloffhani  &  Co.  were  interested 
at  the  time  of  shipment,  that  they  were 
interested  at  tiie  time  of  the  purchase. 
It  is  for  the  plaintiffs  to  make  it  out  by 
evidence.  If  parties  agree  among  them- 
selves that  one  house  shall  buy  goods, 
and  let  the  other  into  an  interest  in  them, 
that  other  being  unknown  to  the  vendor ; 
in  such  a  case  the  vendor  could  not  re- 
cover against  him,  though  such  other 
persons  would  have  the  benefit  of  the 
goods.  On  this  and  other  reasons,  I  think 
the  present  verdict  ought  not  to  be  dis- 
turbed."—  This  principle  is  further  illus- 
trated by  many  cases  showing  that  where 
one,  on  his  individual  credit  alone,  bor- 
rows money  for  the  use  of  the  firm,  the 
firm  will  not  be  liable  merely  because  the 
money  came  to  their  use.  See  Siffkin  v. 
Walker,  2  Camp.  308;  Graeff  v.  Hitch- 
man,  5  \yatts,  454  ;  Emly  v.  Lye,  15  East, 
7;  Green  v.  Tanner,  8  Met.  411;  Ripley 
V.  Kingsbury,  1  Day,  150,  n. 

{,/  )  This  principle  is  fully  established 
by  the  case  of  Saville  v.  Robertson,  4  T. 
R.  720.  See  also  Gouthwaite  v.  Duck- 
worth, 12  East,  421,  where  Saville  v. 
Robertson  is  distinguished.  Lord  Ellen- 
borotif/h,  in  Gouthwaite  v.  Duckworth, 
says  :  "  The  case  of  Saville  v.  Robertson 
does  indeed  approach  very  near  to  this ; 
))ut  the  distinction  is,  that  there  each 
party  brought  his  separate  parcel  of 
goods,  which  were  afterwards  to  be 
mixed  in  the  common  adventure,  on 
board  the  ship;  and  till  that  admixture 
the  partnership  in  the  goods  did  not 
rise.  But  here  the  goods  in  question 
were  purchased  in  pursuance  of  the 
agreement  for  the  adventure,  of  which  it 


had  been  before  settled  that  Duckworth 
was  to  have  a  moiety."  And  JNIr.  Jus- 
tice Baijleij  observed,  that,  "  In  Saville  v. 
Robertson,  after  the  purchase  of  the  goods 
made  by  the  several  adventurers,  there 
was  a  still  further  act  to  be  done,  which 
was  the  putting  them  on  board  the  ship 
in  which  they  had  a  common  concern, 
for  the  joint  adventure ;  and  until  that 
further  act  was  done,  the  goods  pur- 
chased by  each  remained  the  separate 
property  of  each.  But  here,  as  soon  as 
the  goods  were  purchased,  the  interest  of 
the  three  attached  in  them  at  the  same 
instant,  by  virtue  of  the  previous  agree- 
ment." See  also  Post  v.  Kimberly,  .9 
Johns.  470,  in  which  it  was  held,  that 
there  was  no  partnership  between  A  and 
B,  and  C  and  D,  in  the  outward  cargo, 
except,  perhaps,  so  far  as  related  to  the 
transport  and  selling  of  it ;  for  that,  al- 
though the  whole  cargo  was  shipped  on 
board  the  same  vessel,  yet  it  was  clear 
that  each  house  purchased  and  put  on 
board  its  aliquot  part,  without  the  con- 
cern or  responsibility  of  the  other. 
Brooke  v.  Evans,  5  Watts,  196 ;  Sims 
V.  Willing,  8  S.  &  R.  103. 

{k)  Thus,  where  three  persons  were 
engaged  in  a  joint  speculation,  for  the 
purchase  and  importation  of  corn,  but 
no  partnership  fund  was  raised  for  the 
speculation,  and  the  parties  met  the  ex- 
penses in  thirds,  and  two  only  of  the 
three  had  the  management  of  the  specu- 
lation, one  of  these  two  being  the  con- 
signee and  the  other  the  salesman  of  the 
corn  i  it  was  nevertheless  very  truly 
said,  that,  if  there  had  been  a  claim  in 
that  case  by  the  seller  of  the  corn,  no 
doubt  he  would  have  been  entitled  to 
proceed  against  all  the  parties,  and 
might  have  called  on  them  all  for  pay- 
ment. Smith  V.  Cragcn,  1  Cr.  &  J.  500. 
Upon  the  same  principles,  where  A  and 
others  agreed  to  become  partners  in  the 
purchase  of  fifteen  shares  of  a  copper 
adventure,  and  in  pursuance  of  the 
agreement,  A  alone,  and  in  his  own 
name,  contracted  for  the  purchase  of 
the  shares,  and  paid  a  deposit,  to  which 

195 


*  174  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

*  174    *  applied,  where  the  creditor  of  a  foreign  firm,  aware  of 

the  persons  composing  the  firm,  and  that  the  goods  are 
to  be  shipped  for  the  firm,  in  deahng  with  a  resident  member, 
makes  out  the  invoices  to  him  individually,  and  draws  upon  him 
alone.  (Z)  Because  the  liability  of  a  partner  springs  eitlLer  from 
his  holding  himself  out  to  the  world  as  a  partner,  or  from  his 
participation  in  the  business  and  its  profit  or  loss.  If  these  two 
causes  meet,  as  is  usually  the  case,  they  strengthen  each  other ; 
but  either  of  them  alone  is,  in  general,  sufficient  to  create  this 
liability,  (w)  Nor  is  it  necessary  that  there  should  be  an  express 
stipulation,  if  in  fact  they  share  the  business  and  the  profits  as 
partners,  (inm)  And  there  is  no  liability  as  a  partner  where 
there  is  neither  a  participation  of  profits,  nor  any  such  use  of 
the  defendant's  name  permitted  by  him  as  justifies  the  plaintiff 
in  selling  to  others  on  his  credit,  although  there  may  be  in  some 
other  way  or  measure  a  community  of  interest,  (n) 


SECTION  XII. 

OP   THE   AUTHORITY  OF   EACH   PARTNER. 

It  is  a  general  rule,  both  throughout  Europe  and  in  this  coun- 
try, that  the  whole  firm  and  all  the  members  of  a  copartnership 
are  bound  by  the  acts  and  contracts  of  one  partner  Avith  reference 

the  others  contributed  ;  it  was  held  that  ished,  tlie  jury  were  to  find  for  the  plain- 

the  others,  as  well  as  A,  were  bound  by  tiffs.     The   jury    did    so    find,    and    the 

this   contract,  and  that,  upon  an  action  Court  of  King's  Bench  refused  to  grant  a 

and  verdict  against  A  for  the  non-])er-  new  trial.     Gardiner  v.  Childs,  8  C".  &  P. 

forniance  of  it,  the  others  were  bound  to  o45.  —  See  (Joope  v.  Eyre,  1  II.    Bl.  37; 

contribute  their  j)r<)i)ortion  of  tlie  dam-  Barton  v.  Hanson,  2  Taunt.  49;  Sims  y. 

ages   and  costs.      Browne   i'.  Gibbins,  5  Willing,  8  S.  &  K.  103. 

Bro.  P.  C.  491.     So,  where  A  and  B,  pub-  (/)  Bottomly  v.  Nuttall,  94  Eng.  C.  L. 

lishers,     ordered     certain    stationers    to  122;  s.  c.  5  C.  B    (n.  s.)  122. 

supply    paper    to    C    and    1),    printers,  (m)  See    Buckingham   i\   Burgess,    3 

for     tiie     purpose    of    printing     certain  McLean,  304 ;    iMarkliani  ^^  Jones,  7  B. 

specified    works,   and,    upon    the    bank-  Mon.4i)6;   Benedict  c  Davi.s,  2  McLean, 

ruptcy  of   A   and    B,  tlie  stationers  dis-  347;   Cottrill  ^■.  Vanduzen,  22  Vt.  fjll. 

covered  tluit  C  and  I)  were  partners  with  (mm)  Duryea  v.  Burt,  28  Cal.  5(>'.). 

A   and   B   in    the   publication   of    those  (n)  Sec  Osborne  v.  Brennan,  2  Nott  & 

works,  and  thereupon  brought  an  action  McC.  447;   Milburn   v.   Guytiier,  8   Gill, 

against  C  and  1),  lo  recover  the  value  of  92.  —  And  a  lay  or  sliare  in  the  proceeds 

the  paper.  Lord   JJfiiman,  C.  J.,   told  the  of  a  wlialing  voyage,  does  not  create  a 

jury  that  if  they   thouglit,   tliat,  at  the  partnerslnj)  in  the  profits  of  tlie  voyage, 

time    when    the   gooils    were    furnished,  l)ut  is  in  the  nature  of  seamen's  wages, 

the  defendants  were  jiartners  in  tiie  con-  and  governed  by  the  same  rules.     Coffin 

cern  for  wliose  benefit  they  were  f  urn-  v.  Jenkins,  3  Story,  108. 

196 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNEESHIP.  *  175 

to  the  partnership  business  and  aifairs  (wn)  —  such  act  or  con- 
tract being  in  law  the  act  or  contract  of  all.  This  power  of  each 
partner  to  represent  and  to  bind  the  rest,  and  to  dispose  of  the 
partnership  property,  is  sometimes  regarded  as  arising 
from  *  the  agency  which  all  confer  on  each ;  and  some-  *  175 
times  from  the  community  of  interest  whereby  no  partner 
owns  any  part  of  the  partnership  property  exclusively  of  the  rest, 
but  each  partner  owns  the  whole,  in  common  with  all  the  others. 
We  think  it  rests  upon  both  of  these  foundations  together.  It 
is  true  that  there  may  be  a  copartnership  where  one  or  more  of 
the  partners  has  no  interest  in  the  capital  stock  by  agreement 
among  themselves.  But  even  then  all  own  together  the  profits, 
and  so  much  of  the  funds  or  capital  of  the  firm  as  consists  of 
profits.  Partners  are  undoubtedly,  in  some  way,  agents  of  each 
other.  But  the  principle  of  agency  alone  will  not  explain  the 
whole  law  of  their  mutual  responsibility.  Out  of  the  combination 
of  this  principle  with  those  which  grow  out  of  the  community 
of  property  and  of  interest,  the  law  of  partnership  is  formed. 
And  this  law  may  often  be  illustrated  by  a  reference  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  agency ;  but  must  still  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  a 
distinct  system  of  rules  and  principles  peculiar  to  itself. 

So  also,  partnership  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as  like  joint- 
tenancy,  with  important  modifications,  or  like  tenancy  in  com- 
mon, with  such  modifications.  In  truth  it  is  a  distinct  and 
independent  relation ;  and  though  it  has  some  of  the  attributes 
of  joint  tenancy,  and  some  of  tenancy  in  common,  it  is  neither 
of  these.  Nor  can  it  be  much  better  illustrated  b}^  a  reference 
to  either  of  these  modes  of  joint-ownership,  than  they  would  be 
by  a  reference  to  partnership. 

If  an  action  is  brought  against  sundry  persons  as  copartners, 
and  the  fact  of  copartnership  is  admitted,  or  otherwise  proved, 
then  the  admission  of  one  of  the  partners  as  to  any  matter 
between  the  firm  and  another  party  affects,  as  evidence,  all  the 
partners.  But  where  the  existence  of  the  copartnership,  or  of 
the  joint  interest  of  liability,  is  in  dispute,  the  admission  of  one 
person  that  he  is  copartner  with  the  others,  affects  him  alone, 
and  is  not  evidence  of  the  existence  of  .the  copartnership  so 
as  to  bind  the  others,  (o)     And   if   two  firms  are  partners  in 

(nn)  Stockwell  v.  Dillingham,  50  Me.  (o)  Taylor  v.  Henderson,  17  S.  &  R. 

442;  Welles  v.  March,  30  N.  Y.  344.  453;  McPherson  v.  Ratlibone,  7  Wend. 

197 


176 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  176    *  any  transaction,  the  acknowledgment  by  one  affects  both. 
The  effect  of  an  acknowledgment  by  a  partner,  where  a 
promise  is   barred   by  the   Statute  of   Limitations,  will   be  con- 
sidered when  we  treat  of  that  statute. 

Where  a  joint  business  transaction  consists  in  or  refers  to  the 
purchase  of  goods,  it  is  generally  the  rule  that  the  partnership 
liability  begins  when  the  goods  are  ordered.  But  this  may  de- 
pend upon  the  question  whether  the  person  giving  the  order  was, 
at  that  time,  the  agent  of  all  who  are  sought  to  be  charged.  For 
if  he  was  not,  then  they  are  not  liable ;  and  in  that  case  a 
subsequent  naked  acknowledgment  of  the  contract  will  not 
suffice  to  render  them  liable  as  partners,  {p}     For  parties  are 


21G;  Jewett  v.  Stevens,  6  N.  H.  82; 
Mitchell  v.  Rniilstone,  2  Hall.  351  ;  Nel- 
son r.  Lloyd,  9  Watts,  22  ;  Cottrill  v.  Van- 
duzen,  "22  Vt.  511;  Gilpin  y.  Temple,  4 
Harring.  190;  Van  Reimsdyk  v.  Kane,  1 
Gallis. 'tJ30;  Tuttle  v.  Cooper,  5  Tick. 
414 ;  Whitney  v.  Ferris,  lU  Johns.  (iG ; 
Bueknam  r.  Barnuni,  15  Conn.  08;  Phillips 
V.  PurinEjton,  15  Me.  425;  Jennings  r. 
Estes,  16  id.  323;  Welsh  v.  Speaknian, 
8  W.  &  S.  257 ;  Haughey  v.  Strickler,  2 
id.  411;  Porter  y.  Wilson,  13  Penn.  041. 
—  But  the  existence  of  a  partnership  may 
be  proved  by  the  separate  admissions  of 
all  who  are  sued,  or  by  the  acts,  decla- 
rations, and  conduct  of  the  parties,  the 
act  of  one,  the  declarations  of  another, 
and  the  acknowledgment  or  conduct  of 
a  third.  Welsh  v.  Speakman,  8  W.  &  S. 
257.  Sec  also  Ilaughey  v.  Strickler,  2 
W.  &  S.  411.  And  where  proof  of  the 
aduiissions  of  an  alleged  partner  are 
offered  at  the  trial,  it  is  the  province  of 
the  judge  and  not  of  the  jury  to  pass 
upon  tlie  fact  whether  such  person  was 
a  i)artuer  or  not.  Harris  r.  Wilson,  7 
Wend.  57.  —  And  where  the  terms  of 
the  agreement  and  the  facts  are  admit- 
ted, it  is  a  question  of  law,  whether  there 
was  a  parinershii)  or  not.  Everitt  r. 
Chapman,  G  Conn.  347 ;  Terrell  v.  Rich- 
ards, 1  Nott  &  McC.  20.  —  The  fact  that 
tlie  defendants  do  business  as  piirtncrs  is 
prima  facie  evidence  of  tlieir  copartner- 
sliip,  and  no  written  articles  need  be 
sliown.  Bryer  v.  Weston,  1(3  Me.  201  ; 
Gilbert  v.  Whidden,  20  id.  307;  Forbes 
V.  Davidson,  11  Vt.  000.  Aiul  the  ad- 
verse party's  acknowledgment  that  the 
plaintilTs  were  piirliu-rs  is  sufficient. 
Bisel  /•.  Hohhs,  0  Blac  kf.  470.  lu  Hogg 
v.  (>rgill,  34  I'eiin.  St.  344,  it  is  held  tliat 
the  aiimission  of  one  partner  that  an- 
other was  a  member  of  the  firm,  made 

198 


after  dissolution,  binds  no  one  but  him- 
self. 

ip)  Gouthwaite  v.  Duckworth,  12  East, 
421;  Saville  i:  Robertson,  4  T.  R.  720. 
In  Sims  v.  Willing,  8  S  &  R.  103,  A,  by 
order  of  B,  chartered  a  vessel  to  take  a 
cargo  of  flour  and  In<lian  corn  on  freight 
from  Philadelphia  to  Lisbon  Part  of 
tlie  flour  belonged  to  A,  ])art  to  B,  and 
the  remainder  to  C  ;  and  the  share  of 
each  was  paid  for  out  of  his  sej)arate 
funds.  A  effected  a  separate  insurance 
on  his  own  interest  in  the  flour.  The 
whole  shipment  was  consigned  to  C,  in 
Lisbon,  and  the  whole  ap])eared  as  his 
l)roperty  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
it  from  British  cruisers.  Had  the  vessel 
arrived  at  Lisbon  the  whole  of  the  flour 
was  to  have  been  sold  l)y  the  consignee, 
and  the  net  proceeds  of  A's  interest  re- 
mitted, on  his  account,  to  his  correspond- 
ent in  London.  IL/d,  that  A,  B,  and  C 
were  partners,  and  individually  liable  for 
the  whole  amount  of  a  general  average 
due  ujion  the  flour.  — The  case  of  Post  v. 
Kimberly,  0  Johns.  470,  is  a  leading  case 
on  this  subject.  In  that  case,  A.  and  M., 
partners,  owned  three-fourths  of  a  vessel, 
and  B.  and  K.,  partners,  owned  tiie  one- 
fourth  ;  they  agreed  to  fit  her  out  on  a 
voyage  from  New  York  to  Laguira.  A. 
and  i\I.  purchased  three-fourths  of  the 
cargo,  and  chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  with 
notes  lent  and  advanced  to  them  by  P. 
&  R.,  connnission  niercliants.  B.  and  K. 
purchased  the  other  fourth  of  the  cargo, 
for  wi:ich  they  paid  their  own  money, 
and  shii)i)cd  the  same  on  board  tiie  ves- 
sel ;  l)ut  it  was  not  distinguished  from 
the  rest  of  the  cargo  by  any  particular 
marks;  and  the  wlioje  cargo  was  to  he 
sold  at  Laguira,  for  the  joint  account 
and  the  jonit  benefit  of  the  owners,  A. 
and  M.,  and  B.  and  K.    M.  went  out  as  the 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


177 


*  not  jointly  liable  as  partners  upon  any  contract,  unless  *  177 
they  had  a  joint  interest  preceding  or  contemporary  with 
the  formation  of  the  contract.  But  where  two  or  more  agree 
together  to  purchase  goods,  and  agree  also  that  one  shall  purchase 
them  for  the  rest,  here  there  is  a  partnership  preceding  the  pur- 
chase, and  he  that  buys  is  by  the  agreement  of  the  others  their 
agent,  and  all  are  liable  as  partners.  Qq) 

We  have  seen  that  each  partner  is  for  many  purposes  the  agent 
of  all  the  rest,  by  force  of  law,  without  any  express  authority,  (r)  ^ 


supercargo  and  agent ;  and  having  sold 
the  cargo  at  Laguira,  he  invested  tlie 
proceeds  in  a  return  cargo,  with  wliich 
the  vessel  set  sail  for  New  York,  but  was 
obliged  by  stress  of  weather  to  put  into 
Norfolk,  where  M.  sold  the  return  cargo, 
except  a  small  parcel  of  coffee,  and  for 
the  avails  received  bills  of  exchange, 
which  he  indorsed  and  remitted,  witli  the 
parcel  of  coffee,  to  P.  and  R.,  to  whom 
A.  and  M.  were  jointly  indebted,  and 
M.  on  his  private  account,  to  a  greater 
amount,  for  advances  made  at  the  time 
of  the  purchase  of  tlie  outward  cargo. 
P.  and  R.  collected  the  bills  and  sold  the 
coffee  so  remitted,  and  applied  the  same 
to  the  paj'ment  of  the  debts  so  due  to 
them  from  A.  and  M.  P.  and  R.  had 
notice,  if  not  at  the  time  of  the  shipment 
of  the  outward  cargo,  certainly  before 
the  bills  remitted  by  M.  were  collected, 
and  the  coffee  sold  and  converted  into 
money,  that  B.  and  K.  were  interested 
in  and  owned  une-fourih  of  the  cargo  so 
sold  by  M. ;  and  B.  and  K.  demanded  of 
P.  and  R.  their  proportion  of  the  proceeds 
so  remitted  by  M.,  after  deducting  com- 
missions, &c.,  but  P.  and  R.  refused  to 
pay  or  deliver  the  same,  alleging  their 
right  to  retain  the  same,  for  the  payment 
.of  the  debt  due  to  them  from  A.  and  M. 
It  was  held,  that  there  was  no  jiartnership 
existing  between  A.  and  M.  and  B.  and 
K.,  so  as  to  render  the  disposition  of  the 
return  cargo,  by  M.  binding,  as  the  act 
of  a  partner  on  B.  and  K. ;  tliat  there  was 
no  agreement  constituting  a  partnership 
in  the  purchase  of  the  outward  cargo,  or 
to  share  jointly  in  the  ultimate  profit  and 
loss  of  the  adventure ;  and  though  there 
might  be  a  partnership  so  far  as  respect- 
ed the  transportation  and  selling  of  the 
outward  cargo,  for  the  joint  profit  and 
loss  of  the  owners  ;  yet  it  terminated  in 
the  sale  of  the  outward  cargo  ;  and  their 


interest  in  the  return  cargo  was  separate 
and  distinct,  each  being  entitled  to  his 
respective  proportion  of  it  without  any 
concern  in  the  profit  and  loss  which 
might  ultimately  arise ;  and  that  P.  and 
R.,  not  having  received  the  bills  in  the 
course  of  trade,  and  knowing  of  the 
interest  of  B.  and  K.  before  the  bills 
were  paid,  had  no  right  to  retain  their 
share,  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  of  A. 
and  M.,  but  must  account  to  B.  and  K., 
for  their  proportion ;  and  that  a  bill  for 
a  discovery  and  account  by  them,  against 
P.  and  R.,  was  sustainable  in  the  Court  of 
Chancery ;  that  court  having  a  concur- 
rent jurisdiction  with  the  courts  of  law 
in  all  matters  of  account.  —  In  Coope  v. 
Eyre,  1  H.  Bl.  37,  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  agreed 
to  bu3'  jointly  all  the  oil  they  could  get, 
as  their  joint  purchase,  but  A  alone  was 
to  buy,  and  B,  C,  and  I)  were  to  share 
equally  in  the  oil  he  bought.  A  buys  of 
E  on  credit.  The  oil  fails  in  value,  and 
A  fails.  E  sues  B,  C,  and  U,  as  his  part- 
ners. They  were  held  not  to  be  his' 
partners,  because  it  appeared  that  A 
was  not  to  sell  for  the  rest ;  but  when 
he  had  bought,  B,  C,  and  D  were  to  re- 
ceive from  him  each  one-fourth ;  and 
there  was  no  community  in  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  oil.  —  A  firm  cannot  be 
charged  with  a  debt  contracted  by  one 
of  the  partners  before  the  partnership 
was  constituted,  although  the  subject- 
matter  which  was  the  consideration  of 
the  debt,  has  been  carried  into  the  part- 
nership as  stock.  Brooke  r.  Evans,  5 
Watts,  196 ;  Ketchum  v.  Durkee,  1  Hoff. 
Ch.  538. 

(q)  Felichy  v.  Hamilton,  1  Wash.  C. 
C.  491. 

(r)  Boswell  v.  Green,  1  Butcher,  390  ; 
Western  Stage  Company  v.  Walker,  2 
la.  504. 


1  Thus  one  partner  may  buy  and  sell,  Tate  v.  Clements,  16  Fla.  3.39;  Birks  i;. 
French,  21  Kan.  238  ;  Corning  /;.  Abbott,  54  N.  II.  469  ;  Johnson  v  Barry,  95  111.  483 ; 
notwithstanding  notice  to  withhold  credit  from  him,  Campbell  v.  Bowen,  49  Ga.  417  ; 

199 


*  178  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

Loans,   purchases,    sales,    assignments,    pledges,    or   mortgages, 
effected    by    one    partner    on   the    partnership    account, 

*  178    *  and  with  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the  creditor  or  other 

third  party,  are  binding  on  all  the  firm.  And  this  agency, 
as  it  generally  springs  from  a  community  of  interest,  so  it  is  gen- 
erally limited  by  this  community. 

A  partner  may  transfer  all  his  interest  in  the  partnership,  and 
it  has  even  been  held,  contrary  as  we  think  to  the  prevailing  rule, 
that  such  assignment  by  a  partner  to  his  individual  creditors,  was 
valid  against  the  partnership  creditors,  (s)  ^ 

Among  the  questions  which  have  arisen  as  to  the  limitations 
to  the  general  power  of  a  partner  over  the  partnership  property, 
one,  not  yet  perhaps  perfectly  settled,  is  as  to  the  power  of  one 
partner  to  make  an  assignment  of  the  whole  property,  to  pay 
the   partnership   debts,  (t)     We   think  the  weight  of  authority 

(s)  Wilson   V.  Bowden,  8  Rich.  L.  9,  it,  as  I  conceive,  affect  tlie  power,  that 

and  Norris  v.  Vernon,  id.  l3.  these   goods  were  convej'ed  to   trustees 

(t)  Anderson  v.  Tompkins,  1  Brock,  to  be  sold  by  them.  The  mode  of  sale 
450.  It  was  held  in  this  case  that  tlie  must,  I  think,  depend  on  circumstances, 
right  of  one  partner  to  bind  another  by  Should  goods  be  delivered  to  trustees, 
such  assigimient  results  from  his  general  for  sale  witliout  necessity,  the  transac- 
power  to  dispose  of  the  partnershiii  pro-  tion  would  be  examined  with  scrutinizing 
perty,  and  if  made  bona  Jide  is  valid,  eyes,  and  niiglit,  under  some  circumstan- 
Alarshall,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  Had  this,  then,  ces,  be  irni)eached.  But  if  the  necessity 
been  a  sale  for  money,  or  on  credit,  no  be  apparent,  if  the  act  be  justified  by  its 
person,  I  think,  could  have  doubted  its  motives,  if  the  mode  of  sale  be  sucli  as 
obligation.  I  can  perceive  no  distinction  the  circumstances  require,  I  cannot  say 
in  law,  in  reason,  or  in  justice,  between  that  the  partner  has  exceeded  liis  power." 
such  a  sale  and  the  transaction  which  The  assignment  was  also  held  valid  in 
has  taken  i)lace.  A  merchant  may  right-  Harrison  r.  Sterry,  5  Crancli,  300,  al- 
fully  sell  to  his  creditor,  as  well  as  for  thougli  under  seal.  Robinson  v.  Crow- 
money.  He  may  give  goods  in  j)ayment  der,  4  McCord,  519.  And  see  to  the 
for  a  debt.  If  he  may  thus  pay  a  small  same  effect  Mills  v.  Barber,  4  Day,  428; 
creditor,  he  may  thus  pay  a  large  one.  Deckard  /;.  Case,  5  Watts,  22 ;  Tapley 
The  t/nantiim  of  debt,  or  of  goods  sold,  v.  Butterfield,  1  Met.  515 ;  Mabbett  v. 
cannot    alter    the    right.    Neither    does  White,  2  Kern.  442 ;   Kemp  v.  Caruley, 

or  accept  delivery,  Kenney  i'.  Altvatcr,  77  Penn.  St.  .34 ;  Crosswell  v.  Leliman,  54 
Ala.  ;3G3;  or  liire  servants,  Carley  v.  Jenkins,  40  Vt.  721 ;  or  assign  a  firm  chose  in 
action,  Clarke  v.  Hogenian.  13  W.  Va,  718;  or  receive  security  for  money  lent,  In  re 
Land  Credit  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  831 ;  or  mortgage  firm  goods  for  a  firm  debt,  Richard- 
6on  V.  Lester,  83  111.  55;  or  settle  an  insurance  loss.  Brown  r.  Hartford  Lis.  Co.,  117 
Mass.  47y;  or  borrow  money,  Howze  c.  Patterson,  03  Ala.  205;  LefHer  v.  Puce,  44 
Ind.  103;  .Smitli  v.  Collins,  115  Mass.  .388;  or  indorse  negotiable  paper,  Porter  v. 
White,  39  Md.  G13  ;  Moorehead  v.  Gilmore,  77  Penn.  St.  118  ;  Cottam  r.  Smith,  27  La. 
An.  128  ;  or  sign  the  firm  name  to  notes,  Wagner  r.  Simmons,  01  Ala.  143;  Jolmson 
I'.  Harry,  95  111.  483;  Porter  v.  Barry,  39  Md.  613;  Faler  v.  Jordan,  44  Miss  283; 
Ditts  /;.  Lonsdale,  49  Ind.  521  ;  Sliaw  v.  McGregory,  105  Mass.  90;  Dow  v.  Moore, 
47  N.  II.  419;  but  a  partner  cannot  accept  a  bill  drawn  "to  our  order,"  Hogarth  v. 
Latham,  3  Q.  B.  D.  043. 

1  A  partner  may  mortgage  his  interest,  and  the  mortgagee  may  sell  it,  subject  to 
his  copartners'  right  first  to  aj)i)ly  the  joint  property  to  tlie  payment  of  firm  debts 
and  of  any  balance  due  themselves.     Smith  v.  Evans,  37  Ind.  520. 

200 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


179 


and  of  *  reason  is  in  favor  of  this  power,  and  that  such    *  179 
assignment,  being  entirely  in  good  faith,  would  be  held 
valid ;  especially  if  one  of  the  i)artners  had  absconded,  and  the 
other  made  the  arrangement,  (^i)     He  may  sell  the  whole  stock 
in  trade  by  a  single  contract,  (w)     Nor  is  the  sale  avoided  by 


3  Duer,  1.  In  Egberts  v.  Wood,  3  Paige, 
517,  Chancellor  Wulicurth  considered  such 
assignments  valid  when  not  against  the 
known  wislies  of  a  copartner.  The  con- 
trary was  held  in  Dickinson  v.  Legare, 
1  Desaus.  557  (overruled  by  Robinson  v. 
Crowder,  supra)  ;  Dana  v.  Lull,  17  Vt. 
390,  per  Redjield,  J.,  and  Bennett,  J.  See 
Moddewell  v.  Keever,  8  W.  &  S.  63.  In 
Havens  v.  Hussey,  5  Paige,  30,  the  power 
of  one  partner  to  make  such  an  assign- 
ment against  the  known  wishes  of  a 
copartner,  or  without  his  consent,  was 
held  invalid.  Chancellor  Walicorth,  re- 
ferring to  Egberts  v.  Wood,  supra,  said  : 
"As  it  was  not  necessary  for  the  decision 
of  that  case,  I  did  not  express  any 
opinion  as  to  the  validity  of  an  assign- 
ment of  the  partnership  effects  by  one 
partner,  against  the  known  wishes  of 
his  copartner,  to  a  trustee,  for  the  benefit 
of  the  favorite  creditors  of  the  assignor ; 
in  fraud  of  the  rights  of  his  copartner 
to  participate  in  the  distribution  of  the 
partnership  effects  among  the  creditors, 
or  in  the  decision  of  the  question  as  to 
which  of  the  creditors,  if  any,  should 
have  a  preference  in  payment  out  of  the 
effects  of  an  insolvent  concern.  .  .  .  One 
member  of  the  firm,  without  any  express 
authority  from  the  other,  may  discharge 
a  partnership  debt,  either  by  the  pay- 
ment of  money,  or  by  the  transfer  to  the 
creditor  of  any  other  of  the  copartnership 
effects  ;  although  there  may  not  be  suf- 
ficient left  to  pay  an  equal  amount  to 
the  other  creditors  of  the  firm.  But  it  is 
no  part  of  the  ordinary  business  of  a 
copartnership  to  appoint  a  trustee  of  all 
the  partnership  effects,  for  the  purpose 
of  selling  and  distributing  the  proceeds 
among  the  creditors  in  unequal  propor- 
tions. And  no  such  authority  as  that 
can  be  implied.  On  the  contrary,  such 
an  exercise  of  power  by  one  of  the  firm, 
without  the  consent  of  the  other,  is  in 
most  cases  a  virtual  dissolution  of  the 
copartnership  ;  as  it  renders  it  impossible 
for  the  firm  to  continue  its  business."  — 
In  Hitchcock  v.  St.  John,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  511, 
it  was  held,  that  one  partner  cannot  on 
the  eve  of  insolvency  assign  all  the  part- 
nership property  to  a  trustee,  for  the 
purpose  of  pa\-ing  the  debts  of  the  firm 
with  preferences.     In  Kirby  v.  Ingersoll, 


1  Doug.  (Mich.)  477,  the  reasons  for  and 
against  the  validity  of  such  assignments 
to  trustees  were  elaborately  considered 
by  Ftlch,  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  and  Whipple,  J.,  dissenting;  and  it 
was  held  that  the  implied  authority  ari- 
sing from  the  ordinary  contract  of  copart- 
nership does  not  authorize  one  of  the 
partners,  without  the  assent  of  his  co- 
partners, and  in  the  absence  of  special 
circumstances,  as  their  absence  in  a 
foreign  country,  to  make  a  general  as- 
signment of  the  partnership  effects,  to  a 
trustee,  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  giv- 
ing preferences  to  some  over  others.  The 
power  of  one  partner  to  make  such  an 
assignment  to  trustees  as  would  termin- 
ate the  partnership,  was  left  undecided 
in  Hayes  v.  Heyer,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  485,  and 
Pierpoint  v.  Graliam,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  2.32. 
In  the  latter  case  Judge  Washington  evid- 
ently inclined  to  the  opinion  that  it  does 
not  exist,  although  he  did  not  find  it 
necessary  to  express  himself  decidedly 
upon  the  question.  This  power  is  de- 
nied in  Kimball  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.  8 
Bosw.  495,  and  Hook  v.  Stone,  34  Mis. 
.329;  Welles  v.  March,  .30  N.  Y.  344; 
Coope  V.  Bowles,  42  Barb.  87.  See  Col- 
lyer  on  Part.  §  .395 ;  Story  on  Part.  §§ 
101,  310;  3  Kent,  Com.  44,  n.  (7th  ed.). 
But  the  assignment  of  real  property  to 
trustees  will  not  bind  the  partners  who 
do  not  join  in  it.  Anderson  r.  Tompkins, 
1  Brock.  463  ;  Collyer  on  Part.  (3d  Am. 
ed.)  §  394.     See  also  Wilson  v.  Soper,  13 

B.  Mon.  411,  and  Eisher  v.  Murray,  1  E. 
D.  Smith,  .341. 

{tt)  Palmer  v  Myers,  43  Barb.  509. 
See  also  Stein  v.  La  l)ow,  13  Minn.  412. 

(m)  Arnold  v.  Brown,  24  Pick.  89; 
Tapley  v.  Butterfield,  1  Met.  518 ;  Ander- 
son V.  Tompkins,  1  Brock,  450 ;  Pierson 
V.  Hooker,  3  Johns.  70;  Livingston  v. 
Roosevelt,  4  Johns.  277  ;  Mills  v.  Barber, 
4  Day,  430  ;  Pierpoint  v.  Graham,  4  Wash. 

C.  C.  2-34 ;  Kirby  v.  Ingersoll,  1  Harring. 
Ch.  (Mich.)  172;  Ilaistead  v.  Shepard, 
23  Ala.  558.  In  Whitton  v.  Smith.  1 
Freeman,  Ch.  (Miss.)  238,  Buckner,  C.  J., 
says:  "One  of  the  undisputed  canons 
of  the  law  of  partnership  is  the  right  of 
each  partner  to  sell  the  whole  partner- 
ship propert}',  if  the  sale  be  free  from 
fraud  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser,  and 

201 


*180 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


the  fact  that  the  partner  making  the  sale  applies  the 
*  180    *  proceeds   fraudulently   to   the    paj'ment  of    his    private 

debt,  (v)  if  the  purchaser  was  wholly  innocent  of  the  fraud. 
It  seems  to  be  settled  that  a  partner  may  dissent  from  a  future 
or  incomplete  contract,  and  that  a  third  party  having  notice  of 
such  dissent  could  not  hold  the  dissenting  partner,  without  evi- 
dence of  his  subsequent   assent   or   ratification,  (w)      And  the 


such  a  sale  terminates  the  partncrsliip 
relation."  Arnold  v.  Brown,  2i  Pick.  ii2, 
Moilun,  J. :  "  The  sale  was  made  by  one 
of  two  partners.  And  the  first  objection 
is,  that  one,  in  the  absence  of  the  other, 
had  no  autiiority  to  make  tliis  sale.  It  is 
said,  tliat,  altliough  he  might  sell  the 
whole  j)artners!iip  stock  by  retail,  yet 
tliat  it  was  not  according  to  the  ortliiiary 
course  of  business,  and  so  not  within  the 
scope  of  his  authority,  to  sell  the  whole 
at  once  by  a  single  contract.  We  have 
no  evidence  of  the  terms  of  association 
between  these  partners ;  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  either  member  of 
the  firm  had  any  different  authority  than 
■what  was  derived  from  the  relation  sub- 
sisting between  them.  Doubtless  the  or- 
dinary business  of  the  company  was  to 
purcliase  goods  by  the  large  quantity, 
and  to  sell  them  in  small  quantities. 
But  this  cannot  restrain  the  general 
power  to  buy  and  sell.  The  validity 
of  a  purchase  or  a  sale  cannot  be  made 
to  depend  upon  the  amount  bought  and 
sold.  The  authority  will  expand  or  con- 
tract, according  to  the  emergencies  wliich 
may  arise  in  tiie  course  of  their  proper 
business.  One  of  their  j)rincipal  objects 
was  to  sell,  and  it  would  be  absurd  to 
say  that  either  jfartner  might  sell  all  tlie 
goods  by  retail  as  fast  as  possible,  but  if 
a  favorable  ojjportunity  occurred,  to  sell 
a  great  part  or  the  whole  at  once,  he 
would  have  no  power  to  do  it.  That  an 
exigency  had  arisen  in  the  affairs  of 
the  partnersiiip,  wliich  rendered  a  sale 
necessary,  and  which  made  it  highly 
expedient  and  beneficial  to  sell  in  this 
mode,  is  ver\'  apparent.  And  we  have 
no  d(juht  that  tlie  one  partner  was  au- 
thorized to  make  this  sale  in  the  name 
of  the  firm."  See  also  Forkner  v.  Stuart, 
6  Gratt.  107. 

(r)  Arnold  v.  Brown,  24  Pick.  03. 
I^lonon,  J.  :  "  It  was  immaterial  to  the 
pur(;liaser  how  or  to  whom  he  paid  the 
price.  If  a  portion  went  to  i)ay  a  private 
debt  of  one  of  the  firm,  it  would  not 
invalidate  the  sale  and  defeat  the  trans- 
fer of  tlie  goods.  Whether  it  would  be 
deemed   a   legal  payment    pro    taido,  as 

202 


against  the  creditors  of  the  firm,  is  a 
question  with  which  we  have  nothing 
to  do.  So  if  the  partnership  stock  had 
been  taken  in  satisfaction  of  a  private 
debt  due  from  one  of  the  partners  to  the 
purchaser,  it  might  have  been  deemed 
fraudulent  as  to  the  creditors  of  the 
companv.  But  such  was  not  this  case." 
(ir)  in  Willis  v.  Dyson,  1  Stark.  1G4, 
the  dissent  was  by  one  partner,  who  sent 
a  circular  containing  these  words  :  "  I  am 
sorry  that  the  conduct  of  my  ])artner 
compels  me  to  send  the  annexed  circular. 
I  recommend  it  to  you  to  be  in  jiossessioa 
of  my  individual  signature  before  you 
send  any  more  gooils  ;  "  and  it  was  held 
to  be  sufficient.  Lord  Ellenhorouf/h  held, 
"  That  although  no  dissolution  had  taken 
place  till  a  l-ite  ])eriod,  yet  that  after 
notice  by  one  partner  not  to  supjily  any 
more  goods  on  the  partnership  accoimt, 
it  would  be  necessary  for  the  jiartner 
sending  goods  after  such  notice  to  prove 
some  act  of  adoption  by  the  partner  who 
gave  the  notice,  or  that  he  liad  derived 
some  benefit  from  the  goods."  Feigley 
i".  Sponeberger,  5  W.  &  S.  5(j-l ;  Vice  v. 
Fleming,  1  Y.  &  Jer.  227 ;  3  Kent,  (-"om. 
45;  Lay  field's  case,  1  Salk.  2'J2  ;  Minnit 
V.  Whinery,  5  Bro.  P.  C.  489 ;  Kooth  v. 
Quinii,  7  Price,  193 ;  Yeager  v.  Wallace, 
57  Penn.  St.  3(55.  —  The  implied  author- 
ity of  one  partner  to  draw  bills  and 
notes  for  the  ])artnership  is  rovcjked  by 
notice  to  the  person  who  afterwar<ls  re- 
ceives them  that  it  does  not  exist.  Gal  way 
V.  Matthew,  1  Camp.  403  ;  s.  c.  10  East, 
204  ;  Kooth  r.  Qiiinn,  7  Price,  103.  The 
refusal  of  a  partner  to  give  a  joint  note 
does  not  of  itself  amount  to  a  revocation 
of  the  inii)lied  authority,  but  the  ques- 
tion is  to  be  submitted  as  one  of  fart  for 
the  jury.  Leavitt  r.  Peck,  3  Conn.  12  1  ; 
Vice  V.  Fleming,  1  Y.  &  Jer.  227.— Tiiis 
dissent  may  not,  perhaps,  relieve  a  jiart- 
ner from  liability,  where  the  partnership 
consists  of  more  than  two,  unless  the  ma- 
jority dissent.  3  Kent,  Com.  45 ;  Story  on 
Part.  §  123;  Coll.  on  Part.  §  380,  n. ; 
Kooth  V.  Quinn,  7  Price.  193;  Kirk  y. 
Hodgson,  3  Johns.  Ch.  400.  And  it  has 
been  held  that  each  partner  may  bind  his 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


181 


mere  fact  that  the  goods  purchased  by  the  contract  came  into 
the  possession  of  the  firm  is  not  sufficient  evidence  of  such  assent 
or  ratification,  without  some  evidence  of  a  benefit  received  by 
the  dissenting  partner,  from  the  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the 
firm,  (a;) 

*  Money  lent  to  one  partner  for  his  own  expenses,  in-  *  181 
currcd  by  him  in  prosecuting  the  business  of  the  partner- 
ship, has  been  held  to  be  a  partnership  debt.  (?/)  But  if  a  partner 
who  has  given  his  own  security  for  money  borrowed  by  himself, 
apply  that  money  to  partnership  purposes,  this  does  not  make  it 
a  partnership  debt.  The  partnership  owes  the  borrowing  partner, 
and  he  alone  OAves  the  lender.  (2)  ^  And  a  person  lending  money 
to  one  partner,  that  he  may  contribute  it  to  increase  the  capital 
of  the  concern,  cannot  hold  the  other  partners  liable,  without 
some  evidence  of  their  assent  or  authority,  (a)  And  one  attor- 
ney, a  member  of  a  firm,  has  no  general  authority  resulting  from 
the  nature  of  their  business  to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the 
firm.  (/>)  '^     Nor  can  he  bind  his  copartner  by  an  indorsement  of 


copartners  by  any  contract  within  tlie 
scope  of  the  partnership  business,  not- 
withstanihns;  they  object  to  the  transac- 
tion. Wilkins  v.  Pearce,  5  Denio,  541. 
"  By  the  act  of  entering  into  a  copartner- 
ship, eacii  of  its  members  becomes 
clothed  witli  full  power  to  make  any 
and  every  contract  within  tiie  scope  and 
limits  of  the  copartnership  l)usincss.  All 
such  contracts  will  therefore  be  abso- 
lutely binding  upon  the  several  members. 
This,  however,  is  incident  to  the  copart- 
nership relation,  and  must  exist  in  defi- 
ance of  expostulntions  and  objections, 
while  the  relation  endures."  s.  c.  2 
Comst.  460.  A  firm  cannot  be  charged 
with  a  debt  contracted  by  one  partner, 
before  the  partnership  was  constituted, 
although  the  subject-matter  which  was 
the  consideration  of  the  debt  has  been 
carried  into  tlie  partnership  as  stock. 
Nor  can  the  firm  be  charged  with  rent 
which  accrued  upon  a  lease  to  one  of  the 
partners.  Brooke  v.  Evans,  5  Watts, 
196;  Ketchum  v.  Durfee,  1  HofF.  Ch. 
528  ;  Le  Roy  v.  Johnson.  2  Pet.  198. 

(.r)  Monroe  i\  Conner,  15  Me.  178. 
Shepley,  J. :  "  It  is  quite  obvious  that 
there  may  be  a  difference  between  the 


goods  coming  to  the  use  of  the  firm,  and 
a  benefit  derived  to  the  dissenting  jjart- 
ner  from  their  delivery  to  the  firm. 
The  bargain  may  have  proved  to  be  a 
very  losing  one,  and  this  may  have  been 
foreseen  by  the  dissenting  partner  and 
have  been  the  very  cause  of  the  notice ; 
and  why  should  he  be  held  to  pay,  per- 
haps from  his  private  property,  for 
goods,  the  purchase  and  sale  of  which 
may  have  absorbed  the  whole  pariner- 
ship  stock,  when  he  had  provided  against 
such  a  calamity  by  expressing  his  dissent 
from  the  contract  before  it  was  consum- 
mated ?  " 

(jj)  Rothwell  V.  Humphreys,  1  Esp. 
400.  And  see  Ex  parte  Bonbonus,  8  Ves. 
540. 

(z)  Graeff  v.  Hitchman,  5  Watts,  454; 
Bevan  i\  Lewis,  1  Sim.  376 ;  Emly  v. 
Lye,  15  East,  6. 

(.!)  Fisher  ;;.  Taylor,  2  Hare,  218. 
And  see  Greenslade  v.  Dower,  7  B.  &  C. 
635 ;  Stewart  v.  Caldwell,  9  La.  Ann.  419  ; 
King  V.  Faber,  22  Penn.  St.  21. 

(b)  Breckenridge  v.  Sin-ieve,  4  Dana, 
378.  See  also  Sims  v.  Brutton,  5  Excli. 
802  ;  Wilkinson  v.  Candlish,  5  Exch.  91 ; 
Harman  v.  Johnson,  3  Car.  &  K.  272. 


1  Salem  Bank  v.  Thomas,  47  N.  Y.  15. 

2  Plumer  v.  Gregory,  L.  R.  18  Eq.  021.  Neither  can  a  partner  in  a  law  firm  bind 
his  copartner  by  giving  a  note  in  the  firm  name,  even  for  a  partnersiiip  debt,  tmless 
be  has  special  authority,  or  it  was  necessary  for  carrying  on  the  business.  Smith  v. 

203 


*  182  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

a  writ  in  his  own  name,  (c)  A  lender  of  money  to  a  partner  can- 
not, in  general,  recover  of  the  firm,  without  showing  that  the 
money  was  applied  to  the  use  of  the  firm.  For  the  presumption 
would  lie  that  it  was  borrowed  by  the  partner  on  his  own  account, 
and  not  lent  to  the  firm.  But  although  it  be  proved  that  the 
money  was  not  applied  to  the  use  of  the  firm,  yet  the  firm  will  be 
liable  for  it,  if  it  were  borrowed  in  their  name  by  a  partner  whom 
they  had  apparently  clothed  with  authority  to  borrow  it 

*  182    for  them.  (cZ)  ^     If  the  partnership  *  be  carried  on  in  the 

name  of  an  individual,  the  presumption  of  law  is  that  a 
note  signed  by  him  is  his  own  note,  and  the  contrary  must  be 
shown,  (g)  2  If,  however,  a  partner  of  a  firm  having  other  names, 
or  the  word,  company  in  its  partnership  style,  sign  a  bill  or  note 
with  his  own  name,  and  without  the  proper  partnership  style,  or 
in  other  words  to  indicate  that  it  is  on  partnership  account,  for 
money  borrowed,  he  alone  is  answerable,  although  the  money  was 
borrowed  for  and  applied  to  a  partnership  purpose.  (/)  ^     Ques- 

(c)  Davis  V.  Gowen,  17  Me.  387.  note  was  given  in  a  matter  not  relating 

{d)  In    Etheridge   v.  Binney,  9  Pick,  to  tlie  partnership  business,  and  that  also 

272,  it  was  held  that  in  case  of  a  limited  with  the  knowledge  of  the  payee.     See 

and  dormant  partnership  carried  on  by  Thicknesse  v.  Bromilow,  2  Cr.  &  J.  425; 

one    of    the    partners    in   his   individual  Barratt  v.  Swann,  17  IMe.  180 ;    Ensmin- 

name.  if  he  borrow  money  rc/»-ese;i^/H7  it  ger  v.  Marvin,  5  Blackf.  210;   Bank  of 

to  be  for  the  use  of  lite  jxirtnersliip,  the  dor-  the  United   States   v.  Binney,  5  Mason, 

mant    partners    will    be    liable,    without  170;  Wright  r.  Hooker,  0  Selden,  51. 

proof   by  the   creditor   that   the   money  (e)   See  cases  in  former  note,  and  Oli- 

went  to  the  use  of  the  partnership.     But  phant  v.  Mathews,  10  Barb.  008. 

it  was  held  otherwise,  if  there  were  no  (/)  Ripley  v.  Kingsbury,  1  Day,  150, 

sucJ!     representations. —  See     VVhitaker  n. ;   Eoley    v.   Robiirds,  3   Ired.    L.    179; 

V.  Brown,  10   Wend.  50.5,  wliere  it  was  Jaques  r.  Marquand,  0  Cowen,  497  ;  Willis 

held  that  a  note,  given  by  one  partner  in  r.  Hall,  2  iJev.  &  B.  231  ;  Logan  v.  Bond, 

the  name  of  the  firm,  is  o/ i'^seZ/'presump-  13  Ga.  192;    Hogan  r:  Ke^Miolds,  8  Ala. 

live  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  part-  59.     Otherwise,  if   the    paper  be   signed 

ncrship  debt,  and  if  the  other  partners  with  the  partnershif)  clause.     Pearce  v. 

seek  to  avoid  the  payment,  the  burden  Wilkins,  2  Comst.  4(»9;  Hamilton  y.  Sum- 

of  proof  lies  upon  them  to  show  that  the  mers,  12  B.  Mon.  11. 

Sloan,  37  Wis.  285 ;  nor  bind  his  firm  bv  a  post-dated  check  drawn  in  the  name  of  the 
firm,  For.-<ter  r.  Mackretli,  L.  U.  2  E.\.'l03.    See  Garland  v.  Jacomb,  L.  K.  8  Ex.  216. 

1  But  Lill  (,-.  Egan,  89  111.  00'.),  decided  that  if  money  is  lent  to  one  partner,  neither 
the  signing  a  note  for  it  by  his  copartners,  nor  the  application  of  most  of  it  to  firm 
debts  would  make  it  a  partnersliip  transaction. 

•^  Yorksiiire  Banking  Co.  u.  Beatson,  4  C.  V.  D.  204,  decided  that  if  the  name  of 
a  firm  is  identical  with  that  of  an  individual  member  of  it,  proof  that  such  name 
was  signed  to  a  bill  of  exchange  by  the  authority  and  for  the  purposes  of  the  firm 
is  necessary  to  make  the  firm  liable  ;  but  it  was  said  in  the  same  case,  on  appeal,  in 
5  C.  P.  I).  109, aflirnrmg  the  judgment  in  the  particular  case,  that  the  ])resumplion  in 
sucli  a  case  is  that  the  bill  was  given  for  the  firm,  and  is  binding  u])on  it,  at  least 
where  the  individual  carries  on  no  business  separate  from  the  business  of  tlie  firm, 
which  presumption  may  be  rebutted  by  ))roof  that  the  bill  was  signed  not  in  the 
name  of  the  partnershij),  but  of  the  individual  for  his  private  purposes. 

2  But  a  joint  obligation  under  seal  executed  by  all  the  members  of  a  firm  in  its 

204 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  183 

tions  of  this  kind  can  be  decided  in  many  cases  only  by  the  special 
circumstances  attending  the  transaction.  For  it  is  certain  that  if 
money  has  been  actually  borrowed  by  one  partner  on  the  credit  of 
the  firm,  and  in  the  course  of  the  business  of  the  firm,  the  other 
partners  are  liable  for  it,  although  the  money  was  misapplied  by 
him  who  borrowed  it.  ((/)  And  if  the  money  be  borrowed  by  one 
partner,  not  expressly  on  his  individual  credit,  and  it  was  in  part 
borrowed  for  and  used  by  the  firm,  the  copartners  are 
liable.  (A)  *  And  where  the  money  of  a  third  person  is  *  183 
in  the  hands  of  a  copartner  as  trustee,  and  he  applies  it 
to  the  use  of  the  firm,  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the 
copartners,  they  are  certainly  bound,  (i)  And  it  has  been  de- 
cided, upon  strong  reasons,  that  they  are  so  held  without  their 
knowledge  and  consent.  (/)     Still  if  a  partner  borrows  money 

{g)  Emerson  v.  Harmon,  14  Me.  271 ;  119  :  "  Where  a  third  person  lends  money 
Church  V.  Sparrow,  5  Wond.  22o ;  Onon-  to  one  of  the  copartners  upon  the  check 
daga  County  Bank  v.  De  Puy,  17  id.  47  ;  or  notes  of  the  firm,  he  lias  a  right  to 
Waldo  Bank  v.  Lumbert,  IG  Me.  416;  presume  it  is  for  the  use  of  the  firm; 
Winship  v.  Bank  of  United  States,  5  Pet.  unless  there  is  something  to  create  a 
529 ;  Steel  v.  Jennings,  Cheves,  183.  —  suspicion  that  the  money  is  not  borrow- 
But  see  Lloyd  v.  Freshfield,  2  C.  &  P.  325,  ed  for  the  tirm,  and  that  the  borrower  is 
where  Boyle;/,  J., is  reported  to  have  said:  committing  a  fraud  upon  his  copartners. 
"In  point  of  law,  one  of  several  partners  And  wht-re  money  is  thus  bcrrrowed  upon 
may  pledge  the  partnership  name  for  the  note  or  check  of  the  firm,  the  mem- 
monej^  bona  Jide  lent,  the  lender  suppos-  bers  of  tlie  firm  or  those  of  them  to 
ing  that  one  partner  has  the  authority  of  whom  the  credit  was  given  by  the  lend- 
the  house  to  borrow,  and  that  he  is  bor-  er,  are  bound  to  show,  not  only  that  the 
rowing  for  the  purposes  of  the  house,  money  was  not  applied  to  their  use,  but 
But  if  there  he  gross  negligevce,  and  the  also  tliat  the  lender  had  reasons  to  believe 
transaction  be  out  of  the  ordinary  course  it  was  not  intended  to  be  so  applied  at 
of  business,  the  lenders  cannot  recover  of  the  time  it  was  lent.  Bond  v.  (jihson,  1 
the  other  partners,  if  the  money  be  mis-  Camp.  18-5  ;  Whitaker  n.  Brown,  16  Wend, 
applied."  505."     Sec  further  Jaques  v.  Marquand,  6 

(h)  Church  v.  Sparrow,  5  Wend.  223  ;  Cowen,  497. 
Whitaker  v.  Brown,  16  id.  505;  Miller  v.  (i)   Hutchinson  v.  Smith,  7  Paige,  26; 

Manice,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  114.     Whether  the  Jaques  v.  JNIarquand,  6  Cowen,  497  ;  Nich- 

money  was  so  borrowed  and  appropriated  olson  v.  Lcavitt,  4  Sandf.  30'J. 
is  a  question  for  the  jury.    Church  r.  Spar-  {  /  )  Richardson  r.  French,  4  Met.  577. 

row,  supra.  —  In  Miller  v.  Manice,  supra,  In  this  case  it  was  determined  that  where 

^F«/«'or^^,Ch.,  is  reported  to  have  said  at  p.  an  administrator,  who  is  a  member  of  a 

business,  and  for  its  benefit,  will  be  regarded  as  a  copartnersliip  obligation,  and  pay- 
able out  of  the  firm  assets,  although  tlie  firm  name  is  not  mentioned  therein,  and  it 
appears  upon  its  face  to  be  simply  the  obligation  of  the  copartners  contracted  in 
their  individual  names,  Berkshire  Woollen  Co.  v.  Juillard,  75  N.  Y.  535 ;  see  J'Jx 
parte  Stone,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  914;  E.c  parte  Portland  Bank,  70  Me.  369;  and  where  the 
signing  of  a  firm  name  as  "  M.  &  G.  by  G."  to  an  instrument  shows  that  it  was 
intcndeil  to  be  the  act  of  all  the  partners,  although  but  one  partner,  "  G  ,"  is  named 
in  the  instrument,  George  v.  Tate,  102  U.  S.  564;  and  it  is  equally  true  tliat  where 
all  firm  checks  are  drawn  in  one  partner's  name,  a  check  so  drawn  binds  the  firm. 
Crocker  v.  Colwell,  46  N.  Y.  212. — A  letter  beginning  "We  hereby  guarantee," 
signed  by  the  firm  name  and  each  of  the  partners,  is  botli  joint  and  several.  Ec  parte 
Harding,  12  Cli.  D.  557.  —  If  there  is  no  firm  stjie,  one  partner  may  sign  liis  co-partners' 
names  to  a  note  given  in  the  course  of  the  partnership  business,  and  bind  them. 
Nelson  v.  Neely,  63  Ind.  194;  Kitner  v.  Whitiock,  88  111.  513. 

205 


183 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


on  his  own  individual  credit,  and  subsequently  applies  it  to  the 
benefit  of  the  firm,  this  does  not  make  the  firm  liable  to  the  origi- 
nal lender,  (k) 

A  partner  cannot  bind  his  copartners  by  a  submission  of  a  part- 
nership question  to  a  reference.  (H')  ^ 

It  was  decided  many  years  ago,  in  one  case,  that  a  purchase 
by  one  partner  bound  the  others ;  and  in  another  case,  that  a 
sale  by  one  partner  bound  the  others ;  (?)    and  these  rules  are 


partnership,  applies  to  the  partnership 
concerns  money  belonging  to  his  intes- 
tate's estate,  and  afterwards  gives  the 
note  of  tlie  firm  to  a  creditor  of  the 
intestate,  to  whom  such  money  was  due, 
in  discharge  of  such  creditor's  claim  on 
the  estate,  the  firm  is  bound  to  pay  tlie 
note,  although  tlie  money  was  not  in  the 
hands  of  tlie  firm  when  the  note  was 
given.  And  Ilahbard,  J.,  in  giving  tlie 
opinion  of  the  court,  said:  "  The  defence 
relied  upon  in  this  case  is,  that  the 
money  of  tlie  plaintiff  never  came  to  the 
use  of  the  firm  of  P.  Blodgett  &  Co.,  and 
consequently  that  the  note  declared  on 
was  without  consideration  ;  that  if  tiie 
money  in  the  hands  of  P.  Blodgett,  as 
one  of  the  administrators  of  George 
Blodgett,  and  belonging  to  that  estate, 
was  used  by  the  firm  of  P.  Blodgett  & 
Co.,  the  firm  were  not  the  debtors  to  the 
several  creditors  of  the  estate,  between 
whom  and  them  there  was  no  privity, 
but  to  the  administrators  of  tlie  estate  ; 
and  that  the  remedy  of  tlie  creditors,  of 
whom  the  plaintiff  was  one,  was  on  the 
bond  of  the  administrators.  Witliout 
controverting  this  proposition,  we  think 
tlie  jilaintiff's  case  can  be  distinguished 
from  it.  'J'he  firm  of  1'.  Blodgett  &  Co. 
have  the  use  of  the  money  of  the  estate 
which  tliey  have  borrowed  from  the 
administrators.  If,  then,  the  plaintiff, 
knowing  this,  is  willing  to  discharge  her 
claim  against  the  estate,  and  take,  in  lieu 
thereof,  the  note  of  the  firm,  it  seems  to 
us  that  the  transaction  is  a  valid  one, 
and  that  the  note  is  given  on  a  good  con- 
sideration. Supposing  the  transaction  to 
ajipear  in  tlie  books  of  the  firm,  the 
administrators  on  the  estate  of  George 
Bh)ilgett  will  be  cliarged  with  the  amount 
of  the  note  given  to  the  plaintiff;   and 


the  note  will  be  entered  in  the  account 
of  notes  payalile,  and  the  receipt  of  tiie 
plaintiff,  and  her  ordt^r  tor  her  dividend 
upon  the  estate,  will  be  a  good  voucher 
for  tlie  defendants  to  sustain  their  charge 
for  so  much  money  returned  to  the 
administrators.  And  we  are  further  of 
opinion  that  it  was  not  necessary,  as  was 
ruled  by  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas, 
that  tlie  money  should  have  been  sub- 
stantially in  hand,  at  tlie  time  of  giving 
the  note,  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  recover 
upon  it  against  the  firm.  It  was  sufficient 
for  that  purpose  if  the  money,  to  wliich 
the  plaintiff  had  an  equitable  claim,  liad 
in  fact  been  used  bv  the  firm,  to  autiior- 
ize  the  giving  of  tlie  note  so  as  to  bind 
them  ;  it  being  the  substitution  of  one 
creditor  of  the  firm  for  another  for  .a 
good  consideration,  by  consent  of  the 
different  parlies  concerned.  For  whether 
the  defendant,  French,  was  ignorant  or 
not  of  tiie  giving  of  the  note,  at  the  time, 
the  act  of  his  coiiartner  in  this  resjtect 
is  equally  binding  upon  him,  the  firm 
having  had  the  money." 

(k)  Green  v.  Tanner,  8  Jlet.  411  ;  Be- 
van  V.  Lewis,  1  Sim.  oTG;  Graelf  r.  Ilitcli- 
nian,  5  Watts,  454;  Logan  v.  Bond,  13 
Ga.  102;  Wiggins  v.  Ihimmond,  1  Mo. 
121.  If  the  note  be  signed  A  B,  for  A  B 
&  Vo.,  the  firm  will  be  liable.  Staats  v. 
llowlett,  4  Deiiio,  550.  If  a  partner  bor- 
row nionej'  on  his  own  note  for  the  use 
of  the  firm,  lie  may  afterwards  substitute 
the  note  of  the  firm  for  iiis  own,  and  it 
will  be  no  fraud,  and  tiie  firm  will  be 
bound.  Uni(jn  Bank  r.  Katon,  5  Humph. 
400.     See  ante,  p.  *  180. 

(kk)  Martin  r.  Thrasher,  40  Vt.  4()0. 

(/)  Lambert's  case,  Godb.  241;  Hyatt 
V.  Hare,  Comb.  .']83.  And  see  Winshi])  v. 
Bank    of    United    States,    5    Pet.    501 ; 


1  Backus  V.  Covne,  35  Mich.  5;  contra  in  Pennsylvania,  Gay  r.  Waltman,  80  Penn. 
St.  45;J;  see  Thomas  v.  Atlierton,  10  Cli.  I).  185.  Niitlier  can  one  jtartner  confess 
judgment  to  bind  his  copartners,  Soper  i:  Fry,  -JT  Midi.  2:}(j ;  Itluxles  v.  Amsinck, 
:J8  Md.  345:  rontra,  Ross  v.  Howell,  84  Penn.  St.  129.     As  to  whether  a 


partner, 


before  or  after  dissolution,  can  cause  tiie   appearance  of  anotlier  partner  to  be 
entered  to  a  suit  against  the  firm,  see  Hall  v.  Lanning,  'Jl  U.  S.  IGO. 


206 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


184 


*  the  basis  of  a  partnership  liability  now.  And  the  seller  *  184 
or  the  purchaser  will  not  be  affected  by  the  fraudulent  in- 
tention of  the  partner  in  the  transaction,  unless  there  has  been 
collusion,  or  want  of  good  faith,  or  gross  negligence,  on  his 
part,  (wi)  But  the  power  of  one  partner  to  dispose  of  partnership 
property  is  confined  strictly  to  personal  effects,  (n) 

A  mortgage  of  firm  property  by  a  partner  in  his  own  name, 
conveys  no  title,  (wn)  ^ 

The  act  of  each  partner  is  considered  as  the  act  of  the  whole 
partnership,  or  of  all  the  partners,  only  so  far  as  that  act  was 
within  the  scope  of  the  business  of  the  firm  ;  (o)  ^  but  one  copart- 
ner may  bind  the  firm  in  matters  out  of  their  usual  course  of 
business,  if  they  arose  out  of  and  were  connected  with  their  usual 
business,  (js?)  Or  if  they  receive  the  express  sanction  and  con- 
firmation of  the  firm.  (5^)     And  if  a  firm  owe  a  debt,  it  is  held 


Walden  r.  Sherburne,  15  Johns.  422  ; 
Mills  V.  Barber,  4  Day,  430;  Dougal  v. 
Cowles,  5  Day,  515. 

(m)  Bond  r.  Gibson,  1  Camp.  185. 
Assumpsit,  for  goods  sold  and  deliv- 
ered. It  appeared  that  while  the  de- 
fendants were  carrying  on  the  trade  of 
harness-makers  together,  Jephson  bought 
of  the  j)laintiff  a  great  number  of  bits  to 
be  made  up  into  bridles,  wliicli  lie  carried 
awaj'  iiimself  ;  but  that  instead  of  bring- 
ing tiiem  to  the  shop  of  himself  and  his 
copartner,  lie  immediately  pawned  them 
to  raise  money  for  his  own  use.  Guzelee, 
for  the  defendant  Gibson,  contended  that 
this  could  not  be  considered  a  partner- 
ship debt,  as  the  goods  had  not  been 
bought  on  the  partnership  account,  and 
the  credit  appeared  to  have  been  given 
to  Jeplison  only.  He  allowed  the  case 
would  have  been  different  had  the  goods 
once  been  mixed  with  the  partnership 
stock,  or  if  proof  had  been  given  of 
former  dealings  upon  credit  between  the 
plaintiff  and  the  defendants.  Lord  EUen- 
horouf/h :  "  Unless  the  seller  is  guiltj-  of 
collusion,  a  sale  to  one  partner  is  a  sale 
to  the  partnership,  with  whatever  view 
the  goods  may  be  bought,  and  to  what- 
ever purposes  they  may  be  applied.     I 


will  take  it  that  Jephson  here  meant  to 
cheat  his  copartner  ;  still  the  seller  is  not 
on  that  account  to  suffer.  He  is  inno- 
cent ;  and  he  had  a  right  to  suppose  that 
the  individual  acted  for  the  partnership." 
Verdict  for  the  plaintiff.  —  Sec  jMcCuI- 
lough  V.  Somerville,  8  Leigh,  415;  Arn- 
old i\  Brown,  24  Pick.  8!);  Taplcy  v. 
Butteifield,  1  Met.  618;  Anderson  v. 
Tompkins,  1  Brock.  450  ;  Pierpont  i:  Gra- 
ham, 4  Wash.  C.  C.  234;  Kirbv  r.  Inaer- 
soU.  1  Harr.  Ch.  (Mich.)  172  ;  Wliittoii  v. 
Smith,  Frceni.  Ch.  (Miss.)  2.']1 ;  Duncan 
V.  Clark,  2  Rich.  587. 

(n)  Anderson  v.  Tompkins,  1  Brock. 
456;  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Tapley  v.  Butter- 
field,  1  Met.  519;  Coles  v.  Coles,  15 
Johns.  159.  —  Nor  can  one  partner  with- 
out special  authority,  bind  the  firm  by 
a  contract  for  tlie  sale  of  real  estate 
employed  in  the  business  of  the  firm. 
Lawrence  v.  Taylor,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  107. 

(/»0  Clark  r.  Houghton,  12  Gray,  .38. 

(o)  Hannan  v.  Jolinson,  18  E.  L.  & 
E.  400;  s.  c.  2  E.  &  B.  61 ;  Goodman  v. 
White,  2  Miss.  163;  Miller  v.  Hines,  15 
Ga.  197. 

(p)  Sandilands  v.  Marsh,  2  B.  &  Aid. 
673. 

(q)  Ex  parte  Peele,  6  Ves.  602. 


1  But  Woodruff  v.  King,  47  Wis.  261,  decided  that  one  partner  may  execute  a 
chattel  mortgage  of  the  firm  property  to  secure  a  partnership  debt  wltli(mt  his  part- 
ner's consent,  and  the  attachment  by  him  of  a  seal  thereto,  which  was  unnecessary, 
■will  not  affect  its  validity. 

^  Thus  there  is  no  implication  of  law  from  the  mere  existence  of  a  trade  partner- 
ehip  that  one  partner  has  authority  to  bind  the  firm  by  opening  a  banking  account 
on  its  behalf  in  his  own  name.     Alliance  Bank  v.  Kearsley,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  483. 

207 


*185  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

that  a  partner  binds  the  firm  by  their  note  for  tliat  debt,  given  by 
him  against  the  wishes  of  his  partners,  {qq)  Where  any  creditor 
of  one  member  of  a  firm  takes  from  his  own  debtor,  either  in  pay- 
ment or  as  security  for  his  debt,  the  paper  of  the  firm,  the  pre- 
sumption of  law  is,  that  he  took  it  in  fraud  of  the  firm ;  and 
without  proof  of  their  interest,  or  their  assent  and  authority 
(which  may  be  circumstantial),  the  firm  will  not  be 
*  185  held,  (r)  ^  And  if  a  partner  *  applies  partnership  funds  to 
the  payment  of  his  own  debts,  this  act  is  void,  although 
the  creditor  did  not  know  that  the  funds  belonged  to  the  partner- 
ship, (s)  2  And  a  purchaser  who  buys  partnership  property  from 
a  partner,  knowing  that  the  transaction  was  a  fraud  on  the  firm, 
may  be  held  a  trustee  for  the  firm,  (f) 

Partners  may  be  made  liable  for  the  torts  of  a  copartner  if  con- 
nected with  contract,  and  done  apparently  in  due  course  of  the 
business  of  the  firm,  and  the  existence  of  the  copartnership 
and  its  business  is  that  which  gives  the  opportunity  for  the 
wrong  and  injury  inflicted  upon  the  innocent  party,  (u)  ^     It  has 

(qq)  Partin  v.  Luderloh,  6  Jones,  Eq.  him   v.    Ensworth,   7   "Wend.   320;    Hal- 

341.  stead  v.  Sheparil,  23  Ala.   558 ;  Buck  v. 

ir)  Gansevoort  v.  Williams,  14  Wend.  Mosley,  24   Miss.  170  ;  Fiklen  r.  Laliens, 

33  ;  Minor  v.   Gaw,    11   Sni.    &  M.   322  ;  9  Bosw.  436  ;  Wliitmore  v.  Adams,  17  la. 

Clay  V.  Cottrell,  18  Penn.  408;  Homer  w.  567  ;  Burleigh  v.  Parton,  21  Te.xas,  585. 
Wood,  11  Gush.  02;  Butter  v.  Stocking,  (t)  Croughton  c  Forrest,  17  Mo.  131. 

4  Seld.  408.  (")  Willct    ;•.  Chambers,   Covvp.    814. 

(s)  Rogers  v.  Batchelor,  12  Pet.  229;  So    where    one   partner   purchases   such 

Dob  V.  Halsey,  16  Johns.   34  ;   Everng-  articles  as  might  be  of  use  in  the  part- 

1  Commonwealth  Bank  v.  Law,  127  Mass.  72;  Blodgett  v.  Sleeper,  07  Me.  499. 

2  The  creditor  will  hold  such  funds  as  trustee,  Johnson  v.  Ilersey,  70  Me.  74;  aqd 
the  assignee  of  a  firm  may  recover  them  from  tlie  party  receiving  them,  Thomas  v. 
Pennrich,  28  Ohio  St.  55.  Locke  v.  Lewis,  124  Mass.  1,  decided  that  a  sale  by  a 
partner,  in  payment  of  his  own  debt,  of  goods  which  are  in  fact  goods  of  the  partner- 
ship, but  which  the  partnership  has  so  intrusted  to  him  as  to  enable  him  to  deal  with 
as  his  own,  and  to  induce  the  public  to  believe  to  be  his,  and  which  the  creditor 
receives  in  good  faith  and  without  notice  that  they  are  the  goods  of  the  partnership, 
is  valid  against  tiie  partnership  and  its  creditors.  Gray,  C.  J.,  elaborately  discusses 
]{ogers  I'.  Batchelor,  12  Pet.  221,  supni,  and  the  cases  tlierein  cited,  and  says : 
"Upon  a  careful  examination  of  the  cases  referred  to  in  Kogers  r.  Batchelor,  we 
cannot  find  the  slightest  intimation  of  an  opinion  that  the  title  in  tlie  property  or 
security  would  not  i)ass  to  the  private  creditor,  if  he  did  not  know  it  to  l)elong  to 
the  partnership ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  do  find  pointed  suggestions  that  it  would." 
See  Hilliker  >:  Francisco,  05  Mo.  598;  Blodgett  v.  Sleeper,  07  Me.  49'.l ;  Hurt  >: 
Clarke,  50  Ala.  19;  Todil  v.  Lorah,  75  Penn.  St.  155:  Cotzhausen  v.  Judd,  43  Wis. 
213;  Caldwell  v.  Scott,  54  N.  IL  414;  Binns  r.  Waddill,  32  Gratt.  588;  Moriarty  v. 
Bailey,  46  Conn.  592  ;  Davis  v.  Cook,  14  Nev.  205. 

8  A  firm  is  not  liable  for  such  torts,  unless  done  in  the  course  of  the  firm  business, 
Tenney  v.  Foote,  95  111.  99;  Witcher  ;,•.  Brewer,  49  Ala.  119;  or  with  the  copartners' 
knowledge  ami  assent,  Loomis  v.  Barker,  09  III.  300;  or  unless  it  receives  the  benefit 
of  the  transaction,  Durant)-.  Rogers,  87  111.  508.  —  A  partner's  misrepresentation  also 
in  any  firm  transaction  binds  it,  Wiley  v.  Griswold,  41  la.  375;  Henslce  v.  Cannefax, 

208 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


186 


*  been  held  that    one  partner  might  bind  the  firm  by  a    *  186 
guaranty  or  letter  of  credit  given  in  their  name  ;  (v)  but 
it  seems  to  be  now  settled  that  there  must  be  a  special  authority 
for  that  purpose ;  (w)  but  this  may  be  implied  from  the  common 


nership  business,  and  instantly  converts 
them  to  his  own  separate  use,  the  part- 
nership is  liable.  Bond  v.  Gibson,  1 
Camp.  185.  A  employed  B  and  C,  who 
were  partners  as  wine  and  spirit  mer- 
chants, to  purchase  wine  and  sell  the 
same  on  commission.  C,  the  managing 
partner,  represented  that  he  had  made 
the  purchases,  and  that  he  had  sold  a 
part  of  tiie  wines  so  purchased  at  a 
profit ;  the  proceeds  of  such  supposed 
sales  he  paid  to  A,  and  rendered  ac- 
counts, in  wliich  he  stated  the  purchases 
to  have  been  made  at  a  certain  rate  per 
pipe.  In  fact,  C  had  neither  bought  nor 
sold  any  wine.  The  transactions  were 
wholly  fictitious,  but  B  was  w-holly  ig- 
norant of  that.  Upon  the  whole  account 
a  larger  sum  had  been  repaid  to  A,  as 
the  proceeds  of  that  part  of  the  wine  al- 
leged to  be  resold,  than  he  had  advanced  ; 
but  the  other  part  of  the  wine,  which  C 
represented  as  having  been  purchased 
was  unaccounted  for.  IJehl,  that  B  was 
liable  for  tiie  false  representations  of  his 
partner  ;  and  that  A  was  entitled  to  re- 
tain the  money  that  had  been  paid  to 
him  upon  these  fictitious  transactions,  as 
if  they  were  real.  Rapp  v.  Latham,  2  B. 
&  Aid.  795.  See  Stone  i-.  Marsh,  6  B.  & 
C.  551  (Fauntlerov's  case) ;  Hume  v.  Bol- 
land,  Ry.  &  M.  371  ;  Kilby  v.  Wilson, 
Ry.  &  M.  178;  Edmonson  v.  Davis,  4 
Esp.  14;  Moreton  i-.  Hardern,  4  B.  &  C. 
22:3 ;  Babcock  v.  Stone,  3  McLean,  172.  — 
The  conversion  by  one  partner  of  prop- 
erty which  came  into  the  possession  of 
the  firm  on  partnership  account  is  the 
conversion  of  all.  Nisbet  r.  Patton,  4 
Rawle,  120.  The  partnership  is  liable  to 
the  innocent  indorsee  of  a  promissory 
note  signed  by  one  of  the  members  in  the 
name  of  the  firm,  without  the  knowledge 
or  consent  of  his  partner  ;  although  the 
note  was  given  for  a  debt  unconnected 
vnX\\  the  business  of  the  partnership. 
Boardman  v.  Gore,  15  Mass.  3-31.  So  the 
partnership  is  liable  for  the  fraudulent 
representations  of  a  partner  relative  to 
matters  in  the  course  of  its  business, 
although  without  the  knowledge  of  his 


copartners.  Doremus  v.  McCormick,  7 
Gill,  49 ;  Beach  r.  State  Bank,  2  Cart. 
(Ind.)  489;  Hawkins  v.  Appleby,  2 
Sandf.  421.  Sandlord,  J.:  "It  has  long 
been  established  that  a  partner  is  liable 
in  assumpsit  for  the  consequences  of 
frauds  practised  bj'  his  copartner  in  the 
transaction  of  the  business,  of  which  he 
was  entirel}'  ignorant,  and  although  he 
derived  no  benefit  from  the  fraud.  This 
is  upon  the  ground  that,  by  forming  the 
connection,  partners  publish  to  the  world 
their  confidence  in  each  other's  integrity 
and  good  faith,  and  impliedly  agree  to  be 
responsible  for  what  they  shall  respec- 
tively do  within  the  scope  of  their  part- 
nership business ;  and  if,  by  the  wrongful 
act  of  one  a  loss  must  fall  upon  a 
stranger,  or  upon  the  other  partner,  who 
is  equally  innocent,  the  latter,  having 
been  the  cause  or  occasion  of  the  confi- 
dence reposed  in  his  delinquent  associate, 
must  suffer  the  loss."  It  is  held  that  the 
implied  authoritj'  of  a  partner  does  not 
extend  to  illegal  contracts,  as  the  bor- 
rowing of  money  at  usurious  interest, 
and  will  not  bind  his  copartners  without 
their  knowledge  or  consent.  Hutchins  v. 
Turner,  8  Humph.  415.  The  court  in 
this  case  said  :  "  The  liability  of  a  part- 
ner, arising  out  of  this  implied  assent, 
and  undertaking  to  be  responsible  for  the 
acts  of  his  copartner  on  behalf  of  the 
firm,  in  the  ordinary  business  and  trans- 
actions thereof,  cannot  be  held  to  extend 
to  illegal  contracts.  This  would  be  ab- 
surd. An  agency  or  authority  to  a  part- 
ner to  violate  the  provisions  of  a  public 
statute  cannot  be  implied  ;  nor  can  it  be 
implied  that  such  illegal  act  is  within  the 
scope  of  the  partnership,  which  could 
only  exist  for  lawful  purposes."  See 
Pierce  v.  Jackson,  G  Mass.  245  ;  Sherwood 
V.  Marwick,  5  Greenl.  295  ;  Coomer  v. 
Bromley,  12  E.  L.  &  E.  307;  State  v. 
Neal,  7  Foster  (N.  H.),  131;  Graham 
V.  Meyer,  4  Blatch.  129. 

(v)  Hope  V.  Cust,  cited  in  1  East,  48; 
Ex  parte  Gardom,  15  Yes.  286. 

(w)  Sweetser  r.  French,  2  Cush.  309; 
McQuewans  v.  Hamlin,  35  Penn  St.  517. 


49  Mo.  295;  Smith  v.  Collins,  115  Mass.  388;  McKee  r.  Hamilton,  33  Ohio  St.  7; 
Talbot  V.  Wilkins,  31  Ark.  411 ;  but  not  if  made  while  selling  the  several  interests  of 
his  copartners,  unless  approved  by  them  or  he  acts  as  their  agent,  Schwabacker  v. 
Riddle,  84  111.  517. 


14 


209 


187 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


course  of  business  or  previous  transactions  between  the  parties, 
or  from  subsequent  adoption  by  the  firm.  (2-)  ^  And  if  the  word 
"  surety  "  be  added  to  the  signature  of  the  firm,  this  casts  upon 
the  holder  the  burden  of  proving  the  assent  of  the  firm,  (y)  And 
if  the  signature  or  indorsement  be  in  the  usual  form,  but  the 
party  receiving  it  knows  that  it  is  given  by  way  of  suretyship,  he 
must  prove  by  direct  evidence  or  equivalent  circumstances  the 
assent  of  the  partners.  (2)  ^ 

A  release  by  one  partner  is  a  release  by  all,  both  in  law  and  in 

equity,  (a)     And  a  release  to  one  partner  is  a  release  to 
*  187    all.  {b)^     *  But  any  fraud  or  collusion  destroys  the  effect 

of  such  release.     And  the  release  to  discharge  absolutely 
all  the  copartners,  must  be  a  technical  release  under  seal,  (c) 


(.r)  Crawford  v.  Sterling,  4  Esp.  207 ; 
Sutton  V.  Irwine,  12  S.  &  R.  13;  Ex 
parte  Xolte,  2  Glyn  &  J.  295;  Hamill  v. 
Purvis,  2  Penn.  177  ;  Cremer  v.  Higgin- 
son,  1  Mason,  32o ;  Foote  v.  Sabin,  19 
Johns,  lol;  Laverty  v.  Burr,  1  Wend. 
531  ;  N.  Y.  Fire  Insurance  Co.  v.  Bennett, 
5  Conn.  574  ;  Andrews  v.  Planters  Bank, 
7  Sm.  &  M.  192 ;  Langan  v.  Hewett,  13 
Sm.  &  M.  122;  Sweetser  v.  French,  2 
Cush.  309. 

iy)  Boyd  v.  Plumb,  7  Wend.  309  ;  Rol- 
lins V.  Stevens,  31  Me.  454;  Butterfield 
V.  Hemslev,  12  Gray,  22G. 

(z)  Darling  v.  March,  22  Me.  188. 

(a)  Pierson  I'.  Hooker,  3  Johns.  68; 
Bruen  v.  Marquand,  17  Johns.  58;  Sal- 
mon V.  Davis,  4  Binn.  375 ;  Morse  v. 
Bellows,  7  N.  H.  507;  Halsey  v.  Whit- 
ney, 4  Mason,  206  ;  Smith  v.  Stone,  4  G. 
&J.  310;  McBride  v.  Ilagan,  1  Wend. 
326;  Xoyes  v.  N.  Jlaven,  N.  London  & 
Stonington  R.  R.  Co.  30  Conn.  1.  The 
rule  of  law  and  equity  is  the  same,  and 
only  collusion  for  fraudulent  purposes 
between  the  partners  and  a  debtor  de- 
stroys the  effect  of  such  release.  Barker 
r.  Richardson,  1  Y.  &  Jer.  3(32;  Cram  !;. 
Cadwell,  5  Cowen,  489.  —  And  the  fraud 
must  be  clearly  established.  Arton  v. 
Bootli,  4  Moore,  192 ;  Furnival  r.  Wes- 
ton, 7  Moore,  350.  And  see  Legh  v. 
Legli,  1  B.  &  l\  447  ;  Jones  v.  Herbert,  7 
Taunt.  421;  Mountstephen  v.  Brooke,  1 


Chitt.  391.  —  Where  one  partner  signed  a 
general  release  to  a  debtor  of  the  firm, 
and  it  did  not  appear  whether  it  was 
intended  to  apply  to  separate  or  to  part- 
nership demands,  or  whether  tiie  subscrib- 
ing partner  had  on  his  separate  account 
any  demand  against  the  debtor,  the  re- 
lease was  held  a  discharge  from  debts 
due  the  partnership.  Tiie  release  was  a 
part  of  an  indenture  of  assignment,  ia 
trust  for  creditors.  Emerson  v.  Knower, 
8  Pick.  63.  —  Where  such  release  is  for 
all  demands,  parol  proof  that  a  particular 
debt  was  not  intended  to  be  released  is 
not  admissible.  Pierson  v.  Hooker,  3 
Johns.  08. 

(b)  Hammon  v.  Roll,  March,  202; 
Bower  v.  Swadlin,  1  Atk.  294 ;  Collins  v. 
Prosscr,  1  B.  &  C.  082  ;  American  Bank 
V.  Doolittle,  14  Pick.  120;  Goodnow  v. 
Smith,  18  Pick.  410  ;  Claggett  v.  Salmon, 
5  G.  &  J.  314;  Burson  v.  Kincaid,  3 
Penn.  57.  —  So  a  discharge  of  one  surety 
of  his  tcliolc  liiihilitji  is  a  discharge  to  the 
otiicrs.  Nicholson  v.  Revill,  4  A.  &  E. 
675 ;  Mayhow  v.  Crickett,  2  Swanst.  192. 
—  But  a  release  to  one  partner  may,  by 
means  of  recitals  and  ])rovisos,  be  limited 
in  its  ojjcrations  to  the  partner  to  whom 
it  is  given.  Solly  v.  Forbes,  4  Moore, 
448  ;  2  Br.  &  B.  38.  See  Wiggin  v.  Tudor, 
23  Pick.  444. 

(r)  Sliaw  V.  Pratt,  22  Pick.  305; 
Walker    v.  McCuUoch,  4    Greenl.   421  ; 


1  See  In  re  West  of  England  Bank,  14  Ch.  D.  317  ;  IMoran  v.  Prather,  23  Wall.  492  ; 
Dubuque  Bank  v.  Carpenter,  34  La.  433  ;  s.  c.  41  La.  518. 

2  Commonwealth  Bank  v.  Law,  127  Mass.  72;  Security  Bank  v.  McDonald,  127 
Mass.  82;  Lemoine  v.  Bank  of  No.  America,  3  Dillon,  44;  Moynahan  v.  Hanaford, 
42  Mich.  329;  Bloom  v.  Iblm,  53  Miss.  21. 

3  But  not  if  manifestly  for  his  benefit  alone.  Ex  parte  Good,  5  Ch.  D.  46;  Green- 
wald  V.  Raster,  86  Penn.  St.  45. 

210 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


188 


And  a  discharge  of  one  of  several  joint  debtors  by  operation  of 
law,  without  the  consent  or  co-operation  of  the  creditor,  takes  from 
hini  no  remedy  against  the  other  debtor.  Qd) 

The  signature  or  acknowledgment  of  one  partner,  in  matters 
relating  to  the  partnership,  in  general,  binds  the  hrm ;  (e)  as 
notice  in  legal  proceedings,  or  abandonment  to  insurers  by  one 
who  has  effected  insurance  for  himself  and  others.  (/)  And  if 
one  of  several  joint  lessors,  partners  in  trade,  sign  a  notice  to 
quit,  this  will  be  valid  for  all ;  (g)  but  not  if  they  are  not  part?- 
ners  in  trade,  {h)  And  in  general  a  notice  to  one  partner  is 
binding  upon  all ;  (i)  as  of  a  prior  unrecorded  deed,  the  knowl- 
edge of  which,  by  one  partner,  will  avoid  a  subsequent 
deed  to  *  all  the  partners.  (/)  And  notice  of  a  want  of  *  188 
consideration  of  a  promissory  note,  received  by  one  partner, 
affects  all.  (^) 

Where  a  bill  accepted  by  a  firm  is  dishonored  by  one  partner, 
notice  of  the  dishonor  need  not  be  given  to  the  other  partners ;  (?) 


Harrison  v.  Close,  2  Johns.  449  ;  Catskill 
Bank  v.  Messenuer,  9  Cowen,  o7  ;  Lunt 
r.  Stevens,  25  Me.  534  ;  Shotwell  v.  Mil- 
ler, Coxe,  81.  —  It  has  been  held  that 
a  composition  deed,  given  by  the  joint 
creditors  of  a  partnership  upon  its  disso- 
lution, to  that  partner  wlio  winds  up  the 
affairs  of  tlie  hrm,  is  in  tlie  nature  of  a 
release,  and  will  discharge  the  other  part- 
ner from  his  liability.  Ex  parte  Slater,  G 
Ves.  146.  —  But  a  covenant  not  to  sue 
one  of  several  partners  will  not  have  the 
same  effect.  Coll.  on  Part.  §  608,  and 
cases  cited. 

(d)  Ward  v.  Johnson,  13  Mass.  152  ; 
Robertson  v.  Smith,  18  Johns.  451);  Took- 
er  r.  Bennett,  3  Caines,  4 ;  Townend  v. 
Riddle,  2  N.  H.  449. 

(e)  See  Corps  v.  Robinson,  2  Wash.  C. 
C.  388 ;  Bound  v.  Lathrop,  4  Conn.  336 ; 
Fisk  V.  Copeland,  1  Overt.  383.  —  During 
the  partnership  one  may  enter  an  ap- 
pearance in  an  action  to  bind  tlie  whole. 
Bennett  v.  Stickney,  17  Vt.  531.  See 
contra,  Haslet  v.  Street,  2  McCord,  311; 
Loomis  V.  Pierson,  Harper,  L.  470.  But 
after  dissolution  one  cannot  acknowledge 
service  for  the  firm.  Demott  v.  Swaini, 
5  Stew.  &  P.  293.  And  service  of  pro- 
cess upon  one  partner,  after  dissolution, 
will  not  authorize  a  judgment  against 
the  firm.     Duncan  v.  Tombeckbee  Bank, 

4  Port.  (Ala.)  181. 

(/)  Hunt  V.  Ro3'al  Ex.  Assurance  Co. 

5  M.  &  Scl.  47.  So  if  one  partner,  for 
himself  and  partner,  sign  a  note  for  the 


weekly  payment  under  the  Lords'  act, 
such  note  would  bind  tiio  firm.  Meux 
V.  Humplir3%  8  T.  R.  25 ;  Burton  t\  Issit, 
5  B.  &  Aid.  267. 

(7)  Doe  V.  Hulme,  2  Man.  &  R.  483. 

(//)  Goodtitle  v.  Woodward,  3  B.  & 
Aid.  689.  But  one  joint-tenant  may  ap- 
point a  bailiff  to  distrain  for  rent  due  all 
the  joint-tenants.  Robinson  v.  Hofman, 
4  Bing.  562.  And  one  partner  may  au- 
thorize a  clerk  to  draw  or  accept  notes 
or  bills,  in  the  name  of  the  company. 
Tillier  v.  Whitehead,  1  Dallas,  269. 

(/)  Alderson  v.  Pope,  1  Camp.  404; 
Ex  parte  Waitman,  1  Mont.  &  A.  364 ; 
Figgins  V.  Ward,  2  Cr.  &  M.  424 ;  Carter 
V.  Southall,  3  M.  &  W.  128. 

(j )  Barney  v.  Currier,  1  Chipman 
(Vt.),  315;  Gilby  v.  Singleton,  3  Litt. 
250. 

(y[)  Quinn  v.  Fuller,  7  Cush.  224.  —  So, 
in  equity,  service  of  a  subpoena  upon  one 
partner  may,  upon  notice,  be  made  good 
service  upon  his  copartner  abroad.  Car- 
rington  v.  Cantillon,  Bunb.  107 ;  Coles 
V.  Gurney,  1  Madd.  187.  And  see  Lans- 
ing >,'.  McKillup,  7  Cowen,  416. 

(/)  Porthouse  v.  Parker,  1  Camp.  82. 
See  Dabney  v.  Stidger,  4  Sm.  &  M.  749. 
But  it  is  otlierwise  in  case  of  mere  joint 
indorsers,  who  are  })ot  partners ;  notice 
in  such  case  must  be  given  to  both. 
Shepard  v.  Hawley,  1  Conn.  368.  Even, 
it  seems,  to  hold  either.  Bank,  &c.  v. 
Root,  4  Cowen,  126. 

211 


*  188  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

and  where  a  bill  or  note  is  indorsed  by  a  firm,  which  is  dissolved 
before  tlie  note  is  due,  notice  to  one  of  the  partners  by  a  holder 
not  having  knowledge  of  the  dissolution,  is  sufficient,  (w)  And 
where  the  drawer  of  a  bill  is  a  partner  of  the  house  on  which  it  is 
drawn,  he  is  chargeable  without  notice  to  him  of  the  dishonor  of 
the  bill,  (w)  A  partner  cannot,  merely  by  the  authority  given  by 
the  partnership,  and  without  the  authority  of  the  partners,  bind 
his  copartner  by  his  indorsement  of  negotiable  paper  not  belong- 
itig  to  the  partnership,  {nii} 

Generally,  a  partner  cannot  bind  his  copartners  by  deed,  with- 
out express  authority.  But  it  has  been  held  that  if  he  annex  a 
seal  for  himself  and  liis  copartner,  in  the  presence  of  his  copart- 
ner, that  will  bind  them  both,  (o)  ^ 

In  some  cases  very  slight  circumstances  appear  to  besufficient 
to  affect  a  party  with  the  liabilities  of  partnersliip.  (/?)  But  the 
mere  fact  of  persons  giving  a  joint  order  for  goods  will  not 
make  them  liable  as  partners,  if  it  appear  otherwise  that  the 
seller  trusted   to   them   severally,  (g-)     Nor   is   a   person   made 

(m)  Coster  v.  Thomasnn,  10  Ala.  717;  themselves  out  to  others,  whether  their 

Nott  w.  DouiJiing,  6  La.  (J84.     And  in  such  contract  wouhl   make   them    so   or  not. 

case  it  has  been  said,  tliat  one  partner  Stearnes  r.  Haven,  14  Vt.  504.     See  notes 

may,   after    dissolution,    waive    demand  (tj),  (r),  and  {t),  post. 

and  notice  for  tlie  otlier  i)artners  as  well  (</)  Gibson  r.  Lupton,  0  Bing.  297.     In 

as  for  himself.     Dariino- r.  Marcli,  22  Me.  this  case  the  two  defendants,  wiio  were 

184.     But  this  may  be  doubted.  not  general  partners,  gave  a  joint  order 

(n)  Gowan  v.  .Jackson,  20  .Johns.  176.  to  the  plaintiff's  agent  for  the  purchase 

Notice  of  tiie  dishonor  of  a  note  given  of    some    wiieat.     The    order   contained 

to  tlie  surviving  partner  of  a  firm  fixes  these  words,  "  I'ayment  for  the  same  to 

the  liability  of  a  j)artnersl)ip,  and  binds  be  drawn  upon  each  of  us  in  the  usual 

tlie  representatives  of  the  deceased  part-  manner."     In    reply   to    this    order,    the 

ner.     Dabney  v.  Stidger,  4  Sin.  &  M.  741);  plaintiffs  wrote  to  the  defendants:  "  We 

Cocke  I'.  Bank  of  Tennessee,  tj  llumpli.  51.  liave   made   a   purchase  for  your  joint 

{nri)  Bowman  v.  Cecil  Bank,  3  Grant,  account."     At  the  same  time  they  drew 

33.  a  bill  upon  each  defendant  for  one  third 

(o)  Ball  7^  Dunsterville,  4  T.  R.  313;  of    the    price,   each    bill    being   for  one 

Swan  r.  Stoadmaii,  4  Met.  548.     See  Pot-  moiety  of   the  third.     They  afterwards, 

ter  r.  McCoy,  20  Penn.  St.  458;  Freeman  on   the  wheat  being   shijiped,  drew  like 

V.   Carhart,    17    Ga.    348.       In   Gram   v.  bills  for  the  remainder  of  the  price,  hav- 

Seton,  1  Hall,  202,  the  court  seem  inclined  ing  previously   written:  "We  hold  you 

to  maintain  the  general  power  of  a  part-  both  harmless  for  the  advance  up  to  the 

ner  to  affi.v  a  seal  for  the  firm  in   the  period  of  lading  and  invoice."     'I'he  bill 

partnership    business.     See    also    Purvi-  of  lading,  on  coming  into  the  possession 

ance  v.  Sutherland,  2  Ohio  (x.  s.),  478.  of  tiie  defendants,  was  indorsed  by  each 

(/>)  Parker  v.  Barker,  1  Br.  &  B.  0,  3  of  them.     Under  these  circunistance.s,  the 

Moore,  220.  —  Persons  are  to  be  treated  Court  of  Common  Pleas  iield  tiiat  the  de- 

as  iiartnera  if  they  so  conduct  and  hold  f endants  were  only  severally  liable  on  the 

1  But  an  express  or  implied  verbal  or  written  authority  or  ratification,  not  under 
seal,  makes  the  deed  that  of  the  firm.  Ilon)r()()k  v.  Chamlierliii,  110  Mass.  155.  See 
"Williams  >:  (Jiliies,  75  N.  Y.  107;  Cunningham  v.  Lamar,  51  Ga.  574;  Kasson  v. 
Broeker,  47  Wis.  70. 

212 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


189 


*  a  partner  by  a  stipulation  that  a  firm  will  be  governed  by    *  189 
his  advice,  (r) 

If  the  terms  of  the  contract,  and  all  the  facts  necessary  for  its 
construction,  are  ascertained,  the  question  whether  there  is  a  part- 
nership, is  a  question  of  law.  (s) 

No  particular  mode  of  holding  oneself  out  as  a  partner  is  neces- 
sary to  make  one  liable  as  such ;  but  it  must  be  a  voluntary  act ; 
for  otherwise  a  party  might  be  charged  with  a  ruinous  responsi- 
bility without  his  knowledge,  intention,  or  assent,  and  without 
fault  on  his  part,  and  through  the  fraud  or  wrongful  acts  of  oth- 
ers. (^)     Where  a  person  is  received  as  a  new  member 

*  into  an  old  firm,  and  the  new  firm  recognizes,  by  pay-    *  190 
ment  of  interest  a  debt  of  the  old  firm,  this  is,  in  general 


contract,  each,  being  responsible  for  the 
purchase  of  a  moiety  only  of  tlie  cargo. 
See  also  Hopkins  v.  Smith,  11  Johns.  161 ; 
Livingston  v.  Roosevelt,  4  id.  26(3 ;  Mclver 
V.  Humble,  16  East,  169.  —  So  where  in 
an  action  of  assumpsit,  -C  was  charged 
as  a  partner  with  A,  on  the  authority  of 
B,  who  informed  the  plaintiff  before  he 
furnished  the  goods,  that  they  were  in 
partnership,  and,  at  the  trial,  B's  clerk 
proved  that  B  had  been  in  the  habit  of 
discounting  bills  for  A,  and  that  in  dis- 
counting a  bill  at  one  time  for  A,  he  had 
introduced  C  to  him  as  his  partner,  but 
that  the  only  connection  in  trade  between 
B  and  the  defendants  was  in  discounting 
bills ;  Lord  Kenyan  said  that  this  evidence 
was  not  sufficient  to  charge  C  as  A's 
partner;  that  the  introduction  of  C  to  B 
should  be  taken  secundum  suhjectani  mat- 
eriarn,  that  is,  as  applying  to  a  transac- 
tion in  whicJi  A  was  concerned  with  B, 
the  discounting  of  bills,  to  which  trans- 
action only  it  should  be  confined.  De 
Berkom  i'.  Smith,  1  Esp.  29;  see  also 
Livingston  v.  Roosevelt,  4  Johns.  266. 

(?)  Barkhe  ;;.  Scott,  1  Hud.  &  B.  83. 
Because  it  does  not  hold  him  out  to  the 
world  as  a  partner,  nor  give  him  any 
share  in  the  profits,  nor  empower  him  to 
dissolve,  alter,  or  affect  the  partnership. 
—  So  the  fact  that  several  persons  as- 
sociated together  to  run  a  line  of  stage- 
coaches, that  they  had  a  general  meeting, 
and  that  debts  were  contracted  on  account 
of  the  companj',  do  not  prove  a  partner- 
ship as  between  themselves.  Chandler 
V.  Brainard,  14  Pick.  285;  Clark  v.  Reed, 
11  id.  446. —  And  the  fact  that  two  per- 
sons sign  a  note  jointly  was  held  not 
evidence  of  a  partnership  between  them. 
Hopkins  r.  Smith,  11  Johns.  161.  But 
see  Carwick  v.  Vickery,  Dougl.  653;  De 


Berkom  v.  Smith,  1  Esp.  29 ;  3  Kent  (5th 
ed.),  30,  n.  See  further  as  to  what  facts 
will  constitute  a  partnership,  Smith  v, 
Edwards,  2  Har.  &  G.  411. 

(s)  See  Evcrilt  v.  Chapman,  6  Conn. 
347 ;  Tcrrill  v.  Richards,  1  Nott  &  McC. 
20;  Drake  v.  Elwin,  1  Caines,  184;  Beech- 
am  ?■.  Dodd,  3  Har.  485 ;  Drennen  v.  House, 
41  Penn.  St.  30. 

(t)  Such  circumstances  as,  according 
to  the  custom  of  merchants,  usually  in- 
dicate a  partnership,  may  be  given  in 
evidence  against  one  whom  it  is  sought 
to  charge  as  a  partner ;  such  as  the  use 
of  his  name  in  jirinted  invoices,  bills  of 
parcels,  and  advertisements,  or  on  the 
printed  signs  attached  to  tlie  place  of 
business ;  and  these  may  afford  strong 
presumptive  evidence  of  his  acquiescence 
in  the  name  and  character  of  partner. 
In  general,  if  he  so  acts  as  to  justify 
others  in  believing  him  a  partner,  he  will 
be  liable  as  such.  Spencer  v.  Billing,  3 
Camp,  310;  Parker  i-.  Barker,  1  Br.  &  B. 
9,  3  JMoore,  226.  Nevertheless,  this  evi- 
dence may  be  rebutted  by  showing  either 
that  he  was  entirely  ignorant  of  these 
transactions,  or  that  he  took  the  proper 
means  of  disowning  them  and  denying 
his  authority.  One  is  not  liable  as  a 
nominal  partner  because  others  use  his 
name  as  that  of  a  member  of  a  firm, 
without  his  consent,  although  he  pre- 
viously belonged  to  the  firm  ;  proviiled 
he  has  taken  the  proper  steps  to  notify 
the  public  of  his  retirement.  Newsome 
V.  Coles,  2  Camp.  617.  And  the  phiintiff 
should  be  prepared  to  show  that  the  acts 
of  the  defendant,  which  he  relies  on  as 
acts  of  partnership,  were  done  by  the 
defendant,  with  full  knowledge  and  de- 
liberation on  his  part.  See  Fox  v.  Clifton, 
G  Bing.  776,  4  Mo.  &  P.  713. 

213 


*191 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


evidence  of  an  adoption  of  the  debt  by  the  new  firm,  including  the 
new  partner,  wliicli  will  make  him  liable  ;  (w)  but  it  has  not 
always  nor  necessarily  this  effect.  Some  knowledge  of  and  as- 
sent to  this  payment  must  be  brought  home  to  the  new  partner,  by 
direct  testimony,  or  by  showing  such  oversight  of  or  such  share  in 
the  actual  business  of  the  firm  as  would  imply  such  knowledge ; 

and  perhaps  there  should  be  some  evidence  of  assent  by 
*  191    the  *  creditor  to  the  transfer  of  the  debt  from  the  old  to 

the  new  firm,  (i^) 


(n)  Ex  parte  Jackson,  1  Ves.  131.  The 
general  rule,  as  well  as  the  exceptions  to 
it  wliicli  may  possibly  occur,  are  well 
illustrated  by  the  case  of  Ex  parte  Peel, 
6  Ves.  602.  There  Kirk,  a  warehouse- 
man, carrying  on  business  under  tlie  firm 
of  Kirk  and  Company',  being  indebted  to 
Sir  Kobert  Peel  for  goods  sold,  after  tiiat 
debt  was  contracted  had  entered  into 
a  treaty  with  Ford,  a  breeches-maker, 
for  forming  a  pai'tnership.  About  four 
months  afterwards  a  commission  of  bank- 
ruptcy issued  against  them.  No  articles 
having  been  executed,  Ford  disputed  the 
point  of  partnership,  which  was  tried  at 
law,  and  the  partnership  was  established 
upon  the  evidence  of  acts  done.  A  peti- 
tion was  ])resented  by  Sir  Robert  Peel  to 
prove  liis  debt  as  a  joint  debt.  In  sup- 
port of  the  petition  the  affidavit  of  one 
Copeland  stated,  that  it  was  agreed  tliat 
the  separate  debts  of  Kirk  should  be 
assumed  by  the  partnership ;  tliat  entries 
were  made  in  the  books  witli  the  knowl- 
edge of  Ford ;  and  particularly,  that 
the  goods  furnished  by  tlio  petitioner 
were  entered  at  a  redut'ed  price.  This 
was  opposed  by  tlie  affidavit  of  Ford, 
denying  tlie  agreement,  or  even  knowl- 
edge of  tliose  circumstances.  Lord 
Eldon :  "  I  agree  it  is  settled  that  if 
a  man  gives  a  partnership  engagement 
in  the  partnership  name,  witli  regard  to 
a  transaction  not  in  its  nature  a  ])artner- 
ship  transaction,  he  who  seeks  tlie  benefit 
of  that  engagement  must  be  able  to  say 
tliat,  although  in  its  nature  not  a  part- 
nersliij)  transaction,  yet  tiiere  was  some 
authority  beyond  tlie  mere  circumstance 
of  partnership  to  enter  into  that  (-ontract 
so  as  to  binil  the  partnership,  and  tlien  it 
depends  upon  the  degree  of  evidence. 
Slight  circumstances  might  be  sufficient 
where  in  the  original  transaction  the 
party  to  l)e  bound  was  not  a  i)artner  but 
at  the  subsequent  time  liad  acquired  all 
tlie  benefit,  as  if  he  liad  been  a  partner 
in  the  original  transaction  ;  and  it  would 
not  be  unwholesome  for  a  jury  to  infer 

214 


largely  that  that  obligation,  clearly  ac- 
cording to  conscience,  had  been  given 
upon  an  imjilied  authority.  So  liere,  if 
this  was  a  case  in  which  it  was  found 
upon  the  trial  that  this  man  was  a  part- 
ner upon  a  long-existing  partnersiiip, 
with  a  regular  series  of  transactions, 
books,  &c.,  a  knowledge  of  wiiat  his 
partner  had  been  doing  might  be  in- 
ferred against  him ;  that  which  in  com- 
mon prudence  he  ought  to  have  known. 
But  that  is  not  the  case  of  this  partner- 
ship :  it  was  a  treaty.  It  is  not  even  yet 
agreed  how  the  stock  and  partnership 
were  to  be  formed.  In  the  course  of 
that  treaty,  Ford,  ignorant  of  law,  per- 
mits acts  to  be  done  which  the  law  holds 
to  be  partnership  acts.  It  is  a  very  dif- 
ferent consideration  whetlier  this  man, 
so  trepanned  into  a  partnersiiip,  had 
got  regular  books,  &c. ;  and  it  is  difficult 
to  say,  not  only  that  knowing  tiiis  he  had 
agreed  to  it,  but  that  lie  knew  it;  in 
which  case  I  am  afraid  he  must  be 
bound.  That  fact  has  not  been  sufficient- 
ly inquired  into."  The  order,  therefore, 
directed  a  reference  to  the  commissioners 
to  inquire  whether,  at  tlie  commence- 
ment of  the  partnership,  any  debts  due 
from  Kirk,  for  his  stock  in  trade,  were 
assumed,  and  any  debts  to  him  carried 
into  the  ])artnersliip,  with  the  knowledge 
and  assent  of  Ford. 

(i)  Kirwan  ;•.  Kirwan,  2  Cr.  &  M.  617. 
In  this  case  it  appeared  that  A  kept  an 
account  in  the  nature  of  a  banking  ac- 
count with  the  firm  of  B.  &  Co.,  and 
annual  accounts  were  rendered  to  liim. 
During  the  time  that  A  dealt  with  the 
firm,  ail  the  ])artners  retired  except  C, 
who  formed  a  new  partnersliii)  with  K. 
On  the  accession  of  K  a  large  capital 
was  brought  into  the  concern.  A's  ac- 
count was  then  transferred  from  the 
books  of  the  old  to  those  of  the  new 
partnership,  and  the  balance  was  struck 
annually  as  before;  and  A,  until  his 
death,  whicli  hnppened  about  thn.'C  years 
afterwards,   received   sums   on    account, 


CII.  XII.]  PARTNEESHIP.  *  191 

The  liability  of  an  incoming  partner  for  old  debts  is  not  to  be 
presumed,  (w)  ^  but  may  be  proved  by  circumstances  indicating 
his  willingness  and  intention  to  assume  the  old  debts,  (ww') 

If  persons  who  succeed  to  the  interest  of  a  retiring  ])artncr 
continue  to  transact  the  business  in  conjunction  with  the  remain- 
ing partners  as  before,  they  become  members  of  the  firm  as 
under  the  original  articles  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the 
contrary.  Qicx) 

The  authority  of  a  partner  to  bind  liis  firm  rests  indeed  upon  a 
necessity  ;  for  mercantile  business  could  not  be  carried  on  by  a 
partnership  otherwise,  without  great  inconvenience.  And  it  is 
bounded  and  measured  by  this  necessity,  so  that  the  partnership 
is  not  bound  by  the  acts  or  contracts  of  any  partner,  not  within 
the  legitimate  scope  of  the  partnership  business,  (x)  An  illustra- 
tion of  this  may  be  found  in  the  rule  which  is  held  by  authorities 
of  great  weight,  that  one  partner  cannot  bind  his  firm  by  a  sub- 
mission to  arbitration,  without  specific  authority  from  his  copart- 
ners ;   nor   has    a  partner,  as   such,  authority  to   consent   to  a 

and  interest  on  his  balance  from  the  new  And  although  the  account  was  trans- 
firm,  in  the  same  manner  as  before,  ferred  from  tlie  old  to  the  new  firm,  the 
Upon  the  deatli  of  A,  his  administrators  learned  judge  conceived  that  there  might 
brought  an  action  against  the  (juondam  be  many  ways  in  which  interest  might  be 
partners  and  C  to  recover  the  balance,  paid  without  K  being  aware  of  it ;  and 
and  in  that  action  the  quondam  partners  the  manner  of  keeping  the  accounts  led 
contended  that  their  responsibility  had  to  the  supposition  that  he  was  not  aware 
siiiftcd  to  C  and  K,  and  it  was  argued  in  of  it.  See  also  Ex  parte  Sandham,  4 
their  behalf  that  the  transfer  of  the  ac-  Ueac.  &  C.  812;  Stenburg  v.  Callanan, 
count  into  the  books  of   the  new  firm,  14  la.  251. 

and    the    payments    of     money    to    A,  {tv)  See  Catt  v.  Howard,  3  Stark.  5. 

amounted    to    evidence   against   K   that  (ww)  Updyke  v.  Doyle,  7  R.  I.  446. 

he  intended  to  take  the  debt  upon  him.  {ivx)  Meaher  f.  Cox,  37  Ala.  201. 

But   the   Court   of    Exchequer   were   of  {x)  Dickinson  v.  Valpy,   10   B.  &    C. 

opinion  that  no  inference  of    that   sort  128 ;   Sandilands  v.  Marsli,  2  B.  &  Aid. 

could  be  drawn,  in  the  absence  of  any  073 ;  Sims  v.  Brutton,  1  E.  L.  &  E.  446. 

proof  of  A's  assent  to  the  substitution  of  One    partner    cannot    bind    the    firm    or 

K  as  his  debtor,  for  the  original  partners  ;  transfer  its  j^roperty  for  his  private  debt: 

and   Bolland,  B.,  observed  further,    that  Kemeys  r.  liichards,  11  Barb.  312;  Lan- 

there  was  nothing  to  show  that  K  under-  ier   v.   McCabe,   2    Fla.   32 ;    unless   the 

took  to  answer  for  the  debts  of  the  old  other   partners   authorize   or    ratify  the 

firm,  and  tlie  probabilities  were  that  he  act.     Wheeler  v.  Eice,  8  Cush.  205. 
would  not  incur  further  responsibilities. 

1  The  presumption  is  against  the  assumption  by  an  incoming  partner  of  pre-exist- 
ing debts,  Kountz  ?'.  Holthouse,  85  Penn.  St.  235 ;  Paradise  v.  Gerson,  32  La.  An. 
532 ;  but  to  become  so  liable,  he  must  expressly  agree  with  the  creditor  to  assume, 
Shamburgf.  Ruggles,  83  Penn.  St.  148;  Meador  i'.  Hughes,  14  Bush,  652;  Morehead  v. 
Wristow,  73  N.  C.  398.  The  new  partner's  assent  to  assume,  and  the  creditor's  consent 
to  accept  him,  are  both  equally  necessary.  Shoemaker,  &c.  Co.  v.  Bernard,  2  Lea,  358  ; 
but  very  slight  evidence  of  such  assumption  being  sufficient.  Cross  v.  Burlington  Bank, 
17  Kan.  3.36;  Shaw  v.  McGregory,  105  JMass.  96.  See  Guild  v.  Belcher,"  119  Mass. 
257,  tliat  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  that  portion  of  a  firm  note  covering  an  after- 
incurred  debt  may  be  recovered. 

215 


*  192  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

judgment  in  an  action  against  him  and  his  copartners ;  (y)  the 
reason  given  for  these  rules  being,  that  a  partner  has  no  implied 
authority,  except  so  far  as  is  necessary  to  carry  on  the  busi- 
ness of  the  firm.  (2)     Another  reason  is  also  given,  that 

*  192    *  such  implied  authority  might  deprive  the  other  partners 

of  their  legal  rights  or  remedies. 

So  if  a  partner  disposes  of  the  partnership  property  in  any  man- 
ner for  his  personal  and  exclusive  benefit,  as  by  a  sale  on  terms 
beneficial  to  himself  alone,  this  is  not  valid  as  to  the  other  partner 
without  proof  of  his  assent,  (^zz) 

It  is  a  familiar  principle,  that  partners  may  limit  or  enlarge 
the  power  of  each  other,  as  between  themselves,  at  their  own 
pleasure ;  and  it  is  certain  that  third  persons  are  not  affected  by 
any  such  limitations  or  stipulations,  unless  they  have  notice  or 
knowledge  of  them,  (a)  But  whether  they  are  bound  by  limita- 
tions of  which  they  have  notice,  and  therefore  cannot  hold  the 
firm  on  the  contract  of  a  partner  who,  as  they  know,  has  exceeded 
the  power  given  to  him  by  his  firm,  may  not  be  quite  settled ; 
but  we  think  the  better  reason  and  authority  lead  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  third  parties  are  affected  by  such  stipulations  when 
made  known  to  them.  (6) 


SECTION  xin. 

POWER   OF   A    MAJORITY. 

Whether  the  majority  of  the  partners  of  a  firm  can  bind  the 
minority,  is  not  yet  quite  determined  by  authority.  Some  cases 
show  a  disposition  to  admit  this  power,  but  to  confine  its  exercise 

(v)  Ilambidge  v.  De  la  Croiitc,  3  M.  Armstrong  v.  Robinson,  5  G.  &  J.  412; 

G.  &   S.  742 ;  Morgan  v.  Richardson,  IG  Tavlor  v.  Corvt-11,  12  S.  &  R.  243. 
Mo.  409;  IJinncy  v.  Le  Gal,  VJ  Barb.  592.  (zz)  Cadwallader  v.  Kroescn,  22  Md. 

See  also  Gricr  v.  Hood,  25  Penn.  St.  430;  200. 
Clark  V.  Bowen,  22  How.  270.  ia)  Blundell  v.  Windsor,  8  Sim.  001; 

(z)  Stead  1-.  Salt,  3  Bing.  101  ;    Kart-  Walburn  r.  Ingilby,  1  Myl.  &  K.  01. 
haus  v.  Ferrer,  1  Pet.  22« ;   Biiclianan  r.  {h)  See   Haliet  v.  Dowdall,  9  E.  L.  & 

Curry,    10    Johns.    107;    Harrington    v.  E.  347 ;  s.  c.  18  Q.  B.  2  ;  Worcester  Corn 

Higham,  13  Barb.  000;  8.  c.  15  id.  524.  Ex.  Co.  19  E.  L.  &  E.  027;  In  re  Lea.  F. 

But  see   Wilcox   v.  Singletary,  Wright,  &  L.  Ins.  Co.  23  E.  L.  &  E.  422;   Fall 

420;    Southard  v.  Steele,  3  Monr.  435;  River  Union  Bauk  u.  Sturtevant,  12  Cush. 

372. 

216 


CH.  XII.]  PAKTNERSHIP.  *  193 

to  the  internal  concerns  of  the  firm,  (bh^  or  to  those  which  are  of 
little  importance.  The  authorities  on  this  subject  will  be  found 
in  our  notes,  (c)  We  think  a  distinction  might  be  drawn 
*on  principle,  between  partncrsliips  made  by  articles,  and  *  193 
by  their  provisions  not  determinable  by  either  party  at 
pleasure,  and  those  which  may  be  dissolved  by  mutual  consent 
and  terminated  at  once  by  either  party,  at  his  own  will  and 
pleasure.  In  the  former  case,  it  might  be  said  that  the  majority 
should  not  be  permitted  to  govern,  because  the  minority  have  no 
refuge,  no  escape  by  dissolution ;  and  if  controlled  absolutely  by 
tlie  majority,  they  miglit  be  made  to  incur  unreasonable  danger. 
But  where  any  dissenting  partner  may  dissolve  the  partnership  at 
pleasure,  then  the  majority  shoidd  govern.  Because  that  is  but 
saying  to  the  minority,  choose  either  to  go  on  with  us  in  the 
transaction  we  propose  and  approve,  or  leave  us  to  go  on  by  our- 
selves, as  you  prefer.  Where  the  copartnership  is  determinable 
at  the  will  of  any  partner,  the  rule  that  the  minority  may  gov- 
ern only  terminates  a  partnership  between  disagreeing  partners. 
Where  the  partnership  is  not  determinable  at  pleasure,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  rule  that  a  minority  may  arrest  or  prohibit  a 
transaction  which  they  do  not  approve,  gives  them  in  fact  a  power 
to  terminate  a  copartnership  at  pleasure,  because  if  they  can 
arrest  one  transaction,  they  may  all.  This  is  possible ;  but  the 
inconveniences  resulting  from  it  seem  to  be  less  than  those  which 
might  come  from  permitting  a  bare  majority  to  retain  the  capital 
of  copartners,  and  employ  it  in  transactions  which  they  disap- 
prove, and  expose  it  to  hazards  they  are  unwilling  to  encounter. 

{bb)  As  tlie  appointment  of  a  publisher  Turn.  &  R.   525.     Lord  Eldon's  opinion 

of  a  newspaper  owned  by  a  partnersliip.  was  in  favor  of  tlie  power  of  a  majority 

Peacock  v.  Cummings,  46  Penn.  St.  434.  to  bind  the  minority,  provided  their  con- 

(c)  It  has  been  laid  down  by  a  learned  duct  was  bona  fide.  His  lordship  said: 
writer  (Chitty's  Laws  of  Commerce,  vol.  "I  call  that  the  act  of  all  which  is  the 
8,  p.  236),  tliat  in  the  absence  of  any  ex-  act  of  the  majority,  provided  all  are  con- 
press  stipulation  a  majority  must  decide  suited,  and  the  majority  act  bona  fide." 
as  to  the  disposition  of  the  partnership  The  majority  of  partners  do  not  represent 
property.  But  this  opinion  is  given  with  the  whole  body,  except  when  the  voice  of 
considerable  caution,  and  it  may  perhaps  the  minority  has  been  called  for.  In  such 
be  more  safe  to  say,  that  the  power  of  the  case  the  court  will  take  the  oi)inion  of  the 
majority  to  bind  the  minority  is  confined  minority  to  have  been  fairly  overruled, 
to  the  ordinary  transactions  of  the  part-  See  also  Kirk  v.  Hodgson,  3  Johns.  Ch. 
ncrship.  See  6  Ves.  777 ;  5  Bro.  P.  C.  400 ;  Wilkins  v.  Pearce,  5  Denio,  541 ; 
489.  It  is  true  that  in  one  case  it  has  Robinson  v.  Thompson,  1  Vern.  465 ;  Ex 
been  lield  that  in  all  sea  adventures  the  parte  Johnson,  31  E.  L.  &  E.  430;  3  Kent, 
acts  of  the  majority  shall  bind  the  whole;  Com.  45,  n. ;  Story  on  Part.  §  123,  n. ; 
but  in  that  case  provision  to  that  effect  Johnston  v.  Button,  27  Ala.  245 ;  West- 
was  made  by  deed.  Falkland  v.  Cheney,  em  St.  Co.  v.  Walker,  2  la.  504. 
5  Bro.  P.  C.  470.     So  in  Const  v.  Harris, 

217 


*  194  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I, 

Moreover,  the  opposite  rule  —  tliat  the  majority  might  govern  — 
would  give  to  them  the  power  of  dissolving  the  partnership  at 
pleasure  ;  because,  if  they  wished  for  a  dissolution,  they  could 
always  propose  transactions  so  adverse  to  the  views  or  interests 
of  the  minority  as  to  compel  them  to  assent  to  a  dissolution  as 
their  only  escape. 

It  must  be  regarded  as  certain  that  a  majority  cannot  compel  a 

minority  to  extend  the  business  of  the  partnership  to  transactions 

beyond  their  original  intention,  or  otherwise  make  a  ma- 

*  194    tcrial  *  change  in  the  business,  not  contemplated  in  the 

formation  of  the  partnership,  nor  sanctioned  by  all  the 
partners. 


SECTION  XIV. 

OF   DISSOLUTION. 

The  dissolution  of  a  partnership  does  not  affect  the  liability 
of  the  partners  for  former  debts,i  but  in  general,  prevents  the 
incurring  of  a  new  joint  liability. 

However  it  takes  place,  dissolution  terminates  altogether  the 
power  of  a  partner  to  carry  on  the  business  concerns  of  the  part- 
nership, in  a  way  to  bind  former  partners  by  any  contract  what- 
ever. The  former  partners  are  partners  no  longer,  but  tenants  in 
common ;  and  where  there  is  no  agreement  to  the  contrary,  each 
partner,  after  dissolution,  possesses  the  same  authority  to  adjust 
the  affairs  of  the  firm,  by  collecting  its  debts,  and  disposing  of  its 
property,  as  before  the  dissolution ;  but  they  can  no  longer  bind 
each  other,  even  to  the  extent  of  varying  the  form  of  existing  obli- 
gations, (c?)  No  partner  can  indorse  a  note  of  the  firm,  even  to 
pay  a  prior  debt  of  the  firm,  (e)  It  is  said  in  England,  that  a 
retired  partner  may  authorize,  even  by  parol,  a  remaining  partner 

(rf)    Torrey   v.   Baxter,   13   Vt.   452;  Glasscock  i-.  Smith,  25  Ala.  474  ;  Fellows 

Wooclworth  V.  Downer,  id.  522  ;   Robbins  v.  Wj-nian,  8.3  N.  H.  o51.     Perhaps  some 

r.  Fuller,  24  N.  Y.  (10  Smith)  570.     See  doubt  is   thrown  on    this  conclusion,  by 

jjos/,  i}.*200.  Fowle   i'.    Harrintrton,  1   Cush.  14(3,  and 

(e)  Humphries  v.  Chastain,  5  Ga.  lOG ;  Temple  v.  Seaver^  11  Cush.  314. 

1  Nor  will  a  dissolution,  not  caused  by  the  death  of  a  partner,  prevent  the  carry- 
ing out  of  a  firm  contract  only  partially  performed.  Dickson  v.  Indianapolis,  &c. 
Co.,  Go  Ind.  y. 

218 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  195 

to  indorse  bills  in  the  name  of  the  firm,  which  will  hold  him ;  (/) 
but  then,  in  fact,  he  is  scarcely  a  retired  partner.  We  should 
say,  that  a  general  authority  to  a  partner,  to  settle  the  affairs  of 
the  firm,  whether  it  be  an  express  authority,  or  the  authority 
given  by  law  to  a  surviving  partner,  would  not  give  any  power  of 
this  kind.  (</) 

It  is  important  to  know  what  makes  a  dissolution.  If  the  part- 
nership be  for  a  time  certain,  one  partner  may  maintain 
an  *  action  at  law  against  another  for  a  breach  of  the  *  195 
articles  in  dissolving  before  the  period  therein  limited ; 
and  the  action  may  be  brought  before  the  expiration  of  the  time 
for  which  the  partnership  was  limited.  The  damages  would  be 
the  profits  which  would  have  accrued  to  the  plaintiff  from  the 
continuation  of  the  partnership  business.  (A)  Where  a  partner- 
ship is  not  to  endure  for  a  time  certain  by  the  articles  of  copart- 
nership, or  where  that  time  has  expired,  it  may  undoubtedly  be 
dissolved  at  the  pleasure  of  any  partner,  (i)  ^  But  the  dissolution 
should  be  made  with  due  notice  to  the  other  partner  or  partners, 
and  at  such  time  and  in  such  manner  as  would  not  cause  unneces- 
sary injury  to  them ;    nor  would  the  law  sanction  fraud  in  this 


(/)  Smith  V.  Winter,  4  M.  &  W.  454.  injury  would  be  inflicted,  or  fraud  indi- 

((/)  Long  V.  Story,  10  Mo.  63(3;  P.arker  cated.  Howell  v.  Harvey,  5  Ark.  'J80.  — 
V.  Cousins.  2  Gratt.  372;  Lusk  v.  Smith,  The  duration  may  be  gathered  from  tlie 
8  Barb.  570  ;  Hurst  v.  Hill,  8  Md.  399  ;  terms  of  tlie  articles,  although  not  ex- 
Palmer  t-.  Dodge,  4  Oliio  (n.  s.)  21 ;  Ham-  pressly  provided  for.  Wheeler  v.  Van 
ilton  V.  Seaman,  1  Cart.  (Ind.)  185;  Fow-  Wart,  2  Jur.  252.  See  also  Crawshay  v. 
ler  V.  Richardson,  3  Sneed,  508 ;  Merritt  Collins,  15  Ves.  227 ;  Wilson  v.  Green- 
V.  Pollvs,  16  B.  Mon.  355.  But  see  Kemp  wood,  1  Swanst.  480 ;  Washburn  v.  Good- 
V.  CoMn,  3  Greene  (la.),  190.  man,    17   Pick.    519.  —  In    the    case    of 

{h)  Bagley  ?;.  Smith,  ION.  Y.  (6Seld.)  Sanderson  v.   The  Milton  Stage  Co.  18 

489.  Vt.  107,  it  was  held,  —  where  one  partner 

(/)  Griswold  v.  Waddington,  15  Johns,  gave  tlie  other  notice  tiiat  tlie  copartner- 
82. —  But  notice  should  be  given  to  the  ship  was  dissolved,  but  this  was  not  as- 
other  partner.  Norot  ?'.  Bernand,  4  Russ.  sented  to  by  the  other,  and  the  parties 
260;  Peacock  v.  Peacock,  16  Ves.  50. —  did  not  afterwards  act  upon  it,  —  that  it 
This  should  be  a  reasonable  notice  wliere  did  not  operate  as  a  dissolution  of  the 
the  articles  are  totally  silent  upon  the  firm, 
subject,  and  where,  without  such  notice. 


1  "  A  partnership  for  an  indefinite  period  is  in  law  a  partnership  at  the  will 
of  the  partners,  and  either  partner  piay  withdraw  when  he  pleases,  and  dissolve 
the  partnership,  if  he  acts  without  any  fraudulent  purpose,"  Morton,  .J.,  in 
Fletcher  v.  Reed,  131  Mass.  312  ;  altliough  one  partner  paid  a  bonus  for  a  good-will 
established  by  the  other,  McElvey  v.  Lewis,  76  N.  Y.  373;  Sistare  v.  Cusliing,  4 
Hun,  503;  Carlton  r.  Cummins,  51  Ind.  478.  But  a  partner  cannot  treat  the  part- 
nership as  at  an  end  because  of  his  partner's  dishonesty  or  bad  character,  and  absorb 
all  the  joint  benefits  and  property,  when  he  knew  of  such  characteristics  at  the 
formation  of  the  partnership.  Amble  u.  Whipple,  20  WaU.  546;  see  McMahon  e;. 
McClernan,  10  W.  Va.  419. 

219 


*  195  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

matter,  (n)  Whether,  when  the  partnership  is  by  articles  which 
stipuhite  its  continuance  for  a  specified  period,  one  partner  may 
dissolve  it  within  that  period,  is  not,  perhaps,  quite  certain.  ^  By 
the  civil  law,  such  dissolution  is  permitted,  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  be  useless  and  mischievous  to  hold  reluctant  partners 
together.  (/)  In  England  the  weight  of  authority  is  decidedly 
opposed  to  such  dissolution,  as  a  breach  of  contract ;  (/c)  still  it  is 
difficult  to  deny  that  one  may  assign  his  interest,  and  this  would 
operate  a  dissolution;'-^  or  he  might  contract  a  debt,  and  let  his 
interest  be  taken  in  execution.  ^  A  court  of  equity  might  interfere 
to  prevent  such  assignment ;  but  would  not,  in  case  of  debt,  un- 
less there  was  collusion,  or  the  creditor's  interest  could  not  other- 
wise be  secured.  (Z)     And  even  if  the  partnership  by  the  articles 

(»■)  See  Stemmer's  Appeal,  58  Penn.  v.  Connell,   1   Wliart.   388;    Whitton   v. 

St.  1G8.  Smith,  1  Freem.  Ch.  (Miss.)  231 ;  Beaver 

(/)  Vinnius  in  Ins.  8,  26,  4;   Ferriere  v.   Lewis,   14  Ark.    138.      In    Bisliop   v. 

in    id.    tome  V.    156 ;     Dig.    17,  2,   14 ;  Breckles,  1  Iloffm.  Ch.  534,  the  question 

Doniat,    b.    1,    tit.   8,   §   5,  art.    1-8,   by  was  considered  doubtful,  but  the  rule  of 

Strahan.  the   civil   law  deemed  more  reasonable, 

(k)  Peacock  v.  Peacock,  16  Ves.  56;  and  the  refusal  of  one  partner  to  proceed 

Crawshay  v.  Maule,  1  Swanst.  495.     See  properly  in  the  business  of  the  partner- 

Pearpoint  v.  Graham,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  234,  ship,  was  held  sufficient  cause  for  a  de- 

where  ir((s/i»(r/to//,  J.,  distinctly  affirms  the  cree  of  dissolution.    Per  V^ice-Chancellor : 

rule  indicated  by  tlie  English  authorities.  "  The   law   of   the    court,  then,  requires 

(/)  Marquand  v.  N.  Y.  Man.  Co.  17  something  more  than  the  mere  will  of  one 
Johns.  525.  In  this  case,  the  assignment  party  to  justify  a  dissolution.  But  it 
by  one  partner  of  all  his  interest  in  the  seems  to  me  that  but  little  should  be  de- 
partnership  was  held  to  dissolve  it,  al-  manded.  The  principle  of  the  civil  law 
though  by  the  articles  it  was  to  continue  is  the  most  wise.  Why  sliould  this  court 
till  two  partners  sliould  demand  its  disso-  compel  the  continuance  of  a  imion  when 
lution.  In  Skinner  r.  Dayton,  19  Johns,  dissension  has  marred  all  prospects  of  the 
538,  it  was  held  that  the  partnership  is  advantages  contemplated  by  its  forma- 
dissoluble  at  the  pleasure  of  any  partner,  tion  ?  By  refusing  to  dissolve  it,  the 
although  he  has  entered  into  a  covenant  power  of  binding  eacli  other,  and  of  deal- 
for  its  continuance  for  seven  years  —  the  ing  with  tiie  partncrsjiip  property,  re- 
only  consequence  being  tliat  lie  thereby  mains,  wlicn  all  confidence  and  all  corn- 
subjects  himself  to  a  claim  for  damages  bination  of  effort  i.s  at  an  end.  The 
for  a  breach  of  his  covenant.    See  Mason  object  of  the  contract  is  defeated." 

1  Cole  V.  Moxley,  12  W.  Va.  730,  decided  that  one  partner  could  not  dissolve 
a  partnership  for  a  fixed  period,  but  must  account  for  profits  up  to  the  time  of 
expiration. 

'•^  Such  an  assignment  dissolves  tlie  firm,  and  the  assignee  is  only  entitled  to  his 
share  after  tlie  payment  of  debts,  Bank  r.  Carrollton  M.  Co.  11  Waif.  (!2l;  Mor.ss  v. 
Gleason,  04  N.  Y.  204  ;  and  tiie  remaining  jiartner  may  hold  jiossession  until  the 
firm  affairs  are  wound  up.  Miller  v.  Brigham,  50  Cal.  615.  When  the  assignee 
does  take  possession,  the  copartner's  remedy  is  in  equity.  Blood  v.  Fairbanks,  48 
Cal.  171. 

^  But  a  mortgage  to  a  copartner  of  his  interest  in  a  crop  does  not  operate  as  a 
dissolution,  Munroe  v.  Hamilton,  60  Ala.  226;  nor  of  Ids  partnership  interest  in 
personal  ])ropcrly  to  a  third  person,  Dupont  v.  ISIcLaran,  61  Mo.  502;  nor  a  sale 
of  his  interest  in  mining  firm  to  a  third  person,  Nisbet  v.  Nash,  .52  Cal.  540;  nor 
a  seizure  by  a  third  i)erson  of  one  partner's  interest  on  execution,  Cho})i)in  u.  Wilson, 
27  La.  An.  444 ;  nor  seizing  firm  property  to  pay  firm  debts,  the  business  being 
afterwards  discontinued.  Barber  v.  Barnes,  52  Cal.  650. 

220 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  196 

be  dissoluble  at  pleasure,  equity  will  decree  specific  performance 
of  them  if  this  be  necessary  to  give  the  plaintiff  his  rights.  {11} 
And  when  it  decrees  a  dissolution  it  may  determine  at  what  day 
the  partnership  shall  be  considered  as  at  an  end.  Qlm) 

*  It  has  been  questioned  whether  a  court  would  infer  an  *  196 
agreement  for  a  continuance  of  the  partnership  for  a  defi- 
nite period,  from  circumstances ;  as  the  taking  of  a  lease  of  an 
estate  to  be  used  as  partnership  property,  or  the  like.  But  it 
may  well  be  doubted,  whether  such  an  inference  would  be  drawn 
merely  from  circumstances,  unless  they  made  the  agreement  quite 
certain,  (m) 

A  court  of  equity  would  always  decree  a  dissolution  at  the 
prayer  of  one  or  more  copartners,  if  it  were  shown  that  the 
other  partner  or  partners  were  guilty  of  fraud,  or  gross  miscon- 
duct in  the  affairs  of  the  partnership ;  or  it  may  restrain  a  part- 
ner from  injurious  action,  (^n)  But  it  will  not  interfere  for  slight 
causes  ;  and  perhaps  for  nothing  less  than  unquestionable  fraud, 
or  an  amotion  of  the  complaining  partner  from  his  share  in  the 
business,  or  such  conduct  as  renders  the  carrying  on  of  the  busi- 
ness of  the  firm  substantially  impossible,  (o) 

If  the  bill  seeks  to  correct  in  some  way  the  proceedings  of  a 
firm,  but  not  to  dissolve  it,  it  is  not  usual  to  appoint  a 
receiver,  *  although  this  might  be  done.     But  if  the  prayer    *  197 
is  to   dissolve  the  partnership,  it  is   usual   to  appoint   a 
receiver,  (p) 

Any  assignment  of  a  copartner's  interest  in  the  partnership 
funds  operates,  ipso  facto,  a  dissolution ;  this  would  certainly  be 
true  of  the  assignment  of  the  whole  of  a  copartner's  interest, 

{II)  Whitworth  v.  Harris,  40  Miss.  483.  years,  must  hold  that  if  tlie  partners  pur- 

(/?«)  Dumont  v.   Rueppreeht,  38  Ala.  chase  a  fee-simple,  there  shall  be  a  part- 

175.  nersliip    for    ever."       See    Marshall    v. 

(m)    Crawshay   v.  Maule,   1    Swanst.  Marshall,  cited  2  Bell,  Cora  041,  n.  3,  and 

49-5,  508,   521.     Lord  Eldon :    "  Without  643,  n.  1. 

doubt,  in  the  absence  of  an  express,  there  {n)  Kemble  v.  Kean,  G  Sim.  3-33; 
may  be  an  implied  contract,  as  to  the  du-  Mealier  v.  Cox,  37  Ala.  201. 
ration  of  a  partnership.  But  I  must  (o)  Blakeney  v.  Dufaur,  15  E.  L.  &  E. 
contradict  all  authority,  if  I  say,  that  76;  s.  c.  15Beav.  40;  Blake  v.  Dorgan, 
wherever  there  is  a  partnership,  the  pur-  1  Greene  (la.),  537  ;  Terrell  v.  God- 
chase  of  a  leasehold  interest  of  longer  or  dard,  18  Ga.  664;  Renton  v.  Chaplain, 
shorter  duration  is  a  circumstance  from  1  Stock.  62. 

which  it  is  to  be  inferred  that  the  par^  (/>)  Hall  v.  Hall,  3  E.  L.  &  E.  191; 

nership   shall    continue   as   long   as   the  s.  c.  3  Mac.  &  G.  79;    Roberts  v.  Eber- 

lease.    On  that  argument,  the  court  hold-  hardt,  23  E.  L.  &  F.  245 ;    s.  c.  1  Ka.y, 

ing  that  a  lease  of  seven  years  is  proof  of  148  ;     Speights    v.   Peters,   9   Gill,   472 ; 

partnership  for  seven  years,  and  a  lease  Sloane  v.  Moore,  37  Penn.  St.  217. 
of  fourteen  of  a  partnership  for  fourteen 

221 


198 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book  I. 


and  perhaps  of  the  assignment  of  any  portion  of  his  interest 
which  required  a  closing  of  the  partnership  business  and  accounts 
to  determine  the  vahie  of  the  portion  assigned  ;  and  although  the 
assignment  was  made  only  to  give  a  collateral  security,  {q}  And 
an  assignment  by  one  partner  of  his  share  of  the  future 
*  198  profits  to  another  partner  is  a  dissolution  of  the  *  partner- 
ship, because  the  essence  of  that  is  a  participation  of  the 
profits.  (?•) 

As  death  operates  of  itself  a  dissolution,  (s)  ^  so  in  England  civil 


(q)  Horton's  Appeal,  13  Pcnn.  St.  67  ; 
Parklmrst  v.  Kinsman,  1  Blatch.  488 ; 
Marquand  v.  New  York  Manuf.  Co.  17 
Johns.  525.  —  In  Whitton  v.  Smith,  1 
Freem.  Ch.  (Miss.)  231,  it  was  held  that 
a  sale  or  assignment  by  one  partner  of  all 
his  interest  in  tlie  partnership  property, 
operates  as  a  dissolution,  if>so  facto,  al- 
though the  partnership  articles  provide 
for  a  continuance  of  the  partnership  for 
a  definite  period.  —  See  Conwell  v.  San- 
didge,  5  Dana,  213  ;  Cochran  v.  Perry,  8 
W.  &  S.  202.  —  But  the  true  principle 
seems  to  be  stated  in  Taft  ik  Buffum,  14 
Pick.  322.  In  this  case,  one  of  four  mem- 
bers of  a  firm  assigned  the  whole  of  his 
interest  in  all  the  personal  and  real  es- 
tate of  the  firm  to  one  of  his  copartners, 
but  still  continued  to  transact  the  busi- 
ness of  the  firm  in  the  same  manner  as 
before,  until  the  failure  of  tlio  company  ; 
a  suit  was  commenced  against  tlie  re- 
maining three  members  of  ttie  firm  ;  they 
pleaded  in  abatement  the  non-joinder  of 
the  part\-  wiio  had  so  assigned  his  share, 
and  the  court  held  that  a  conveyance  by 
a  partner  of  all  his  interest  in  all  tlie  real 
and  personal  estate  of  tlie  firm  to  one  of 
liis  copartners,  docs  not  ipso  facto  dissolve 
the  copartnership;  it  is  only  evidence 
tending  to  show  a  dissolution.  In  tliis 
case  the  court  say  tliat  a  person  may  still 
be  a  partner,  though  he  ceases  to  have 
any  property  in  the  stock  of  a  partner- 
sliip,  on  the  principle  that  two  persons 
may  become  partners,  one  furnishing 
money  or  goods,  and  the  other  skill  or 
labor;  or  after  persons  have  entered  into 
a  partnership,  and  each  has  furnished 
capital,  one  may,  with  the  consent  of  his 
associates,  and  for  good  consideration,  as 


of  great  skill  or  labor,  withdraw  his  funds 
or  share  in  the  stock,  and  still  continue 
to  be  a  member  of  the  firm.  Putnam,  J., 
remarked  :  "  We  think  that  such  an  ar- 
rangement would  not  necessurilij  operate 
as  a  dissolution  of  the  connection."  He 
adils  :  "  A  majority  of  tlie  court  are  of 
opinion  tiiatit  [the  fact  of  the  sale  by  one 
partner]  was  evidence  in  the  case,  whicli 
might  or  might  not  prove  a  dissolution, 
as  other  facts  miglit  be  proved  in  the 
case,  all  of  which  should  have  been  left 
to  the  jury,  to  determine  the  fact  whetiier 
the  partnership  liad  been  dissolved  or  not. 
For  example,  if,  after  a  sale,  the  partner 
assigning  his  interest  liad  ceased  to  have 
any  concern  in  the  establishment,  had  en- 
tered into  otlier  business  on  iiis  own  sep- 
arate account,  or,  as  it  might  be,  had 
removed  to  a  foreign  country  or  place, 
and  tliere  carried  on  business  for  iiim- 
self,  or  lived  upon  liis  own  funds  or 
otherwise ;  upon  such  evidence  we  should 
all  think  that  the  jury  ougiit  to  find  that 
tlie  copartnership  was  dissolved.  t)n  the 
other  hand,  if  (as  in  the  present  case  it  is 
found)  tiie  partner  so  assigning,  after  tlie 
conveyance,  continued  to  act  as  a  jiart- 
ner,  making  himself  liable  as  sucii  by 
drafts  and  otiier  partnership  business, 
just  as  he  had  done  before  the  convey- 
ance ;  then  it  would  seem  to  a  majority 
of  the  court  that  the  jury  ouglit  to  find 
that  the  partnership  was  not  dissolved." 
Coll.  on  Part.  §  110. —  See  Buford  v.  Mc- 
Neelev,  2  Dev.  Eq.  481  ;  Dana  c.  Lull,  17 
Vt.  390. 

(r)  Heath  ?'.  Sansom,  4  R.  &  Ad.  175; 
Edens  ik  Williams,  30  III.  252. 

(.s)  Vulliamy  r.  Noble,  3  Meriv.  593; 
Murray  v.  Muniford,  G  Cowen,  441 ;  Can- 


1  Cobble  V.  Tomlinson,  50  Ind.  550;  Martine  v.  International  Ins.  Roc.  53  N.  Y. 
339;  Slocomb  r.  Lizardi,  21  La.  An.  355;  unless  the  partnership  articles  specifically 
provide  for  its  continuance,  Uoberts  v.  Kelsey,  38  Mich.  002.  Whether  death  will 
work  a  dissolution  in  a  j);irtnershi))  or  voluntary  association  composed  of  many  mem- 
bers depends  upon  the  intention  as  gathered  from  the  terms  and  character  of  the 
organization.     Walker  v.  Wait,  60  Vt.  668.     See  Duffield  v.  Brainerd,  45  Conn.  424. 

222 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  199 

death  has  the  same -effect;  as  outlawry,  or  attainder  for  treason  or 
felony.  We  have  not  this  civil  death  in  this  country  ;  and  impris- 
onment for  a  term  of  years,  or  even  for  life,  would  probably  have 
only  the  effect  of  other  incapacity  ;  and  so  would  absconding  for 
debt  or  crime.  Q')  That  is,  it  would  not  be  a  dissolution  of  the 
partnership,  nor  cause  a  dissolution  at  once,  proprio  vigore,  but 
it  would  be  good  ground  for  applying  to  any  court,  having 
authority,  to  grant  a  dissolution.  When  either  partner  becomes 
disabled  to  act,  or  when  the  business  becomes  wholly  impractica- 
ble, a  court  of  equity  would  dissolve  the  partnership,  or  treat  it 
as  dissolved,  as  the  justice  of  the  case  might  require,  (u)  The 
contract  of  partnership  is  mutual ;  and  it  would  be  obviously 
unjust  to  hold  one  party  to  his  contract,  when  it  had  become 
impossible  for  the  other  to  fulfil  his  part.  If  the  party  so  dis- 
abled from  active  aid,  was,  by  the  terms  of  the  contract,  only 
a  silent  or  dormant  partner,  only  contributing  capital,  and  sharing 
with  his  partner  the  profit  and  loss  arising  from  the  use  made  of 
the  capital  by  the  active  partner,  the  above  reason  would  seem 
not  applicable,  because  his  capital  might  remain  as  before.  But 
in  this  case,  if  an  application  comes  from  the  active  partner,  he 
certainly  should  be  permitted  to  renounce  the  benefit  of  the  capi- 
tal under  such  circumstances,  if  he  wished  to  do  so.  And  if  the 
application  comes  from  the  party  owning  the  capital,  or  his  repre- 
sentatives, they  as  certainly  ought  to  be  permitted  to  withdraw 
the  capital  from  hazards  which  the  owner  could  no  longer  esti- 
mate nor  provide  for,  nor  advise  in  relation  to.  And  we  think 
with  Mr.  Justice  Story  and  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Parker,  that  it  may 
well  be  doubted  whether  the  rule  of  law  should  not  be  that 
absolute  insanity  *  or  any  equivalent  disability,  operates  at  *  199 
once,  and  ipso  facto,  a  dissolution,  (v)     But  it  is  said  that  a 

fielfl  !'.  Hard,  6  Conn.  184 ;  Burwell  ?'.  6  Hnmph.  85,  it  was  held,  that  an  inqui- 
Mamleville,  2  How.  5(iO;  Knapp  v.  Mc-  sition  of  lunacy,  found  against  a  member 
Bride,  7  Ala.  10.  —  In  such  case  the  dis-  of  a  partnersliip,  ipso  facto,  dissolves  the 
solution  takes  effect  from  the  time  of  the  partnership.  See  also  Griswold  v.  Wad- 
death,  however  numerous  the  association,  dington,  15  Johns.  57  ;  Davis  v.  Lane,  10 
and  this  not  only  as  to  the  deceased  part-  N.  H.  101,  where  Pctrker,  C.  J.,  is  reported 
ner,  but  also  as  to  all  of  the  survivors,  to  have  said  :  "  It  has  been  held,  in  Eng- 
Dyer  y.  Clark,  5  Met.  575 ;  Scholefield  r.  land,  that  the  insanity  of  one  partner 
Eichelberger,  7  Pet.  586.  And  the  same  does  not  operate  as  a  dissolution  of  the 
rule  applies  to  a  silent  partner.  Wash-  partnership,  but  that  object  must  be  at- 
burn  V.  Goodman,  17  Pick.  520.  tained  through  a  court  of  equity.  Sayer 
(t)  Whitman  y.  Leonard,  3  Pick.  177.  v.  Bennet,  cited  2  Ves.  &  B.  oV,.  Gow 
(»)  Leaf  r.  Coles,  12  E.  L.  &  E.  117.  on  Part.  272.  But  the  soundness  of 
(i-j  vStory  on  Part.  §  295;  Jones  v.  the  principle  may  perhaps  be  doubted. 
Noy,  2  Myl.  &  K.  125.    In  Isler  v.  Baker,  Waters  v.  Taylor,  2  Ves  &  B.  303 ;  Gris- 

223 


199 


THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


decree  of  dissolution  for  the  cause  of  insanity,  has  no  retrospec- 
tive action ;  not  even  to  the  time  wlien  the  bill  was  filed,  (w) 

Nothing  is  more  common  than  for  a  firm  to  go  on  without 
change  of  name,  or  of  business,  or  even  new  books  of  account, 
wlicu  a  member  leaves  it,  or  a  new  member  is  added.  Yet, 
strictly  speaking,  the  old  partnership  was  dissolved  and  a  new 
one  formed  by  any  change  among  its  members.  Thus  a  mort- 
gage to  a  firm  to  cover  advances,  was  held  not  applicable  to  tlie 
firm  after  a  new  member  was  added,  (ww) 

Bankruptcy  of  the  firm,  or  of  one  partner,  operates  an  imme- 
diate dissolution.  (2;)  ^  Insolvency  under  the  statutes  would  have 
tlie  same  effect ;  (?/)  but  not  the  mere   insolvency  which  is  only 


wold  V.  Waddington,  15  Johns.  57,  82, 
cited  stipra.  It  certainly  could  not  have 
been  applied  here  prior  to  1832,  as  we 
had  before  that  time  no  court  through 
whose  decree  in  equity  a  dissolution  could 
have  been  effected.  Admitting  it  to  be 
correct  in  its  fullest  extent,  however,  it 
would  not  affect  this  case,  for  each  part- 
ner has  an  interest  by  the  partnersliip 
contract,  and  the  interest  of  one  partner 
would  not  be  terminated  by  the  insanity 
of  another.  In  making  a  sale,  or  contract, 
he  does  not  act  as  agent,  but  in  his  own 
right ;  and  the  partnersliip  name  may  be 
used  by  one,  without  any  supposition 
tliat  another  acts,  individually,  or  has 
any  knowledge  or  volition  in  relation  to 
the  matter.  But  so  long  as  the  partner- 
sliip continues,  the  act  of  one  binds  the 
others  ;  and  as  it  is,  in  its  effect,  the  act 
of  all  tlie  partners,  it  may  deserve  great 
consideration  whetlier  the  insanity  of  one, 
in  the  absence  of  any  stipulation  to  the 
contrary,  does  not  operat^  ipso  Jiirfo,  as  a 
dissolution  of  the  partnersliip  itself.'' 

(w)  Besch  r.  Frolich,  1   Phil.  Ch.  172. 

(ww)  Abat  V.  I'cnny,  1!)  La.  An.  280. 

(.r)  Fox  V.  Hanbury,  Cow]).  448. 
Lord  Mansfield  :  "  An  act  of  bankruptcy 
by  one  partner  is  to  many  purposes  a  dis- 
solution of  the  partnersliip,  by  virtue  of 
the  relation  in  the  statutes,  which  avoid 
all  the  acts  of  a  bankrupt  from  the  day 


of  his  bankruptcy ;  and  from  the  neces- 
sity of  the  thing,  all  his  property  being 
vested  in  the  assignees,  who  cannot  carry 
on  a  trade."  See  Wilson  i\  Greenwood, 
1  Swanst.  482  ;  Ex  parte  Smith,  5  Ves. 
295;  Ex  parte  Williams,  11  Ves.  5  ; 
Crawshaj- t'.  Collins,  15  Ves.  218;  Dut- 
ton  r.  Morrison,  17  Ves.  193;  Griswold  v. 
Waddington,  15  Johns.  82 ;  s.  c.  IG  Johns. 
491 ;  Marquand  v.  N.  Y.  Manuf.  Co.  17 
id.  535;  Arnold  v.  Brown,  24  Pick.  89; 
Atwood  V.  Gillett,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  206; 
Coll.  on  Part.  B.  1,  ch.  2."^  3 ;  Story  on 
Part.  §  313.  But  "  an  act  of  bankrujitcy, 
however,  docs  not  dissolve  the  partner- 
ship instanter.  It  must  be  followed  by  a 
fiat  and  adjudication.  '  The  adjudication 
that  he  is  a  bankrupt,'  said  Lord  Lonijh- 
Itonjui/li,  '  is  what  severs  the  partnersliiji.'  " 
Coll.  on  Part.  §  111;  Ex  parte  Smith,  5 
Ves.  295;  Story  on  Part.  §  314.  The 
English  law  gives  effect  to  the  dissolu- 
tion from  the  declaration  of  bankruptcy 
under  a  commission  ;  but  this  relates  back 
to  the  act  of  bankruptcy,  and  vests  the 
property  in  the  assignees  from  that  period 
by  operation  of  law.  Fox  v.  Ilanbury, 
supra;  Ex  parte  Smith,  5  Ves.  290; 
Barker  v.  Goodair,  11  Ves.  83 ;  Thomason 
V.  Frere,  10  East,  418;  3  Kent,  Com.  59. 
(//)  Williamson  v.  Wilson,  1  Bland, 
418  ;  Gowan  v.  Jeffries,  2  Ashm.  305,  and 
cases  cited  supi-a. 


'  The  bankruptcy  of  one  partner  operates  a  dissolution,  Gates  v.  Beecher, 
60  N.  Y.  518;  Allen  v.  Woonsocket  Co.  11  R.  I.  288;  Wilkins  v.  Davis,  2  Lowell, 
511 ;  In  re  Lelaml,  5  Benedict,  108  ;  and  his  assignee  becomes  a  tenant  in  (;ommon  with 
the  solvent  partners,  Ilalsey  v.  Norton,  45  Miss.  703;  Wilkins  v.  Davis,  2  Lowell, 
511  ;  but  the  assignee  cannot  maintain  a  firm  suit,  Amsinck  v.  Bean,  22  Wall.  395; 
without  joining  the  solvent  partners,  Brownings.  Marvin,  22  Ilun,  547  ;  Ilalsey  y. 
Norton,  45  ,\Iiss.  703.  —  So  an  assignment  by  an  insolvent  firm  in  trust  for  creditors 
works  a  dissolution  if  no  provision  is  made  for  a  continuance.  McKelvy's  Appeal,  72 
Penn.  St.  409. 

224 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  200 

an  inability  to  pay  debts,  until  a  refusal  to  pay ;  (z)  and  proba- 
bly not  until  interference  with  the  lirni  by  attachment  or  other 
legal  process,  by  a  creditor  of  the  firm,  or  of  an  indebted 
*  partner.  In  the  last  case,  it  would  seem  to  operate  *  200 
as  a  transfer  of  the  partner's  interest.  And  bankruptcy 
destroys  the  right  of  a  partner  to  bind  the  firm  by  his  acknowl- 
edgment of  debt,  (a)  But  either  of  the  solvent  and  compe- 
tent partners  may  collect,  adjust,  and  receipt  for  partnership 
accounts,  (i) 

After  a  dissolution  from  any  cause,  we  hold  that  no  partner 
can  bind  his  former  partners  by  any  new  contract,  not  even  if 
it  relates  to  a  previous  transaction ;  thus  it  is  held  that  ho  cannot 
make  a  promissory  note  binding  the  firm  for  a  partnership  debt 
contracted  before  the  dissolution,  (hh')  ^  nor  renew  a  note  given 
before  the  dissolution,  {hc^ ^  But  the  authorities  are  not  in  agree- 
ment on  this  question,  (hd') 

Whether   a  partnership   is   absolutely  dissolved   or   only    sus- 

(z)  The  insolvency  of  a  partnership  ever  the  one  or  the  other  operates  to 
does  not  ]>er  se  dissolve  it.  Arnold  v.  vest  the  hankrupt's  or  insolvent's  prop- 
Brown,  24  Pick.  93.  Morton,  J. :  "  It  is  erty  in  assignees,  or  other  ministers  of 
further  contended  for  the  plaintiffs  that  the  law,  it  would  produce  that  effect." 
the  partnership  was  dissolved.  There  is  (a)  Atwood  v.  Gillett,  2  Doug.  (Mich.) 
no  pretence  that  the  partners  intended  to  206. 

dissolve  the  partnership.     If  it  was  done  (b)  Fox  v.  Hamburg,  Cowp.  445;  Har- 

at  all  by  them  it  was  the  effect  of  their  vey  c.  Crickett,  5  M.  &  Sel.  336 ;  Gordon 

acts   against   their   intentions.      The   in-  c.  Freeman,  11  111.  14 ;  Major  r.  Hawkes, 

solvency  of  one  or  both  the  partners,  we  12  111.  298. 

think,   would    not   produce    tliis    effect.  (bl>)  Cunningham  iv  Bragg,  37  Ala.  436. 

The  insolvency  of  one  might  furnish  to  (he)  Lumberman's  Bank  v.  Pratt,  51 

the  other  sufljcient  ground  for  declaring  Me.  563. 

a  dissolution.     But,  in  tliis  State  the  ina-  (bd)  Thus  it  is  said  that  notes  given 

bility  to  pay  the  company  or  the  private  by  a  partner  in  settlement  of    the  busi- 

debts  of  the  partners  would  not,  pei-  se,  ness    after    dissolution,   bind    the    other 

operate   as  a   dissolution.      In  England,  partners,  in  Ward  v.  Tyler,  52  Penn.  St. 

bankruptcy,  and  in  some  of   our  States  393.     And  that  they  do  not,  in  Lange  v. 

where  insolvent  laws  exist,  legal  insolv-  Kennedy,  20  Wis.  279. 
ency  may  produce  a  dissolution.     Wher- 

1  Without  express  authorit)^  Matteson  v.  Nathanson,  .38  Mich.  377  ;  nor  can  he  by 
part  payment  or  acknowledgment  remove  the  bar  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  New- 
man r.  McComas,  43  Md.  70 ;  Mayberry  r.  Willougliby,  5  Neb.  368  ;  Tate  v.  Clem- 
ents, 16  Fla.  339 ;  Maxey  v.  Strong,  53  Miss.  280 ;  Dowzclot  v.  Eawlings,  58  Mo.  75  ; 
Crumlcss  v.  Sturgess,  6  Hciskell,  190  ;  Folk  v^  Ptussell,  7  Baxter,  591;  contra,  Merritt 
V.  Day,  9  Vroom,  32;  Mix  v.  Shattuck,  50  Vt.  421;  Feigiey  v.  Whitaker,  22  Ohio 
St.  606. 

'  Curry  i-.  White,  51  Cal.  5-30;  Montreal  Bank  i-.  Page,  98  111.  109;  Seward  v. 
L'Estrange,  36  Tex.  295;  Meyer  v.  Atkins,  29  La.  An.  586;  Maxey  v.  Strong,  53 
Miss.  280 ;  Floyd  v.  Miller,  61  Ind.  224 ;  Jenness  i:  Carleton,  40  Mich.  343  ;  though 
authorized  to  wind  up  affairs.  Smith  v.  Shclden,  35  Mich.  42  ;  Mauney  c  Coit,  80 
N.  C.  200;  co7itra,  Lloyd  v.  Thomas,  79  Penn.  St.  68.  —But  a  demand  by  or  on  a. 
former  partner,  after  dissolution,  on  a  firm  note  will  charge  an  indorser.  Gates  v. 
Beecher,  60  N.  Y.  518 ;  Fourth  Bank,  &c.  v.  Henschen,  52  Mo.  207. 

VOL.  I.  15  225 


200 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


ponded,  where  the  partners  are  domiciled  in  different  countries, 
by  the  breaking  out  of  a  war  between  the  countries,  may  not 
be  positively  settled,  but  the  weight  of  authority  is  in  favor  of 
the  dissolution,  (c)  ^ 

Although  the  death  of  a  partner  operates  a  dissolution  of  the 
partnership,  the  articles  of  copartnership  may  provide  for  its  con- 
tinuance, by  an  agreement  that  the  executors,  administrators, 
heirs,  or  other  designated  person,  shall  take  the  place  of  a  de- 
ceased partner,  (c?)     But  where  executors,  in  execution  of  a  will, 


(c)  Griswold  v.  Waddington,  15  Johns. 
57 ;  16  ill.  438.  In  this  case,  tlie  author- 
ities and  i)rinciples  governing  contracts 
witli  persons  domiciled  in  an  enemy's 
country,  were  fully  reviewed  by  Chan- 
cellor Kent,  in  the  Court  of  Errors. 
McConncll  v.  Hector,  3  B.  &  P.  113; 
Scholefield  v.  Eichelberger,  7  Pet.  586. 
The  partnership  in  such  cases  will  be 
illegal,  notwithstanding  one  or  more 
partners  are  resident  in  a  neutral  coun- 
try. The  San  Jose  Indiano,  2  Gallis. 
268;  The  Franklin,  6  Rob.  Adm.  127. 
And  the  property  of  a  house  of  trade 
established  in  an  enemy's  country  is  con- 
demnable  as  prize,  whatever  may  be  the 
domicile  of  the  partners.  The  Freund- 
schaft,  4  Wheat.  105;  Story  on  Part.  §  316. 

(d)  Wrexham  r.  Huddleston,  I  Swanst. 
514,  n. ;  Crawshay  v.  Maulc,  1  Swanst. 
520;  Pearce  i\  Chamberlain,  2  Ves.  Sen. 
33 ;  Balmain  t-.  Shore,  9  Ves.  500 ;  War- 
ner 1-.  Cunningham,  3  Dow,  76;  Gratz  v. 
Bayard,  11  S.  &  U.  41  ;  Knapp  v.  McBride, 
7  Ala.  28.  And  such  express  agreement 
for  the  continuance  of  the  partnership 
after  the  death  of  one  partner  is  neces- 
sary, although  the  partnersliip  is  for  a 
term  of  years.  Gillespie  v.  Hamilton,  3 
Madd.  251  ;  Sc:holefield  ?'.  Eichelberger, 
7  Pet.  586 ;  Pigott  v.  Bagley,  McClel.  & 
Y.  575.  It  is  not  a  settled  question 
whether  stipulations  in  the  articles  of 
partnership,  providing  for  its  ('ontinu- 
ance  after  the  death  of  a  partner  for  the 
benefit  of  the  heirs,  is  binding  on  them. 
Louisiana  Bank  v.  Kenner's  Succession, 
I  La.  384.  But  according  to  Chancellor 
Ke7it,  "  the  better  opinion  is,  that  they 
are    not   anywhere    absolutely   binding. 


It  is  at  the  option  of  the  representatives, 
and  if  they  do  not  consent,  the  death  of 
the  party  puts  an  end  to  the  partner- 
ship." 3  Kent,  Com.  57,  n. ;  Pigott  v. 
Bagley,  xVIcClel.  &  Y.  569;  Kershaw  v. 
Matthews,  2  Russ.  62.  —  A  partner,  too, 
may  by  his  will  provide  that  the  partner- 
ship shall  continue  notwithstanding  his 
death  ;  and  if  it  is  consented  to  by  the 
surviving  partner,  it  becomes  obligatory  ; 
but,  in  that  case,  that  part  of  his  prop- 
erty only  will  be  liable,  in  case  of  bank- 
ruptcy, which  he  has  directed  to  be 
embarked  in  the  trade.  Ex  parte  Gar- 
land, 10  Ves.  110;  Thompson  r.  Andrews, 
1  Myl.  &  K.  116 ;  Pitkin  v.  Pitkin.  7  Conn. 
307 ;  Burwell  v.  Mandeville's  Ex'r,  2 
How.  560,  576.  Tlie  court  in  this  case 
said  :  "  By  the  general  rule  of  law  every 
partnership  is  dissolved  by  the  death  of 
one  of  the  partners.  It  is  true  that  it  is 
competent  for  the  partners  to  provide  by 
agreement  for  the  continuance  of  the 
partnership  after  such  death;  but  then  it 
takes  place  in  virtue  of  such  agreement 
only,  as  the  act  of  the  parties,  and  not 
by  mere  operation  of  law.  A  partner, 
too,  may  by  his  will  provide  that  the 
partnership  shall  continue  notwithstand- 
ing his  death ;  and  if  it  is  consented  to 
by  the  surviving  ])artner,  it  becomes 
obligatory,  just  as  it  would  if  the  test- 
ator, being  a  sole  trader,  had  provided 
for  the  continuance  of  his  tra<le  by  his 
executor,  after  his  death.  But  then  in 
each  case  the  agreement  or  authority 
must  be  clearly  made  out ;  and  third 
persons,  having  notice  of  the  death,  are 
bound  to  iiKiuire  how  far  the  agreement 
or  authority  to  continue  it  extends,  and 


1  Woods  V.  Wilder,  43  N.  Y.  164 ;  Now  Orleans  Bank  v.  Matthews,  49  N.  Y.  12 ; 
Hubbard  v.  Matthews,  54  N.  Y.  43;  Taylor  v.  Hutchinson,  25  Gratt.  536;  Booker 
V.  Kirkpatrick,  26  Gratt.  145;  Planters'  Bank  v.  St.  John,  1  Woods,  585.  See  Mc- 
Stca  V.  Matthews,  50  N.  Y.  166 ;  Matthews  r.  McStca,  91  U.  S.  7.  —  Where  a  firm  is 
dissolved  by  war,  notice  of  dishonor  of  a  firm  note  given  to  a  partner  remaining 
where  its  place  of  business  was,  binds  all,  including  a  partner  in  the  hostile  terri- 
tory.    Hubbard  v.  Matthews,  54  N.  Y.  43. 

22G 


CH.  XII.] 


PAETNERSHIP. 


201 


*  carry  on  the  business  of  a  partnership  for  the  benefit  of  *  201 
the  heir,  the  whole  property  is  liable,  and  not  merely  the 
capital  in  the  business,  (g)  And  if,  without  such  requirement  in 
the  will,  executors  put  or  leave  the  funds  of  the  deceased  in  the 
partnership,  voluntarily,  they  would  be  liable  personally  as  part- 
ners, (ee) 

When  a  partner  dies,  the  partnership  property  goes  to  the  sur- 
vivors for  the  purpose  of  settlement,  and  they  have  all  the  power 
necessary  for  this  purpose,  and  no  more.  (/)  ^  Thus  they  may 
apply  the  funds  of  the  firm  to  discharge  incumbrances  on  the  real 
estate,  or  to  execute  a  contract  for  purchase  of  real  estate,  (j^) 
But  they  cannot  renew  a  promissory  note  and  bind  their  partners 
to  the  new  note,  although  they  will  be  themselves  bound  by  it, 
nor  can  a  partner  do  this  who  is  authorized  by  the  partners,  on 
a  dissolution,  to  wind  up  the  business.  (/^)  It  is  said  that  the 
survivors  can  charge  nothing  for  their  trouble  or  labor  in  settling 


what  funds  it  binds,  and  if  they  trust  the 
surviving  party  beyond  the  reaeii  of  such 
agreement,  or  autliority,  or  fund,  it  is 
their  own  fault,  and  tliey  liave  no  rigiit 
to  complain  that  the  law  docs  not  afford 
them  any  satisfactory  redress.  A  test- 
ator, too,  directing  the  continuance  of  a 
partnership,  may,  if  he  so  choose,  bind 
his  general  assets  for  all  the  debts  of  the 
partnership  contracted  after  his  death. 
But  he  may  also  limit  his  responsibility, 
either  to  the  funds  already  embarked  in 
the  trade,  or  to  any  specific  amount  to 
be  invested  therein  for  that  purpose ;  and 
then  the  creditors  can  resort  to  that  fund 
or  amount  onlj',  and  not  to  the  general 
assets  of  the  testator's  estate,  although 
the  partner  or  executor,  or  other  person 
carrying  on  the  trade,  may  be  person- 
ally responsible  for  all  the  debts  con- 
tracted." 

(c)  McXeillie  v.  Acton,  21  E.  L.  &  E. 
3  ;  Laughlin  v.  Lorentz,  48  Penn.  St.  275. 

{ec)  Ricliter  v  Poppenhusen,  39  How- 
ard (N.  Y.),  82. 

(/)  Ex  parte  RufSn,  6  Ves.  119,  126; 
Ex  parte  Williams,  11  Ves.  5;  Crawshay 
V.  Collins,  15  Ves.  218;  Peacock  v.  Pea- 
cock, 16  Ves.  49,  57 ;  Harvey  v.  Crickett, 


5  M.  &  Sel.  336 ;  Butchart  v.  Dresser,  31 
E.  L.  &  E.  121 ;  Barney  r.  Smith,  4  Har. 

6  J.  495;  Murray  v.  Mumford,  6  Cowen, 
441 ;  Washburn  v.  Goodman,  17  Pick. 
519;  Rice  v.  Richards,  1  Busb.  Eq.  (N. 
C),  277;  Shields  ij.  Fuller,  4  Wis.  102; 
Van  Valkenburg  v.  Bradley,  14  la.  108. 
But  in  Buckley  v.  Barber,  1  E.  L.  &  E. 
506,  Baron  Parke  doubts  whether  sur- 
viving partners  have  a  power  to  sell 
and  give  a  good  legal  title  to  the  share 
of  the  partnership  property  belonging  to 
the  executors  of  the  deceased,  even  when 
they  sell  in  order  to  pay  the  debts  of  the 
deceased  and  of  themselves,  and  decides 
that  at  all  events  the  survivors  have  no 
power  to  dispose  of  it  otherwise  than  to 
pay  such  debt,  certainly  not  to  mortgage 
it  together  with  their  own  as  a  security 
for  a  debt  principally  due  from  them, 
and  in  part  only  from  the  deceased.  In 
Louisiana  the  rule  of  the  French  law 
prevails,  and  the  surviving  partner  has 
no  power  to  sue  for  the  partnership  debts 
without  the  authority  of  the  court.  Con- 
nelly V.  Cheever,  16  La.  30;  Hyde  v. 
Brashear,  19  La.  402. 

iff)  Shearer  v.  Shearer,  98  Mass.  107. 
(fg)  Myatts  v.  Bell,  41  Ala.  222. 


1  Thus  a  surviving  partner,  where  a  firm  has  an  account  at  a  banker's,  has  a  right 
to  draw  checks  upon  the  partnership  account.  Backhouse  v.  Charlton,  8  Cli.  D.  444; 
or  indorse  a  note  payable  to  the  firm,  Johnson  v.  Berlizheimer,  84  III.  54  ;  contra, 
Cavitt  V.  James,  39  Tex.  189;  or  give  notice  of  intention  to  renew  a  lease  before 
its  expiration,  where  the  lease  to  the  firm  gave  the  privilege,  Betts  v.  June,  51 
N.  Y.  274.  i-         B  >  > 

227 


*  202  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

the  concern.  (^)  ^     Nor  is  a  partner  entitled  to  compensa- 

*  202    tion  for  extra  services  in  the  absence  of  an  express  *  con- 

tract, and  it  is  said  that  there  is  no  principle  of  the  law 
which  authorizes  an  inquiry  into  the  inequality  of  the  services 
of  partners,  inilcss  there  be  an  express  stipulation  to  that 
effect,  (A) 

They  are  tenants  in  common  with  the  representatives  of  the 
deceased,  as  to  the  choses  in  possession.  And  they  have  a  lien 
on  them  to  settle  the  affairs  of  the  concern,  and  pay  its  debts,  (i)^ 
And  if  a  surviving  partner  has  paid  more  than  his  proportion 
of  the  firm's  debts,  he  may  claim  repayment  from  the  estate  of 
the  deceased.  But  after  his  lien  on  the  partnership  funds  is 
exhausted,  he  can  claim  only  in  common  and  equally  with  the 
separate  creditors  of  the  deceased,  (y) 

Whether  a  creditor  of  the  firm  may  proceed  against  the  estate 
of  the  deceased  partner  without  first  exhausting  his  remedies 
against  the  partnership  funds,  is  not  certain ;  but  the  prevailing 
rule  in  this  country  is  that  he  must  first  look  to  the  partnership 
funds.  (^) 

If  the  survivors  carry  on  the  concern,  and  enter  into  new  trans- 
actions with  the  partnership  funds,  they  do  so  at  their  peril ;  and 

(g)  Beatty  v.  Wray,  19  Penn.  St.  516.  go  at  once  to  the  estate  of  the  deceased 

See  VVillett  !'.  Bhiiiford,  1  Hare,  25o,  for  partner;    Devaynes    v.   Noble,    1    Meriv. 

the  discretion  of  tlie  court  as  to  shares  529;    Sumner   i\   Powell,   2    Meriv.   37; 

of  partners.  Wilkinson   i:   Henderson,   1    Myl.    &    K. 

(h)  Piper  v.  Smith,  1  Head,  93;  Mur-  582.  And  this  doctrine  seems  to  he  sup- 
ray  I'.  .Johnston,  id.  353.  ported  in  Fillyan   v.  Laverty,  3  Fla.  72, 

{i)  Ex  parte   lluffin,  6  Ves.  119;    Ex  and  Camp  v.  Grant.  21   Conn.  41.     But 

parte  Williams,  11  Ves.  5.  see    Bennett    v.   Woolfolk,    15    Ga.    21-3, 

(j)  Busby   V.  Chenault,  13   B.  Mon.  and    Parker    v.   Jackson,    10    Barb.  33; 

554.  Tracy  v.  Suydani,  30   Barb.  110 ;    Cres- 

{k)  In  England  it  seems  that  he  may  well  v.  Blank,  3  Grant,  320. 

1  Dunlap  )•-  Watson,  124  Mass.  .305;  Johnson  v.  Hartshorne,  52  N.  Y.  173; 
Brown's  Appeal,  89  Penn.  St.  130;  Denver  v.  Uoane,  99  U.  S  355;  ronlrn,  Boyster 
V.  Johnson,  73  N.  C.  474 ;  nor  if  appointed  receiver  on  his  own  application,  Brien  v. 
Harriman,  1  Tcnn.  Cli.  407.  But  a  partner  who,  at  his  own  risk,  continues  the  busi- 
ness in  order  to  preserve  the  good-will  and  to  sell  the  property  and  business  to 
advantage,  may  be  allowed  a  reasonable  compensation,  Cameron  v.  Francisco,  26 
Ohio  St.  190;  and  if  a  surviving  partner,  with  the  assent  of  the  administrator  of 
the  deceased  partner,  employs  extra  labor  to  finish  existing  contracts,  enters  upon 
new  contracts,  employing  the  machinery,  i)atents,  and  property  of  the  firm  therein, 
then,  to  the  extent  of  his  jiersonal  services  devoted  to  such  extra  work,  lie  is  entitled 
to  compensation,  Schenkl  r.  Dana,  118  Mass.  230. 

2  Tremper  v.  Conklin,  44  N.  Y.  58;  Carlton  v.  Mavs,  8  W.  Va.  245;  see  Smith  v. 
Wood,  31  Md.  2'j3  ;  PfetTer  r.  Steiner,  27  Mich.  537  ;  Bush  v.  Clark,  127  Mass.  1 11.  But 
choses  in  action  and  other  demands  belong  to  the  surviving  partner,  Daby  r.  Erics- 
eon,  45  N.  Y.  780;  Davi.lson  v.  Weems,  58  Ala.  187  ;  Nicklaus  v.  Dahn,  03  Ind.  87; 
Brown  v.  Allen,  35  la.  .300;  and  after  the  survivor's  death  his  representative  succeeds  to 
such  rights,  Costley  v.  Wilkerson,  49  Ala.  210;  Brooks  v.  Brooks,  12  Heiskell,  12. 

228 


CH.  XII.]  PARTNERSHIP.  *  203 

the  representatives  of  the  deceased  may  elect  to  call  on  them  for 
the  capital  with  a  share  of  the  profits,  or  with  interest.  (Z)  ^ 

After  allowing  a  reasonable  time  for  a  settlement,  a  court  of 
equity  will  enjoin  a  survivor  from  further  prosecution  of  the 
business,  and  will  appoint  a  receiver,  and  direct  an  account  to 
be  taken.  Qm^ 

A  court  of  equity  will  interfere  and  decree  a  dissolution, 
upon  *  a  case  distinctly  made  out,  of  positive  and  injurious  *  203 
wrong,  done  by  one  or  more  of  the  partners,  against  the 
interest  of  the  firm  ;  («)  and  when  called  upon  to  settle  the  affairs 
of  a  partnership,  it  will  respect  any  stipulations  between  the  part- 
ners as  to  the  mode  of  settlement.  In  the  absence  of  such  stipu- 
lations it  will  be  governed  by  the  last  settled  account,  both  as  to 
its  result  and  its  method,  unless  the  account  be  set  aside  for 
fraud,  actual  or  constructive,  or  be  open  to  objection  as  oppressive 
and  unreasonable,  (o)  Nor  will  a  partner  be  allowed  compensa- 
tion for  services  to  the  firm,  or  any  peculiar  advantage,  without 
express  stipulation,  or  circumstances  of  equivalent  force,  (jt?) 
The  presumption  of  law  is  that  the  losses  are  to  be  equally  borne, 
and  the  profits  equally  divided,  even  if  the  money  or  the  labor  are 
provided  in  different  proportions.  (5-) 

While  it  is  a  general  rule  that  every  partner  is  bound  to  exer- 
cise due  skill  and  diligence  in  promoting  the  interests  of  the  firm, 
without  reward  or  compensation,  unless  it  be  otherwise  agreed 

(/)  Brown  v.  Lytton,  1  P.  Wms.  140;  i;.  Barrett,  1  Sim.  45;  Jones  v.  Yates,  9 

Hammond     ?•.    Douglas,     5    A^es.     539  ;  B.  &  C  532. 

Featherstonaugh    i-.    Fenwick,    17    Vcs.  (0)  Jackson  v.    Sedgwick,    1    Swanst. 

298 ;    Heatlicote  v.  Hulme,  1   Jac.  &  W.  4G0,   469 ;    Pettyt    v.   Jancson,  6    Madd. 

122;    Sigourne.y   v.   Munn,  7    Conn.   11;  140;   Oidaker  v.  Lavender,  G  Sim.  239; 

Crawshay  v.  Collins,  2  Russ.  345;  s.  c.  Desha  v.  Sheppard,  20  Ala.  747;    Story 

15  Ves.  218;   3  Kent,  Cora.  64;  Millard  on  Part.  §§  200,  349. 

f.  Ramsdell,  1  Harring.  Ch.  (Mich.)  373;  (/j)  Lee  v.  Lashbrooke,  8  Dana,  214; 

Bemie  v.  Vandever,  10  Ark.  010.     But  a  Coursen  r.  Hamlin,  2  Duer,  513;  Day  v. 

partner  appointed  receiver  is  not  held  as  Lockwood,  24  Conn.  185.      But  if  some 

partner  to  account  for  profits  for  part-  of  those  who  are  partners,  really  act  as 

nership  money  invested  in  trade.    White-  trustees  for  the  company,  they  may  have 

sides  V.  Laffert}-,  3  Humph.  150.  a  right  to  repayment  of  their  advances. 

(m)  Murray    v.    Mumford,   6    Cowen,  See /h  re  German  Mining  Co.  27  E.  L.  & 

441;    Walker  r.   House,  4    Md.  Ch.  39;  E.  158. 

Crawshay  r.  Maule,  1  Swanst.  495.  (7)   Webster    v.   Brav,    7    Hare,   159; 

(n)  Tattersall  v.  Groote,  2  B.  &  P.  131 ;  Gould  v.  Gould,  6  Wend.  203;  Donelson 

Ex  parte  Broome,  1  Rose,  69;  Hamil  v.  v.  Posey,  13  Ala.  752;  Roach  v.  Perry, 

Stokes,  4  Price,  161;    s.  c.  Daniel,  20;  16  111.  37;    Lyman  v.  Lyman,  2  Paine, 

Oidaker  v.  Lavender,  6  Sim.  239;  Green  C.  C.  11. 

1  A  survivor  mixing  firm  property  with  his  own  is  liable  for  resulting  confusion, 
unless  he  can  distinguish  each  from  the  other.     Diversey  v.  Johnson,  93  111.  547. 

229 


*  204  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

between  the  parties,  (^qq)  ^  such  agreement  may  be  implied  from 
the  course  of  business  pursued  between  the  partners,  as  disclosed 
by  the  evidence ;  and  when  a  partner  renders  services  which 
neither  the  law  nor  the  agreement  of  the  parties  imposes  upon 
him,  it  is  said  that  an  agreement  that  he  shall  be  paid  is 
implied,  (r) 

A  dissolution  will  be  decreed,  if  the  court  are  satisfied  that  the 

whole  scheme  and  purpose  of  the  partnership  were  absurd  and 

unpracticable ;  (s)    or  that  the  original  agreement  between  the 

parties  was  tainted  with  fraud,  (t)     In  such  cases,  all  the 

*  204    *  partners  must  be  made  parties   to  the  bill,  (w)     Even 

after  a  dissolution,  and  while  the  affairs  are  in  settlement, 
the  court  will  interfere,  by  injunction  or  a  receiver,  if  necessary  to 
prevent  waste  or  wrong,  (y) 

When  a  court  of  equity  winds  up  a  partnership  concern,  it  is 
done  by  a  sale  of  the  partnership  effects ;  (iv)  and  either  partner 
may,  it  is  said,  insist  upon  a  sale,  (x) 

Proper  notice  should  be  given  of  a  dissolution  ;  for  a  firm  may 
be  bound,  by  a  contract  made  after  dissolution,  or  retirement  of 
one  or  more,  by  a  former  partner,  in  the  usual  course  of  business, 
with  a  person  who  had  no  notice  or  knowledge  of  the  dissolu- 
tion. (^)  The  requirement  of  notice  in  case  of  dissolution  is 
quite  similar  to  that  stated  in  a  previous  section  in  relation  to 
a  retiring  partner. 

(qq)  An  attorney  at  law,  who  was  a  E.   245 ;    s.   c.   1   Kay,   148 ;  Mayson  v. 

partner  in  a  mercantile  firm,  was  not  al-  Beazle}',  27  Miss.  185;  IMiliiken  v.  Lov- 

lowed  to  cliarsie  commissions  for  collect-  ing,  :37  j\Ie.  408. 

ing  the  debts  of  the  firm,  in  Vanduzer  v.  («•)  Crawshav  <'.  Maule,  1  Swanst.  496; 

McMillan,  37  Ga.  29y.     See  also  Drew  v.  Crawshay  v.  Collins,  15  Ves.  218. 

Ferson,  22  Wis.  G51.  (x)  Lyman  v.  Lyman,  2  Paine,  C.  C. 

(r)  Levi  V.  Kanrick,  13  la.  344.  11. 

(s)  Beaumont  v.  Meredith,  3  Ves.  &  B.  (n)  Merritt  v.  Bollys,  IG  B.  Mon.  355; 

180  ;  Buckley  ".  Cater,  17  Ves.  15;  Pearce  Clai)p  v.    Bogers,    2    Kern.   283;   Devina 

r.  Piper,   17   Ves.  1 ;  Reeve  f.  Parkins,  2  v.  Harris,  3  Greene   (la),  180;   Pope  v. 

Jac.  &  W.  300.  Risley,  23  Mo.  185;  Brown   v.  Clark,  14 

(t)  Ilynes  v.  Stewart,  10  B.  Mon.  429;  Penn.  St.  409;  Conro  c.  Port  Henry  Iron 

Fogg  I-.  Johnston,  27  Ala.  432.  Co.   12  Barb.  27 ;  Lyon   v.  Johnston,  28 

(!<)  Long  V.  Yonge,  2  Sim.  .309.  Conn.    1 ;  Mvers  v.   Smith,    15  la,    181 ; 

\v)  Roberts  v.  Eberhardt,  23  E.  L.  &  Reilly  v.  Smfth,  10  La.  An.  31. 

1  Each  partner  mnst  work  to  the  extent  of  his  ability  for  the  firm,  failing  to  do 
which  he  is  chargeable  on  a  settlement  of  accounts  for  the  value  of  his  services. 
Marsh's  Appeal,  00  I'enn.  St.  30. 

230 


CH.  XII.] 


PAETNERSHIP. 


*205 


SECTION  XV. 

OF   THE   RIGHTS   OF   CREDITORS   IN   RESPECT   TO    PARTNERSHIP   FUNDS. 

The  property  of  a  partnership  is  bound  to  the  payment  of  the 
partnership  debts,  and  the  right  of  a  private  creditor  of  one 
copartner  to  that  partner's  interest  in  the  property  of  the  firm, 
is  postponed  to  the  right  of  the  partnership  creditor,  (z)  ^ 
But  it  *  is  said  that  if  the  contract  between  the  partners '  *  205 
prevents  them  from  having  any  lien  on  the  partnership 
effects  for  the  payment  of  the  partnership  debts,  the  partnership 
creditors  have  no  preference  over  individual  creditors,  (a) 

Dilificult  questions  sometimes  arise  where  the  private  creditor 
seeks  to  attach,  or  levy  upon  the  partnership  property,  or  the  in- 
terest of  the  indebted  partner  therein.  Where  attachment  by 
mesne  process  exists,  such  attachment  is  allowed ;  but  it  is  gen- 
erally made  subject  to  the  paramount  rights  of  the  partnership 


(z)  Murrill  v.  Neill,  8  How.  414  ;  Pierce 
V.  Jackson,  G  Mass.  243  ;  Tappan  (•.  Blais- 
dell,  5  N.  H.  100 ;  Brewster  v.  Hammctt, 
4  Conn.  540  ;  Coninicrcial  Bank  v.  Wil- 
kins,  9  Greenl.  28 ;  Douglas  v.  Winslow, 
20  Me.  89;  Donelson  v.  Posey,  13  Ala. 
(N.  s.)  752  ;  Fillev  v.  Phelps,  18  Conn. 
294 ;  Pearson  v.  Keedy,  6  B.  Mon.  128 ; 
Black  V.  Bush,  7  id.  210;  Glenn  v.  Gill, 
2  Md.  1  ;  Sutcliffe  v.  Dohrman,  18  Ohio, 
181  ;  Baker's  Appeal,  21  Penn.  St.  70. 
And  if  the  partners  sell  the  partnership 
property  for  the  purpose  of  paying  tiie 
])rivate  deht  of  one  partner,  such  sale  is 
null  and  void  as  to  the  creditors  of  the 
firm.  Ferson  ?'.  Monroe,  1  Foster  (N. 
H.),  462.  —  If  the  individual  partners 
have  no  lien  on  the  partnership  funds  for 
the  payment  of  partnership  liabilities, 
the  creditors  of  the  partnership  are  en- 
titled to  no  preference  over  the  creditors 
of  the  individual  partners  in  attaching 
its  property.  Rice  w.  Barnard,  20  Vt. 
479;  Ferson  ?'.  Monroe,  1  Foster  (N.  H.), 
462.  And  this  preference  is  denied  to 
the  creditors  of  the  partnership,  where 
there  has  been  a  bona  fide  sale  of  the 
partnership  effects  without  the  reserva- 


tion of  a  lien.  Ketchum  ?'.  Durkee,  1 
Barb.  Ch.  480;  Reese  v.  Bradford,  13 
Ala.  387.  See  Smith  v.  Edwards,  7 
Humph.  106.  An  assignment  by  part- 
ners of  their  joint  and  se])arate  property 
for  the  payment  of  their  debts,  with  pref- 
erence to  certain  partner.ship  creditors 
and  certain  individual  creditors,  has  been 
held  valid.  Kirby  v.  Schoonmaker,  3 
Barb.  Ch.  46,  50.  —  In  Vermont,  the  cred- 
itors of  the  partnership,  in  attaching 
partnership  property,  are  at  law  entitled 
to  no  preference  to  creditors  of  an  indi- 
vidual partner.  Reed  r.  Shepardson,  2 
Vt.  120;  Clark  v.  Lyman,  8  Vt.  290. 
But  in  equitij  the  partnersliip  effects  are 
pledged  to  each  partner  until  lie  is  re- 
leased from  all  his  partnership  f)bliga- 
tions,  and  are  first  cliargcable  with  tlie 
claims  of  the  partnership  creditors,  ndl;- 
withstanding  prior  attachments  of  tlie 
separate  creditors.  Washburn  )■.  Bank 
of  Bellows  Falls,  19  Vt.  278;  Bardwell 
r.  Perrv,  19  id.  292 ;  Crooker  v.  Crooker, 
46  Me.  250. 

(«)  Rice  V.  Barnard,  20  Vt.  479;  Snod- 
grass'  Appeal,  13  Penn.  St.  471 ;  Jones  v. 
Lusk,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  356. 


1  It  is  equally  true  that  no  partner  has  a  right  to  share  in  the  firm  property 
e.xcept  after  payment  of  its  liabilities.  Staats  v.  Bristow,  73  N.  Y.  204  ;  Rice  u. 
McMartin,  39  Conn.  573 ;  Hall  v.  Clagett,  48  Md.  223  ;  Conant  v.  Frary,  49  Ind.  530. 

231 


206 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTEACTS. 


[book  I. 


creditors,  (i)  ^  And  such  attachment  is  defeated  by  the 
*  206    mere  *  insolvency  of  the  firm,  although  the  partnership 

creditors  have  commenced  no  action  for  the  recovery  of 
their  debts.  ('•)     But  where  one  partner  is  dormant,  the  creditor 


(6)  Pierce  v.  Jackson,  G  Mass.  242.  In 
tliis  case  an  attachment  of  partnership 
property  for  a  partnership  deht  was  held 
to  prevail  over  a  jirior  attachment  of  the 
same  property  for  the  separate  debt  of 
one  of  the  partners.  Parsons,  C.  J.  :  "At 
common  law  a  partnership  stock  belongs 
to  the  partnersliip,  and  one  partner  has 
no  interest  in  it  but  his  share  of  what  is 
remaining  after  all  the  partnersliip  debts 
are  paid,  he  also  accounting  for  what  he 
may  owe  to  the  firm.  Consequently,  all 
the  debts  due  from  the  joint  fund  must 
first  be  discharged,  before  any  partner 
can  appropriate  any  part  of  it  to  his  own 
use,  or  pay  any  of  his  private  debts  ;  and 
a  creditor  to  one  of  the  partners  cannot 
claim  any  interest  but  wliat  belongs  to 
his  debtor,  whetlier  his  claim  be  founded 
on  any  contract  made  with  his  debtor,  or 
on  a  seizing  of  the  goods  on  execution." 
Phillips  V.  l?ridgc,  11  id.  248 ;  Newman  v. 
Bagley,  16  Pick.  572 ;  Allen  v.  Wells,  22 
id.  450 ;  Trowbridge  v.  Cnshman,  24  id. 
310 ;  Commercial  Bank  v.  Wilkins,  9 
Greenl.  28;  Smith  v.  Barker,  1  Fairf. 
458;  Douglas  r.  Winslow,  20  Me.  89. 
Weston,  C.  J. :  "  The  interest  of  each 
partner  is  in  his  portion  of  the  residuum 
after  all  the  debts  and  liabilities  of  the 
firm  are  liquidated  and  discliarged. 
Equity  will  not  aid  the  separate  creditor, 
until  tlie  partnership  claims  are  first  ad- 
justed. And  they  will  interpose  to  aid 
the  creditors  of  the  firm,  when  a  separate 
creditor  attempts  to  withdraw  funds,  in 
regard  to  which  they  have  a  priority. 
In  this  State,  and  in  Massachusetts,  a 
separate  creditor  may  attach  the  goods 
of  a  firm,  so  far  as  his  debtor  has  an  in- 
terest in  them,  subject  to  the  paramount 
claims  of  the  creditors  of  tlie  firm." — 
Tappan  ;,•.  Blaisdell,  5  N.  II.  100.  Rich- 
nn/son,  C.  J.  :  "According  to  the  old  cases 
in  the  courts  of  law,  the  separate  credi- 
tor took  the  goods  of  the  partners,  and 
sold  the  share  of  his  debtor,  without  in- 


quiring what  were  the  riglits  of  the  other 
partners,  or  wliat  was  the  real  share  of 
each.  Blackhurst  v.  Clinkard,  1  Show. 
1G9,  1  Salk.  392.  1  Comyns,  277.  But  the 
true  nature  of  a  partnershii)  seems  to 
have  been  better  understood  in  more 
modern  times,  and  it  is  now  settled  that 
each  partner  has  a  lien  on  the  partner- 
ship property,  in  respect  to  the  balance 
due  to  him,  and  the  liabilities  he  may 
have  incurred  on  account  of  the  partner- 
sliip." Morrison  v.  Blodgett,  8  N.  II.  2:]8 ; 
Page  i\  Carpenter,  10  id.  77 ;  Dow  v. 
Say  ward,  12  id.  276 ;  Brewster  v.  Hara- 
mett,  4  Conn.  540 ;  Washburn  v.  The 
Bank  of  Bellows  Falls,  19  Vt.  278 ;  In 
tlie  matter  of  Smith,  16  Johns.  102; 
Bobbins  r.  Cooper,  0  Johns.  Ch.  186.  But 
where  a  partnership  was  dissolved,  and  a 
creditor  of  the  partnership  afterwards 
took  the  joint  and  several  note  of  the 
individual  partners,  he/d,  that  he  could 
not  be  regardetl  as  a  creditor  of  the  part- 
nership, nor  entitled  to  preference  as 
such.  Page  r.  Carpenter,  10  N.  H.  77. 
In  Conroy  v.  Woods,  13  Cal.  626,  it  is 
lield  tliat  when  one  partner  buys  out  his 
copartners,  agreeing  to  pay  the  debts  of 
the  firm,  the  partnersliip  property  re- 
mains l)ound  for  firm  deljts,  just  as  before 
the  sale.  The  lien  of  firm  creditors  at- 
taching, must  be  preferred  to  the  lien  of 
an  individual  creditor  of  the  remaining 
partner,  attaching  first.  See  James  v. 
Stratton,  32  111.  202. 

(r)  Pierce  r.  Jackson,  6  Mass.  242 ;  Fisk 
V.  Ilerrick,  6  id  271.  In  the  latter  case 
tlie  court  said:  "Before  either  partner 
can  rightfully  claim  to  his  own  use,  or 
for  the  payment  of  his  own  debts,  any  of 
the  partnership  effects,  the  partnership 
must  be  solvent,  and  he  must  not  be  a 
debtor  to  it." —  Kice  r.  Austin,  17  id.  206; 
Commercial  Bank  r.  Wilkins,  9  Greenl. 
28;  Lyndon  r.  Corham,  1  (iallis.  368. 
"  The  general  rule  undoubtedly  is,  that 
the  interest  of  each  partner  in  the  part- 


1  That  firm  property  may  be  taken  on  mesne  process  or  execution  for  a  partner's 
separate  debt,  see  Branch  r.  Wiseman,  51  Ind.  1;  Clark  v.  Cushing,  .72  (\al.  617; 
Saunders  i'.  liartlett,  12  Ileiskell,  316 ;  L(mgcope  v.  Bruce,  44  Tex.  434;  Barrett  f. 
McKenzie,  24  Minn.  20 ;  Hacker  r.  Jolinson,  66  Me.  21 ;  contra,  llaynes  >•.  Knowles, 
36  .Mich.  407;  New  Drleans  v.  (lautlireaux,  32  r>a.  .\n.  1126;  Durborrow's  Ajipeal, 
84  Penn.  St.  404;  Anderson  v.  Chenney,  51  Ga.  372.  An  attachment  of  firm  goods 
in  a  suit  against  one  partner  is  not  valid  against  a  subsequent  attachment  by  a  firm 
creditor.  Kistner  r.  Sindlinger ;  Bogue's  Appeal,  83  Penn.  St.  101;  F>iglith  Bank 
V.  Fitch,  49  N.  Y.  539;  Fargo  i;.  Ames,  45  la.  491  ;  Cox  v.  Russell,  44  la.  556. 

232 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


207 


of  the  other  is  not  then  postponed  in  his  attachment  of  the  stock 
in  trade,  to  a  creditor  of  the  same  firm  who  had  discovered  the 
dormant  partner,  and  makes  him  defendant.  (^cV)  But  such  })ost- 
jjonement  woukl  be  made,  where  the  first  attaching  creditor's  debt 
did  not  arise  from  the  partnersliip  business,  and  the  debt  of 
the  second  creditor  did  arise  therefrom,  (c)  The  same  rule  is 
apphed  to  attachments  by  trustee  process,  and  to  direct  attach- 
ments. (/) 

*  Formerly,  both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  the    *  207 
principle  of  moieties  prevailed.     That  is,  the  private  cred- 
itor took  the  proportion  of  the  partnership  stock  which  belonged 
by  numerical  division  to  his  debtor.  (^)     But  now,  both  there 


nership  funds  is  only  what  remains  after 
the  i)artnersliip  accounts  are  taken ; 
and  unless,  upon  such  an  account,  tlie 
partner  be  a  creditor  of  the  fund,  lie 
is  entitled  to  nothing.  And  if  the  part- 
nership be  insolvent,  the  same  effect  fol- 
lows." 

{(1)  The  reason  of  this  exception  to 
the  general  doctrine  is,  that  the  public 
rely  on  the  personal  credit  of  the  osten- 
sible owner,  and  not  on  that  of  the  dor- 
mant partners.  Lord  v.  Baldwin,  6  Pick. 
348,  351.  "  The  case  before  us  is  that  of 
a  dormant  partnership,  wliich  is  neces- 
sarily, from  its  very  cliaracter,  unknown 
at  the  time  ti»e  liability  is  incurred.  All 
the  creditors  sold  their  goods  or  made 
their  contract  with  the  ostensible,  visible 
partner  ;  they  trusted  to  him  personally, 
and  to  the  goods  upon  which  he  was 
trading,  as  his.  The  dormant  partner  is 
brought  to  light  by  ex  post  facfo  investi- 
gation ;  and  he  is  made  responsible,  not 
because  lie  was  trusted,  but  because  he 
secretly  enjoyed  the  profits  of  tiie  busi- 
ness. Now,  in  such  case,  the  reason  for 
giving  preference  to  such  creditors  as 
may  first  discover  his  liability,  so  that 
stock  ostensibly  belonging  to  the  visible 
partner  shall  first  be  applied  to  the  satis- 
faction of  their  debts,  does  not  exist."  . .  . 
"  The  question  now  is,  wliether,  when  all 
the  creditors  have  trusted  the  man  of 
business  and  apparent  owner  of  the  goods, 
any  one  of  them,  who  is  behind  tlie  rest 
in  his  attachment,  shall  supplant  them 
and  gain  p.  iority  because  he  has  discov- 
ered this  concealed  liability.  At  the  time 
the  debt  was  created,  he  stood  upon  the 
same  footing  with  the  rest;  he  trusted 
John  Brown  and  the  goods  in  his  posses- 
sion ;  so  did  they.  They  have  taken  pos- 
session first  of  the  fund  which  was  held 
out  to  the  public  as  the  means  of  credit ; 


and  it  might  be,  and  probably  was  in  this 
very  case,  that  the  goods  attached  are 
the  identical  goods  which  tlicy  sold  to 
the  party  sued.  There  would  be  then  no 
pretence  of  equity,  and  we  think  not  of 
law,  in  allowing  a  preference  founded 
upon  no  meritorious  distinction  of  cir- 
cumstances." French  r.  Chase,  G  Greenl. 
166.  The  authority  of  the  two  preced- 
ing cases  is  fully  affirmed  in  Cammack  r. 
Johnson,  1  Green,  Ch.  163.  See  also  Van 
Valen  v.  Russell,  13  Barb.  590  ;  Brown's 
Appeal,  17  Penn.  St.  480. 

(e)  Winter  v.  Richards,  10  Conn.  37. 
This  case  determines  that  a  first  attach- 
ing creditor,  who  has  dealt  with  a  partner 
in  the  course  of  the  business  of  the  partnership, 
but  at  the  same  time  in  ignorance  of  its 
existence,  shall  not  be  postponed  to  sub- 
sequent attaching  creditors,  to  whom  the 
dormant  partners  were  known  when  the 
business  transactions  took  place,  or  sub- 
sequently disclosed  before  their  attach- 
ments, but  that  he  shall  be  postponed  if 
Ids  claims  did  not  arise  from  a  partner- 
ship transaction,  while  that  of  the  subse- 
quent attaching  cieditor  did.  The  court 
distinguished  Lord  r.  Baldwin  from  the 
case  before  them,  and  remark  :  "  The  re- 
sult in  that  case  is  perfectly  compatible 
with  tlio  decision  in  this  ;  and  it  is  ap- 
parent that  the  court  meant  only  to  de- 
cide the  case  before  them  ;  for  they  say, 
'  Whether  a  private  creditor  of  his  could 
seize  property  so  situated,  and  hold  it 
against  the  ostensible  owner,  is  a  question 
of  a  very  different  nature.'  "  See  Allen 
V.  Dunn,  15  Me.  202. 

(/)  risk  V.  Herrick,  6  Mass.  271; 
Church  V.  Knox,  2  Conn.  514  ;  Barber  v. 
Hartford  Bank,  9  id.  407  ;  Lyndon  v.  Gor- 
ham,  1  Gal  lis.  367  ;  Mobley  v.  Lombat,  7 
How.  (Miss.)  318. 

(g)  Heydon  v.  Heydon,  1  Salk.  392. 

233 


208 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


and  here,  the  rule  is  well  settled  that  if  partnership  effects  can 
be  taken  either  by  attachment  or  on  execution  to  secure  or  satisfy 
the  debts  of  one  of  the  partners,  this  can  be  done  only  to  the 
extent  of  that  partner's  interest,  and  subject  to  the  settlement  of 
all  partnership  accounts.  (A)     The  levy  of  execution  does 

*  208    not  give  the  creditor  *  a  separate  possession  of  the  goods. 

The  indebted  partner  had  no  such  possession  himself ;  and 
the  levy  gives  to  his  creditor  only  that  which  the  debtor  had  ;  and 
that  is  a  right  to  call  for  an  account,  and  then  a  right  to  the  bal- 
ance which  may  be  found  to  belong  to  him  upon  a  settlement. 
And  it  must  still  be  regarded  as  unsettled,  whether  a  sheriff  levy- 
ing an  execution  of  a  separate  creditor  on  a  ])artner\s  interest, 

can  take  any,  and  if  any  what,  actual  possession  of  the 

*  209    partnership  property,  (i)     *  Considering  the  great  diver- 


"  Coleman  and  Heydon  were  copartners, 
and  a  judgment  was  against  ('oleinan, 
and  all  the  goods  both  of  Coleman  and 
Heydon  were  taken  in  execntion,  and  it 
was  held  by  Holt,  C.  J.,  and  the  court, 
tiiat  tlie  sheriff  must  seize  all,  because  the 
moieties  are  undivided ;  for  if  lie  seize 
but  a  moiety,  and  sell  that,  the  other  will 
have  a  right  to  a  moiety  of  that  moiety. 
But  he  must  seize  the  whole,  and  sell  a 
moiety  thereof  undivided,  and  the  ven- 
dee will  be  tenant  in  common  with  the 
other  partner."  Jacky  v.  Butler,  2  Ld. 
Eaym.  871.  "  Two  joint  partners  are  in 
trade.  Judgment  was  entered  against 
one  of  them  ;  and,  upon  a  Jieri  facias,  all 
the  goods,  being  undivided,  were  seized  in 
execution  ;  and  upon  application  to  the 
King's  Bench  by  him  against  whom  the 
judgment  was  not,  the  court  held  that 
the  sheriff  could  not  sell  more  than  a 
moiety,  for  the  property  of  the  other 
moietj'  was  not  affected  by  the  judg- 
ment, nor  by  the  execution."  Bachurst 
V.  Clinkard,  1  Show.  IT^i ;  Marriott  i'. 
Shaw,  1  Comyns,  277;  Rex  v.  Manning, 
2  id.  010.  "  If  A,  B,  and  C  are  partners, 
and  judgment  and  execution  is  sued 
again.st  A,  only  his  share  of  the  goods 
can  be  sold.  It  is  true,  the  sheriff  may 
seize  the  whole,  because  the  share  of  each 
being  undivided,  cannot  l)e  known  ;  and 
if  he  seize  more  than  a  thiril  i)art,  he  can 
only  .sell  a  third  of  what  is  seized,  for  H 
and  C  have  an  equal  interest  with  A  in 
tlie  gooils  seized  ;  but  the  sheriff  can  ou\y 
sell  the  part  of  him  against  whom  the 
judgment  and  execution  was  sued."  See 
Eddie  v.  Davidson,  Dougl.  O.V) ;  Parker 
V.  Pistor,  :',  H.  &  P.  2H«  ;  Walh.ce  r.  Pat- 
terson, 2  liar.  &  Mcll.  4Go ;   Lyndon  v. 

234 


Gorham,  1  Gallis.  367  ;  McCarty  v.  Em- 
lin,  2  Dallas,  278;  Church  v.  Knox,  2 
Conn.  [)H.  Ttie  same  rule  is  recognized 
as  law  in  Vermont,  but  not  in  equity. 
Keed  v.  Shepardson,  2  Vt.  120;  Clark  v. 
Lyman,  8  id.  2!)0  ;  Washburn  i-.  Bank  of 
Bellows  Falls,  10  id.  278. 

(/()  Fox  V.  Hanbury,  Cowp.  445; 
Eddie  r,  Davidson,  Dougl.  GOO;  West  r. 
Skip,  1  Ves.  Sen.  230 ;  Hankev  v.  Garratt, 
1  Ves.  Jr.  280;  Taylor  v.  Fields,  4  id. 
396  ;  Young  i:  Keighley,  15  Ves.  557  ;  In 
re  Wait,  1  Jac.  &  W.  008,  Lord  Eldon  ; 
Dutton  V.  Morrison,  17  Ves.  103;  Com- 
mercial Bank  v.  Wilkins,  9  Greenl.  33  ; 
Doner  v.  Stauffer,  1  Penn.  St.  198 ;  Win- 
ston V.  Ewing,  1  Ala.  (x.  s.)  129;  Story 
on  Part.  §  201 ;  Coll.  on  Part.  §  822.  n. ; 
ante,  note  (/();  Crane  v.  French,  1  Wend. 
311;  Tappan  v.  Blaisdell,  5  N.  II.  100; 
Burgess  v.  Atkins,  5  Blackf.  337,  3.38. 
JJcwei/,  J.  :  "  The  general  rule  of  law  is, 
that  in  levying  an  execution  against  one 
partner  for  his  separate  debt,  the  officer 
may  take  possession  of  all  the  joint 
property  of  the  firm,  in  order  to  inven- 
tory and  apj)raise  it.  lie  has  no  author- 
ity to  divide  it ;  he  can  only  sell  the  joint 
interest  of  the  debtor,  whatever  it  may 
be,  and  the  purchaser  will  stand  in  the 
place  of  the  debtor,  and  hold  tlie  same 
interest  in  the  joint  concern  which  lie 
held." 

(/)  In  Scrnghani  >•.  Carter,  12  Wend. 
131,  it  was  held  that  rei)lcvin  does  not 
lie  against  a  sheriff  in  such  a  case  for 
taking  the  property  and  removing  it  to  a 
place  of  safe  custody,  and  the  remedy  of 
the  other  j);irtiiers  is  to  obtain  au  order 
staying  proceedings  until  an  account  be 
taken   in  equity.     In   Burrall  o.    Acker, 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


*209 


sity  of  authority,  as  shown  by  our  note,  and  consequent  uncer- 
tainty, as  to  this  power  of  the  sheriff,  the  question  seems  to 


23  id.  006,  he  was  held  authorized  to  take 
joint  possession,  witli  the  other  partners, 
of  the  partnersliip  property,  after  the 
levy  and  before  tlie  sale,  but  wlietlier  he 
was  entitled  to  exelusive  possession,  was 
not  deeided.  The  subject  was  fully  dis- 
cussed by  Mr.  Justice  Cuwen,  in  Phillii)s 
V.  Cook,  24  Wend.  ?>89,  and  it  was  de- 
cided that,  on  an  execution  at  law 
against  one  of  two  partners,  tlie  slieriff 
niisht  lawfully  seize,  not  merely  tlie 
moiety,  but  the  corpus  of  the  joint  es- 
tate, or  the  whole,  or  as  much  of  tlie 
entire  partnership  effects  as  might  be 
necessary  to  satisfy  tiie  execution,  and 
deliver  the  property  sold  to  the  pur- 
chaser ;  and  if  he  purchases  with  notice 
of  the  partnership,  he  takes  subject  to  an 
account  between  the  partners,  and  to  the 
equitable  claims  of  tlie  partnership  cred- 
itors. Bates  V.  James,  3  Duer,  45.  It 
has  since  been  held  that  he  is  equally 
subject  to  an  account  whether  he  had 
sucli  notice  or  not.  Walsh  i\  Adams,  3 
Denio,  125.  Tiie  same  cases  afiirm  his 
power  to  deliver  all  the  goods  of  the 
partnership  to  tlie  purchaser.  Birdseye 
V.  Kay, 4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  158,  affirms  Phillips 
V.  Cook,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  seizure 
of  the  whole  of  the  joint  estate  by  the 
sheriff  on  an  execution  against  one  part- 
ner for  his  separate  debt.  But  tiie  sheriff 
subjects  himself  to  an  action  if  he  sells 
tlie  entire  property  in  the  goods  of  the 
copartnership,  or  any  thing  more  than 
the  debtor  partner's  interest  in  them. 
Waddcll  V.  Cook,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  47, 
n. ;  Walsh  v.  Adams,  3  Denio,  125.  In 
New  York,  it  is  held  that  neither  a  court 
of  law  nor  of  equity  will  stay  execution 
at  law  against  the  joint  estate  for  a  sep- 
arate debt  until  an  account  be  taken. 
Moody  u.  Payne,  2  Johns.  Ch.  548  ;  In  re 
Smith,  16  Johns.  106,  n. ;  Phillips  v. 
Cook,  24  Wend.  389  ;  Hergman  v.  Det- 
tlebach,  11  How.  Pr.  46.  See  Keed  v. 
Howard,  2  Met.  36.  But  the  rule  has 
been  disapproved.  Cammack  v.  Johnson, 
1  Green,  Cli.  168.     In  Alabama,  the  sher- 

t  iff  is  held  justified  in  taking  exclusive 
possessi(m  of  the  goods  of  the  firm  until 
the  aid  of  a  court  of  equity  is  successfully 
invoked.  Moore  v.  iSample,  3  Ala.  (n. 
B.)  319.  In  New  Hampshire,  the  riglit  of 
a  sheriff  to  take  possession  of  partner- 
ship property,  levied  on  for  tiie  private 

■  debt  of  a  partner,  has  been  denied  after 
an  elaborate  examination  of  the  question. 
Gibson  v.  Stevens,  7  N.  H.  352,  357. 
Parker,  J. ;    "  The  specific  property  of  a 


partnership  cannot  be  lawfully  taken  and 
sold  to  satisfy  the  private  debt  of  one  of 
the  partners.  His  creditor  can  have  no 
greater  right  than  the  debtor  himself  has 
individually,  wliicli  is  a  rigiit  to  a  sliare  of 
the  surplus.  This  is  the  necessary  result 
of  tlie  doctrine,  that  the  ]iarlnershi])  prop- 
erty is  a  fund  in  the  first  place  for  tlie 
payment  of  the  partncrsliij)  debts,  and 
that  the  interest  of  an  individual  jjartner 
is  only  his  share  of  the  sui-])lus.  5  N.  H. 
192,  193,  250;  9  Conn.  410.  Tliere  are 
difficulties  in  selling  the  interest  of  one 
partner  upon  an  execution.  Courts  of 
equity  first  direct  an  account  which 
courts  of  law  cannot  do ;  and  if  the 
interest  of  one  partner  may  be  sold  upon 
an  execution  at  law,  it  must  be  left  to  an 
account  afterwards.  Gow  on  Part.  246- 
254.  And  a  question  may  arise  in  such 
case,  whether  the  sale  operates  as  a  disso- 
lution of  the  partneiship  before  the  time 
limited  by  the  articles  of  copartnership, 
or  whether  tlie  otJier  partners  are  author- 
ized to  carry  on  the  trade,  and  account 
at  the  expiration  of  the  term.  If  the 
sheriff  can  sell  only  the  interest  of  the 
partner,  and  not  the  goods,  he  must  be 
liable  if  he  make  actual  seizure  of  the 
specific  property,  either  to  the  partner- 
ship or  the  other  partners.  Wilson  v. 
Conine,  2  Johns.  280.  Especially  if  he 
sell  the  whole  as  in  this  ease.  1  Gallis. 
370;  15  Mass.  82."  Morrison  v.  Blod- 
gett,  8  N.  H.  238.  Parker,  J.  :  "  If  the 
sheriff  cannot  sell  an  interest  in  specified 
portions  of  the  goods  of  the  jiarlnership, 
there  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  he  should 
levy  upon  those  goods,  and  deliver  them 
to  the  vendee,  or  why  he  should  in  fact 
reduce  them  into  possession.  If  '  in  truth 
the  sale  does  not  transfer  any  part  of  the 
joint  property  so  as  to  entitle  him '  (the 
vendee)  'to  take  it  from  tlie  otiier  part- 
ner' (1  Story,  Eq.  626),  on  what  jiriuciple 
is  the  sheriff  authorized  to  seize  and 
hold  to  the  exclusion  of  the  otiier  part- 
ners, what  his  vendee  after  a  sale  of  tlie 
interest  of  the  debtor  is  perfected,  cannot 
take  from  them  ?  If  tlie  slieriff  sells 
'  only  the  interest  of  such  partner,  and 
not  the  effects  themselves'  (1  Wight, 
50,  cited  2  Jolms.  Ch.  549),  upon  wliat 
grounds  shall  he  seize  the  effects  which 
he  is  not  to  sell  1  If  '  the  creditors  of 
the  partnership  have  a  preference  to  be 
paid  tlieir  debts  out  of  the  partnership 
funds  before  the  private  creditors  of 
either  of  the  partners,'  and  tiiis  '  is 
worked  out  through  the  equity  of   the 

235 


*210 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


call  for  statutory  provisions ;  but  in  the  absence  of  such  pro- 
visions, and  on  general  principles,  it  would  seem  that  the  sheriff 
cannot  take  or  give,  by  sale,  specific  possession  of  the  partnership 
property.  He  takes  and  can  sell  only  the  right  and  interest  of 
the  indebted  partner  to  and  in  the  whole  fund. 

Different  rules  and  modes  of  practice  prevail  in  different 
*  210  jjarts  *  of  this  country.  But  wherever  it  can  be  done,  the 
better  and  safer  way  Avould  probably  be  for  the  writ  to  be 
a  trustee  process,  or  in  the  nature  of  a  foreign  attachment,  and 
this  should  be  served  on  the  other  partners  as  alleged  trustees, 
and  a  return  made  by  the  sheriff  that  he  had  attached  all  the 
right  and  interest  of  the  partner  defendant  in  the  stock  and  prop- 
erty of  the  partnership.  And  the  other  partners  being  summoned 
as  trustees,  would  be  obliged  to  disclose  in  their  answer  the 
state  of  the  concern,  which  will  show  the  interest  of  the  partner 
defendant. 

After  sale  on  execution,  the  sheriff  should  convey  to  the  pur- 
chaser all  the  right  and  interest  of  the  indebted  partner  in  the 
stock  and  property  of  the  partnership.  And  the  purchaser  would 
then  have  the  right  to  demand  an  account,  and  a  transfer  to  him 
of  whatever  balance  or  property  would,  upon  such  account,  have 
belonged  to  his  debtor,  and  would  have,  perhaps,  the  same  right 
of  possession.  (/) 


partners  over  tlie  wiiole  funds  '  (1  Story, 
Eq  (i25),  that  equity  should  prevent  them 
from  beiny  deprived  of  tlie  means  of 
payment  by  reason  of  sucli  seizure  by  the 
sheriff,  wlio  can  neither  sell  the  goods, 
nor  ])ay  the  creditors,  an.d  against  whom 
they  cannot  proceed,  so  long  as  he  may 
lawfully  liold  tiie  goods."  ..."  In 
Smith's  case,  IG  Jolms.  106,  the  court, 
after  saying  that  the  separate  creditor 
takes  the  share  of  his  debtor  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  debtor  himself  had 
it,  and  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  other 
parlTier,  add  :  '  Tlie  sheriif  therefore  does 
not  seize  the  partnershij)  effects  them- 
selves, for  the  other  j)artner  has  a  right 
to  retain  them  for  the  jiay  ment  of  tlie  part- 
nershij) debts. '  And  in  Crane  v.  French, 
1  Wend,  ol.'i,  Ciiief  Justice  Savage,  after 
con.sidering  the  subject,  says:  'The  sher- 
iff therefore  sells  the  mere  riglit  and  title 
to  tiie  partnership  jjroperty,  Imt  does  not 
deliver  possession.'  See  also  5  N.  H. 
iy.'5 ;  2  Conn.  510,  517.  The  conclusion 
that  the  sheriff,  upon  an  execution 
against  one  partner,  is  not  to  deliver 
to    his    vendee,  and  is    not  to  seize    the 

236 


partnership  effects,  is  sustained,  there- 
fore, not  only  by  the  reason  of  the  thing, 
after  the  adoption  of  the  general  prin- 
ciple before  stated,  but  by  express  au- 
thority." The  doctrine  of  these  cases  is 
affirmed  in  Page  v.  Carpenter,  10  N.  H. 
77;  Dow  V.  Say  ward,  12  id.  271,  14  id.  9. 
See  Tavlor  '•.  Field,  4  V'es. :!'.)() ;  JolmsoTi  v. 
Evans,"  7  Man.  &  (J  240.  241),  250,  Tindal, 
C.J.  ;  Coll.  on  Part.  B.  iii.  ch.  vi.  §  10.— In 
Newman  i\  Bean,  1  Foster  (N.  II.),  93,  it 
was  hold  that  an  action  miglit  be  main- 
tained against  a  third  i)ers()n  wlio  seizes 
goods  on  execution  belonging  to  a  ])art- 
ner.sliin,  for  the  debt  of  an  individual 
])artner,  and  excludes  the  other  i)artni'rs 
from  the  ])ossession  of  them.  See  on  this 
subject  20  Am.  Jur.,  art.  .3.  See  also 
Place  V.  Sweetzer,  10  Ohio,  142;  Newhall 
V.  Buckingham,  14  111.  4)5 ;  Hill  v.  Wiggin, 
1  Foster  (N.  II  ),  202;  Vann  v.  Ilussey.  1 
Jones,  ;]81 ;  Deal  >\  Bogue,  20  Peim.  St. 
228;  Lucas  v.  Laws,  27  Penn.  St.  211; 
Heiidieimer  v.  Ilemmingway,  35  Penn. 
St.  432. 

(  /)  Morrison  v.  Blodgett,  8  N.  II.  254. 
Parker,  J. :  "  Whether,  under  our  i)resent 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNERSHIP. 


211 


*  That  the  private  creditors  of  one  of  the  partners  can-  *  211 
not  reach  the  partnorsliip  funds  until  the  claims  of  the 
partnership  creditors  are  satisfied,  is  now  the  universal  rule  both 
in  courts  of  law  and  of  equity,  (/c)  But  whether  the  private  prop- 
erty of  a  partner  is  equally  preserved  for  his  private  creditors,  is 
not  perhayis  certain.  At  law,  no  such  rule  seems  to  be  well  estab- 
lished. But  where  the  partnership  has  failed,  and  the  partner- 
ship property  is  held  as  a  fund  for  the  partnership  creditors,  the 
justice  of  holding  the  private  property  of  individual  partners  for 
the  exclusive  benefit  of  their  private  creditors,  is  obvious.  Then 
each  fund  would  be  held  separate ;  the  partnership  assets  for  the 


laws,  the  creditor  can  do  more  than  re- 
turn a  general  attachment  of  the  interest 
of  his  debtor  in  the  partnersliip,  and 
summon  the  other  partners  as  his  trust- 
ees ;  and  what  are  tlie  effects  of  such  a 
service  upon  the  rights  and  duties  of  the 
other  partners,  and,  of  course,  upon  the 
action  of  the  debtor  himself  ?  Whether 
it  can  suspend  his  right  to  interfere  with 
the  partnership  property,  so  long  as  the 
attachment  exists,  or  whether  he  may 
proceed  to  act  as  partner  until  judgment 
and  sale  upon  execution?  And  whether, 
after  an  attachment,  the  creditor  of  any 
of  the  partners  may  maintain  a  bill  in 
equity  for  an  account  before  a  seizure 
and  sale  of  the  interest  of  the  debtor  on 
the  execution  ?  are  questions  which  may 
arise,  but  upon  whicli  this  case  does  not 
call  for  an  opinion." — Dow  v.  Say  ward, 
12  N.  H.  276.  Upham,  J. :  "  In  the  case 
of  Morrison  r.  Blodgett,  is  a  very  elabor- 
ate examination  of  this  question  by  Mr. 
Chief  Justice  Parker,  and  the  opinion  of 
the  court  is  strongly  intimated  that  a 
general  attachment  of  the  interest  of  a 
partner  in  a  firm  may  be  made,  though 
it  is  suggested  that,  in  order  to  make  the 
attaclmient  available,  by  obtaining  a  true 
knowledge  of  the  extent  of  the  partner- 
ship interest,  it  might  be  expedient  or 
necessary  to  summon  the  other  parties 
as  trustees.  We  are  unable  now  to  see 
any  better  course  than  was  there  sug- 
gested. There  seems  to  be  a  good  reason 
for  giving  up  the  process  of  attachment 
at  law  in  such  cases,  as  it  would  probably 
in  this  mode  be  rendered  equally  as  effec- 
tual and  prompt  as  any  other  means  of 
securing  the  interest  of  the  debtor  that 
raiglit  be  devised.  If  a  process  in  chan- 
cery shoidd  be  deemed  more  effectual, 
still  it  might  be  desirable  also  to  retain 
a  right  of  attachment  at  law."  See  also 
Page  V.  Carpenter,  10  N.  H.  77;  s.  c.  14 


N.  H.  9,  12.  ParJcer,  C.  J. :  "  Neither  will 
the  fact  that  the  interest  of  a  partner  is 
of  a  nature  that  is  incapable  of  actual 
seizure,  and  of  a  reduction  into  posses- 
sion, exempt  it  from  a  seizure  and  sale 
upon  execution.  Equities  of  redemption 
and  other  interests  are  of  that  char- 
actor,  but  are  nevertheless  subject  to  an 
execution  at  law.  It  follows,  then,  that 
the  interest  of  the  defendant  in  the  pro- 
perty of  the  stage  com])any  was  liable  to 
attachment.  Wliatever  may  be  the  sub- 
ject of  the  levy  and  sale,  may  be  the 
subject  of  attachment.  It  is  true  that 
there  is  diificulty  in  securing  the  interest 
of  one  partner  by  attachment,  so  that  he 
or  his  partners,  through  their  right  to 
hold  the  property,  may  not  impair  the 
security.  Tliis  suliject  was  adverted  to 
in  Morrison  v.  Blodgett,  before  cited. 
Perhaps  it  cannot  be  done  witliout  some 
further  legislation,  unless  it  be  through 
the  aid  of  chancery  by  means  of  an  in- 
jimction.  But  the  difficulty  of  effectually 
securing  the  interest  of  one  partner  by  an 
attachment,  so  that  the  other  partners, 
or  tlie  debtor  himself,  cannot  through 
the  rights  of  the  otlier  partners  to  retain 
possession  of  the  property,  imjiair  the 
security,  by  no  means  proves  tliat  such 
interest  is  not  attachable.  It  ma}',  not- 
withstanding, be  attached,  and  the  credit- 
or will  thereby  gain  a  prior  right  to  have 
it  applied  in  satisfaction  of  his  judg- 
ment. And  should  the  debtor  or  his 
partners  attempt  to  avoid  the  effect  of 
the  attachment,  the  creditor  may,  per- 
haps, on  application  to  this  court,  obtain 
an  injunction  to  restrain  them  from  any 
acts  inconsistent  with  his  right  to  have 
the  interest  of  his  debtor  sold  upon  the 
execution."    pp.  12,  ].3. 

(k)  Murrill  v.  Neill,  8  How.  414; 
Shedd  I'.  Wilson,  1  Williams,  478 ;  Con- 
verse V.  McKee,  14  Tex.  20. 

237 


211 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


partnership  creditors,  and  the  assets  of  each  partner  for  his  own 
creditors,  and  only  the  balance  of  each  fund,  after  the  special 
claims  npon  it  were  discharged,  would  be  applicable  to  the  claims 
of  the  other  class.  But  it  will  be  seen  from  our  note  that  this 
cannot  now  be  asserted,  on  authority,  to  be  a  settled  rule,  even  in 
equity.  (0 


{D  In  the  time  of  Lord  FlardwicTce 
joint  creditors  were  allowed,  in  bank- 
ruptcy, to  prove  their  debts  under  a 
separate  commission  against  one  partner, 
or  imdcr  separate  conmiisslons  against 
all  the  partners,  but  only  for  the  purpose 
of  assenting  to  or  dissenting  from  the 
certificate,  and  were  considered  to  have 
an  equitable  right  to  the  surplus  of  the 
separate  estate,  after  payment  of  the 
separate  creditors.  Ex  parte  Baudier,  1 
Atk.  98 ;  Ex  parte  Voguel,  id.  V-l'l ;  Ex 
parte  Oldknow,  Co.  B.  L.  ch.  0,  §  15 ; 
Ex  parte  Cobliam,  id.  See  Button  v. 
Morrison,  17  Ves.  207  ;  Ex  parte  Far  low, 

1  Rose,  4"22.  Lord  Thnrlow  broke  in 
upon  this  rule,  allowing  joint  creditors 
to  prove  and  take  dividends  under  a 
separate  commission,  and  holding  that 
a  comnjission  of  bankruptcy  was  an  ex- 
ecution for  all  the  creditors,  and  that  no 
distinction  ought  to  be  made  between 
joint  and  separate  debts,  but  that  they 
ought  to  be  paid  ratably  out  of  the 
bankrupt's  propertj'.  Ex  parte  Haydon, 
Co.  B.  L.  ch.  6,  §  15;  s.  c.  1  Bro.  Ch. 
453;  Ex  parte  Copland,  Co.  B.  L.  ch.  6,  § 
15;  s.  c.  1  Cox,  429;  Ex  parte  Hodgson, 

2  Bro.  Ch.  5;  Ex  parte  Page,  id.  119;  Ex 
parte  Flintum,  id.  120.  Ijord  I'osli/n  re- 
stored the  j)rinciple  of  Lord  Hardwicke's 
rule  {Ex  parte  Elton,  3  Ves.  238;  Ex 
parte  Abell,  4  id.  837),  which  was  adopted 
by  Lord  Eldon  less  out  of  regard  to  the 
reason  of  the  rule  itself  than  for  the 
sake  of  establishing  a  uniform  practice. 
Ex  parte  Clay,  0  W's.  813;  Ex  jmrte  Ken- 
sington, 14  id.  447;  Ex  parte  I'aitt,  1(5  id. 
193.  See  his  remarks  in  Cliiswell  v. 
Gra}',  9  Ves.  120;  Barker  v.  Goodair,  11 
id.  86,  and  such  is  the  English  law.  Gow 
on  I'art.  312.  There  are,  however,  three 
cxcejitions  to  this  rule:  "1st,  where  a 
joint  creditor  is  the  petitioning  creditor 
under  a  separate  fiat;  2<1,  where  there 
is  no  joint  estate,  and  no  solvent  partner; 
3d,  where  tiierc  are  no  separate  debts. 
In  the  first  case  the  petitioning  creditor, 
and  in  the  second,  all  the  joint  creditors 
may  prove  against  the  s([)arate  estate 
pari  jiassn  with  the  separate  creditors. 
In  the  last  case,  as  there  are  no  separate 
creditors,  the  joint  creditors  will  be  ad- 
mitted pari  ]iassu  with  each   other  upon 

238 


the  separate  estate."  Coll.  on  Part.  § 
923;  Story  on  Part.  §§  378o82.  But  see 
Emanuel  v.  Bird,  19  Ala.  596,  and  Cleg- 
horn  V.  Ins.  Bank  of  Columbus,  9  Ga. 
319.  The  history  of  the  ICnglish  rule 
was  reviewed  in  Murray  v.  Murray,  5 
Johns.  Ch.  (iO.  It  has  been  adopted 
by  some  American  courts.  Woddrop  r. 
Ward,  3  Desaus.  203  ;  Tunno  v.  Treze- 
vant,  2  id.  270;  Hall  v.  Hall,  2  McCord, 
Ch.  302;  McCulloch  v.  Dashiel,  1  Har, 
&  G.  90 ;  Murrill  v.  Neill,  8  How.  414. 
See  In  re  Marwick,  Davies,  229;  In  re 
Warren,  id.  320 ;  Morris  v.  Morris,  4 
Gratt.  293.  In  Jackson  v.  Cornell,  1 
Sandf.  Ch.  348,  the  Assistant  Vice-Chan- 
celhjr  said  :  "  It  is  not  denied  that  the 
rule  of  equity  is  uniform  and  stringent, 
that  the  partnership  pro])erty  of  a  firm 
shall  all  be  applied  to  the  partnership 
debts,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  creditors 
of  the  individual  members  of  the  firm  ; 
and  that  the  creditors  of  the  latter  are 
to  be  first  ])ai(l  out  of  tiie  separate  effects 
of  their  debtor,  before  the  partnersliip 
creditors  can  claim  any  thing.  See  Wil- 
der V.  Keeler,  3  Paige,  167  ;  Egberts  v. 
Wood,  id.  517;  Payne  v.  Matthews,  6 
id.  19;  Hutchinson  r.  Smith,  7  id.  2b;  1 
Story,  Eq.  §§  ()25,  ()75."  And  it  was  held 
in  Jack.*on  r.  Cornell  that  a  general  as- 
signment of  his  separate  proper!}'  made 
by  an  insolvent  copartner,  which  prefers 
the  creditors  of  tiie  firm  to  the  exclusion 
of  his  own,  is  fraudulent  and  void  as  to 
the  latter.  The  English  ride  has  been 
discardeil  in  Pennsylvania.  Bell  v.  New- 
man, 5  S.  &  H.  78 ;  //(  re  Sperry,  1  Ashm. 
347.  And  Ivord  Tltnrloic's  rule  ])revails 
in  Connecticut,  although  the  surviving 
partner  be  solvent  and  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court.  Camp  r.  Grant,  21 
Conn.  41.  It  has  been  held  in  Massnchu- 
setts  that  whatever  may  be  the  ride  in  a 
com-t  of  equity,  an  attachment  of  the 
separate  property  of  a  ])artner  for  a 
partnership  debt  is  not  defeated  at  law 
by  a  sidjsequent  attachment  of  the  same 
property  for  his  sejjarate  debt.  —  Allen 
i\  Wills,  22  Pick.  450.  iMrey,  J.  :  "  It  is 
urged,  however,  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant, that  as  this  court,  as  a  court  of 
law,  have  long  since  recognized  the  ])rin- 
ciple  that  an  attachment  of  the  goods  of 


en.  XII.] 


PAETNERSHIP. 


212 


The  rights  of  partnership  creditors  to  a  preference  in 
the  distribution  *  of  the  partnership  property  must  not  be    *  212 
taken  to  extend  so  far  as  to  affect  a  bona  fide  transmutation 
of  partnership  into  private  property  made  prior  to  or  upon  a  dis- 
sohition.     While  the  partnership  remains  and  its  business  is  going 
on,  whether  it  be  in  fact  solvent  or  not,  any  honest  distribution 
of  the  partnership  effects  among  the  members  of  the  firm 
cannot  *  be  disturbed  by  any  equities  of  creditors  of  the    *  218 


a  partncrsllip,  by  a  creditor  of  one  of 
the  partners,  is  not  valid,  as  against  an 
after  attachment  hy  a  partnership  cred- 
itor, it  sliouhl  also  adojjt  the  converse  of 
the  proposition,  giving  a  like  j)reference 
to  separate  creditors  in  respect  to  the 
separate  property.  But  we  think  there 
is  a  manifest  distinction  in  the  two  cases. 
The  restriction  upon  separate  creditors, 
as  to  partnership  property,  arises  not 
merely  from  the  nature  of  the  debt 
attempted  to  be  secured,  but  also  from 
the  situation  of  the  property  proposed 
to  be  attached.  In  such  a  case,  a  distinct 
moiety  or  other  proportion,  in  certain 
specific  articles  of  the  partnership  pro- 
perty, cannot  be  taken  and  sold,  as  one 
partner  has  no  distinct  separate  property 
in  the  partnership  effects.  His  interest 
embraces  only  wh;it  remains  upon  the  final 
adjustment  of  the  partnership  concerns. 
But,  on  the  otiicr  hand,  a  debt  due  from 
the  copartnership  is  the  debt  of  eacli 
member  of  the  firm,  and  every  individ- 
ual member  is  liable  to  pay  the  whole 
amount  of  the  same  to  the  creditor  of 
the  firm.  In  the  case  of  the  copartner- 
ship, the  interest  of  the  debtor  is  not  the 
right  to  any  specific  property,  but  to  a 
residuum  which  is  imcertain  and  contin- 
gent, while  the  interest  of  one  partner 
in  his  individual  property  is  that  of  a 
present  absolute  interest  in  the  specific 
property.  Each  separate  member  of  the 
copartnership  being  thus  liable  for  all 
debts  due  from  the  copartnership,  and 
no  objection  arising  from  any  interfer- 
ence with  tlie  rights  of  others  as  joint 
owners,  it  seems  necessarily  to  follow, 
that  his  separate  property  may  be  well 
adjudged  to  be  liable  to  be  attached 
and  held  to  secure  a  debt  due  from  the 
copartnership."  And  in  the  distribution 
of  the  estates  of  deceased  insolvent  debt- 
ors, partnership  debts  are  paid  ratably 
with  the  private  claims.  Sparhawk  v. 
Russell,  10  Met.  305.  But  in  New 
Hampshire  the  English  rule  has  been 
adopted  in  the  law,  to  its  fullest  extent, 
and  where  real  estate  of  one  partner 
was  set  off  on  execution  for  a  debt  due 


from  the  partnership,  and  afterwards  the 
same  land  was  set  off  for  a  separate  debt 
of  the  same  partner,  the  last  levy  was 
held  to  jirevail  over  the  first  and  to  give 
the  legal  title.  Jarvis  i\  Brooks,  3  Fos- 
ter (N.  II.),  1M6.  —  The  conclusion  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Vermont  on  this  ques- 
tion is  as  follows  :  "  That  a  partnership 
contract  imposes  precisely  the  same  ob- 
ligation ujion  each  separate  partner  that 
a  sole  and  separate  contract  does,  and 
that  it  is  not  true  that,  in  joint  contracts, 
the  creditor  looks  to  tiie  credit  of  the 
joint  estate,  and  the  separate  creditor  to 
that  of  the  separate  estate ;  and  that 
there  is  no  express  or  implied  contract 
resulting  from  the  law  of  partnership, 
that  the  separate  estate  shall  go  to  pay 
separate  debts  exclusively  ;  but  that,  as 
the  partnership  creditors  in  equity  have 
a  prior  lien  on  the  partnership  funds, 
chancery  will  compel  them  to  exhaust 
that  remedy  before  resorting  to  the  sep- 
arate estate :  but  that  beyond  this,  both 
sets  of  creditors  stand  precisely  equal, 
both  at  law  and  in  equity."  Per  Rf^dfi'ld, 
J.,  Bardwell  v.  Perry,  19  Vt.  292,"  303. 
Mr.  Justice  Storij  says  of  the  English 
rule:  "It  now  stands  as  much,  if  not 
more,  upon  the  general  ground  of  author- 
ity, and  the  ma.xim  stare  decisis,  than 
upon  the  ground  of  any  equitable  reason- 
ing." Story  on  Part.  §  377.  And  he  says 
further  :  "  It  is  not,  perhaps,  too  much  to 
say,  that  it  rests  on  a  foundation  as  ques- 
tionable and  as  unsatisfactory  as  any 
rule  in  the  whole  system  of  our  jurispru- 
dence ;  "  but  "  should  be  left  undisturbed 
as  it  may  not  be  easy  to  substitute  any 
other  rule  which  would  uniforndy  work 
with  perfect  equality  and  equity."  §  382. 
Chancellor  Kent,  on  the  other  hand  re- 
marks :  "  For  mj'  part,  I  am  free  to  con- 
fess that  I  feel  no  hostility  to  the  rule, 
and  think  that  it  is,  upon  the  whole, 
reasonal)le  and  just."  3  Kent,  Com.  G5,  n. 
See  also  Walker  v.  Eyth,  25  Penn.  St. 
216;  Morrison  v.  Kurtz,  15  111.  193; 
Baker  v.  Wimpee,  19  Ga.  87 ;  Young  v. 
Frier,  1  Stock.  465. 

239 


*  214  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

partnership,  (w)  ^  In  a  recent  case  in  Illinois,  in  which  this 
subject  is  much  considered,  the  rule  in  equity  is  stated  to  be 
this :  the  assets  of  a  deceased  and  of  insolvent  partners,  if  there 
be  partnership  and  separate  property,  will  be  distributed  by  pay- 
ing the  firm  debts  out  of  the  joint  estate,  and  the  individual  debts 
out  of  the  separate  estate  ;  that  the  joint  and  individual  debts 
should  be  kept  distinct,  and  the  assets  of  the  two  estates  mar- 
shalled accordingly ;  that  joint  creditors  must  first  resort  to  the 
joint  fund,  and  the  creditors  of  the  individual  partners  to  their 
separate  property ;  that  upon  the  inadequacy  of  either  of  these, 
then  the  joint  or  separate  estate  may  be  applied  according  to  the 
exigency  of  the  case ;  that  if  there  is  no  joint  fund  nor  any  sol- 
vent partner,  joint  creditors  may  participate  equally  with  a  private 
creditor  in  the  estate  of  a  deceased  partner,  and  if  there  should 
be  a  surplus  of  the  joint  fund,  the  creditor  of  an  individual 

*  214    partner  may  resort  *  to  that,  (w)     Nor  have  the  joint  cred- 

itors such  a  lien  on  the  partnership  funds,  as  to  avoid  a 
transfer  in  good  faith  and  for  value  to  a  purchaser,  by  partners, 
before  judgment  and  execution,  (o) 

A  note  signed  by  all  the  partners,  but  not  by  the  partnership 
name,  would  not  create  a  partnership  debt,  unless  it  was  given  as 
a  partnership  note,  in  the  partnership  business ;  if  given  for  a 
matter  outside  the  partnership  business,  it  would  be  only  a  joint 
note,  (oo) 


SECTION  XVI. 

LIMITED    PARTNERSHIP. 

This  species  of  partnership  has  been  but  recently  introduced 
into  this  country,  but  has  already  been  adopted  in  very  many  of 
our  States,  and  promises  to  be  of  great  utility.  (^)     We  have 

(m)  Ex  parte  Knffin,  6  Ves.  119;  Allen  Allen  v.  Center  Valley  Co.  21  Conn.  180. 

V.  Center  Valley  Co.  21  Conn.  130.  See  however  Ferson  v.  Munroe,  1  Foster 

(n)  Palilnian  v.  Graves,  2(i  111.  405.  (N.  H.),  402. 

(n)  Greenwood  v.   Brodiiead,  8  Barb.  (oo)  Turner  v.  Jaycox,  40  N.  Y.  470. 

593;    Waterman  v.    Hunt,  2    R.   I.  298;  (/>)  New  York,  Massacliusetts,  Rhode 

1  Ilollis  r.  Staley,  ?>  Ba.xter,  1G7  ;  Case  ?•.  Beauregard,  90  U.  S.119;  Tn  re  Lonjr, 
7  Benedict,  141  ;  Schmidlapp  r.  Cnrrie,  55  Miss.  597.  See  Menagh  v.  Wliitwell,  52 
N.  Y.  146,  that  the  firm  must  be  solvent. 

240 


CH.  XII.]  PAETNERSHIP.  *  215 

borrowed  it  from  the  continent  of  Europe,  as  it  was  formerly 
unknown  in  English  practice,  and  is  not  recognized  by  the  com- 
mon law  of  England.  Limited  partnership  is  now  permitted 
in  England,  but  it  is  not  the  same  thing  there  that  it  is  in  this 
country. 

With  us,  a  limited  partnership,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  a 
special  partnership,  arises  wholly  from  statute,  and  is  defined  and 
determined  by  statutory  provisions.  The  purpose  of  it  is  to 
enable  a  party  to  put  into  the  stock  of  a  firm  a  definite  sum  of 
money,  and  abide  a  responsibility  and  share  a  profit  which  shall 
be  in  proportion  to  the  money  thus  contributed,  and  no  more. 
By  the  common  law  of  partnership,  he  who  had  any  interest  in 
the  stock,  and  received  any  proportion  of  the  profits,  is  a  partner, 
and  as  such,  liable  in  solido  for  the  whole  debts  of  the  firm.  And 
mere  joint-stock  companies,  without  incorporation,  are,  as  to  all 
purposes  of  liability,  like  common  partnerships,  (g)  Capitalists 
were  therefore  unwilling  to  place  their  capital  in  the  stock  of  a 
trading  company,  unless  advantages  were  offered  them 
equivalent  to  this  great  risk.  Men  of  *  business  capacity,  *  215 
who  had  only  their  skill,  industry,  and  integrity,  could  not 
always  borrow  adequate  capital,  because  they  could  not  give  abso- 
lute security ;  and  they  could  not  pay  as  a  premium  for  the  risk 
more  than  legal  interest,  because  the  usury  laws  prohibited  this. 
But  they  may  now  enter  into  an  arrangement  with  a  capitalist,  by 
which  they  receive  from  him  adequate  means  for  carrying  on  their 
business  profitably,  paying  him  a  fair  share  of  the  profits  earned 
by  the  combination  of  his  capital  and  their  labor,  while  he  runs 
the  risk  of  losing  the  capital  which  is  thus  earning  him  a  profit, 
but  knows  that  he  can  lose  no  more. 

Partnerships  of  this  kind  being,  as  has  been  stated,  wholly  un- 
known to  the  common  law,  are  authorized  and  regulated  only  by 
statute.  And  these  statutes  differ  considerably  in  the  several 
States.  But  the  provisions  are  generally  to  the  following  effect. 
First,  there  must  be  one  or  more  who  are  general  partners,  and 
one  or  more  who  are  special  partners ;  secondly,  the  names  of  the 
special  partners  do  not  appear  in  the  firm,  nor  have  they  all  the 

Island,  Connecticut,  Vermont,  New  Jer-  (q)  Cox  v.  Bodfish,  .35  Me.  .302  ;  Pipe  v. 

Bey,     Pennsylvania,     Maryland,      South     Bateman,  1  Clarke  (la.),  369;    Williams 
Carolina,     Geor<iia,    Alabama,    Florida,     t".  Bank  of  Micliigan,  7  Wend.  542;  Hess 
Mississippi,    Indiana,  Michigan,  Illinois,     v.  Werts,  4  S.  &  R.  356. 
Kentucky,  Virginia. 

VOL.  I.  16  241 


*  216  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

powers  and  duties  of  active  members ;  thirdly,  the  sum  proposed 
to  be  contributed  by  the  special  jiartncrs  must  be  actually  paid 
in ;  fourthly,  the  arrangement  must  be  in  writing,  specifying  the 
names  of  the  partners,  the  amount  paid  in,  &c.,  which  is  to  be 
acknowledged  before  a  magistrate,  and  then  recorded  and  adver- 
tised, in  such  way  as  shall  give  the  public  distinct  knowledge  of 
what  it  is,  and  who  they  are,  that  persons  dealing  with  the  firm 
give  credit  to.  Besides  these  general  provisions,  others  of  a  more 
particular  nature  are  sometimes  introduced.  Thus  in  some  States, 
no  special  partnership  may  carry  on  the  business  of  insurance  or 
banking.  And  there  are  often  special  provisions  to  give  greater 
security  to  the  public  and  persons  dealing  with  such  firms.  But 
for  these  we  must  refer  the  reader  to  the  statutes  of  the  several 
States. 

A  special  partner,  complying  with  the  requirements  of  the  law, 

cannot  be  held  as  personally  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  firm ; 

although,   of   course,   the   whole   amount   which   he   contributes 

goes   into   the   fund   to   which   the   creditors   of   the   firm   may 

look. 

*  216        *  It  seems  to  be  quite  well  settled,  that  the  special  part- 

ner must,  at  his  own  peril,  comply  precisely  with  the 
requirements  of  the  statutes,  (^qq)  Any  disregard  of  them,  or 
want  of  conformity,  although  it  be  accidental  and  entirely  inno- 
cent on  his  part,  or  any  material  mistake  by  another,  as  by  the 
printer  who  prints  the  advertisement,  deprives  him  of  the  benefit 
of  the  statute.  He  is  then  a  partner  at  common  law,  and,  as  such, 
liable  in  soliclo  for  the  whole  debts  of  the  firm,  (r) 

(77)  Haggcrty  r.  Portor,  lO.']  Mass.  17;  calling  the  contribution  85,000,  when   it 

Pierce  v.  Bryant,  5  Allen,  01  ;  Richardson  was  but  .$2,000,  if  it  had  called  it  62,000, 

V.  Hogg,  •"38  Pciin.  St.   15i} ;    Hartland  v.  when  it  was  in  fact  65,000,  it  might  liave 

Cliace,  :5'.t  I'arlj.  283.  been  well  urged,  in  the  absence  of  all  ill- 

(r)  Hubbard  v.  Morgan,  U.  S.  D.  C.  design  or  personal  fault  on  the  part  of 
for  N.  Y.,  May,  1839,  cited  in  3  Kent,  the  special  partner,  that  this  error  could 
Com.  36 ;  Argall  v.  Smith,  3  Denio,  435.  not  mislead  the  public,  or  any  dealer 
In  this  case,  which  was  decided  by  the  with  the  firm  to  his  injury,  as  it  made  the 
Court  of  ICrrors  of  New  York  uuani-  grounils  of  credit  less  than  their  actual 
mously,  it  was  held,  that  the  publication  value,  instead  of,  as  in  the  case  at  bar, 
of  tiie  amount  contributed  by  the  special  making  them  more.  But  even  tlien  the 
partner  as  85,000,  whereas  it  was  $2,000,  necessity  of  a  strict  compliance  with  the 
left  upon  him  all  the  liabilities  of  a  gen-  provisions  of  the  statute  might  be  sufB- 
eral  j)artner.  The  argument  of  Spencer,  cient  to  holil  the  special  partner  as  a  gen- 
Senator,  who  alone  gives  the  reasons  of  eral  one.  See  Hogg  v.  Orgill,  3-1  Penn. 
the  decision,  turns  upon  the  necessity  of  St.  344,  as  to  payment  in  checks  of  third 
a  trap  advertisement ;  he  regards  an  erro-  persons,  by  special  partner,  being  equiva- 
neous  advertisement  as  no  advertisement  lent  to  an  nciual  cash  ])(ii/ment,  as  required 
at  all.  But  suppose  the  error  had  been  by  the  New  York  statute, 
the  reverse  of  what  it  was.     Instead  of 

242 


CH.  XII.] 


PARTNEKSHIP. 


216 


If  a  special  partner  sells  out  his  interest  to  the  general  partner 
for  a  sum  exceeding  his  invested  capital,  it  has  been  held  that  this 
was  such  a  withdrawal  of  his  capital  as  the  statute  prohibits,  and 
that  it  made  him  liable.  («)  But  it  seems  that  the  special  partner 
ma}'  make  loans  to  the  partnership,  (ss) 

If  the  special  partner  of  one  firm  is  the  general  partner  of 
another  firm,  the  second  firm  may  claim  as  creditor  of  the  first 
firm,  (f) 


(s)  Beers  r.  Reynolds,  12  Barb.  288;     cial  partners  are  considered  under  various 


8.  c.  I  Kern.  97. 

(ss)  Walkensham  v.  Perzell,  4  Rob. 
426. 

[t)  Haves  v.  Beraent,  3  Sandf.  304. 
See  also  Hayes  r.  Heyer,  35  N.  Y.  826. 
The  rights,  duties,  and  liabilities  of  spe- 


poinls  of  view,  in  Singer  v.  Kelly,  44 
Pcnn.  St.  145;  Dunning's  Appeal,  44 
Penn.  St.  150;  McKnight  )■.  KatclifE, 
44  Penn.  St.  156;  Harris  v.  Murray,  28 
N.  Y.  574. 

243 


*  217  THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK  I. 


*217.  *  CHAPTER  XIII. 

NEW   PARTIES    BY   NOVATION. 

The  term  novation  has  not  been  much  used  in  English  or 
American  law,  but  may  be  found  in  some  late  English  cases  ; 
and  the  thing  itself,  or  this  form  of  contract,  may  be  found  in 
many  cases,  both  in  England  and  in  this  country.  The  word  is 
borrowed  from  the  civil  law,  where  it  forms  an  important  topic ; 
and  we  may  find  a  clear  statement  of  its  principles  in  Pothier's 
work  on  Contracts,  (a)  It  is  defined  thus  :  a  transaction  whereby 
a  debtor  is  discharged  from  his  liability  to  his  original  creditor, 
by  contracting  a  new  obligation  in  favor  of  a  new  creditor,  by 
the  order  of  his  original  creditor.  Thus,  A  owes  B  one  thousand 
dollars  ;  B  owes  C  the  same  sum,  and,  at  the  request  of  C,  orders 
A  to  pay  that  sum,  when  it  shall  fall  due,  to  C.  To  this  A  con- 
sents, and  B  discharges  A  from  all  obligation  to  him.  A  thus 
contracts  a  new  obligation  to  C,  and  his  original  obligation  to  B 
is  at  an  end.  By  the  civil  law,  any  new  contract  entered  into 
for  the  purpose  and  with  the  effect  of  dissolving  an  existing  con- 
tract was-  regarded  as  a  novation,  and  in  the  above  case  the  civil 
law  would  recognize  two  sorts  of  contracts  of  novation ;  the  con- 
tract by  which  A  is  discharged  from  his  liability  to  B  by  contract- 
ing a  new  obligation  to  C,  and  the  novation  by  which  B  would 
be  discharged  from  his  obligation  to  C  by  procuring  A  as  a  new 
debtor.  This  distinction  has  not  been  preserved  in  the  common 
law,  and  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  parties  in  both  cases 
are  governed  by  the  same  rule. 

A  leading  English  case  on  this  subject  is  Tatlock  v.  Harris,  (i) 

(a)  Part  3,  ch.  2,  art.  4.  second  indorser,  a  Imnd  fide  holder  for  va- 

(b)  3T.  R.  174.  In  this  case  it  was  do-  Itiable  consideriition  mi;,'ht  recover  the 
termined  that  wliere  a  hill  of  exchan<:(!  was  amount  of  it  in  an  action  npainst  the  ac- 
drawn  by  tlie  ilefcndant  and  others  on  tlie  ccptor  for  money  paid  or  money  had  and 
defendant  alone,  in  fivor  of  a  fictitious  received;  and  Bnllcr,  J.,  puts  this  case: 
person  (which  was  known  to  all  parties  "  Suppose  A  owes  B  .£100,  and  B  owes 
concerned  in  drawing  the  hill),  and  the  dc-  C  .£100,  and  the  three  meet,  and  it  is  apreed 
fcndunt  received  the  value  of  it  fiom  the  between  theai  that  A  sliall  jjay  C  the  £100, 

244 


CH.  XIII.] 


NOVATION. 


218 


It  will  be  seen,  from  the  statement  of  the  cases  in  the 
*  note,  that  the  principle  deducible  from  them  is,  that  if  *  218 
A  owes  B,  and  B  owes  C,  and  it  is  agreed  by  these  three 
parties  that  A  shall  pay  this  debt  to  0,  and  A  is  by  this  agree- 
ment discharged  from  his  debt  to  B,  and  B  is  also  discharged 
from  his  debt  to  C,  then  there  is  an  obligation  created  from  A  to 
C,  and  C  may  bring  an  action  against  A  in  his  own  name,  (c)  ^ 


B's  debt  is  extinguished,  and  C  may  re- 
cover that  sum  against  A."  —  So  in  Wil- 
son V.  Coupland,  5  B.  &  Aid.  228,  where 
the  plaintiffs  were  creditors  and  the  de- 
fendants were  debtors  to  the  firm  of  "  '!'.  & 
Co.,"  and  bi/  consent  of  all  parlies  an  ar- 
rangement was  made  that  the  defendants 
should  i)iiy  to  the  plaintiff's  the  debt  due 
from  them  to  "  T.  &  Co.,"  it  was  held,  that 
as  the  demand  of  "  T.  &  Co."  on  the  de- 
fendants jvas  for  money  had  and  received, 
the  plaintiffs  might  recover  against  the  de- 
fendants on  a  count  for  money  had  and  re- 
ceived, Best,  J.,  saying,  "  A  chose  in  action 
is  not  assignable  without  the  consent  of  all 
parties.  But  here  all  parties  have  assented, 
and  from  the  moment  of  the  assent  of  the 
defendants  it  seems  to  me  that  the  sum  due 
from  the  defendants  to  '  T.  &  Co.'  became 
money  had  and  received  to  the  use  of  the 
plaintiffs."  The  case  of  Heaton  v.  Anj:ier, 
7  N.  H.  397,  furnishes  an  excellent  illus- 
tration of  this  principle.  That  was  an  ac- 
tion of  assutnpsit  for  a  wagon  sold  and  de- 
livered. The  defendant  having  bought  the 
wagon  of  the  plaintiff  at  auction,  sold  it 
immediately  afterwards  on  the  same  day  to 
one  John  Chase.  Chase  and  the  defendant 
then  went  to  the  plaintiff,  and  Chase  agreed 
to  pay  the  price  of  the  wagon  to  the  plaintiff 
for  the  defendant,  and  the  plaintiff  agreed  to 
take  Chase  as  paymaster.  Held,  that  the 
debt  due  from  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff 
was  extinguished.  Green,  J.,  having  cited 
the  case  put  by  Bu/ler,  J.,  in  Tatlock-r.  Har- 
ris, said:  "The  case  put  by  Buller  is  the 
very  case  now  before  us.  Heaton,  Angier, 
and  Chase  being  together,  it  was  agreed  be- 
tween them  that  the  plaintiff  should  take 
Chase  as  his  debtor  for  the  sum  due  from 
the  defendant.  The  debt  due  to  the  plain- 
tiff from  the  defendant  was  thus  extin- 
guished.    It  was  an  accord  executed.    And 


Chase,  by  assuming  the  debt  due  to  the 
plaintiff,  must  be  considered  as  having  paid 
that  amount  to  the  defendant,  as  part  of 
the  price  he  was  to  pay  the  defendant  for 
the  wagon."  See  also  Thompson  v.  Per- 
cival,  h  B.  &  Ad.  925,  3  Nev.  &  M.  171.  — 
And  in  such  case  the  defendant's  under- 
taking is  not  to  pay  the  debt  of  a  third  per- 
son within  the  meaning  of  the  Statute  of 
Frauds.  Bird  v.  Gammon,  3  Bing.  N.  C. 
883;  Meert  v.  Moessard,  1  Mo.  &  P.  8 ; 
Arnold  v.  Lvman,  17  Mass.  400;  French  v. 
French,  2  Man.  &  G.  644,  3  Scott,  N.  R. 
12.5  ;  Blunt  r.  Boyd,  3  Barb.  209. 

(c)  So  if  in  such  case  the  promise  of  A 
to  pay  C  is  conditional,  as  to  pay  whatever 
may  hereafter  be  found  due  from  A  to  B, 
and  after  such  amount  is  ascertained,  but 
before  it  is  paid,  B  becomes  bankrupt,  still 
C  may  sue  A  for  the  amount  of  A's  debt 
to  B.  Crowfoot  V.  Gurney,  9  Bing.  372. 
See  also  Hodgson  v.  Anderson,  3  B.  &  C. 
842.  —  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  in 
order  to  constitute  an  assignment  of  a  debt 
or  a  novation,  so  as  to  enable  the  transfer- 
ree  to  bring  an  action  in  his  own  name  in 
a  coii7-t  oflaiv,  the  assent  of  the  debtor  to 
the  agreed  transfer  is  absolutely  essential, 
and  there  must  be  a  promise  founded  on 
sufficient  consideration  to  pay  it  to  the 
transferee.  In  equity,  however,  it  is  other- 
wise, and  there  need  be  no  promise  by  the 
debtor  to  the  assignee  in  order  to  entitle 
him  to  sue  in  his  own  name.  Lord  Eklon 
in  Ex  parte  South,  3  Swanst.  392  ;  Tibbits 
V.  George,  5  A.  &  E.  115,  116 ;  Bobbins  v. 
Bacon,  3  Greenl.  (2d  ed.)  346,  n. ;  Blin  v. 
Pierce,  20  Vt.  25  ;  L'Estrange  v.  L'Estrange, 
1  E.  L.  &  E.  153,  n. ;  Van  Buskirk  v.  Hart- 
ford Fire  Ins.  Co.  14  Conn.  141  ;  Mande- 
ville  V.  Welch,  5  Wheat.  277  ;  Gibson  v. 
Cooke,  20  Pick.  15.  See  also  Schlosser's 
Appeal,  58  Penn.  St.  493. 


1  Thus  where  a  mortgagor  conveys  the  mortgaged  premises,  and  his  grantee 
agrees  to  assume  and  pay  the  mortgage  debt,  and  the  mortgagee  accepts  him  as  his 
debtor,  a  novation  results,  Campbell  u.  Smith,  71  N.  Y.  2G;  Calvo  r.  Davies,  73  N.  Y. 
211 ;  Merriman  v.  Moore,  90  Penn.  St.  78 ;  or  where  a  new  firm  takes  upon  itself  the 
liabilities  of  the  old,  and  a  creditor,  with  knowledge  of  that  fact,  agrees  to  accept 
the  new  firm  as  debtor,  and  releases  the  old  firm,  Shaw  v.  McGrcgory,  105  Mass. 
96 ;    Silverman  v.  Chase,  90  111.  37.     Such  a   release  may  be  inferred   from   the 

245 


*  219  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

This  would  certainly  seem  to  be  in  contradiction  or  exception 

to  the  ancient  rule,  that  a  personal  contract  cannot  be  assigned 

so  as  to  give  the  assignee  a  right  of   action  in  his  own   name. 

But  it  is  not  so  much  an  exception  as  a  different  thing.     It  is 

the  case  of  a  new  contract  formed  and  a  former  contract 

*  219    dissolved.     *  And  the  general  principles  in  relation  to  con- 

sideration  attach  to  the  whole  transaction,  ((i)     Thus,  to 
give  to  the  transaction  its  full  legal  eflicacy,  the  original  liabilities 
must  be  extinguished.     For  if  the  debt  from  A  to  B  be  not  dis- 
charged by  A's  promise  to  pay  it  to  C,  then  there  is  no  considera- 
tion for  this  promise,  and  no  action  can  be  maintained  upon 

*  220    it ;  (e)  ^  but,  *  if  this  liability  be  discharged,  then  it  is  a 

{(1)  For  example,  in  order  that  an  as-  purchase-money  to   pay  the   plaintiff  and 

si.snincnt  of  a  chose  in  action  should  be  other  creditors  their  demands  against  the 

valid  against  the  creditors  of  the  assignor,  estate,  which  the  defeiulant  promised  the 

it  must   he   bona  fide  and  upon   adequate  executor  to  ])ay.     This  action  was  brought 

consideration.     Langley  v.  Berry,  14  N.  H.  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  jdaintiff's  dc- 

82  ;   Giildings  r.  Coleinan,  12  N.  H.  153.  mand.     Iltld,  that  he  could  not  recover. 

The    assi.'ununt,    however,    need    not,   al-  L/plium,  J.,  "  The  princi|ial  ([uestion  in  this 

though  in  writing,  exjjress  to  be  for  value  case  is,  whether  the  plaintiff  can  avail  hiin- 

received.     Johnson  i".  Thayer,  17  Me.  401  ;  self  of  the  i)romise  made  by  the  defendant 

Legro  V.  Staples,  16  Me.  252;   Adams  v.  to  the  executor  —  he  never  having  agreed 

Robinson,  1    Pick.  461.     It  is  sufficient  if  to  accept  the  defendant  as  his  debtor,  nor 

it  be  so  in  ])oint  of  fact;  and  this  must  be  having  made  any  demand  of  him  for  the 

proved  alinndi'  than  from  the  face  of  the  money  prior  to  the  commencement  of  tliis 

pa])er.     Langley  c.  Berry,  s«/)ra.     See  post,  suit    .   .   .  In  cases  of  this  kind,  a  contract, 

Chapter  on  Assignment.  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  mutual  to 

(e)  Cuxon  v.   Chadley,  3  B.  &  C.  591  ;  all  concerned;  and  until  it  is  com])leted  by 

Buttcrfield   v.    Hartshorn,    7    N.    H.    345.  the  assent  of  all  interested  it  is  liable  to  be 

This  was  an  action  of  assumpsit  for  money  defeated,  and  the  money  deposited  countcr- 

liail  and  received.    The  plaintiff  held  a  claim  manded.     It  seems,  also,  to  be  clear,  that 

against  the   estate   of  a   person  deceased,  no  contract  of  the  kind  hero  attempted  to 

The  executor  of  the  estate  sold  a  farm  be-  be  entered  into  can  be  made  without  an 

longing  thereto  to  the  defendant,  and  left  entire  change  of  the  original  rights  and  lia- 

in  the  defendant's  hands  a  portion  of  the  bilities  of  the  parties  to  it.     There  is  to  be 

acceptance  of  interest,  the  receiving  of  new  notes,  or  the  proving  a  claim  in  bank- 
ruptcy, IJilborough  i-.  Holmes,  5  Ch.  D.  255;  Wright  v.  Brosseau,  73  111.  331;  but 
the  mere  accei)tancc  of  the  note  of  an  individual  partner  after  tlissolution  is  not 
enougii  without  an  express  agreement,  Lcabo  v.  Goode,  (i7  Mo.  120;  otherwise,  of 
a  bond  given  for  a  simple  contract  debt,  Bennett  v.  Cadwell,  70  Penn.  St.  253.  See 
Houniz  r.  Holtliouse,  85  Penn.  St.  235,  as  to  the  assumption  of  firm  debts  by  an 
incoming  partner.  —  A  compromise  between  tlie  creditor  and  debtor,  by  which  the 
amount,  the  terms  and  luoile  of  payment  of  the  debt,  the  rate  of  interest  and  nature 
of  the  securities  are  changed,  is  not  a  novation,  unless  the  intention  of  the  parties 
80  to  do  is  particularly  expressed.  Baker  v.  Frellsen,  32  La.  An.  822.  —  The  debtor 
also  must  assent  to  the  new  .arrangement,  to  give  it  validity ;  as  where  an  ice  com- 
pany, with  winch  a  (nistomer  from  dissatisfaction  had  ceased  to  deal,  bought  out  the 
company  with  which  tiie  c\istomer  had  subsequently  contracted  for  ice,  and  continued 
to  deliver  ice  to  him  withotit  notifying  him  of  the  purchase  until  after  the  consump- 
tion of  the  ice,  it  was  liric/,  liiat  no  recovery  could  be  had  for  the  ice  so  delivered. 
Boston  Ice  Co.  r.  Potter,  123  Mass.  28. 

^  There  must  be  an  absolute  extinguishment  of  the  original  debt.  Caswell  ''. 
Fellows.  110  Mass.  52.  As  to  extension  of  the  time  of  payment  being  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration, sec  Windiiam  v.  Doles,  59  Ga.  205;  Ilixon  v  Iletherington,  57  Ala.  105. 

24G 


CH.  XIII.] 


NOVATION. 


220 


sufficient  consideration ;  and  if  at  the  same  time  C  gives  up 
his  claim  on  B  as  the  ground  on  which  B  orders  A  to  pay  C, 
then  the  consideration  for  which  A  promises  to  pay  C  may  be 
considered  as  moving  from  C.  An  order  addressed  by  a  creditor 
to  his  debtor,  directing  him  to  pay  the  debt  to  some  one  to  whom 
the  creditor  is  indebted,  operates  as  a  substitution  of  the  new  debt 
for  the  old  one,  when  it  is  presented  to  the  debtor,  and  assented 
to  by  him,  and  not  before ;  and  also  provided  this  third  party 
gives  up  his  original  claim  against  the  first  creditor,  and  not 
otherwise.  (/)  The  mutual  assent  of  all  the  three  parties  seems 
to  be  necessary  to  make  it  an  effectual  novation,  or  substitution ; 


a  deposit  of  money  for  the  payment  of  a 
prior  debt,  an  ay;reeinent  to  hold  the  money 
for  this  purpose,  and  an  agreement  on  the 
part  of  a  third  person  to  accept  it  in  com- 
pliance with  this  arrangement.  It  is  made 
through  the  agency  of  tiiree  individuals, 
for  the  purpose  of  payment:  and  it  can 
have  no  other  etFect  than  to  extinguish  the 
original  debt,  and  create  a  new  liability  of 
debtor  and  creditor  between  the  person 
holding  the  money  and  the  individual  who 
is  to  receive  it.  On  any  other  supposition 
there  would  be  a  duplicate  liability  for  the 
same  debt ;  and  the  deposit,  instead  of  be- 
ing a  payment,  would  be  a  mei-e  collateral 
security,  which  is  totally  different  from  the 
avowed  object  of  the  parties.  To  entitle 
the  plaintiff  to  recover,  there  must  be  an 
extinguishment  of  the  original  debt;  and 
it  is  questionable  whether,  in  cases  of  this 
kind,  anything  can  operate  as  an  extin- 
guishment of  tlie  original  debt,  but  payment, 
or  an  ex])ress  agreement  of  the  creditor  to 
take  another  person  as  his  debtor  in  dis- 
charge of  the  original  claim."  Sec  also 
Warren  r.  Batchelder,  15  N.  H.  129.— 
Wharton  v.  Walker.  4  B.  &  C.  163.  In 
this  case  A  bcin<:  indebted  to  B,  gave  him 
an  order  upon  C,  who  was  A's  tenant,  to 
pay  B  the  amoimt  that  should  be  due  from 
C  to  A,  from  the  next  rent.  R  sent  the 
order  to  the  tenant  C,  but  had  not  any 
direct  communication  with  him  upon  the 
subject.  At  tlie  next  rent-day  C  produced 
the  order  to  A,  and  promised  him  to  pay 
the  amount  to  B,  and  upon  receiving  the 
difference  between  the  amount  of  the  order 
and  the  whole  rent  then  due,  A  gave  C  a 
receipt  for  the  whole.  B  afterwards  sued 
C  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  order,  in 
an  action  for  money  had  and  received,  and 
upon  an  account  stated.  It  was  held  by 
the  whole  Court  of  King's  Bench,  that  he 
could  not  recover  on  cither  count,  because 
the  debt  from  A  to  B  was  not  extinguished, 
Bayley,  J.,  saying :  "  If,  by  an  agreement 


betwccu  the  three  parties,  the  plaintiff  had 
undertaken  to  looli  to  the  defendant,  and 
not  to  his  original  <lebtor,  that  would  have 
been  binding,  and  the  plaintiff"  might  have 
maintained  an  action  on  such  ag:eeinent; 
but  in  order  to  give  him  that  right  of  ac- 
tion there  must  be  an  extinguishment  of 
the  intermediate  debt.  No  such  bargain 
was  made  hetwceen  the  parties  in  this  case. 
U])on  the  defendant's  refusing  to  pay  the 
plaintiff,  the  latter  might  still  sue  A,  and 
this  brings  the  case  within  Cuxon  v.  Chad- 
ley,  3  B.  &  C.  591."  Sec  also  French  v. 
French,  2  Man.  &  G.  644,  3  Scott,  N.  R. 
125;  Thomas  r.  Shillibeer,  1  M.  &  W.  124; 
]\loore  V.  Hill,  2  Peake,  10;  Maxwell  ;). 
Jameson,  2  B.  &  Aid.  55  ;  Short  r.  City  of 
New  Orleans,  4  La.  An.  281 ;  McKinney  v. 
Alvis,  14  111.  34. 

(/)  Where  a  declaration  alleged  that 
one  J.  S.,  being  indebted  to  the  plaintiff, 
made  and  delivered  to  him  his  order  in 
writing,  directed  to  the  defendant,  to  de- 
liver to  the  plaintiff  or  bearer  a  certain 
quantity  of  wood  ;  and  that  the  defendant, 
being  indebted  to  J.  S.,  in  consideration 
thereof  accepted  the  said  order,  and  prom- 
ised to  deliver  the  wood,  according  to  the 
tenor  and  efiect  of  such  order  and  the  ac- 
ceptance thereof ;  Held,  on  demurrer,  that 
the  defendant's  acceptance  of  the  order,  and 
his  promise  to  deliver  the  wood,  were  with- 
out any  consideration,  and  therefore  void  ; 
and  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  maintain 
an  action  against  him  thereon.  Perhaps 
it  might  be  questioned  in  such  a  case  as 
this,  whether  the  order  of  J.  S.  on  the  de- 
fendant, together  with  the  acceptance  of  it 
by  J.  S.  did  not  discharge  the  defendant's 
debt  to  J.  S  ,  and  so  raise  a  consideration 
for  his  promise  to  pay  the  plaintiff.  The 
defendant  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
liable  under  the  rules  of  the  civil  law. 
Ford  v.  Adams,  2  Barb.  349.  Sec  also 
Gails  V.  Sch.  Osceola,  14  La.  An.  54. 

247 


*  221  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

for  SO  long  as  the  debtor  has  made  no  promise,  or  come  under 
no  obligation  to  the  party  in  whose  favor  the  order  is  given,  it 
is  a  mere  mandate  which  the  creditor  may  revoke  at  his  pleas- 
ure. (^)  ^     And  if  the  person  in  whose  favor  the  order  is 

*  221    drawn  has  in  consideration  *  thereof  discharged  the.  debt 

due  to  him,  and  so  may  hold  this  order  as  against  the 
creditor  giving  it,  still  it  is  not  a  novation.  He  must  sue  in  the 
name  of  the  party  drawing  the  order,  unless  the  person  on  whom 
it  is  made  has  agreed  with  him  in  whose  favor  it  is  made  to 
comply  with  the  order.  (Ji)  And  if  the  action  is  brought  in  the 
name  of  the  original  creditor,  it  is  subject  to  the  equitable  de- 
fences which  may  exist  between  him  and  the  debtor.  But  after 
such  assent  or  agreement  is  given,  then  the  order  is  irrevocable, 
and  neither  party  can  recede  from  the  agreement,  (z)  The  old 
debt  is  entirely  discharged. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  in  such  case  the  debtor  does  not 
undertake  to  pay  the  debt  of  another,  but  contracts  an  entirely 

[g)  Owen  v.  Bowen,  4  C.  &  P.  93.     In  And  the  creditor  must  also  consent  to  take 

this  case  A  gave  a  sum  of  money  into  the  tlie  new  debtor  as  his  sole  security,  and  to 

hands  of  B,  to  pay  to  C,  but  B  had  not  extinguish    his   claim   against    his   former 

paid  it  over.     It  was  Itdd,  that  if  C  had  debtor.     Butterfield  v.  Hartshorn,  7  N.  H. 

not  consented  to  receive  this  sum  of  B,  A  345. 

might  countermand  the  authority  and  re-  {i)  See  Ainslie  i'.  Boynton,  2  Barb.  258 ; 

cover  it  back  from  B.     See  also  Gibson  i.  Hodges  i".  Eastman,  12  Vt.  358;  Surtees  v, 

Minet,  1  C.  &  T.  247.  Hubbard,  4  Esp.  203.     In  this  case  Lord 

(h)  The  agreement  of  a/^  parties  seems  Ellenburourjli  observed:  "  Choses  in  action 

to  be  absolutely  essential  to  complete  this  generally   are    not    assignable.     Where  a 

contract,  and  unless  there  is  a  promise  by  party  entitled  to  money  assigns  over  his 

the  debtor  to  pay  the  new  substituted  crcd-  interest  to  another,  the  mere  act  of  as.sign- 

itor  the  amount  for  which  he  was  originally  ment  does  not  entitle  the  assignee  to  main- 

lialjle  to  his  own  creditor,  there  is  no  priv-  tain  an  action  for  it.     The  debtor  may  re- 

ity  of  contract,  and  an  action  at  law  will  fuse  his  assent ;  he  may  have  an  account 

not  lie  by  the  transferee  in  his  own  name,  against  the  assignor,  and  wish  to  have  his 

Williams  i-.  Everett,  14  East,  582;  Mande-  set-otF;  but  if  there  is  anything  like  an  as- 

ville  V.  Welch,  5  Wheat.  277;  Trustees  of  sent  on  the  part  of  the  holder  of  the  money, 

Howard  College  r.  Pace,  15  Ga.  486;  Gib-  in  that  case  I  think  that  this  [assum])sit  for 

son  V.  Cooke,  20  Pick.  18.     See  Wharton  money  had  and  received],  which  is  an  equi- 

V.  Walker,  4  B.  &  C.  1G3  ;  Scott  v.  Porchcr,  table  action,  is  maintainable."     Bccckcr  i;. 

3  Mcriv.  0.i2  ;   Wedhike  v.  ilurlev,  1  Cr.  &  Beecker,  7  Johns.  103  ;   IIollv  v.  Kathbone, 

J.  83;  Baron  (;.  Husband,  4  B.  &  Ad.  614.  8   id,    149;    Norris   v.    Hall,' 18   Me.   332; 

But  see  Hall  v.  Marston,  17  Mass.  575. —  Clement  v.  Clement,  8  N.  II.  472. 

1  All  three  parties  must  concur  in  the  same  agreement.  Murphy  v.  Ilanralian,  50 
Wis.  485,  480 ;  which  the  original  and  substituted  debtor  may  rescind  at  any  time 
before  the  latter  has  notice  that  the  creditor  accepts  him,  Trimble  v.  Strother,  25 
Ohio  St.  378;  Durham  i\  Bischoff,  47  Ind.  211.  The  acceptance  of  the  new  for  the 
original  contract  discharges  the  old  debt,  whether  the  new  contract  is  ever  performed 
or  not.  Morriss  r.  Harvey,  75  Va.  72(3.  By  accepting  a  third  person  in  substitution 
for  the  original  debtor,  the  creditor  assumes  the  risk  of  such  jxTson's  insolvency. 
Cadens  v.  Tcasdale,  V,  Vt.  40!).  See  also  Andrews  r.  Campbell,  :!()  Ohio  St.  :3()1 ; 
rianaginu.  Hambleton,  54  Md.  222;  Drake  v.  Hill,  53  la.  37  ;  Shaffer  i?.  McKanna, 
24  Kan.  22. 

248 


CH.  XIII.]  NOVATION.  *  222 

new  debt  of  his  own,  the  consideration  of  which  is  the  absolute 
discharge  of  the  old  debt.  Consequently,  this  new  promise  is 
not  within  the  provisions  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  relating  to 
a  promise  to  pay  the  debt  of  another,  (y) 

There  is  one  point  upon  which  some  uncertainty  exists  as  to 
the  principles  of  the  civil  law  concerning  novation,  but  upon 
which  the  rule  of  the  common  law  is  clear.  If  the  order  be  for 
less  than  the  whole  debt  due  from  him  on  whom  it  is  made  to 
the  maker,  it  seems  not  to  be  entirely  agreed  upon  by  civilians 
whether  such  an  order,  assented  to  and  complied  with, 
would  *  or  would  not  discharge  the  whole  of  the  original  *  222 
debt.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  by  the  common  law 
it  would  be  a  discharge  only  pro  tanto,  unless  there  were  a  dis- 
tinct agreement  and  a  valid  promise  that  it  should  be  taken  for 
the  whole.  (^) 

( J )  Bird  V.  Gammon,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  883 ;  of  a  debt  due  from  the  drawee  to  the  drawer, 

Blunt  V.  Boyd,  3  Barb.  209.     And  see  ante,  without  the  consent  of  the  drawee,  amount 

note  (b),  p.  *217.  to  an  assignment  of  any  portion  of  the  debt 

(k)  Heatlicote  v.  Crookshanks,  2  T.  R.  or  liability,  and  does  not  authorize  the  in- 

27;  Fitch  r.  Sutton,  5  East,  230 ;  Pinnel's  stitution  of  a  suit  in  the  name  of  the  assignee 

case,  5  Rep.  117 ;  Cumber  v.  Wane,  1  Stra.  for  the  wliole  or  any  part  of  the  sum  due 

426.     See  also  Sibree  v.  Tripp,  1 5  M.  &  W.  from  the  debtor.     Gibson  v.  Cooke,  20  Pick. 

23,  where  the  case  of  Cumber  v.  Wane  was  15  ;  Mandeville  v.  Welch,  5  Wheat.  277  ; 

much  discussed,  and  somewhat  qualified.  —  Bobbins  v.  Bacon,  3  Greenl.  346  (2d  ed.),  n. 
Neither  will  an  order  or  draft  for  part  only 

249 


*223 


THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


223 


*  CHAPTER  XIV. 


NEW   PARTIES   BY   ASSIGNMENT. 

Sect.  I.  —  Of  Assignments  of  Choses  in  Action. 

Any  right  under  a  contract,  either  express  or  implied,  which 
has  not  been  reduced  to  j^ossession,  is  a  chose  in  action ;  (a)  and 
is  so  called  because  it  can  be  enforced  against  an  adverse  party 
only  by  an  action  at  law.  At  common  law,  the  transfer  of  such 
chose  in  action  was  entirely  forbidden.  The  reason  was  said  to 
be  this.  A  chose  in  action,  by  its  very  nature  and  definition,  is  a 
right  which  cannot  be  enforced  against  a  reluctant  party,  except 
by  an  action,  or  suit  at  law.  And  if  this  be  transferred,  the  only 
thing  which  passes  is  a  right  to  go  to  law ;  and  so  much  did  the 
ancient  law  abhor  litigation,  that  such  transfers  were  wholly 
*  224    prohibited.  (J)     But  we  apprehend  that  the  *  stronger  and 


(a)  2  Bl.  Cora.  396,  397  ;  1  Dane,  Abr. 
92.  Chosps  in  action  are  not  limited,  how- 
ever, to  riglits  arising  under  contracts. 
"  Blackstone  seems  to  have  entertained 
the  ophiion,  that  the  term  chose,  or  thing 
in  action,  only  inchiiled  debts  due,  or 
damages  recoverable  for  the  breacli  of  a 
contract,  express  or  implied.  But  this 
definition  is  too  Hmited.  The  term  cliose 
in  action  is  used  in  contradistinction  to 
chose  in  posstssion.  It  includes  all  rights 
to  personal  property  not  in  possession 
which  may  be  enforced  by  action  ;  and  it 
makes  no  difference  whether  the  owner 
lias  been  deprive<l  of  his  ])r()])ert}'  by  tlie 
tortious  act  of  another,  or  liy  his  breach 
of  a  contract,  express  or  implied.  In  both 
cases,  tiie  debt  or  damages  of  the  owner 
is  a  '  tiling  in  action.'"  Per  Bronson,  C. 
J.,  Gillet  V.  Fairchild,  4  Denio,  80.  It 
was  accordingly  held  in  that  case  that  a 
receiver  of  an  insolvent  corjioration,  who 
was  empowered  by  law  to  sue  for  and  re- 
cover "  all  the  estate,  debts,  and  thinfis  in 
action,"  belonging  to  the  corporation, 
might  maintain  trorrr  for  the  conversion 
of  tlie  personal  projicrtv  of  the  corpora- 
tion before   the  plaintiil    was  appointed 

250 


receiver.      See  also  Hall  v.  Robinson,  2 
Comst.  293. 

(h)  "  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  by  the 
ancient  maxim  of  the  common  law,  a 
right  of  entry  or  a  chose  in  action  cannot 
be  granted  or  transferred  to  a  stranger, 
and  thereby  is  avoided  great  oppression, 
injur}',  and  injustice."  Co.  Lit.  20(3  a. 
So  again  in  Lampet's  case,  10  Kep.  48, 
Lord  Coke  says  :  "  Tlie  great  wisdom  and 
policy  of  the  sages  and  founders  of  our 
law  liave  provided,  that  no  possibility, 
right,  title,  nor  llting  in  action,  shall  be 
granted  or  assigned  to  strangers,  for  that 
would  l)e  the  occasion  of  multiplying  of 
contentions  and  suits,  of  great  oppression 
of  the  peo])le,  and  chiefly  of  terre-tenants, 
and  the  subversion  of  the  due  and  equal 
execution  of  justice."  At  what  time  this 
doctrine,  which,  it  is  said,  had  relation 
originallj'  only  to  hnnlul  cs/ates.  was  first 
adjudged  to  be  equall}'  apjilicable  to  the 
assignment  of  a  mere  pemonal  cliatlcl  not  in 
possession,  it  is  not  easy  to  decide ;  it 
seems,  however,  to  have  been  so  settled 
at  a  ver}'  early  period  of  our  history,  as 
the  works  of  our  oldest  ti'xt-writiTs,  and 
the  reports  contain  numberless  observa- 


CH.  XIV.] 


ASSIGNMENT. 


224 


better  reason  was,  that  no  debtor  shall  have  a  new  creditor  sub- 
stituted for  the  original  one,  without  his  consent ;  for  he  may 
have  substantial  reasons  for  choosing  whom  he  should  owe. 

Courts  of  equity  have,  for  a  long  time,  disregarded  this  rule  ;  (c) 
and,  as  a  general  rule,  they  permit  the  assignee  of  a  chose  in 
action  to  sustain  an  action  in  his  own  name,  if  he  can  go  into 
equity  at  all ;  but  when  such  a  case  comes  before  them,  they 
apply  such  equitable  rules,  as  would  prevent  the  debtor  from 
being  oppressed  or  injured.  ((/)     Such  an  assignment  is  regarded 


tions  and  cases  on  the  subject.  Chitly  & 
Hulnie  on  Bills,  p.  6.  —  But  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served tiiat  the  king  was  always  an  ex- 
ception to  this  rule,  for  he  niiglit  always 
either  grant  or  receive  a  possibility  or 
chose  in  action  by  assignment.  Brever- 
ton's  case,  Dyer,  oO  b  ;  Co.  Lit.  232  b,  n. 
(1).  And  it  seems  that  in  this  country 
the  same  exception  exists  in  respect  to 
the  government  of  the  United  States. 
United  States  r.  Buford,  3  Pet.  30. 

(c)  Anon.  Freem.  Ch.  (Miss.)  145; 
Wrigiit  V.  Wright,  1  Ves.  Sen.  409; 
Warmstrey  >•.  Tanfield,  1  Chanc.  29 ; 
Row  V.  Dawson,  1  Ves.  Sen.  331 ;  Prosser 
V.  Edmonds,  1  Y.  &  Coll.  481 ;  Hinkle  v. 
Wanzer,  17  How.  3-33  ;  Bigelow  v.  Willson, 
1  Pick.  485,  493 ;  Dix  v.  Cobb,  4  ]\Iass. 
508,  511 ;  Haskell  v.  Hilton,  30  Me.  419  ; 
Miller  u.  Wliittier,  32  id.  203;  Moor  v. 
Veazie,  ul.  342  ;  Ex  parte  Foster,  2  Story, 
133. 

(d)  It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  the 
assignee  of  a  cAo.se  in  action  may  always 
enforce  his  claim  in  a  court  of  equity ; 
but  simply  that  he  may  proceed  in  equity 
in  his  own  name,  whenever  he  is  entitled 
to  go  into  a  court  of  equity  at  all.  It 
seems  to  be  well  settled,  however,  that 
the  mere  fact  of  one's  being  the  assignee 
of  a  c7(ose  in  action  will  not  entitle  him  to 
go  into  a  court  of  equity  at  all.  His 
remedy  is  generally  complete  at  law  by  a 
suit  in  the  name  of  the  assignor,  and  to 
that  he  will  be  left.  It  is  only  when  the 
legal  remedy  is  in  some  manner  obstructed 
or  rendered  insufficient  that  a  court  of 
equity  will  interpose.  The  law  was  thus 
laid  down  by  Lord  Ilardwiche,  in  Motteux 
V.  The  London  Assurance  Co.  1  Atk.  545, 
547  ;  by  Lord  King,  in  Dhegetoft  v.  The 
London  Assurance  Co.  Mosely,  83  ;  and 
by  Sir  Lancelot  ShadwcU,  in  Hammond  v. 
Messenger,  9  Sim.  327,  332.  In  this  last 
case  the  learned  Vice-Chancellor  said  : 
"  If  this  case  were  stripped  of  all  special 
circumstances,  it  would  be,  simply,  a  bill 
filed  by  a  plaintiff  who  had  olitained  from 
certain  persons  to  whom  a  debt  was  due 


a  right  to  sue  in  their  names  for  the  debt. 
It  is  quite  new  to  me  that,  in  such  a  siui- 
ple  case  as  that,  this  court  allows,  in  the 
first  instance,  a  bill  to  be  filed  against  the 
debtor,  by  the  person  who  has  become 
the  assignee  of  the  debt.  I  admit  that, 
if  special  circumstances  are  stated,  and 
it  is  represented  that  notwithstanding  the 
right  which  the  party  has  obtained  to  sue 
in  the  name  of  the  creditor,  tlie  creditor 
will  interfere  and  prevent  the  exercise  of 
that  right,  this  court  will  interpose  for 
the  purpose  of  preventing  that  species  of 
wrong  being  done ;  and,  if  the  creditor 
will  not  allow  the  matter  to  be  tried  at 
law  in  his  name,  this  court  has  a  juris- 
diction, in  the  first  instance,  to  compel 
the  debtor  to  pay  the  debt  to  the  plain- 
tiff;  especially  in  a  case  where  the  act 
done  by  the  creditor  is  done  in  collusion 
with  the  debtor.  If  bills  of  this  kind  were 
allowable,  it  is  obvious  that  they  would 
be  pretty  frequent ;  but  I  never  remem- 
ber any  instance  of  such  a  bill  as  this 
being  filed,  unaccompanied  by  special 
circumstances."  See  also  Keys  v.  Wil- 
liams, 3  Y.  &  Col.  462,  46(>,  and  Rose  v. 
Clarke,  1  Y.  &  Col.  Ch.  634,  548.  The 
doctrine  has  been  distinctly  held  also  in 
New  York :  Carter  v.  United  Ins.  Co.  1 
Johns.  Ch.  4(53 ;  Ontario  Bank  v.  Mum- 
ford,  2  Barb.  Ch.  596.  And  in  Maryland : 
Cover  V.  Christie,  2  Har.  &  J.  67  ;  Adair 
v.  Winchester,  7  G.  &  J.  114.  And  in 
Tennessee  :  Smiley  i'.  Bell,  Mart.  &  Y. 
378.  And  in  Virginia:  Moseley  r.  Boush, 
4  Kand.  392.  There  is  no  confiict  between 
the  case  of  Moseley  v.  Boush  and  the 
case  of  Winn  v.  Bowles,  6  Munf.  23,  an 
earlier  Virginia  case.  The  latter  case 
simply  decided  that  the  statute  of  Vir- 
ginia, authorizing  the  assignee  of  a  chose 
in  action  to  sue  in  his  own  name,  did  not 
take  from  the  Court  of  Chancery  the 
jurisdiction  which  it  formerly  had. 
There  seems  to  have  been  sufficient  in 
this  case  to  give  a  court  of  equity  juris- 
diction consistently  with  the  rule  that 
we  have  laid  down.     Mr.  Justice  Story, 

251 


*225 


THE  LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  225  *  in  equity  as  a  declaration  of  trust,  and  an  authorization 
to  the  assignee  to  reduce  the  interest  to  possession,  (e) 
But  if  the  assignee  be  a  mere  nominal  holder,  without  interest 
in  the  thing  assigned,  then  the  suit  should  be  brought,  even  in 
equity,  in  the  name  of  the  party  in  interest.  (/) 

The  fraudulent   intent  of  the  assignor  will,  generally,  defeat 
the  assignment,  although  the  assignee  is  innocent,  {ff)^ 


indeed,  in  liis  Commentaries  on  Equity 
Jurisprudence,  expresses  a  somewliat  dif- 
ferent view  iqjon  tliis  subject.  After 
stating  tlie  law  as  laid  down  in  Ham- 
mond V.  Messenger,  cited  above,  he  says, 
§  1057  a  :  "  This  doctrine  is  apparently 
new,  at  least  in  the  broad  extent  in 
which  it  is  laid  down ;  and  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  generally  adopted  in  Amer- 
ica. On  the  contrary,  the  more  general 
principle  established  in  this  country 
seems  to  be,  that,  wherever  an  assignee 
has  an  equitable  right  or  interest  in  a 
debt,  or  other  property  (as  the  assignee 
of  a  debt  certainly  has),  there  a  court  of 
equity  is  the  proper  forum  to  enforce  it ; 
and  he  is  not  to  be  driven  to  any  circuity 
by  instituting  a  suit  at  law  in  the  name 
of  the  person  who  is  possessed  of  the  le- 
gal title."  He  cites  no  case,  however, 
which  appears  to  conflict  with  Hammond 
V.  Messenger,  except  the  case  of  Towns- 
end  V.  Carpenter,  11  Ohio,  21.  That  case 
does  not  indeed  decide  that  the  mere  fact 
of  one's  being  an  assignee  of  a  chose  in 
action  will  entitle  him  to  enforce  his 
claim  in  equity.  The  learned  judge, 
however,  does  not  cite  any  case  in  sup- 
port of  his  position,  and  he  appears  not 
to  have  been  aware  of  tlie  weight  of 
authority  against  him ;  for  he  says  he 
knows  of  no  case  except  Moseley  v. 
Boush,  cited  above,  "  where  it  has  been 
held  that  a  court  of  law,  having  once  de- 
clined jurisdiction  of  a  particular  subject- 
matter,  and  afterwards  in  an  indirect 
manner  entertained  it,  that  a  Court  of 
Chancery,  to  whicli  it  appropriately  and 
originally  belonged,  is  therefore  deprived 
of  it."     The  case  of  the  Ontario  Bank  v. 


Mumford,  cited  above,  which  was  decided 
since  Story's  Equity  was  published,  con- 
tains a  thorough  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject. Tlie  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  relied 
ujion  Story's  Equity,  but  Chancellor  Wal- 
icortli,  having  cited  with  approbation  the 
case  of  Hammond  v.  Messenger  and  sev- 
eral of  the  other  cases  referred  to  in  tliis 
note,  reaffirmed  to  its  full  extent  the  doc- 
trine which  they  contain.  "  As  a  general 
rule,"  says  he,  "this  court  will  not  entei'- 
tain  a  suit  brought  by  the  assignee  of  a 
debt,  or  of  a  chose  in  action,  which  is  a 
mere  legal  demand ;  but  will  leave  him 
to  his  remedy  at  law  by  a  suit  in  the 
name  of  the  assignor.  Where,  however, 
special  circumstances  render  it  necessary 
for  the  assignee  to  come  into  a  court  of 
equity  for  relief,  to  prevent  a  failure  of 
justice,  he  will  be  allowed  to  bring  a  suit 
here  ujjon  a  mere  legal  demand."  Such 
must  undoubtedly  be  considered  the  true 
rule  upon  the  subject.  In  California,  by 
statute,  "  the  assignee  of  a  non-negotiable 
note  has  a  right  of  action  not  only  against 
his  immediate  assignor,  but  also  against 
previous  assignors,  in  short,  against  every 
person  from  whom  the  note  has  passed 
by  assignment."  Hamilton  ?-.  McDonald, 
18  Cal.  128.  See  also  Kendall  v.  United 
States,  7  Wallace,  113:  Moore  v.  Lowrey, 
25  la.  336. 

(e)  Co.  Lit.  2.32  b,  n.  (1) ;  Morrison  v. 
Deaderick,  10  Humph.  342. 

(/)  Field  V.  Maghee,  5  Paige,  539; 
Eogers  v.  Traders'  Insurance  Co.  6  Paige, 
583. 

iff)  Flanigan  v.  Lampman,  12  Mich. 


1  Combes  v.  Chandler,  .33  Ohio  St.  178,  decided  that  if  the  real  owner  of  a  note  has 
conferred  the  apparent  absolute  ownership  upon  the  assignor,  the  assignee,  pur- 
chasing upon  the  faith  of  such  ownership,  will  obtain  a  valid  title  against  the  real 
owner,  although  liis  assignor  obtained  the  note  from  such  owner  by  fraud.  See 
McNeil  V.  Tenth  Bank,  4G  N.  Y.  325.  But  the  assignment  of  a  mortgage,  executed 
simply  for  use  as  collateral  security  for  a  loan  by  the  mortgagee,  on  his  failure  to 
procure  the  loan,  conveys  no  title,  and  is  void.  Davis  v.  Bechstein,  G9  N.  Y.  440. 
That  the  assignee  of  a  non-negotiable  certificate,  indorsed  in  blank  by  the  owner, 
may  write  an  absolute  assignment  over  tlie  indorsement,  and  bv  a  sale  of  it  for  value, 
cut  off  the  riglits  of  the  owner,  sec  Cowdrey  v.  Vandenburgh,  "lOl  U.  S.  572. 

252 


CH.  XIV.] 


ASSIGNMENT. 


*226 


There  are  assignments  of  choses  in  action  which  will  not  be  sus- 
tained either  in  equity  or  at  law,  as  being  against  public  policy.^ 
As  by  an  officer  in  the  army  or  navy,  of  his  pay,  (</)  or 
*his  commission,  (h)  or  the  salaries  of  judges,  (^')  or  of  a  *  226 
mere  right  to  file  a  bill  in  equity  for  a  fraud,  {j)  or  a  right 
of  action  for  an  injury  to  the  person,  an  action  for  which  dies 
with  the  person,  (k)  But  a  judgment  in  such  action  may  be 
assigned,  and  claims  for  torts  to  property.  (Jcic)  But  after  the 
conversion  of  a  chattel,  the  owner  may  sell  it  so  as  to  give  the 
purchaser  a  right  to  claim  it  of  the  wrong-doer.  (?) 

A  mere  right  of  entry  for  condition  broken  has  been  held  not 
assignable.  (?Z) 

Courts  of  law  also  permit  and  protect  assignments  of  choses 
in  action,  to  a  certain  extent,  (m)  ^     If  the  debtor  assent  to  the 


[g)  Stone  v.  Lidderdale,  2  Anst.  533 ; 
McCarthy  v.  Goold,  I  Ball  &  B.  387  ; 
Davis  V.  IJuke  of  Marlborough,  1  Swanst. 
74 ;  Flarty  r.  Odium,  3  T.  R.  681 ;  Gren- 
fell  V.  Dean  and  Canons  of  Windsor,  2 
Beav.  544 ;  Jenkins  v.  Hooker,  19  Barb. 
435. 

(h)  Collyer  v.  Fallon,  Turn.  &  R.  459. 

(i)  Lord  Kenyon,  Flarty  v.  Odium,  3 
T.  R.  081.  But  it  seems  a  city  officer 
may  lawfully  make  an  assignment  of  his 
salary  yet  to  grow  due,  so  as  to  prevent 
its  attachment  iipon  a  trustee  process. 
Brackett  v.  Blake,  7  Met.  335.  And 
see  State  Bank  v.  Hastings,  15  Wis. 
75. 

(j)  Prosser  v.  Edmonds,  1  Y.  &  Col. 
481  ;  Morrison  v.  Deaderick,  10  Humph. 
342. 

[h]  Gardner  v.  Adams,  12  Wend.  297  ; 
Thurman  r.  Wells,  18  Barb.  500 ;  Cook 
V.  Newman,  8  How.  Pr.  523.  "  In  gen- 
eral, it  may  be  affirmed  that  mere  per- 
sonal torts,  which  die  with  the  party,  and 
do  not  survive  to  his  personal  representa- 
tive, are  not  capable  of  passing  by  as- 
signment ;  and  that  vested  rights  ad  rem 
and  in  re,  possibilities  coupled  with  an 
interest,  and  claims  growing  out  of  and 
adhering  to  property,  may  pass  by  as- 


signment. Story,  J.,  Comegys  v.  Vasse, 
l"Pet.  193,  213;  Lazard  v.  Wheeler,  22 
Cal.  173. 

(kk)  Jordan  v.  Gillen,  44  N.  H.  424. 

(/)  Hall  V.  Robinson,  2  Comst.  293, 
overruling  Gardner  v.  Adams,  so  far  as 
the  latter  conflicts  with  what  is  stated  in 
the  text.  It  will  be  perceived  that  this 
case  furnishes  no  exception  to  the  rule 
that  a  right  of  action  for  a  tort  cannot 
be  assigned.  It  merely  decides  that  the 
owner  of  a  chattel  may  sell  it  and  con- 
vey a  good  title  to  it,  notwithstanding  it 
lias  been  wrongfully  converted,  and  then 
the  vendee  may  demand  it  in  his  own 
right ;  and,  iipon  a  refusal  to  deliver  it, 
bring  his  action,  not  for  the  conversion 
done  to  the  vendor,  but  for  the  conversion 
done  to  himself  by  such  refusal.  And 
see  Andrews  v.  Bond,  IG  Barb.  633; 
Franklin  y.Neate,  13  M.  &  W.  481. 

(//)  Warner  v.  Beckett,  3  Conn.  468. 

(m)  Buller,  J.,  Master  v.  Miller,  4  T. 
R.  320,  340 :  "  It  is  true  that  formerly 
the  courts  of  law  did  not  take  notice  of 
an  equity  or  trust ;  for  trusts  are  within 
the  original  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of 
equity  ;  but  of  late  years  it  has  been 
found  productive  of  great  expense  to 
send  the  parties  to  the  other  side  of  the 


1  The  general  principle  that  a  public  officer  cannot  assign  the  future  salary  of  liis 
office,  as  against  public  policy,  is  laid  down  in  Bliss  v.  Lawrence,  58  N.  Y.  442,  which 
was  the  case  of  a  clerk  in  the  United  States  Treasury  Department  in  the  city  of  New 
York.  —  The  assignment  of  a  life  insurance  policy  to  a  person  having  no  insurable 
interest  in  the  life  insured,  was  held  invalid  in  Warnock  v.  Davis,  104  U.  S.  775. 

2  A  voluntary  assignment  of  a  chose  in  action  not  affecting  credit(n-s,  made  in 
good  faith,  is  good  as  against  a  subsequent  assignee  for  value.  Putnam  v.  Story, 
132  Mass.  205.  — But  a  creditor  cannot  assign  apart  of  his  claim  without  the  debtor's 
consent.     Beardslee  v.  Morgner,  73  Mo.  22. 

253 


227 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


assignment,  and  promise  to  pay  the  assignee,  an  action  may  be 
brought  by  the  assignee  in  his  own  name,  (w)  but  other- 
*  227  wise  he  *  must  bring  it  in  the  name  of  the  assignor ;  (o) 
and  this  rule  applies  to  an  assignment  of  a  negotiable  bill 
or  note,  unless  it  be  indorsed  by  the  assignor,  (jo)  And  the 
action  brought  in  the  name  of  the  assignor  for  the  benefit  of  the 
assignee  is  open  to  all  equitable  defences  ;  but  only  to  those 
which  arc  equitable.  That  is,  the  debtor  may  make  all  defences 
which  he  might  have  made  if  the  suit  were  for  the  benefit  of  the 
assignor  as  well  as  in  his  name,  provided  these  defences  rest 
upon  honest  transactions  which  took  place  between  the  debtor 
and  the  assignor  before  the  assignment,  or  after  the  assignment 
and  before  the  debtor  had  notice  or  knowledge  of  it.  (5-)  The 
same  rule  holds  as  to  the  equities  existing  between  an  assignor 


Hall ;  wherever  this  court  have  seen  that 
the  justice  of  tlie  case  has  been  clearly 
with  the  plaintiff,  they  have  not  turned 
him  round  upon  this  objection.  Then  if 
this  court  will  take  notice  of  a  trust, 
why  should  they  not  of  an  equity  1  It  is 
certainly  true  tliat  a  chose  in  action  cannot 
strictly  be  assigned  ;  but  this  court  will 
take  notice  of  a  trust,  and  consider  who 
is  beneficiallv  interested."  Ashhnrst,  J., 
Winch  V.  Keelev,  1  T.  K.  619;  Dix  v. 
Cobb,  4  Mass.  oU8  ;  Welch  v.  Mandeville, 
1  Wheat.  2:]:; ;  Legli  v.  Legh,  1  B.  &  P. 
447 ;  Eastman  v.  Wright,  t)  Pick.  316, 
322 ;  Owings  i-.  Low,  5  G.  &  J.  134,  145 ; 
Hickey  ;;.  liurt,  7  Taunt.  48 ;  Graham  v. 
Gracie,  13  Q.  B.  548. 

(«)  Crocker  i'.  Whitney,  10  Mass. 
316  ;  Mowry  v.  Todd,  12  id.  281 ;  Bar- 
rett V.  Union  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  7  Cush.  175; 
Currier  v.  Ilodgdon,  3  N.  H.  82  ;  Morse 
V.  Bellows,  7  id.  540,  505;  Moar  v. 
Wright,  1  Vt.  57;  Buckliu  v.  Ward,  7 
id.  195  ;  Hodges  v.  Eastman,  12  id.  358 ; 
Stiles  V.  Farrar,  18  id.  444 ;  Smith  v. 
Berry,  18  IVIe.  122;  Warren  v.  Wlieeler. 
21  id.  484;  Barger  v.  Collins,  7  Ilarr.  & 
J.  213,  2iy  ;  Clarke  v.  Thompson,  2  H.  I. 
146.  Such  seems  to  be  the  general  ruling 
on  this  subject.  But  such  a  transaction 
would  seem  to  fall  within  the  law  of  no- 
vation ;  and  the  question  would  be  as  to 
the  consideration  on  which  the  promise 
of  the  original  debtor  to  the  assignee  is 
founded.  J'robably  it  would  be  lield 
that  if  A  holds  the  note  of  B,  payable 
to  A,  and  assigns  tld-i  f(jr  value  to  C,  and 
B  assents  ami  i)roiniscs  to  j)ay  C,  B  is  by 
such  transfer  released  from  his  promise 
to  A,  and  this  is  a  sufficient  consideration 

254 


to  sustain  his  promise  to  C.  See  Ford 
V.  Adams,  2  Barb.  349.  In  Tibbits  v. 
George,  5  A.  &  E.  115,  Lord  Dinman 
said :  "  None  of  the  authorities  which 
have  been  cited  show  that  it  is  necessary 
that  tlie  assignment  should  be  in  writing 
in  order  to  pass  an  equitable  interest, 
although  in  very  many  of  the  cases  there 
was  a  writing  ;  and  as  to  express  assent, 
it  is  undoubtedly  held  that,  in  order  to 
give  an  action  at  law,  the  debtor  must 
consent  to  the  agreed  transfer  of  tiie 
debt,  and  that  there  must  be  some  consid- 
eration for  his  promise  to  pay  it  to  the 
transferee." 

(o)  Jessel  V.  Williamsburgh  Ins.  Co. 
3  Hill  (X.  Y.),  88;  Usher  v.  De  Wolfe, 
13  Mass.  200 ;  Coolidge  v.  Ruggles,  15  id. 
387 ;  Skinner  v.  Somes,  14  iil.  107  ;  Pal- 
mer V.  Merrill,  6  Cush.  282.  See  also 
supra,  note  (m). 

{p)  Freeman  v.  Perry,  22  Conn.  617. 
See  also  Hedges  v.  Sealy,  9  Barb.  214. 

(fj)  Mangles  i-.  Dixon,  18  E.  L.  &  E. 
82;  Bartle'tt  v.  Pearstm,  20  Me.  0,  15; 
Guerry  v.  Perryman,  6  Ga.  110;  Wood 
I'.  Perry,  1  Barb.  114,  131  ;  Commercial 
Bank  i\  Colt,  15  id.  506;  Sanborn  v.  Lit- 
tle, 3  N.  H.  530;  Norton  r.  Rose,  2  Wash. 
(Va.)  233;  Murray  v.  Lvlburn,  2  .Johns. 
Cli.  441  ;  Ilacket  v.  Mart"in,  8  (ireenl.  77; 
Greene  v.  Darling,  &  Mason,  201,  214; 
Comstock  V.  Farnum,  2  Mass.  06  ;  Wood 
V.  Partridge,  11  id.  488;  Mc.Jilton  v. 
Love,  13  111.  486 ;  Thompson  v.  Emery, 
7  Foster  (N.  H.),  260;  Faull  r.  Tinsman, 
86  Peim.  St.  108.  See  Patterson  >:  Ath- 
erton,  3  McLean,  147,  in  wliich  a  different 
doctrine  seems  to  be  held,  but  on  very  in- 
sufficient grounds. 


CH.  XIV.]  ASSIGNMENT.  *  228 

and  his  assignee  in  respect  to  a  chose  in  action  held  for  value 
and  without  notice  by  a  subsequent  assignee.  The  latter  takes 
the  exact  position  of  his  vendor,  (r)  The  assignee  of  a  non- 
negotiable  obligation  can  take  no  rights  which  his  assignor  did 
not  possess,  and,  generally,  make  no  defences  he  could  not 
make,  (rr)  ^  The  assignment  of  a  note  to  which  a  lien  is 
attached  by  way  of  security,  carries  with  it,  in  general,  the 
lien,  (^rs}  ^ 

The  death  of  the  assignor  will  not  defeat  the  assignment,  but 
the  assignee  may  bring  the  action  in  the  name  of  the  executor 
or  administrator  of  the  deceased,  (s)  If  the  assignment  be  in 
good  faith  and  for  valuable  consideration,  although  the  action  be 
brought  in  the  name  of  the  assignor,  neither  his  release  nor  his 
bankruptcy  will  defeat  it.  (i)  A  debt  due  for  goods  sold  and 
delivered,  and  resting  for  evidence  on  a  book  account,  may 
*  be  so  assigned,  (w)  or  an  unliquidated  balance  of  ac-  *  228 
counts,  (u)  or  a  contingent  debt,  (w)  ^  or  a  judgment,  (a;) 
or  a  bond ;  but  an  action  on  a  bond  must  be  in  the  name  of  the 
obligee,  although  it  be  made  payable  expressly  to  "  assigns."  (y) 
And  it  has  been  held  that  a  grant  of  a  franchise  to  a  town,  as  the 
right  of  fishery,  may  be  the  subject  of  a  legal  assignment  or 
release,  and  the  assignee  or  releasee  may  maintain  an  action 
respecting  it  in  his  own  name.  (2)  But  a  servant  bound  by 
indenture  cannot   be  transferred  or  assigned  by  the   master  to 

(r)  Bush    V.  Lathrop,    22    N.   Y.    (8  586;  Parker  r.  Kelley,  10  id.  184 ;  Winch 

Smitli)  535.  v.  Keely,  1  T.  R.  619;  Blin  v.  Pierce,  20 

{rr)  Gray  v.  Thomas,  18  La.  An.  412.  Vt.  25;  Blake  v.  Buclianan,  22  Vt.  548; 

{rs)  Forwood    v.   Delioney,    5    Bush,  Parsons  v.  Woodward,  2  N.J.  196;  Jew- 

174;  Guy  ;;.  Butler,  6  Bush,  508;  Perry  ett  v.  Dockray,  34  Me.  45. 
V.  Roberts,  30  Ind.  244.  (u)  Dix  v.  Cobb,  4  Mass.  508. 

(s)  Dawes  ;;.  Boylston,  9  Mass.  337,  (v)  Crocker  v.  Whitney,  10  Mass.  316. 

346  ;  Cutts  v.  Perkins,  12  id.  206,  210.  (w)  Cutts  v.  Perkins,  12  Mass.  206. 

(t)  Dix   V.  Cobb,  4   Mass.   508,   511;  (x)  Brown  v.  Maine  Bank,  11  Mass. 

Brown  V.  Maine  Bank,  11  id.  153  ;  Webb  153  ;  Dunn  v.  Suell,  15  id.  481. 
V.  Steele,  13  N.  H.  230,  236 ;  Duncklee  v.  {ij)  Skinner  v.  Somes,  14  Mass.  107. 

Greenfield  Steam  Mill  Co.  3  Foster  (N.  (2)  Watertown    v.   White,    13    Mass. 

H.),  245 ;  Anderson  v.  Miller,  7  Sm.  &  M.  477. 

1  For  a  learned  discussion  of  the  rights  of  assignees  of  non-negotiable  choses  in  action, 
Bee  the  opinion  of  Dwight,  C,  in  Union  College  Trustees  v.  Wheeler,  61  N.  Y.  88. 

2  So  an  assi<;nment  by  a  stockholder  of  his  shares  of  stock  carries  his  proportionate 
share  of  the  assets,  including  all  undeclared  dividends.  Boardmant;.  Lake  Shore,  &c. 
R.  Co.,  84N.  Y.  157. 

3  An  assignment  of  money  to  become  due  is  valid,  and  if  the  person  from  whom 
the  money  is  to  become  due,  after  notice  of  the  assignment,  advances  such  money  to 
the  assignor,  the  assignee  may  recover  it  of  him.  Brice  v.  Bannister,  3  Q.  B.  D.  569. 
See  also  Philadelphia  v.  Lockhardt,  73  Penn.  St.  211. 

255 


*  229  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  ^  [BOOK  I. 

another,  because  the  master  has  only  a  personal  trust,  (a)  ^  The 
right  of  a  mortgagor  to  redeem  his  equity  of  redemption  after  the 
same  has  been  taken  and  sold  on  execution,  is  assignable  both  at 
law  and  in  equity.  (6)  The  respective  interests  of  a  crew  of  a 
privateer  in  a  prize  cannot  be' assigned,  because,  by  the  statute  of 
the  United  States,  they  have  no  right  in  or  control  over  the  prop- 
erty until  it  has  been  libelled,  condemned,  and  sold  by  the  mar- 
shal, and  the  proceeds,  after  all  legal  deductions,  paid  over  to  the 
prize  agents,  (c)  2 


SECTION  11. 

OF   THE   MAXXER   OF   ASSIGNMENT. 

It  was  once  held  that  the  assignment  of  an  instriunent  must  be 
of  as  liigh  a  nature  as  the  instrument  assigned,  (c?)  But  this  rule 
has  been  very  much  relaxed,  if  not  overthrown ;  and  indeed  it  has 
been  determined  that  the  equitable  interest  in  a  chose  in 
*  229  action  may  be  assigned  for  a  valuable  consideration  *  by  a 
mere  delivery  of  the  evidence  of  the  contract ;  and  that  it 
is  not  necessary  that  the  assignment  should  be  in  writing,  (e)  ^ 

(a)  Hall  V.  Gardner,  1  Mass.  172 ;  case,  Parker,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  It  is  uniformly 
Davis  I'.  Cobum,  8  id.  299 ;  Clement  i'.  holden,  that  an  assignment  of  an  instru- 
Clement,  8  N.  H.  472 ;  Graham  v.  Kinder,  ment  under  seal  must  be  by  deed ;  in 
11  B.  Mon.  60.  So  the  powers  and  du-  other  words,  that  the  instrument  of  trans- 
ties  of  the  testamentary  guardian  of  an  fer  must  be  of  as  high  a  nature  as  the  in- 
infant  are  a  personal  trust,  which  cannot  strument  transferred." 
be  assigned.   Bakh  v.  Smith,  12  N.  H.  437.  (e)  "  There  are  cases  in  the  old  books 

(6)  Bigelow  r.  Willson,  1  Pick.  485.  which  show  that  debts    and  even  deeds 

(c)  Usher  r.  De  Wolfe,  13  Mass.  200  ;  may  l)e  assigned  by  parol ;   and  we  are 

Alexander  v.  Wellington,  2  Russ.  &  M.  35.  satisfied  that  there  is  no  sensible  ground 

{d)  Perkins  r.   Parker,  1  Mass.   117;  upon  which  a  writing  shall  be  held  ne- 

Wood  V.  Partridge,  11  id.  488.    In  tliis  ccssary  to  prove  an  assignment  of  a  con- 

^  A  contract  to  keep  wagons  let  to  a  railway  company  in  repair  is  not  an  agreement 
for  personal  performance,  such  that  it  cannot  be  assigned  and  the  repair  of  the  wagons 
by  the  assignee  be  a  sutHcient  performance  of  the  coniract,  British  Wagon  Co.  v.  Lea, 
5  Q.  B.  I).  149;  and  equally  so  of  a  contract  for  street  cleaning,  Devlin  v.  Mavor,  &c 
of  New  York,  6-3  N.  Y.  8. 

2  But  a  right  in  a  sura  awarded  to  the  owner  of  property  by  his  own  government  by 
way  of  compensation  for  its  destruction  by  the  act  of  a  foreign  government,  either  out 
of  reprisals  made  by  the  former  upon  the  latter,  or  out  of  a  fund  set  apart  by  the  former 
for  the  purpose,  in  accordance  with  a  treaty  by  which  it  has  renounced  all  claims  of  its 
citizens  upon  the  latter,  is  an  interest  lesaily  capable  of  being  assigned  by  such  owner, 
even  before  his  own  govemmi-nt  has  taken  any  steps  toward  securing  to  him  an  indem- 
tiity  for  his  loss.     Leonard  v.  Nye.  125  Mass.  455 ;  .Jones  r.  Dexter,  125  Mass.  469. 

'  An  oral  aisii^nment  of  an  account,  or  a  portion  of  it,  for  a  valid  consideration,  h 
good,  and  vests  in  the  assignee  the  ri;:ht  to  collect  the  debt  in  his  own  name.  Rialey  a 
Phenix  Bank.  S2  N.  Y.  31S.    See  also  Swiuer  v.  Smith,  35  la.  269. 

256 


CH.  XIV.]  ASSIGNMENT.  *  229 

So  the  cquitcablc  interest  in  a  judgment  may  be  assigned  by  a 
delivery  of  the  execution.  (/)  But  a  mere  agreement  to  assign 
without  any  delivery,  actual  or  symbolical,  of  the  writing  evi- 
dencing the  debt ;  or  an  indorsement  upon  the  instrument  direct- 
ing the  debtor  to  pay  a  portion  of  the  amount  due,  to  a  third 
person,  such  indorsement  being  notified  to  the  debtor,  but  the 
writing  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  creditor,  does  not  constitute 
a  sufficient  assignment.  (^) 

We  may,  however,  say,  that  now  the  assignment  of  a  debt  may 
be  by  parol,  and  may  be  inferred  from  the  conduct  and  acts  of  the 
party,  {gg') 

An  order  or  draft  upon  a  particular  fund,  purporting  to  appro- 
priate that  fund  to  its  payment,  or  directly  implying  this,  is,  after 
notice,  an  equitable  assignment  of  the  fund,  and  needs  no  accept- 
ance to  have  this  effect,  {gli) 

The  cause  of  action  which  a  buyer  of  land  has  against  the  seller 
for  his  misrepresentation,  is  personal,  and  does  not  pass  by  an 
assignment  of  the  contract,  (^gi)  A  holder  of  a  debt  or  claim, 
assigning  it  for  valuable  consideration,  warrants  its  genuineness 
and  legal  force,  unless  he  communicates  all  the  facts  bearing  upon 
the  case,  when  the  buyer  takes  the  risk,  ((y*) 


SECTION  III. 

OP   THE   EQUITABLE   DEFENCES. 

We  have  seen  that  an  assignee  of  a  chose  in  action  takes  it  sub- 
ject to  all  the  equities  of  defence  which  exist  between  the  assignor 
and  the  debtor.  (Ji)  ^     The  assignee  does  not  take  a  legal  interest, 

tract,  which  assignment  has  been  executed  v.  George,  5  A.  &  E.  107  ;  Heath  i-.  Hall, 

by  delivery,  any  more  than  in  the  assign-  4  Taunt.  32(3. 

ment  of  a  personal  chattel."     Per  Parker,  (  /')  Dunn  v.  Snell,  15  Mass.  481. 

C.  J.,  Jones  V.  Witter,  13  Mass.  304.     See  (<j)  Whittle   v.    Skinner,  23  Vt.   531  ; 

also  Dunn  v.  Snell,  15  JMass.  481 ;  Palmer  Palmer  v.  Merrill,  6  Cush.  282. 

V.  Merrill,  6  Cush.  292  ;  Yose   v.  Handv,  (77)  Crurnsev  v.  Gardner,  49  Me.  167. 

2  Greenl.  322,  .334 ;  Robbins  v.  Bacon,  3  id.  (7/))   Sliuttleworth  v.  Bruce,  7  Bob.  160. 

346  ;  Porter  v.  Ballard,  26  :\Ie.  448  ;  Pres-  (7O  Collins  v.  Suau,  7  Rob.  023. 

cott  I'.  Hull,  17  Johns.  284,  202 ;  Ford  v.  (nj)  Flynn  v.  Allen,  57  Penn.  St.  482. 

Stuart,    19    Johns.    342;    Thompson    v.  (h)  See  SH/)m,  note  (7),  p.* 227.    And  see 

Emery,   7   Foster  (N.   H.),  269:  Tibbits  Spain  r.  Hamilton,  1  Wallace,  004. 

1  As  to  equities  under  the  assignment  of  a  mortgage,  pendente  lite,  see  Ellis  v.  Sisson, 
96  111.  10.5. 

VOL.  I.  17  257 


*  230  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

nor  hold  what  he  takes  by  a  legal  title ;  but  he  holds  by  an 
equitable  title  an  equitable  interest ;  and  this  interest  courts  of 
law  will  protect  only  so  far  as  the  equities  of  the  case  permit; 
and  any  subsequent  assignee  is  subject  to  the  same  equities  as  his 
assignor,  (i)  But  these  equities  must  be  those  subsisting  at  the 
time  when  the  debtor  receives  notice  of  the  assignment ;  for  the 
assignment,  with  notice,  imposes  upon  the  debtor  an  equitable 
and  moral  obligation  to  pay  the  money  to  the  assignee.  (^")  ^ 

*  230    Moreover,  the  assignee  ought,  especially  if  *  required,  to 

exhibit  the  assignment,  or  satisfactory  evidence  of  it,  to 
the  debtor,  to  make  his  right  certain ;  although  it  is  enough,  if 
the  debtor  be  in  good  faith  informed  of  it,  and  has  no  reason  to 
doubt  it.  (/c)  And  if  after  the  assignment,  and  previous  to  such 
a  notice  of  it,  the  debtor  pays  the  debt  to  the  assignor,  he  shall  be 
discharged,  because  he  shall  not  suffer  by  the  negligence  or  fault 
of  the  assignee.  (Z)  ^ 

If,  after  the  assignment  and  notice,  the  debtor  pays  the  debt  to 
the  assi£;nor,  and  is  discharged  by  him,  and  the  assignee  recovers 
judgment  against  the  assignor  for  the  consideration  paid  him  for 
the  assignment,  the  assignee  may  still  recover  of  the  debtor  the 
debt  assigned,  deducting  what  he  actually  recovers  from  the 
assignor,  (m)  Nor  can  the  debtor  set  off  any  demand  against 
the  assignor  which  accrues  to  him  after  such  assignment  and 
notice,  (w)  but  he  may  any  which  existed  at  or  before  the  assign- 
ment and  notice,  (o) 

(0  Willis  V.  Tw.amhly,  1-3  Mass.  204 ;  17 ;  Bean  v.  Simpson,  16  Me.  49 ;  John- 
Stocks  V.  Dob.son,  lit  K.  L.  &  E.  !)G;  Bush  son  v.  Blootljrood,  1  .Johns.  Cas.  51 ;  An 
V.  Lathrop,  22  N.  Y.  (8  Smith)  5o5.  derson  v.  Van  Alcn,  12  Johns.  343. 

ij)  Crocker  v.  Wliitney,  10  Mass.  316,  (/)  .Jones    (•.    Witter,    13    Mass.    304 

319;  Howry  r.  Todd,   12  id.  281  ;  Jones  Stocks  v.  Dobson,  19  E.  L.  &  E.  96. 

r.  Witter,  13   id.  304;  Fay   v.  Jones,  18  (in)  Jones  v.  Witter,  13  Mass.  304. 

Barb.  340;  Hisley  j'.  Itisley,  11  Rob.  (La.)  (h)  Goodwin  r.  Cuiniingham,  12  Mass, 

298;  Small  v.  Browder,  11  B.  Mon.  212;  193;  Green  v.  Hatch,  id.  195;  Jenkins  v. 

Clodfelter  r.  Gox,  1    Sneed,  3:j0  ;  Myers  Brewster,  14  id.  291  ;  rinllips  v.  Bank  of 

V.  The  United  Guarantee,  &c.  Co.  31  E.  L.  I^ewiston,   18  I'enn.    St.    394  ;  Conant  v. 

&   E.   538  ;  Fanton   v.   Fairfield    County  Seneca  County  Bank,  1  Ohio  St.  298. 

Bank,  23  Conn.  485.    See  also  supra,  note  (o)  Ainslie   v.  Boyntoii,  2   Barb.  258 

(7),  p  *227.  Sanborn  v.  Little,  8  N.  II.  539. 

(k)  Davenport  i'.  Woodbridg(;,  8Grcenl. 

1  Notice,  not  the  assif^nment,  fixes  the  ri<:hts  of  the  parties.  Miller  r.  Krcitcr,  76 
Penn.  St.  78.  —  As  to  third  ])ersons,  the  assif^nment  of  a  chose  in  action  is  valid  without 
notice  to  the  debtor.     Thaver  v.  Daniel.-;,  11  ."5  Mass.  129. 


to  the 


Notice  is  ermally  ncccs.sary  to  j)rotect  the  assifrnce  ajrainst  such  paj'mcnt  by  the  debtor 
K.,  ...e  assignor.  Ilcerniansy.  Ellsworth,  04  N.Y.  1.59.  —  The  assiL'nee  ofa  jnd;rment  takes 
it  subject  to  equities  between  the  ori;^inal  parties  and  to  any  payments  by  the  juilgnicnt 
debtor  before  notice  of  the  assignment.     Koble  v.  Thompson  Oil  Co.,  79  Tcnn.  St.  354. 

258 


CH.  XIV.]  ASSIGNMENT.  *  231 

In  New  York  and  in  some  other  States,  the  assignee  of  a  chose 
in  action,  may  now  bring  an  action  ii])on  it  in  his  own  name,  by- 
statutory  provision.  But  this  change  is  only  in  the  form  of  the 
action,  and  not  in  its  effect.  The  assignee  is  still  subject  to  the 
same  equities  of  defence  as  before.  That  is,  if  the  defendant  can 
show  that  he,  in  good  faith,  paid  the  debt,  or  a  part  of  the  debt, 
to  the  assignor,  before  the  assignment,  or  before  he  had  any 
knowledge  of  the  assignment,  the  defence  is  as  effectual  as  if  the 
action  were  in  the  name  of  the  assignor. 

It  has  been  held  in  New  York  that  an  assignment  of  a  thing  in 
action  is  presumed  to  have  been  upon  sufficient  consideration, 
unless  the  contrary  appear,  and  in  such  case  no  trust  results 
therefrom  for  the  benefit  of  the  assignor.  (|?) 


*  SECTION  IV.  *231 

COVENANTS   ANNEXED   TO   LAND. 

A  covenant  affecting  real  property,  made  with  a  covenantee 
who  possesses  a  transferable  interest  therein,  is  annexed  to  the 
estate,  and  is  transferable  at  law,  passing  with  the  interest  in  the 
realty  to  which  it  is  annexed  ;  (g-)  and  it  is  often  called  a  "  cove- 
nant running  with  the  land."  If  such  covenants  be  made  by  the 
owner  of  land  who  conveys  his  entire  interest  to  the  covenantee, 
they  are  annexed  to  the  estate,  and  the  assignee  of  that  estate 
may  bring  his  action  on  the  covenants  in  his  own  name.  (7*)  But 
the  assignee  must  take  the  estate  which  the  covenantee  has  in 
the  land,  and  no  other ;  nor  can  he  sue  upon  the  covenants  if  he 
takes  a  different  estate,  (s)     But  it  is  said  that  the  assignee  can- 

(p)  Eno  V.  Crooke,  10  N.  Y.   (6  Seld.)  covenant,  and  on  refusal,  may  maintain 

60.  an   action  against  him  by  tlie  common 

{q)  "A  covenant  is  real  when  it  doth  law.       Meddlemore   v.   Goodale,   1   Rol. 

run  in  the  realty  so  with  tlie  land  that  he  Abr.  521.     See  also  Campbell  v.  Lewis,  3 

that  hath  tlie  one,  hath  or  is  subject  to  B.  &  Aid.  392. 

the  other,  and  so  a  warranty  is  called  a  (s)  He  is  not  in  fact  an  assignee  of  the 

real  covenant."     Shep.  Touch.  161.  covenantee   unless   he    takes    tlie    same 

(r)  Thus  if  A,  seized  of  land   in  fee,  estate  ;  for  an  assignment,  by  the  very 

conveys  it  by   deed  to  B,  and  covenants  definition  of  the  word,  is  "  a  transfer,  or 

with  B,  his  heirs,  and  assigns,  for  further  making  over  to  anotlier,  of  one's  irhole  in- 

assurance,  and  then  B  conveys  to  C,  and  teresl,  whatever  that  interest  may  be  ;  and 

C  to  D,  D  may  require  A  to  make  fur-  an  assignment  for  his  life  or  years  differs 

ther  assurance  to  him  according  to  the  from  a  lease  only  in  this,  that  by  a  lease 

259 


232 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


not  sue  upon  the  corenants  unless  the  estate  passes  to  him ;  and 
therefore  cannot  sue  upon  the  covenants  that  the  grantor 
*  232  is  lawfully  seized  of  the  land,  and  has  a  good  *  right  to 
convey ;  for  if  these  be  broken,  no  estate  passes  to  the  as- 
signee, and  being  broken  before  the  assignment,  they  have  become 
personal  choses  in  action  and  so  not  assignable.  (0 

The  right  to  sue  for  existing  breaches  does  not  pass  to  the 
assignee,  —  being  mere  personal  choses  in  action,  (tt) — unless 
they  be  continuing  breaches.  As  if  there  be  a  covenant  to  repair, 
which  is  broken,  and  the  need  of  repair  remains,  and  the  assignee 
takes  the  property  in  that  condition,  he  may  sue  on  the  cove- 
nant, (v)  But  if  there  be  arrearages  of  rent,  the  breaches  of  the 
covenant  to  pay  are  each  entire,  giving  a  distinct  right  of  action, 


one  grants  an  interest  less  than  his  own, 
reserving  to  himself  a  reversion  ;  in  as- 
signments he  parts  with  his  whole  prop- 
erty, and  the  assignee  consequently  stands 
in  the  place  of  tiie  assignor."  1  Steph. 
Com.  485.  There  is  a  difference,  how- 
ever, in  this  respect,  between  tlie  estate 
or  interest  in  the  land  and  the  land  itself  ; 
for  there  may  be  an  assignment  of  a  part 
of  the  land,  and  the  assignee  may  have 
his  action.  This  distinction  is  taken  by 
Lord  Coke.  "It  is  to  be  observed,"  says 
he,  "  that  an  assignee  of  part  of  the  land 
shall  vouch  as  assignee.  As  if  a  man 
makes  a  feoffment  in  fee  of  two  acres  to 
one,  with  warranty  to  him,  his  heirs  and 
assigns,  if  he  mal^e  a  feoffment  of  one 
acre,  that  feoffee  shall  vouch  as  assignee  ; 
for  there  is  a  diversity  between  the  ivhote 
estate  in  part,  and  part  of  the  estate  in  the 
whole,  or  of  an//  part.  As  if  a  man  hath 
a  warrant}'  to  him,  his  heirs  and  assigns, 
and  ho  makes  a  lease  for  life,  or  a  gift  in 
tail,  the  lessee  or  donee  shall  not  vouch 
as  assignee,  because  he  hath  not  the  es- 
tate in  fee-simple  whereunto  the  warranty 
is  aimexed."  Co.  Litt.  385  a.  See  also 
Holford  V.  Hatch,  Dougl.  183;  Palmer  v. 
Edwards,  id.  187,  n. ;  Van  Rensselaer  r. 
Gallup,  5  Denio,  454;  Astor  !'.  Miller,  2 
Paige,  08,  78;  Van  Home  v.  Grain,  1 
Paige,  455. 

{!)  This  is  the  established  doctrine  in 
this  country,  and  it  would  seem  to  be  in 
accordance  with  the  older  authorities  in 
England.  Sliep.  Touch.  170;  Greenby  w. 
Wilcocks,  2  Johns.  1 ;  Mitchell  v.  War- 
ner, 5  ('onn.  497  ;  Marston  r.  Hobbs,  2 
Mass.  439;  Ross  r.  Turner,  2  Kng.  (Ark.) 
132;  Fowler  i-.  Poling,  2  Rarb.  300;  Bal- 
lard V.  Child,  34  Me.  355;  Thayer  v. 
Clemence,  22  Pick.  400.  Per  Shaw,  C.  J. 
Chancellor  h'>'>it   says :  "  The  covenants 

260 


of  seizin,  and  of  a  right  to  convey,  and 
that  the  land  is  free  from  incumbrances, 
are  personal  covenants,  not  running  with 
the  land,  or  passing  to  the  assignee ;  for, 
if  not  true,  there  is  a  breach  of  them  as 
soon  as  the  deed  is  executed,  and  they 
become  choses  in  action,  which  are  not 
technically  assignable.  But  the  covenant 
of  warrant}^  and  the  covenant  for  quiet 
enjoyment,  are  prospective,  and  an  actual 
ouster  or  eviction  is  necessary  to  consti- 
tute a  breach  of  them.  They  are,  there- 
fore, in  th:-  nature  of  real  covenants,  and 
they  run  with  the  land  conveyed,  and 
descend  to  heirs,  and  vest  in  assignees  or 
the  purchaser.  The  distincti(jn  taken  in 
the  American  cases  is  sujiported  by  the 
general  current  of  English  authorities, 
which  assume  the  principle  that  covenant 
does  not  lie  by  an  assignee  for  a  breach 
done  before  his  time.  On  the  other  hand 
it  was  decided  by  the  K.  B.,  in  Kingdom 
f.  Nottle,  1  M.  &  Sel.  355,  4  id.  53,  tliat  a 
covenant  of  seizin  did  run  with  the  land, 
and  the  assignee  might  sue  on  the  ground 
that  want  of  seizin  is  a  C(nitiinial  breach. 
The  reason  assigned  for  this  last  decision 
is  too  refined  to  be  sound.  Tlie  breach 
is  single,  entire,  and  perfect  in  tiie  first 
instance."  4  Kent,  Com.  471.  The  case 
of  Kingdom  r.  Nottle  was  severely  criti- 
cised and  condemned  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Connecticut,  in  Mitchell  v. 
Warner,  5  Conn.  407,  and  it  cannot  be 
consiilered  as  law  in  tliis  country. 

(u)  St.  Saviour's  Churchwardens  v. 
Smith,  3  BtuT.  1271 ;  Tillotson  v.  Boyd, 
4  Sandf.  51(i. 

(r)  Mascal's  Case,  Moore,  242,  1  Leon, 
02  ;  Vivian  v.  Campion,  1  Salk.  141,  Lord 
Rayni.  1125;  Spraguo  v.  Baker,  17  Mass. 
681). 


CH.  XIV.]  ASSIGNMENT.  233 

and  on  the  death  of  the  landlord  these  arrearages  go  to  the  per- 
sonal representative  and  not  to  the  heir,  (w) 

Covenants  between  landlord  and  tenant,  lessee  and  reversioner, 
run  with  the  land.  If  one  who  owns  in  fee  conveys  to  another  a 
less  estate,  such  as  a  term  of  years,  and  enters  into  covenants 
with  the  grantee,  which  relate  to  the  use  and  value  of  the  prop- 
erty granted,  the  right  of  action  for  a  breach  of  these  covenants 
which  the  grantee  has,  passes  to  his  assignee,  so  long  as  this  less 
estate  continues,  (x)  Such  are  covenants  to  repair,  to  grant 
estovers  for  repair  or  for  firewood,  to  keep  watercourses 
*  in  good  order,  (?/)  or  to  supply  with  water  ;  (z)  also  *  233 
covenants  for  renewal,  (a)  for  quiet  enjoyment,  (5)  and 
the  usual  warranties  for  quiet  possession,  (c)  But  if  one  having 
no  estate  in  the  land  grants  with  covenants  of  warranty,  as  no 
estate  passes,  and  nothing  except  by  estoppel,  the  assignee  can- 
not sue  on  these  covenants,  for  a  lessee  by  estoppel  cannot  pass 
any  thing  over,  (c?) 

(w)  Anon.  Skin.  367 ;  Micigley  v.  Love-  (a)  Koe  v.  Hayley,  12  East,  464. 

lace,  Carth.  289,  12  Mod.  4G.  (b)  Noke  v.  Awder,  Cro.  E.  436. 

(x)  Spencer's  Case,  5  Rep.  17  b.  (c)  Campbell  v.  Lewis,  3  B.  &  Aid.  302. 

(y)  Holmes  v.  Buckley,  Prec.  Ch.  39,  1  (d)  Noke  v.  Awder,  Cro.  E.  436 ;  Whit- 

Eq.  Ca.  Abr.  27,  pi.  4.  ten  v.  Peacock,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  411. 

(z)  Jourdain  v.  Wilson,  4  B.  &  Aid. 
266. 

261 


234  THE  LAW  OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 


*234  *  CHAPTER  XV. 

OP  GIFTS  ;    OR   VOLUNTARY   ASSIGNMENTS   OF   CHATTELS. 

The  word  "  gift "  is  often  introduced  into  deeds  of  land ;  but 
by  gifts  are  usually  meant  transfers  of  chattels,  which  are  wholly 
voluntary,  or  without  any  pecuniary  or  good  consideration.  They 
are  usually  distinguished  into  gifts  inter  vivos,  and  gifts  causd 
mortis, 

SECTION  I. 

OP   GIFTS   INTER   VIVOS. 

Any  person  competent  to  transact  ordinary  business,  may  give 
whatever  he  or  she  owns,  to  any  other  person.  The  usual  inca- 
pacities for  legal  action  apply  here.  A  gift  by  a  minor,  a  married 
woman,  an  insane  person,  or  a  person  under  guardianship,  or 
under  duress,  would  be  void  or  voidable  according  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case. 

Gifts  by  persons  competent  to  give,  of  property  which  they  had 
a  right  to  give,  to  persons  competent  to  receive,  and  which  are 
completed  by  transfer  of  possession,  however  voluntary  they  may 
have  been,  are  regarded  by  the  law  as  executed  contracts,  founded 
upon  mutual  consent.  It  is  essential,  however,  that  there  should 
be  such  a  change  of  possession  as  to  put  it  out  of  the  power  of 
the  giver  to  repossess  himself  of  the  thing  given.  (?/)  ^    And  gifts 

(y)  Little  v.  Willetts,  55  Barb.  125,  37  Howard  (N.  Y.),  481. 

^  A  gift  of  an  insurance  polic}',  to  be  oxrbanged  with  the  donor's  assent  for  one  in 
accordance  with  the  donee's  wislies,  is  sufTiciently  consnmmated  when  tlie  policy  is  {jivcn 
to  the  donee  and  then  returned,  to  be  forwarded,  by  the  donor's  order,  to  the  insurance 
company,  and  is  subsequently  cxchanfred  aceordiufjly  without  anv  intervening  objec- 
tion by  the  donor.  Crittenden  r.  Phrenix  Ins.  Co.,  41  'Mich.  442.  The  delivery  of  a  sav- 
ings-bank book  also  with  an  order  fur  the  p;iyment  of  the  whole  deposit  for  tlie  purpose 
of  transferring  the  money  to  the  donee  forms  a  complete  gift,  although  the  book  and 

262 


CH.  XV.]  GIFTS.  *  235 

to  persons  holding  somewhat  of  a  fiduciary  relation,  as  to  attorney 
from  client,  to  parent  from  child,  to  guardian  from  ward,  to  trus- 
tee from  cestui  que  trust,  arc  scrutinized  by  courts  of  law  as 
well  as  equity  with  great  care,  even  if  not  held  presumptively 
void.  (2)  1 

It  is  essential  to  a  gift,  that  it  goes  into  effect  at  once,  and  com- 
pletely. If  it  regards  the  future,  it  is  but  a  promise ;  and  being 
a  promise  without  consideration,  it  cannot  be  enforced,  and  has  no 
legal  validity.  Hence  delivery  is  essential  to  the  validity 
of  every  gift ;  (a)  for  not  even  a  court  of  equity  will  *  in-  *  235 
terfere  to  enforce  a  merely  intended  or  promised  gift,  (i) 
There  is,  it  is  true,  some  authority  for  supposing  that  a  gift  inter 
vivos  may  be  valid  without  delivery,  if  there  be  a  distinct  accept- 
ance, (c)  But  this  is  not  the  law.  Nor  will  transfer  by  writing 
alone  satisfy  the  requirement  of  delivery,  {d)     The  delivery  may 

(2)  Garvin  v.  Williams,  44  Mo.  465.  (c)   Comyiis,  in  his  Digest,  Bicns,  T>.  2, 

((()  Brvson    !'.    Brownrigg,   9   Ves.    1;  under  "Property  of  goods,   how  vested," 

Antrobus  v.   Smith,   12  Ves.  39;  Irons  v.  says  that  "if  a  man  grant  all  his  goods,  the 

Smallpiece,   2   B.   &   Aid.    551;    Noble    v.  property  vests  in  the  grantee,  and  the  grant 

Smith,  2  Johns.  52  ;  Hooper  v.  Goodwin,  may  be  withont  deed."     This  is  asserted  in 

1  Swiinst.  485;  Adams  v.  Hayes,  2  Ired.  L.  London  &  B.  Railway  Co   v.  Fairclough,  2 

366  ;  Sims  v.  Sims,  2  Ala.   117  ;  Allen  v.  Man.  &  G.  691,  n.  (a),  and  the  distinction 

Polereozky,  31  Me.  338  ;  Withers  v.  Weaver,  made,  on  this  point,  between  gifts  inter  vivos 

10  Barr,  391  ;  Dole  v.  Lincoln,  31  Me.  422  ;  and  gifts  causd  mortis. 

Carjjenter  r.  Dodge,  20  Vt.  595  ;  Hunting-  (d)  Cottcen  v.  Missing,  1  Madd.  Ch.  176  ; 

ton  V.  Gilniore,  14  Barb.  243  ;  Hunter  v.  Caswell  r.   Ware,  30  Ga.   267  ;   Evans   i'. 

Hunter,  19  Barb.  631;  Brown  v.  Brown,  Lipscomb,   31    Ga.    71.     And   so    long   as 

23  Barb.  5G5  ;  Hitch  v.  Davis,  3  Md.  Ch.  money  delivered   by  A   to  B  for  C,   as  a 

266  ;  People  v.  Johnson,  14  111.  342  ;   Craig  voluntary  gift  from  A  to  C,  is  in  the  hands 

V.  Kittrcdge,  46  N.  H.  57 ;  Irish  v.  Nutting,  of  B,  A  may  revoke  the  gift,  and  reclaim 

47  Barb.  37.  the  money  from  B.   "See   Lvte  v.   Perr}', 

[b)   Pennington  v.  Gittings,  2  G.  &  J.  Dyer,  49  a,  and  Connor  f.  Trawick,  37  Ala. 

208.     Sec  Antrobus  v.  Smith,  12  Ves.  39.  289.     But  in  Cranz  v.  Kroger,  22  111.  74, 

order  are  not  presented  to  the  bank  until  after  the  donor's  death,  Kimball  i\  Leland, 
110  Mass.  325  ;  Davis  v.  Ney,  125  Mass.  590  ;  so  of  a  mere  delivery  of  the  book  alone. 
Camp's  Appeal,  36  Conn.  88;  and  of  a  deposit  in  a  savings  bank  in  the  donor's  name 
as  trustee  for  A.,  with  the  intention  to  make  a  present  or  future  gift.  Minor  v.  Pogci-s,  40 
Conn.  512;  Kerrigan  v.  Paniigan,  43  Conn.  17  ;  the  purchase  of  a  hor-^e  by  a  husband, 
vvitli  the  intention  of  making  an  immediate  gift  to  liis  wife,  and  the  keejiing  it  in  his 
stable,  is  a  sufficient  delivery  to  her,  Wheeler  v.  Wheeler,  43  Conn.  503.  But  the 
delivery  of  a  check  on  a  savings  bank  payable  four  days  after  the  donor's  death  does  not 
constitute  a  valid  gift.  Curry  v.  Powers,  70  N.  Y.  212.  —  Death  will  operate  as  a  revo- 
cation of  check  delivered  with  the  intention  of  making  a  gift  of  the  fund  on  which  it 
was  drawn,  if  not  paid  or  accepted.  Simmons  v.  Cincinnati  Sav.  Soc.  31  Ohio  St.  457. 
As  to  a  donee's  acquiring  a  perfect  title  to  an  oral  gift,  if  he  obtains  possession  of  it 
before  the  donor  revokes  the  same,  althoutrh  it  was  not  present  or  in  esse  when  made, 
see  Whiting  w.  Barrett,  7  Lansing,  106.  As  to  delivery  generally,  see  Davis  r.  Nev, 
125  Ma,ss.  590;  Currv  v.  Powers,  70  N.  Y.  212;  Ham  v.  Van  Urden,  84  N.  Y.  257; 
Taylor  (•.  Henry.  48  Md.  550. 

1  But  a  gift  by  a  patient  to  her  physician,  which  the  donor  elects  to  abide  by  after 
the  relation  ceases,  cannot  be  impeached  after  her  death.  Mitchell  v.  Homfray,  8  Q.  B. 
D.  587.  J'      ^ 

263 


*  236  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

be  constructive  ;  for  it  may  be  any  such  delivery  as  the  nature  of 
the  thing  and  its  actual  position  require ;  as  a  delivery  of  a  part 
for  the  whole,  or  of  a  key,  {dd)  or  of  a  cumbrous  mass  by  taking 
the  donee  near  it,  and  pointing  it  out,  with  words  of  gift,  or  by 
an  order  on  a  bailee.  But  in  this  last  instance,  we  should  say 
that  the  gift  did  not  become  complete  until  the  order  was  pre- 
sented and  accepted,  or  performed,  (e) 

A  gift,  by  a  competent  party,  made  perfect  by  delivery  and 
acceptance,  is  then  irrevocable  by  the  donor.  But  if  it  be  preju- 
dicial to  existing  creditors,  it  is,  as  a  transfer  without  considera- 
tion, void  as  to  them.  It  is  not,  however,  void  as  to  subsequent 
creditors,  unless  made  under  actual  or  expected  insolvency,  or 
with  a  fraudulent  purpose  as  to  future  creditors.  In  either  of 
these  cases,  gifts,  or  voluntary  transfers  or  settlements  of  any 
kind  (all  of  which  are  regarded  by  the  law  as  gifts),  are 
void.  (/) 

*  236        *  From  the  established  principles  in  regard  to  promises 

without  consideration,  and  the  necessity  of  delivery  and 
acceptance,  it  may  be  inferred,  that  if  a  gift,  inter  vivos,  be  made 
by  a  note  or  promise,  not  under  seal,  it  may  be  avoided  by  the 
donor,  for  it  is  not  a  present  gift,  but  a  promise  without  consid- 
eration. If  it  be.  by  a  check,  or  order,  or  draft,  then  it  can  be 
revoked,  and  payment  or  acceptance  stopped.  But  if  it  is  paid  in 
good  faith  and  before  revocation,  it  becomes  a  completed  and 
irrevocable  gift.  So  it  would  be  if  it  were  accepted  in  such  a  way 
as  to  bind  the  acceptor.  On  the  other  hand,  if  any  consideration 
which  the  law  acknowledges,  enters  into  a  transaction  which  is 
called  a  gift,  it  changes  it  at  once  into  a  sale  or  barter,  if  deliv- 
ery be  made,  and  otherwise  into  an  executory  and  enforceable 
contract. 

it  W.1S  said  that  if  the  {,'ift  be  evidenced  by  Brewer,  6  Tex.  45  ;  Anderson  v.  Baker,  1 

writing,  it  cannot  be  resumed,  y/c/c/,  also,  Ga.  .5!)5  ;  Donneil  r.  Donnell,  1  Ilenil,  267. 
in  .same  case,  that  a  parent  may  resume  a  (/)  For  American  cases  in  Avhich  this 

pift  made  to  a  child,  without  the  consent  of  question    is    considered,    see   Thomson    v. 

the  child.  Douj,rhcrtv,    12   S.   &  R.   448;    Hanson   v. 

(fA/)   Marsh  t-.  Fuller,  18  N.  II.  360.     A  Bm-kner,  4  Dana,  2.51  ;    Hudnal  c  Wilder, 

gift  of  a  pocket  wits  held  to  carry  its  con-  4    IMcC'ord,   294  ;    Sexton    v.    Wheaton,   8 

tents,  in  Allerton  v.   Lanp,  10  Bo'sw.  362;  Wheat.  229;  Oannard  r.  Kslava,  20  Ala. 

Cooper  V.  Burr,  45  Barb   9.  732  ;   Clark  r.  Depew,  25  I'enn.   St.  509  ; 

(e)   Carradine  v.   Collins,  7  Sm.  &  M.  Trimble  r.  KatclifTe,  9  B.  Mon.  511;  Haw- 

428;  Blakcv  v.  Blakcv,  9  Ala.  391  ;  Pope  kins  v.  Moffit,  10  B.  Mon.  81. 
V.  Randolph,  13  Ala.  214;   llillebrant  v. 

264 


CH.  XV.]  GIFTS.  *  237 


SECTION  II. 

OF  GIFTS   CAUSA   MORTIS. 

These  gifts  can  be  made  only  by  a  person  by  whom  death  is 
believed,  on  reasonable  grounds,  to  be  very  near,  and  who  makes 
the  gift  in  view  of,  and  because  of,  his  approaching  death,  (^ff) 

Much  that  was  said  of  gifts  inter  vivos,  applies  equally  to  gifts 
causd  mortis.  There  must  be  delivery  to  the  donee  ;  and  while 
it  need  not  be  strictly  actual,  it  must  be  as  near  an  actual  delivery 
to  the  donee,  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  nature 
and  actual  position  of  the  thing  given,  will  permit.  (^)  ^  And  it 
is  said  that  no  mere  possession,  whether  it  be  subsequent  or  pre- 
vious and  continued,  will  supply  the  want  of  delivery ;  (A) 
but  we  should  doubt  whether  this  can  be  regarded  *  as  a  *  237 
universal  rule.  The  law  watches,  however,  this  kind  of 
transfer  jealously,  and  is  unwilling  that  it  should  take  the  place 
of  wills,  and  make  them  unnecessary ;  because,  while  it  is  much 
less  troublesome,  it  is  open  to  those  objections  of  uncertainty 
which  the  law  seeks  to  avoid,  in  reference  to  wills,  by  its  precau- 
tions and  provisions  as  to  their  execution.  Hence  it  is  the  pre- 
vailing rule,  that  the  donor's  own  note,  or  his  own  check  or  draft 
not  accepted  or  paid  before  his  death,  does  not  pass  by  gift  causd 
mortis.'^    Delivery  by  a  dying  husband  of  the  book  of  a  savings 

(/f)  Knott  V.  Hogan,  4  Met.  (Kv.)  99;  Vt.  591  ;  Dresser  v.  Dresser,  46  Mc.  48. 

Champnev  v.  Blanchard,  39  N.  Y.  l"ll.  But  see  Headley  v.  Kirby,  18  Fenn.  St.  326. 

('/)  Jones  y.  Selby,  Free.  Ch.  300 ;  Driny  (A)  Dole  i>. 'Lincolu/si  Me.  422  ;  Plun- 

V.  Smith,  1   P.  Wras.  404;    Snelljrrove  v.  tinfjton  r.  Gilmore,  14  Barb.  243.     In  Eng- 

Bailev,  3  Atk.  214  ;  Lawson  i\  Lawson,  1  land,  the  law  seems  not  to  be  settled  on  this 

P.  W'ms.  441  ;  Miller  v.  Miller,  3  F.  Wms.  point.     Moore  v.  Dalton,  7  E.  L.  &  E.  134, 

3.56;  Ward  y.  Turner,  2  Ves.  431.     There  differs   from    the  cases   first  cited;    while 

seems  to  be  no  limit  w  law  to  the  extent  of  Gough  v.  Findon,  7  Exch.  48,  8  E.  L.  & 

a  donatio  causa  moitis.     Meach  v.  Meacli,  24  E.  5U7,  confirms  them. 

*  A  savings-bank  deposit  may  be  a  gift  caiim  mortis,  provable  by  delivery  of  book,  though 
unaccompanied  by  assignment.  Pierce  v.  Boston  Savings  Bank,  129  Mass.  425.  In 
Ellis  V.  Secor,  31  Mich  185,  it  appeared  that  a  woman,  living  alone,  was  found  dead, 
with  the  following  writing  signed  by  her  on  a  slate  at  her  bedside  :  "  I  wish  A.  to 
take  possession  of  all,  personal,  real,  and  mixed.  I  am  so  sick,  I  believe  I  shall  die. 
Look  in  valise."  In  the  valise  was  found  an  envelope  containing  securities,  and  another 
envelope  containing  a  memorandum  of  her  wishes.  It  also  appeared  that  the  deceased 
was  under  obligation  to  A.  for  services  and  kindnesses.  Held,  as  valid  a  gift  causd  mortis 
as  if  there  had  been  manual  delivery  of  securities. 

2  Smith  V.  Smith,  3  Stewart,  564  ;  although  accompanied  by  a  delivery  of  his 
bankers'  pass-book,  Beak  v.  Beak,  L.  li.  13  Eq.  489. 

265 


*  237  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

bank  showing  deposits  by  a  deceased  wife,  with  a  verbal  gift 
thereof  passed  to  the  donee  the  moneys  so  deposited.  (JiK)  And 
bank-notes,  certainly,  (i)  and  perhaps  the  notes,  bonds,  and  other 
written  promises  of  others  than  the  donor,  may  be  the  subject  of 
a  valid  donatio  causd  mortis,  although  the  rule  on  this  subject  can 
hardly  be  considered  as  completely  settled.  (/) 

It  is  held  in  New  York,  rightly  we  think,  that  a  valid  gift, 
causd  7nortis,  of  corporate  stocks,  may  be  made  by  simple  delivery 
of  the  certificates  with  intent  to  transfer  the  stock,  although  the 
certificates  contain  a  restriction  on  the  method  of  transfer,  (jj) 

In  a  recent  English  case,  a  father  put  a  check  into  the  hands 
of  his  son  of  nine  months  old,  and  said,  I  give  this  to  baby  for 
himself.  Afterwards  he  said  it  was  his  purpose  to  give  the 
amount  of  the  check  to  his  child.  But  at  his  death  it  was  found 
among  his  papers,  and  it  was  held  that  there  had  been  neither 
a  gift  nor  a  valid  declaration  of  trust,  {jk}  In  another  case  a 
voluntary  deed  of  gift  of  all  her  personal  property  was  made  by 
one  who  soon  after  died.  Then  the  donee  died.  Among  his 
effects  were  promissory  notes  which  had  belonged  to  the  donor, 
but  were  not  indorsed,  and  there  was  no  evidence  of  their  delivery 
to  him.  But  it  w^as  held  that  the  deed  of  gift  was  a  complete 
declaration  of  trust  and  carried  all  her  personal  property  to  the 
donee,  (y?)  There  have  been  some  cases  arising  from  gifts  made 
by  soldiers  before  joining  the  army,  in  the  late  war.  Where  the 
gift  was  made  to  take  effect  "  if  he  did  not  come  back,"  it  was 
held  not  valid,  because  not  a  present  absolute  gift,  (jm)  But  in 
another  case,  where  the  same  contingency  existed,  it  was  held 
valid,  (/w) 

The  donor,  during  his  life,  may  at  any  time  revoke  any  dona- 

(hh)  Tilling-hast  f .  Wlieaton,  8  R.  I.  536.  of  a  third  person  may  be  a  valid  donatio 

(i)  Hill  V.  Chapman,  2  Uro.  Ch.  612.  anisd  7)ioitis,  iilthonixh  not  made  transfer- 

This  has  not  heen  recently  doubted.  able  by  delivery  by  blank  indorsement  ;  and 

{j)   See   Miller  v.   Miller,  3  V.  Wms.  in  that  case  the  executor  or  administrator 

3.50,  and  Bradley  v.  Hunt,  5  G.  &,  J.  54.  of  the  deceased  must  indorse  it.     Brown  y. 

These  cases  seem  to  hold  that,  if  the  notes  Brown,  18  Conn.  410.     See  also  Sessions 

were  payable  to  bearer,  the  donation  would  v.  Moseley,  4  Gush.  87,  and  Smith  v.  Kit- 
be  valid,  thus  ])utrinfr  such  a  note  on  the  tredge,  21"  Vt.  238. 

footing  of  bank-biils.     This  di-^tiiution  may  {]/)  Walsh  r.  Sexton,  55  Barb.  251. 

perhaps  be  sustained,  but  it  should  be  ex-  (  jk)  Jones  v.  Lock,  I-aw  Rep.  1  Ch.  25. 

tended  to  all  notes  iiidorsi'd  in  blank,  for  (}7)  Richardson  r  Kichardson,  Law  Kep. 

they  are  just  as  much  ir  m-leiable  by  deliv-  3  Eq.  686.     Sec  Morgan  v.  Malle.son,  L.  li. 

eiy  to  bearer.      See  Pari>h  r.  Stone,  14  Pick.  10  Kcj.  475. 

2u7,  which  asserts  the  law  as  stated  in  the  (  jiii)  Linscnbigler  v.  Gourley,  66  Penn. 

text.     Sie  also  Harris  >■.  Clark,  2  Barb.  56,  St.  106. 

94,  and  3  Comst    93;  Flint  /•.   Pattee,  33  {jn)   Virgin  v.  Gaither,  42  111.  39. 

N.  U.  520.     But  it  also  seems  that  the  note 

26G 


CH.  XV.]  GIFTS.  *  237 

tion  causd  mortis,  even  if  it  be  completed  by  delivery  and  accep- 
tance. Such  a  gift  is  as  revocable  as  a  will.  The  authorities 
agree  that  he  may  do  this  if  he  recovers,  because  the  death,  which 
has  not  taken  place,  was  the  cause  of  the  gift.  (Jc) 

Gifts  causd  mortis  are  wholly  void  as  against  existing  credi- 
tors. (I)  A  court  of  equity  will  sometimes  compel  a  party  to 
complete  and  execute  a  gift  which,  at  law,  would  be  wholly  in  the 
power  of  the  donor,  (w) 

(h)  In  Jones  v.  Selbv,  Prec.  Ch.  300,  a  decided  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  years 

donatio  causa  mortis  was  put  on  the  same  ago,  but  the  rule  has  never  been  shaken, 
footing  as  a  will,  in  this  respect,  —  that  it  (/)   See  cases  cited  in  note  (  /"),  p.  *235. 

could,  as  certainly,  be  revoked  by  the  donor,  (m)  See  post,  Chap,  on  Specific  Perlbrm- 

at  any  time  during  his  life.     This  case  was  ance,  sect.  2. 

267 


238  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 


*238  *  CHAPTER  XYL 

NEW  PARTIES  BY  INDORSEMENT,  OR  OP  NEGOTIABLE  BILLS  AND   NOTES. 

Sect.  I.  —  Of  the  Nature  and  Effect  of  Indorsement. 

By  the  ancient  rules  of  law  we  have  seen  that  the  transfer  of 
simple  contracts  was  entirely  forbidden.  It  is  usually  expressed 
by  the  phrase,  that  a  chose  in  action  is  not  assignable.  But  bills 
of  exchange  and  promissory  notes,  made  payable  to  order,  are 
called  negotiable  paper ;  and  they  may  be  transferred  by  indorse- 
ment, and  the  holder  can  sue  in  his  own  name,  and  the  equita- 
ble defences  which  might  have  existed  between  the  promisor  and 
the  original  promisee  are  cut  off. 

It  is  generally  said  that  the  law  of  bills  and  notes  is  excep- 
tional ;  that  they  are  choses  in  action,  which,  by  the  policy  of  the 
law  mei-chant,  and  to  satisfy  the  necessities  of  trade  and  business, 
are  permitted  to  be  assigned  as  other  choses  in  action  cannot  be. 
This  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  but  the  law  of  negotiable  paper  may 
be  considered  as  resting  on  other  grounds  also.  If  A  owes  B 
one  hundred  dollars,  and  gives  him  a  promissory  note  wherein 
he  promises  to  pay  that  sum  to  him  (without  any  Avords  extend- 
ing the  promise  to  another),  this  note  is  not  negotiable  ;  and  if 
it  be  assigned,  it  is  so  under  the  general  rule  of  law,  and  is  sub- 
ject in  the  hands  of  the  assignee  to  all  equitable  defences.  But 
if  A  in  his  note  promises  to  pay  B  or  his  order,  then  the  origi- 
nal promise  is  in  the  alternative,  and  it  is  this  which  makes  the 
note  negotiable,  (a)  The  promise  is  to  pay  cither  B  or  some 
one  else  to  whom  B  shall  direct  the  payment  to  be  made.  And 
when  B  orders  the  payment  to  be  made  to  C,  then  C  may  demand 
it  under  the  original  promise.  He  may  say  that  the  prom- 
*  239  ise  was  made  to  B,  but  it  Avas  a  promise  *  to  pay  C  as  soon 
as  he  should  come  within  the  condition ;  that  is,  as  soon 


(a)  Reed  v.  Murphy,  1  Ga.  230. 
268 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  240 

as  he  should  become  the  payee  by  order  of  B.  And  then  the  law 
merchant  extends  this  somewhat,  by  saying  that  the  original 
promise  was  in  fact  to  pay  either  to  B,  or  to  C  if  B  .shall  order 
payment  made  to  him,  or  to  any  person  to  whom  C  shall  order 
payment  made,  after  B  has  ordered  the  payment  made  to  C.  For 
B  has  the  right  of  not  merely  ordering  payment  to  be  made  to  C, 
but  to  C  or  his  order ;  and  C  has  then  the  same  right,  and  by  the 
continued  exercise  of  this  right  the  transfer  may  be  made  to  any 
number  of  assignees  successively,  and  the  last  party  to  whom  .the 
note  is  thus  transferred,  or  the  final  holder,  becomes  the  person 
to  whom  A  promised  B  to  pay  the  money,  and  such  holder  may 
sue  in  his  own  name  upon  this  promise.  And  not  only  are  words 
"  or  order "  unnecessary  in  the  indorsement,  but  it  is  held  that 
if  the  indorsement  be  expressly  restrictive,  as  if  made  to  A  only, 
its  negotiability  remains  unaffected.  (6)  It  is  said,  however,  that 
this  does  not  apply  to  notes  indorsed  after  maturity,  (c) 

We  may  find  the  reasons  of  the  law  of  negotiable  bills  and 
notes  in  their  origin  and  purpose.  By  interchange  of  property, 
men  supply  each  other's  wants  and  their  own  at  the  same  time. 
In  the  beginning  of  society  this  could  be  done  only  by  actual  bar- 
ter, as  it  is  now  among  the  rudest  savages.  But  very  early  money 
was  invented  as  the  representative  of  all  property,  and  as  there- 
fore greatly  facilitating  the  exchange  of  all  property,  and  as 
measuring  its  convertible  value.  The  utility  of  this  means  en- 
larged, as  the  wants  of  commerce,  which  grew  with  civilization, 
were  developed.  But  at  length  more  was  needed ;  it  became 
expedient  to  take  a  further  step ;  and  negotiable  paper,  first  bills 
of  exchange  and  then  promissory  notes,  were  introduced  into  mer- 
cantile use,  as  the  representative  of  the  represe7itative  of  propertij^ 
—  that  is,  as  the  representative  of  money.  It  was  possible  to 
make  exchanges  of  large  quantities  of  bulky  articles,  by  the  use 
of  money,  without  much  inconvenience ;  and  it  was  possible  for 
him  who  wished  to  part  with  what  he  had,  to  acquire  in  its 
stead  by  selling  it  for  money,  an  article  *  in  which  the  *  240 
value  of  all  that  he  parted  with  was  securely  vested,  until 
he  had  such  opportunity  as  he  might  wish  to  place  this  value  in 
other  property,  which  he  did  by  buying.  But  still  coin  was  itself 
a  substantial  article,  not  easily  moved  to  great  distances  in  large 

(6)  Walker  v.  Macdonald,  2  Exch.  527.        (c)  Leavitt  v.  Putnam,  1  Sandf.  199. 

269 


*  240  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

quantities  ;  and  while  it  adequately  represented  all  property,  it 
failed  to  represent  credit.  And  this  new  invention  was  made, 
and  negotiable  paper  introduced,  to  extend  this  representation 
another  degree.  It  does  not  represent  property  directly,  but 
money.  And  as  in  one  form  it  represents  the  money  into  which 
it  is  convertible  at,  the  pleasure  of  the  holder,  so  in  another  form 
it  represents  a  future  payment  of  money,  and  then  it  represents 
credit.  And  as  names  in  any  number  may  be  written  on  one 
instrument,  that  instrument  represents  and  embodies  the  credit 
of  one  man  or  the  aggregated  credit  of  many.  Thus,  by  this  in- 
vention, vast  amounts  of  value  may  change  ownership  at  any  dis- 
tance, and  be  transmitted  as  easily  as  a  single  coin  could  be  sent. 
And  by  the  same  invention,  while  property  is  used  in  commercial 
intercourse,  the  credit  which  springs  from  and  is  due  to  the  pos- 
session of  that  property  may  also  be  used  at  the  same  time,  and 
in  the  same  way.  And  all  this  is  possible  because  negotiable 
paper  is  the  adequate  representative  of  money,  and  of  actual 
credit,  in  the  transaction  of  business.  And  it  is  possible  there- 
fore only  while  this  paper  is  such  representative,  and  no  longer ; 
and  the  whole  system  of  the  law  of  negotiable  paper  has  for  its 
object  to  make  this  paper  in  fact  such  representative,  and  to 
secure  its  prompt  and  available  convertibility,  and  to  provide  for 
the  safety  of  those  who  use  this  implement,  either  by  making  it 
or  receiving  it,  in  good  faith.  Hence,  if  a  note  be  made  payable 
absolutely,  no  evidence  can  be  received  of  an  oral  agreement 
made  when  the  note  was  made,  that  it  should  be  given  up  when 
a  certain  event  occurred,  and  that  this  event  has  occurred,  (ce) 

If  a  note  be  surrendered  to  the  maker  from  a  mistaken  belief 
that  it  has  been  paid,  he  is  still  liable  for  the  balance  due  upon 
it.  {cd) 

By  the  practice  of  merchants,  the  transfer  of  negotiable  paper 
is  made  by  indorsements.     The  payee  writes  his  name  (c?)  on 

(re)    Tower   v.   Kichardson,   6   Allen,  indorsor  of  tlic   l)ill.      Lord  FJhnhnrough 

35L  ,  said:    "I  am  clearly  of  oiiinioii  that  this 

(cd)  Banks  v.  Marshall,  28  Cal.  223.  is  not  an  inilorseinent  hy  the  defendant. 

(d)    There    ean    be    no    indorsement  For  sueli  a  purpose  the  name  of  the  party 

witliout  a  sifjninn  of  tiie  name.     Vincent  must  appearwritten  witli  intent  to  indorse. 

V.  Ilorlock   1  Camp.  442.     In  this  case  A,  We  see  these  words,  'pay  the  contents  to 

the  drawer  and  piiyee  of   a  bill  of  ex-  such  a  one,'  written  over  a  blank  iiidorse- 

clianfje,  indorsed  the  bill  in  blank  to  B,  ment  every  day,  without  any  thoufjlit  of 

who  wrote  over  A's  sijrnature,  "  pay  tlic  contractinj,f  an  obIij;ation  ;  and  no  obliRa- 

contents  to  C,"  and  then  delivered  it  to  tion  is  thereby  contracted.     When  a  bill 

C.    Held,  that  B  was  not  liable  to  C  as  an  is  indorsed  by  the  payee  in  blank,  a  power 

270 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  241 

*  the  back  of  the  bill  or  note,  or,  as  it  has  been  held,  *  241 
something  which  is  the  equivalent  of  his  name  and  is 
intended  as  a  substitute  for  it,  (^)  and  delivers  the  paper  to 
the  purchaser,  (/)  ^  and  is  then  called  an  indorser ;  and  it  has 
been  held  that  if  a  payee  writes  his  name  on  any  part  of  the 
paper  with  intent  to  indorse  it,  this  is  an  indorsement,  (^ff)  The 
purchaser  of  the  note  may  then  write  over  this  indorsement  an 
order  to  pay  the  contents  of  the  note  to  him  or  to  his  order,  if 
the  payee  has  not  already  written  this.  The  purchaser  thus 
becomes  an  indorsee.  When  the  name  only  is  written  it  is  called 
an  indorsement  in  blank,  and  the  holder  may  transfer  it  by 
delivery,  and  it  may  thus  pass  through  many  hands,  the  final 
holder  who  demands  payment  writing  over  the  name  indorsed 
an  order  to  pay  to  him.  Whenever  this  order  is  written  by  an 
indorser,  whether  a  first  or  later  indorser,  it  is  an  indorsement 
in  full,  and  the  indorsee  cannot  transfer  the  note  except  by  his 
indorsement,  which  again  may  be  in  full  or  in  blank.  It  is  now 
quite  settled  that  the  executor  or  administrator  of  a  deceased 
payee  may  indorse  the  note  of  his  testator,  (^)  but  he  has  no 

is  wiven  to  the  indorsee  of  specially  ap-  the  payee  or  holder  must  not  only  write 

pointinfiT  the  payment  to  be  made  to  a  his  name  on  the  back,  but  must  deliver 

particular  individual,  and  what  lie  does  in  the  bill  to  tlie  indorsee.     Enimett  v.  Tot- 

the  exercise  of  this  power  is  only  ex/nrssio  tcnhani,  20  E.  L.  &  E.  348  ;   Sainsbnry  v. 

eorum  qnce  twite  insinit.    Tiiis  is  a  sufficient  Parkinson,  id.  301.     See  also  Hall  v.  Wil- 

indorsement  to  the  jilaintiff'a,  but  not  %  the  son,  16  Barb.  548. 

de/tnfifints."    So  Duller,  J.,  in  Fcnn  v.  Har-  iff)  Haines  r.  Dubois,!  Vroom,  259. 

rison,  3  T.  R.  761,  says:  "In  the  case  of  (g)  This  question  was  ably  discussed 

a  bill  of    exchanfje,  we  know  precisely  in    the   case   of    Rawlinson   v.    Stone,   3 

what  remedy  the  holder  lias,  if  the  bill  be  Wils.    1.     This   was   an   action   upon    a 

not  paid;  Ids  security  appears  wholly  on  promissory  note,  payable  to  A,  or  order, 

the  face  of  tlie  bill  itself,  —  the  acceptor,  and  indorsed  by  the  administratrix  of  A. 

the  drawer,  and  the  indorsers,  are  all  Ha-  It  was  objected  tiiat  the  indorsement  was 

ble  in  their  turns ;  but  tiiey  are  only  liable  not  valid  so  as  to  give  the  indorsee  an  ac- 

hecniise  they  have  written  their  names  on  the  tion  in  his  own  name.     But  the  objection 

bill."  was  overruled ;   and  this  case  has  been 

(e)  The  figures  128  were  held  sufficient  considered  ever  since  as  having  settled 

in  Butchers  and  Drovers  Bank  v.  Brown,  the  law  upon  this  point.     See  Watkins  v. 

6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  443.  Maule,  2  Jac.  &  W.  2.]7,  243  ;    Shaw,  C, 

{/)  In  order  to  a  valid  indorsement,  J.,  Kand  v.  Hubbard,  4  Met.  252,  258; 

1  In  Adams  »^.  Blethen,  66  Me.  19,  the  indorsement  was  in  terms:  "I  this  day 
sold  and  delivered  "  to  A.  the  within  note,  signed  by  the  ])ayee.  A  constructive  delivery 
is  sufficient,  as  by  an  order  on  the  bank  where  the  note  is  held  as  collateral  security, 
Howe  r.  Ould,  28  Graft.  1.  A  note  may  be  delivered  on  condition  that  it  shall  not 
take  effect  until  something  is  done,  as  the  acceptance  of  an  insurance  policy  for  which 
it  is  given,  Watkins  v.  Bowers,  119  Mass.  383;  and  if  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
third  person,  takes  effect  on  the  performance  of  the  condition,  without  further  de- 
livery, Taylor  v.  Thomas,  13  Kan.  217.  The  delivery  of  an  envelope  containing  a 
note,  on  condition  that  it  should  not  be  opened  during  the  maker's  life,  and  be  returned 
if  desired,  is,  after  the  maker's  death  without  return,  a  good  delivery,  and  the  note  is 
valid.     Worth  v.  Case,  42  N.  Y.  362. 

271 


*  242  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

right  to  deliver  to  the  indorsee  a  note  which  was  indorsed  by  the 
deceased,  but  never  delivered  by  him.  (Ji)  The  same  rule  holds 
also  in  the  case  of  an  assignee  of  an  insolvent  payee,  (i) 

The  indorsement  of   a  blank  note   binds  the  indorser   to  any 

terms  as  to  amount  and   time  of   payment  which   the   party  to 

whom  he  intrusts  the  paper  inserts,  (y)     If  the  note  be 

*  242    originally  *  made   payable   to  "  bearer,"  it  is   negotiated 

or  transferred  by  delivery  only,  and  needs  no  indorse- 
ment, (Jc)  any  person  bearing  or  presenting  the  note  becoming 
in  that  case  the  party  to  whom  the  maker  of  the  note  promises 
to  pay  it. 

If  a  note,  whether  indorsed  in  blank  or  made  payable  to  bearer, 
be  transferred  by  delivery,  the  transferrer  is  not  liable  as  an 
indorser,  nor  as  a  guarantor,  nor  is  he,  in  general,  liable  in  any 
way.  1  But  if  the  paper  be  wholly  worthless,  as  by  the  forgery 
of  the  principal  names,  or  for  any  similar  reasons,  the  transferrer 
may  be  held  to  repay  the  money  paid  him  for  it,  on  the  ground 
of  failure  of  consideration.  (Z) 

The  holder  of  negotiable  paper,  indorsed  in  blank  or  made 
payable  to  bearer,  is  presumed  to  be  the  owner  for  consideration. 
If  circumstances  cast  suspicion  on  his  ownership,  as  if  it  came 
to  him  from  or  through  one  who  had  stolen  it,  then  he  must 
prove  that  he  gave  value  for  it ;  and  on  such  proof  will  be  entitled 
to  it,  unless  it  is  shown  that  he  was  cognizant  of  the  want  of 
title,  or  had  such  notice  or  means  of  knowledge  as  made  his  neg- 
ligence equivalent  to  fraud.  (???)     If  one  signs  a  note  on  condi- 

Malbon  r.  Southard,  36  Me.  147 ;  Dwight  (k)  Wilboiir  v.  Turner,  5  Pick.  526; 

V.  Newell,  15  111.  o03.  Dole  v.  Weeks,  4  Mass.  451.     And  this  is 

(/()    Bromage  v.  Lloyd,  1   Excli.   .31;  so  although  it  he  under  seal.     Porter  y. 

Clark  V.  Sigourney,  17  Conn.  511;    Clark  MeCoUuni,  15  Ga.  528. 

V.  Boyd,  2  Ilannu.  279.  (/)  Gurney  v.  Womersley,  4  E.  &  B. 

((■)    Pinkerton  v.  Marshall,  2   IT.    Bl.  183. 

334;  Thomason  v.  Frere,  10  East,  418.  (m)  Miller?;.  Race,  1  Burr.  452;  Grant 

( /)  Montague  v.  Perkins,  22  E.  L.  &  v.  Vaughan,  3  Burr.    151(5;    Peacock   v. 

E.  516;  Russel  v.  Langstaffe,  Dougl.  514  ;  Rhodes,  Dougl.  6;J;; ;    Collins  c.  Martin,  1 

Violett  V.  Patton,  5   Craneh,   142,    151;  B.  &  P.  048 ;   Lawson  ?•.  AVeston,  4  Ksp. 

Johnson  ;•.  Blasdale,  1  Sm.  &  M.  1;    Tor-  5(i;    King  i'.  Milsom,  2  Cam]).  5;    Solo- 

rey  r.  Fisk,  10  Sm.  &  M.  5'JO ;  Smith  v.  nions  v.  Bank  of  England,  13  East,  13.5, 

Wyckoff,  3  Sandf.Ch.  77,  90;   FuUerton  n. ;    Paterson  r.  Hardacre,  4  Taunt.  114 ; 

r.  Sturges,   4   Ohio    St.   529;    Young   v.  Hatch  r.  Searles,  31  E.  L.  &  E.  219;  Jud- 

Ward,  21  111.  22;i.  son  v.  Holmes,  9  La.  An.  20;    Cruger  v. 

1  But  such  a  transferrer  impliedly  warrants  the  genuineness  of  the  instnmient,  and 
that  he  has  a  right  to  transfer  it  t»v  delivery,  Wliitnev  v.  Potsdam  Bank,  4.')  N.  Y.  ;30.'3 ; 
Giffert  v.  West,  37  Wis.  11.");  Snyder  v.  Reno,  .38  la.  329 ;  hut  not  if  the  transferrer 
expressly  refuses  to  so  warrant,  Bell  v.  Dagg,  60  N.  Y.  528;  or  if  the  transferee  agrees 
to  take  his  chances,  Bcal  v.  Roberts,  113  Mass.  525. 

272 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES    AND    BILLS.  *  243 

tion  that  a  certain  other  person  sign  it  also,  and  that  other  person 
does  not  sign  it,  it  is  said  that  the  signer  is  not  liable  to  an  indor- 
see ;  but  this  must  not  be  extended  to  an  innocent  indorsee  for 
value,  (w) 

*  A  distinction  of  this  kind  has  been  made.  If  an  indor-  *  243 
ser  shows  that  the  paper  was  issued  for  an  illegal  consid- 
eration, it  may  be  no  defence  against  an  innocent  holder,  who 
must,  however,  prove  value  paid ;  but  if  he  only  shows  that  the 
consideration  was  void,  the  presumption  of  value  is  in  favor  of 
the  indorsee,  and  the  defendant  must  prove  that  the  plaintiff 
holds  it  not  for  value.  Co)  A  note  given  in  renewal  of  a  note 
made  for  an  illegal  consideration,  is  open  to  the  same  defence  as 
the  original  note,  (oo) 

All  the  payees  must  join  in  the  indorsement,  (p)  and  strictly 
speaking,  only  a  payee,  or  one  made  payee  by  a  subsequent  indorse- 
ment, can  become  himself  an  indorser.  It  is  not  enough  that  a 
name  is  written  on  the  back  of  a  note  or  bill,  for  although  this  is, 
literally  speaking,  an  indorsement,  whether  it  be  so  or  not  by  law 
and  the  usage  of  merchants  must  depend  upon  the  character  of 
the  signer.  The  effect  of  a  simple  signature,  without  any  other 
words,  on  the  back  of  a  note,  by  one  not  the  payee,  has  been  much 
considered  and  variously  decided.  From  the  authorities  which  we 
deem  entitled  to  most  respect  upon  this  question,  and  from  gen- 
eral principles,  we  come  to  these  conclusions  :  If  any  one  not  the 
payee  of  a  negotiable  note,  or  in  the  case  of  a  note  not  negotia- 
ble, if  any  party,  writes  his  name  on  the  back  of  the  note  at  or 
sufficiently  near  the  time  it  is   made,  his  signature  binds  him 

Armstronsr,  -j  Johns.  Cas.  5 ;    Conrny  v.  see  by  delivery  only,  without  any  fresh 

Warren,  3  Johns.  Cas.  259;    Thurston  i'.  indorsement,    the    transferee    takes,    as 

McKown,  0  Mass.  428;  Munroe  c.  Cooper,  against  tlie  acceptor,  anj' title  wliicii  the 

5  Pick.  412;    Wheeler  r.  Guild,  20  Pick,  intermediate  indorsee   possessed.      Fair- 

545;  Aldrich  ;;.  Warren,  16  Me.  465.     It  clough  v.  Pavia,  25  E.  L.  &  E.  533. 

is  now  well  settled,  overruling  the  earlier  (n)  Awde  v.  Di.xon,  5  E.  L.  &  E.  512  ; 

cases,  that  if  the  defendant  prove  a  note  s.  c.  6  Exch.  860;    Evans  v.  Bremmer,  35 

fraudulent  or  illegal  in  its  inception,  this  E.  L.  &  E.  397  ;    Prentiss  v.  Graves,  33 

throws   the   burden   on   the   plaintiff  of  Barb.  621. 

proving  that  he   paid  value.      Smith    v.  (o)  Fitch  v.  Jones,  5  E.  &  B.  238.    See, 

Braine,  3  E.  L.  &  E.  379 ;   Bailey  v.  Bid-  for  effect  of  illegality  of  consideration, 

well,  13  M.  &  W.  73 ;   Case  i\  Mechanics  Brown    v.    Tarkington,  3   Wallace,   377, 

Banking  Association,  4  Comst.  166.    It  is  and  Clubb  i'.  Hutson,  18  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  414. 

otherwise  if  the  defendant  merely  show  (oo)  Holden  t".  Cosgrove,  12  Gray,  216. 

a  want  of  consideration  when  the  note  (p)   Dwight  v.  Pease,  3  McLean,  94. 

was  given.     INIiddleton  Bank  v.  Jerome,  But  see,  for  a  disregard  of  this  rule  in 

18  Conn.  443;   Ellicott  v.  Martin,  6  Md.  reference  to   a  payee   whose   name  was 

509;    Thompson    ?'.    Shepherd,    12    Met.  left  in   the  note   by  mistake,  Pease   v. 

311.     Where  a  bill  or  note  is  indorsed  in  Dwight,  6  How.  190. 
blank,  and  is  transferred  by  the  indor- 

VOL.  I.  18                                         273 


*  244  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

in  the  same  way  as  if  it  was  on  the  face  of  the  note  and  below 

that  of  the  maker,  that  is  to  say,  he  is  held  as  a  joint  maker, 

or  as  a   joint  and  several  maker  according  to  the  form  of   the 

note.  (5-)  ^     If  the  signature  be  at  a  distinctly  later  period, 

*  244    *  after  the  making  and  delivery  of  the  note,  the  signer,  as 

to  the  payee,  is  not  a  maker  but  a  guarantor,  (r)  His 
promise  is  void  if  without  consideration,  but  the  consideration 
may  be  the  original  consideration  for  the  note,  if  the  note  was 
received  at  his  request  and  upon  his  promise  to  guarantee  the 
same,  or  perhaps,  if  the  note  was  made  at  his  request  alone, 
without  the  promise,  and  more  certainly  if  the  note  was  given 
for  his  benefit ;  or  the  consideration  for  the  guaranty  may  be 
a  new  one  moving  in  some  way  from  the  holder.  In  the  last 
case,  if  the  note  is  not  negotiable,  the  party  indorsing  can  be 
held  only  as  maker  or  as  guarantor,  but  if  the  note  be  negotia- 
ble, the  question  might  arise  whether,  although  the  party  sign- 
ing is  only  a  guarantor  as  to  the  payee  or  i)arty  receiving  the 
note  from  him,  he  may  not  be  liable  to  subsequent  parties  as 
indorser.  For  if  he  be  only  a  guarantor  he  may  make  the 
defence  of  a  want  of  consideration  against  any  holder,  but  if 
an  indorser,  only  against  his  immediate  indorsee.  This  ques- 
tion we  should  answer  by  saying,  that  if  the  payee  writes  his 
name  over  the  name  of  the  other,  thus  making  him  to  all 
appearances  a  second  indorser,  he  might  be  held  as  such  by  any 
subsequent  ignorant  holder  for  value,  because  he  has  enabled 
the  payee  to  give  his  signature  this  appearance  and  therefore  this 

(7)  Campbell  ?•.  Butler,  14  Johns.  349;  lins   v.   Everett,   4   Ga.    2G6;    Robinson 

Dean  v.  Hall,  17  Wend.  214  ;  Sampson  v.  v.  Abell,  17  Oiiio,  30;    Webster  i;.  Cobb, 

Thornton,  3  Met.  275;    Union   Bank   v.  17  111.  4-39;    Goode  i'.  Jones.  9  Mo.  876; 

Willis,   8  id.   504 ;    Austin   v.    Boyd,  24  Lewis  v.  Harvey,  18  Mo.  74 ;   AVilson  v. 

Pick.  G4;    Bryant    v.    Eastman,  7  Cusli.  Foot,  11   Met.  285;    Lowell  v.  Gage,  38 

111;  Adams  v.  Hardy, .32  Me.  339;    Mar-  Me.  35;    Carpenter  v.  Oakes,  10  Rich.  L. 

tin  V.  Boyd,  11  N.  H.  385;    Flint  v.  Day,  17  ;    Higgins  v.  Watson,  1  I\Lann.  (Mich.) 

9Vt.  345;  Bright  t-.  Carpenter,  9  Ilainm.  428;     Cecil  i;.  Mi.x,  0  Port.  (Ind.)  478; 

1.39;    Carroll  v.  Weld,  13  111.  0S2.     See  Cook  v.  Southwiek,  9  Te.v.  015 ;   Branch 

also  Ellis  V.  Brown,  0  Barb.  282;  Malbon  Bank  r.  James,  9  Ala.  949;    Essex  Com- 

r.  Southard,  36    IMe.   147  ;    Partridge   v.  pany    v.    Edwards,  12   Mass.   273.      For 

Colby,  19  Barb.  258;  Schneiders.  Schiff-  cases  in  which  such  signer  is  held  only 

man,  20  Mo.  571  ;    (jreenougli  v.  Smead,  as  guarantor  or  indorser,  see  Blatchford 

3  Ohio  St.  415;    Seabury  ?•.  Hungerford,  v.  Milliken,  35  111.  434;    Van  Doren  v. 

2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  84;   Cottrell  v.  Conklin,  4  Tjader,  1  Nev.  380;   Price  v.  Lavender, 

Duer,  45;    Brown  v.    Curtiss,  2   Comst.  38  Ala.  .389. 

225;    Sylvester  v.   Downer,  20  Vt.  355 ;  (r)    Id.;    Tenney   v.   Prince,   4  Pick. 

McGuire   i'.    Bosworth,  1    La.   An.   248;  385;    Sampson  v.  Thornton,  3  Met.  275; 

Penny  v.  Parham,  1  La.  An.  274  ;   Col-  Hammond  v.  Chamberlain,  20  Vt.  400. 

1  Gorman  v.  Kctchum,  33  Wis.  427. 

274 


CII.  XYI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  245 

effect.  And  wo  should  go  further  and  consider  that  he  would 
be  liable  to  any  holder  even  with  full  notice,  because  he  wrote  his 
name  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the  payee  his  credit,  and  there- 
fore impliedly  authorized  the  payee  to  give  his  suretyship  any 
character  perfectly  compatible  with  the  manner  and  place  of  his 
signature,  so  that  unless  there  was  a  special  agreement  between 
the  parties  that  this  should  not  be  done,  which  was  also  known 
to  the  holder,  the  payee  might  transfer  the  note,  making  the 
signer  a  second  indorser,  and  liable  as  such,  (s)  It  has  been 
held  in  England,  that  one  sued  as  indorser,  cannot  plead  in 
defence  that  the  note  was  not  indorsed  to  him.  (f) 

It  is  held  in  many  States  that  one  who  indorses  *  a  note  *  245 
in  blank  at  any  time  before  it  is  indorsed  by  the  payee  may 
be  held  as  an  original  promisor,  (w)  i  And  it  has  been  held  that 
this  is  a  conclusive  presumption  of  law,  and  cannot  be  rebutted 
by  evidence  showing  a  different  agreement.  (?;)  In  Louisiana, 
it  is  held  that  a  person  who  is  not  a  party,  putting  his  name  to 
a  note,  is  presumed  to  be  a  surety,  (yv') 

Whether  two  persons  who  indorse  a  bill  or  note  at  the  same 
time  arc  joint  indorsers,  or  first  and  second  indorsers,  is  open 
to  evidence  as  between  the  two  ;  and  one  who  indorses  at  the 
request  of  another  and  for  the  same  purpose  is  not  a  joint  indor- 
ser with  him.  (yiv')     It  is  indeed  a  general  rule,  that  as  between 

(s)  Crozer    v.  Chambers,   1   Spencer,  Schiffman,  20  IMo.  571 ;  Orrick  r.  Colston, 

256  ;    Riley    v.    Gerrish,   9    Cush.    10(3 ;  7  Gratt.  189  ;  Carroll  v.  Weld,  13  111.  682  ; 

Moies   V.  I3ird,  11  Mass.  440.     See  post,  Riggs  v.  Waldo,  2  Cal.  485.      See  ante,  p. 

Sect.  in.  p.  *  250.  *  243,  note  (ry). 

{t)  McGregor  v.   Rhodes,  6  E.  &  B.  (y)  Essex  Company   v.  Edmands,  12 

2GG.  Gray,  273. 

(h)  Irish  V.  Cutter,  31  Me.  536;  Riley  (vv)  Collins  v.  Trist,  20  La.  An.  348. 

r.   Gerrish,  9  Cush.   104  ;    Schneider  v.  (vw)  Shaw  v.  Knox,  98  Mass.  214. 

1  In  New  York,  when  a  person  other  than  the  payee  indorses  a  note  in  blank,  the 
payee  not  having  indorsed  it,  in  the  absence  of  proof  that  he  signed  as  surety,  he  is 
impliedly  liable  as  a  subsequent  indorser,  and  is  not  liable  to  any  one  with  notice  unless 
the  payee  has  first  assumed  the  liabilities  of  a  first  indorser,  Phelps  v.  Vischer,  50 
N.  Y.  69  ;  but  if  he  indorses  to  become  se<'urity  for  the  maker,  the  payee  may  maintain 
an  action  against  him  on  the  note,  or  indorse  without  recourse,  Coulter  v.  Richmond, 
59  N.  Y.  478.  In  some  States,  such  a  person  is  held  liable  as  a  joint  promisor  and  surety 
of  the  maker,  Pemberton  Bank  v.  Lougee,  108  Mass.  371  ;  Woodman  v.  Boothbv,  66 
Me.  389;  Walz  v.  Alback,  37  Md.  404  ;  ChaflFe  v.  Memphis,  &c.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.  'l93; 
Moynahan  v.  Hanaford,  42  Mich.  329  ;  in  Indiana,  as  an  indorser  simply,  Bronson  v. 
Alexander,  48  Ind.  244  ;  in  New  Jersey,  if  signing  at  the  making  of  the  note  as  surety, 
he  is  liaMe  as  a  joint  promisor;  if  signing  afterwards  as  surety,  he  is  liable  as  a 
guarantor,  Chaddock  v.  Vanness,  6  Vroom,  ."517;  in  Connecticut,  such  an  indorsement 
is  a  guaranty  of  the  collectibility  of  the  note  by  due  diligence,  Holbrook  v.  Camp,  38 
Conn.  23  ;  in  California,  it  imposes  the  same  liability  as  a  regular  indorsement,  Jones 
V.  Goodwin,  39  Cal.  493. 

275 


*  245  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

drawer,  acceptor,  and  indorsers,  tlicir  relation  and  responsibility 
may  be  explained  by  evidence,  (ra:) 

Notes  and  bills  are  usually  considered  totretlier ;  the  law  re- 
specting them  being  in  most  respects  the  same.  The  maker  of 
a  note  being-  liable,  generally,  in  the  same  way  as  the  acceptor 
of  a  bill.  And  if  an  instrument  be  so  far  ambiguous,  that  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  it  is  a  bill  or  a  note,  it  seems  that  the  holder 
may  treat  it  as  cither,  at  his  election,  (w) 

Among  the  points  of  difference,  it  has  sometimes  been  supposed 
that  a  bill  drawn  on  the  credit  of  goods  operates  as  a  bill  of  sale 
of  the  goods,  and  passes  the  property  in  them  to  one  who  dis- 
counts or  buys  the  bill.  This  is  not  quite  so.  A  bill  drawn  by 
a  consignor  or  a  consignee  of  goods,  may  stand  on  the  credit  of 
those  goods,  and  those  goods  may  be  given  as  security  for  the  bill 
to  one  who  discounts  it ;  but  it  seems  settled  that  the  mere  draw- 
ing of  the  bill,  and  selling  it  or  offering  it  for  discount,  has  not 
the  effect  of  transferring  the  goods,  {x)  But  where  the  bill  of 
lading  was  attached  to  the  bill  of  exchange,  and  the  bill  dis- 
counted by  a  bank  on  the  credit  of  the  bill  of  lading,  and  the 
consignee  on  whom  the  bill  was  drawn,  refused  acceptance, 
it  was  held  that  the  bank  took  the  goods  by  discounting  the 
bill,  (a-a;) 


SECTION  II. 

OP  THE   ESSENTIALS   OF   NEGOTIABLE   NOTES    AND   BILLS. 

Promissory  notes  were  made  negotiable  in  England  by  the  stat- 
ute of  III.  &  IV.  Anne ;  but  it  has  been  doubted  there  whether 
a  note,  payable  to  tiie  maker's  own  order,  was  a  negotiable 
note.  (?/)  ^     In  this  country  it  is  so  undoubtedly.     In  New  York 

(vx)  Lewis  V.  AVillianis,  4  Busli,  678.  (</)  Written  securities,  in  the  form  of 

(iv)  Lloyd    r.  Oliver,  12  E.    L.    &   E.  promissory   notes,   made    payable  lo  the 

424;  s.  c.  is  Q.  15.  471.  maker  or  liis  oiiler,  and  by  him  indorsed, 

{r)  Marine  F.  &  Ins.  Bank  v.  Jaunccy,  are    an   irregular    kind    of    instrument, 

3  Sandf.  207  ;  Wheeler  r.  Stone,  4  Gill,  wliieh  has   grown  into  use  among  nier- 

38;  Hopkins  v.  Heehe,  2»")  I'enn.  St.  85;  chants,  since  the  statute  of  Anne,  and  ia 

SaniLs  r.  Matthews,  27  Ala.  '.VM.  now  extremely  connnon  in  this  coimtry 

(xx)  The  Davenport  Nat.  Bank  v.  IIo-  and  in  ICngland.     At  what  i)recise  time 

meyer,  45  Mo.  145.  they  first  came  into  use,  and  what  was 

1  Sec  Goodwin  v.  Bobart":,  L.  H.  10  Ex.  337,  for  a  history  of  negotiable  securities,  in 
the  judgment  of  Coc/cbum,  C.  J. 

276 


CH.  XVI.] 


NOTES   AND   BILLS. 


246 


*  it  is  provided  by  statute,  that  a  promissory  note,  "  made    *  246 
payable   to   the   order   of  the   maker  thereof,  or  to   the 


the  occasion  which  gave  rise  to  thcin,  it 
is  iiiij)ossiblo'  to  say.  Baroii  Parke,  in 
Hoopur  ty.  Williauis,  2  Exch.  21,  cliarac- 
tcrizes  them  as  securities,  in  an  informal, 
not  to  say  absurd,  form,  probably  intro- 
duced long  after  tiie  statute  of  Anne  — 
for  what  good  reason  no  one  can  tell  — 
and  become  of  late  3'ears  exceedingly 
common.  So  Ciiief  Justice  Wikk,  in 
Brown  v.  De  Winton,  0  C.  B.  342,  said 
that  notes  in  this  form,  according  to  his 
experience,  which  extended  over  a  period 
exceeding  forty  years,  were  very  far 
from  uncommon.  Tiiey  seem  not  to 
have  attracted  the  attention  of  courts 
until  a  recent  date.  It  has  always  been 
the  received  opinion  in  this  country  that 
instruments  in  this  iorm  were  negotiable 
within  the  statute  of  Anne,  and  that  they 
differed  in  no  material  particular  from 
notes  in  tiie  ordinary  form.  iSuch  also,  ac- 
cording to  the  observation  of  eminent 
counsel,  in  Brown  v.  De  Winton,  was  the 
received  opinion  in  England,  until  the 
case  of  Fliglit  v.  Maclean,  16  M.  &  W. 
51.  Since  that  case,  the  nature  and  con- 
struction of  instruments  of  this  kind 
have  been  very  learnedly  and  elabor- 
ately discussed  by  the  three  j^rineipal 
common-law  courts  in  Westminster 
Hall.  The  case  of  Flight  v.  Maclean 
came  up  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  in 
1840.  The  declaration  stated  tiiat  the 
defendant  made  liis  promissory  note  in 
writing,  and  thereby  promised  to  pay  to 
the  order  of  tlie  defendant  £500  two 
months  after  date,  and  that  the  defendant 
then  indorsed  the  same  to  the  plaintiff. 
To  this  there  was  a  special  demurrer,  as- 
signing for  cause,  that  it  was  uncertain 
whether  tlie  plaintiff  meant  to  charge  the 
defendant  as  maker  or  as  indorser  of  the 
note,  and  that  a  note  payable  to  a  man's 
own  order  was  not  a  legal  instrument, 
and  could  not  be  negotiated.  The  court 
sustained  the  donmrrer  without  much 
discussion,  "  on  the  ground  that  tlie  in- 
strument in  question,  made  payable  to 
the  maker's  order,  was  not  a  promissory 
note  within  the  statute  of  Anne,  which 
requires  that  a  promissory  note,  to  be  as- 
signable, shall  lie  made  payable  by  the 
})arty  making  It  to  some  'other  person,'  or 
his  order,  or  unto  bearer."  During  the 
argument,  however,  ParLe,  B.,  put  to 
the  counsel  this  question :  "  Though  by 
the  law-merchant  the  note  cannot  be 
indorsed,  coulil  not  the  defendant  make 
this  a  promissory  note  by  indorsing  it 
to  another  person  f  "    This  case  was  fol- 


lowed tiie  next  year  in  the  Queen's 
Bench  by  the  case  of  Wood  r.  Myttcm, 
10  Q.  B.  805,  in  which  precisely  the  same 
qui'stion  was  presented  as  in  Flight  v. 
Maclean,  except  that  in  the  latter  it 
arose  on  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment, 
whereas  in  the  former  it  arose  on  a  sixcvil 
demmrei:  The  question  was  argued  at 
considerable  length,  and  Lord  Dtnman, 
after  a  very  minute  examination  of  the 
statute  of  Anne,  held  that  the  instrument 
declared  on  was  a  promissory  note  within 
the  terms  of  the  statute,  and  judgment 
was  given  for  the  plaintiff.  It  is  to  be 
observed,  however,  that  Patteson,  J.,  dur- 
ing the  argument  of  this  case,  put  to  the 
counsel  a  question  similar  to  that  put 
by  Baron  Parke,  in  Flight  v.  Maclean. 
"  Whatever,"  said  he,  "  may  be  the 
case  with  respect  to  a  note  like  this 
before  indorsement,  may  it  not,  as  soon 
as  it  is  indorsed,  come  within  the  statute, 
either  as  a  note  payable  to  bearer,  if  it  is 
indorsed  in  blank,  or  as  a  note  paj'able 
to  the  person  designated,  if  it  is  indorsed 
in  full  ?  "  In  1848  the  question  came  up 
again  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  in  the 
case  of  Hooper  r.  Williams,  2  Exch.  1.3. 
The  instrument  declared  on  in  this  ease  was 
similar  to  those  in  the  two  former  cases, 
being  made  payable  to  the  defendant's 
own  order,  and  by  him  indorsed  in  blank. 
The  pleader,  however,  adopting  the  sug- 
gestion of  Mr.  Baron  Parke  and  j\lr.  Jus- 
tice Puttcson,  declared  as  upon  a  note 
payable  to  bearer.  At  the  trial  the  de- 
fendant objected  that  there  was  a  vari- 
ance between  tiie  note  and  the  declaration, 
and  the  case  coming  before  the  court  in 
banc  upon  this  objection,  Parke,  B.,  in 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said: 
"  It  appears  to  us,  that  the  instrument  in 
this  case  was,  when  it  first  became  a 
binding  promissory  note,  a  note  payable 
to  bearer,  and  consequently  was  properly 
described  in  the  declaration.  This  view 
of  the  case  reconciles  the  decision  of 
this  court  in  Flight  r.  Maclean,  with  that 
of  the  Queen's  Bench  in  Wood  v.  Mytton ; 
but  not  the  reasons  given  for  those  decis- 
ions. In  the  case  in  this  court  the  dec- 
laration was  bad  on  special  demurrer, 
as  it  did  not  set  out  the  legal  effect  of  the 
instrument.  In  that  in  the  Queen's 
Bench,  the  motion  being  for  arrest  of 
judgment,  the  declaration  was,  in  sub- 
stance, good  ;  for  it  set  out  an  inartificial 
contract,  which  had  the  legal  effect  of  a 
valid  note  payable,  as  stated  on  the 
record,  to  the  plaintiff.     The  difference 


247 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  247  order  of  a  fictitious  *  person,  shall,  if  negotiated  by  the 
maker,  have  the  same  effect,  and  be  of  the  same  validity, 
as  against  the  maker,  and  all  persons  having  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  as  if  payable  to  bearer."  (z) 

In  some  of  our  States  there  are  statutory  provisions  permitting 
negotiable  paper  to  be  under  seal.^ 

In  Virginia  every  promissory  note  or  check  payable  at  a  par- 
ticular bank  or  banking-oftico,  and  every  inland  bill  payable  in 


between  the  two  courts  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  statute  is  of  no  practical  conse- 
quence, as,  in  our  view  of  the  case, 
securities  in  this  informal,  not  to  say 
absurd  form,  are  still  not  invalid  ;  and  it 
might  be  of  much  inconvenience  if  the}' 
were,  for  tiiere  is  no  douljt  that  tiiis  form 
of  note,  probably  introduced  long  after 
the  statute  of  Anne,  and  for  what  good 
reason  no  one  can  tell,  lias  become  of 
late  years  exceedingly  common  ;  and  it 
is  obvious  that,  until  they  are  indorsed, 
they  must  always  remain  in  the  hands  of 
the  maker  himsi'lf,  and  so  he  can  never 
be  liable  upon  tliem."  Shortly  after  the 
decision  in  tliis  case,  the  same  question 
came  up  in  tiie  Common  Bench,  in  the 
case  of  Erowu  v.  l)e  Winton  and  Gay  ;•. 
Lander,  6  C.  B.  .3o6.  In  Brown  v.  De 
Winton  the  question  came  up  in  the  same 
shape  as  in  Wood  ;■.  JNlytton,  and  Collimni, 
J.,  in  giving  the  judgment  of  the  court,  de- 
livered a  very  al)le  and  elaborate  opinion, 
in  which  he  agreed  entirely  witii  the  view 
taken  by  the  Court  of  Excliequer.  In 
Gay  r.  Lander,  the  question  was  pre- 
sented in  a  little  different  light.  It  is  a 
familiar  principle  in  the  law  of  negotia- 
ble paper,  that  when  a  note  is  made  pay- 
able to  A  or  his  order,  the  words  "  his 
order  "  impart  to  the  note  a  permanently 
assignable  quality  into  whose  hands  so- 
ever it  may  come;  so  that,  though  A 
indorse  tlie  note  to  B  specially,  without 
using  the  words  "or  his  order,"  yet  B  may 
indorse  it  in  turn  to  whomsoever  he 
pleases.  Tiie  point  raised  in  Gay  v.  Lan- 
der was,  whether  tjie  indorsement  should 
receive  the  same  eonstruction  in  the  case 
of  a  note  payal)le  to  tiie  order  of  the 
maker  and  l)y  him  indorsed,  and  the 
court  held  tiiat  it  sliould.  Cidliniin,  J.,  in 
delivering  tiie  ojiinion,  said :  "We  think 
that  the  princijiie  on  which  tlie  case  of 
Brown  v.  De  Winton  was  decided,  will 
extend  to  this  case.  Tiie  princijtle  on 
which  that  case  was  decided  is,  that  the 


note,  before  it  was  indorsed,  was  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  promise  to  pay  to  liie  ])erson  to 
whom  tlie  maker  should  afterwards,  by 
indorsement,  order  the  amount  to  be  ])aid  ; 
and  tliat,  after  the  note  is  indorsed  and 
circulated,  it  must  be  taken  as  against 
the  ])arty  so  making  and  indorsing  tlie 
note,  that  he  intended  that  his  indorse- 
ment should  have  the  same  effect  as  the 
indorsement  by  the  payee  of  a  note  pay- 
able to  the  order  of  a  person  other  than 
the  maker  would  have  had.  Now,  it  is 
well  established  that,  if  a  note  be  made 
payable  to  J.  S.  or  order,  and  J.  S.,  in 
such  case,  indorses  the  note  specially  to 
Smith  &  Co.,  without  adding  '  or  order, 
Smith  &  Co.  may  convey  a  good  title  to 
any  other  person  by  indorsement."  It 
might,  perhaps,  be  inferred  from  what 
M\  from  Bar(in  Purle  in  Hooper  r.  Wil- 
liams, that  he  entertained  a  different 
opinion  on  this  last  point,  but  the  jioint 
did  not  arise  in  that  case,  and  probably 
his  attention  was  not  particularly  directed 
to  it.  In  Absolon  v.  Marks,  IIQ.  B.  19, 
the  defendant  and  four  others  made  a 
joint  and  several  note  payable  to  their 
own  order,  and  all  indorsed  it  in  blank  ; 
and  upon  an  action  in  which  the  decda- 
ration  stated  that  the  defendant  made 
his  promissory  note  payable  to  his  own 
order,  and  indorsed  thesame  to  tlieplain- 
tiif  and  promised  to  pay  him  the  same 
according  to  its  tenor  and  effect.  Lord 
iJeniiuin  decided  that  the  note  having 
been  indorsed  was  thereby  made  certain 
and  a  good  promissory  note  under  the 
statute.  See  also  Kdie  v.  East  India  Co. 
2  Burr.  l-JK! ;  Woods  v.  Hidlev,  U 
Ilumiiii.  I'M;  Wardens,  &c.  of  St. 
•James  Church  v.  Moore,  1  Cart.  (Ind.) 
28!). 

(-)  1  N.  Y.  R.  S.  7G8,  §  5.  For  a  case 
illustrative  of  this  rule,  see  Central 
Bank  of  Brooklyn  v.  Lang,  1  Bosw. 
(N.  Y.)  202. 


^  In  general,  however,  a  note  under  seal  is  not  negotiable. 
Fonoier  of  England,  L.  K.  8  Q.  B.  374. 

278 


See  Crouch  v.  Credit 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND   BILLS.  *  248 

the  State,  is  negotiable  by  statute.  In  Kentucky  the  words 
*  "  or  order  "  are  not  necessary,  (a)  In  Ohio  a  power  of  *  248 
attorney  to  confess  judgment  may  be  inserted  in  a  nego- 
tiable note,  (i)  1  And  a  certificate  of  deposit  in  a  bank  has 
been  held  negotiable  by  our  highest  authority,  (c)  ^  The  word 
"  negotiable,"  however,  has  been  held  not  to  make  a  note  negotia- 
ble, though  it  may  show  an  intention  that  it  should  be  so.  (c?) 

It  is  sufficient  in  law  if  the  maker's  name  appears  in  the  note ; 
as,  "  I,  A.,  promise,"  &c.  But  signature  at  the  bottom  is  so 
usual,  that  the  want  of  it  would  taint  the  note  with  suspicion,  (e) 
Signature  of  a  note,  as  of  other  instruments,  is  often  made  by  a 
mark,  which  is  properly  attested.  But  it  is  held  that  a  signature 
by  a  mark  not  attested  is  valid,  and  evidence  may  establish  it  as 
a  signature,  (ee)  '^ 

As  the  negotiable  bill  or  note  is  intended  to  represent  and  take 
the  place  of  money,  it  must  be  payable  in  money,  and  not  in 
goods ;  (/)  *  and  although  it  has  been  held  in  this  country  that 

(a)  Maxwell  v.  Goodrum,  10  B.  Mon.  (ee)  Willoughby  i-.  Moulton,  47  N.  H. 

286.  205. 

(6)  Osborn  v.  Hawley,  19  Ohio,  130.  (/)  Jerome  v.  Whitney,  7  Johns.  321 ; 

(c)  Miller  v.  AiLsten,  13  How.  218.  Thomas  v.  Koosa,  7  Johns.  461 ;  Peay  v. 
See  also  Poorman  v.  Mills,  35  Cal.  118.  Pickett,  1  Nott  &  McC.  254;    Rhodes  v. 

(d)  Carruth  v.  Walker,  8  Cal.  252.  Lindley,  3  Hamm.  51 ;  Atkinson  v.  Manks, 

(e)  Taylor  v.  Dobbins,  1  Stra.  399;  1  Cowen,  691,  707  ;  Clark  r.  King,  2  Mass. 
Elliot  V.  Cooper,  2  Ld.  Kaym.  1376;  3  524;  Bunker  v.  Athearn,  35  Me.  364; 
Kent.  Com.  78.  Wingo  v.  McDowell,  8  Rich.  L.  446.     So 

1  An  agreement  in  a  note  to  pay  attorney's  fees  does  not  destroy  its  negotiability, 
Stoneman  i-.  Pyle,  ."^5  Ind.  103  ;  Sperry  v.  Horr,  32  la.  184;  Seaton  v.  Scovill,  18  Kan. 
433 ;  Gaar  v.  Louisville  Bank.  Co.,  11  JBush,  180.  Contra,  Woods  v.  North,  84  Penn.  St. 
407 ;  in  Trenton  Bank  v.  Gay,  63  Mo.  33,  as  rendering  it  uncertain,  and  in  Bullock  v. 
Taylor,  39  Mich.  137,  as  being  a  stipulation  for  a  penalty. 

■^  A  certificate  of  deposit  promising  payment  to  order  of  a  certain  number  of  dollars 
"in  currency"  is  negotiable,  Klauher  v.  BiggerstafF,  47  Wis.  551;  but  not  if  payable 
"in  current  funds,"  Johnson  v.  Henderson,  76  N.  C.  227.  A  certificate  of  deposit, 
payable  on  return  thereof  "  properly  indorsed,"  is  in  leaal  effect  a  promissory  note 
payable  on  demand,  and  the  princijiles  applicable  to  such  notes  should  be  applied  to 
these  certificates.  Cooleif,  C.  J.,  in  Tripp  v.  Ciirtenius,  36  Mich.  494.  So  if  payable 
"on  return  of  this  receipt."     Frank  r.  VVessels,  64  N.  Y.  155. 

■^  The  signature  to  a  note  may  be  made  with  a  printed  facsimile.  Pennington  v. 
Baehr,  48  Cal.  565.  In  Brook  v.  Hook,  L.  R.  6  Ex.  89,  it  was  declared,  by  a  divided 
court,  that  a  forged  signature  cannot  be  ratified.  Contra  in  Wellington  v.  Jackson,  121 
Mass.  157;  Hefner  v.  Vandolah,  62  111.  483.  One  inducing  another,  by  admitting  his 
signature,  to  take  a  bill  of  exchange,  cannot  show  it  io  be  a  forgery.  Continental  Bank 
V.  Commonwealth  Bank,  50  N.  Y.  575. 

*  A  l)ill  of  exchange  drawn  in  Canada  and  pavable  in  New  York  in  "  gold  dollars  " 
is  negotialde.  Chrysler  v.  Renois,  43  N.  Y.  209.  So  Black  r.  Ward,  27  Mich.  191, 
decided  tiiat  a  note  made  and  indorsed  in  Michigan  and  payable  in  Canada,  "  in  Canada 
currency,"  is  payable  in  money  and  negotiable.  So  too  in  Iowa,  ixnder  a  statute,  in 
Council  Bhiffs  Works  v.  Cuppey,  41  la.  104,  an  instrument  to  pay  a  certain  sum  in 
"railroad  ties  "  "  without  defalcation  "  was  declared,  by  a  divided  court,  to  be  negotiable. 
But  a  note  payable  in  "  currenaj  "  is  not  negotiable,  Hiise  v.  Hamblin,  29  la.  501;  nor 
prima  facie  if  payable  in  "  current  funds,"  Haddock  v.  Woods,  46  la.  433. 

279 


249 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


it  might  be  made  payable  in  bank-bills  which  were  at  the  time 
the  note  was  made  universally  current  as  cash,  (^)  the  weight  of 
authority  and  reason  is  against  this,  and  in  favor  of  the  English 
rule,  which  requires  them  to  be  payable  in  money.  (7i) 
*  249  The  *  payment  must  not  rest  upon  any  contingency  or  un- 
certain event,  (z)  Hence  a  draft  on  a  public  ofiicer,  as 
such,  is  not  negotiable,  because  it  is  presumably  drawn  against  a 
contingent  public  fund,  (y)  But  if  the  event  must  happen,  an 
uncertainty  as  to  the  time  of  its  happening  does  not  prevent 
the  bill    or  note  from   being   negotiable.  (^)  ^     And  if   the  bill 


the  bill  or  note,  in  order  to  be  negotiable, 
must  coiitiiiu  a  ])romise  for  the  piij'uicnt 
of  money  <"<('/,  and  not  for  tlie  jjaynient 
of  money  and  the  performance  of  some 
other  act.  Austin  i\  Burns,  10  Barb. 
643.  Therefore,  wiiere  a  note  contained 
a  promise  to  ileliver  up  horses  and  a 
wharf,  and  also  to  pay  money  at  a  par- 
ticular day,  it  was  held  not  to  be  within 
the  statute.  Martin  v.  Chauntry,  2  Stra. 
1271.  A  note,  however,  need  not  con- 
tain the  words  "promise  to  jtai/,"  in  order 
to  come  within  the  statute ;  it  is  sufficient 
if  it  contain  words  which,  upon  a  rea- 
sonable construction,  import  a  promise  to 
pay.  Therefore,  where  a  note  contained 
a  promise  by  the  maker  to  be  accountable 
to  A  or  order  for  .£100,  it  was  held  to  be 
within  the  statute.  Alorris  i\  Lee,  2  Ld. 
Raym.  1300,  8  Mod.  302,  1  Stra.  029. 
And  so  where  the  note  set  forth  in  the 
declaration  was,  "  I  acknowledge  myself 
to  be  indebted  to  A  in  .£ — ,  to  ho  jiaid  on 
demand,  for  value  received;"  on  demur- 
rer to  the  declaration,  the  court,  after 
solemn  argument,  held  that  this  was  a 
good  note  within  the  statute,  the  words 
"to  be  paid,"  amounting  to  a  promise  to 
pay;  observing,  that  the  same  words  in  a 
lease  would  anioimt  to  a  covenant  to  pay 
rent.  Casborne  v.  Dutton,  Selw.  N.  P. 
395.  See  also  Iljme  v.  Dewdney,  11  E. 
L.  &  E.  400,  n.;  2  Foster  (N.  II.),  183. 

('/)  Keith '•., Jones, 9, Johns.  i20;.Judah 
V.  Harris,  19  .Joims.  144;  Swetland  v. 
Creigh,  15  Ohio,  118;  Williams  v.  Sims, 
22  Ala.  512;  Harnes  r.  Gorman,  9  Kieli. 
L.  297;  Butler  v.  Taine,  8  Minn.  324. 
In  Iowa,  a  note  payable  in  articles  of 


personal  property  is  negotiable  by  sta- 
tute. See  Higgs  v.  Price,  3  Greene  (la.), 
31)4. 

(/()  McCormick  v.  Trotter,  10  S.  &  R. 
94 ;  Gray  v.  Donahoe,  4  Watts,  400  ; 
Ilasbrook  i;.  Palmer,  2  McLean,  10;  Fry 
V.  Rousseau,  3  McLean,  100 ;  Smith  v. 
Philadelphia  Bank,  14  Penn.  St.  525  ; 
Lowe  V.  Bliss,  34  111.  108 ;  3  Kent,  Com. 
75.  But  an  instrument  jiromising  to  pay 
a  sum  of  money,  to  one  or  order,  with 
interest,  as  per  interest  warrants  at- 
tached, or  upon  its  surrender  before 
due,  to  issue  stock  in  exchange  there- 
for, has  been  held  to  be  a  negotiable 
note.  Hodges  v.  Shules,  22  N.  Y.  (8 
Smith)  114.  See  also  London  S.  F. 
Society  v.  Hagerstown  Savings  Bank, 
30  Penn.  St.  489.  where  a  certificate  of 
deposit,  payable  in  currency,  was  held 
not  to  be  negotiable. 

(/)  Alexander  v.  Thomas,  2  E.  L.  & 
E.  280 ;  Storm  v.  Stirling,  28  E.  L.  &  E. 
108;  Austin  v.  Burns,  10  Barb.  043; 
Dawkes  v.  Lord  Lorane,  3  Wils.  207 ; 
Beardesley  ?-.  Baldwin,  2  Stra.  1151; 
Roberts  v.  Peake,  1  Burr.  323 ;  Cook 
V.  Satterlee,  0  Cowen,  108 ;  Van  Vacter 
".  Flack,  1  Sm.  &  M.  393;  Palmer  v. 
Pratt,  9  ,J.  B.  Moore,  358 ;  Dodge  v.  Em- 
erson, 34  Me.  96. 

(j)  Reeside  r.  Knox,  2  Whart.  233; 
Dvcr  V.  Covinston,  19  Penn.  St.  200 ; 
Raigauel  v.  Aylilf,  10  Ark.  594;  West 
v.  Foreman.  21  Ala.  400;  Kinney  v.  Lee, 
10  Tex.  155. 

(k)  Cooke  V.  Colehan,  2  Stra.  1217; 
Andrews  r.  Franklin,  1  Stra.  24  ;  Evans  v. 
Underwood,  1  Wils.  262;  Dawkes  v.  Lord 


^  A  note  payable  at  the  death  of  the  maker  is  negotiable,  Mahicr  v.  Keays,  28  La.  An. 
246  ;  but  not  if  payable  by  instahnents  to  cease  at  the  payee's  death,  Brooks  v.  Ilargreavcs, 
21  Mich.  2.54.  —  The  negotiability  of  a  premium  note  is  not  aHieted  l)y  a  memorandum 
therein  that  if  the  note  is  not  paid  at  maturity  the  premium  shall  he  considered  as  earned 
and  the  ])olicy  be  void  so  lon<:  as  the  note  remains  unpaid.  Kirk  v.  l)o{lgc  Co.  Ins.  Co., 
3'J  Wis.  i;i8.  Nor  docs  a  recital  in  a  imte  that  additional  interest  will  be  jiaid  "after  due," 
and  that  the  maker  has  de|)Obited  collateral  liecuritv  to  be  sold  on  certain  terms  on  its 

280 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES    AND    BILLS.  *  250 

direct  the  drawee  to  credit  the  payee  with  so  much  cash,  it  is  a 
good  bill.  (I) 

While  it  is  essential  to  a  bill  of  exchange  that  it  be  an  order 
or  positive  direction  to  the  drawee  to  make  the  payment,  it  is 
sufficient  if  it  be  substantially  so;  and  the  use  of  the  word 
"  please,"  or  any  equivalent  expression,  does  not  alter  the  char- 
acter of  the  instrument,  (m)  ^ 

If  the  amount  is  expressed  in  the  usual  way,  by  figures  in  the 
corner  or  at  the  bottom,  and  is  also  written  in  words  in  the  body 
of  the  note,  the  written  words  not  only  prevail  over  the  written 
figures,  but  are  said  to  do  this  so  conclusively,  that  evidence  is 
not  admissible  to  show  that  the  figures  were  right,  and  that  the 
words  were  omitted  by  mistake  from  the  body  of  the  note,  (w) 

Usually  bills  and  notes  express  the  consideration  by  saying 
"  for  value  received ; "  but  where  this  is  not  expressed,  it  is  im- 
plied by  law,  both  as  to  the  makers  and  the  acceptors  or  indorsers 
of  negotiable  bills  and  notes,  and  this  presumption  must  be 
rebutted  by  evidence  if  the  defence  rests  on  want  of  *  con-  *  250 
sideration,  (o)  ^     And  the  presumption  is  so  far  rebutted 

Lorane,  3  Wils.  207,  213 ;  Washington  An.  503,  it  was  held  that  a  note  payable 
County  Mutual  Insurance  Company  v.  "  one  day  after  tiie  trety  of  peas,"  ma- 
Miller,  2()  Vt.  77.  In  Seacord  v.  Burling,  tured  upon  the  termination  of  the  war. 
5  Denio,  441,  it  was  held  that  an  agree-  (/)  Ellison  v.  CoUingridgc,  9  C.  B. 
ment  in  writing  by  which  tlie  subscriber  570:  Lloyd  v.  Oliver,  12  E.  L.  &  E.  424; 
to  it  promised  to  pay  another  a  sum  of  s.  c.  18  Q.  B.  471. 

money  on  demand  with  interest,  and  ad-  (ni)  Wheatley  v.  Strobe,  12  Cal.  92. 

ded  bid  no  demand  is  to  be  made  as  long  as  (n)   Saunderson    v.  Piper,  4   Bing.  N. 

the  interest  is  paid,  was  not  a  promissory  C.  425. 

note.     And  see  IJiehardson  v.  Martyr,  30  (o)  Hatch  v.  Trayes,  11  A.  &  E.  702; 

E.  L.  &  E.  305;  Kelley  y.  Heinmingway,  Grant  v.  Da    Costa,  3    M.    &    Sel.  .351; 

13  111.  004.     In  Gaines  ?;.  Dorsett,  18  La.  Benjamin    v.   Tillman,  2   McLean,  213  ; 

non-payment,  affect  its  negotiabihty.  Towne  v.  Rice,  122  Mass.  67.  —  Mattison  v. 
Marks,  .'Jl  Mich.  421,  held  that  a  !iote  payable  "on  or  before  "  a  day  named,  was  payable 
at  a  time  sufKciently  certain,  the  maker  having  an  option  merely  to  pay  in  advance 
of  his  legal  liability.  Contra,  Stults  tJ.  Silva,  119  Mass.  137.  A  note  payable  at  a 
certain  time,  "or  before,"  if  made  out  of  the  profits  of  a  certain  machine,  is  negotiable. 
Ernst  V.  Steckman,  74  Penn.  St.  13  ;  Walker  v.  Woollen,  54  Ind.  164.  And  a  written 
promise  to  pay  money  to  a  corporation  or  order,  in  instalments  as  required  by  its 
directors,  is  a  good  note  on  demand  by  the  payee  or  its  directors.  White  c  Smith,  77 
111.  351  ;  Stillwell  v.  Craig,  58  Mo.  24.  But  a  promissory  note,  with  the  words  "  Given 
as  collateral  security  with  agreement"  in  the  margin,  is  not  negotiable.  Costelo  v. 
Crowell,  127  Mass.  293.  —  A  promissory  note  made  payable  a  specified  number  of 
months  after  date,  without  grace,  fdls  due  on  the  same  day  of  the  month  as  that  of  its 
date.     Roehner  v.  Knickerbocker  Ins.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  160. 

1  Thus  "  On  demand,  with  interest,  ]ilea«e  pay  J.  S.  or  order,  fifty-five  dollars,"  is 
a  promissory  note.     Almy  v.  Winslow,  126  Mass.  ^42. 

-  A  reference  to  the  consideration  in  a  note  does  not  affect  its  negotiability.  Taylor 
V.  Curry,  109  Mass.  36;  Collins  v.  Bradbury,  64  Me.  37.  In  Missouri,  by  s"tatntc,"the 
words  "for  value  received"  must  be  inserted,  to  make  a  note  negotiable.  Bailey  u. 
Smock,  61  Mo.  213. 

281 


*  250  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [cOOK  I. 

as  to  cast  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  holder,  by  evidence  making 
the  consideration  doubtful,  (jo)  The  defence  of  illegal  considera- 
tion is  not  generally  valid  if  it  be  not  illegal  in  the  State  where 
the  note  is  payable  and  the  action  brought,  {pp')  But  as  to  the 
question  of  usury,  the  note  is  governed  by  the  laws  of  the  State 
where  it  was  made,  (^pq) 

To  a  note  there  need  be  but  two  original  parties,  a  maker  and 
a  payee  ;  and  these  must  be  sufiiciently  certain.  Thus,  no  action 
can  be  maintained  on  a  note  payable  "  to  the  heirs,  executors, 
or  assigns  of  A."  (^q)  To  a  bill  there  are  three  parties,  drawer, 
drawee,  and  payee.  The  drawee  is  not  bound  until  acceptance ; 
and  then  having  become  the  acceptor,  he  is  regarded  as  prima- 
rily the  promisor,  and  the  drawer  only  collaterally ;  (r)  and  the 
drawer  is  therefore  liable  in  very  much  the  same  way  as  the 
indorser  of  a  note.  And  as  with  a  note  so  with  a  bill  of  ex- 
change, the  payee  must  be  sufficiently  certain,  that  is,  a  per- 
son capable  of  being  ascertained  at  the  time  the  instrument  is 
drawn,  (s) 

So  too  the  payer  should  be  certain ;  and  generally  if  one  who 
is  guardian  or  trustee  or  the  holder  of  some  office,  signs  with  his 
name,  adding  thereto  the  name  of  his  function  or  office,  with 
intent  to  make  himself  liable  only  in  that  capacity,  such  addition 
will  generally  be  held  only  as  words  of  description,  and  he  will 
be  personally  liable  on  the  note,  (ss)  ^  This  question  has  been 
considered  in  the  chapter  on  Agents,  and  the  section  on  the 
Signature  of  an  Agent. 

If  the  payee  be  a  fictitious  person,  an  innocent  indorsee  may 
sue  the  drawer  or  maker  ;  but  as  to  the  acceptor  it  has  been  held 


Bristol  !•.  Warner,  10  Conn.  7;  Poplcwell  E.  L.  &  E.  562;  Blair  v.  Bank  of  Ten- 

V.  Wilson,  1   Rtra.  2(54  ;  Lines  v.  Smith,  4  nessce,  11    Humph.    84.     But    a   drawee 

Fla.  47;  ("lark  v.  Schneider,  17  Mo.  295.  who  is  only  an  accommodation  acceptor, 

(p)   Delano  v.  Bartiett,  0   Cush.  804.  is  but  a  suret}'  for  the  drawer  for  most 

But  see  Kitch  v.  Keddinu:.  4  Sandf.  l.')0.  purposes.     Parks  v.  Ingram,  2  Foster  (N. 

(])]i)  Backman  v.  Jcnks,  55  Harb.  468.  II.),  283;  Steman  v.  Harrison,  42   renn. 

(l,<l)  Hull  .-.  Augustine,  23  Wis.  388.  St.  49. 

(7)  Bennington    v.   Dinsmore,  2   Gill,  (.s)  Yates  v.  Nash,  98  Eng.  C.  L.  581 ; 

348.     See  also  as  to  necessary  certainty  1  Parsons,  Notes  and  Bills,  61. 
of  the  payee,  Cowie  v.  Stirling,  6  E.  &  (.s.s)  P^oster  !-.  Fuller,  (i  Mass.  58;  Fiske 

B.  333.  V.  Eldridge,  12  Gray,  474. 

(r)  Attenborough    v.    Mackenzie,    30 


^  A  bill  of  exchange  headed  "  Office  of  B.  Co.,"  and  concluding  "charge  same  to 
account  of  B.  Co.,"  and  signed  "A.,  Pi-cs't,  C,  Scc'y,"  does  not  biud  the  signers 
personally.     Uitchcock  v.  Buchanan,  105  U.  S.  416. 

282 


CII.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  250 

that  be  is  answerable  only  if  he  knew  that  the  payee  was  ficti- 
tious.    But  we  should  have  some  doubts  of  this,  (t') 

Where  instruments  are  not  negotiable,  third  parties  may  be- 
come interested ;  but,  if  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  new  parties 
at  all,  it  is  only  with  much  qualification. 


SECTION  III. 

WHO   MAY   INDORSE. 

Only  negotiable  paper  can  be  indorsed,  in  the  technical  and 
legal  sense  of  this  word ;  and  an  indorsement  can  be  made  only 
by  the  original  payee  or  by  some  one  who  is  made  payee  by 
indorsement  to  him.  But  not  unfrequcntly  a  stranger  to  the  note 
writes  his  name  on  the  back,  and  then  the  question  arises  what 
is  his  relation  to  the  note.  On  this  point  we  have  already  stated 
that  there  is  a  singular  diversity  in  the  decisions  of  different 
States.     In  some  he  is  held  as  a  joint  promisor  or  surety,  (^tt)  ^ 

(t)  Collis    V.   Emett,   1    H.   Bl.    313;  u.  Thomas,  7  Mo.  440 ;  Lewis  y.  Harvey, 

Munet    V.   Gibson,   3    T.   U.   481.       See  18    id.    74;    Perry    v.    Barret,    id.    140; 

Stevens  v.  Strang,  2  Sandf.  188.  Schneider    v.    Scliift'man,    20     id.     571. 

{It)  In  Massachusetts,  Baker  y.  Briajscs,  Soutli   Carolina,   Stoney  v.  Beaubicn,  2 

8  Picli.  122,  130;    Tenny  v.  Prince,  4"  id.  McMullen,  313;  Baker  v.  Scott,  5  Kich. 

385;  Austin  ?•.  Boyd.  24  id  04;  Ilawkes  305;   Carpenter   v.  Oaks,  10   id.  17.     In 

V.Phillips,  7Gra3-,  284;  Draper  r.  Weld,  Louisiana,  such  party  is  regarded   as  a 

13  id.  580;  Union  Bank  r.  Willis,  8  Met.  surety.     McGuire  v.  Bosvvorth,  1  La.  An. 

504.     In  this  last  case  the  previous  cases  248;    Penny    v.   Parham,   id.    274.     The 

on    tliis    subject   in    Massachusetts    are  principle  upon  whicii  one  not  the  payee 

carefully  reviewed.     Maine,  Irish  v.  Cut-  signing  negotiable  paper  in  bhmk  ujion 

ter,  31  Maine,  536  ;  Leonard  v.  Wildes,  36  the  back  of  it  is  charged  as  a  promisor, 

id.   265 ;   Malbon   v.    Southard,   id.   147  ;  if   he  does  tliis  at  the  time  the  note  is 

Childs  V.  Wyinan,  44  id.  433;  Adams  v.  made,  is   stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Parker, 

Hardy,   32   id.    339.     Vermont,    Nasli   v.  in  Moies  v.  Bird,  11  Mass.  436,  440.     In 

Skinner,  12  Vt.  219;    Sylvester  v.  Dow-  Lewis    v.   Harvey,    18    Mo.    74^    Gamble, 

ner,  20  id.  355.     New  Hampshire,  Martin  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of    the  court, 

V.  Boyd,  11  N.  H.  885.     Missouri,  Powell  said  :  ''  We  think  the  strength  of    argu- 

'  But  the  rule  of  Union  Bank  v.  Willis,  supra,  does  not  apply  where  the  note  is 
payable  to  the  maker's  own  order,  and  there  can  be  only  a  promise  to  ])ay  such  per- 
son, as  the  maker  himself  makes  the  bearer  or  indorsee,  Stoddard  v.  Penuiman,  108 
Mass.  .306,  370;  or  if  wiien  negotiated  the  maker's  name  appears  first  on  the  back  of  the 
note,  Dubois  v.  Mason,  127  Mass.  37.  But  in  Massachusetts,  by  a  late  statute,  one  in- 
dorsing a  note  above  tlie  name  of  the  payee  is  liable  oidy  on  the  failure  of  tlic  maker  to 
pay,  and  not  absolutely.  Commonwealth  Bank  v.  Law,  127  Mass.  72.  If  a  stranger, 
for  a  sufficient  consideration,  ])laees  his  name  on  the  back  of  a  note  after  it  is  due, 
chany-es  tlic  rate  of  interest  on  the  face  of  the  note,  pays  the  interest  then  due,  and  sub- 
sequently pays  an  histalment  of  hitercst  at  the  changed  rate,  he  is  liable  as  an  original 
promisor.     Kodocanachi  v.  Buttrick,  125  Mass.  134. 

283 


250 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


in  others  as  a  guarantor,  {tu}  in  others  as  an  indorscr.  (^u)  In 
most  of  the  States  the  effect  of  such  indorsement  depends  on  the 
intention  of  the  parties,  ^vliich  may  be  shown  by  evidence  ;  Qw^ 


mcnt  is  decidedly  opposed  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  party  who  puts  his  name 
upon  tiie  back  of  a  note  to  wliich  he  is 
not  a  party,  whether  it  be  negotiable  or 
not,  is  to  be  held  only  as  an  indorser. 
We  tliink  that  he  is  to  be  taken  to  have 
assumed  the  obligation  arising  from  the 
act  of  putting  liis  name  upon  pajx'r  as  it 
then  was,  and  upon  wliicli  he  couhl  not 
then  be  an  indorser.  Shall  he,  then,  be 
lield  to  be  a  guarantor  or  a  maker  ?  In 
the  absence  of  all  extrinsic  evidence,  it  is 
but  giving  effect  to  Ids  signature  to  allow 
the  holder  to  treat  him  as  a  maker,  for 
that  is  tlie  effect  most  beneficial  to  tlie 
holder,  and  is  entirely  consistent  with  the 
meaning  of  his  signature." 

(tu)  As  in  Illinois,  Webster  v.  Cobb,  17 
111.  4-J9  ;  Klein  v.  Currier,  14  id.  237  ;  Car- 
roll V.  Weld,  13  id.  G82 ;  Camden  v.  Mc- 
Koy,  3  Scam.  437  ;  Cushman  v.  Dement, 
id.  497  ;  Smith  v.  Finch,  2  id.  321.  In 
Ohio,  Robinson  i-.  Abell,  17  Ohio,  36; 
Greenough  v.  Smead,  3  Ohio  St.  415.  In 
Kansas,  Firman  r.  Blood, 2  Kansas,  4%.  In 
Te.xas,  Carr  /•.  Rowland,  14  Texas,  275 ; 
Cook  V.  Southwick,  9  id.  G15.  In  Vir- 
ginia, Watson  r.  Hurt,  G  Gratt.  033.  In 
Connecticut,  Clark  v.  Merriam,  25  Conn. 
57G  ;  Beckwith  v.  Angell,  G  id.  315  ;  Per- 
kins r.  Catlin,  11  id.  213;  Hanson  v.  Sher- 
wood, 2G  id.  437.  Tiiese  cases  in  Con- 
necticut liold  that  such  indorsement  in 
blank  prima  Jacie  implies  a  contract  on 
the  part  of  the  indorser  tliat  tiie  note  is 
due  and  payable  according  to  its  tenor, 
that  the  maker  shall  be  of  ability  to  pay 
it  when  it  comes  to  maturity,  and  tliat  it 
is  collectible  by  the  use  of  due  diligence. 
In  Pennsylvania,  it  is  held,  that,  where  a 
negotiable  note  is  indorsed  by  one  not  a 
party  to  it,  the  presumption  from  the  pa- 
per is,  that  lie  indorsed  as  second  indorser 
for  the  acconnnodation  of  the  prior 
parties,  and  no  liability  would  attach  to 
him  so  long  as  the  note  remains  in  the 
liands  of  the  payee ;  but  when  made  at 
the  request  of  the  payee,  who  acts  upon 
the  faith  of  it,  it  imparts  a  guaranty. 
Schollenberger  v.  Nehf,  28  Penn.  St.  189. 
The  rule  adopted  in  (Jhio  differs  from 
that  which  prevails  in  Massachusetts  in 
this,  tliat  in  the  former  State  a  stranger 
indorsing  in  blank  is  jircsumed  to  be  a 
guarantor ;  in  the  latter  State  he  is  pre- 
Bumed  to  be  an  original  promisor.  But 
in  Ohio  such  person  may  be  charged  as 
maker  upc)n  ])roof  that  his  indorsement 
was  made  at  the  time  of  execution  by 

284 


the  other  party,  or  if  afterward,  that  it 
was  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement  or  in- 
tention that  he  should  become  responsi- 
ble from  the  date  of  the  execution.  In 
Massachusetts,  the  indorsement  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  made  at  the  time  of 
the  execution  of  the  note ;  so  that  the 
difference  in  fact  is  only  one  as  to  the 
presumi)tion  of  the  time  of  the  indorse- 
ment, though  it  has  not  been  so  stated  in 
the  Ohio  decision.  See  Greenough  v. 
Smead,  supra. 

(//•)  As  in  New  York,  Spies  v.  Gilmore, 
1  Comst.  321 ;  Ellis  v.  Brown,  6  Barb. 
282  ;  Waterbury  v.  Sinclair,  20  id.  455 ; 
Cottrell  V.  Conklin,  4  Duer,  45.  These 
decisions  overrule  the  earlier  ones  in  this 
State,  holding  such  indorser  liable  as  an 
original  ])romisor.  See  Ilerrick  v.  Car- 
man, 12  Johns.  159;  Cam])l)eU  v.  Butler; 
14  id.  349.  In  Indiana,  Wells  v.  Jackson, 
G  Blackf.  40  ;  Cecil  v.  Mix,  6  Ind.  478 ; 
Vore  V.  Hurst,  13  id.  551.  In  Tennessee, 
Camparree  v.  Brockway,  11  Humph.  355; 
Clouston  V.  Barbiere,  4  Sneed,  336.  In 
Iowa,  Fear  v.  Dunlap,  1  Greene,  331.  In 
California,  such  jxirty  is  called  a  guar- 
antor, but  his  liability  is  the  same  as  that 
of  an  indorser.  Riggs  v.  Waldo,  2  Cal. 
485 ;  Pierce  v.  Kennedy,  5  id.  138.  Mis- 
sissipjii,  Jennings  v.  Thomas,  13  S.  &  M. 
617,  5  id.  G27. 

(liv)  Clark  r.  Merriam,  25  Conn.  576; 
SchoUenberucr  r.  "N'ehf,  28  Reiin.  St.  180 ; 
Carroll  v.  Weld,  13  111.  082;  Cottrell  ». 
Conklin,  4  Duer,  45 ;  Lewis  !-.  Harvey,  18 
Mo.  74 ;  Barrows  v.  Lane,  5  Vt.  161 ; 
Knapp  V.  Parker,  6  id.  042 ;  Sandford  v. 
Norton,  14  id.  228;  Flint  v.  Day,  9  id. 
345;  Sylvester  v.  Downer,  20  id.  355; 
Beckwith  v.  Angell,  0  Conn.  315;  Perkins 
I'.  Catlin,  11  id.  218;  Chamiiion  (".Grif- 
fith, 13  Ohio,  228;  Robinson  r.  Abell,  17 
id.  36;  Greenough  v.  Smead,  3  Oliio  St. 
415;  Jennings  ;•.  Thomas,  13  S.  &M.G17, 
5  id.  G27 ;  Fear  i\  Dunlaj),  1  (ireene, 
Iowa,  331  ;  I'atterson  r.  Todd,  18  Penn. 
St.  4;^0.  Tliis  question  is  discussed  at 
length  in  Perkins  v.  Catlin,  U  Conn.  213, 
by  J/itnliin/tun,  J.,  who  said  :  "  The  in- 
dorsement is  not  controlled  by  the  oral 
testimony,  but  completed  acconling  to 
the  manifest  intention  of  the  jiarties. 
The  evidence  is  olTered  in  conformity 
with  the  familiar  rule,  that  tlie  law  docs 
not  imply  a  contract  where  an  express 
one  has  been  made."  Thus,  where  a 
part}'  guaranteed  a  note  "good,"  it  may 
be  shown  that  the  jilaintilf  took  the  note 


CH.  XVI.] 


NOTES   AND   BILLS. 


*251 


but  in  Massachusetts  the  presumption  tliat  lie  intended  to  be  an 
original  promisor  seems  to  be  conclusive,  (te) 

The  indorsement  of  a  bill  or  note  ]msses  no  property,  unless 
the  indorser  had  at  the  time  a  legal  property  in  the 
note,  (m)  *  And  therefore  a  married  woman  cannot  at  *  251 
common  law,  indorse  a  note  made  payable  to  her  before  or 
during  her  coverture,  unless  by  force  of  some  statutory  provi- 
sion, (v)  Nor  does  the  property  in  a  note  pass  by  indorsement, 
if  the  indorsee  knew  at  the  time  he  received  it  that  the  indorser 
had  no  right  to  make  the  transfer,  (w)  A  party  receiving  a  bill 
or  note  as  agent,  or  for  any  particular  purpose,  and  exceed- 
ing his  authority  or  violating  his  duty,  may  nevertheless  pass 
the   property    in   the   note  to   a   bona  fide   holder,  (.r)     But  no 


under  an  express  agreement  tliat  tlio 
plaintiff  should  run  his  own  risk  as  to 
the  solvency  of  the  maker,  the  plaintiff 
saying,  previous  to  the  signing  of  the 
guaranty,  that  it  was  only  a  guaranty, 
that  the  note  was  not  paid,  or  that  it  was 
genuine,  thougli  knowing  at  the  time  that 
it  was  of  different  legal  effect,  and  that 
the  defendant  was  ignorant  of  tlie  legal 
effect  of  it,  and  relied  upon  the  plaintiff's 
representation.  Cooke  i'.  Nathan,  16 
Barb.  o43.  See  in  this  connection,  the 
remarks  of  Woite,  J.,  in  Castle  v.  Can- 
dee,  16  Conn.  223. 

{tx)  In  Wright  i-.  Morse,  9  Gray,  So", 
the  defendant,  whose  name  was  on  the 
back  of  the  note,  and  who  was  not  the 
payee,  offered  to  sliow  tliat  at  the  time 
he  signed  the  note  it  was  agreed  by  the 
plaintiff,  the  payee  of  the  note,  and  the 
defendant,  that  if  the  maker  of  the  note 
should  arrive  safely  in  California,  tlie 
defendant  was  to  be  released,  and  the 
plaintiff  was  not  to  look  to  the  defendant 
for  the  payment  of  the  note,  and  that  the 
defendant  was  only  a  guarantor,  that,  if 
the  maker  should  arrive  safely  at  (Califor- 
nia, then  the  plaintiff  was  to  get  his  money 
from  the  maker.  Held  inadmissible.  See 
also  Essex  Co.  v.  Edmands,  12  Gray,  273. 

(u)  Mead  v.  Young.  4  T.  H.  28.  In  this 
case  it  was  held  that  in  an  action  by  the 
indorsee  against  the  acceptor  of  a  bill  of 
exchange,  drawn  payable  to  "A,  or  or- 
der," it  is  (lomjietent  for  the  defendant  to 
give  in  evidence  that  the  person  who  in- 
dorsed to  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  real 
payee,  though  he  be  of  the  same  name, 
and  though  there  be  no  addition  to  the 
name  of  the  paj'ee  on  the  bill.  The  in- 
dorsement and  delivery  nnist  both  be 
made  by  the  person  then  having  t!ie  legal 
interest  in  the  note ;  and  if  a  note  is  in- 


dorsed by  the  payee,  and  retained  in  his 
possession,  and  after  his  death  is  deliv- 
ered by  his  executor  to  the  person  to 
whom  it  was  indorsed,  the  title  to  the 
note  is  not  thus  transferred.  Bromage  v. 
Lloyd,  1  Exch.  31 ;  Lloj'd  v.  Howard,  1 
E.  L.  &  E.  227,  n. ;  Awde  v.  Dixon,  5  E. 
L.  &  E.  512  ;  s.  c.  6  Exch.  869 ;  Prescott 
?\  Brinsley,  6  Cush.  2o3;  Clark  r.  Boyd, 
2  Hamm.  56;  Clark  r.  Sigourney,  17 
Conn.  511.  See  also  Bay  v.  Coddington, 
5  Johns.  Ch.  54 ;  Lawrence  v.  Stonington 
Bank,  6  Conn.  521. 

(r)  Savage  v.  King,  17  Me.  301.  See 
Barlow  r.  Bishop,  1  East,  432;  Common- 
wealth r.  Manley,  12  Pick.  173. 

(if)  See  Roberts  v.  Eden,  1  B.  &  P. 
398;  Stoddard  r.  Kimball,  (i  Cush.  470. 

(j-)  Thus  where  the  drawer  of  a  bill 
of  exchange  which  had  been  accepted, 
wrote  his  name  across  the  back  of  it,  and 
delivered  it  to  A  to  get  it  discounted,  and 
A,  while  the  bill  was  yet  running,  de- 
posited it  with  B,  as  security  for  money 
advanced  to  himself,  but  without  any 
fraud  in  B,  this  was  held  to  be  a  valid  in- 
dorsement from  the.  drawer  to  B.  Palmer 
v.  Picliards,  1  E.  L.  &  E.  529.  In  this 
case,  Parke,  Baron,  said  :  "  I  think  this 
was  a  perfectly  good  indorsement  from 
Edwards  to  Tingey.  If  the  allegation  in 
the  declaration  were  that  there  liad  been 
an  indorsement  of  this  bill  frmn  Edwards 
to  Brown,  it  would  be  a  question  of  fact 
wiiether  the  writing  of  Edwards's  name 
on  the  back  of  the  instrument,  accom- 
panied by  a  delivery  of  it  to  Brown, 
meant  to  transfer  the  property'  in  the 
bill  to  him,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  in- 
dorse it  as  his  own,  or  merely  to  hand  it 
over  to  another  party.  As  to  the  case 
which  has  been  cited,  of  Lloyd  v.  How- 
ard, I  think  the  decision  there  was  per- 

285 


*252 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  252  assignee,  cyen  for  *  good  consideration,  can  hold  the  bill 
or  note,  if  he  knew  or  had  direct  and  sufficient  means  of 
knowing  that  the  transfer  of  the  same  to  him  was  wrongful  or 
unauthorized.  The  assignor  may  have  held  the  bill  or  note  by 
indorsement  to  him;  and  as  an  indorsement  may  always  be 
restricted  or  conditioned  at  the  pleasure  of  the  indorser,  the 
assignor  was  bound  to  obey  such  restriction  ;  and  an  assignee 
by  indorsement,  who  knows  that  the  indorsement  to  him  was 
made  in  disregard  of  such  restriction,  has  no  property  in  the  bill 
or  note.  (?/)  If  a  negotiable  bill  or  note  be  indorsed  for  consid- 
eration, so  that  the  whole  property  passes  to  the  indorsee,  its 
negotiable  quality  passes  with  it ;  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
this  negotiability  can  be  restrained  by  the  indorsement.  (2)  But 
where  the  indorsement  is  without  consideration,  and  is  intended 
merely  to  give  the  indorsee  authority  to  receive  money  for  the 
indorser,  there  the  restriction  operates  ;  and  if  such  indorsee  again 
indorses  it  over,  the  second  indorsee  cannot  hold  it,  because  the 
first  indorsement  gave  him  notice  that  the  first  indorsee  had  no 
power  to  transfer  the  note,  (a) 

If  a  note  is  once  indorsed  in  blank  it  is  thereafter  transferable 


fectly  right,  and  an  autliority  for  saying 
tliat  there  was  no  indorsement  from  Ed- 
wards to  Brown  ;  for  tlie  mere  writing  of 
a  man's  name  on  the  back  of  an  instru- 
ment is  not  enough  for  that  purpose ;  it 
is  only  one  act  towards  it  ;  and  Llo^'d  v. 
Howard  shows  that  tlie  writing  the  name 
and  lianding  tiie  instrument  to  a  third 
person,  witiiout  any  intention  to  pass  the 
property  in  it  to  that  person,  is  insuffi- 
cient to  constitute  an  in(h)rsement  to 
that  person.  But  if  a  man  writes  his 
name  on  the  hack  of  a  bill  of  exchange 
in  order  that  it  may  be  negotiated,  and 
any  person  afterwards  receives  it  for 
value,  it  does  not  lie  in  the  indorser's 
moutli  to  say  that  the  bill  was  not  in- 
dorscil  to  that  person  ;  and  it  has  been 
the  established  rule  ever  since  the  case  of 
Collins  V.  Martin,  1  B.  &  V.  648,  that  any 
person  who  thus  takes  a  bill  for  value  is 
tiie  indorsee  of  it.  I  think  that  Eilwards, 
by  putting  liis  name  on  the  back  of  this 
Ijill,  and  ])uttiiig  it  into  the  hands  of  his 
agent,  with  authority  to  represent  him, 
who  hands  it  over  to  a  third  jiart}',  ought 
not  to  be  permitted  to  say  that  he  did 
not  indorse  it  to  any  ])erson  who  took  it 
for  value  from  his  agent.  The  (juestion, 
therefore,  here  is,  whether,  tiiere  lieing 
no  proof  of  any  fraud  in  Tingey,  he  luay 

286 


not  be  considered  a  holder  of  the  bill, 
and  Edwards,  as  having  indorsed  it  to 
him.  The  case  is  distinguishable  from 
Lloyd  r.  Howard  in  this,  that  if  this  bill 
were  indorsed  to  Brown  solely  with  tiie 
view  to  enable  him  to  pass  it  away,  and 
not  to  treat  him  as  owner  of  the  bill  him- 
self, no  property  passed  from  Edwards 
to  him  ;  and  if  such  jiroperty  had  been 
alleged,  the  ease  of  Lloyd  r.  Howard 
would  api)ly.  Biit  that  decision  does  not 
hold  witli  resi)ect  to  a  third  person  who 
received  it  from  the  agent  whom  Ed- 
wards intrusted  with  it,  and  who  has 
paid  value  for  it."  See  also  JNlarston  v. 
Allen,  8  M.  &  W.  494;  Andrews  v.  Bond, 
IG  Barb,  (j-j.'] ;  Smith  r.  Braine.  3  E.  L.  & 
E.  :)7i);  Moodv  r.  Threlkeld,  18  Ga.  555; 
Stoddard  i-.  Kiml)all,  G  Cush.  409. 

(jy)  Anclier!.'.  Bank  of  Eusland,  Dougl. 
G.37';  Siffournevr.  Llovd,  8'B.  &  C.  622; 
s.  c.  .3  Mo.  &  P.  229,  5  jiing.  525;  Hobert- 
son  V.  Kensington,  4  'I'aunt.  SO.  Sec  also 
Bolton  V.  Pidler,  1  B.  &  P.  539;  Rams- 
bottom  r.  Cator,  1  Stark.  228;  Savage  v. 
Aldren,  2  Stark.  2:]2. 

(?)   See  ante,  p.  *2;>9. 

(a)  Edie  i'.  East  India  Co.  2  Burr. 
1210,  per  Wihnot,  J.  ;  Wilson  i\  Holmes, 
5  Mass.  54;3 ;  Power  v.  Finnic,  4  Call,  411, 
per  Roane,  J. 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  253 

by  mere  delivery  so  long  as  the  indorsement  continues  blank,  and 
its  negotiability  cannot  be  restricted  by  subsequent  special  in- 
dorsements, but  the  holder  may  strike  them  all  out  and  recover 
under  the  blank  indorsement,  by  filling  that  so  as  to  make  the 
note  payable  to  himself,  (i)  Where  one  has  acquired  a  bill  by 
indorsement,  bond  fide,  he  may  hold  it  and  recover  upon  it,  al- 
though earlier  parties  knew  that  it  was  transferred  wrongfully 
or  without  authority,  (c) 

*  If  a  negotiable  bill  or  note  which  is  open  to  any  defence  *  253 
that  can  be  made  only  against  a  holder  with  knowledge  or 
notice,  pass  by  indorsement,  for  consideration,  to  a  holder  without 
knowledge  or  notice,  against  whom  the  defence  cannot  be  made, 
and  this  holder  indorse  it  over  for  consideration  to  a  party  who 
has  knowledge  or  notice  of  the  defence,  such  indorsee  may  never- 
theless recover  on  the  note,  because  he  stands  on  the  right  of  his 
indorser.  The  party  bound  to  pay  it  to  the  holder  without  notice 
is  not  injured  by  being  bound  to  pay  it  to  his  indorsee  ;  and  the 
innocent  holder  has  not  only  the  right  of  enforcing  payment, 
but  of  transferring  the  note  by  indorsement ;  and  with  it  all  his 
rights,  {d) 

No  party  can  be  at  once  plaintiff  and  defendant ;  hence  a  firm 
which  is  promisee  of  a  note,  cannot  sue  a  firm  that  is  promisor,  if 
any  person  is  a  member  of  both  firms ;  and  a  note  signed  by  sev- 
eral makers  and  payable  to  one  of  them,  cannot  be  sued  by  him. 
But  if  any  such  note  passes  by  indorsement  into  the  hands  of  a 
third  party,  he  may  sue  all  the  parties  to  the  note,  (e) 

Any  person  may  accept  or  indorse  a  bill,  or  sign  or  indorse  a 
note,  as  agent  for  another ;  and  the  principal  is  held  and  not  the 
agent,  if  there  was  sufficient  authority  for  the  act,  and  the  act 
itself  was  properly  done.  A  general  authority  to  transact  busi- 
ness, however  wide  in  its  terms,  is  seldom  construed  to  include 
the  power  of  making  or  indorsing  negotiable  paper,  (ee)     But  an 

(h)  Smith  V.  Clarke,  1  Esp.  180,  Pcake  gave  money  for  it,  it  is  a  good  note  as  to 

Cas.  225,  per  Lord  Kenyan;   Mitchell  v.  him,  unless  there  should  be  some  fraud  or 

Fuller,  15  Penn.  St.  268.  equity  against  him  appearing  in  the  case." 

((•)  And  tills  altliough  his  indorser  [d]  Ilascall  y.  Wliitmore,  19  Me.  102 ; 
acquired  the  bill  or  note  by  fraud.  Salt-  Thomas  v.  Newton,  2  C.  &  P.  600;  Solo- 
marsh  V.  Tuthill,  13  Ala.  .390.  Sec  also  mons  v.  Bank  of  ICngland,  lo  East,  lo5 ; 
Haly  V.  Lane,  2  Atk.  181,  where  Lord  Smith  v.  Hiscock,  14  Me.  449 ;  Chalmers 
Hardwicke  is  reported  to  have  said:  v.  Lanion,  1  Camp.  38o. 
"  Where  tliere  is  a  negotiable  note,  and  ((;)  Ileywood  v.  Wingate,  14  N.  H.  73. 
it  comes   into   the   hands  of   a  third  or  See  ante,  p  *  165. 

fourth    indorsee,    though    some    of    the  (ee)  Lawrence  v.   Gebhard,   41    Barb, 

former  indorsees  might  not  pay  a  valu-  575,     is    an    interesting    case    on    this 

able  consideration,  yet  if  the  last  indorsee  question. 

287 


*254 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


authority  from  a  payee  to  indorse  a  note  })ayal)lc  to  his  order,  is 
not  to  be  inferred  from  the  mere  act  of  delivery.  (/)  And  when 
authorized  the  agent  should  show  unequivocally  that  he  acts  only 
as  agent,  if  he  intends  not  to  bind  himself ;  and  he  seems  to  be 
held  to  this  obligation  more  strictly  in  England,  (^)  than  in  this 
country.  (7i) 


*254 


*  SECTION   IV. 


OP   INDORSEMENT   AFTER   MATURITY. 


Notes  and  bills  are  usually  transferred  by  indorsement  before 
they  are  due.  But  they  may  be  so  transferred  after  they  are  due, 
and  before  they  are  paid.  There  is,  however,  a  very  important 
difference  between  the  effect  of  the  transfer  of  a  bill  or  note 
before  its  maturity,  and  that  of  such  transfer  when  the  bill  or 
note  is  overdue.  The  bond  fide  holder  of  a  note  by  indorsement 
before  maturity  takes  it  subject  to  no  equities  existing  between 
his  assignor  and  the  promisor  which  are  not  indicated  on  the  face 
of  the  note,  (i)  and  to  none  which  do  not  exist  at  the  time  of  the 
transfer.  (/)  It  was  once  much  questioned  whether  he  who  re- 
ceived a  note  under  circumstances  of  suspicion  was  not  bound  to 
ascertain  for  himself,  and  at  his  own  peril,  that  the  note  came 
rightfully  into  his  hands  ;  and  therefore  a  promisor  might  defend 
against  the  note,  by  showing  that  he  had  lost  it,  or  that  it  was 
stolen  from  him,  or  by  any  other  similar  defence,  showing  also 
that  this  might  have  been  ascertained  by  the  holder  before  receiv- 
ing the  note.  (]c)     But  the  weight  of  recent  authority  is  in  favor 


(/)  Ilarrop  v.  Fishor,  100  Eng.  C.  L. 
196  ;  s.  c.  10  J.  Scott,  l'.)(3. 

(,))  Nicholls  V.  Diamond,  24  E.  L.  &E. 
403;  Marc  i-.  Charles,  :J1  E.  L.  &  E.  138; 
8.  c.  5  E.  &  B.  978. 

(h)  Hicks  V.  Hinde,  9  Barb.  528; 
Baljcock  V.  Beman,  1  Kern.  200  ;  De  Witt 
V.  Waltcjn,  5  Seld.  571.     See  ante,  p.  *52. 

(/)  ]5ro\vn  r.  Davies,  :>  T.  R.  82,  per 
BnlU'.r,  J. ;  Hall  v.  Wilson,  10  Barh.  548  ; 
Fletcher  r.  Gusliec,  32  ]\lc.  587  ;  Walker 
V.  Davis,  33  id.  510;  Gw^nn  r.  Lee,  9 
Gill,  138;  Kohlman  v.  Ludwip,  5  La. 
An.  33.  And  the  doctrine  of  /w  jifiuhtm 
is  that  whoever  jturchascs  jjrojierty  wliicli 
is  at  that  time  in  litigation,  takes  it  sub- 
ject to  any  decree  or  jiidj^iiient  made  in 
respect  to  it  in  tlie  pending  suit,  is  held 

288 


not  to  applj'  to  negotiable  notes.  Wins- 
ton r.  Weslfeldt,  22  Ala.  760. 

( /)  Furniss  v.  Gilchrist,  1  Sandf. 
53.  " 

(/.)  In  Gill  V.  Cubitt,  3  B.  &  C.  466, 
where  a  bill  of  exchange  was  stolen  dur- 
ing the  night,  and  taken  to  the  office  of  a 
discount  broker  early  in  the  following 
morning  by  a  person  whose  features  were 
known,  but  whose  name  was  unknown  to 
the  ])roker,  and  the  latter,  being  satisfied 
with  the  name  of  the  acceptor,  discounted 
the  l)ill,  according  to  his  usual  jiractice, 
without  making  any  inquiry  of  the  i>er- 
son  who  brought  it  ;  it  was  lirUl  that,  in 
an  action  on  tlu;  bill  by  the  broker  against 
the  accej)tor,  the  jury  were  pro)>erly  di- 
rected to  find  a  verdict  for  the  defendant, 


en.  XVI. J  NOTES    AND   BILLS.  *  255 

of  the  rule  that  such  holder  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the 
note,  unless  *  he  is  a  wilful  party  to  the  wrong  by  whicli  it  *  255 
comes  into  his  hands,  or,  perhaps,  has  been  guilty  of  such 
negligence  as  amounts  to  constructive  fraud  ;  (Z)  ^  for  even  gross 
negligem^e  alone  would  not  deprive  him  of  his  right,  (w)  ^  But 
the  authorities  on  this  subject  are  not,  as  our  note  will  show,  in 
entire  agreement.  The  law  is  certainly  otherwise,  however,  if 
the  bill  or  note  were  transferred  to  him  when  overdue,  (n)  It 
comes  to  him  then  discredited ;  he  is  put  upon  his  guard ;  and, 
although  he  pays  a  full  consideration  for  it,  he  receives  nothing 
but  the  title  and  rights  of  his  assignor.  Sucli  a  bill  or  note  can 
no  longer  represent  a  distinct  and  definite  credit,  or  money  to  be 
paid  at  a  certain  period  ;  and  as  it  no  longer  answers  the  purpose 
or  performs  the  functions  of  negotiable  paper,  it  no  longer  shares 
the  privileges  of  such  instruments.  And  it  is  therefore  said  that 
any  defence  which  might  be  made  against  the  assignor  may  be 
made  available  against  the  assignee ;  (o)  and  where  a  note  was 

if  they  thought  that  the  plaintiff  had  J.,  says  :  "  I  never  could  understand  what 
taken  the  bill  under  circumstances  which  is  meant  by  a  party's  taking  a  bill  under 
ouglit  to  iiave  excited  the  suspicion  of  a  circumstances  wliich  ought  to  liave  ex- 
prudent  and  careful  man ;  and  they  hav-  cited  the  suspicion  of  a  prudent  man." 
ing  found  for  the  defendant,  the  court  re-  But  the  authority  of  tliese  cases  is  de- 
fused to  disturb  the  verdict.  Down  v.  nied  in  Pringle  v.  Piiillips,  5  Sandf.  157, 
Hailing,  4  B.  &  C.  330;  Smith  i\  Mec.  &  and  an  opposite  doctrine  strongly  main- 
Tran.  Bk.  6  La.  An.  610.  tained  and  decided.     So  also  in  Roth  & 

{/)  Miller  v.  Race,  1  Burr.  452;  Law-  Co.  i'.  Colvin,  Allen  &   Co.  32   Vt.   125, 

son  V.  Weston,  4  P]sp.  56 ;    Goodman   v.  where    tiie    law   is    fully   examined    by 

Harvej',  6  Nev.  &,  M.  372 ;  Cone  v.  Bald-  Poland,  J.,  and  the  doctrine   of    Gill    v. 

win,  12  Pick.  545 ;  Matthews  v.  Poy thress,  Cubitt  reaffirmed,  and  the  case  of  Pringle 

4  Ga.  287  ;  Raphael  v.  Bank  of  England,  »>■  Phillips  fully  approved.     And  see  Mer- 

33  E.  L.  &  E.  276,  17  C.  B.  101 ;   Magee  riani  v.  Granite  Bank,  8  Gray,  254 ;  and 

V.  Badger,  30  Barb.  246.    See  contra,  Nut-  Crosby  v.  Grant,  .36  N.  H.  278 ;  Hall  v. 

ter  V.  Stover,  48  Me.  163.  Hale,  8  Conn.  336 ;  Sandford  i'.  Norton, 

(m)  "Gross   negligence  may   be    evi-  14  Vt.  228 ;  Tutor  r.  Patton,  13  La.  213; 

dence  of  mala  Jides,  Ijut  is  not  the  same  Greneaux  v.  Wheeler,  6  Tex.  515. 

thing.     We    have    shaken    off    the    last  (n)  Clialmers  i'.  Lanion,  1  Camp.  383 ; 

remnant  of  the  contrary  doctrine."     Per  Thomas  v.  Newton,  2  C.  &  P.  606;  Smith 

Lord  Denmnn.  Goodman  v.  Harvey,  4  A.  v.  Hiscock,  14  Me.  449 ;  Hascall  v.  Wliit- 

&  E.  870,  6  Nev.  &  M.  372.     It  is  a  ques-  more,  19  id.  102. 

tion  for  the  jury  whether  tlie  party  taking  (o)  Brown  v.  Davics,  3  T.  R.  80,  per 
the  bill  was  guiltv  of  bad  faith.  See  Bnller,  J. ;  Beek  v.  Roblev,  1  H.  Bl.  89,  n. 
Cimliffe  V.  Booth,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  821.  In  (d)  ;  Howard  v.  Ames,  3  Met.  308;  Mac- 
Crook  V.  Jadis,  5  B.  &  Ad.  909,  Putteson,  kay  v.  Holland,  4  id.  09;  Potter  v.  Tyler, 

'  Johnson  v.  Way,  27  Ohio  St.  374. 

2  One  who  purchases  negotiable  paper  before  due  for  a  valuable  consideration,  in 
good  faith  and  without  actual  knowledge  or  notice  of  any  defect  of  title,  although  guilty 
of  gross  negligence,  holds  it  bv  a  title  valid  as  against  every  other  person.  Seybcl 
V.  Currency  Bank,  54  N.  Y.  288;  First  Bank  v.  Goodsell,  "l07  Mass.  149;  Phelan 
V.  Moss,  67  Penn.  St.  59;  Comstock  v.  Hannah,  76  111.  530;  Shreeves  v.  Allen,  79 
111.  553.^- A  purchaser  for  value,  of  unmatured  commercial  paper,  with  interest  over- 
due is  not,  from  that  fact  alone,  affected  with  notice  of  prior  equities  or  infirmities  in 
the  title.  Cromwell  c.  Sac  County,  96  U.  S.  51 ;  Kelley  v.  Whitney,  45  Wis.  110. 
VOL.  I.  19  289 


*256 


THE   LAW    OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


sold  and  delivered  before  maturity  but  not  indorsed  until 
*  256  after  maturity,  it  was  *  held  open  to  the  same  defences  as 
if  it  had  been  transferred  after  dishonor,  (jo)  This  rule 
has,  however,  this  important  qualification.  It  is  said  by  high 
authorities,  and  on  ijood  reason,  that  the  defence  must  arise  from 
the  note  itself,  or  the  transaction  in  which  the  note  originated, 
and  not  from  any  collateral  matter,  {q) 

Although  paper  negotiated  when  overdue  is  subject  to  equitable 
defences,  yet  a  demand  must  be  made  on  the  acceptor  or  maker 
within  reasonable  time,  and  reasonable  notice  must  be  given  to  an 
indorser,  or  he  will  be  discharged,  (r) 

As  between  the  original  parties  to  negotiable  paper  the  consid- 
eration may  always  be  inquired  into ;  and  so  it  may  as  between 
indorser  and  indorsee.  (5)  But  an  action  by  an  indorsee  against 
the  maker  cannot  be  defeated  by  showing  that  no  consideration 


2  id.  58;  McNeil  v.  McDonak],  1  Hill 
(S.  C),  1 ;  Hosteller  r.  Bosh,  7  Ired.  Eq. 
39;  Coniiery  v.  Kendall,  5  La.  An.  515; 
Sawyer  v.  Hoovey,  id.  153;  Lancaster 
Bank  v.  Woodward,  18  Penn.  St.  357  ; 
Clay  V.  Cottrell,  id.  408.  —  The  burden  of 
proving,  however,  that  the  note  was  in- 
dorsed after  it  was  overdue,  in  order  to 
let  in  his  equities,  is  on  the  defendant; 
for  the  presumption  is  that  the  indorse- 
ment was  made  at  or  soon  after  the  date 
of  the  note,  or  at  least  before  its  matur- 
ity. Burnhara  v.  Wood,  8  N.  H.  334; 
Burnham  v.  Webster,  19  Me.  232  ;  Ranger 
V.  Carey,  1  Met.  369;  Cain  v.  Spann,  1 
McMuU.  258  ;  Washburn  i\  Ramsdell,  1» 
Vt.  299.  —  And  this  burden  is  not  dis- 
charged by  proof  that  the  note  was 
transferred  and  delivered  to  the  plain- 
tiff before  it  was  dishonored,  but  was 
not  indorsed  until  afterwards.  Ranger 
V.  Carey,  1  Met.  369.  —  Suspicious  cir- 
cumstances, however,  may  rebut  this 
presumption.  Snyder  v.  Riley,  6  Barr, 
165  ;  Tarns  v.  Way,  13  Penn.  St.  222. 

{p)  Southard  r.  Porter,  43  N.  H.  239. 

(7)  Burrough  v.  Moss,  10  B.  &  C.  558; 
Whitehead  v.  Walker,  10  M.  &  W.  696; 
Carruthers  v.  West,  11  Q.  B.  143;  Hngiies 
I'.  Large,  2  Barr,  103;  Cumberland  Bank 
V.  Ilann,  3  Harrison,  223;  CiuuidkT  v. 
Drew,  6  N.  H.  40'.) ;  Robinson  v.  layman, 
10  Conn.  81;  Britton  v.  Bishop,  ll  Vt. 
70;  Robertson  v.  Breedlove,  7  Port.  (Ala.) 
541 ;  Tuscumliia  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Rhodes,  8 
Ala.  206;  Tinsley  v.  Beall,  2  Ga.  134; 
Hankins  v.  Shoup,  2  Cart.  (Ind.)  342; 
McAlpin  V.  Wingard,  2  Rich.  L.  547  ; 
Oulds  V.  Harrison,  2«  E.  L.  &  E.  524,  10 

290 


Exch.  572 ;  Arnot  i\  Woodburn,  35  Mo. 
99.  In  Massachusetts  and  South  Caro- 
lina all  set-offs  between  the  original  par- 
ties existing  at  the  time  of  the  transfer 
of  the  title  are  allowed.  Sargent  v. 
Southgate,  5  Pick.  312 ;  Nixon  v.  Eng- 
lish, 3  McCord,  549;  Perry  v.  Mays,  2 
Bailey,  354;  Cain  v.  Spann,  1  McMull, 
258.  So  in  Maine  :  Burnham  v.  Tucker, 
18  Me.  179 ;  Wood  v.  Warren,  19  id.  23. 
In  New  York  the  point  was  considered 
doubtful  in  Miner  v.  Hoyt,  4  Hill,  193, 
197.  —  In  Massachusetts,  however,  equi- 
ties arising  between  the  original  parties 
after  the  transfer  of  title,  but  before 
notice  to  the  maker,  cannot  be  set  off  as 
against  the  indorsee.  Ranger  v.  Carey, 
1  Met.  369  ;  Baxter  v.  Little,  6  id.  7. 

(r)  McKinney  v.  Crawford,  8  S.  &  R. 
351;  Dwight  v.  Emerson,  2  N.  H.  159; 
Patterson  v.  Todd,  18  Penn.  St.  426 ; 
Levy  V.  Drew,  14  Ark.  334 ;  Thayer  v. 
Brackett,  12  Mass.  465 ;  Field  v.  Nicker- 
son,  13  Mass.  138  ;  Berry  v.  Robinson,  9 
Johns.  121. 

(s)  De  Bras  v.  Forbes,  1  Esp.  117; 
Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  2  T.  R.  71,  per 
Ash/iurst,  J. ;  Abbot  v.  Hendricks,  1  Man. 
&  G.  791 ;  Herrick  v.  Carman,  10  Johns. 
224  ;  Hill  v.  Ely,  5  S.  &  R.  363  ;  Clement 
I'.  Reppard,  15  Penn.  St.  Ill;  Johnson  v. 
Martinus,  4  Ilalst.  144;  Hill  v.  Buck- 
minster,  5  Pick.  391 ;  Fisher  v.  Salmon, 

1  Cal.  413;  Fisher  v.  Leland,  4  Cush. 
456 ;  Bank  of  Tennessee  v.  Johnson,  1 
Swan,  217.     It  is  held  in  Starr  v.  Torrey, 

2  N.  J.  190,  tliat  failure  of  consideration 
known  to  indorsee,  is  a  defence  in  a  suit 
by  him  against  maker. 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES    AND    BILLS.  *  257 

passed  to  the  maker  from  the  payee  and  indorser,  (t)  or  between 
any  remote  parties. 

A  distinction  of  this  kind  is  sometimes  made.     An  in- 
dorsee *  who  buys  a  note  for  less  than  its  face,  can  recover    *  257 
from  his  indorser  only  what  he  paid,  with  interest ;  but 
may  recover  from  the  maker,  the  whole  amount  of  the  note.     This 
has  been  held  in  some  cases  in  New  York.  (2)     See  on  this  sub- 
ject the  chapter  on  Usury. 

On  the  ground  that  negotiable  paper  is  intended  only  for  busi- 
ness purposes,  and  has  its  peculiar  privileges  only  that  it  may 
more  perfectly  perform  this  function,  it  has  been  held  that  one 
who  takes  a  negotiable  note,  even  before  its  maturity,  but  only  in 
payment  of  or  as  security  for  an  antecedent  debt,  without  giving 
for  it  any  new  consideration,  does  not  take  it  in  the  way  of  busi- 
ness, and  is  not  a  bo7id  fide  holder ;  and  that  he  therefore  holds 
the  note  subject  to  all  equitable  defences.  This  doctrine  rests 
upon  adjudications  and  opinions  of  great  weight ;  but  it  is  also 
denied  by  very  high  authorities,  indeed  by  the  highest  in  this 
country,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  who  have  de- 
cided that  a  pre-existing  debt  of  itself,  and  without  any  strength- 
ening circumstances,  is  of  itself  a  sufficient  consideration.  But  it 
has  nevertheless  been  held  since  that  decision,  by  courts  entitled 
to  great  respect,  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  erro- 
neous and  untenable.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  law  on  this 
subject  is  in  a  very  unsettled  state ;  but  it  may  be  supposed  that 
in  this  country  the  authority  of  the  Supreme  Court  will  generally 
prevail,  (a)  ^ 

(t)  Perkins  v.  Challis,  1   N.  H.  254;  changed    the    common    law.     Oertel    v. 

Waterman  v.  Barratt,  4  Barring.  (Del.)  Schroeder,  48   111.  133. 
311.     See    Klopp  &  Stump   v.    Lebanon  («■)  Ingalls  v.  Lee,  9  Barb.  647 ;  Cram 

Valley  Bank,   39    Penn.   St.  489,   as    to  v.  Hendricks,  7  Wend.  569;   Rapelye  v. 

incompetency   of  indorser  as   a  witness  Anderson,  4    Hill   (N.  Y.),  472;  Youngs 

to  impair  the   legal   effect   of   the   note  v.  Lee,  18  Barb.  187. 

in  the  hands  of  a  holder  to  whom  it  (a)  In  Swift  v.  Tyson,  16  Pet.  19,  the 
was  regularly  negotiated.  The  Supreme  court  say,  "  We  have  no  liesitation  in 
Court  of  Illinois  holds  that  a  statute  of  saying  that  pre-existing  debt  does  con- 
that  State  permitting  the  defence  of  stitute  a  valuable  consideration  in  the 
want    or    failure    of    consideration,    has  sense  of  tlie  general  rule  already  stated, 

1  In  Railroad  Co.  v.  National  Bank,  102  U.  S.  14,  affirming  Swift  v.  Tyson,  supra, 
and  Gates  i'.  National  Bank,  100  U.  S.  239,  Harlan,  J.,  declared  that  "Our  conclusion, 
therefore,  is  that  the  transfer,  before  maturity,  of  negotiable  paper,  as  security  for  an 
antecedent  debt  merely,  without  other  circumstances,  if  the  paper  be  so  indorsed  that 
the  holder  becomes  a  party  to  the  instrument,  although  the  transfer  is  without  express 
agreement  by  the  creditor  for  indulgence,  is  not  an  improper  use  of  such  paper,  and  is 
as  much  in  the  usual  course  of  commercial  business  as  its  transfer  in  payment  of  such 
debt.     In  either  case,  the  bond  fide  holder  is  unaffected  by  equities  or  defences  between 

291 


258 


TIIK    LAW    OP    CONTRACTS. 


[l!0(JK    I. 


*  258        *  It  hiis  been  held  that  a  note  iiuloi-sed  and  negtjtiutcd 
on  the  last  day  of  grace,  is  subject  to  the  same  defences  as 
if  indorsed  after  dishonor,  (h) 


as  applicable  to  negotiable  instruments." 
So  iield  in  Succession  of  iJulhonde,  21 
La.  An.  3.  This  question  lias  not  yet 
rcceivcil  a  distinct  adjudication  in  Eng- 
land, and  the  following  cases,  in  wliicli 
it  lias  incidentally  ariscfO,  leave  in  doidit 
what  the  inclination  of  judicial  opinion 
is.  Brainah  v.  Roberts,  1  liing.  N.  C. 
4(10 ;  pLTcival  V.  Frampton,  2  C.  M.  &  R. 
180;  Crofts  k.  Beal,  5  K.  L.  &  E.  408. 
The  cases  of  Collins  v.  Marten,  1  B.  &  1'. 
650;  Ileywofxl  v.  Watson,  4  Ring.  4%; 
De  la  (.'hauniette  v.  Bank  of  England, 
9  B.  &  C.  200  ;  Smith  v.  De  Witt,  (i  Dow. 

6  II.  20,  have  some  bearing  on  the  ques- 
tion. The  decisions  in  this  country  have 
turned  chiefly  upon  the  question  whether 
the  transfer  is  for  a  vdlid  conaidcralion. 
The  weight  of  authority  is,  that  the 
transfer  of  a  negotiable  instrument,  in 
pni/mf:nt  f)f  a  ilebt  already  due,  or  where 
upon  the  faith  of  such  transfer  other 
security  is  relincjuished  or  indulgence 
given,  is  for  a  valid  consideration,  and 
entitles  the  holder  to  j»rotection.  Smith 
V.  Van  Loan,  10  Wend.  6-V.) ;  Bank  of 
Salina  i:  Babcock,  21  Wend.  400;  Bank 
of  Sandusky  >•.  Scoville,  24  Wend.  115; 
Miimhall,  C.  J.,  Coolidge  v.  Payson,  2 
Wheat,  m,  73;  Swift  v.  Tyson,  16  Bet. 
15;  Walker  »;.  Geiss,  4  Whart.  252,  258; 
Homes  V.  Smyth,  10  Me.  177;  Norton  w. 
Waite,  20  Me.  175;  Adams  v.  Smith,  :i'> 
Me.  824 ;  Brusli  v.  Scribru-r,  1 1  Conn. 
388;  Bostwick  v.  Dodge,  1  Dougl.  (Mich.) 
413;  Keddick  ?;.  Jones,  6  Ircd.  L.  107; 
NicJiol  V.  Bate,  10  Yerg.  420  ;  Wormley  v. 
Lowry,  1   Humph.  470;   Co})b  v.   Doyle, 

7  II.  I.  550;  Brown  v.  Leavitt,  31  N.  Y. 
113;  Stotts  );.  Byers,  17  la.  303;  Curtis 
V.  Mohr,  18  Wis.  01 ;  Boatman's  Institu- 
tion V.  Holland,  88  Mo.  40;  Maning 
V.  McClure,  30  III.  4W) ;  Stevenson  ». 
Ileyland,  11  Minn.  l'.)8;  Citizens  Bank 
V.  I'ayne,  18  Ln..  222.  fontr/i,  Ilosa  v. 
BrotlKTHOM,  10  Weiid.  85  ;   I5riglit  v.  Jud- 

'  son,  47  Barb.  20.  But  see  Smith  v.  Van 
Loan,  Af'/yra;  Ontario  Bank  y.  Worthing- 
ton,  12  Wend.  503;  I'ayne  v.  Cutler,  13 
Wend.  0fJ5.  In  the  follf)wing  eases,  it  is 
held  that,  where  the  transfer  is  rnrrf/i/  for 


the  sake;  f)f  collateral  unrurflij,  there  is  no 
valid  consideration,  and  the  holder  is  not 
entitled  to  jjrotection  against  the  equities. 
Bay  V.  (Joddington,  5  Johns.  i'Ai.  54;  s. 
<:.  20  .Johns.  0:)7  ;   Stalker  v.  McDonald, 

0  Hill  (.\.  Y.),  0:i;  (lark  -•.  Ely,  2  Sand. 
Ch.  lt;0;  .Vlickles  ».  (Jolvin,  4  Barl).  304; 
Fenby  v.  Britchard,  2  Sandf.  151  ;  Youngs 
V.  Lee,  18  Barb.  187,  2  Kern.  501  ;  Kirk- 
jjatrick  r.  Muirhead,  10  I'eim.  St.  123; 
I'etric!  V.  Clark,  II  S.  &  it.  377  ;  Bertrand 
V.  Barkman,  8  Eng.  (Ark.)  b'/);  Jcnness 
V.  Bean,  10  N.  II.  200;  Williams  v.  Little, 
11  N.  II.  00;  Prentice  v.  7,a.uo,  2  Gratt. 
202  ;  Gib.son  v.  Conner,  3  Ga.  47  ;  Allaire 
V.  Ilartshorne,  1  N.  J.  005;  Brandiall  ??. 
Beckett,  31  Me.  205;  Alexander  w.  Spring- 
field Bank,  2  Met.  (Ky  )  534.  Cmtnj, 
Swifl  V.  Tyson,  10  Pet.  15;  Chicopee 
Bank  v.  ("hapin,  8  Met.  40;  Stevens  v. 
Blanchard,  3  (Jush.  108 ;  Valette  v.  Mason, 

1  Smith  (Ind.),  80;  h.  c.  1  Cart.  288; 
I'ugh  V.  Durfee,  1  Blatcli.  412;  Atkinson 
V.  IJrooks,  20  Vt.  500;  Greneaux  v. 
Wheeler,  tj  Texas,  515.  Ser-  further  on 
the  .HufHiience  of  the  consideration  af- 
forfled  by  a  pre-existent  debt,  Rutland 
Bank  n.  Buck,  5  Wend.  0(5;  Gnuidin  v. 
Le  Roy,  2  Paige,  500;  White  v.  Spring- 
field Bank,  3  Sandf.  222;  Lathrop  v. 
Morris,  5  Sandf.  7  ;  N.  Y.  M.  I.  W.  v. 
Sn)itli,  4  Diier,  302;  IJlaiK'hard  v.  Stevens, 
3  r'ush.  102;  Pond  v.  Lockwood,  8  Ala. 
600;  Varnum  i).  Bellamy,  4  McLean,  87; 
King  V.  Doolittle,  1  Head,  77.  In  Trus- 
tees of  Iowa  College  v.  Hill,  12  la.  420,  it 
was  held  that  if  one  took  a  note  as  col- 
lateral security  for  an  antcjcederit  flebt, 
he  is  nevertheless  ;)?■/«(«  /r/r.-/V',  thougli  not 
conclusively,  to  be  considered  as  holder 
for  value,  and  it  is  on  the  defendant  to 
show  that  he  is  not  such  a  holrler;  that 
if  it  was  taken  as  coUaKTal  security 
only,  the  plaintiff  parting  with  nothing, 
giving  no  time,  relinquishing  no  right, 
nor  suffering  damages  or  iujurj^  as  the 
considcTation,  or  in  consequence  of  re- 
ceiving it,  he  would  not  b(!  such  holder. 
See  <^)uthwite  v.  Porter,  45  N.  H.  470. 

{!>)   Pine  v.  Smith,  11  Gray,  38;  Crosby 
V.  fJrant,  30  N.  H.  273. 


prior  parties,  of  which  he  had  no  notice.  Tliis  conclusion  is  abundantly  flnstained  by 
authority.  A  different  dcterminalion,  by  this  courf,  would,  we  a])prehend,  greatly 
surprise  both  the  legal  jiroCcssion  and  the  coumicrcial  world."  So  in  New  York  in  the 
case  of  imre»trict<;d  ae(oniniodatir)n  paper,  but  not  if  fraudulently  diverted  from  its 
original  jiurjKJSC.  Grwers'  Bank  v.  Pcnfield,  GO  N.  Y.  502;  Continental  Bank  v. 
Towrisend,  87  N.  Y.  8.  Currie  i;.  Misa,  L.  R.  10  Ex.  1.'').3,  decided  that  the  "title  of  a 
creditor  to  a  negotiable  security  given   Uj  him  on  account  of  a  j>rc-cxisting  debt,  and 

292 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND   BILLS.  *  259 


SECTION  V. 

OF   ACCOMMODATION   PAPER. 

A  party  may  be  willing  to  lend  his  credit  to  another,  when  he 
cannot  or  does  not  wish  to  lend  him  money.  He  does  this  by 
signing  or  indorsing  a  note  or  bill  without  consideration.  Such 
notes  or  bills  are  known  as  accommodation  paper. 

It  has  been  sometimes  said  that  the  defence  of  want  of  consid- 
eration is  valid  against  the  indorsee  when  the  indorsee  took  the 
paper  with  notice  of  the  want  of  consideration,  or  of  any  circum- 
stances which  would  have  avoided  the  note  in  the  hands  of  the 
indorser.  (m)  But  the  case  of  an  accommodation  note, 
*  whether  made  or  indorsed  for  the  benefit  of  the  party  to  *  259 
whom  the  maker  or  indorser  intends  to  lend  his  credit,  is 
an  exception  to  this  rule.  If  A  makes  a  note  to  B  or  his  order, 
intending  to  lend  B  his  credit,  and  gives  it  to  B  to  raise  money 
on,  B  cannot  sue  A  on  that  note  ;  but  if  he  indorses  it  to  C,  who 
discounts  the  note  in  good  faith,  knowing  it  however  to  be  an 
accommodation  note  and  without  valuable  consideration,  C  can 
nevertheless  recover  the  note  from  A.  The  maker  may  therefore 
have  a  defence  against  the  payee  which  he  cannot  have  against 
an  indorsee  who  has  knowledge  of  that  defence,  (v)  ^  But  this 
is  true  only  where  the  consideration  paid  by  the  indorsee  may 

(«)  Steers   i-.   Lasliley,  6  T.   R.   61 ;  Mott,  7  Johns.  361 ;   Grant  v.  EUicott,  7 

Wyat  V.  Bulmer,  2  Esp.  538 ;    Perkins  v.  Wend.  227  ;   Molson  v.  Hawley,  1  Blatch. 

Challis,  1  N.  H.  254  ;    Brown  v.  Davies,  3  409 ;   Lord  v.  The  Ocean  Bank,  20  Penn. 

T.  R.  80;  Down  t;.  Hailing,  4  B.  &  C.  330 ;  St.  384;    Kemp  v.  Balls,   10  Exch.  605. 

Ayer  v.  Hutchins,  4  Mass.  370;   Thomp-  And  this  is  so,  even  if  the  indorsee  took 

son  V.  Hale,  6  Pick.  259 ;    Littell  v.  Mar-  the  bill  after  it  became  due.     Charles  v. 

shall,  1  Rob.  (La.)  51.  Marsden.    1   Taunt.  224;    Carrutliers   v. 

(r)    Thompson  v.  Shepherd,   12  Met.  West,  11  Q.  B.  143;  Renwick  r.  Williams, 

311 ;  Smith  v.  Knox,  3  Esp.  46 ;  Brown  v.  2  Md.  356. 

received  by  him  honafide,  and  without  notice  of  any  infirmity  of  title  on  the  part  of  the 
debtor,  is  indefeasible,  whether  that  security  be  payable  at  a  future  time  or  on  demand;" 
Lord  Coleridcie,  C.  J.,  dissenting  on  the  ground  that  the  security  in  question  was  a 
check  not  entitling  the  holder  to  tliis  protection.  Contra,  Armour  v.  McMichael,  7 
Vroom,  92  ;  Mix  v.  Bloomington  Bank,  91  111.  20. 

1  An  accommodation  note  transferred  after  due,  though  subject  to  equities  between 
the  original  parties,  is  not  to  set-off,  though  existing  at  the  time  the  note  was  negotiated. 
Stannus  v.  St;mnus,  30  la.  448. 

293 


*  259  THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

be  regarded  as  going  to  the  maker  in  the  same  manner  as  it 
would  if  the  payee  had  been  promisor,  and  the  maker  had  signed 
the  note  as  his  surety.  The  successive  indorsers  of  accommoda- 
tion paper  are  not  however  so  far  sureties  as  have  a  claim  of  con- 
tribution against  each  other;  for  each  indorsee  has  the  same 
claim  against  earlier  indorsers  that  he  would  have  if  it  was  not 
accommodation  paper,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  there  was  an 
agreement  between  the  indorsers  that  they  should  be  considered, 
as  between  themselves,  as  joint  indorsers  and  sureties,  (w)  ^  It 
has  been  held  in  England  that  where  A  signs  with  B  for  B's 
accommodation,  and  C  takes  the  note  agreeing,  when  he  takes  it, 
to  hold  A  only  as  surety,  and  C  gives  time  to  B  to  the  injury  of 
A ;  a  plea  by  A,  stating  these  facts  in  defence,  was  good,  (a:)  In 
general,  accommodation  notes  or  bills  are  now  governed  by  the 
same  rules  as  negotiable  paper  for  consideration.  (^/)  ^ 


SECTION  VI. 

NOTES    ON   DEMAND. 

Notes  and  bills  payable  on  demand  are  in  one  sense  always 
overdue ;  they  arc  not,  however,  so  treated  until  payment  has 
been  demanded  and  refused  ;  then  they  become  like  bills  on  time 
which  have  been  dishonored ;  and  to  bring  them  within  this  rule 
there  should  be  evidence  of  such  demand  and  refusal.     But  there 

{w)  Aiken  v.  Barkley,  2  Speers,  747.  430.     But   see   Hansbrough  v.   Gray,  3 

In  tliis  case  llie  autliorities  are  fully  con-  Gratt.  350. 

sidered,  and  it  is  sliown  that  tlie  rule  is  (//)  Fenton  v.  Pocock,  5  Taunt.  192; 

held  as  stated  in  the  text,  in  Massachu-  Bank  of  Montgomery  v.  Walker,  9  S.  & 

setts,  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  R.  229  ;   Murray  r.  Judah,  6  Cowen,  484  ; 

Maryland,     Kentucky,     Louisiana,    and  Clopper  v.  Union  Bank  of   Maryland,  7 

Connecticut,  and  otherwise  only  in  Oliio  Har.  &  J.  92  ;    Church  i-.  Barlow,  9  Pick, 

and  North  Carolina.    The  Supreme  Court  547  ;    Grant   v.    EUicott,  7    Wend.    227  ; 

of  the  U.  S.  have  lield  that  there  was  no  Marr  i'.  Jolinson,  9  Yerg.  1 ;   per  Wilde, 

distinction   in   this   respect   between    in-  J.,  Com.  Bank  v.  Cunningham,  24  Pick, 

dorsers  for   value  and  indorsees  for  ac-  274;  Far.  &  M.  Bank  v.  Rathbone,  20  Vt. 

commodalion.in  McDonald  r.  McGruder,  19;  Strong  v.  Foster,  .33  E.  L.  &  E.  282; 

3  Pet.  470.    And  it  is  so  held  in  Missouri,  s.  c.  17  C.  B.  201  ;   Prouty  v.  Roberts,  G 

in  McCune  v.  Belt,  45  Mo.  174.  Cush.  19.     See  also  Parks  v.  Ingram,  2 

(x)   Pooley  V.    Ilarradine,  7    E.   &  B.  Foster  (N.  H.),  283. 

1  Where  the  intention  of  all  parties  to  an  accommodation  bill  was  that  it  should  be 
met  by  the  last  indorser,  the  previous  indorsers  cannot  be  sued  unless  they  have  had 
notice  of  dishonor.     Turner  v.  Samson,  2  Q.  B.  D.  23. 

2  Kirschncr  v.  Conklin,  40  Conn.  77. 

294 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  2G0 

is  this  difference  between  a  note  on  time  and  a  note  on  demand  ; 
a  note  on  time,  after  that  time  has  passed,  is  certainly  dishonored, 
and  an  indorsee  must  know  it.  But  there  is  no  time  when  a  note 
on  demand  must  have  been  dishonored,  and  none  tlierefore  when 
an  indorsee  could  not  have  received  it  without  that  knowl- 
edge. Nevertheless  it  seems  reasonable  to  *  say  that  if  a  *  260 
note  which  was  payable  at  any  day,  has  not  been  paid  for 
very  many  days,  it  may  fairly  be  presumed  to  have  been  dis- 
honored, and  an  indorsee  after  this  lapse  of  time,  may  be  held  to 
have  had  a  sufficient  notice  of  its  dishonor ;  and  many  American 
authorities  hold  this  view,  (c)  ^  But  it  is  still  true,  that  the  law 
does  not  presume  that  they  were  made  with  the  intention  of  im- 
mediate demand  and  payment.  And  if  it  provides  for  interest, 
this  strengthens  the  probability  that  the  maker  was  to  have  a 
credit  of  some  extent,  and  the  indorser  or  guarantor  will  be  held 
liable  accordingly,  (c?)  In  such  cases  the  note  may  be  regarded 
as  a  continuing  security,  and  the  indorser  would  remain  liable 
until  an  actual  demand.  Nor  would  the  holder  be  chargeable 
with  neglect  for  omitting  to  make  such  demand  within  any  par- 
ticular time,  (g)  2     A  note  payable  generally,  but  not  specifying 

(c)  If  not  negotiated  until  a  long  time  montlis  before  it  was  indorsed,  a  length 
after  it  is  made,  it  is  subject  to  all  the  of  time  sufficient  to  induce  suspicions 
equities  in  the  hands  of  an  indorsee,  as  it  that  the  promisors  would  not  pay  it,  and 
would  be  in  the  possession  of  the  payee,  to  cause  some  inquiry  to  be  made, 
Furman  v.  Haskin,  'Z  Caines,  .309 ;  Hen-  whether  it  had  in  fact  been  dishonored, 
dricks  i-.  Judali,  1  Johns.  319;  and  two  or  why  payment  had  not  been  made.  If 
months  and  a  half  after  a  note  was  dated  there  was  no  other  circumstance,  this 
was  held  sufficient  to  let  in  the  equities  would  be  a  good  reason  to  let  the  defend- 
of  the  maker  against  the  payee,  in  an  ac-  ants  into  any  defence  whicli  could  legally 
tion  by  the  indorsee.  Losee  v.  Dunkin,  be  made  by  them,  if  Page  [the  payee  and 
7  Johns.  70.  Under  different  circum-  indorser]  were  the  plaintiff."  In  England 
stances,  a  period  of  five  montlis  after  a  the  principle  tiiat  a  note  payable  on  de- 
note was  dated  was  held  not  sufficient  for  mand  may  become  discredited  by  mere 
this  purpose.  Sandford  v.  Mickles,  4  lapse  of  time  is  not  adopted.  Brooks  v. 
Johns.  324.  So  seven  days  has  been  held  Mitchell,  9  M.  &  W.  15 ;  Barough  v. 
not  to  be  sufficient.  Thurston  r.  Mc-  White,  4  B.  &  C.  355 ;  Gascoyne  u.  Smith, 
Kown,  6  Mass.  428;  Ayer  v.  Hutchins,  4  1  McClel.  &  Y.  348.  See  Herrick  v.  Wol- 
Mass.  370.  In  this  case  the  rule  concern-  verton,  41  N.  Y.  58L 
ing  notes  payable  on  demand  was  thus  id)  Lockwood  i'.  Crawford,  18  Conn, 
laid  down  by  Parsons,  Q.  J.:     "A  note  361. 

payable  on  demand  is  due  presently.     In  (e)  Merritt  y.  Todd,  23  N.  Y.  28;    1 

this   case   the   note  has  been  due  eiglit  Pars.  Is'otes  &  Bills,  2(33. 

h 

^  In  Chartered  Bank  v.  Dickson,  L.  R.  3  P.  C.  574,  it  was  decided  that  a  note  on 
demand  must  be  presented  for  payment  within  a  reasonable  time  under  the  circum- 
stances, or  the  indorsers  would  be  discharged. 

2  Pardee  v.  Fish,  60  N.  Y.  265,  271,  to  the  same  effect.  See  Herrick  v.  Wool  verton, 
41  N.  Y.  581.  But  Wheeler  v.  Warner,  47  N.  Y.  519,  held  that  a  promissory  note, 
payable  on  demand,  whether  with  or  without  interest,  is  due  forthwith,  and  an  action 
thereon  against  the  maker  is  barred  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  if  not  brought  within 
six  years  after  its  date  and  distinguished,  Merritt  v.  Todd,  23  N.  Y.  28,  supra,  as  deciding 

295 


*  261  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

auy  time  of  payment,  is  due  immediately ;  and  a  provision  that ' 
interest  is  to  accrue  after  a  specified  contingency,  as  the  decision 
of  a  certain  suit,  does  not  affect  this  rule.  (/) 

Where  a  note  on  demand  is  indorsed  within  a  reasonable  time 
after  its  date,  the  indorsee  has  all  the  rights  of  an  indorsee  of  a 
negotiable  note  on  time  where  the  indorsement  was  made  before 
maturity ;  but  what  this  reasonable  time  shall  be  must  depend 
upon  the  facts  of  the  case.  It  is  not  determined  by  any  positive 
rule.  (^)     Nor  is  there  a  positive  rule  as  to  the  present- 

*  261    ment  of  bank-checks ;  but  *  the  rule  as  to  overdue  notes 

is  applied  with  more  strictness  to  them.  (7i)  ^  But  still, 
one  who  takes  a  check  that  is  overdue  is  said  not  to  take  it  subject 
to  all  infirmities  of  title,  if  he  exercises  a  reasonable  caution  in 
taking  it ;  of  which  a  jury  is  to  judge.  (^)  And  the  drawer  of 
a  check  is  not  discharged  by  any  delay  in  presenting  it  which  has 
not  been  actually  injurious  to  him.  (/)  ^  In  a  recent  case  in 
New  York  it  was  held  that  a  presentment  of  a  check  for  payment 
on  the  day  after  receiving  it,  would  be  sufficient  to  charge  the 
maker.  ( j>)')  ^     It  may  be  remarked  that  priority  in  the  drawing 

(/)  Holmes  v.  West,  17  Cal.  G23.  (N.  H.),  230;  Ames  v.  Merriam,  98  Mass. 

(g)  The  question  of  reasonable  time,  294;   Bickford  v.  First,  &c.  Bank,  42  111. 

witliiii  which  a  note  due  on  demand  must  238. 

be  indorsed  after  it  is  made,  in  order  to  (h)    Boehm  v.  Sterling,  7  T.  R.  42.S; 

shut  out  any  equities  between  the  maker  Down  v.  Hailing,  4  B.  &  C.  330 ;    Roth- 

and  indorser,  is  purely  a  question  of  law.  schild  v.  Corney,  9  B.  &  C.  388 ;  Brady  v. 

Per  Shaw,  C.  J.,  Sylvester  v.  Crapo,  15  Little  Miami    11.   R.  Co.  34   Barb.    249; 

Pick.  93;  Camp  v.  Scott,  14  Vt.  887.—  O'Brien  v.  Smith,  1  Black,  99.      But  in 

Two   days  and   even   five   months   have  this  country  the  principle  is  not  consid- 

been  held  to  be  witliin  the  limit.    Dennett  ered  applicable  to    bank-notes   or  bank 

r.    Wyman,    13    Vt.    485;     Sandford    v.  post  notes.      The  Fulton   Bank   i\   The 

Mickles,  4  Johns.  224.      So  one  month.  Phoenix  Bank,  1  Hall,  5G2,  577. 
Ranger  v.  Carey,  1    Met.  3(59.      On  the  (()   Rothschild  v.  Corney,  1  Dan.  &  L. 

other     liand,     under     different     circum-  325 ;    Foster  v.  Paulk,   S.  J.  Ct.  of  Me. 

stances,  eight  montlis,  and  two  months,  1857,  20  Law  Rep.  222  ;  Mohawk  Bank  w. 

)iave  been  considered  be\'ond  it.     Ameri-  Broderick,  13  Wend.  133 
can  Bank  i;.  .Jenness,  2  Met.  288;   Nevins  (j)    Robinson   i'.   Ilawksford,  9  A.  & 

I'.  Townsliend,  0  Conn.  5;  Camp  >\  Scott,  E.  (n.  s.)  52  ;    Park  v.  Thomas,  13  Sm.  & 

14    Vt.    3S7.        See  further,    Wcthey   v.  M.  11 ;  Foster  ?•.  Paulk,  s!//;m. 
Andrews,  3  Hill  (X.  Y.),  582;  Tiionii)son  {jj)  Johnson  v.  Bank  of  N.  America, 

i:   Hale.  6  Pick   259;    Mudd  v.  Harper,  1  5  Rob.  554. 
Md.   110;    Carleton  v.  Bailey,  7  Foster 

tliat  as  between  a  holder  and  indorser  such  a  note  was  not  due  until  demand  made. 
Peckham,  J.,  said  :  "  There  is  no  divided  opinion  here  or  in  England  that  upon  such  a 
note,  with  or  without  interest,  an  action  may  be  maintained  against  the  maker  without 
any  demand  because  it  is  due." 

1  A  bank  check  is  to  be  presented  within  a  reasonable  time,  which  will  depend  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  Woodruff  u.  Plant,  41  Conn.  344.  See  Rochester  Bank  v. 
Harris,  108  Mass.  514 ;  Smith  v.  Miller,  43  N.  Y.  171. 

2  Heywood  v.  Pickering,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  428;  Griffin  v.  Kemp,  46  Ind.  1 72 ;  Planters' 
Bank  u.'Merritt,  7  Hciskell,  177  ;  Gregg  v.  George,  IG  Kan.  546. 

3  Burschaitcr  v.  Eric  Bank,  42  N.  Y.  538;  Simpson  v.  Pacilic  Ins.  Co.,  44  Cal.  139. 

296 


CH.  xvl]  notes  and  bills.  *  262 

of  a  check  gives  the  holder  no  preference  of  payment  over  checks 
subsequently  drawn.  (^)  If  a  check  be  drawn  on  a  bank  where 
there  are  no  funds,  it  need  not  be  presented  to  maintain  an 
action.  (Z)  ^  A  check  on  a  broker  payable  to  bearer  is  a  nego- 
tiable instrument,  and  may  pass  by  indorsement  so  as  to  entitle 
the  holder  to  sue  the  indorser  as  in  the  case  of  a  bill  of  ex- 
change, (m)  2 


SECTION  VII. 

OP  THE  TRANSFER   OF   BILLS    AND   NOTES. 

A  bill  once  paid  by  the  acceptor  can  no  longer  be  negotiated ; 
but  until  paid  by  him  it  is  capable  of  indefinite  negotia- 
tion, (n)  ^     *  If  paid  in  part  it  may  be  indorsed  as  to  the    *  262 
residue.     But  while  wholly  due  it  cannot  be  indorsed  in 
part ;  (o)  and  if  it  be  indorsed  in  part,  and  is  afterwards  indorsed 

(k)  Dykes  v.  The  Leather  M.  Bank,  has  paid  the  bill,  it  seems  that  he  may 

11  Paige,  612.  sue  the  acceptor  upon  the  bill ;    and  if, 

(/)  Foster  v.  Paulk,  supra.  instead  of  suing  the  acceptor,  he  put  it 

(m)  Keene  r.  Beard,  98  Eng.  C.  L.  372.  into  circulation  upon   his   own    indorse- 

See  also  Pars.  Notes  &  Bills,  58.  ment  only,  it  does  not  prejudice  any  of 

(n)  Connery  ('.  Kendall,  5  La.  An.  51-5;  the  other  parties  who  have  indorsed  the 

Pray  v.  Maine,  7  Cush.  253 ;  Eaton  v.  Me-  bill  that  the  holder  should  be  at  liberty 

Kown,  34  Me.  510.    Per  Lord  EUcnborough,  to  sue  the  acceptor.     The  case  would  be 

Callow  V.  Lawrence,  3  M.  &  Sel.  97  ;  Beck  different   if   the   circulation   of    the   bill 

V.  Robley,  1  H.  Bl.  89,  n.  —  But  if  a  bill  would  have  the  effect  of  prejudicing  any 

is  paid  by  the  drawer,  it  may  afterwards  of  the  indorsers." 

be  reissued  by  the  drawer,  and  the  ac-         (o)  Hawkins  v.    Cardy,  1   Ld.   Raym. 

ceptor  will  be  still  liable  to  pay  it.    Hub-  360.     And  although  an  indorser  has  paid 

bard  v.  Jackson,  8  C.  &  P    134,  4  Bing.  part  of  a  bill  to  the  indorsee,  the  latter 

390,  1  Mo.  &  P.  11. — Ih  Callow  v.  Law-  may  still  recover  the  wliole  amount  of 

rence,  supra,  Lord  Ellenborough  said:    "  A  the  bill  against  the  drawer.      Johnson  v. 

bill  of  exchange  is  negotiable  ar/ ('w/z»(VMm,  Reunion,  2  Wils.  262  ;  Martin  v.  Hayes, 

until  it  has  been  paid  by  or  discharged  1  Bush.  L.  423. 
on  behalf  of  the  acceptor.    If  the  drawer 

1  See  Wirth  v.  Austin,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  689. 

2  So,  too,  a  check  payable  to  order  may  be  transferred  by  the  payee  by  parol,  with 
manual  delivery,  without  indorsement.  Freund  v.  Importers  &  Traders  Bank,  76 
N.  Y.  352. 

3  In  West  Boston  Bank  v.  Thompson,  124  Mass.  506,  514,  to  the  point  that  "  when 
the  indorser  of  a  note  which  has  been  in  circulation  takes  it  up,  all  indorsements  on  the 
note  subsequent  to  his  are  cancelled,  and  he  cannot  afterwards  negotiate  the  note  so  as 
to  make  the  subsequent  indorsers  liable  to  any  person  with  notice  of  the  facts,"  Morton, 
J.,  said  that  "  the  mere  fact  that  a  note,  before  its  maturity,  comes  in  the  usual  course  of 
business  into  the  hands  of  the  payee  after  having  been  once  negotiated  by  him,  does  not 
destroy  its  negotiability,  nor  defeat  the  right  of  a  bond  fide  holder  to  recover  against  all 
who  are  parties  to  the  note  at  the  time  it  is  negotiated  to  him."  See  also  West  St. 
Louis  Bank  v.  Sliawnee  County  Bank,  95  U.  S.  557,  and  Lemoine  v.  Bank  of  North 
America,  3  Dillon,  44. 

297 


*  262  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

by  the  same  indorser  to  the  same  indorsee  for  the  remaining  part, 
this  is  not  a  good  indorsement,  (jo) 

The  holder  of  a  bill  or  note  payable  to  bearer,  or  of  one  payable 
to  some  payee  or  order  and  indorsed  in  blank,  may  transfer  the 
same  by  mere  delivery,  (^q}  ^  and  is  not  liable  upon  it  (r)  But 
where  one  obtains  money  on  a  bill  or  note  by  discount,  and  the 
bill  or  note  is  forged,  if  he  did  not  indorse  it  he  is  still  liable  to 
refund  the  money  to  the  party  from  whom  he  received  it  on  the 
ground  of  an  implied  warranty  that  the  instrument  is  genuine ; 
and  also  on  the  general  principle,  that  one  who  pays  money  with- 
out consideration  may  recover  it  back,  (.s-)  ^ 

If  a  note  be  made  payable  on  its  face  or  by  indorsement  to 
a  party  or  his  order,  that  party  can  transfer  the  note  in  full 
property  only  by  his  indorsement ;  and  when  he  indorses  it  he 
makes  himself  liable  to  pay  it  if  those  who  ought  to  have  paid 

(p)  Hughes    V.   Kiddell,   2    Bay,    .^24.  See  also  Rogers  v.  Langford,  1  Cr.  &  M. 

This  was  an  action  against  the  indorser  637. 

of  a  note.      By  one  indorsement  he  had         (s)  Jones  v.  Rj'de,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  157, 

assigned  part  of  the  sum  mentioned  in  5  Taunt.  489 ;  Bruce  v.  Bruce,  1  A.  K. 

the  note,  and  the  residue  by  another  in-  Marsh.   105,  5  Taunt.  495 ;  Gonipertz  v. 

dorsemcnt.      The   court    held    that    the  Bartlett,  24  E.  L.  &  E.  156;  Gurncy  v. 

action   could   not  be   supported,   on  the  Womersley,  28  E.  L.  &  E.  256,  and  edi- 

ground  that  an  indorsement  for  part  of  a  tor's  note  ;  Eagle  Bank  v.  Sniitli,  5  Conn, 

note  or  bill  is  bad ;  and  if  so,  then  two  71 ;  Canal  Bank  v.  Bank  of   Albany,  1 

vicious  indorsements  could  never  consti-  Hill   (N.   Y.),  87;   Thompson  v.  McCul- 

tute  a  good  one.      See  also  Hawkins  v.  lough,  .31  Mo.  224.     Sed  aliter,  if  the  bill 

Cardy,   1  Ld.   Raym.  .360,    Carth.    466 ;  or  note  is  discounted  by  the  banker  of 

Johnson   v.   Kennion,  2    Wils.   262,   per  the  accej^tor  or  maker.  Smith  v.  Mercer, 

Gould,  J.  6  Taunt.  76.     The  ruling  of  Abboit,  C.  J.t 

(7)  Davis  V.  Lane,  8  N.  H.  224;  Wil-  in   Fuller  v.   Smith,  Ry.  &  M.  49,  is  not 

hour  V.   Turner,   5  Pick.   526 ;    Dole  v.  consistent  with  Smith  v.  Mercer,  6  Taun- 

Weeks,  4  Mass.  451.  ton,  76. 

(r)  Camidge  v.  Allenby,  6  B.  &  C.  373. 

1  The  possessor  of  a  note  payable  to  bearer  or  indorsed  in  blank  may,  with  the 
beneficial  owner's  consent,  sue  it,  and  then  is  regarded  as  the  holder.  Bank  of  America 
V.  Senior,  11  R.  L  376  ;  Hovey  v.  Sebring,  24  Mich.  232.  An  indorsement  for  collection 
transfers  the  legal  title  to  the  note,  and  the  indorsee  can  sue  in  his  own  name.  King  v. 
Fleece,  7  Ileiskell,  27.'?.  Contra,  Best  v.  Nokomis  Bank,  76  111.  608.  In  Massachusetts 
the  holder  of  a  negotiable  promissory  note,  if  with  legal  capacity  to  sue,  may  bring  a 
suit  upon  it.  whether  he  have  any  title  or  interest,  in  law  or  in  fact,  in  it  whatever. 
Pemberton  Bank  v.  Porter,  125  Mass.  333;  Atlas  Bank  v.  Savery,  127  Mass.  75.  But 
it  is  a  good  defence  to  a  promissory  note,  that  the  plaintiil',  although  in  jjossession  of 
the  note,  has  no  interest  in  it,  and  is  prosecuting  the  action,  not  for  the  benefit  of  the 
person  beneficially  interested,  but  against  his  objection.  Towne  v.  Wason,  128  Mass. 
517.  A  person  advancing  money  to  buy  a  note  for  the  indorser  cannot  sue  him 
thereupon.  Dodge  v.  Brown,  113  Mass.  323;  unless  so  agreed,  Horton  v.  Manning,  37 
Tex.  23. 

2  When  a  bill  is  accepted  in  blank  for  the  purpose  of  being  negotiated,  and  is 
afterwards  fdlcd  in  witli  the  name  and  signature  of  a  person  as  drawer  and  indorser,  the 
acceptor  cannot,  as  against  a  bond  fide  indorsee,  adduce  evidence  to  show  that  either 
the  drawing  or  indorsement  is  a  forgery.  Loudon  &  Southwestern  Bank  v.  Wentworth, 
5  Ex.  D.  96. 

298 


CH.  XYI.]  NOTES    AND    BILLS.  *  263 

*  it  to  him,  had  he  continued  to  hold  it,  fail  to  pay  it  to  the  *  263 
party  to  whom  he  ordoi's  it  to  bo  paid.     His  indorsement  is 

in  itself  only  an  order  on  them  to  pay  the  bill  or  note  ;  but  the 
law  annexes  to  this  order  a  promise  on  his  part  to  pay  the  bill 
or  note  if  they  do  not.  He  may  guard  against  this  by  indorsing 
it  with  the  words  "  without  recourse,"  which  mean,  by  usage,  that 
the  holder  is  not  to  have,  in  any  event,  recourse  to  the  indor- 
ser.  (^)  While  these  words,  or  any  words  which  convey  clearly 
the  same  meaning,  protect  the  indorser  from  any  demand  on  him, 
they  convey  to  the  indorsee  the  paper  itself,  with  all  its  negotia- 
ble qualities,  in  the  same  way  as  an  indorsement  with  no  words 
of  restriction  or  exception  could  do.  (m)  The  same  purpose  will 
be  answered  if  he  uses  any  other  words,  or  others  distinctly  ex- 
pressive of  the  same  meaning.  Without  these  the  indorser  is 
liable  for  the  whole  amount,  (v) 

It  is  this  peculiarity  which  gives  their  great  value  and  utility 
to  bills  and  notes  as  instruments  of  commerce  and  business,  and 
this  liability  is  strictly  defined  and  very  carefully  watched  and 
protected.  It  is  a  conditional  liability  only.  All  the  previous 
parties  must  have  the  bill  or  note  presented  to  them,  and  payment 
demanded ;  and  notice  of  the  demand  and  non-payment  must  be 
given  to  all.  And  this  requirement  is  very  precise  as  to  time, 
and  somewhat  so  as  to  form,  as  we  shall  presently  see. 

It  has  been  said  that  every  party  so  indorsing  a  bill  or  note 
may  be  regarded  as  making  a  new  bill  or  note ;  (w)  this,  though 
true  in  general,  may  not  be  precisely  and  exactly  the  rule  of 
law ;  still  important  consequences  sometimes  flow  from  it. 

*  Thus  an  indorsement  is  said  to  imply  that  all  previous    *  264 
parties  could  do  validly  what  they  did,' and  that  the  present 
indorser  has  power  to  make  a  valid  indorsement,  (a;)     And  an 

(<)  Rice  V.  Stearns,  3  Mass.  225  ;   Up-  and  indorsing  them  to  him  without  quali- 

ham   V.   Prince,   12  Mass.   14 ;    Waite  v.  fication,  is  liable  to  the  principal  on  his 

Foster,  33  Me.  424.  indorsement,  however  small  his  commis- 

(m)  Epler  V.  Funk,  8  Barr,  468.  Such  sion. 
an  indorsement  transfers  the  indorser's  {v:)  Chitty  &  Hulme  on  Bills,  p.  241, 
wiiole  interest  therein,  but  taken  with  and  cases  cited.  See  also  Pease  v.  Tur- 
other  circumstances,  it  is  said  to  tend  to  ner,  3  How.  (Miss.)  375.  — In  Gwinnel  v. 
show  that  the  note  was  not  indorsed  for  Herbert,  5  A.  &  E.  436,  it  is  said  that  the 
value,  and  therefore  to  open  to  the  maker  indorser  of  a  promissory  note  does  not 
the  same  defences  against  the  indorsee  stand  in  the  situation  of  maker  relatively 
which  he  could  have  made  against  the  to  his  indorsee,  and  the  latter  cannot  de- 
payee.    Richardson  v.  Lincoln,  5  Met.  201.  clare  against  him  as  maker. 

(y)   Goupy  I'.  Harden,  7  Taunt.  159.    In  (x)  McNeil     v.    Knott,    11     Ga.    142; 

this  case  it  was  held,  that  an  agent  pur-  Beal  v.  Alexander,  6  Tex.  531 ;  Delaware 

chasing  foreign  bills  for  his   principal,  Bank  v.  Jarvis,  20  N.  Y.  (0  Smith)  226. 

299 


*  264  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

acceptor  is  bound,  although  the  name  of  the  drawer  is  forged,  and 
an  indorser,  although  the  maker's  name  is  forged ;  for  by  accept- 
ance and  by  each  indorsement,  a  new  contract  is  formed,  (y) 
And  the  same  rule  would  apply  to  a  party  who  intervenes  and 
accepts  or  pays  supra  protest,  (z)  But  a  distinction  has  been 
taken  between  a  bill  with  the  signature  forged,  and  one  of  which 
the  whole  body  is  forged,  holding  that  the  implied  admission  or 
warranty  of  the  acceptor  docs  not  apply  in  the  latter  case,  (a) 
And  if  a  prior  indorsement  be  forged,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
second  indorser  cannot  be  charged  as  promisor  or  indorser.  (aa) 
A  drawee  is  bound  to  know  the  signature  of  his  drawer,  and 
if  he  pays  the  amount  of  the  bill  cannot  recover  it  back ;  but 
this  obligation  does  not  go  beyond  the  signature,  and  if  the 
amount  of  the  bill  is  increased  by  a  forgery,  he  has  been  per- 
mitted to  recover  from  the  payee  the  original  amount,  and  what- 
ever more  he  paid.  {ah~)  If  an  acceptor  gives  to  a  holder  for 
value  a  new  bill  in  payment  of  a  forged  one,  which  he  had  ac- 
cepted, not  knowing  it  to  be  forged  when  he  gives  the  new 
bill,  he  is  bound  on  the  new  bill.  (5)  So,  if  a  bank  pays  a 
forged  check,  it  bears   the   loss,  (c)  ^     And   a   party  cannot  be 

{y)  Wilson   l-.  Lntwidge,  1   Stra.  048 ;  (z)  Goddard    v.    Merchants    Bank,    4 

Jenys  v.   Fawler,  2   Stra.  946  ;  Price  v.  Comst.  147. 

Neai,  3  Burr,  13-34  ;  Smith  v.  Chester,  1  (a)  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Union  Bank, 

T.  R.  655,  per   Bailer,  J. ;  Bass  v.  Clive,  3  Comst.  230.      But  see  Hall  v.  Fuller,  5 

4  M.  &  Sel.  15,  per  Dampier,  J. ;  Smith  v.  B.  &  C.  750. 

Mercer,  G   Taunt.   7(3;  Robinson  i>.  Rey-  (««)   Howe  r.  Merrill,  5  Cush.  80. 

nolds,  2  Q.  B.  lSt6  ;  Canal  Bank  v.  Bank  (ab)  National  Park  Bank  v.  Ninth  Na- 

of  Albany,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  287  ;  Goddard  tional  Bank,  55  Barb.  87. 

V.  Mercliants  Bank,  4  Comst.  147;  Hara-  (b)  Mather  i:  Maidstone,  37  E.  L.  &  E. 

ilton  V.  Fearson,  1  Cart.  (Ind.)  540.      So  335;  s.  c.  18  C.  B.  273. 

also   the   acceptor   undertakes    that   the  (c)  Levy   u.  Bank  of  United  States,  1 

drawer  has  the  capac-ity  to  draw  and  in-  Binn.  27  ;  Bank  of  St.  Albans  v.  F.  &  M. 

dorse.      Dravton  v.  Dale,  2  B.  &  C.  299,  Bank,  10  Vt.  141 ;  Orr  v.  Union  Bank  of 

3  Dow.  &  R.  534,  per  /%%.  J.  ;  Suiith  v.  Scotland,  29  E.  L.  &  E.  1. 
Marsack,  6  C.  B.  486;  Mather  v.  Maid- 
stone, 18  C.  B.  273. 

1  If  there  was  no  delay  in  giving  notice  after  the  discovery  of  the  forgery.  Welch  v. 
Goodwin,  12'5  Mass.  71  ;  Allen  r.  Fourth  Bank,  59  N.  Y.  12.  But  not  if  the  payee  by 
his  own  fault  or  negligence  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  fraud,  or  to  mislead  the 
drawee.  Bank  of  North  America  v.  Bangs,  106  Mass.  441  ;  Park  Hank  v.  Ninth  Bank, 
46  N.  Y.  77;  Quincy  Bank  y.  Ricker,  71  lU.  439;  Howard  v.  Mis.sissijipi  Bank,  28  La. 
An.  727.  In  Pennsylvania,  by  statute,  recovery  may  be  Iiad  when  any  party's  signature 
is  forged,  against  a  party  previously  holding  or  negotiating.  Tradesmen's  Bank  v. 
Third  Bank,  66  Penn.  St.  43.5.  The  drawer  of  a  check  made  payable  to  the  order  of 
the  payee  is  not  bound  by  a  payment  thereof  by  the  bank,  ujjou  a  "forged  indorsement  of 
the  name  of  the  payee,  the  bank  being  bound  before  ]iaymeiit  to  ascertain  the 
genuineness  of  the  indorsement,  Welsh  ?,\  German  American  Bank,  73  N.  Y.  424; 
Seventh  Bank  v.  Cook,  73  Penn.  St.  483  ;  unless  the  drawer  so  directed  or  misled  the 
bank,  Dodge  v.  Exchange  Bank,  20  Ohio  St.  234.  See  First  Bank  r.  Whitman,  94  U.  S. 
343.    But  an  answer,  "  it  is  good,"  by  a  bank  officer,  supposing  the  inquiry  related  only 

300 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES    AND    DILLS.  *  265 

held  liable  upon  paper  on  which  his  name  is  forged,  merely  be- 
cause he  has  paid,  without  objection,  other  notes  forged  by  the 
same  person,  (c?)  ^  And  if  a  bank  receive  payment  of  an  amount 
due  to  it  in  its  own  bills,  which  turn  out  to  be  forged,  it  is 
bound,  (e)  But,  in  general,  payment  of  a  debt  in  forged  bills, 
both  parties  being  innocent,  is  no  payment,  nor  is  a  bank  bound 
by  discounting  a  forged  note ;  (/)  and  it  has  been  held  that  a 
depositor  owes  the  bank  no  duty  which  requires  him  to 
examine  his  pass-book  or  vouchers,  with  *  a  view  to  the  *  265 
detection  of  forgeries  of  his  name.  ((7)  ~  But  the  loser  by 
forged  paper  can  recover  it  back  only  by  showing  proper  diligence 
in  detecting  the  forgery  and  in  giving  notice  to  those  who  might 
be  affected  by  it.  (A)  ^ 

It  has  been  held  that  a  note  made  by  a  corporation  in  violation 
of  a  statute,  is  void  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  holder.  (^)  And 
this  has  been  held  also,  where  the  signature  of  the  promisor  was 
obtained  by  fraud.  (/)  But  where  one  whose  name  was  forged 
took  security  for  the  note,  it  was  held  to  be  a  ratification  by 
him.  (k)  And  it  is  also  held  that  mere  illegality  of  consideration 
—  if  the  note  be  not  declared  void  by  statute  —  will  not  affect  the 
rights  of  one  who  holds  it  for  value  and  in  good  faith.  (Z) 

Whether  payment  of  a  debt  in  bills  of  an  insolvent  bank,  both 
parties  being  ignorant  of  the  fact,  is  payment,  seems  not  to  be 
quite  settled.     It  must  depend  upon  the  question  (which  in  each 

Id)  Walters  i'.  Harvey,  17  Md.  150.  Mass.  33 ;  Canal  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Albany, 

(e)  United  States  Bank  v.  Bank  of  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  287;  Pope  v.  Nance,  1 
Georgia,  10  Wheat.  333.  Minor  (Ala.),  299. 

( f)  Stedman  v.  Gooch,  1  Esp.  5 ;  Markle         ( /)  Eoot  v.  Godard,  3  McLean,  102. 

V.  Hatfield,  2  Johns.  455 ;  Young  v.  Adams,         (,/)  Dunn  v.  Smith,  12  Sm.  &  M.  602. 
6  Mass.   182;  Eagle   Bank   v.   Smith,  5         (k)  Fitzpatrick  v.  S.  Commissioners,  7 

Conn.  71.  Humph.  224. 

(g)  Weisser  ?-.  Denison,  10  N.  Y.  68.  (/)  Norris   v.  Langley,  19  N.  H.  423; 
{/()  Gloucester  Bank  v.  Salem  Bank,  17  Jolmson  v.  Meeker,  1  Wis.  436. 

to  the  drawer's  signature  and  his  account,  does  not  bind  the  bank.  Espy  v.  Cincinnati 
Bank,  18  Wall.  604 ;  nor  the  certification  of  a  check  previously  materially  altered, 
Security  Bank  v.  Bank  of  the  Republic,  67  N.  Y.  458.  Contra,  Louisiana  Bank  v. 
Citizens  Bank,  28  La.  An.  189.     See  Morse  v.  Massachusetts  Bank,  1  Holmes,  209. 

1  But  one  who,  knowing  the  signature  to  a  promissory  note  to  be  forged,  and  intending 
to  be  bound  by  it,  acknowledges  it  as  his  own,  assumes  the  note  as  his  own,  and  is  bound 
by  it  just  as  if  it  had  been  originally  signed  by  his  authority.  Wellington  v.  Jackson, 
121  Mass.  157.  But  Shisler  v.  Vandike,  92  Penn.  St.  447,  declared  that  where  a  fraud 
is  of  such  a  character  as  the  forged  indorsement  of  a  note,  its  ratification  by  the  person 
whose  name  is  forged  is  opposed  to  public  policy,  and  cannot  be  permitted.  —  Detroit 
Bank  v.  Burkham,  32  Mich.  328,  was  to  the  effect  that  a  drawee  cannot  recover  of  the 
payee  where  the  security  accompanying  a  bill  proved  to  be  fictitious. 

2  Manufacturers  Bank  v.  Barnes,  65  111.  69. 

3  Schroeder  v.  Harvey,  75  111.  638. 

301 


*  266  THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

case  may  be  affected  by  its  peculiar  circumstances),  whether  the 
payee  takes  the  bills  as  absolute  payment  at  his  own  risk,  or  takes 
them  only  as  conditional  payment,  he  to  be  bound  only  to  use 
due  dilitrcnce  in  collecting  the  bills,  and  if  he  fails,  the  payment 
to  be  null.  Perhaps  the  weight  of  authority,  as  well  as  of  reason, 
is  in  favor  of  this  last  view  predominating  where  there  is  no 
sufficient  evidence  of  a  contrary  intention,  (m)  How  far  a  bill  or 
note  received  by  a  creditor  is  considered  in  law  as  a  payment  of 
the  debt,  will  be  treated  hereafter,  (w) 

The  liability  of  an  indorser  may  be  considered,  first  as  depend- 
ing on  the  demand  of   payment,  and  then  as  to  notice  of  non- 
payment, and  the  proceedings  necessary  thereon.     But  bills  of 
exchange  must  also,  in  some  instances,  be  presented  for 

*  266    acceptance,  *  when  they  are  made  payable  at  a  certain  time 

after  sight,  in  order  to  fix  the  day  of  their  maturity.  If 
payable  in  so  many  days  after  date  this  is  not  necessary.  But  the 
holder  may  present  any  bill  for  acceptance  at  any  time,  even  the 
last  day  before  it  is  due ;  and  if  not  accepted  may  sue  the  drawer 
and  indorser.  It  is  prudent  and  usual  to  present  a  bill  for  accept- 
ance soon  after  it  is  received,  as  the  holder  thereby  acquires  the 
security  of  the  acceptor,  (o)  ^ 


SECTION  VIII. 

OF  PRESENTMENT  FOR  ACCEPTANCE. 

Presentment  for  acceptance  should  be  made  by  the  holder  or 
his  authorized  agent  to  the  drawee  ^  or  his  authorized  agent,  (/>) 

(m)  Ellis  (.'.  Wild,  6  Mass.  321 ;  Ontario  to  the  drawee.      It  must  be  a  reasonable 

Rank  >■.  Licjlitbody,  11  Wend.  9,  i:j  Wend,  time;  and  tiiat  is  a  question  for  the  jury 

101 ;  Wainwri<rht  v.  Webster,  11  Vt.  57G;  to  decide  from  the  circumstances  of  each 

Gilman  v.  Peck,  id.  516  ;  Fogg  v.  Sawyer,  case.    See  also  Fry  i\  Hill,  7  Taunt.  .397  ; 

9  N.  H.  365;  Frontier  Bank  v.  Morse,  22  Mullick  v.  Kadakissen,  28  E.  L.  &  E.  86. 

Me.  88 ;  Timmis   r.  Gibbins,  14  E.  L.  &  —  No  cause  of  action   arises  upon  a  l)ill 

E.  64,  n.      Contm,  Lowrey  v.  Durrell,  2  payable   at  sight,  until  it  is  presented. 

Port.    (Ala.)    280;    Scruggs    v.    Gass,   8  Holmes  r.  Kerrison,  2  Taunt,  .323  ;  Thorpe 

Yerg.  175;  Bayard  v.  Slmnk,  1  W.  &  S.  i-.  Booth,  l{y.  &  M.  388. 
92,  (/))  Cheek  r.  Roper,  5  Esp.  175.  It  is  not 

(n)  Post,  Chap,  on  Defences.  sufficient  to  call  at  the  residence  of  the 

(o)  Muilman  >•.  D'Equino,  2  H.  Bl.  565.  drawee  and  present  the  bill  to  some  per- 

It  was  here  held  that  there  is  no  fi.xed  son,  who  is  unknown  to  the  party  calling, 

time  within  which  a  bill  payable  at  sight.  Id. 
or  a  certain  time  after,  shall  be  presented 

1  See  Montelius  v.  Charles,  76  111.  .303. 

-  The  holder  of  a  bill  of  exchange  payable  on  a  day  certain  is  not  bound  to  present 

302 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND   BILLS.  *  267 

during  the  usual  hours  of  business.  (  q)  ^  And  the  drawee  has 
until  the  next  day  to  determine  whether  he  will  accept,  but  may 
answer  at  once,  (r) 

A  bill  may  be  in  some  sort  accepted  before  it  is  drawn,  for  a 
written  promise  to  accept  a  certain  bill  hereafter  to  be 
made  is  *  construed  as  an  acceptance,  if  precisely  that  bill  *  267 
is  drawn  within  a  reasonable  time  after  such  promise,  (s)  ^ 
But  a  bill  payable  so  many  days  after  sight,  cannot  have  its  day 
of  payment  fixed,  except  by  presentment ;  and  it  has  therefore 
been  said,  that  an  acceptance  by  previous  promise  does  not  apply 
except  to  bills  payable  on  demand,  or  at  so  many  days  after 
date,  (f)  It  does  not  seem  quite  clear,  however,  why  the  accept- 
ance by  such  promise  might  not  be  held  valid  to  bind  the  acceptor^ 

{q\  Elford  V.  Teed,  1  M.  &  Sel.  28;  See  Wiseman  i-.  Chiapella,  23  How.  368, 
Church  V.  Clark,  21  Pick.  310;  Bank  of  for  a  discussion  of  the  cases  on  present- 
United  States  V.  Carneal,  2  Pet.  543 ;  ment  for  acceptance. 
Harrison  v.  Crowder,  6  Sin.  &  M.  464 ;  (?)  Montgomery  County  Bank  v.  Al- 
Parker  v.  Gordon,  7  East,  385.  —  And  bany  City  Bank,  8  Barb.  399. 
presentment  after  banking  hours,  and  an  (s)  Pillans  v.  Van  Mierop,  3  Burr.  1670; 
authorized  person  then  answering,  has  Coolidge  v.  Payson,  2  Wheat.  66 ;  Wilson 
been  held  sufBcient.  Garnett  v.  Wood-  v.  Clements,  3  Mass.  1 ;  Goodrich  v.  Gor- 
cock,  1  Stark.  475.  A  presentment,  how-  don,  15  Johns.  6 ;  Parker  v.  Greele,  2 
ever,  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  at  Wend.  545 ;  Kendrick  v.  Campbell,  1 
the  drawee's  residence,  has  been  held  at  Bailey,  522;  Carnegie  v.  Morrison,  2 
a  reasonable  hour.  Barclay  v.  Bailey,  2  Met.  381 ;  Storer  v.  Logan,  9  Mass.  55; 
Camp.  537.  —  But  eleven  or  twelve  at  McEvers  w.  Mason,  10  Johns.  207  ;  Schim- 
night  has  been  held  otherwise.  Dana  v.  melpennich  v.  Bayard,  1  Pet.  264  ;  Boyce 
Sawyer,  22  Me.  244.  So  of  a  demand  at  v.  Edwards,  4  Pet.  121 ;  Williams  v.  Wi- 
eight  in  the  moni'ng.  Lunt  u.  Adams,  17  nans,  2  Green  (N.  J.),  839;  Bayard  ;;. 
Me.  230.  See  Flint  v.  Rogers,  15  Me.  67 ;  Lathy,  2  McLean,  462  ;  Vance  v.  Ward, 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Hamer,  7  How.  2  Dana,  95;  Reed  u.  Marsh,  5  B.  Mon.  8; 
(Miss./  448;  Cohea  v.  Hunt,  2  Sm.  &  M.  Howland  v.  Carson,  15  Penn.  St.  453; 
227.  —  The  rule  in  all  cases  is  that  the  Beach  r.  State  Bank,  2  Cart.  (Ind.)  488; 
presentment  should  be  at  a  reasonable  Cassell  f.  Dows,  2  Blatch.  335;  Lewis  v. 
time;  and  when  the  paper  is  due  from  or  Kramer,  3  Md.  275;  Naglee  v.  Lyman,  14 
at  a  bank,  it  sliould,  as  we  have  already  Cal.  450.  See  also  Exchange  Bank  v. 
said,  as  a  general  rule,  be  presented  with-  Rice,  98  Mass.  288. 

in  banking  hours.      But  in  other  cases         (I)  Story    on   Bills   of    Exch.    §    249; 

the  period  ranges  through  the  whole  day,  Wildes  v.  Savage,  1  Story,  22 ;  Russell  v^ 

down  to  tiie  time  of  going  to  bed.      Cay-  Wiggin,  2  Story,  213. 
uga  Bank  i-.  Hunt,  2  Hill   (N.  Y.),  635. 

the  same  for  acceptance  to  the  drawee ;  and  a  presentment  for  payment  at  the  time  and 
place  at  which  it  is  made  payable  is  a  sufficient  presentment  to  charge  the  drawer  and 
indorsers.  Walker  v.  Stetson,  19  Ohio  St.  400.  Unreasonable  delay  of  the  payee  of  a 
draft  to  present  it  to  the  drawee,  or  to  notify  the  drawer  of  its  non-acceptance  or 
non-payment,  or  to  return  it  to  the  drawer  as  refused  by  the  drawee,  makes  the  paper  the 
payee's  own,  and  discharges  the  drawer.  Allan  v.  Eldred,  50  Wis.  132.  The  payee  of 
a  check  has  no  right  against  a  bank  or  banker  until  its  acceptance.  First  Bank  v. 
Whitman,  94  U.  S.  343  ;  nor  is  a  check  an  assignment  of  funds  in  bankers'  hands,  Carr 
V.  Security  Bank,  107  Mass.  45  ;  Tyler  r.  Gould,  48  N.  Y.  682.  Contra,  Union  Bank  v. 
Oceana  County  Bank,  80  111.  212. 

1  Skelton  v.  Dustin,  92  111.  49,  that  any  time  within  the  day  is  sufficient,  if  not 
payable  at  a  bank. 

2  So  a  promise  in  a  telegram  binds  the  sender  to  one  who  takes  a  bill  on  the  faith  of 
the  despatch.     Central  Bank  v.  Richards,  109  Mass.  413. 

303 


*  268  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

leaving  the  day  of  payment  to  be  fixed  by  presentment.  That  is, 
if  a  bill  payable  at  sixty  days  after  sight  were  presented  and 
acceptance  refused,  and  the  protest  fixed  the  day  of  presentment 
and  therefore  the  day  when  it  should  be  paid,  it  is  not  clear  why 
the  acceptor  might  not  be  held  on  his  promise  to  accept  that  very 
bill  when  it  should  be  made  and  i)resented. 

An  acceptance  must  be  absolute,  and  not  differ  in  any  respect 
from  the  terms  of  the  l)ill.  If  any  other  be  given,  the  holder  may 
assent  and  so  bind  the  acceptor,  but  must  give  notice,  as  in  case 
of  non-acceptance,  to  other  parties,  in  order  to  bind  them ;  (w) 
and  the  acceptor  is  held  only  so  far  as  he  promises  by  his  accept- 
ance, (v)  The  usual  way  of  accepting  is  by  writing  the  word 
"accepted"  on  the  face  of  the  bill,  and  signing  the  acceptor's 
name  ;  but  there  is  no  precise  formula  or  method  which  is  neces- 
sary to  constitute  a  good  acceptance.  It  seems  to  be  enough  if 
it  is  substantially  a  distinct  promise  to  pay  the  bill  according  to 
its  terms,  whether  it  be  in  writing  upon  the  bill  or  upon  a  separ- 
ate paper,  or  by  parol,  (w)^  And  a  written  promise  to  pay  a 
bill,  operates  as  an  acceptance  of  the  bill  when  drawn ;  but  it 
should  be  sufficiently  precise  to  identify  the  bill  as  that 

*  268    authorized,  {ivw')     In  many  *  of  our  States  there  are  stat- 

utes respecting  acceptance  of  bills,  (x) 

(;/)  Walker  v.  Bank  of  State  of  New  have  had  the  money,  and  they  ought  to 

York,  13  Barb.  G36 ;  Lyon  v.  Sundius,  1  be  paid,   but  I   do  not    interfere  in  this 

Camp.  423;  Russell  z;.  Phillips,  14  Q.  B.  business,  you   should    see   my   partner." 

891.  And  it  was  hfld  that  all  this  amounted  to 

(i-)  Sallery  r.   Prindle,  14   Barb.  186.  a  parol  acceptance  of  the  bills  on  which 

See,  however,  Clarke  v.  Gordon,  3  Rich,  the  defendants  were  liable  to  an  indorsee, 

L.  311.  between  whom  and  A  there  was  no  priv- 

(w)  Edson  V.  Fuller,  2  Foster  (N.  11.),  ity,  and  that  the  indorsee  was  not  pre- 
183;  Barnet  v.  Smith,  10  Foster  (N.  IL),  eluded  from  suing,  by  having  made  a 
256;  Wynne  v.  Raikes,  6  I'>ast,  514;  protest  in  ignorance  of  this  acceptance. 
Fairlee  r.  Herring,  3  Biiig.  625.  In  tliis  — In  Ward  r.  Allen,  2  Met.  53,  a  bill  was 
case,  bills  having  been  drawn  on  the  de-  read  to  the  drawee,  who  said  it  was  cor- 
fendants  by  their  agent,  and  with  their  rect  and  should  be  paid;  and  this  was 
authority,  in  respect  to  a  mine  which  treated  as  a  sufficient  acceptance.  See 
they  afterwards  transferred  to  A,  they  Parkhurst  v.  Dickerson,  21  Pick.  307  ; 
requested  A  to  place  funds  in  their  hands  Luff  r.  Pope,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  413 ;  Walker 
to  meet  tlic  bills  when  due,  saying,  "it  v.  Lide,  1  Rich.  L.  249;  Walker  i'.  Bank 
would  be  unpleasant  to  have  bills  drawn  of  State  of  New  York,  13  Barb.  O'-Hi; 
on  them  paid  by  another  i)arty."  A  Lewis  v.  Kramer,  3  Md.  265;  Orear  v. 
placed  funds  accordingly  ;  but  when  the  McDonald,  'J  Gill,  350. 
l)ills  were  left  with  tiie  defendants  for  {inr)  Plunnner  v.  Lyman,  49  Me.  229  ; 
acceptance,  no  accei)tance  was  written  Burns  v.  Rowland,  40  Barb.  368. 
on  them.  A's  agent  having  complained  {x)  In  New  York,  Missouri,  and  Cali- 
to  one  of  the  defendants  on  the  subject,  fornia,  the  acceptance  must  be  in  writ- 
he said:     "What,   not  accepted?      We  ing;   and  maybe  by  promise  before  the 

1  An  oral  acceptance  of  a  bill  is  binding  upon  the  acceptor.    Pierce  v.  Kittredge,  115 
Mass.  374. 

304 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  269 

An  acceptance  can  be  made  only  by  a  drawee,  or  by  one  for 
honor ;  but  an  acceptance  by  one  of  many  drawees  binds  the 
acceptor,  (if) 


SECTION  IX. 

OF  PRESENTMENT    FOR   PAYMENT. 

•  A  bill  or  note  must  be  presented  for  payment  at  its  maturity, 
or  the  indorsers  are  not  held.  They  guarantee  its  payment,  not 
by  express  words,  but  by  operation  of  law.  And  for  their  protec- 
tion the  law  annexes  to  their  liability,  as  a  condition,  that  reason- 
able efforts  shall  be  made  to  procure  the  payment  from  those 
bound  to  pay  before  them,  and  also  that  they  shall  have  reasona- 
ble notice  of  a  refusal  to  pay,  that  they  may  have  an  opportunity 
to  indemnify  themselves.  The  justice  of  this  is  obvious.  A 
holder  of  a  note,  with  a  good  indorser,  might  be  very  indifferent 
as  to  the  payment  by  the  promisor  or  an  earlier  indorser,  if  he 
knew  that  he  could  certainly  collect  the  amount  from  the  indor- 
ser on  whom  he  relied ;  therefore  the  very  liability  of  this  indor- 
ser is  made  to  rest  upon  the  efforts  of  the  holder  to  obtain 
the  money  from  the  prior  parties.  Again ;  each  indorser 
transfers  by  indorsement  a  debt  due  to  *  himself,  and  if  by  *  269 
the  guaranty  which  springs  from  his  indorsement  he  has  to 
pay  this  debt  to  another,  he  is  entitled  to  all  such  prompt  knowl- 
edge of  the  failure  of  the  party  whom  he  guarantees,  and  of  his 
own  consequent  liability,  as  will  enable  him  to  secure  a  payment 
of  this  debt  to  himself,  if  that  be  possible.  The  rules,  and  the 
exceptions  to  the  rules,  in  relation  to  demand  of  payment  and 
notice  of  non-payment,  will  be  found  to  rest  upon  these  prin- 
ciples. 

Generally  the  question  of  reasonable  time,  reasonable  diligence, 
and  reasonable  notice,  is  open  to  the  circumstances  of  every  case, 
and  is  determined  by  a  reference  to  them,  (z)  But  in  regard  to 
bills  and  notes  the  law  merchant  has  defined  all  of  these  with 
great  exactness. 

bill  is  drawn.   And  a  drawee  holding  and  (y)  Owen  v.  Van  Uster,  1  E.  L.  &  E. 

refusing  to  return  a  bill  to  a  holder  for     396 ;  s.  c.  10  C.  B.  318. 
twenty-four  hours,  is   to  be  held  as  ac-         (z)  Goodwin  v.  Davenport,  47  Me.  112. 
cepting  it. 

VOL.  I.  20  305 


270 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


The  general  rule  may  be  said  to  be,  that  the  drawer  and  indor- 
sers  of  a  bill  and  the  indorscrs  of  a  note  are  discharged  from 
their  liability,  unless  payment  of  the  bill  or  note  be  demanded 
from  the  party  previously  bound  to  pay  it,  on  the  day  on  which 
it  falls  due.  (a)  And  if  the  holder  neglects  to  make  such 
demand,  he  not  only  loses  the  guaranty  of  subsequent  parties, 
but  all  right  to  recover  for  the  consideration  or  debt  for  which 

the  bill  or  note  was  given.  (6) 
*  270        *  Let  us  look  at  the  exceptions  to   this  rule  requiring 

such  presentment  of  a  bill  or  note.  Bankruptcy  or  insol- 
vency, however  certain  or  however  manifested,  is  not  one.  (c)  ^ 
Though  the  bank  or  shop  be  shut,  presentment  there  or  to  the 
parties  personally  must  still  be  made,  ((i)     Nor  will  the  death  of 


{n)  Field  V.  Nickcrson,  13  Mass.  I.jI  ; 
Martin  v.  Winslow,  2  Mason,  241 ;  Sice  v. 
Cunningliain,  1  Co\vcn,397;  Montgomery 
Countv  Bank  v.  Albany  City  Bank,  8 
Barb,  mi ;  Holbrook  v.  Allen,  4  Fla.  87  ; 
Robinson  i:  Blen,  20  Me.  109;  Magruder 
V.  Union  Bank,  3  Bet.  87 ;  Jiuiiati  Bank 
V.  Hale,  1()  S.  &  R.  157.  If  the  bill  or 
note  is  payable  at  (i  time  ce/rlaiu,  it  must 
be  presented  on  the  last  day  of  grace; 
and  a  demand  either  before  or  after  that 
day  is  insufficient  to  charge  the  indorser. 
Id. ;  Howe  v.  Bradley,  19  Me.  31 ;  Lcavitt 
V.  Simes,  3  N.  H.  14 ;  Farmers  Bank  v. 
Duvall,  7  G.  &  J.  78  ;  Piatt  v.  Eads,  1 
Blackf.  81 ;  Etting  v.  Schuylkill  Bank,  2 
Barr,  355. 

ih)  Bridges  v.  Berry,  3  Taunt.  130; 
Camidge  v.  Allenby,  6  B.  &  C.  373. 
Tins  was  an  action  for  the  price  of 
goods.  It  appeared  that  the  same  were 
sold  at  York  on  Saturday,  December 
lOtl),  182"),  and  on  the  same  day,  at  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  vendee  de- 
livered to  the  vendor,  as,  and  for  a  pay- 
ment of  the  price,  certain  promissory 
notes  of  the  bank  of  D.  &  Co.  at  Hud- 
dersfield,  payable  on  demand  to  bearer. 
D.  &  Co.  stopped  payment  on  the  same 
day  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and 
never  afterwards  resumed  tlieir  pay- 
ments ;  but  neither  of  the  parties  knew 
of  the  stoppage,  or  of  the  insolvency  of 
1).  &  Co.  The  vendor  never  circulated 
the  notes,  or  presented  them  to  the 
bankers  for  payment;  but  on  Saturday, 
the  17th,  he  required  the  vendee  to  take 
back  the  notes,  and  to  pay  him  the 
amount,  which  the  latter  refused.  Held, 
under  these  circumstances,  that  the  ven- 


dor of  the  goods  was  guilty  of  laches, 
and  had  thereby  made  the  notes  his  own, 
and,  consequently,  that  the}^  operated  as 
a  satisfaction  of  the  debt.  In  Hare  v. 
Henty,  100  Eng.  C.  L.  65,  it  is  held  that  a 
banker  receiving  a  check  upon  another 
banker,  not  resident  in  the  same  town,  is 
not  bound  to  transmit  it  for  presentment, 
by  the  post  of  the  day  on  which  he  re- 
ceives it,  but  he  has  until  post  time  of  the 
next  day  for  so  doing.  See  also  2  Bars. 
Notes  &  Bills,  72. 

(c)  Russell  y.  Langstaffe,  Dougl.  515; 
Ex  parte  Johnston,  3  Ueac.  &  C.  433 ; 
Bowes  V.  Howe,  5  Taunt.  30 ;  Gower  v. 
Moore,  25  Me.  16  ;  Ireland  v.  Kip,  Anthon, 
142  ;  Siiaw  v.  Reed,  12  Pick.  132  ;  Groten 
I'.  Dalheim,  6  Greenl.  476  ;  Holland  v. 
Turner,  10  Conn.  308;  Orear  v.  McDon- 
ald, 9  Gill,  3.50.  And  although  tlie  in- 
dorsers,  at  the  time  of  indorsement,  had 
reason  to  believe,  and  did  believe,  that 
the  maker  would  not  pay,  this  does  not 
dispense  with  the  necessity  of  due  notice 
to  them  of  such  maker's  default.  Denny 
V.  Palmer,  5  Ired.  L.  610  ;  Oliver  v.  Mun- 
day,  2  Penning.  082 ;  AUwood  v.  Hasel- 
don,  2  Bailey,  457. 

(d)  Bowes  I'.  Howe,  5  Taunt.  30,  re- 
versing the  decision  of  the  King's  Bench 
in  the  same  case,  16  East,  112.  And  see 
Camidge  v.  Allenby,  6  B.  &  C.  373.  If 
the  maker  is  absent  on  a  voyage  at  sea, 
having  a  domicile  within  the  State,  pay- 
ment must  be  demanded  there.  Whittier 
V.  Groffam.  3  Greenl.  82;  Dcnnie  v. 
Walker,  7  N.  H.  199.  See  Ogden  v.  Cow- 
ley, 2  Johns.  274 ;  Galpin  v.  Hard,  3  Mc- 
Cord,  394  ;  I']llis  v.  Commercial  Bank,  7 
How.  (Miss.)  294. 


306 


1  Smith  V.  Miller,  52  N.  Y.  545. 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  271 

the  party  prevent  the  necessity  of  demanding  payment  of  his 
personal  representatives,  if  he  have  any,  (e)  and  if  not,  at  his 
house ;  nor  will  the  death  of  the  party  who  should  give  notice ; 
for  if  no  executor  or  administrator  is  appointed  before  the  note 
falls  due,  the  executor  or  administrator  may  make  sufificient 
demand  and  give  notice  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the 
appointment.  (/) 

Delay  or  omission  to  demand  payment  does  not,  however,  dis- 
charge the  drawer  of  a  bill,  if  the  drawee  had  in  his  hands 
no  effects  of  the  drawer,  at  any  time  between  the  drawing  of  the 
bill  and  its  maturity,  and  had  no  right  on  other  ground  to  expect 
the  payment  of  the  bill,  (^)  for  the  drawer  had  then  no  right  to 
draw  the  bill,  and  therefore  no  right  to  demand  or  notice,  because 
he  could  not  profit  by  it  to  get  payment  to  himself  of  the  debt 
from  the  drawee,  there  being  no  such  debt.  So  also  if  the 
transaction  between  the  drawer  and  the  drawee  was  *  ille-  *  271 
gal.  (7t)  But  such  presentment  should  still  be  made  in 
all  cases  to  hold  the  subsequent  parties,  (i)  And  it  is  held  that 
an  accommodation  drawer  is  entitled  to  demand  and  notice  of  dis- 
honor, although  he  had  no  funds  in  the  hands  of  the  drawee.  (^^) 
The  discharge  from  liability  arising  from  such  delay  or  omis- 
sion may  be  waived,  by  an  express  promise  to  pay  made  after 
such  discharge,  or  by  a  payment  in  part,  from  which  the  law 
infers  an  acknowledgment  of  liability  ;  but  not  by  a  mere  promise 
to  pay  made  before  such  delay  or  omission,  (/)  ^     If  the  party 

(e)  Gower  v.  Moore,  25  Me.  16;   Lan-  it  was  the  duty  of  the  maker,  and  not  of 

dry  V.  Stansburj'',  10  La.  484.  the  sureties,  to  provide  for  the  pa3-ment. 

(  /■)  White  I.'.  Stoddard,  11  Grav,  2-58.  Fort  v.  Cortes,  14  La.  180. 

(y)  De  Berdt  v.  Atkinson,  2  U.  Bl.  (h)  Copp  v.  McDugall,  9  Mass.  1. 
336 ;  Terry  v.  Parker,  6  A.  &  E.  502  ;  Where  the  indorsee  of  a  negotiable  prom- 
Kinsley  i'.  Robinson,  21  Pick.  827;  Foard  issory  note  failed  to  recover  against  the 
V.  Womack,  2  Ala.  368 ;  WoUenweber  v.  promisor,  because  the  original  contract 
Ketterlinus,  17  Penn.  St.  389;  Allen  v.  was  usurious,  the  indorser,  who  was  the 
Smith's  Adm'r,  4  Harring.  (Del.)  234;  original  payee,  was  held  liable,  without 
Oliver  v.  Bank  of  Tenn.  ll  Humph.  74;  notice,  for  the  amount  due  by  the  note, 
Orear  v.  McDonald,  9  Gill,  350.  See  also  but  not  for  the  costs  of  the  indorsee's 
Fitch  V.  Redding,  4  Sandf.  130  ;  Allen  v.  action  against  the  promisor. 
King,  4  McLean,  128;  Durrura  i'.  Hen-  (i)  Wilkes  v.  Jacks,  Peake  Cas.  202; 
drick,  4  Tex.  492;  Bowring  v.  Andrews.  Leach  v.  Hewitt,  4  Taunt.  730;  Ramdu- 
SMcLean,  576;  Gilletti'.  Averill,  SDenioj  lollday  t-.  Darieux,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  61 ; 
85 ;  Mobley  v.  Clark,  28  Barb,  390.  But  Carter  v.  Flower,  16  M.  &  W.  743. 
where  a  note  is  signed  by  one  person  as  a  {ii)  Merchants  Bank  v.  Easley,  44  Mo. 
principal,  and  others  as  sureties,  it  is  not  286. 

a  sufficient  excuse  to  show  tha.t  the  sureties  { j)  That  payment  of  part  is  a  waiver 

had  no  funds  in  the  place  of  payment ;  for  of  non-demand  on  the  maker,  see  Vaughan 

1  That  a  promise  to  pay  after  neglect  of  presentment  and  notice,  or  both  with  knowl- 
edge, is  a  waiver,  see  Yeager  v.  Farwell,  13  Wall.  6 ;  Meyer  v.  Hibsher,  47  N.  Y.  265; 
Tardy  v.  Boyd,  26  Gratt.  631 ;  Johnson  v.  Arrigoni,  5  dreg.  485.     If  an  indorser  also 

307 


*  '7: 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book 


who  should  pay  the  note  has  absconded,  or  has  no  domicile  or 
regular  place  of  business,' and  cannot  be  found  by  reasonable 
endeavors,  payment  need  not  be   demanded  of  him,  because  it 

would  be  of  no  utility  to  a  subsequent  party ;  (k)  still, 
*  272    notice  of  these  facts  *  should  be  given.     And  it  has  been 

held  that  where  demand  of  payment  was  delayed  by  politi- 
cal disturbances,  or  by  any  invincible  obstacle,  it  was  enough  if 
the  demand  was  made  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  obstruction 
ceased.  (0  ^ 


V.  Fuller,  Stra.  1246;  Taylor  v.  Jones, 
2  Camp.  100 ;  Lundio  v.  Robertson,  7 
East,  2:J1  ;  Ilacldock  v.  Bury,  id.  236,  n. ; 
Hodge  V.  Fillis,  3  Camp.  4t54 ;  Ilopley  ?\ 
Dufrcsne,  15  East,  275  ;  Kyram  v.  Hun- 
ter, 36  Me.  217  ;  Low  v.  Howard,  11 
Cush.  268;  Dorsey  v.  Watson,  1-4  Mo. 
59 ;  Harvey  v.  Troupe,  23  Miss.  538.  — 
That  a  new  promise  to  pay,  after  notice 
of  the  neglect  to  demand  of  the  maker, 
is  a  waiver,  see  Sussex  Bank  v.  Baldwin, 
2  Harrison,  487  ;  Seeley  v.  Bisbee,  2  Vt. 
105;  Ladd  v.  Kenney,  2  N.  H.  340; 
Sogers  V.  Hackett,  1  Foster  (N.  H.),  100; 
Breed  v.  Hillhouse,  7  Conn.  523 ;  Jones  v. 
O'Brien,  26  E.  L.  &  E.  283 ;  Peto  v.  Rey- 
nolds, id.  404.  —  It  has  been  decided  that 
it  must  be  shown  atfirmatively,  however, 
that  the  indorser,  when  he  made  the 
promise,  knew  that  no  demand  had  been 
made  on  the  maker.  Otis  v.  Hussey,  3 
N.  H.  346 ;  New  Orleans  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Mills,  2  La.  An.  824  ;  Robinson  v.  Day,  7 
La.  An.  201.  But  it  is  said  in  Bruce  v. 
Lytle,  13  Barb.  103,  that  where  there  is 
an  e.\j)ress  promise,  demand  and  notice 
will  be  presumed  unless  the  contrary  be 
shown.  —  So  if  an  indorser  take  full  se- 
curity from  the  maker  to  secure  him 
against  his  liability  to  pay  the  note,  this 
excuses  a  demand  on  tlie  maker,  and  no- 
tice thereof  to  the  indorser.  Durham  v. 
Price,  5  Yerg.  300 ;  Duvall  v.  Farmers 
Bank,  2  G.  &  J.  31 ;  Mead  v.  Small,  2 
Greenl.  207;  Marshall  ;;.  Mitchell,  34  Me. 
227;  Marshall  -•.  Mitchell,  35  Me.  223; 
I'rentiss  v.  Danielson,  5  Conn.  175;  Perry 
V.  Green,  4  Harrison,  61 ;  Mechanics 
Bank  v.  Griswold,  7  Wend.  165;  Cod- 
dington  v.  Davies,  3  Denio,  16  ;  Bond  v. 
Farnham,  5  Mass.  170 ;  Stephenson  v. 
Primrose,  8  Port.  (Ala.)  155.  —  yl/(7cr,  of 
only  part  security.      Spencer  v.  Harvey, 


17  Wend.  489 ;  Bruce  v.  Lytle,  13  Barb. 
103 ;  Burroughs  v.  Hannegan,  1  McLean, 
309 ;  Kyle  v.  Green,  24  Ohio,  495 ;  Wood- 
man V.  Eastman,  10  N.  H.  359 ;  Andrews 
V.  Boyd,  3  Met.  434  ;  Otsego  Co.  Bank  v. 
Warren,  18  Barb.  290.  —  And  the  whole 
doctrine  itself  is  subject  to  many  quali- 
fications ;  and  in  Kramer  v.  Sandford,  4 
W.  &  S.  328,  where  the  American  author- 
ities are  fully  reviewed,  Gibson,  C.  J.,  ob- 
served that  this  doctrine  of  waiver  in 
consideration  of  security  had  no  footing 
in  Westminster  Hall. 

{k)  Putnam  v.  Sullivan,  4  Mass.  45 ; 
Gilbert  v.  Dennis,  3  Met.  495,  499;  per 
Shaw,  C.  J. ;  Duncan  v.  McCullough,  4 
S.  &  R.  480 ;  Lehman  v.  Jones,  1  W.  & 
S.  120;  Wheeler  v.  Field,  6  Met.  290; 
Gist  V.  Lybrand,  3  Ohio,  307;  Central 
Bank  v.  Allen,  16  Me.  41 ;  Bruce  v.  Lytle, 
13  Barb.  163;  Nailor  v.  Bowie,  3  Md. 
251 ;  Ratcliff  v.  Planters  Bank,  5  Sneed, 
425.  —  So  when  the  maker  of  the  note 
was  a  seafaring  man,  having  no  resi- 
dence or  place  of  business  in  the  State, 
and  was  at  sea  when  payment  was  due, 
no  demand  was  held  requisite.  Moore 
V.  Coffield,  1  Dev.  247.  So  where  the 
maker  of  a  promissory  note  removes 
from  the  State  subsequently  to  making, 
and  continues  to  reside  abroad  until  its 
maturity.  Foster  v.  Julicn,  24  N.  Y.  28. 
—  But  where  the  holder  was  told,  at  the 
time  of  the  indorsement,  tliat  the  maker 
was  a  transient  person,  and  his  residence 
unknown,  an  eflort  should  be  made,  not- 
withstanding, to  find  him.  Otis  v.  Hus- 
sey, 3  N.  H.  346. 

(/)  Patience  v.  Townley,  2  Smith, 
King's  Bench,  223.  And  so  the  preva- 
lence of  a  contagious  malignant  fever 
in  the  place  of  residence  of  the  parties, 
which  occasioned  a  stoppage  of  all  busi- 


indorses  a  renewal  note,  void  for  usury,  given  in  substitution  of  the  original  note,  it  is 
a  waiver  of  presentment  and  notice  of  the  non-payment  of  the  original  note.  Lcary  v. 
Miller,  61  N.  Y.  488. 

1  See  Rouquette  v.  Overmann,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  525;  Bond  v.  Moore,  93  U.  S.  593; 
Dunbar  v.  Tyler,  44  Miss.  1 ;  Norris  v.  Despard,  38  Md.  487. 

308 


CH.  2VI.] 


NOTES   AND   BILLS. 


273 


Where  the  bill  or  note  is  made  payable  at  a  particular  place 
specified  in  the  body  of  it,  it  seems  to  be  the  rule  in  England  that 
it  must  be  presented  for  that  purpose  at  that  place,  for  the  place 
is  part  of  the  contract ;  (m)  but  "  payable  at,"  <fec.,  out  of  the 
body  of  the  note,  either  at  the  bottom,  or  in  the  margin,  is  but  a 
memorandum,  which  binds  nobody,  {n)  And  in  this  country, 
neither  a  bill  or  note  drawn  payable  at  a  place  certain,  nor  a  bill 
drawn  payable  generally,  but  accepted  payable  at  a  specified 
place,  need  be  presented  at  that  place,  (o)  ^  in  order  to 
*  sustain  an  action  against  the  maker  or  acceptor ;  but  *  273 
he  may  show  by  way  of  defence,  that  he  was  ready  there 
with  funds,  and  thus  escape  all  damages  and  interest ;  ( j?)  and 
if  he  can  show  positive  loss  from  the  want  of  such  presentment 


ness,  has  been  held  a  sufficient  excuse 
for  a  delay  of  two  months  in  giving  no- 
tice of  a  non-payment.  Tunno  v.  Lague, 
2  Johns.  Cas.  1.  If  tlie  holder  deposits 
the  note  in  tiie  post-office  in  season  to 
reacli  the  place  of  payment  at  the  prop- 
er time,  to  be  there  presented  by  iiis 
agent,  but  through  the  mistake  of  the 
postmaster  it  is  misdirected  and  delayed, 
these  facts  have  been  held  to  excuse  the 
delay.  Windham  Bank  v.  Norton,  22 
Conn.  213. 

(vi)  Rowe  V.  Young,  2  Br.  &  B.  165; 
Sanderson  v.  Bowes,  14  East,  500 ;  Spind- 
Icr  V.  Grellett,  1  Exch.  384 ;  Emblin  v. 
Dartnell,  12  M.  &  W.  830.  These  de- 
cisions, however,  led  to  the  enactment  of 
1  &  2  Geo.  IV.  c.  78,  which  provides  that 
an  acceptance  at  a  particular  place  is  a 
general  acceptance,  unless  expressed  to 
be  payable  there  only,  and  not  otherwise 
or  elsewliere.  On  the  construction  of 
this  statute,  see  Selby  v.  Eden,  8  Bing. 
611 ;  Fayle  v.  Bird,  0  B.  &  C.  531. 

(n)  Masters  v.  Barretto,  8  M.  G.  &  S. 
433 ;  Exon  v.  Russell,  4  M.  &  Sel.  505 ; 
Bowling  V.  Harrison,  6  How.  259. 

(o)  tlnited  States  Bank  v.  Smith,  11 
Wheat.  171 ;  Foden  r.  Sharp,  4  Jolins. 
183;  Wolcott  y.Van  Santvoord,  17  Jolms. 
248;  Caldwell  v.  Cassidy,  8  Cowen,  271; 
Haxtun  v.  Bishop,  3  Wend.  15  ;  Wallace 
V.  McConnell,  13  Pet.  136;  Carley  v. 
Vance,  17  Mass.  389;  Watkins  i'. 
Crouch,  5  Leigh,  522  ;  Ruggles  v.  Pat- 
ten, 8  Mass.  480;  Allen  v.  Smith's 
Adm'r,  4  Harring.  (Del.)  234;  Dough- 
erty V.  Western  Bank  of  Georgia,  13  Ga. 


288 ;  Ripka  v.  Pope,  5  La.  An  61 ;  Blair 
V.  Bank  of  Tenn.  11  Humph.  84  ;  Weed  v. 
Van  Houten,  4  Halst.  189;  McNairy  v. 
Bell,  1  Yerg.  502  ;  Mulherrin  v.  Hannum, 
2  id.  81;  Bacon  v.  Dyer,  8  Fairf.  19; 
Remick  v.  O'Kyle,  id.  340 ;  Dockray  v. 
Dunn,  87  Me.  442;  Nichols  v.  Pool,  2 
Jones  (N.  C),  23;  Irvine  v.  Withers,  1 
Stew.  (Ala.)  234;  P^ldred  v.  Hawes,  4 
Conn.  465;  Wnite,  J.,  in  Jackson  v.  Park- 
er, 13  id.  358 ;  Payson  ;;.  Whitcomb,  15 
Pick.  212;  Sumner  v.  Ford,  3  Ark.  389; 
Green  v.  Goings,  7  Barb.  652 ;  Brigham 
V.  Smith,  10  N.  H.  274.  Contra,  per  tiiori/, 
J.,  Picquet  v.  Curtis,  1  Sumner,  478. 
See  also  New  Hope  D.  B.  Co.  v.  Perry, 
11  111.  467;  Gancs  i\  Manning,  2  Green 
(la.),  251 ;  Andrews  v.  Hoxie,  5  Tex.  171  ; 
Carter  v.  Smith,  9  Cush.  321 ;  McKenzie 
V.  Durant,  9  Rich.  L.  61 ;  Bank  of  State 
V.  Bank  of  C.  F.  13  Ired.  L.  75.  — If  the 
bill  or  note  be  payable  at  a  particular 
place,  on  demand,  tlien,  according  to 
Savage,  C.  J.,  in  Caldwell  v.  Cassidy,  8 
Cowen,  271,  demand  is  necessary.  This 
is  denied  in  Dougherty  i\  Western  Bank 
of  Georgia,  13  Ga.  287 ;  but  it  is  there 
decided  that  bank-notes  are  exceptions 
to  the  general  rule,  on  the  ground  of 
public  policy,  and  demand  upon  them 
must  be  made.  This  may,  however,  be 
doubted. 

(/»)  Wolcott  V.  Van  Santvoord,  17 
Johns.  248;  Wallace  v.  McConnell,  13 
Pet.  136;  Savage,  C.  J.,  in  Haxtum  v. 
Bisliop,  3  Wend.  21 ;  Wilde,  J.,  in  Carley 
V.  Vance,  17  Mass.  392  ;  Caldwell  v.  Cas- 
sidy, 8  Cowen,  271. 


1  See,  to  the  same  effect.  Hills  v.  Place,  48  N.  Y.  520 ;  Yeaton  v.  Berney,  62  111.  61  ; 
Mahan  v.  Waters,  60  Mo.  167.  If  a  note  specifies  no  place  of  payment,  a  presentment 
at  the  maker's  former  place  of  business,  with  no  inquiry  as  to  his  residence,  will  not 
charge  an  iadors^r.     Talbot  v.  Commonwealth  Bank,  129  Mass.  67. 

309 


*  274  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

(as  the  subsequent  failure  of  a  bank  where  he  had  placed  funds  to 
meet  the  bill),  he  will  be  discharged  from  his  liability  on  the  bill 
to  the  amount  of  such  loss.  Such  seems  to  be  the  prevailing, 
though  not  the  only  view,  taken  of  this  subject  by  the  American 
authorities  ;  for  some  of  much  weight  hold,  that  where  the  accept- 
ance is  thus  qualified,  the  holder  may  refuse  it,  and  protest  as  for 
non-acceptance ;  but  if  he  receives  and  assents  to  it  he  is  bound 
by  it,  and  can  demand  payment  nowhere  else.  The  drawers  and 
indorsers  are  certainly  discharged  by  a  neglect  to  demand  pay- 
ment at  such  specified  place,  (q)^  If  the  place  be  designated 
only  in  a  memorandum  not  in  the  body  of  the  bill  or  note,  pre- 
sentment may  be  made  at  such  place,  but  may  also  be  made  where 
it  might  have  been  without  such  memorandum.  (/•)  If  the  note 
be  payable  at  ani/  of  several  different  places,  presentment  at  any 
one  of  them  will  be  sufficient,  (s)  It  has  been  held  that  where  a 
note  was  made  payable  at  a  certain  house,  and  the  occupant 

*  274    *  of  the  house  was  himself  the  holder  of  the  note  at  its  ma- 

turity, it  was  demand  enough  if  he  examined  his  accounts, 
and  refusal  enough  if  he  had  no  balance  in  his  hands  belonging  to 
the  party  bound  to  pay.  (i) 

(q)  See  3  Kent.  Com.  97,  99;  Picquet  cordingly,  and  contended  that  the  mem- 

V-   Curtis,  1   Sunnier,  478;  Gale  i-.  Kem-  orandum   was   as    much    parcel    of    the 

per's  Heirs,  10  La.  oOG;  Warren  y.  AUnut,  contract  as  if  it  had  been  in  tlie  body  of 

12  La.  454;  Bacon  v.  Dyer,  V2  Me.  19.  the  instrument,  and  that  therefore  pre- 

(;•)  Williams  v.  Waring,  10  B.  &  C.  2.  sentment  at  the  house  where  the  note  was 
This  was  an  action  of  assumpsit  on  a  made  payable  should  have  been  averred 
promissory  note  by  the  indorsee  against  and  proved.  Lord  Tcnterden,  C.  J. :  "la 
the  maker.  The  note  was  in  the  follow-  point  of  practice,  the  distinction  between 
ing  form :  "  31st  January,  1827.  Two  mentioning  a  particular  place  for  pay- 
months  after  date  I  promise  to  pay  to  nient  of  a  note,  in  the  body  and  in  the 
A.  B.  X25,  value  received.  J.  Waring,  margin  of  the  instrument,  lias  been  fre- 
At  Messrs.  B.  &  Co.'s,  Bankers,  London."  quently  acted  on.  In  the  latter  case  it 
The  note  was  in  the  handwriting  of  the  has  been  treated  as  a  memorandum  only, 
defendant,  the  maker,  and  the  nicmoran-  and  not  as  a  part  of  the  contract;  and 
dum  was  written  at  the  time  the  note  I  do  not  see  any  sufficient  reason  for 
was  made.  For  the  defendant  it  was  departing  from  tiiat  course."  Baijley,  J., 
contended  that  the  note  should  have  cited  the  case  of  Exon  v.  Runell,  4  M.  & 
been  described  in  the  declaration  as  Sel.  506,  as  bchig  sufhcient  to  decide  this 
payable  at  Messrs.  B.  &  Co  's,  and  that  case  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff.  See  also 
evidence  of  presentment  there  should  Morris  v.  Husson,  4  Sandf.  93. 
liave  been  given.  The  judge  overruled  (s)  Langlcy  v.  Palmer,  30  Me.  467. 
the  objection,  but  gave  leave  to  move  \t)  Sanderson  v.  Judge,  2  II.  Bi.  509. 
to  enter  a  nonsuit.     It  was   moved  ac- 

1  Contra,  m  Iowa,  Fuller  v.  Dingman,  41  la.  506. 

310 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES    AND    BILLS.  *  275 


SECTION  X. 

OF    WHOM,   WHEN,   AND   WHERE   THE    DEMAND   OR    PRESENTMENT    FOR 
PAYMENT   SHOULD   BE   MADE. 

Demand  of  payment  should  be  made  by  the  holder,  or  his 
authorized  agent,  of  the  party  bound  to  pay,  or  his  authorized 
agent ;  (?<)  and  at  his  usual  place  of  residence,  or  usual  place  of 
business ;  if  the  former,  within  such  hours  as  may  be  reasonably 
so  employed,  and  if  the  latter,  in  business  hours ;  but  a  demand 
at  a  bank  where  a  note  is  payable,  made  after  business  hours,  but 
while  the  bank  is  still  open  and  the  officers  are  there,  has  been 
held  sufficient.  (?;)  ^  If  the  holder  finds  the  dwelling-house  or 
place  of  business  of  the  payor  closed,  so  that  he  cannot  enter  the 
same,  and  after  due  inquiry  cannot  find  the  payor,  the  prevalent 
doctrine  in  this  country  is,  that  he  may  treat  the  bill  or  note  as 
dishonored,  (w)  If  the  payor  has  changed  his  residence  to  some 
other  place  within  the  same  State,  the  holder  must  endeavor  to 
find  it  and  make  demand  there  ;  but  if  he  have  removed  out  of  the 
State,  subsequent  to  making  the  note,  the  demand  may  be 
made  at  his  former  residence,  (x)  The  presumption  *  is  *  275 
that  the  maker  lives  where  he  dates  the  note,  and  demand 
must  be  made  there,  unless  when  the  note  falls  due  the  payor 
resides  elsewhere  within  the  State,  and  the  holder  knows  it,  and 
then  the  holder  must  make  the  demand  there,  (y) 

(m)  Lord  Kenr/on,  in  Cooke  v.  Calla-  Bank  of  United  States,  2  Pet.  96 ;  Ogden 

way,   1    Esp.    115.  —  And    a   person    in  y.  Cowley,  2  Johns.  274;  Fields  i;.  Mallett, 

possession  of  a  bill,  payjible  to  liis  own  3  Hawks,  465  ;  Buxton  v.  Jones,  1  Man. 

order,    is    a    holder    for    this    purpose.  &  G.  83.  —  But  in  such  case  some  inquiry 


Smith  V.  McCiure,  5  East,  476,  2  J.  P 

Smith,  43;  v.  Ormston,  10  Mod.  286 

—  A  demand  by  a  notary  is  sufficient 
Hartford  Bank  v.  Stedman,  3  Conn.  489 
Sussex  Bank  v.  Baldwin,  2  Harrison,  487 
Bank  of  Utica  v.  Smith,  18  Johns.  230 


or  effort  ought  to  be  made  to  find  the 
maker.  Ellis  v.  Commercial  Bank,  7 
How.  (Miss.)  294;  Sullivan  v.  Mitchell, 
1  Car.  L.  Kep.  482;  Collins  v.  Butler, 
Stra.  1087. 

(x)   Anderson  v.  Drake,  14  Johns.  114  ; 


—  Parol  authority  to  an  agent  to  demand  McGruuer    v.   Bank    of   Washington,    9 

payment  is  sufficient.     Shedd  v.  Brett,  1  Wheat.   598 ;    Gillespie   v.   Hannahan,   4 

Pick.  401.  McCord,  503;  Reid  v.  Morrison,  2  W.  & 

(v)  Shepherd  I'.  Chamberlain,  8  Gray,  S.  401;  Wheeler  v.  Field,  6   Met.  290; 

225.     See  Hallowell  v.  Curry,  41  Penn.  Nailor  v.  Bowie,  3  Md.  251.     See  Gilmore 

St.  322.  V.  Spies,  1  Barb.  158. 

(w)  Hine  v.  Allely,  4  B.  &  Ad.  624;  (y)  Fisher    v.   Evans,    5    Binn.    641  ; 

Shedd  V.  Brett,  1  Pick.  413 ;  Williams  v.  Nailor  v.  Bowie,  3  Md.  251 ;   Lowery  i;. 

1  Salt  Springs  Bank  v.  Burton,  58  N.  Y.  430. 

311 


275 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


Presentment  for  payment,  or  demand,  is  sufficient,  if  made  on 
one  member  of  a  partnership.  If  there  be  joint  makers  who  are 
not  partners,  we  hold  it  should  be  made  on  all.  (jjy)  ^  But  it  is 
not  always  so  held,  (^yz)  ^  It  has  been  held  that  the  holder  of 
negotiable  paper  may  assume  that  a  party  resides  where  he 
resided  when  he  put  his  name  on  the  paper,  unless  he  has  notice 
or  knowledge  of  a  change  of  residence,  (jja) 

The  whole  law  in  respect  of  demand  and  notice  is  very  much 
influenced  by  the  usage  of  particular  places,  where  such  usage  is 
so  well  established  and  so  well  known  that  persons  may  be  sup- 
posed to  contract  with  reference  to  it.  Of  this  the  English  rule 
in  relation  to  checks  on  bankers  affords  an  instance,  (2)  ^  and 
also  the  usage  of  the  banks  of  our  different  cities  as  to  notes  dis- 
counted by  them,  or  left  with  them  for  collection.  In  this  coun- 
try the  practice  is  not  uniform ;  but,  in  general,  a  demand  is 
made  some  days  before  the  maturity  of  a  note,  by  a  notice  post- 


Scott,  24  Wend.  358  ;  Smith  v.  Philbrick, 
10  Gray,  2.52.  See  also  on  this  subject, 
Taj'lor  v.  Snyder,  3  Denio,  115.  A  note 
specifying  no  phice  of  pa^'nicnt,  was 
dated,  made,  and  indorsed  in  tlie  State 
of  New  York,  but  the  maker  and  in- 
dorser  resided  in  Mexico,  and  continued 
to  reside  tliere  wlicn  tlie  note  fell  due, 
their  place  of  residence  being  known 
to  the  pa3-ce  and  holder,  both  when  the 
note  was  given  and  when  it  matured ; 
and  it  was  held  that  a  demand  of  pay- 
ment on  the  maker  and  a  notice  to  the 
indorser  were  necessary  to  charge  the 
indorser.  Gilniore  v.  Spies,  1  Barb.  158 ; 
affirmed  on  appeal,  1  Comst.  321.  But 
it  is  said  in  llicketts  v.  Pendleton,  14 
Md.  320,  that  where  the  maker  does  not 
reside,  and  has  no  place  of  business  in 
the  State  where  the  note  is  payable,  no 
demand  upon  him  is  necessary  to  charge 
the  indorser. 

(>jil)  IJlake  V.  McMillen,  22  la.  358; 
Union  Bank  v.  Willis,  8  Met.  504.  So 
held  as  to  joint  indorsers,  in  Savre  v. 
Frick,  7  Watts  &  S.  383,  and  Shepard  v. 
Ilawley,  1  Conn.  307. 

(ys)  A  demand  on  one  of  three  joint 
promisors  held  sufficient  in  Harris  v. 
Clark,  10  Ohio,  5. 

(//a)  Ward  v.  Perrin,  54  Barb.  89.  But 
see  Peters  v.  Hobbs,  25  Ark.  07. 

(z)  Kobson  V.  Bennett,  2  Taunt.  388. 


By  the  practice  of  the  London  bankers, 
if  one  banker  who  holds  a  check  drawn 
on  another  banker  presents  it  after  four 
o'clock,  it  is  not  then  paid,  but  a  mark  is 
put  on  it  to  show  that  the  drawer  has 
assets,  and  that  it  will  be  paid ;  and 
checks  so  marked  have  a  priority,  and 
are  exchanged  or  paid  next  day  at  noon, 
at  the  clearing-house ;  held,  that  a  check 
presented  after  four,  and  so  marked,  and 
carried  to  the  clearing-house  next  day, 
but  not  paid,  no  clerk  from  the  drawee's 
house  attending,  need  not  be  presented 
for  payment  at  the  banking-house  of  tlie 
drawee.  Such  a  marking,  under  this 
practice,  amounts  to  an  acceptance,  pay- 
able next  day  at  the  clearing-house.  It 
is  not  necessary  to  present  for  payment 
a  check  payable  on  demand  till  the  day 
following  the  day  on  which  it  is  given. 
A  person  receiving  a  check  on  a  banker 
is  equally  authorized  in  lodging  it  with 
his  own  banker  to  obtain  payment,  as  lie 
would  be  in  jiaying  it  awaj'  in  the  course 
of  trade.  Although  in  consequence  there- 
of the  notice  of  its  dishonor  is  postponed 
a  day,  one  day  being  allowed  for  notice 
from  the  payee  to  the  drawer,  after  the 
day  on  which  notice  is  given  by  the 
bankers  to  the  payee.  See  Bancroft  v. 
Hall,  Holt,  470;  Henry  v.  Lee,  2  Chitt. 
124. 


1  Red  Oak  Bank  v.  Orvis,  40  la.  332;  Gates  v.  Beechcr,  60  N.  Y.  518,  523. 
'!■  Allen  V.  Ilarrah,  30  la.  3G3,  to  the   same   effect,  with    regard   to   an    Ohio   note, 
following  Harris  v.  Clark,  supra. 

3  See  Heywood  i.-.  Pickering,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  428. 

312 


CH.  XVI,]  NOTES   AND   BILLS.  *  276 

dated  on  the  day  of  maturity,  omitting  the  days  of  grace. 
But  it  is  usual  also,  if  the  note  be  not  paid  on  the  last  day 
of  grace,  to  make  a  formal  demand  on  that  day,  after  business 
hours.  Bills  and  notes  sometimes  express  days  of  grace,  but  gen- 
erally not.  Usually,  and  in  some  States  by  statutory  provi- 
sions, all  bills  and  notes  on  time,  when  grace  is  not  expressly 
excluded,  are  entitled  to  grace,  (a)  ^  And  it  has  been 
*  held  that  a  bank  post-note  dated,  which  had  across  one  *  276 
end  the  words  "  due  on  "  a  certain  day  which  excluded  all 
the  days  of  grace,  which  words  the  bank  cashiers  of  Boston, 
where  the  note  was  issued,  testified  were  placed  there  to  indicate 
that  the  note  was  due  and  payable  on  that  day  without  grace, 
was  still  entitled  to  grace.  (5)  But  notes  payable  on  demand 
are  not  entitled  to  grace,  (<?)  nor  are  checks  on  banks,  though 
payable  on  time.  (cZ)  ^ 

It  sometimes  happens  that  when  a  bill  is  drawn  in  one  country, 
and  made  payable  in  another,  the  laws  in  relation  to  presentment 
and  demand  differ  in  those  countries ;  and  then  the  question 
arises,  which  law  shall  prevail.  It  would  seem  that  in  England 
the  law  of  the  place  in  which  it  is  payable  prevails  ;  (e)  ^  but  in 

(a)  Corp  V.  McComb,  1  Johns.  Cas.  11  id.  431 ;  Cook  v.  Darling,  2  R.  I.  385.— 
328 ;  Jackson  v.  Richards,  2  Caines,  343.  The  days  of  grace  on  negotiable  notes 
In  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary,  constitute  a  part  of  the  original  contract, 
the  legal  presumption  is,  that  in  every  Savings  Bank  v.  Bates,  8  Conn.  505,  but 
State  in  the  Union  three  days  of  grace  the  notes  may  be  declared  on  according 
are  allowed  by  law  on  bills  of  exchange  to  their  terms  without  adding  the  days  of 
and  promissory  notes.  Wood  v.  Corl,  4  grace.  Padvviek  v.  Turner,  11  Q.  B.  124. 
Met.  203.  In  this  case,  Shaw,  C.  J.,  said  :  —  Whenever  the  maker  of  a  note  is  en- 
"  We  consider  it  well  settled,  that  by  the  titled  to  grace,  the  indorser  has  the  same 
general  law-merchant,  which  is  part  of  privilege.  Pickard  v.  Valentine,  13  Me. 
the  common  law,  as  prevailing  through-  412;  Central  Bank  v.  Allen,  16  Me.  41. 
out  tiie  United  States,  in  the  absence  of  (/;)  Perkins  v.  Franklin  Bank,  21  Pick, 
all  proof  of  particular  contract  or  special  483,  confirmed  in  Mechanics  Bank  v. 
custom,  three  days  of  grace  are  allowed  Merchants  Bank,  6  Met.  13. 
on  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  (c)  In  re  Brown,  2  Story,  503 ;  Salter 
notes  ;  and  when  it  is  relied  upon  that  by  v.  Burt,  20  Wend.  205  ;  Somerville  v. 
special  custom  no  grace  is  allowed,  or  Williams,  1  Stew.  (Ala.)  484;  Cammer  v. 
any  other  term  of  grace  than  three  days,  Harrison,  2  McCord,  246. 
it  is  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  and  {d}  Bo  wen  v.  Newell,  5  Sandf.  326. 
the  proof  lies  on  the  party  taking  it."  (e)  Rothschild  v.  Currie,  1  Q.  B.  43. 
See  also  Bussard  v.  Levering,  6  Wheat.  This  was  an  action  by  an  indorsee  against 
102 ;  Renner  v.  Bank  of  Columbia,  9  the  payee  and  indorser  of  a  bill  of  ex- 
Wheat.  581 ;  Mills  v.  United  States  Bank,  change  drawn  in  England  on,  and  accept- 

^  See  Reed  v.  Wilson,  12  Vroom,  29.  On  mere  instalments  of  interest,  however,  no 
days  of  grace  are  allowed.  Macloon  v.  Smith,  49  Wis.  200 ;  Bank  of  N.  A.  v.  Ivirby, 
108  Mass.  497,  501. 

2  Contra,  Culter  v.  Reynolds,  64  111.  .321. 

8  Rouquette  v.  Overmann,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  525,  decided  that  the  liability  of  an 
indorser  of  a  bill  of  exchange  is  measured,  like  that  of  the  acceptor,  whose  surety  he  is, 
by  the  law  of  the  place  of  performance ;  and  that  where  the  time  of  payment  and  protest 

313 


*  277  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

this  country  it  lias  been  decided  that  the  law  of  the  country  in 
which  the  bill  is  indorsed  shall  govern  exclusively  as  to  the  lia- 
bilities  and  duties  of   the  indorscrs,  on  the  ground   that   every 
indorsement  is  substantially  a  new  contract.  (/)     Hence, 

*  277    a  bill  drawn  in  one  place  and  payable  in  *  another,  and 

there  accepted,  must  be  governed,  as  to  the  acceptor,  by 
the  laws  of  the  place  in  which  it  is  accepted.  (</)  And  as  no 
indorsement  becomes  effectual  until  actual  transfer,  the  place 
of  the  actual  transfer  is  the  place  of  the  contract  of  indorse- 
ment. (^) 


SECTION  XI. 

OF   NOTICE   OF   NON-PAYMENT. 

Where  a  bill  is  not  accepted,  or  a  bill  or  note  is  not  paid  at 
maturity,  by  the  party  bound  then  to  pay  it,  all  subsequent  parties 
must  have  immediate  notice  of  this  fact.  ^     The  contract  of   an 

ed  by,  a  French  house,  both  plaintiff  and  not  present  the  hill  for  payment  after  protest 
defendant  being  domiciled  in  England  ;  for  non-acceptance,  notwithstanding  that 
held,  that  due  notice  of  the  dishonor  of  by  the  French  code  de  commerce  the  holder 
the  bill  by  the  acceptor  was  parcel  of  the  is  not  excused  from  the  protest  for  non- 
contract  ;  that  the  bill  being  made  pay-  payment  by  the  protest  for  non-accept- 
able by  the  acceptor  abroad  was  a  foreign  ance  ;  and  loses  all  claim  against  the 
bill,  and  the  lex  loci  contractus  must  there-  indorser,  if  tlie  bill  be  not  presented  for 
fore  prevail ;  and  that  it  was  sufficient  protest  for  non-payment.  In  such  a  case 
for  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  he  had  the  payee  of  the  bill  is  bound  to  conform 
given  the  defendant  such  notice  of  the  to  the  French  law  in  respect  to  bills  of 
dishonor  and  protest  as  was  required  by  exchange,  to  enforce  his  remedies  against 
the  law  of  France.  In  Gibbs  v.  Fremont,  the  drawers,  but  not  so  the  indorsee ;  he 
20  E.  L.  &  E.  555,  the  case  of  Rothschild  is  only  required  to  comply  with  the  law- 
V.  Currie  is,  however,  referred  to  by  merchant  prevailing  here,  the  indorse- 
Alderson,  B.,  as  of  questionable  authority,  ment  having  been  made  in  the  city  of 
( f)  Aymer  (;.  Sheldon,  12  Wend.  439.  New  York ;  and  according  to  which  his 
In  this  case  it  was  held,  that  the  indorsee  right  of  action  is  perfect,  after  protest 
of  a  bill  of  exchange,  payable  a  certain  for  non-acceptance.  See  also  Hatcher  v. 
number  of  days  after  sight,  drawn  in  a  McMorine,  4  Dev.  L.  122. 
French  West  India  Island,  on  a  mercantile  (g)  Lizardi  v.  Cohen,  3  Gill,  430. 
house  in  Bordeaux,  and  transferred  in  (h)  Cook  ;-'.  Litclifield,  5  Sandf.  330; 
the  city  of  New  York  by  the  payee,  need  Young  v.  Harris,  14  B.  Mon.  556. 

of  a  bill  of  exchange,  drawn  and  indorsed  in  England  and  made  payable  and  accepted 
in  France,  was  enlarged  by  the  government  of  France  to  a  certain  time,  due  notice  of 
presentment  and  dishonor,  made  thereafter  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  P'rance,  was 
sufficient  to  bind  the  indorser.  —  A  bill  of  exchange  drawn  in  England  and  payable  in 
Spain  was  indorsed  in  England  by  the  defendant  to  tlie  plaintiff,  who  indorsed  it  to  M., 
residing  in  Spain.  Acccjjtance  having  been  refused,  a  delay  of  twelve  days  occurred 
before  M.  wrote  to  inform  the  plaintiff  of  the  dishonor.  On  receipt  from  M.  of  the  notice 
of  dishonor,  the  plaintiff  gave  immediate  notice  to  the  defendant.  No  notice  of  dishonor 
by  non-acceptance  is  required  by  the  law  of  Spain.  Held,  that  the  jjlaintiH' was  entitled 
to  recover  the  amount  of  the  bill.     Hornc  ?'.  Rouquette,  3  Q.  B.  D.  514. 

1  Omission  to  give  notice  of  default  in  the  payment  of  previous  instalments  of  a  note 

314 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES    AND    BILLS.  *  278 

indorser  is  a  written  contract ;  his  liability  is  conditional  and 
depends  upon  due  demand  and  notice,  and  cannot  be  made  abso- 
lute by  parol  evidence  of  statements  made  before  or  at  the  time 
of  the  indorsement.  (JiK)  Thus  a  verbal  agreement  of  the  parties 
to  waive  notice  may  not  render  it  unnecessary ;  (i)  but  it  is  some- 
times waived  in  writing,  and  this  usually  on  the  note  ;  as  by  the 
words,  "  I  waive  demand  and  notice  ; "  and  such  waiver  is  suffi- 
cient, (y)  A  waiver  of  demand  alone  should  operate  as  a  waiver 
of  notice ;  for  if  demand  of  payment  is  not  made  because  unneces- 
sary, a  notice  can  hardly  be  necessary  or  useful ;  but  a  waiver  of 
notice  alone  is  not  a  waiver  of  demand,  for  though  the  party 
waiving  may  not  wish  for  notice  of  the  non-payment,  he 
may  still  claim  that  *  payment  should  be  demanded.  (Jc)  ^  *  278 
A  waiver  of  protest  has  been  construed  variously  ;  that 
it  is  a  waiver  of  demand  but  not  of  notice,  (Z)  that  after  waiver 
of  protest,  demand  must  still  be  made,  QV)  and  that  such  waiver 
is  a  waiver  of  demand  and  notice.  (Iiti) 

There  may  be  a  constructive  waiver  of  demand  and  notice ; 
as,  by  an  act  of  the  indorser  or  drawer  which  puts  the  holder  off 
his  guard,  or  which  prevents  the  holder  from  treating  the  note 
as  he  otherwise  would.  There  are  many  cases  showing  how  this 
waiver  may  be   effected,  (lii)  ^    An   indorser   consenting   to   an 

(lih)  Goldman  v.  Davis,  23  Cal.  256.  (j)  Woodman   v.  Thurston,  8   Cush. 

(i)  It  is  so  intimated  in  some  English  159. 
cases.      Free   v.    Hawkins,    Holt,  550,  8  (k)  Drinkwater   v.   Tebbetts,    17   Me. 

Tamit.  92.      But  see  Drinliwater  v.  Teb-  16  ;  Lane  v.  Steward,  20  Me.  98 ;  Berk- 

betts,  17  Me.  16;  Boyd  v.  Cleaveland,  4  shire    Bank  v.  Jones,  6  Mass.   524;  Bu- 

Pick.  525;  Taunton  Bank  v.  Richardson,  chanan  v.  Marshall,  22  Vt.  561.    See  also 

5    Pick.    437;    Fuller    v.    McDonald,    8  Union  Bank  y.  Hyde,  6  Wheat.  572 ;  Cod- 

Greenl.  213  ;  Marshall  v.  Mitchell,  35  Me.  dington   v.  Davis,  3  Denio,  16;  Bird  v.  Le 

221 ;  Farmers  Bank  v.  Waples,  4  Harring.  Blanc,  6  La.  An.  470. 
(Del.)  429;  Hoadley  v.  Bliss,  9  Ga.  303;  (/)  Wall  v.  Bry,  1  La.  An.  312. 

Lary   v.   Young,   8   Eng.    (Ark.)   402.—  (//)  Buckley  r.  Bentley,  42  Barb.  646. 

Although  a  bill  or  note  has  been  indorsed  (//«)  Fisher  v.  Price,  37  Ala.  407  ;  Jac- 

long  after  it  is  overdue,  there  must  still  card  v.  Anderson,  37  Mo.  91 ;  Porter  v. 

be   a   demand  and   notice   of  default  in  Kemball,  53  Barb.  407. 
order  to  charge  the  indorser,  because  a  (/?))  Gove    v.    Wining,    7    Met.    212; 

bill  or  note,  although  overdue,  does  not  Taylor   v.  French,  4   E.  D.   Smith,  458; 

cease  to  be  negotiable.     Dwight  v.  Emer-  Mintun    v.   Fisher,   7   Cal.    573 ;  Kyle  v. 

son,  2  N.  H.  159;  Berry  v.  Robinson,  9  Green,  14  Ohio,  490;  Amoskeag  i'.  Moore, 

Johns.  121;  Greely  v.  Hunt,  21  Me.  455;  37  N.  H.  539;  Curtiss  v.  Martin,  20  Hi. 

Kirkpatrick  y.  McCullock,  3  Humph.  171;  557.      But   see  Haskell  v.  Boardman,  8 

Adams  v.  Torbert,  6  Ala.  865.  Allen,  38. 

so  payable  does  not  discharge  the  indorser  as  to  later  instalments.     Fitchburg  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Davis,  121  Mass.  121.     See  Croydon  Gas  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  2  C.  P.  D.  46. 

1  A  waiver  of  "  notice  "  will  not  excuse  due  presentment.    Voorhies  v.  Atlee,  29  la.  49. 

2  An  admission  of  liability,  promise  to  pay,  and  arrangement  for  delay  of 
proceedings  upon  the  note  by  an  indorser,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  amount  to 
a  waiver  of  demand  and  notice.     Cheshire  v.  Taylor,  29  la.  492. 

315 


*  279  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

extension  of  time  between  maker  and  payee,  thereby  waives 
demand  and  notice  at  the  original  maturity  of  the  note.  (?o) 

No  waiver  affects  any  party  but  him  who  makes  it.  It  was  for- 
merly held  that  a  neglect  to  give  notice  would  not  support  a 
defence  to  a  bill,  unless  injury  could  be  proved ;  but  is  now  well 
settled  that  the  law  presumes  injury,  (m) 

The  omission  to  give  such  notice  may,  however,  be  excused  by 
circumstances  which  rendered  it  impossible,  or  nearly  so.  The 
maker's  letter,  before  maturity,  stating  inability  to  pay,  and 
requesting  delay,  does  not  excuse  want  of  demand  or  of  no- 
tice, (w)  But  a  request  of  the  indorser  for  delay,  or  an  agree- 
ment with  him  for  delay,  Avould  excuse  or  waive  demand  and 
notice,  (o)  The  absconding  or  absence  beyond  reach  of  the  party 
to  be  notified,  (^)  ^  or  ignorance  of  his  residence,  {q}  or  the  death 
or  sufficient  illness  of  the  party  bound  to  give  notice,  or  any  suffi- 
cient accident  or  obstruction,  will  excuse  the  want  of  notice.  But 
nothing  of  this  kind  is  a  sufficient  excuse,  provided  the  notice 
could   have   been   given   by  great   diligence   and   earnest 

*  279    endeavor,  for  so  much  is  required  by  the  law.  (r)     *  Nor 

(lo)  Walker  v.  Graham,   21   La.   An.  war  between  one  country  and  the  country 

209.  where  the  note  ife  payable  excuses  imme- 

(m)  Dennis   v.  Morrice,  3    Esp.    158;  diate  notice;  but  notice  should  be  given 

Norton  r.  Ticker  in  g,  8  B.  &C.  610;   Hill  within  reasonable  time  after  peace.    Hop- 

V.  Heap,  Dow.  &  R.  59 ;  De  Berdt  v.  At-  kirk  v.  Page,  2  Brock.  20  ;  Griswold  v. 

kinson,  2  H.  Bl.  336.  —  But  in  Terry  v.  Waddington,   16  Johns.  438 ;  Scholefield 

Parker,  G  A.  &  E.  502,  it  was  held,  that  v.  Eichelberger,  7  Pet.  586. 
if  a  drawer  of  a  bill  of  exchange  have  no  (q)  Hunt  v.  Maybee,  3  Seld.  266;  Por- 

effects  in  the  hands  of  the  drawee  at  the  tor  v.  Judson,  1  Gray,  175. 
time  of  the  drawing  of  the  bill,  and  of  (?•)  A  party  is  bound  to  use  reasonaUe, 

its  maturity,  and  have  no  ground  to  ex-  but  not  excessive,  diligence.    Sussex  Bank 

ppct  that  it  will  be  paid,  it  is  not  neces-  v.  Baldwin,  2   Harrison,   487;    Bank   of 

sary  to  present  the  bill  at  maturity ;  and  Utica  v.  Bender,  21  Wend.  643 ;  Clark  v. 

if  it  be  presented  two  days  afterwards,  Bigelow,  16  Me.  246 ;   Roberts  v.  Mason, 

and  payment  be   refused,  the  drawer  is  1  Ala.  (n.  s.)  373;  Preston  i'.  Daysson,  7 

liable,  and  the  case  of  De  Berdt  v.  Atkin-  La.  7  ;  Runyon  v.  Montford,  1  Busb.  L. 

son  is  denied  to  be  correct.    And  see  ante,  371 ;    Manchester    Bank    v.    Fellows,    8 

page  *  271,  note  (./).  Foster  (N.   H.),  302.  —  If  due  diligence 

(n)  Pierce  i;.  Whitney,  29  Me.  188.  be  used    it  will   be    sufficient,   although 

(o)  Ridgeway    v.   Day,    13   Penn.    St.  notice  should  be  sent  to  the  wrong  place. 

208;  Clayton  v.  Pliipps,  14  Mo.  399.  Burmester  v.  Barron,  9  E.  L.  &  E.  402; 

(p)   Walwyn  f.  St.Quintin,  2  Esp.  516,  Nichol   v.   Bate.   7    Ycrg.   305;    Barr   v. 

1  B.  &  P.  052  ;  Bowes  v.  Howe,  5  Taunt.  Marsh,  9  id.   253 ;    Pliipps   v.   Cliase,  6 

30.   And  see  Crosse  v.  Smith,  1  M.  &  Sel.  Met.  491 ;  Barker  v.  Clarke,  20  Me.  156. 

145;  Bruce  i>.  Lytic,  13  Barb.  163.  —  So  And  where  a  party  is  ignorant  of   the 

^  Notice  to  the  person  named  in  a  will  as  executor  of  the  non-payment  of  a  promissory 
note  indorsed  by  his  testator,  which  became  payable  after  the  will  was  offered  for  probate 
and  letters  testamentary  applied  for,  and  hef'ure  the  executor  named  declined  to  accept 
the  trust,  is  sufficient  to  charge  the  estate ;  but  siicli  notice,  if  the  note  matured  after  the 
executor  had  renounced  the  trust,  and  a  special  administrator  had  been  appointed, 
is  not  sufficient,  although  no  public  notice  of  the  lattcr's  appuiutmcnt  had  been  or- 
dered or  given.     Gooduow  v.  Warren,  122  Mass.  79. 

31G 


CH.  XVI.  1  NOTES    AND    BILLS.  *  279 

will  the  holder's  inability  to  learn  the  proper  place  for  giving 
notice,  though  an  excuse  for  him,  be  available  to  another  indorser 
who  possesses  the  necessary  information,  (.s) 

A  conveyance  of  all  the  property  of  the  maker  to  the  indorser, 
and  an  acceptance  by  him,  would  be  regarded  as  waiving  his  right 
to  notice,  (t)  It  might,  however,  be  questioned  whether  it  would 
have  this  effect,  if  made  after  the  maturity  of  the  note,  and  with- 
out mention  of  it.  (w) 

It  may  not  be  certain,  whether  the  giving  of  full  security  to  the 
indorser  by  the  maker,  would  necessarily  operate  as  a  waiver. 
We  should  say  it  would  not,  because  the  maker  might  intend 
only  to  secure  the  indorser,  if  he  be  legally  held,  (v) 

It  is  a  well  settled  rule,  that  where  there  has  been  no  demand 
or  notice,  the  party  entitled  to  it  waives  this  defence,  by  a  prom- 
ise to  pay,  made  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  and 
of  his  defence,  (w)^  And  such  a  promise,  made  with  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  absence  of  demand  or  notice,  operated  as  a  waiver, 
although  the  promisor  did  not  know  that  demand  of  the  note  was 
necessary  to  hold  him.  (vw) 

No  mere  probability  that  the  note  or  bill  will  not  be  paid 
excuses  demand,  and  it  is  even  held  that  the  certainty  of  non-pay- 
ment does  not.  (w)  And  if  an  indorser  adds  to  his  name  the 
word  "  surety,"  this  is  said  only  to  give  him  the  right  of  a  surety 
in  addition  to  that  of  an  indorser.  (a:)  But  a  party  having  colla- 
teral security  for  the  whole  of  his  liability  on  the  note,  is  not 
entitled  to  demand  and  notice.  (?/) 

address  of  the  person  liable  upon  a  bill  meroiis  and  obscure.    3  Kent,  Com.  113, 

or  note,  it  is  sufficient  if  he  use  reason-  and  Story,  Prom.  Notes,  §  357,  and  on 

able  diligence  to  ascertain  it,  and   after  Bills,  §  374,  would  seem  to  hold  the  tak- 

having    ascertained    it,   sends    a    notice  ing  of    security  a  waiver  of  the  notice, 

forthwith.     Dixon  v.  Johnson,  29  E.  L.  But  it  is  held  otherwise  in  Creamer  v. 

&  E.  504.  •Perry,  17  Pick.  332 ;  Woodman  v.  East- 

(s)  Beale  v.  Paris,  20  N.  Y.  (6  Smith)  man,  10  N.  H.  359 ;   Holland  v.  Turner, 

407.  10  Conn.  308 ;  Taylor  v.  French,  4  E.  D. 

(/)  This  seems,  upon  the  whole,  to  be  Smith,  458 ;  Kramer  v.  Sandford,  4  Watts 

settled  by  authority.    See  Corney  v.  Da  &  S.  328;    Seacord  v.  Miller,  3  Kern.  55; 

Costa,  1  Esp.  302 ;  Barton  v.  Baker,  1  S.  Moore  v.  Coffleld,  1  Dev.  247  ;  Denny  v. 

&  R.  334 ;   Kramer  v.  Sandford,  4  Watts  Palmer,  610 ;  Dufour  v.  Morse,  9  La.  333. 

&_  S.  328 ;    Bond  v.  Farnham,  5  Mass.  The  subject  of  this  and  the  two  preced- 

170 ;  Bank  of  South  Carolina  v.  Myers,  ing    notes    is    fully  considered  and   the 

Bailey,  412  ;  Barrett  v.  Charleston  Bank,  authorities  examined  in  1  Pars.  Notes  & 

2  McMuUan,  191 ;   Stephenson  v.  Prim-  Bills,  560-575. 

rose,  8  Port.  Ala.  155;  Perry  v.  Green,  4  {rv)  Salisbury  v.  Renick,  44  Mo.  554. 

Harr.  61 ;  Vreeland  v.  Hyde,  2  Hale,  429 ;  (vw)  Matthews  v.  Allen,  16  Gray,  594. 

Seacord  v.  Miller,  3  Kern.  55;   Benedict  {w)  Gray  v.  Bell,  2  Rich.  L.  67. 

V.  Caffee,  5  Duer,  226.  (x)  Bradford  v.  Corey,  5  Barb.  461 ; 

(u)  Walters  v.  Munroe,  17  Md.  154.  Campbell  v.  Knapp,  16  Penn.  St.  27. 

(v)  The  cases  on  this  subject  are  nu-  {>/)  3  Kent,  Com.  113. 

317 


*  280  ^  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

If  there  be  joint  indorsers  (not  partners)  notice  should  be  given 
to  each ;  and  it  is  held  that  neglect  to  give  notice  to  either  one 
discharges  all.  (jyy) 

In  general,  the  notice  must  be  given  within  a  reasonable  time  ; 

and  what   this  time  is,  is  a  question  of   law  for  the  court,  (2) 

and    each    case    will    be    judged    by   its    circumstances. 

*  280    *  It  is  so  important  that  the  rights  and  duties  of  all  per- 

sons interested  in  negotiable  paper  should  be  as  exactly 
defined  and  as  certainly  known  as  possible,  that  there  is  now  a 
positive  rule  of  law  on  the  subject ;  and  this,  as  gathered  from  the 
usage  in  commercial  places,  and  the  weight  of  authorities  is,  that 
notice  of  non-payment  may  be  given  to  parties  liable  to  pay,  on 
the  same  day  on  which  payment  has  been  refused ;  (a)  either 
personally  or  by  mail,  as  may  be  proper  under  the  circumstances ; 
and  that  notice  ahould  be  given  as  soon  as  on  the  day  following 
that  on  which  payment  has  been  refused  ;  (5)  ^  or  by  the  mail  of 
the  same  day,  or  by  the  next  mail  afterwards,  provided  no  con- 
venient or  usual  means  intervene.  Where  there  is  but  one  mail 
departing  upon  the  day  succeeding  the  default,  notice  must  be 
sent  thereby  unless  it  depart  before  ordinary  business  hours  on 
that  day.  (c)  ^  But  if  there  be  more  than  one  mail  it  is  consid- 
ered that  it  is  sufficient  if  the  notice  be  deposited  in  time  to  go 


(yn)  People's  Bank  v.  Keecli,  26  Md.  Fitch,  4  B.  Mon.  599 ;   Coleman  v.  Car- 

521.' '  penter,  9  Barr,  178. 

(z)  Hussey  v.  Freeman,  10  Mass.  84 ;  (b)  If  tlie  parties  reside  in  the  same 

Nash  r.  Harrington,  2  Aik.  9;  Haddock  town,  notice   given  at  any  time  on  the 

V.  Murray,  I  N.  H.  140;  Sussex  Bank  v.  next  day  after  the  default  is  sufficient. 

Bald\vin,'2  Harrison,  488;  Bank  of  Utica  Grand  Bank  v.  Blancliard,  23  Pick.  305 

f.  Bender,  21  We-nd.  013 ;  Remer  (•.  Dow-  Remington  r.  Harrington,  8   Ohio,  507 

ner,  23   id.  020 ;    Bennett   v.  Young,   18  Whittlesey  v.  Dean,  2  Aik.  263. 
Penn.  St.  201  ;  Smith  v.  Fisher,  24  Penn.  (c)   Lennox  v.  Roberts,  2  Wheat.  373 

St.  222.  —  It  seems  to  be  in  some  respects  Seventh  Ward  Bank  v.  Hanrick,  2  Story, 

partly  a  question  of  law  and  partly  of  416;  Davis  v.  Hanly,  7  Eng.  (Ark.)  647 

fact.     See   Taylor   v.   Bryden,  8   Johns.  Lawson   v.  Farmers    Bank,    1    Ohio    St 

173;    Ferris   v.   Saxton,    1    Southard,   1;  207 ;  Hartford  Bank  r.  Stedman,  3  Conn 

Scott  V.  Alexander,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  335;  480;  Howard  i-.  Ives,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  203 

Dodge  V.  Bank  of    Kentucky,  2  A.  K.  Whitwell    v.    Johnson,    17    Mass.    449 

Marsh.  GIO.  Mitchell    v.    Dcgrand,    1    Mason,    170 

(a)  Burbridge  v.   Manners,   3  Camp.  United  States  v.  Barker,  4  Wasli.  C.  C 

193;  Bussard  r.  Levering,  6  Wheat.  102;  465;    Chick  v.   Pillsbury,   24   Me.   458 

Corp   V.   McComb,   1   Johns.   Cas.   328;  Downs   v.  Planters   Bank,  1   Sm.  &  M 

Farmers  Bank  v.  Duvall,  7  G.  &  J.  79;  261;  Mitciiell  v.  Cross,  2  R.  I.  437;  Bur 

Smith  V.  Little,  10  N.  11.  520;  McClane  v.  gess  v.  Vreeland,4  N.  J.  71 ;  Stephenson 

V.  Dickson,  24  Penn.  St.  148. 


1  If  mail  communication  is  stopped  by  war,  posting  a  notice  is  insufiBcient.    Farmers 
Bank  v.  GunneJI,  26  Gr;itt.  1.31. 

'^  See  Glad  well  i'.  Turner,  L.  R.  5  Ex.  59. 

318 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  281 

by  any  mail  of  that  day.  (d)     In  London  it  may  be  sent  by  penny- 
post  to  parties  residing  there. 

The  notice  should  be  properly  addressed.  Where  an  indorser 
added  to  his  indorsement  his  street  and  number,  it  was  held  that 
the  notice  should  be  so  addressed,  (^dd} 

If  the  parties  live  in  the  same  town  or  city,  the  notice  should 
be  personal,  or  left  at  the  residence  or  place  of  business  of  the 
party,  and  if  sent  through  the  mail,  it  is  sufficient  only  if  in 
fact  received  in  due  season,  (e)  By  "  parties "  in  this  rule,  is 
meant  the  party  to  be  notified,  and  the  party  who  is  to  give  the 
notice,  and  this  last  is  the  bank  or  notary  holding  the 
*  paper  as  agent,  and  not  the  owner,  (/)  In  general,  a  *  281 
personal  notice  is  good,  if  given  anywhere,  (^)  ^  unless 
the  reception  of  notice  is  an  official  act,  requiring  an  official 
place.  (A) 

If  the  parties  do  not  live  in  the  some  town,  then  it  may  be  sent 
to  the  post-office  nearest  to  the  residence  of  the  party  to  be 
notified,  (z)  '■^  or  it  may  be  sent  to  the  post-office  where  the  party 

{(l)  Whitwell    V.  Johnson,   17    Mass.  {h)  Seneca  Bank  v.  Neass,  5  Denio, 

449;  Housatonic  Bank  y.  Laflin,  5  Gush.  329. 

650  ;   Story  on  Prom.  Notes,  §  324  ;  Car-  (i)  Scott  v.  Lifford,  9  East,  347  ;  Dun- 

ter  V.  Burley,  9  N   H.  558.  /ap  v.  Thompson,  5  Yerg.   G7  ;    Spann  v. 

(dd)  Bartlett    v.   Robinson,   9    Bosw.  BaUzell,    1    Fla.    302.  —  But    in    Pierce 

305,  39  N.  Y.  187.  v.  Pendar,  6  Met.  352,  it  was  held,  that 

(e)  Bowling  v.  Harrison,  6  How.  248 ;  when  both  parties  resided  in  the  same 
Hyslop  V.  Jones,  3  McLean,  96 ;  Foster  town,  notice  could  not  be  given  through 
r.  Sineath,  2  Rich.  L.  338;  Van  Vechtcn  tlie  post-oflBce,  and  Shaw,  C.  J.,  thus 
V.  Pruyn,  8  Kern,  549.  But  by  statute  it  remarked  upon  this  point :  "  Tlie  only  re- 
is  sufficient,  in  New  York,  if  the  notice  maining  question  tlien  is,  whether  notice 
be  put  in  the  mail.  See,  as  interesting  by  the  post-office  was  sufficient.  The 
cases  on  the  requisites  of  notice,  Walker  general  rule  certainly  is,  that  when  the 
V.  Stetson,  14  Ohio  (U.  S),  89,  and  Palmer  indorser  resides  in  the  same  place  with 
V.  Whitney,  21  Ind.  58.  the  party  who  is  to  give  the  notice,  the 

(  f)   Bowling  V.  Harrison,  6  How.  248  ;  notice  must  be  given   to  the  party  per- 

Burbank  v.  Beach,  15  Barb.  326;  Green  sonally,  or  at  his   domicile   or   place  of 

V.  Fouley,  20  Ala.  322 ;  Manchester  Bank  business.     Perhaps  a  different  rule  may 

V.  Fellows,  8  Foster  (N.  H.),  302.  prevail  in  London,  where  a  penny-post  is 

(7)  Hyslop  V.  Jones,  3  McLean,  96.  established  and   regulated    by   law,   by 

1  See  Bartlett  v.  Hawley,  120  Mass.  92. 

2  If  there  are  several  post-offices  in  the  same  town,  the  notice  may  be  sent  to  either, 
Saco  Bank  v.  Sanborn,  63  Me.  340,  unless  tiie  party  usually  receives  his  mail  at  one 
alone,  when  it  should  be  sent  there,  Roberts  v.  Taft,  120  Mass.  169.  Notice  sent  on  the 
day  of  default  to  E.,  where  the  indorser  had  formerly  resided,  but  whence  he  had 
removed  to  C.  without  the  holder's  knowledge,  and  thence  forwarded  to  C.  on  the  next 
day,  where  the  indorser  received  it,  is  seasonable.  North  Bennington  Bank  v.  Wood, 
51  Vt.  'iTl.  —  A  notice  left  at  the  desk  of  a  custom-house  officer  is  prima,  facie  sufficient. 
Commonwealth  Bank  v.  Mudgett,  44  N.  Y.  514;  or  if  addressed  to  the  director  of  a 
corporation  who  indorsed  its  bill  as  surety,  at  its  place  of  business,  it  is  sufficient, 
Berridge  v.  Fitzgerald,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  639. —  If  an  indorser's  residence  is  unknown,  in- 
formation may  be  sought  from  the  other  parties  to  the  note.  Gilchrist  v.  Donwell,  53 
Mo.  591.     See  Gawtry  v.  Doane,  51  N.  Y.  84,  92. 

319 


*282 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


usually  receives  his  letters,  although  not  his  actual  place  of  resi- 
dence ;  (y)  or  to  the  post-office  at  the  place  of  the  party's  resi- 
dence, though  he  usually  receives  his  letters  at  a  nearer  office  in 
another  town ;  (A;)  or  to  the  place  of  his  actual  residence  at  the 
time,  although  the  party  has  his  domicile  elsewhere.  (k¥)  If  the 
sender  knows  that  the  other  party  usually  receives  his  letters  at 
another  office,  he  may  send  notice  there.  (V)  And  if  the  indor- 
ser  has  changed  his  residence,  and  the  change  is  unknown  to  the 
party  sending  notice,  he  may  send  the  notice  to  his  former  resi- 
dence, (w)  So  he  may  send  it  to  any  place  designated  by 
*  282  the  indorser  on  the  note.  («)  *  Where  notice  may  be  pro- 
perly given  through  the  post-office,  it  is  sufficient  if  the 
notice  be  deposited  in  the  office  in  season,  although  it  is  never 
received  by  the  indorser.  (o) 

Where  an  indorser  receives  notice,  and  is  bound  to  give  notice 
to  other  parties  as  the  condition  of  making  them  liable  to  him, 
he  comes  under  similar  rules,  and  each  successive  indorser  has 
until  the  next  day  to  give  such  notice.  (  p)  But  no  party  bound 
to  give  notice  can  profit  by  the  days  to  which  other  parties  are 


whom  letters  are  to  be  delivered  to  the 
party  addressed,  or  at  his  place  of  dom- 
icile or  business,  on  the  same  day  they 
are  deposited.  And  perhaps  the  same 
rule  might  not  apph%  where  the  party  to 
whom  notice  is  to  be  given  lives  in  the 
same  town,  if  it  be  at  a  distinct  village 
or  settlement  where  a  town  is  large,  and 
there  are  several  post-offices  in  different 
parts  of  it.  But  of  this  we  give  no 
opinion.  In  the  present  case  the  de- 
fendant had  his  residence  and  place  of 
business  in  the  city  of  Bangor,  and  the 
only  notice  given  him  was  by  a  letter, 
addressed  to  him  at  Bangor,  and  de- 
posited in  tlie  post-office  at  that  place. 
And  we  are  of  opinion  that  this  was 
insufficient  to  charge  liim  as  indorser." 
In  Green  v.  Farley,  20  Ala.  322,  where 
both  indorser  and  holder  resided  in  Mont- 
gomery, but  the  acceptor  resided  in 
Mobile,  and  the  note  was  there  pro- 
tested, it  was  held  that  notice  to  the 
indorser  sent  by  the  notary  tlirough  tlie 
post-office  was  sufficient.  And  see  Bell 
V.  Hagerstown  Bank,  7  Gill,  21G ;  Morton 
V.  Westcott,  8  Gush.  425. 

( /)  Morris  v.  Ilusson,  4  Sandf.  94; 
Bank  of  Louisiana  v.  Tournillon,  9  La. 
An.  132. 

(k)  Seneca  Bank  v.  Neass,  5  Denio, 
329;  Morton  v.  Westcott,  8  Cush.  425; 
Manchester  Bank  v.  White,  10  Foster 
(N.  II.),  450. 

320 


(kk)   Young  v.  Durgin,  15  Gray,  264. 

(/)  Walker  i'.  Bank  of  Augusta,  3  Ga. 
486;  Sherman  v.  Clark,  3  McLean,  91 ; 
Mont.  Co.  B.  V.  Marsh,  3  Seld.  48L 
Thompson,  J.,  in  Bank  of  Columbia  v. 
Lawrence,  1  Pet.  578. 

(wi)  Union  Bank  of  T.  v.  Go  wen,  10 
Sm.  &  M.  333;  Hunt  v.  Fish,  4  Barb. 
324  ;   Hunt  v.  Nugent,  4  Barb.  541. 

(n)  Burraeister  v.  Barron,  9  E.  L.  &  E. 
402  ;  s.  c.  17  Q.  B.  828  ;  Morris  v.  Husson, 
4  Sandf.  93.  But  the  mere  dating  of  the 
note  does  not  dispense  with  proper  in- 
quiry as  to  residence.  Carroll  v.  LTpton, 
3  Comst.  272  ;  Pierce  v.  Struthers,  27 
Penn.  St.  249 ;  Runyon  v.  Montfort,  1 
Busb.  L.  371. 

(o)  Bell  V.  Hagerstown  Bank,  7  Gill, 
216;  Sasscer  v.  Farmers  Bank,  4  Md. 
409. 

(p)  Darbyshire  v.  Parker,  6  East,  3; 
Smith  V.  Mullett,  2  Camp.  208  ;  Jame- 
son V.  Swinton,  2  Camp.  374;  Brown  v. 
Ferguson,  4  Leigh,  37.  Tliis  rule  is  so 
well  settled  that,  although  tlie  party  re- 
ceiving notice  may  easily  have  forwarded 
it  the  same  day,  yet  he  is  not  under  obli- 
gation to  send  it  until  the  ne.xt  post  after 
the  day  of  its  reception.  Geill  v.  Jeremy, 
Mo.  &  M.  01.  See  Hilton  v.  Shepherd,  6 
East,  14,  n. ;  West  River  Bank  v.  Taylor, 
34  N.  Y.  128. 


CH.  XVI,]  NOTES   AND   BILLS,  *  283 

entitled.  Thus,  if  a  note  has  six  indorsers,  and  the  holder  noti- 
fies the  last,  and  the  last  notifies  the  fifth,  and  so  on  until  all  are 
notified,  the  first  indorser  will  not  receive  notice  until  six  days 
have  elapsed,  and  will  still  be  lield  to  all  parties.  But  if  the 
holder  gives  no  notice  until  the  fourth  day,  and  then  notifies  the 
first  and  second  indorsers,  no  indorser  will  be  held. 

If  a  bill  is  sent  to  an  agent  for  collection,  he  is  treated  as  a 
holder  of  the  note  for  the  purpose  of  giving  notice,  and  his 
principal  has  the  same  time  for  notifying  his  indorsers  after 
receiving  notice  from  the  agent,  as  if  himself  an  indorser  receiv- 
ing notice  from  an  indorsee.  (5')  It  has  however  recently  been 
held  in  England,  that  the  allowance  of  a  day  in  each  step  in  pre- 
sentation and  notice  applies  only  as  between  the  parties  to  a  bill, 
and  not  as  between  a  distant  holder  of  his  agent.  Qqq) 

Whether  joint  indorsers,  who  are  not  partners,  are  entitled  to 
separate  notice,  may  not  be  certain  ;  but  we  think  that  they  have 
this  right,  on  reason  as  well  as  authority.  (?•) 

If  Sunday  or  any  other  day  intervene,  which,  by  law,  or  by  es- 
tablished usage,  is  not  a  day  of  business,  then  it  is  not  counted, 
and  the  obligation  as  to  notice  is  the  same  as  if  it  fell  on  the 
succeeding  day.  (s)  If  a  note  or  bill  payable  without  *  grace  *  283 
falls  due  on  such  a  day,  it  is  not  payable  until  the  next  day, 
But  if  the  last  day  of  grace  falls  upon  such  a  day,  then  it  is  pay- 
able on  the  day  before ;  for  the  days  of  grace  are  regarded  as  mat- 
ters of  favor,  and  are  abridged  instead  of  being  lengthened  by  the 
intervention  of  such  a  day.  (t)   An  action  brought  on  the  last  day 

(q)  Bank   of  U.  S.   v.  Davis,  2   Hill  {t)  Where  days  of  grace  are  allowed, 

(N.  Y.),  451 ;  Church  v.  Barlow,  9  Pick,  and  the  last  of  them  falls  on  Sunday,  tiie 

547 ;  Lawson  v.  Farmers  Bank,  1   Ohio  fourth  of  July,  or  other  public  holiday, 

St.  206.  the  bill  or  note  is  payable  the  day  before. 

((](])  In  re  Leeds  Banking   Co.  Law  Kansom  v.  Mack,  2  Hill   (N.  Y.),  588; 

Rep.  1  Eq.  1.  Cuyler  v.  Stevens,  4  Wend.  666;  Sheldon 

(r)  It  would  seem  that  notice  to  one  is  v.  Benham,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  129;  Homes  v. 

enough,   from    Porthouse    v.    Parker,   1  Smith,  20  Me.  204;   Tassell   '•.  Lewis,  I 

Camp.  82,  and  Harris  u.  Clark,  10  Ohio,  Ld.  Raym.  743;  Haynes  v.  Birks,  3  B.  & 

6.     That  notice  must  be  given  to  each,  is  P.  599;    Bussard  v.  Levering,  6  Wheat, 

held  in  Shepard  v.  Hawley,  1  Conn.  307;  102;  Adams  v.  Otterback,  15  How.  539; 

Willis   V.   Green,   5    Hill    (N.    Y.),    232;  Lewis  u.  Burr,  2  Caines  Cas.  195;  Barlow 

Union  Bank  w.  Willis,  8  Met.  504;  State  v.  Planters  Bank,  7    How.   (Miss.)    129; 

Bank  v.^  Slaughter,  7  Blackf .  133.  Offut  v.  Stout,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  332.     But  if 

(s)  Eagle  Bank  v.  Chapin,  3  Pick.  180 ;  no  grace  is  allowed,  and  the  day  on  which 

Agnew  V.  Bank  of  Gettysburg,  2  Har.  &  the  bill  or  note  by  its  terms  falls  due  is  a 

G.  479;  Hawkes  v.  Salter,  4  Bing.  715;  holiday,  it  is  not  payable  until  the  day 

Wright  L\  Shawcross,  2  B.  &  Aid.  501,  n. ;  after.      Salter   v.   Burt,  20  Wend.  205; 

Bray  v.  Iladwen,  5  M.  &  Sel.  68.      So  of  Avery  v.  Stewart,  2  Conn.  69;  Delamater 

public  holidays.      Cuyler  v.   Stevens,  4  ij.  Miller,  1  Cowen,  75;  Barratt  f.  Allen, 

Wend.  566 ;  Lindo  v.  Unsworth,  2  Camp.  10  Ohio,  426.  —  If,  however,  the  nominal 

602.  day  of  payment  in  an  instrument,  which 

VOL.  I.                              21  321 


284 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


of  grace,  has  been  held  to  have  been  brought  too  -  soon  ;  (w)  but 
this  is  not  settled,  (y)  ^ 

The  purpose  of  notice  is,  that  the  party  receiving  it  may  obtain 
security  from  the  party  liable  to  him,  for  the  sum  for  which  he  is 
liable  to  other  parties.  No  precise  form  is  necessary ;  but  it  must 
be  consonant  witli  the  facts,  and  state  distinctly  the  dishonor  of 
the  bill,  and  either  expressly  or  by  an  equivalent  implication,  that 

the  party  to  whom  the  notice  is  sent  is  looked  to  for  the 
*  284    payment,  (w)    And  it  is  held  by  the  *  best  authority,  that 

this  implication  arises  from  the  actual  notice  of  dishonor,  (a;) 
Nor  will  a  slight  mistake  in  the  name  or  description  of  the  note  or 
party  vitiate  the  notice,  unless  the  party  receiving  it  is  misled 
thereby ;  (^)  nor  need  the  notice  state  who  owns  or  who  protests 
the  note,  (z)  Any  party  may  give  notice,  and  it  will  enure  to  the 
benefit  of  every  other  party,  (a)  provided  the  party  giving  the 
notice  be  himself   the  holder   or  an   indorser  already  fixed  by 


is  entitled  to  grace,  happens  to  fall  on 
Sunday  or  on  a  holiday,  the  days  of  grace 
are  the  same  as  in  otlier  cases,  and  pay- 
ment is  not  due  until  the  third  day  after. 
Wooley  V.  Clements,  11  Ala.  220. 

(u)  Wiggle  V.  Thomason,  11  Sm.  &  M. 
452 ;   Walter  v.  Kirk,  14  111.  55. 

(v)  See  McKenzie  v.  Uurant,  9  Rich. 
L.  (31 ;  Ammidown  v.  Woodman,  21  Me. 
580. 

{w)  Hartley  v.  Case,  4  B.  &  C.  339 ; 
Solarte  v.  Palmer,  7  Bing.  5o0;  Boulton 
V.  Welsh,  3  Bing.  N.  C'  688,  remarked 
upon  in  Iloulditcli  r.  Caut}%  4  id.  411  ; 
Grugcon  v.  Smith,  (5  A.  &  E.  499 ;  Strange 
V.  Price,  10  id.  125;  Cooke  u.  French,  id. 
131;  Furze  v.  Sharwood,  2  Q.  B.  388; 
King  V.  Bickley,  id.  419;  Rohson  v.  Cur- 
lewis,  id.  421;  Hcdger  v.  Steavenson,  2 
M.  &  W.  799;  Lewis  r.  Gompertz,  6  id. 
oOy  ;  Bailey  v.  Porter,  14  id.  44;  Messen- 
ger V.  Southcy,  1  Man.  &  G.  76;  Arm- 
strong V.  Christiani,  5  C.  B.  087  ;  Everard 
V.  Watson,  18  E.  L.  &  E.  194  ;  Barstow 
V.  Hiriart,  0  La.  An.  98  ;  Denegre  v.  lliri- 
art,  id.  100;  Cook  r.  Litchfield,  5  Sandf. 
330;  Beals  v.  Peck.  12  Barb.  245;  Spann 
V.  Baltzcll,  1  Fia.  302 ;  Reedy  v.  Sei.xas, 
2  Johns.  Cas.  337  ;  United  States  Bank  v. 
Carneal,  2  Pet.  543;  Mills  i:  Bank  of 
United  States,  11  Wlieat.  431 ;  Shed  v. 
Brett,  1  Pick.  401 ;  (iilhert  i:  Dennis,  3 
Met.  495;  Pinkham  v.  Macy,  9  id.  174; 
Dole  V.  Gold,  5  Barb.  4!K);"  De  Wolf  v. 
Murray,  2  Sandf.  160;  Youngs  v.  Lee,  2 


Kern.  551  ;  Smith  v.  Little,  10  N.  H.  526; 
Cowles  V.  Harts,  3  Conn.  516 ;  Wheaton 
V.  Wilmarth,  13  Met.  423  ;  Cayuga  Coun- 
ty Bank  v.  Warden,  1  Comst.  413 ;  Piatt 
?!.  Drake,  1  Dougl  (Mich.)  290;  Spies  v. 
Newberry,  2  id.  425  ;  Bank  of  Cape  Fear 
V.  Sewell,2  Hawks,  500.  See  also  1  Am. 
Lead.  Cas.  231-237 ;  Boehme  v.  Carr,  3 
Md.  202 ;  Farmers  Bank  v.  Bowie,  4  id. 
290;  Woodin  v.  Foster,  16  Barb.  146; 
Wynn  v.  Alden,  4  Denio,  163 ;  Townsend 
V.  Lorain  Bank,  2  Ohio  (n.  s.),  345;  Paul 
V.  Joel,  4  H.  &  N.  355.  And  if  a  party  to 
a  note  gives  positive  notice  of  dishonor, 
which  afterwards  turns  out  to  be  true,  it 
is  immaterial  whether  he  had  knowledge 
of  the  fact  at  the  time  when  he  gave  the 
notice  or  not.  Jennings  v.  Roberts,  29  E. 
L.  &  E.  118. 

(x)  Chard  v.  Fox,  14  Q.  B.  200;  Gra- 
ham V.  Sangston,  1  Md.  60;  Mills  v.  Bank 
of  United  States,  11  Wheat.  431;  Met- 
calfe ('.  Richardson,  20  E.  L.  &  E.  301. 

(>/)  Mellersh  r.  Rippen,  11  E.  L.  &  E. 
499 ;  Smith  v.  Whiting,  12  Mass.  6 ;  To- 
bey  V.  Lcnning,  14  Pcnn.  St.  483 ;  Cayuga 
County  Bank  v.  Warden,  2  Seld.  19; 
Snow  V.  Perkins,  2  Mich.  239;  Housa- 
tonic  Bank  v.  Laflin,  5  Cush.  546 ;  Den- 
nistoun  v.  Stewart,  17  How.  600. 

(z)  Bradley  v.  Davis,  20  Me.  45. 

(a)  Chapman  v.  Keene,  3  A.  &  E.  193 ; 
overruling  Tindal  v.  Brown,  1  T.  R.  167, 
2  id.  186,  n.,  and  Ex  parte  Barclay,  7  Ves. 
597  ;  Beal's  Adm'r  j;.  Alexander,  6  Tex. 


1  See  Blackman  i;.  Nearing,  43  Conn.  56.    An  action  may  be  brought  on  the  last  day 
of  grace  if  a  demand  be  first  made,  otherwise  not;  see  Pastes  v.  Power,  102  Mass.  65. 

322 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND   BILLS.  *  285 

notice,  (/')  and  gives  the  notice  to  the  party  sought  to  be  charged 
within  one  day  after  the  dishonor,  or  after  receiving  notice  him- 
self, (e)  The  holder  may  leave  without  notice  whom  he  will,  and 
hold  by  due  notice  those  whom  he  will  ;  and  the  indorser  having 
due  notice,  must  himself  notify  prior  parties  to  whom  he  Avould 
look.  (cZ)  But  if  a  holder  prevents  an  indorser  from  having  re- 
course to  a  prior  party,  by  discharging  that  prior  party,  he  cannot 
look  to  the  indorser  whom  he  notifies.  And  notice  given  to  one 
party  does  not  hold  another ;  thus  if  a  second  indorser  having 
notice,  and  thereby  being  bound,  neglects  to  give  notice  to  the  first 
indorser,  the  latter  would  not  be  liable,  (e)  Nor  does  authority  to 
an  agent  to  indorse  a  note  imply  authority  to  receive  notice  of 
dishonor.  (/)  And  if  one  partner  makes  a  note  which  another 
indorses,  regular  notice  of  the  dishonor  must  be  given  to  the 
indorser.  (^)  If  the  paper  be  in  fact  dishonored,  a  notice  may 
be  good,  although  the  party  giving  it  had  no  certain  knowledge  of 
the  fact.  (7i) 

The  party  giving  the  notice  must  have  with  him  the  note  or 
bill,  unless  there  are  special  circumstances  accounting  for  and 
excusing  its  absence.  (Iih) 

*  After  the  holder  of  a  dishonored  bill  or  note  has  given  *  285 
due  notice  to  indorsers,  he  may  indulge  the  acceptor  or 
maker  with  forbearance  or  delay,  without  losing  his  claim  on  the 
indorsers,  provided  he  retains  the  power  of  enforcing  payment 
at  any  moment,  (i)  ^  But  if  he  makes  a  bargain  for  delay,  prom- 
ising it  on  a  consideration  which  makes  the  promise  binding,  or 
under  liis  seal,  this  destroys  his  claim  against  the  indorser.  (/) 

531.     But  the  notice  must  be  given  by  a  (e)  Morgan  v.  Woodworth,  3  Johns, 

party  to  the  bill.     If  given  by  a  stranger  Cas.  90. 

it  will  not  suffice  Jameson  v.  Swinton,  (  /  )  Valk  v.  Gaillard,  4  Strob.  L.  99. 
2  Camp.  373:  Chanoine  v.  Fowler,  3  (q)  Poland  y.  Boyd,  23  Penn.  St.  476. 
Wend.  173;  Wilson  v.  Swabey,  1  Stark.  (A)  Jennings  v.  Roberts,  4  E.  &  B.  615. 
34.  So  in  case  of  non-acceptance,  notice  (hli)  Arnold  i>.  Dresser,  8  Allen,  435. 
to  the  drawer  by  the  drawee  will  not  (/)  Pole  v.  Ford,  2  Chitt.  125 ;  Philpot 
avail,  for  the  latter  is  not  a  party.  Stan-  v.  Bryant.  4  Bing.  717  ;  Badnall  i'.  Sain- 
ton r.  Blossom,  14  Mass.  116.  uel,  3  Price,  521 ;  Walwvn  r.  St.  Quintin, 
(h)  Lysaft  V.  Bryant,  9  C.  B.  46.  1  B.  &  P.  652;   McLemore  v.  Powell.  12 

(c)  Brown  v.  Ferguson,  4  Leigh,  37;  ViHieat.  554;  Bank  v.  Myers,  1  Bailey 
Simpson  v.  Turney,  5  Humph.  419.  See  412;  Planters  Bank  v.  Sellman.  2  G.  &  J 
also  Turner  v.  Leech,  4  B.  &  Aid.  451;  230;  Gahn  v.  Niemcewicz,  11  Wend.  312 
Rowe  V.  Tipper,  20  E.  L.  &  E.  220,  n.  Frazier  v.  Dick,  5  Rob.  (La.)  249 ;  Walk- 

(d)  Valk  V.  Bank  of  State,  1  McMull.  er  v.  Bank  of  Mont.  Co.  12  S.  &  R.  382 
Eq.  414 ;  Carter  v.  Bradley,  19  Me.  62 ;  Freemans  Bank  v.  Rollins,  13  Me.  202. 
Lawson  v.  Farmers  Bank,  1  Ohio  St.  206.  (;)  Clark  v.  Henty,  3  Y.  &  Col.  187 

1  Bateson  v.  Gosling,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  9 ;  Tobey  v.  Ellis,  114  Mass.  120;  Hagey  v.  Hill, 
75  Penn.  St.  108. 

323 


♦  286  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

The  reason  is,  that  he  ought  not  to  claim  payment  of  the  indors- 
ers,  unless,  on  payment,  he  could  transfer  to  them  the  bill  or  note, 
with  a  full  right  to  enforce  payment  at  once  from  the  acceptor  or 
maker.  But  he  could  give  them  no  such  right  if  he  had,  for  good 
consideration,  given  to  the  acceptor  or  maker  his  promise  that 
they  should  not  be  sued. 

It  has  been  a  subject  of  some  discussion  whether  the  above  rule 
applies  in  cases  of  assignments  in  insolvency.^  Bankrupt  and  in- 
solvent laws  usually  provide  that  the  discharge  of  the  bankrupt  or 
insolvent  shall  not  discharge  his  indorsers  or  sureties ;  and  it  is 
sometimes  attempted  to  effect  the  same  result  in  voluntary  as- 
signments in  insolvency.  The  indentures  contain  a  provision 
that  the  creditors  who  become  parties  to  them  shall  discharge  the 
insolvent ;  but  they  also  contain  a  further  provision  that  the  in- 
dorsers or  sureties  shall  not  be  discharged.  And  the  question  has 
been  whether  the  indorsers  or  sureties  are  discharged  notwith- 
standing this  provision.  But  we  think  the  reason  of  the  rule 
which  discharges  them,  does  not  hold  in  this  case.  For  where 
the  debtor  himself  stipulates  that  his  discharge  shall  not  prevent 
his  creditors  from  having  recourse  to  his  indorsers  or  sureties,  it 
must  be  understood  that  he  binds  himself  not  to  oppose  such  dis- 
charge to  a  suit  against  himself  by  the  indorsers  or  sureties 
*  286  if  tliey  are  held  liable  to  his  creditors  *  by  reason  of  a  pro- 
vision which  he  himself  expressly  makes.  The  reason, 
therefore,  fails,  which  generally  makes  his  discharge  their  dis- 
charge. And,  it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  for  their  benefit  that 
this  provision  should  be  carried  into  effect.  For  if  his  discharge 
necessarily  operated  their  discharge,  creditors  would  naturally  pre- 
fer a  claim  against  them  to  the  dividend  of  an  insolvent,  and  would 
therefore  take  nothing  from  him,  but  all  from  them.  Whereas, 
if  this  clause  permits  them  to  get  what  they  can  from  the  insol- 
vent, and  look  to  the  indorsers  or  sureties  only  for  the  balance, 

Greely  v.  Dow,  2  Met.  176 ;  Wharton  v.  charged,  though  the  party  for  whom  he 

Williamson,  13  Penn.  St.  273.      See  also  is  bound  take  security  of  the  acceptor 

Moss  I'.  Hall,  5  Exch.  40.     Unlike,  how-  and  then  release  it  without  his  consent, 

ever,  the  case  of  a  surety,  a  party  liable  Hurd   v.  Little,  12  Mass.  603;  Pitts  v. 

on   a  bill   as   indorser  will   not   be   dis-  Congdon,  2  Corast.  352. 

1  An  indorser  or  surety  is  not  discharged  by  the  creditor's  voting  to  accept  a 
composition  in  bankruptcy  from  the  maker,  Ex  parte  Jacobs,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  211; 
Megrath  v.  Gray,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  216;  Guild  v.  Butler,  122  Mass.  498;  and  notice  must 
be  sent  to  an  indorser,  although  a  bankrupt,  and  his  assignee  has  been  appointed,  Ex 
parte  Baker,  4  Ch.  D.  795. 

324 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  287 

they  would  always  do  so,  and  the  sureties  would  have  the  benefit 
of  whatever  was  paid  by  way  of  dividend,  (/t) 

If  an  indorscr  who  is  released  from  his  liability  by  the  laches 
of  the  holder,  thereafter  promises  to  pay  the  note  with  knowledge 
of  the  facts  which  constitute  the  laches,  he  cannot  set  up  as  a 
defence  against  the  note  the  want  of  demand  and  notice,  (klc) 
And  he  is  thus  liable  although  when  he  made  the  promise  he  did 
not  know  that  the  want  of  notice  released  him,  as  he  must  be  pre- 
sumed to  know  the  law.  (H) 


SECTION  XII. 

OF   PROTEST. 

If  a  foreign  bill  be  not  accepted,  or  not  paid  at  maturity,  it 
must  be  protested  at  once ;  and  this  should  be  done  by  a  notary 
public,  to  whose  official  acts  under  his  seal,  full  faith  is  given  in 
all  countries,  (l)  Inland  bills  are  generally,  and  promissory  notes 
very  often  protested  in  like  manner,  but  this  is  not  required  by 
the  law-merchant,  (w)  It  is  held,  on  the  weight  of  authority, 
that  our  States  are  so  far  foreign  to  each  other,  that  a  bill  drawn 
in  one  of  them,  upon  a  drawee  resident  in  another,  re- 
quires protest,  (n)  The  notary's  certificate  *  of  protest  *  287 
would  not  be  evidence  of  dishonor,  where  the  protest  was 

(k)  Parke,  B.,  Kearsley  v.  Cole,  16  M.  v.  Bates,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  52;  Cole  v.  Jes- 

&  W.  135;  Ex  parte  GifEord,  0  Ves.  805;  sup,  9  Barb.  393. 

Boultbee  v.  Stubbs,  18  Ves.  20;  Ex  parte  (m)  Windle  v.  Andrews,  2  B.  &  Aid. 

Glendiniiing,  Buck,  Cases  in  Bankruptcy,  696;    Bonar   v.   Mitchell,  5    Exch.   415; 

517 ;  Nicholson  v.  Revill,  4  A.  &  E.  675;  Young  v.  Bryan,  6  Wheat.  146;  Burke  v. 

Lewis  V.  Jones,  4  B.  &  C.  506,  n. ;  Nichols  McCay,  2  How.  QG. 

V.  Norris,  3  B.  &  Ad.  41 ;  Clagett  v.  Sal-  (w)'  Whether  a  bill  drawn  in  one  of 

mon,  5  G.  &  J.  314;  Owen  v.  Homan,  3  the  United  States  upon  persons  resident 

E.  L.  &  E.  112 ;  Price  v.  Barker,  30  E.  L.  in  another  is  a  foreign  bill  so  as  to  re- 

&  E.  157  ;  Sohier  v.  Loring,  6  Cush.  537.  quire  a  protest  in  case  of  non-acceptance 

See  ante,  p.  *29.  or  non-payment,  is  a  question  concerning 

(kk)   See  ante,  p.  *271,  and  note;  and  which  there  has  been  a  difference  of  ju- 

also  Sigerson  v.  Matthews,  20  How.  496:  dicial  opinion.     It  has  been  held  in  New 

Rogers  v.  Hackett,  1  Foster,  100 ;   Key-  York  and  Connecticut  that  such  bills  are 

nolds  V.  Douglas,  12  Pet.  497 ;  Thornton  not  foreign.     Miller  v.  Hackley,  5  Johns. 

V.  Wynn,  12  Wheat.  183.  375;   Bay  w.  Church,  15  Conn.  15.      But 

(kl)  Morgan  v.  Peet,  32  111.  281.     See  the  case  in   New   York  has   been   since 

ante  as  to  waiver,  p.  *279.  overruled  in  the  same  jurisdiction;  and 

(/)  Gale  V.  Walsh,  5  T.  R.  239 ;  Bry-  in  the  other  States  where  the  question 

den  V.  Taylor,  2  Har.  &  J.  396 ;  Townsley  has  arisen,  and  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 

V.  Sumrall,  2  Pet.  170.     And  the  duty  of  the  United  States,  a  contrary  opinion  has 

the  notary  cannot  be  performed  by  an  been  held.     Duncan  v.  Course,  1  S.  Car. 

agent  or  clerk.    Onondaga  County  Bank  Const.   100;    Cape  Fear  Bank  v.  Stine- 

325 


*  288  THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

not  required  by  law,  (o)  even  if  the  notes  were  payable  in  a  for- 
eign country.  (^)  If  the  bill  be  protested  for  non-acceptance  by 
the  drawee,  any  third  person  may  intervene,  and  accept  or  pay 
the  bill,  for  the  honor  of  the  drawer  or  of  any  indorser ;  and  such 
acceptance  supra  protest  has  the  same  effect  as  if  the  bill  had 
been  drawn  on  him.  He  is  liable  in  the  same  way,  and  he  has 
his  remed}-  against  the  person  for  whom  he  accepts,  and  all  prior 
parties  with  notice ;  and  if  he  pays  the  bill  for  an  indorser  he 
stands  in  the  position  of  an  indorsee  for  value.  (9-)  And  this  is 
true  although  the  acceptance  is  at  the  request  and  for  the  honor 
of  the  drawee  after  his  refusal,  (r)  The  holder  is  not  bound  to 
receive  an  acceptance  supra  protest^  (&)  but  must  receive  payment 
if  tendered  to  him  supra  protest.  But  after  a  general  acceptance  by 
the  drawee  there  can  be  no  acceptance  supra  protest,  and  a  third 
party  can  only  add  his  credit  to  the  bill  by  a  collateral  guaranty,  (i) 
If  the  l)ill  designates  a  third  party  to  whom  recourse  is  to  be  had  on 
non-accoptance,  it  is  said  that  this  direction  must  be  obeyed,  (m) 

The  notarial  protest  is  generally  admissible,  but  not  conclusive 
evidence  of  the  facts  therein  stated,  which  properly  belong  to  the 
act  of  protest,  (v) 

*  288        *  Banks  which  receive  bills   and   notes  for  collection, 

generally,  perhaps  always,  employ  agents  to  collect,  and 
notaries  to  demand  and  protest.  And  it  has  been  held  that  such 
a  bank  is  liable  only  for  due  discretion  in  choosing  its  agent,  and 
not  for  the  agent's  negligence,  (w)  And  if  any  act  is  to  be  done 
at  a  distance  from  the  bank,  the  assent  of  the  holder  of  the  note 

metz,    1    Hill    (S.    C),   44;    Lonstlale   v.  156  ;  Baring  r.  Clark,  19  Pick.  220.    The 

Brown,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  148 ;  Phoenix  Bank  payer  supra  protest  for  the  honor  of  the 

V.   Mussey,  12  Pick.  483  ;   Brown  v.  Per-  indorser  cannot  hold  such  indorser  liable 

guson,  4  Leigh,  37 ;    Halliday  v.  McDou-  if  he  have  already  been  discharged  by 

gall,  20  Wend.  81 ;  Carter  v.  Barley,  9  N.  reason  of  want  of  notice  of  tlie  non-ac- 

H.  558;  Buckner  v.  Pinley,  2  Pet.  68G ;  ceptance.     When  a  party  lias  once  been 

Schneider  v.   Cochrane,  9  La.   An.  235.  exonerated,  his  liability  cannot  be  revived 

This  is  in  accordance  with  the  doctrine  without  his  assent.     Iliggins  v.  Morrison, 

of  Mahoncy   ;;.  Ashlin,  2  B.  &  Ad.  478,  4  Dana,  100. 

where  a  bill  drawn  in  Ireland  upon  a  per-  (?)  Konig  v.  Bayard,  1  Pet.  250. 

hon  resident  in  England  was  held  to  be  a  (s)  Mitford  v.  Walcot,  12  Mod.  410. 

foreign  bill.  (<)  Jackson  v.  Hudson,  2  Camp.  447. 

(o)   Union    Bank   i;.   Hyde,  6  "Wheat.  («)   Story  on  Bills  of  Exch.  §§  05,  219. 

574;  Taylor  i'.  Bank  of  Illinois,  7  Monr.  (v)  So  by  statute  in  New  Hampshire, 

580;   Bank  of   U.  S.  i'.  Leathers,  10  B.  Kentucky,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Alabama, 

Mon.  04  ;  Carter  v.  Burloy,  9  N.  II.  558.  and    California.      See    also    Gordon    v. 

ip)   Kirtland  v.  Wanzer,  2  Duer.  278.  Price,  10  Ired.  L.  385;  Graham  v.  Sangs- 

(7)   I/olt,  C.  J.,  in  Mutford  v.  Walcot,  ton,  1  Md.  59;  Sumner  v.  Bowen,  2  Wis. 

1   Ld.  llaym.  574;    Mertcns  v.  Winning-  524;  Austin  r.  Wilson,  24  Vt.  030. 
ton,  1   Esp.   112;    Goodhall  v.  Polhill,  1  (»•)   Agricultural  Bank  i;.  Coraraercial 

C.  B.  2.'',3 ;  Geralopulo  v.  Wider,  3  E.  L.  Bank,  7  Sm.  &  W.  592. 
&  E.  615 ;  Wood  v.  Pugh,  7  Ohio,  Part  2, 

326 


CH.  XVI.]  NOTES   AND    BILLS.  *  289 

to  the  employment  of  a  sub-agent  will  be  presumed,  (a:)  ^  But 
where  a  bank  assumes  to  act  directly  by  its  own  servants  or 
agents,  the  general  principles  uf  agency  would  apply,  and  make 
the  bank  responsible  for  the  acts  of  its  agents. 

As  to  the  form  and  particular  statements  of  the  protest,  the 
true  rule  is,  that  notice  of  protest  should  inform  the  party,  with 
reasonable  certainty,  what  note  or  bill  it  is  on  which  he  is  to  be 
charged,  (xx) 


SECTION   XIII. 

ON   DAMAGES   FOR   NON-PAYMENT   OF    BILLS. 

If  a  bill  of  exchange  be  not  paid  at  maturity,  the  holder  may  at 
once  redraw  on  the  drawer  or  indorser,  not  only  for  the  face  of 
the  bill,  but  for  so  much  more  as  shall  indemnify  him  ;  and  there- 
fore for  so  much  as  shall  cover  the  necessary  costs  of  protest, 
notice,  commissions,  and  whatever  further  loss  he  sustains  by  the 
current  rate  of  exchange  on  the  place  where  the  drawer  or  in- 
dorser resided.  (^)  This  is  the  rule  of  the  law-merchant ;  but  in 
this  country,  instead  of  re-exchange,  or  damages  to  be  ascertained 
by  a  reference  to  the  above  items  of  loss,  established  rates  of 
damage  are  fixed  by  statute  or  by  usage,  (z)  These  rates  are 
larger  in  proportion  to  the  distance  of  the  place  where  the 
drawee  resides  from  the  place  where  the  bill  is  drawn.  *  For  *  289 
the  amount,  or  percentage  of  damage,  at  different  dis- 
tances, we  can  only  refer  to  the  laws  of  the  several  States.  They 
differ  considerably  ;  and  it  may  be  regretted  that  more  uniformity 
does  not  prevail  among  the  several  States  in  relation  to  this  mat- 

(x)  Dorchester  Bank  r.  N.  E.  Bank,  1  drawer  or  indorser,  and  recover  all  the 

Cush.   177 ;    Baldwin  i'.  Bank  of  Louis-  customary  damages.     Welden  v.  Buck,  4 

iana,   1    La.    An.   13;    Citizens   Bank   v.  Johns.  144;  Whitehead  r.  Walker,  9  M. 

Howell,  8  Md.  530.  &  W.  50G.     But  the  acceptor  is  not  liable 

(xx)  Bank   v.  Woods,  28  N.  Y.  545;  for  re-exchange.     Woolsey  v.  Crawford. 

Home  Ins.  Co.  r.  Green,  19  N.  Y.  118.  2   Camp.  445;    Napier   v.   Schneider,   12 

{//)  JVIellish  I'.  Simeon,  2  H.  Bl.  378;  East,  420;  Sibely  r.  Tut,  1  McMuU.  Eq. 

Detastet  r.  Baring,  11  East,  265;  Graves  320;  Suse  v.  Pompe,  98  Eng.  C.  L.  538. 

V.  Dash,  12  Johns.  17  (overruling  Hen-  Sec  on  this  topic,  Pars.  Notes  &  Bills, 

dricks  v.  Franklin,  4  Johns.  UO) ;   Den-  652,661. 

ston  V.  Henderson,  13  id.  322.    The  holder  (s)   Hendricks    v.   Franklin,  4  Johns, 

may  also,  upon  protest  ior  non-acceptance,  119,  per   Spencer,  J.;    Parsons,   C.   J.,  in 

without  waiting  for  protest  upon   non-  Grimshaw  v.  Bender,  G  Mass.  157. 
payment,  maintain  an  action  against  tlie 

1  riantcts  Bank  v.  Wilmington  Bank,  75  N.  C.  534. 

327 


*  290  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

tcr.  It  seems  to  be  settled  by  the  weight  of  authority,  that,  in 
determining  the  amount  of  re-exchange,  the  actual  or  mercantile 
par  or  valuation  of  money  should  be  regarded,  and  not  the  mere 
legal  or  nominal  rate,  which,  as  between  this  country  and  Eng- 
land, differs  very  widely  from  the  true  value,  (a) 


SECTION   XIV. 

BILLS    OF   LADING. 

These  documents  are  also  by  the  law-merchant  now  treated  as 
negotiable  instruments  to  a  certain  extent,  (^ad)  The  master,  by 
signing  such  bill,  promises  to  deliver  the  goods  to  A  "  or  his 
assigns."  If  A  indorses  the  bill  to  any  person,  or  in  blank,  de- 
livering it  to  any  person,  that  constitutes  such  person  his  assignee, 
and  vests  in  him  a  property  in  the  goods,  and  he  may  claim  the 
goods  of  the  captain  or  owners  in  the  place  of  the  person  putting 
them  on  board,  and  with  the  same  rights.  (6)  But  a  bill  of  lading 
is  rather  quasi  negotiable  than  actually  so,  the  effect  of  the  in- 
dorsement being  only  to  transfer  the  property  in  the  goods  and 
not  the  right  upon  the  contract  itself,  and  the  indorsee  cannot 
maintain  an  action  on  the  bill  itself  in  his  own  name,  nor  an 
action  on  the  case  for  the  non-delivery  of  the  goods,  (c)  ^ 
*  290  And  a  mere  memorandum  of  shipment  would  not  *  have  the 
•  force  nor  the  negotiability  of  a  bill  of  lading,  (t^)  nor  will  the 
property  in  goods,  for  which  a  bill  of  lading  has  been  given,  pass 
by  a  mere  delivery  of  the  bill  without  indorsement,  (e)  or  by  in- 

(rt)  Scott   V.  Bevan,  2  B.  &  Ad.  78;  ment,"  and  assignable  by  such  indorse- 

Smith  V.  Shaw,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  167;  Grant  ment. 
V.  Hoaley,  3  Sumner,  523.  (c)  Thompson   v.  Dominey,  14  M.  & 

(aa)  These  are  also  made  so  in  Eng-  W.  403  ;    Howard  v.   Siiepherd,  9  C.   B. 

land  by  18  &  19  Vict.  ch.  111.  297;  Dows  v.  Cobb,  12  Barb.  310;  Line- 

(/;)   Lickbarrow  o.  Mason,  2  T.  R.  63;  ker  v.  Ayesliford,   1   Cal.  75.      See  also 

Newsom  v.  Thornton,  0  East.  41  ;  Berk-  Rowley  i>.  Bigclow,  12  Pick.  314;  Stanton 

ley  V.  Watling,  7  A.  &  E.  39,  2   Nev.  &  v.  Eager,  16  Pick.  474;  Tindal  v.  Taylor, 

P.  178 ;  Saltus  v.  Everett,  20  Wend.  208;  4  E.  &  B.  219. 

Chandler  v.   Beldeii,  18  Johns.  157;  Ry-  (d)  See  Jenkyns  r.  Usborne,  13  Law 

berg  V.   Snell,   2    Wash.  C.   C.  294.      In  J.  (n.  s.)  C.  P.  19G;  Brandt  v.  Bowlby,  2 

Renteria  v.  Kuding,  1  Mo.  &  M.  511,  Lord  B.  &  Ad.  932. 

Tentenlfin  said  tiiat  a  bill  of  lading,  in  (n)  Stone  v.  Swift,  4  Pick.  389.      But 

which  the  word  "  assigns  "  did  not  appear,  see  Walter  v.  Ross,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  283. 
was  nevertheless  "an  indorsable  instru- 

1  A  warehouse  recci])t  is  negotiable  only  to  the  same  extent  and  for  the  same 
purpo.scs  as  a  bill  of  lading  or  carrier's  receipt;  its  indorsement  or  delivery  does  not 
transfer  the  contract  itself,  but  only  the  property  represented  by  it,  and  becomes  mere 
evidence  of  citlc.     Hale  v.  Milwaukee  Dock  Co.  20  Wis.  482. 

828 


CH.  XVI.]  BILLS.  *  291 

dorscnicnt  without  delivery.  (/)    For  a  further  statement  of  the 
law  of  Bills  of  Lading,  see  the  chapter  on  the  Law  of  Shipping. 

Certificates  are  sometimes  used  as  if  they  were  negotiable ;  but 
in  an  interesting  case  in  Massachusetts,  it  was  decided  that  they 
were  not,  and  that  the  word  "  trustee  "  added  to  the  name  of  the 
person  in  whose  name  they  stood  notified  the  person  to  whom 
they  were  delivered  as  security,  and  he  could  not  make  a  valid 
transfer  of  them.  (^)  ^ 


SECTION  XV. 

OP   PROPERTY   PASSING   WITH   POSSESSION. 

By  the  common  law,  one  who  has  no  title  to  a  chattel  can  give 
no  title,  except  by  a  sale  in  market  overt,  which  is  not  known  in 
this  country.  An  exception  exists  in  the  case  of  negotiable  notes 
made  payable  to  bearer,  or  payable  to  order  and  indorsed  in  blank, 
so  as  to  be  transferable  by  delivery.  (^)  We  consider  that  this 
exception  extends  to  all  negotiable  instruments  which  are  trans- 
ferable by  mere  delivery  by  any  party  holding  them  ;  and  that 
by  delivery  thereof,  a  good  title  passes  "  to  any  person  honestly 
acquiring  them  ; "  (A)  because  the  property  passes  with  the  pos- 
session. Only,  as  has  been  said,  when  suspicion  is  cast  upon  his 
ownership,  as  by  showing  that  the  paper  got  into  circulation  by 
force  or  fraud,  need  he  account  for  it,  even  by  showing  that  he 
had  paid  a  good  consideration  for  it.  (z)  It  becomes,  then,  im- 
portant to  determine  what  are  negotiable  instruments.  If, 
for  example,  the  bond  of  a  railroad  *  company,  payable  to    *  291 

if)  Buffington  v.  Curtis,  15  Mass.  528;  Chalmers,  2  Seld.  209 ;  Seeley  v.  Engell, 

Allen  V.  Williams,  12  Pick.  297.  17  Barb.  530;   Lemon  v.  Temple,  7  Ind. 

(#)   Shaw  ;;.  Spencer,  100  Mass.  382.  5-56;   Shelton  v.  Sherfey,  3  Greene  (La.), 

{(/)  Miller  v.  Race,  1  Burr.  452.  108;  Wilson  v.  Lazier,  11  Gratt.  477.    But 

{h)  So  said  by  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  Gorgier  he  must  be  a  lawful  holder,  and  is  not  if 

V.  Mieville,  3  B.  &  C.  45.      In  Clark  v.  he  took  it  usuriously  from  an  agent.     He 

Shee,  Cowper,  197,  Lord  Mansfield  puts  cannot  retain  it  against  an  insolvent  prin- 

notes  and  money  on  precisely  the  same  cipal.     Keutgen  v.  Parks,  2  Sandf.  60. 

footing.     "When,"  says  he,  ''money  or  (i)  Berry  v.  Alderman,  24  E.  L.  &  E. 

notes  are  paid  bond  fide,  and  upon  a"val-  318;  s.  c.  14  C.  B.  95;  Fitch  v.  Jones,  32 

uable  consideration,  they  never  shall  be  E.  L.  &  E.  134;  s.  c.  5  E.  &  B.  238;  Mc- 

brought  back   by  the  true  owner;    but  Kesson  v.  Stanberry,  3  Ohio  (n.  s.),  156; 

where  they  come  mala  fide  into  a  person's  Catlin  v.  Hansen,  1  Duer,  809 ;  McCaskill 

hands,  they  are  in  the  nature  of  specific  v.   Ballard,   8   Rich.    L.   470 ;    Perrin   v. 

property  ;    and  if  their  identity  can  be  Noyes,  39  Me.  384;  Bissell  v.  Morgan,  11 

traced  and  ascertained,  the  party  has  a  Cush.  198.     See  p.  *241,  awie. 
right  to  recover."     See   also  James  v. 

1  See  also  Gaston  v.  Am.  Exchange  Bank,  2  Stewart,  98. 

329 


*  292  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

bearer,  is  a  negotiable  instrument,  then  a  purchaser  in  good 
faith  holds  it  not  only  free  from  the  equitable  defences  which 
the  company  might  have  made  against  the  first  holder,  but 
also  against  the  claims  of  an  owner  who  may  have  lost  it,  or  from 
whom  it  was  stolen.  We  regard  both  the  English  and  American 
authorities  as  making  all  instruments  negotiable  which  are  pay- 
able to  bearer,  and  also  those  which  are  by  custom  transferable 
by  delivery,  within  which  deiinition  the  common  bonds  of  rail- 
road companies  would  fall.  Of  the  coupons  attached,  which  have 
no  seal,  this  would  seem  to  be  the  rule.  But  usage  must  have 
great  influence  in  determining  this  question.  Our  note  will  show 
the  state  of  the  authorities  on  this  subject.  (/)  ^ 

If  the  owner  of  a  note  or  bill  not  negotiable,  or  if  ne- 

*  292    gotiable  *  specially  indorsed  to  him,  lose  it,  he  may,  on  suf- 

(  /)  See  Gorgier  v.  Mieville,  3  B.  &  C.  bility  of  such  instruments  Knox  Co. 
45,  and  coraijare  it  with  Glyn  v.  Baker,  Com.  v.  Asi)inwall,  21  How.  5-39;  Beaver 
13  East,  509.  See  also  Wookey  v.  Pole,  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  44  Penn.  St.  63.  See 
4  B.  &  Aid.  1 ;  Grant  o.  Vaughan,  3  Burr,  also  Redfield  on  Railways,  595,  §  239, 
1516,  where  a  draft  by  a  merchant  on  and  2  Am.  Law  Keg.  (n.  s.)  748.  See 
liis  banker  was  held  negotiable.  This  Lickbarrow  v.  Dason,  5  T.  R.  683,  respect- 
case  distinctly  confirms  the  case  of  ing  bills  of  lading,  before  cited.  Zwinger 
Miller  v.  Race.  In  Jackson  v.  Y.  &  C.  R.  i\  Samuda,  7  Taunt.  265  ;  Lucas  v.  Dor- 
R.  Co.  48  Me.  147,  it  was  held  that  unless  rien,  7  Taunt.  278  ;  Lang  v.  Smith,  7 
there  was  some  statutory  provision  to  Bing.  284  ;  in  which  case  it  was  held  that 
that  effect  an  action  could  not  be  main-  certain  bordereaux  and  coupons,  entitling 
tained  upon  interest  coupons,  not  con-  the  bearer  to  certain  portions  of  the  pub- 
taining  negotiable  words,  by  an  assignee,  lie  debt  of  Naples,  were  not  negotiable, 
Goodtnow,  J.,  delivered  a  dissenting  opin-  the  jury  finding  that  they  did  not  usually 
ion,  citing  and  supporting  the  text  above,  pass  from  hand  to  hand  like  money. 
Since  tJiat  time  the  same  question  has  Taylor  v.  Kymer,  3  B.  &  Ad.  321,  and 
been  passed  upon  by  the  Supreme  Courts  Taylor  y  Trueman,  1  Mo.  &  M.  453,  were 
of  the  United  States  and  of  Pennsylvania,  decided  on  the  construction  of  Stat.  6 
both  of  which  fully  sustain  the  negotia-  Geo.  IV.  c.  94.     But  an  instrument  for 

1  The  scrip  of  a  foreign  government,  issued  by  it  on  negotiating  a  loan,  and  for 
which  a  bond  is  to  be  given  after  all  instalments  have  been  duly  paid,  is,  by  the  custom 
of  all  the  stock-markets  of  Europe,  a  negotiable  instrument,  and  passes  b}^  mere  delivery 
to  a  bond  Jide  holder  for  value.  English  law  follows  this  custom.  Goodwin  v.  Robarts, 
1  App.  Cas.  476.  — Boyd  v.  Kennedy,  9  Vroom,  14G,  decided  that  corporation  coupon 
bonds  lawfully  issued,  containing  words  of  negotiability,  are  negotiable  like  commercial 
paper.  To  the  same  effect  arc  Vermilye  v.  AdamsEx.  Co.,  21  Wall.  138;  Marion 
Commissioners  i.  Clark,  94  U.  S.  278;  Cromwell  v.  Sac  County,  96  U.  S.  51  ;  Force  v. 
Elizabeth,  1  Stewart,  403;  E.xchangc  Bank  v.  Hartford,  &c.  R.  Co.,  8  R.I.  37.5; 
Dinsmore  v.  Duncan,  .'57  N.  Y.  573;  Chesai)eake  Co.  v.  Blair,  45  Md.  102,  110;  Griffith 
V.  Burden,  35  la.  138,  142;  San  Antonio  v.  Lane,  32  Tex.  405.  See  Crouch  v.  Credit 
Foncier  of  England,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  .374. —  An  interest  coupon  detached  fi-om  a 
mortgage  bond  of  a  railroad  is  negotiable  by  delivery,  and  may  be  enforced  against 
the  corporation  by  a  bond  fide  holder  who  has  no  interest  in  and  cannot  produce 
the  bond.  Haven  v.  Grand  Junction  R.  Co.,  109  Mass.  88.  To  the  same  effect  are 
Evertson  v.  Newport  Bank,  66  N.  Y.  14;  Cicero  v.  Clifford,  53  Ind.  191  ;  Kennard  v. 
Cass  Co.,  3  Dillon,  147.  "  Interest  coupons  detached  from  bonds,  payable  to  bearer 
at  a  specified  time  and  place,  arc  negotial)le  promises  for  the  payment  of  money,  and 
therefore  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  bank-notes  or  other  negotiable  instruments.  They 
are,  in  effect,  j)roniissory  notes  by  the  law  merchant,  and  possess  all  the  attributes  of  ne- 
gotiable paper."  Roi)ce,  J.,  in  Nortli  Bennington  Bank  r.  Tabor,  52  Vt.  87,  93. 
—  That  days  of  grace  are  allowed  on  coupons,  see  Evertson  v.  Newport  Bank,  CO  N.  Y.  14. 

380 


CH.  XV i.]  BONDS.  *  292 

ficient  proof  of  its  tenor  and  of  his  loss,  sustain  an  action  at 
law,  because  no  finder  can  give  good  title  to  any  holder  by  a 
hond  fide  sale  of  such  paper  to  him.  (/c)  ^  But  if  the  paper  be  ne- 
gotiable and  indorsed  in  blank,  or  if  it  be  payable  to  bearer,  then 
the  promisor  or  indorser  may  be  held  liable  to  an  innocent  holder 
for  consideration.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  promisor  or  in- 
dorser should  not  be  liable  to  the  loser  without  sufficient  indemnity 
to  him  against  the  possible  demand  of  such  innocent  purchaser.  (V) 
But  courts  of  law  find  it  difficult  to  require  such  indemnity,  or  to 
judge  of  its  sufficiency ;  and  therefore,  generally  at  least,  they 
turn  the  loser  over  to  courts  of  equity,  in  which  the  defendant 
may  be  properly  secured  by  adequate  indemnity ;  and  there  the 
action  will  be  maintained,  (rti)  Hence  if  a  note  or  bill,  transfer- 
able by  delivery,  be  lost  to  the  owner  at  the  time  of  its  maturity, 
this  loss  is,  in  general,  a  defence  against  a  suit  at  law.  (ii)  But 
in  some  of  our  States,  statutes  permit  recovery  (o)  if  the  plaintiff 

the  payment  of  money  under  seal  is  not  with   deUvery   are  negotiable,  but  that 

negotiable,  although  it  appear  to  be  so  certificates  of  stock  in  a  corporation  are 

upon  its  face;  at  least  where  any  writing  not.     See  Hodges  v.  Shuler,  22  N.  Y.  (8 

is  necessary  in  order  to  transfer  it.    Clark  Smith)  114. 

0.  Farmers  Man.  Co.  15  Wend.  256;  [k)  Wainu.  Bailey,  10  A.  &  E.  616. 
Parke,  Baron,  in  Hibblewhite  v.  Mc-  (/)  Pierson  v.  Hutchinson,  2  Camp. 
Morine,  6  M.  &  W.  200.  In  Fisher  v.  211;  Hansard  v.  Robinson,  7  B.  &  C.  90; 
The  Morris  Canal  and  Banking  Com-  Clay  v.  Crowe,  18  E.  L.  &  E.  514 ;  Davis 
pauy,  decided  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  v.  Dodd,  4  Taunt.  602;  Poole  v.  Smith,  1 
New  Jersey  in  1855,  it  was  held  that  rail-  Holt,  144  ;  Rowley  v.  Ball,  3  Cowen,  303; 
road  bonds  are  negotiable,  and  this  case  Kirby  i.  Sisson,  2  Wend.  550;  Devlin  v. 
was  fully  concurred  in  by  the  Court  of  Clark,  31  Mo.  22.  But  evidence  is  ad- 
Appeals.  Delafield  v.  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  missible  to  show  that  the  note  has  been 
Y.),  159,  is  generally  regarded  as  having  actually  destroyed,  or  that  it  amnot  come  to 
settled  the  same  point  in  New  York,  in  the  hands  of  a  bond  Jide  holder.  Eolt  v. 
reference  to  State  bonds.  But  the  Court  Watson,  4  Bing.  273  ;  Rowley  v.  Ball, 
of  Appeals  in  the  Schuyler  case,  held  supra.  The  case  where  a  bank-bill  is  cut 
that  certificates  of  stock  in  a  corporation  in  halves  and  one  of  them  is  lost,  and 
are  not  negotiable ;  or  at  least,  tLat  he  payment  sought  for  the  other,  would 
who  takes  an  assignment  of  a  certificate,  seem  to  stand  upon  the  same  grounds  as 
without  any  transfer  in  the  corporation's  that  of  a  lost  negotiable  instrument, 
books,  acquires  only  the  title  of  assignor.  Mayor  v.  Johnson,  3  Camp.  324.  But  see 
Mechanics  Bank  v.  New  York  and  New  Bullet  v.  Bank  of  Pennsylvania,  2  Wash. 
Haven  Railroad  Co.  3  Kern.  599.  So  in  C.  C.  172 ;  Patton  v.  State  Bank,  2  Nott 
Ide  V.  Conn.  &  Pass.  Riv.  R.  R.  Co.  32  Vt.  &  McC.  464;  Hindsdale  v.  Bank  of  Or- 
297,  it  was  held  that  a  railway  bond  paj'-  ange,  6  Wend.  378. 

able  to  bearer  is  a  negotiable  instrument  (m)    Pierson  v.  Hutchinson,  2  Camp, 

and  may  be  declared  upon  and  described  211 ;    Lord  Eldon,  in  Ex  parte  Greenvvay, 

in  an  action  of   assumpsit  as  a  "  bond."  G  Ves.  812. 

The  result  would  seem  to  be  that  all  cor-  (n)  Aranguren  v.  Scholfield,  38  E.  L.  & 

poration   bonds  and   government   stocks  E.  424  ;  Morgan  p.  Reintzel,  7  Cranch,  273. 

which  pass   by  delivery  or  indorsement  (a)  New  York,  Alabama,  Mississippi. 

1  McGregory  v.  McGregory,  1 07  Mass.  54.3  ;  Tucker  i-.  Tucker,  1 1 9  Mass.  79.  See  King 
V.  Zimmerman,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  466.  But  the  owner  of  a  note  may  sue  it  without  possession 
of  it,  if  in  the  hands  of  the  adverse  party.  Wright  v.  Wright,  54  N.  Y.  437,  441.  —  The 
rule  that  a  bond  Jide  purchaser  of  a  lost  or  stolen  bill  or  note,  indorsed  in  blank  or 
payable  to  bearer  is  not  bound  to  look  beyond  the  instrument  has  no  application  to 
the  case  of  a  lost  or  stolen  bill  of  lading.     Shaw  v.  Railroad  Co.,  101  U.  S.  557. 

331 


♦292 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


gives  indemnity,  and  in  others,  the  court  so  direct,  (p)  But,  if  it 
is  physically  destroyed,  it  may  be  recovered  at  law,  —  where,  if 
only  lost,  courts  would  have  denied  relief,  {q^ 

(p)    Meeker   v.   Jackson,    3    Yeates,  (7)  Aborn  v.   Bosworth,  1  R.  I.  401  ; 

442 ;    Anderson  v.  Robson,   2  Bay,  495 ;  Swift  v.  Stevens,  8  Conn.  431 ;  Rogers  v. 

Fales  V.  Russell,  IG  Pick.  315  ;    Bullet  i-.  Miller,  4  Scam.  3-34  ;    McNair  v.  Gilbert, 

Bank  of  Renn.  2  Wash.  C.  C.  172;    Swift  3  Wend.  344;   Piutard  v.  Tackington,  10 

V.  Stevens,  8  Conn.  431 ;  Thayer  v.  Iving,  Johns.  104. 
15  Ohio,  242. 

332 


CH.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  293 


*  CHAPTER  XVII.  *293 

INFANTS. 

In  general,  all  persons  may  enter  into  contracts  ;  and  when  a 
contract  is  made  the  law  presumes  the  competency  of  the  parties. 
If,  therefore,  a  party  rests  his  action  or  his  defence  upon  the  in- 
competency or  incapacity  of  himself  or  of  the  other  party,  this 
must  be  proved,  (a)  This  incompetency  may  be  absolute  and  en- 
tire, or  limited  and  partial ;  in  some  cases  a  contract  is  void  as  to 
both  parties,  and  in  others  only  as  to  one  ;  in  some  cases  void,  and 
in  others  voidable.   We  shall  consider  these  questions  as  we  proceed. 

As  the  essence  of  a  contract  is  an  assent  or  agreement  of  the 
minds  of  both  parties,  where  such  assent  is  impossible,  from  the 
want,  immaturity,  or  incapacity  of  mind,  there  can  be  no  perfect 
contract.  On  this  ground  rests,  originally,  the  disability  of  infants. 
We  will  first  consider  this  class  of  disabled  persons. 


SECTION  I. 

INCAPACITY   OF   INFANTS  TO    CONTRACT. 

All  persons  are  denominated  infants,  by  the  common  law,  until 
the  age  of  twenty-one.    But  in  some  parts  of  this  country 
*  females  reach  majority,  at  least  for  some  purposes,  at    *  294 

(a)  Jenne  I".  Ward,  2  Stark.  326  ;  Leader  was  commenced),  and  the  defendant  must 
V.  Bany,  1  Esp.  353 ;  Henderson  v.  Clark,  prove  that  he  was  still  a  minor  at  the  time 
27  Miss.  436.  Not  only  is  a  defendant,  who  of  such  ratification.  Bay  v.  Gunn,  1  Denio, 
sets  up  his  infancy  as  a  defence  to  his  con-  108  ;  Borthwick  v.  Carruthers,  1  T.  K.  648  ; 
tract,  bound  in  the  first  instance  to  prove  Hartley  v.  Wharton,  11  A.  &  E.  934.  —  If 
his  non-ape  affirmatively,  but  if  to  such  a  the  infant  leave  the  point  in  doubt,  the  de- 
plea  the  plaintiff  reply  a  new  promise,  nffer  fence  is  not  sustained.  Harrison  v.  Clifton, 
the  defendant  became  of  age,  he  may  show  a  17  Law  Jour.  Ex.  283. 
new  promise  at  any  time  (before  the  suit 

333 


*  295  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

eighteen,  as  in  Vermont,  (J)  in  Maryland,  (c)  in  Ohio,  (c?)  in 
Maine,  (e)  in  Missouri,  (/)  in  Texas,  (^)  and,  perhaps,  in  some 
others  of  our  States.  A  person  is  of  full  age  at  the  beginning  of 
the  last  day  of  his  twenty-first  year,  or  the  day  before  his  twenty- 
first  birthday.  This  rule  is  founded  upon  an  ancient  authority,  and 
upon  the  principle  that  the  law  recognizes  no  parts  of  a  day,  and 
therefore  when  the  last  day  of  the  last  year  begins,  it  is  considered 
as  ending.  (7i)  A  similar  rule  as  to  infancy  prevailed  in  the  Roman 
civil  law.  (f)  An  infant,  using  the  word  in  its  common  meaning, 
that  of  a  child  who  has  not  left  its  mother's  arms,  cannot  make  a 
contract  in  fact ;  but  most  children  who  are  a  few  years  old  are 
capable  of  making  a  contract.  And  when  the  law  says  that  they 
are  not  capable  until  the  age  of  twenty-one,  it  is  for  their  sake, 
and  by  way  of  protection  to  them.  If  we  keep  this  principle  dis- 
tinctly in  mind,  it  will  guide  us  through  the  intricacies  of  the  law 
in  relation  to  this  subject. 

Thus  as  a  general  rule,  the  contract  of  an  infant  is  said  to  be  not 
void,  but  voidable.  That  is,  he  may,  either  during  his  minority,  or 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  he  becomes  of  age,  (/)  avoid  the 
contract  if  he  will ;  or  when  he  reaches  the  age  of  twenty-one,  if 
he  sees  it  to  be  for  his  benefit,  and  chooses  so  to  do,  he  may  con- 
firm and  enforce  the  contract.  It  has  been  said  that  whatever 
contract  the  court  can  see  and  declare  to  be  to  his  prejudice,  that 
will  be  pronounced  void  ;  and  whatever  contracts  are  not 

*  295    clearly  to  his  prejudice,  but  may  be  useful,  *  these  will  be 

held  voidable.  And  in  reliance  on  this  principle  as  a  safe 
and  sufficient  rule,  an  infant's  warrant  of  attorney  authorizing  a 
conveyance  of  his  land,  (^)  a  confession  of  a  judgment  against 

(h)  Sparhawk  v.  Buell,  9  Vt.  42,  79.  597,  and  in   State  v.  Clarke,  3   Earring. 

(c)  Davis  i;.  Jacquin,  5  Har.  &  J.  100.  (Del.)  557. 

(d)  Ohio  Statutes,  ch.  59.  (i)  Savigny,  Dr.  Rom.  182,  383,  384. 

(e)  Maine,  Acts  of  1852,  ch.  291.  (  /)  It  was'  settled  by  the  case  of  Zoiich 
(/)  Laws  of  Missouri,  1849,  p.  67.  v.  Parsons,  3  Burr.  1794,  that  an  inftni 
(7)  Hartley's  Dig.  of  Texas  Laws,  art.  cannot  avoid  his  conveyances  of  land  until 

2420.  he  becomes  of  a<re.     In  Roof  v.  Stafford,  7 

{h)  There  seems  to  have  been  but  one  Cowen,  179,  it  was  held  that  the  same  rule 

case,  on  this  question,  in  England,  reported,  applied  to  a  sale  of  chattels;   but  in  the 

undiT  the  name  of  Herbert  l\  Turball,  in  same  case,  on  error.  9  Cowen,  626,  the  dis- 

1  Keb.  589,  and  in  Sid.  ir.2,  and  without  tinction  was  maintained,  that  while  he  could 

names  in  1  Salk.  44,  and  ref<rred  to  as  good  not  avoid  a  conveyance  of  lands  until  he 

law  in  2  Salk.  625,  in  Ld.  Raym.  480.  and  was  of  age,  he  might  a  sale  of  chattels.     So 

in  Com.  Dig.  Enfant,  A;  and  the  rule  is  also  in  Bool  v.  Mix,  17  Wend.  119,  and  in 

repeated  in  ail  the  text-books.     The  reason  Shipman   v.   Horton,   17  Conn.  481.     See 

is  analogous  to  that  which   made  the  old  also  Matthewson  v.  Johnson,  1   Hoff.  Ch. 

law  writers  speak  of  a  year  and  a  day,  when  560  ;  Carr  c.  Clough,  6  Foster  {N.  H),  280. 
they  mean  a  whole  year.     The  same  rule  (k)  Lawrence  v.  McArter,  10  Ohio,  37  ; 

is  asserted  in  Hamlin  v.  Stevenson,  4  Dana,  Pyle  v.  Cravens,  4  Litt.  17, 

334 


CH.  Xril.]  INFANTS.  *  295 

him,  (?)  1  and  his  cognovit  for  the  same  purpose,  althoii.i^h  the 
action  was  wholly  for  necessaries,  (jn)  or  his  appointment  of  an 
agent  of  any  kind,  (ji)  his  bond  with  a  penalty,  or  for  the  payment 
of  interest,  (o)  a  release  by  a  female  infant  to  her  guardian,  (/>) 
an  infant's  contract  of  suretyship,  (^)  ^  his  release  of  his  legacy  or 
distributive  share  in  an  estate,  (r)  and  a  mortgage  by  an  infant 
wife  of  her  reversionary  interest,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the 
debts  of  a  partnership  in  which  her  husband  was  a  partner,  (s)  ^ 
have  each  been  declared  to  be  absolutely  void.  (t). 

The  better  opinion,  however,  as  may  be  gathered  from  the 
later  cases,  cited  in  our  notes,  seems  to  be  that  an  infant's  con- 
tracts are,  none  of  them,  or  nearly  none,  absolutely  void,  that  is, 
so  far  void  that  he  cannot  ratify  them  after  he  arrives  at  the  age 
of  legal  majority.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  strong  tendency  of 
modern  decisions,  (u)  * 

(/)  Sawnderson  v.  Marr,  1  H.  Bl.  75  ;  477,  481  ;  Latt  v.  Booth,  3  Car.  &  K.  292; 

Bennett  v.  Davis,  6  Cowen,  393 ;  Waplcs  Vent  v.  Osii:ood,  19  Pick.  572  ;  Lawson  v. 

V.  Hastings,  3  Harring.  (Del.)  403;  Knox  Lovejoy,  8  Greenl.  405;  Rogers  v.  Hurd,  4 

V.  Flack,  22  Penn.  St.  337.  Day,  57;  McGan  v.  Marshall,  7  Humph. 

(m)  Oliver  v.  Woodrofte,  4  M.  &  W.  650.  121  ;  Fridge  v.  The  State,  3  G.  &  J.  104  ; 

(n)   Doe  d.  Thomas  v.  Roberts,  16  M.  Ridgely  r.'Crandall,  4  Md.  435 ;   Wheaton 

&  W.  778.  V.  East,  5  Yerg.  41  ;  McMinn  v.  Richmonds, 

(o)  Baylis  v.  Dinely,  3  M.  &  Sel.  477  ;  6  id.  9  ;  Kline  v.  Beebe,  6  Conn.  494  ;  United 

Hunter  v.  Agnew,  1  Fox  &  S.  15;  Colcock  States  v.  Bainbridge,  1  Mason,  71,  82,  and 

V.  Ferguson,  3  Desaus.  482.  many  other  cases.     But  it  may  be  ques- 

(p)  Fridge  v.  The  State,  3  G.  &  J.  104.  tinned  whether  it  is  a  sufficiently  clear,  cer- 

(q)   Wheaton  v.  East,  5  Yerg.  41,  61 ;  tain,  and  practical  rule.     The  more  recent 

Allen  r.  Minor,  2  Call,  70.     But  see  contra  authorities  incline  to  hold  all  (or  all  with 

Hinely  v.  Margaritz,  3  Penn.  St.  428.  a  single  exception)  an  infant's  contracts  to 

(r)  Langtbrd  v.  Frey,  8  Humph.  443.  be  voidable  merely,  not  void,  and  that  it  is 

(s)  Cronise  v.   Clark,  4  Md.    Ch.  403.  the  privilege  and  right  of  the  infant  only 

See  also  McCarty  v.  Murray,  3  Gray,  578.  (not  that  of  the  court)  to  declare  his  con- 

(t)   In  Connecticut  some  contracts  of  an  tracts  void.     And  the  rule  itself  as  alluded 

infant  are  made  void  by  statute.     Rogers  to  in  the  text,  and  sustained  by  the  older 

V.  Hurd,  4  Day,  57 ;  Maples  v.  Wightman,  authorities,  has  been  declared  unsatisfac- 

4  Conn.  376.  tory,  liable  to  many  exceptions,  and  diffi- 

('()  The  rule  that  an  infant's  contracts  cult  of  safe  application.     See  Fonda  y.  Van 

are  void  or  voidable  according  as  they  may  Home,  15  Wend.  631,  635 ;  Breckenbridge's 

be  pronounced  to  be  prejudicial  or  useful.  Heirs  v.  Ormsby,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  236,  241  ; 

has  been  laid  down,  and  recognized  by  many  Scott  v.  Buchanan,  2  Humph.  468  ;  Cole  v. 

courts  and  judges.     See  Keane  v.  Boycott,  Pennoyer,  14  111.  158;  Cummings  v.  Pow- 

2  H.  Bl.  b\h  ;  Baylis  v.  Dinely,  3  M.  &  Sel.  ell,  8  Tex.  80.     And  see  a  just  criticism  by 

1  So,  too  a  judgment  confessed  by  an  infant's  partner,  Soper  v.  Fry,  37  Mich.  236. 

2  Contra,  Fetrow  j;.  Wiseman,  40  Ind.  148,  as  voidable  only.  But  an  infant's  con- 
tract in  signing  a  promissory  note  as  surety  is  not  necessarily  void  if  it  may  be  benefi- 
cial to  him,  and  becomes  binding  if,  after  coming  of  age,  with  knowledge  that  his  in- 
fancy is  a  ('efence,  he  promises  to  pay  the  note.     Owen  v.  Long,  112  Mass.  403. 

8  Likewise  an  agreement  by  infant  husband,  made  shortly  before  marriage,  and  in 
consideration  of  it,  to  assign  all  of  the  wife's  property  to  a  trustee  for  her  sole  and  sep- 
arate use,  is  void.     Kingsman  v.  Kingsman,  6  Q.  B.  D.  122. 

*  That  all  of  an  infant's  contracts  not  illegal,  or  appointing  an  agent,  are  voidable, 
see  Hamer  v.  Dipple,  31  Ohio  St.  72 ;  Fetrow  v.  Wiseman,  40  Ind.  148. 

335 


*  296  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

*  296  *  But  the  contract  of  an  infant  for  necessaries  is  neither 
void  nor  voidable.  It  is  permitted  for  his  own  sake  that 
he  may  make  a  valid  contract  for  these  things,  as  otherwise,  what^ 
ever  his  need,  he  might  not  be  able  to  obtain  food,  shelter,  or  rai- 
ment. And  the  principles  which  govern  this  rule  show  plainly 
that  it  is  intended  only  for  his  benefit,  and  is  regarded  and  treated 
as  an  exception  to  a  general  rule. 

The  word  necessaries,  in  relation  to  an  infant,  is  not  used  in 
a  strict  sense ;  but  the  social  position  of  the  infant,  his  means, 
and  those  of  his  parents,  are  taken  into  consideration.  Necessa- 
ries for  him  mean  such  things  as  he  ought  properly  to  have,  and 
not  merely  that  which  is  indispensable  to  his  life  or  his  bodily 
comfort.i  It  is  difficult  to  lay  down  any  positive  rule  which 
shall  determine  what  are  and  what  are  not  necessaries.  Indeed 
there  is  no  such  rule.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  whether 
articles  of  a  certain  kind,  or  certain  subjects  of  expenditure,  are 
or  are  not  such  necessaries  as  an  infant  may  contract  for,  is  a 
matter  of  law,  and  for  instruction  by  the  court ;  but  the  question 
whether  any  particular  things  come  under  these  classes,  and  the 
question  also  as  to  quantity,  are,  generally,  matters  of  fact  for  the 
jury  to  determine,  (y)  The  cases  cited  in  the  notes  will  show 
the  views  taken  of  this  question  by  various  courts  in  England 
and  in  this  country. 

It  seems  to  be  certain  that  food,  clothing,  lodging,  and  needful 
medicine,  are  such  necessaries ;  and  the  infant  may  contract 
for  them  on  credit,  although  he  has  ready  funds  in  his  posses- 
sion, (w')     So,  proper  instruction,  (x)     Necessaries  for  an  infant's 

Mr.  Justice  Bell  upon  the  vague  and  in-  Caldwell,  12  Cush.  512.  This  is  to  be  un- 
definite  use  of  tlie  words  "  void  "  and  "  void-  derstood  with  some  limitation,  however,  for 
able,"  in  State  r.  Kiehmond,  6  Foster  (N.H.),  the  quantity  oi'  ^oods  supplied  maybe  ex- 
232;'  Parke,  B.,  in  Williams  v.  Moore,  11  cessive,  in  which  case,  if  the  jurv  give  the 
M.  &  W.  2.56;  1  Am.  Lead.  Cas.  10.3,  104  plaintiff  his  whole  bill,  their  verdict  may 
And  see  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliot,  1  be  set  aside.  Johnson  v.  Lines,  6  W.  &  S. 
Cow.  611 ;  and  yost,  note  (b),  *  .329.  80.  So  if  they  find  a  verdict  for  the  plain- 
In)  Bent  V.  Manning,  10  Vt.  225,  230;  tiff,  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  the  court,  a 
Beeler  y.  Young,  1  Bibb,  519,  521;  Grace  new  trial  will  he  granted.  Harrison !'.  Fauc, 
V.  Hale,  2  Humph  27,  29  ;  Stanton  v.  Wil-  1  Man.  &  G.  550. 

son,  3  Day,  37;  Phelps  v.  Worcester,  11  (rv)  Burghart  r.  Hall,  4  M.  &  W.  727. 

N.  H.  51  ;  Harri-on  v.  Fane,  1  Man.  &  G.  (x)  And  for  some,  the  term  "  proper  in- 

550 ;   Peters  v.  Fleming,  6  M.  &  W.  42  ;  struction "  might  include  a  knowledge  of 

Burghart  v.   Angerstein,  6  C.  &  P.  690  ;  the   languages,   while   for   others   a   mera 

Tupper  V.  Cadwell,  12  Met.  559;  Davis  r.  knowledge  of  reading  and  writing  may  h^ 

1  Necessaries  are  not  "limited  to  that  which  is  requisite  to  sustain  life,  but  include 
whatever  is  proper  and  suitable  in  the  case  of  each  individual,  having  reference  to  his 
circumstances  and  condition  in  life."  Pardee,  J.,  in  Strong  v.  Foote,  42  Conn.  203, 
a  case  in  which  dentistry  was  declared  necessary. 

33G 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


297 


*  wife  may  bo  validly  contracted  for  by  him  ;  but  not,  it  is    *  297 
said,  if  tliey  are  necessaries  provided  in  view  of  marriage, 
though  his  wife  afterwards  use  them.  (?/)     And  it  seems  that,  as 
an  incident  to  a  marriage,  which  an  infant  may  contract,  he  is 
liable   during  coverture   for   the   antenuptial   debts  of  his  wife, 
which  she  was  legally  liable  to  pay,  at  her  marriage,  (jz)     He  is 
also  liable  to  the  same  extent  as  an  adult  would  be  for  neces- 
saries supplied  to  his  lawful  children,  (a)     In  some  cases,  such 
things    as   horses,   regimentals,   watches,   or   even    jewelry,   are 
regarded  as   necessaries,  {h')  ^     An  infant  cannot  borrow 
money,  so  as  to  *  render  himself  liable  to  an  action  for    *  298 
money  lent,  although  borrowed  and  expended  for  neces- 
saries ;  because  the  law  does  not,  for  his  own  sake,  trust  him  with 


sufficient.  Akkrson,  B.,  in  Peters  v.  Flem- 
ing, 6  M.  &  W.  48.  But  a  regular  colle- 
giate education  for  one  in  the  ordinary  sta- 
tion and  circumstances  in  life,  has  been  held 
in  this  country  not  within  the  term  "  neces- 
.saries."  Middlebury  College  v.  Chandler, 
16  Vt.  683.  But  a  good  "common-school" 
education  would  be,  for  every  one ;  such  an 
education  is  essential  to  the  intelligent  dis- 
charge of  civil,  political,  and  religious  du- 
ties. Roi/ce,  J.,  in  Middlebury  College  v. 
Chandler,  16  Vt.  686.  Instruction  in  read- 
ing and  writing  was  held  necessary,  in 
Manby  v.  Scott,  1  Sid.  112  ;  and  the  reason 
given  was,  that  it  was  for  the  benefit  of  the 
realm  that  learning  should  be  advanced. 
In  Eaymond  v.  Loyl,  10  Barb.  489,  Hand,  J., 
says  :  "  It  was  said  on  the  argument  that 
'schooling' is  not  a  necessary.  And  Mr. 
Chitty  says,  it  seems  a  parent  is  not  legally 
bound  to  "educate  his  child.  Chit,  on  Cont. 
140.  A  parent  is  almost  the  sole  judge  of 
what  is  necessary.  But  if  a  parent  is  liable 
to  a  third  person,  I  hope  it  will  never  be 
decided  that  sending  to  a  common  school, 
at  a  suitable  season,  and  to  a  reasonable 
extent,  is  not  necessary  in  this  country." 

(y)  Turner  v.  Trisby,  I  Stra.  168.'  See 
Rainsford  v.  Fenwick,  Carter,  21.5;  Abell 
)'.  "Warren,  4  Vt  149,  152;  Beeler  v. 
Young,  1  Bibb,  519,  520.  And  see  Sams  v. 
Stockton,  14  B.  Mon.  232.  And  an  infant 
widow  is  personally  bound  by  her  contract 
for  the  funeral  expenses  of  her  deceased 
husband,  who  died  leaving  no  assets.  Chap- 
pie V.  Cooper,  13  M.  &  W.  252. 

(z)  Paris  v.  Stroud,  Barnes's  notes,  95  ; 


Roach  V.  Quick,  9  Wend.  238  ;  Butler  v. 
Breck,  7  Met.  164. 

(a)  Dicta  in  Abell  v.  Warren,  4  Vt.  152 ; 
Beeler  v.  Young,  1  Bibb,  520. 

(6)  To  be  necessaries  the  articles  must 
be  bond  Jide  purchased  for  use,  and  not  for 
mere  ornament ;  they  need  not  be  such  as 
a  person  could  not  do  without,  but  should 
be  in  quality  and  quantity  suitable  for  his 
real  wants,  and  his  condition  and  circum- 
stances in  life.  The  term  includes  his  food, 
but  not  dinners,  confectionery,  fruit,  &c., 
supplied  to  his  friend.  Brooker  v.  Scott, 
1  M.  &  W.  67  ;  Wharton  v.  McKenzie,  5 
Q.  B.  606.  Also  lodging  and  house-rent, 
Kirton  v.  Elliott,  2  Bulst.  69;  Crisp  v. 
Churchill,  cited  in  Lloyd  v.  Johnson,  1  B. 
&  P.  340  ;  but  not  repairs  upon  his  house, 
although  beneficial  in  themselves,  and  ne- 
cessary to  save  the  building  from  decay. 
Tupper  V.  Cadwell,  12  Met.  559.  Nor  food 
for  his  horses.  Mason  v.  Wright,  13  Met. 
306.  N(ir  the  rent  of  a  building  for  carry- 
ing on  a  trade  or  manual  occupation.  Lowe 
V.  Griffith,  1  Scott,  458.  Suitable  clothing 
also  comes  within  the  class  of  necessaries, 
but  not  suits  of  satin  and  velvet  with  gold 
lace.  Makarell  v.  Bachelor,  Cro.  E.  583. 
Nor  racing  jackets.  Burghart  v.  Anger- 
stein,  6  C.  &  P.  690.  Nor  cockades  for  an 
infant  captain's  soldiers.  Hands  v.  Slaney, 
8  T.  R.  578 ;  although  regimentals  for  a 
voiuuieer,  and  livery  for  such  captain's  ser- 
vant have  been  held  to  be  necessaries.  Id. ; 
Coates  V.  Wilson,  5  Esp  152.  The  follow- 
ing are  examples  of  articles  not  generally 
"  necessaries "  :    Horses,    saddles,    bridles, 


1  A  pair  of  jewelled  solitaires  worth  £25,  and  an  antique  silver  goblet  worth  £15 
15s.,  intended  for  a  present,  are  not  necessaries,  Ryder  v.  Wombwell,  L.  R.  3  Ex.  90; 
L.  R.  4  Ex.  32  ,  nor  dwelling-house  repairs,  Wallis  v.  Bardwell,  126  Mass.  366  ;  nor  travel- 
ling expenses,  McKanna  v.  Merry,  61  III.  177. 

VOL.  I,  22  337 


*  299  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

the  expenditure,  (c)  Nor  is  he  liable  on  a  contract  for  repairs 
made  upon  his  house,  although  the  house  must  have  fallen  into 
decay  without  them,  (c?)  Nor  can  he  bind  himself  for  the  insur- 
ance of  his  property,  (e)  nor  for  the  board  of  horses  which  he  uses 
in  his  business.  (/)  ^  And  it  is  said  that  an  action  cannot  be  main- 
tained against  an  infant  for  the  falsehood  of  his  warranty,  or  for  a 
breach  of  it.  (^) 

It  is  said  that  a  lawsuit  may  or  may  not  be  a  necessary  for  an 
infant,  according  to  circumstances,  {gg^ 


SECTION  II. 

OP   THE   OBLIGATIONS   OP   PARENTS   IN   RESPECT   TO   INFANT   CHILDREN. 

The  obligation  of  the  father  to  maintain  the  child  is  and  always 
has  been  recognized,  in  some  way  and  in  some  degree, 

*  299  *  in  all  civilized  countries.  The  infant  cannot  support  him- 
self ;  others  must  therefore  supply  him  with  the  means  of 

subsistence,  and  the  only  question  is,  whether  the  public  (that  is, 

liquors,  pistols,  powder,  whips,  and  fiddles.  7  W.  &  S.  83,  88  ;   Bent  v.  Manning,  10 

Beeler  v.   Younji-,   1   Bibb,  519;    Glover  v.  Vt.  225,   230.     It   is  otherwise  in   equit}'. 

Ott,  I  McCord.  572;  Rainwater  i'.  Durham,  Marlow  v.  Pitfieid,  1  P.  Wins.  558.     But 

2   Nott  &  McC.    524 ;    Grace   v.    Hale,   2  money  advanced  to  an  officer,  to  procure 

Humph.    27  ;   Clowes   v.   Brooke,   2   Stra.  the  liberation  of  an  infant  from  an  arrest 

1101  ;  Harrison  v.  Fane,  1  Man.  &  G.  550.  on  a  debt  for  mcessaries,  may  be  recovered, 

A  stanhope.     Charters  v.  Bayntun,  7  C.  &  it  not  being,  strictly  speaking,  money  lent, 

P.  52.     Coach  hire.     Hedgley  v.  Holt,  4  C.  Clarke  v.  Leslie,  5  Esp.  28.     So  an  infant 

&  P.  104.     A  chronometer  for  a  lieutenant  is  liable  for  money  paid  at  his  request  to 

in  the  navy,  not  then  in  commission.     Ber-  satisfy  a  debt  which  he  had  contracted  for 

olles  u.  Ramsay,  Holt,  77.     Balls  and  ser-  necessaries.    Randall  i'.  Sweet,  1  Denio,  460. 

enades.     Carter,   216.     Counsel    fees    and  So  if  the  infant  gives  his  note  for  the  neces- 

expcnses  of  a  lawsuit.     Phelps  v.  Worces-  saries,  and  another  signs  as  surety,  and  sub- 

ter,  1 1  N.  II.  51.     But  as  each  case  is  gov-  scquently  pays  the  note,  he  may  recover  the 

erncd  by  its  own  peculiar  circumstances,  amount  of  the  infant.     Conn  v.  Coburn,  7 

the  examples  here  given  can  serve  only  as  N.  H.  368  ;  Haine  v.  Tarrant,  2  Hill  (S.  C), 

illustrations,   and   under  different   circum-  400. 

stances  would  not  necessarily  be  binding  (d)  Tupper  v.  Cadwell,  12  Met.  559. 

precedents.     Thus,  as  we  have  just  seen,  (?)  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  t;.  Noyes,  32  N.  H. 

liorses  are  not  generally  necessarj',  but  when  345. 

an  infant  had  been  advised  to  ride  on  horse-  (/)  Merriam  v.  Cunningham,  11  Cush. 

back  for  his  health,  a  different  rule  was  ap-  40.     Sec  also,  on  the  point  of  his  binding 

plied.     Hart  n.  Prater,  1  Jur.  G23.  himself  by  contract,   Swift  v.  Barnctt,   10 

(c)  Smith  V.  Gibson,  Peake,  Ad.  Cas.  Cush.  436",  and  Hussey  v.  Roundtree,  Busb. 

52;  Darby  v.  Boucher,  1   Salk.  279;  Pro-  L.  110. 

hart  y.  Knouth,  2  Esp.  472,  n. ;  Beeler  v.  (g)  Morrill  v.  Aden,  19  Vt.  505;  Pres- 

Young,  1  Bibb,  519,  521  ;  Earlc  v.  Pcale,  1  cottt'.  Norris,  32  N.  H.  101. 
Salk.  387,  10  Mod.  67  ;  Walker  v.  Simpson,         (77)  Thrall  v.  Wright,  38  Vt.  494. 

1  Nor  for  stjpplies,  as  tobacco,  baprging,  ties,  and  cash  furnished  an  infant  encaged 
in  planting  on  iii'^  own  account;  nor  for  provisions,  if  boarding  with  his  father.  Decell 
0.  Lcwcnthal,  57  Miss.  331. 

338 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


300 


the  State)  shall  do  this,  or  his  parent.  And  justice,  equally  with 
the  best  affections  of  our  nature,  answers  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
parent.  But  it  is  a  very  difficult  question  how  far  this  duty  is 
made  a  legal  obligation  by  the  common  lavv.^ 

In  England,  after  much  questioning,  and  perhaps  a  tendency  to 
hold  the  father  liable  for  necessaries  supplied  to  the  cliild  on  the 
ground  of  moral  obligation  and  duty,  (A)  it  seems  to  be  on  the 
whole,  settled,  that  this  moral  obligation  is  not  a  legal  one ;  and 
indeed  it  has  been  recently  peremptorily  decided  that  no 
*  such  legal  obligation  exists  in  the  case  of  contracts  made  *  300 
by  the  child  for  necessaries.  (^)     The  father's  liability  is 


(/i)  In  Simpson  v.  Robertson,  1  Esp.  17 
(17'J3),  wliicii  is  the  earliest  case  on  this 
point,  Lon\  Keni/on  said  he  had  ruled  be- 
fore, that  if  a  tradesman  colludes  with  a 
younj^  man,  and  furnishes  him  with  clothes 
to  an  extravagant  degree,  though  the  Jcither 
might  have  been  li<tble  had  thei/  been  to  a  rea- 
sonithle  extent,  the  tradesman  who  gives 
credit  to  such  an  extravagant  degree  shall 
not,  at  law,  be  allowed  to  recover.  Crantz 
;;.  Gill.  2  Ksp.  471  (1796),  decided  that  if 
the  fither  gives  the  son  a  reasonable  allow- 
ance for  his  expenses,  he  is  not  liable  even 
ibr  necessaries  furnished  to  the  son.  The 
presumption  of  liability  was  rebutted  by  the 
allowance.  But  this  case  seems  to  imply 
that  such  liability  exists  in  the  absence  of 
rebutting  circumstances.  —  In  Urmston  v. 
Newcomen,  4  A.  &  E.  899,  6  Nev.  &  M.  454 
(1836),  it  was  considered  as  a  doubtful 
question  whether  a  parent  was,  at  common 
law,  liable  to  pay  a  third  person  who  fur- 
nishes necessaries  for  his  deserted  child. 
Sir  John  Campbell,  Attorney-General,  argu- 
endo, says,  p.  903  :  "  Then  the  question  is 
whether  a  father,  if  he  desert  his  legitimate 
child,  be  not  liable  in  assumpsit  to  any 
one  who  provides  food  and  clothing  for  it. 
There  is  no  express  decision  on  tiie  point." 
Alexander,  contra  :  "  The  supposed  founda- 
tion of  the  defendant's  liability  does  not  ex- 
ist. It  is  not  true  that,  by  the  common  law, 
a  father  is  bound  to  maintain  his  child." 
Lord  Denman,  C.  J.,  says:  "The  general 
question  is  important ;  but  the  facts  do  not 
raise  it."  And  aftenvards  :  "  The  general 
question,  therefore,  which  we  should  ap- 
proach with  much  anxiety,  docs  not  arise." 
Littledale,  J. :  "  The  general  question  does 
not  arise."  Pafleson,  ,J.  :  "  I  agree  that 
the  general  question  does  not  arise."  Cole- 
ridge, J. :  "  It  is  best  to  say  nothing  on  the 
general  question.  For  the  purpose  of  this 
case,  I  will  assume  (what  is  not  to  be  un- 


derstood as  my  opinion  at  present),  that' 
the  general  liability  is  as  contended  by  the 
Attorney-General."  —  In  Law  v.  Wilkin,  6 
A.  &  E.  718  (1837),  the  defendant's  son 
was  from  home  at  school,  and  appeared  to 
be  in  want  of  clothes  which  the  plaintiff 
sup])lied  him.  When  the  boy  went  home, 
he  took  the  clothes  with  him  but  did  not 
wear  them.  There  was  no  evidence  that 
the  father  ever  saw  the  clothes,  or  that  he 
had  any  communication  with  the  plaintiff 
before  or  after  they  were  furnished.  The 
judge  at  nisi  priiis  nonsuited  the  plaintiff, 
thinking  there  was  not  sufficient  evidence 
to  go  to  the  jury  to  charge  the  defendant. 
The  Court  of  Iving's  Bench  set  aside  the 
nonsuit  on  the  ground  that  there  was  some 
evidence  to  that  effect ;  and  Lord  Denman, 
C.  J.,  who  with  his  brethren  the  year  before 
bad  carefully  and  almost  anxiously  avoided 
the  question,  in  Urmston  o,  Newcomen, 
now  said  :  "  A  father  is  properly  liable  for 
anv  neccssarj'  provision  made  lor  his  infant 
son."  Littledale,  Patteson, and  Coleridge,  J  J., 
made  no  objection  to  this  dictum,  although 
the  decision  of  the  case  did  not  require  it.  — 
In  Cooper  v.  Phillips.  4  C.  &  P.  581  ( 1 831 ), 
Taunton,  J.,  says  :  "  If  the  father  of  a  fam- 
ily lives  at  a  distance  from  the  place  at 
which  his  children  are,  and  i)Uts  them  un- 
der the  protection  of  servants,  I  am  of  opin- 
ion that  if  any  accident  occurs  to  one  of  the 
children,  even  from  the  carelessness  of  the 
servant,  the  father  of  the  family  is  hound 
to  pay  for  the  medical  attendance  on  su(  h 
child." 

(0  In  Baker  I'.  Keen,  2  Stark.  .501  (1819), 
Abbott,  C.  J.,  said :  "  A  father  would  not 
be  bound  by  the  contract  of  his  son,  unless 
either  an  actual  authority  were  proved,  or 
circumst.inces  appeared  from  which  such 
an  authority  might  be  implied.  Were  it 
otherwise,  a  father,  who  had  an  imprudent 
son,  might  be  prejudiced  to  an  indefinite 


1  See  judgment  of  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  in  Bageley  v.  Forder,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  559  ;  Kelley 
V.  Davis,  49  N.  H.  187. 

339 


301 


THE    LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


301    nevprtlieless  *  admitted  in  many  English  cases,  but  is  now 
put  on  the  ground  of  agency  ;  and  the  authority  of  the  infant 


extent ;  it  was  rherefore  necessary  that  some 
proof  should  be  i^iven  that  the  order  of  the 
son  was  made  by  the  autliority  of  his  father. 
The  (luestion,  tlierefore,  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  jury,  was,  whether,  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  particuhir  case,  there 
was  sufficient  to  convince  them  that  the 
defendant  liad  invested  liis  son  with  sucli 
authority.  He  had  placed  his  son  at  the 
tnilitary  colleiije  at  Harlow,  and  had  paid 
}iis  expenses  wliiie  he  rcmaiuetl  there.  The 
son,  it  apjK'ared,  then  <)btainc<l  a  commis- 
sion in  the  army,  and,  haviu;,^  lound  his 
way  to  London,  at  a  consider.ible  distance 
from  his  father's  residence,  had  ordered 
regimentals  and  other  articles  suitable  to 
his  eciuipment  for  the  East  Indies.  If  it 
had  appeared  in  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant had  su])plied  his  son  with  money  for 
this  purpose,  or  that  he  had  ordered  these 
articles  to  be  furnished  elsewliere,  the  cir- 
cumstance niiu;ht  have  rebutted  the  pre- 
sumption of  any  authority  from  the  de- 
fendant to  order  them  from  the  ])laintiff. 
Nothing  however  of  this  nature  had  been 
proved ;  and  since  the  articles  themselves 
were  necessary  for  the  son,  and  suitable  to 
that  situation  in  which  the  defendant  had 
placed  him,  it  was  for  the  jury  to  say, 
whether  they  were  not  satisfied  that  an  au- 
thority had  been  j^iven  by  the  defendant." 
—  This  was  soon  followed  by  Fluek  v.  Tol- 
lemaehe,  1  C.  &  P.  5  (182.3),  before  Bur- 
roiujh,  Justice  of  the  Ivinji's  Bench.  The 
defendant's  son  was  a  cadet  at  Woolwich 
the  father  living  at  Uxbridge.  Upon  being 
written  to  to  pay  the  plaintiff's  l)ill,  which 
was  the  first  knowledge  the  defendant  had 
of  the  transaction,  he  said  he  had  ordered 
uo  goods  of  the  plaintiff,  and  would  not 
pay  for  any  supplied  to  his  son.  The  lat- 
ter was  fifteen  years  old.  Bunomjk,  J.,  told 
the  jury,  that  "  an  action  can  only  be  main- 
tained against  a  person  for  clothes  supplied 
to  his  son,  either  when  he  has  ordered  such 
clothes,  and  contracted  to  pay  for  them,  or 
when  they  have  been  at  first  furnished  with- 
out his  knowledge,  and  he  has  adopted  the 
contract  afterwards ;  such  adoption  may 
be  inferred  from  his  seeing  his  son  wear  the 
clothes,  and  not  returning  them,  or  making, 
ut  or  soon  after  the  time  when  he  knows  of 
their  being  supplied,  some  objeciion.  Here 
the  only  knowledge  that  it  ajjjjcarcd  the 
defendant  had  of  the  transaction  was  being 
asked  for  the  money ;  he  then  repudiated 
the  contract  altogether.  It  would  be  rather 
too  much  that  parents  should  be  comj)ell- 
ablc  to  pay  for  goods  that  any  tradesman 
may,  without  theirknowledge  imjirovidently 
trust  flneir  sons  with."  —  In  Blackburn  v. 

340 


Mackey,  1  C.  &  P.  1  (1823),  before  Abbott, 
Ciiief  Justice  of  the  King's  Bench,  the  de- 
fendant's son  was  a  minor  living  away  from 
his  father,  as  a  clerk  in  London,  receiving 
a  guinea  a  week  as  wages.  The  father  did 
not  supply  the  son  with  any  clothes,  and  it 
was  jn'oved  that  he  was,  at  the  time  of  the 
su])ply  by  the  plaintiff,  in  great  want  of 
them.  The  defetulant  did  not  know  the 
plaintiff,  and  when  informed  of  the  supply 
of  clothes  to  his  son,  he  repudiated  the  con- 
tract altogether.  Abbott,  C.  J.,  told  the 
jury,  that  a  father  was  not  bound  to  pay 
for  articles  ordered  by  his  son,  unless  he  had 
given  some  authority,  express  or  implied. 
—  In  Rolfe  V.  Abbott,  6  C.  &  P.  286  (1833), 
the  defendant's  son,  a  young  man  of  nine- 
teen years  of  age,  and  having  a  situation 
worth  £90  a  year,  went  with  a  friend  who 
introduced  hiui  to  the  plaintiff,  a  tailor,  and 
the  latter  sui)])lied  him  with  clothes,  and 
soon  after  sent  his  bill,  debiting  them  to  the 
son,  and  not  to  the  father.  The  friend  of  the 
minor  had  no  authority  from  the  father  to 
introduce  his  son  to  the  plaintiff,  and  there 
was  no  evidence  that  the  father  knew  of 
the  cransaction.  In  summing  up  to  the 
jury,  Gurney,  B.,  said  :  "  The  question  in 
this  case  is,  whether  these  clothes  were  sup- 
plied to  the  son  of  the  defendant  by  the  as- 
sent of  the  defendant.  For,  to  charge  him, 
it  is  essentiiil  that  the  goods  should  have 
been  supplied  with  his  assent  or  by  his  au- 
thority. Indeed,  if  the  law  were  not  so, 
any  one  of  you  who  had  an  imprudent  son 
might  have  bills  to  a  large  amount  at  the 
tailor's,  the  hatter's,  the  shoemaker's,  and 
the  hosier's,  and  you  know  nothing  at  all 
about  it."  —  Clements  v.  Williams,  8  C.  & 
P.  58  {1?37),  was  an  action  by  a  school- 
master against  a  guardian  for  clothes  sup- 
plied to  his  ward  who  had  been  placed  in 
the  plaintifTs  school,  but  who  had  not  been 
provided  by  his  guardian  with  clothes  for 
upwards  of  a  year.  The  schoolmaster  sup- 
plied his  wants,  and  charged  them  to  the 
guardian,  with  his  bill  for  tuition.  Wil- 
liams, J.,  told  the  jury,  that  he  was  not 
aware  of  any  authority  which  a  school- 
master had  to  cause  his  pupil  to  be  sup- 
plied with  articles  of  wearing  a]>parel  with- 
out the  sanction,  express  or  im|)licd,  of  the 
parent  or  guardian  ;  and  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  schoolmaster,  if  he  observed  his 
pupil  to  be  in  want  of  such  articles,  to  com- 
municate that  fact  to  the  boy's  friends,  and 
not  to  furnish  hiin  with  such  things  with- 
out their  auihoritv. —  Seaborne  v.  Maddy, 
9  C.  &  P.  497  (1840),  is  also  a  very  strong 
case  against  the  parent's  liability.  This 
was  an  action  of  assumpsit  for  the  board 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


302 


to  bind  the  father  by  *  contracts  for  necessaries  is  inferred,    *  302 
both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  from  very  sHght  evi- 
dence, (y)     If  we  take  the  case  *  of  necessaries  supplied    *  303 


and  Iodising  of  the  defendant's  illegitimate 
child.  The  child  had  been  jjlaeed  with  the 
plaintiff  hy  the  defendant  in  the  year  IS'Jl, 
at  2s.  a  week,  and  the  amount  had  been 
paid  down  to  the  month  of  April,  1838. 
The  child  remained  with  the  ])laintiffdown 
to  April,  1830,  and  evidence  was  given  of 
a  conversation  in  the  month  of  May  follow- 
ing, in  which  it  was  alleged  that  the  defend- 
ant had  promised  payment  of  the  amount 
claimed.  The  defendant  gave  evidence, 
that,  at  the  time  of  settlement  in  1838,  he 
said  the  plaintiff  was  to  give  up  the  child 
cither  to  Mr.  Parkes  or  the  Union,  for  he 
would  pay  no  longer.  Evidence  was  also 
given,  that  on  several  occasions  when  asked 
for  payment  the  defendant  refused  to  pay 
any  thing,  ami  there  was  also  contradictory 
evidence  as  to  the  conversation  in  May, 
1839.  Pcirkc,  B.,  said:  "No  one  is  bound 
to  pay  another  for  maintaining  his  children, 
either  legitimate  or  illegitimate,  except  he 
has  entered  into  some  contract  to  do  so. 
Every  man  is  to  maintain  his  own  children 
as  he  himself  shall  think  proper,  and  it  re- 
quires a  contract  to  enable  another  person 
to  do  so,  and  charge  him  for  it  in  an  action. 
In  the  present  case  there  had  been  a  con- 
tract in  1831,  which  was  put  an  end  to  in 
1838.  However,  on  the  part  of  the  plain- 
tiff, it  is  contended  that  a  new  contract  is 
to  be  inferred  from  the  conversation  with 
the  defiendant  in  the  year  1839.  This  is 
for  you  to  consider.  But  you  must  also 
bear  in  mind  that  the  defendant  has  on 
several  occasions  distinctly  refused  to  pay 
any  thing,  and  that  as  to  one  of  the  con- 
versations, the  evidence  is  contradictory." 
The  case  of  Mortimore  v.  Wright,  6  M.  & 
W.  482  (1840),  seems  to  be  decisive  on  this 
point.  Lord  Ahinger,  C.  B.,  said:  "I  am 
clearly  of  opinion  that  there  was  no  evi- 
dence for  the  jury  in  this  case,  and  that 
the  plaintiff  ought  to  have  been  nonsuited. 
The  learned  judge  was  anxious,  as  judges 
have  always  lieen  in  modern  times,  not  to 
withdraw  any  scintilla  of  evidence  from  the 
jury ;  but  he  now  agrees  with  the  rest  of 
the  court  that  there  ought  to  have  been  a 
nonsuit.  In  the  present  instance  I  am  the 
more  desirous  to  make  the  rule  absolute  to 
that  extent,  in  order  that  there  may  be  no 
uncertainty  as  to  the  law  upon  this  subject. 
In  point  of  law,  a  father  who  gives  no  au- 
thority, and  enters  into  no  contract,  is  no 
more  liable  for  goods  supplied  to  his  son 
than  a  brother,  or  an  uncle,  or  a  mere 
stranger  would  be.  From  the  moral  obli- 
gation a  parent  is  under  to  provide  for  his 


children,  a  jury  are,  not  unnaturally,  dis- 
posed to  infer  against  him  an  admission  of 
a  lialiility  in  respect  of  claims  upon  his  son, 
on  grounds  which  warrant  no  such  infer- 
ence in  point  of  law.  .  .  .  With  regard  to 
the  case  in  the  Court  of  King's  Bench,  of 
Law  V.  Wilkin,  if  the  decision  is  to  be 
taken  as  it  is  reported,  I  can  only  say  that 
I  am  sorry  for  it,  and  cannot  assent  to  it 
It  may  have  been  influenced  by  facts  which 
do  not  appear  in  the  report ;  but,  as  tl  e 
case  stands,  it  appears  to  sanction  the  idea 
that  a  father,  as  regards  his  liability  for 
debts  incurred  by  his  son,  is  in  a  different 
situation  from  any  other  relative  ;  which  is 
a  doctrine  I  must  altogether  dissent  from. 
If  a  father  does  any  specific  act,  from  which 
it  may  reasonably  be  inferred  that  he  has 
authorized  his  son  to  contract  a  debt,  he 
may  be  liable  in  respect  of  the  debt  so  con- 
tracted ;  but  the  mere  moral  obligation  on 
the  father  to  maintain  his  child  aUbrds  no 
inference  of  a  legal  promise  to  pay  his  debts; 
and  we  ought  not  to  put  upon  his  acts  an 
interpretation  which  abstractedly,  and  with- 
out reference  to  that  moral  obligation,  they 
will  not  reasonably  warrant.  In  order  to 
bind  a  father,  in  point  of  law,  for  a  debt 
incurred  by  his  son,  you  must  prove  that 
he  has  contracted  to  be  bound,  just  in  the 
same  manner  as  you  would  prove  such  a 
contract  against  any  other  person ;  and  it 
would  bring  the  law  into  great  uncertainty 
if  it  were  permitted  to  juries  to  impose  a 
liability  in  each  particular  case,  according 
to  their  own  feelings  or  prejudices."  Parke, 
B.,  added :  "  It  is  a  clear  principle  of  law 
that  a  father  is  not  under  any  legal  obliga- 
tion to  pay  his  son's  debts."  —  And  in  Shel- 
ton  V.  Springett,  20  E.  L  &  E.  281,  the 
same  principles  are  reiterated  ;  and  the  law 
declared  to  be  well  settled,  that  without 
some  contract,  express  or  implied,  the  father 
is  not  liable  for  necessaries  supplied  to  the 
son.  Jems,  C.  J.,  says  :  "  If  a  father  turns 
his  son  upon  the  world,  the  son's  only  re- 
source, in  the  absence  of  any  thing  to  siiow 
a  contract  on  the  fatlier's  part,  is  to  apply 
to  the  parish,  and  then  tlie  proper  steps 
will  be  taken  to  enforce  the  performance  of 
the  parent's  legal  duty." 

[j)  This  may  be  inferred  from  some  of 
the  cases  we  have  already  cited  ;  but  it  was 
doubted  in  Mortimore  r.  Wriglit,  whether 
Law  V.  Wilkin,  and  Blackburn  v.  Mackey, 
were  law.  And  in  Shelton  v.  Spiingett, 
where  the  father  had  given  his  son  £5  and 
sent  him  to  London  to  look  out  for  a  ship, 
telling  him  to  put  up  at  a  particular  hotel, 

341 


303 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


to  an  infant  actually  incapacitated  by  want  of  ago,  or  by  disease 
of  mind  or  body,  from  making  any  contract,  or  acting  in  any 
way  as  the  agent  of  any  person,  the  father  cannot  be  made  lia- 
ble except  on  the  ground  of  his  parental  obligation ;  and  there 
are  cases,  or  rather  dicta  in  some  cases  which  might  indicate, 
perhaps,  that  the  question  would  be  decided  in  England  in  favor 
of  this  liability  on  his  part,  if    it  were  necessary.     It  will  be 


but  the  son  put  up  at  anotlier,  upon  wliich 
evidence  the  jury  liad  found  a  verdict  against 
the  f'atlier  for  the  sou's  hoard,  the  verdict 
was  set  aside  and  a  nonsuit  ordered  on  the 
ground  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  war- 
rant a  jurv  in  holdinjj  the  father  liable.  In 
Forsyth  (•'  Milne  (1808),  cited  in  McPher- 
son  on  Infants,  p.  511,  tlie  defendant's  wife, 
in  his  al)!-euce  and  witliout  his  knowledge, 
contracted  with  a  third  person  for  the  board 
of  their  minor  daughter.  The  defendant 
paid  the  bill,  but  expressed  some  disappro- 
bation of  it.  The  mother  removed  the 
daughter  to  another  situation  ;  it  was  held 
that  the  first  payment  so  far  acknowledged 
tlie  discretionary  jxnver  of  the  wife  to  con- 
tract, as  to  make  the  father  liable  to  the 
plaintiff  upon  the  second  contract.  —  In 
Bryan  v.  Jackson,  4  Conn.  288  (1822), 
where  the  defendant's  minor  son  had  taken 
up  goods  of  the  ]ilaintiff,  whii'h  the  defend- 
ant paid  for,  without  objection,  or  giving 
iiotiie  not  to  trust  his  son  any  further,  and 
the  son  afterwards  took  up  other  goods  of 
a  similar  nature;  it  was  held  that  the  pny- 
n)ent  so  made  by  the  defendant  was  equiva- 
lent to  a  recognition  of  his  son's  authority, 
and  rendered  the  defendant  liable  for  the 
goods  subse(jueutly  taken  up,  although  he 
had  (but  without  tlie  plaintiff's  knowledge) 
given  jjositive  orders  to  his  son  to  contract 
no  more  debts,  and  had  placed  him  under 
the  care  of  a  friend,  with  instructions  to 
furnish  him  with  every  thing  necessary  and 
suitable  for  him.  See  also  McKenzie  v. 
Stevens,  19  Ala.  691.  —  It  was  held  in 
Niehole  v.  Allen,  3  C.  &  P.  36  (1827),  that 
if  a  parent  knew  that  a  third  person  was 
maintaining  his  minor  child,  although  ille- 
gitimate, and  ex])ressed  no  dissent,  he  is 
liable,  unless  he  show  that  the  child  is  there 
against  iiis  consent ;  hut  this  case  was  after- 
wards denied  in  Mortiinore  v.  Wright.  — 
In  Uuniney  f.  Keyes,  7  N.  II.  571  (1835), 
it  was  held,  that  if  a  husband,  living  in  a 
state  of  separation  from  his  wife,  suffers  his 
children  to  reside  with  the  mother,  he  is 
liable  for  necessaries  furnished  them,  and 
she  is  considered  as  his  ajzcnt  to  contract 
for  this  ))ur])Ose.  And  see  Uawlvns  i;.  Van- 
dyke, 3  Ksp.  2.50  (1800).  In  Deane  v.  An- 
nis,  14  Mc.  26  (1836),  the  defendant's  minor 
son  left  his  father's  home  against  his  will, 

342 


and  refused  to  return  to  it  upon  his  father's 
commands.  Peing  afterwards  ttiken  sick, 
however,  he  did  return,  and  remained  until 
his  death.  During  his  sickness  his  father 
went  with  him  to  the  plaintiff's  house  to 
obtain  medical  advice,  and  the  plaintiff 
afterwards  visited  the  boy  professionally  at 
his  father's  house.  No  express  promise 
was  proved  to  pay  the  plaintiff,  nor  did  the 
father  notify  him  that  he  did  not  expect  to 
pay  him.  The  father  was  held  liable  for 
the  plaintiff's  services. — And  in  Swain  v. 
Tyler,  26  Vt.  1,  where  the  father  had  given 
his  minor  son  leave  to  act  for  himself,  and 
had  made  publication  of  the  fact,  and  that 
he  would  not  thereafter  pay  any  debts  of 
his  son.  The  son  returned  to  his  father's 
house  sick,  and  the  plaintiff's  charges  were 
for  necessary  medical  services  rendered  the 
son,  upon  the  credit  of  the  father,  and  in 
pood  faith  charged  to  him  at  the  time,  and 
the  father  knew  of  the  services  being  ren- 
dered and  did  not  object,  it  was  held  that 
the  law  implies  a  promise  to  pay,  though 
the  father  did  not  assent  to  the  services 
being  done  on  his  credit,  either  expressly 
or  impliedlv,  in  fact.  —  The  case  of 'Phayer 
V.  White,  12  Met.  343  (1847),  has  an  im- 
portant bearing  upon  the  point  of  implied 
liability.  It  does  not  a])pear  in  that  case 
that  the  defendant's  son  was  a  minor,  nor 
were  the  goods  bought  by  the  son  necessa- 
ries, but  the  facts  were  that  a  son,  who  had 
several  times,  with  his  father's  express  con- 
sent, bought  goods  of  T.  in  the  name  and 
on  the  credit  of  his  father,  again  bought 
goods  of  T.  in  the  name  of  his  father,  on 
six  months'  credit ;  T.  charged  the  goods 
to  the  father,  and  immediately  wrote  a  let- 
ter to  him,  informing  him  thereof,  and 
stating  that  he  su])posed  it  was  correct,  but 
thout;ht  proper  to  give  him  notice.  The 
father  made  no  re])ly  to  this  letter.  Hdd, 
in  a  suit  by  T.  against  the  father,  for  the 
price  of  the  goods,  that  the  jury  were  war- 
ranted in  inferring,  from  the  fatlier's  silence, 
his  consent  to  the  transaction  thus  notified 
to  him.  /AW,  also,  that  such  consent  was 
proof  either  of  an  original  authority  to  the 
son,  or  of  a  subsequent  aflirniancc  by  the 
father,  which  bound  him  to  pay  for  the 
goods. 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


304 


noticed,  that  where  it  is  most  distinctly  denied  that  this  moral 
obligation  of  the  parent  constitutes  a  legal  obligation,  the  denial 
is  confined  to  a  liability  for  the  contracts  of  the  child.  The  rea- 
son is  said  to  be,  the  danger  of  permitting  a  father  to  be  bound  in 
this  way,  and  it  is  variously  illustrated  in  the  cases ;  but  this  rea- 
son fails  where  the  infant  can  make  no  contracts,  and  must  be 
supplied  or  suffer. 

In  this  country,  the  rule  of  law  varies  in  the  different  States. 
In  most  of  them  in  which  the  question  has  come  before  the  courts, 
the  legal  liability  of  the  parent  for  necessaries  furnished  to  the 
infant,  is  asserted,  unless  they  are  supplied  by  the  father ;  and  it 
is  put  on  the  ground  that  the  moral  obligation  is  also  a  legal  one, 
and  some  of  our  courts  have  declared  this  quite  strongly.  (Jc) 
In  other  States  the  present  English  rule  has  been  *  declared  *  304 
to  be  law,  and  agency  and  authority  are  held  to  be  the  only 
ground  of  such  liability.  (^) 


(k)  See  Stanton  v.  Wilson,  3  Day,  37 
(1808).  In  this  case  the  father  had  been 
divorced  from  the  phiintifF,  his  former  wife, 
and  two  of  her  children  were  ordered  into 
her  cnstody  as  guardian.  A  third  remain- 
ed with  his  father  (the  defendant),  for  a 
few  years,  when  through  fear  of  personal 
violence  and  abuse  from  his  father  he  fli  d, 
and  went  to  live  with  his  mother  and  her 
second  husband,  who  furnished  him  with 
support  and  education.  The  action  was 
brought  to  recover  for  the  support  of  the 
three  children.  "It  was  agreed  that  the 
whole  of  the  charges  accrued  without  any 
request  from  the  father,  and  that  he  never 
made  any  express  promise  to  pay  them." 
The  court  (two  judges  dissenting),  held 
the  father  liable  for  tlie  whole  bill,  saying  : 
"parents  are  bound  by  law  to  maintain, 
protect,  and  educate  their  legitimate  chil- 
dren during  their  infancy.  This  duty  rests 
on  the  father.  But  because  the  father  has 
abandoned  his  duty  and  trust,  by  putting 
the  child  out  of  his  jjrotection,  he  cannot 
thereby  exonerate  himself  from  its  main- 
tenance, education,  and  support.  The 
duty  remains,  and  the  hiw  will  enforce  its 
performance,  or  there  must  be  a  failure 
of  justice.  The  infant  cast  on  the  world 
must  seek  protection  and  safety  where  it 
can  be  found ;  and  where  with  more  pro- 
priety can  it  apply  than  to  the  next  friend, 
nearest  relative,  and  such  as  are  most  in- 
terested in  its  safety  and  happiness  T  The 
father  having  forced  his  child  abroad  to 
seek  a  sustenance  under  such  circumstances, 
sends  a  credit  along  with  him,  and  shall 
not  be  permitted  to  say  it  was  furnished 


without  his  consent,  or  against  his  will." 
But  see  Finch  v.  Finch,  22  Conn.  411,  post, 
note  (o).  In  the  case  of  Edwards  ?;.  Davis, 
16  Johns.  284,  it  was  decided  that  there 
was  no  common-law  obligation  requiring  a 
child  to  support  a  parent;  but  Spencer.  J., 
in  delivering  the  o])inion  of  the  court,  said : 
"  The  duty  of  a  parent  to  maintain  his 
offspring,  until  they  attain  the  age  of  ma- 
turity, is  a  perfect  common-law  duty."  In 
the  matter  of  Ryder,  11  Paige,  187,  Wal- 
worth, C,  says:  "A  parent  who  has  the 
means  is  undoubtedly  bound  to  support  his 
or  her  minor  ciiild."  For  recent  New  York 
decisions,  see  close  of  next  note.  See  also 
Benson  v.  Remington,  2  Mass.  113  ;  Whip- 
ple V.  Dow,  id.  415;  Dawes  r.  Howard, 
4  id.  97;  Van  Valkinburgh  v.  Watson,  13 
Johns.  480;  Pidfjin  v.  Cram,  8  N.  H.  350, 
2  Kent,  Com.  193;  Call  v.  Ward,  4  W.  & 
S.  118;  Dennis  r.  Clark,  2  Cush.  353; 
State  V.  Cook,  12  Ired.  L.  67. 

(/)  In  Hunt  V.  Thompson,  3  Scam.  180 
(1841),  Wilson,  C.  J.,  said:  "That  a  par- 
ent is  under  an  obligation  to  provide  for 
the  maintenance  of  his  infant  cliildren  is  a 
principle  of  natural  law  ;  and  it  is  upon 
this  natural  oliligation  alone  that  the  duty 
of  a  parent  to  provide  his  infant  children 
with  the  necessaries  of  life  rests ;  for  there 
is  no  rule  of  municipal  law  enforcing  this 
duty.  The  claim  of  the  wife  upon  the  hus- 
band, for  necessaries  suitable  to  his  rank 
and  fortune,  is  recognized  by  the  principles 
of  the  common  law,  and  by  statute.  A 
like  claim  to  some  extent  may  be  enforced 
in  favor  of  indigent  and  infirm  parents, 
and  other  relatives,  against  children,  fee, 

343 


305 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  305  *  The  law  can  hardly  be  considered  as  positively  settled 
either  in  England  or  in  this  country.  But,  resting  not  so 
much  on  direct  and  specific  authorities,  as  on  the  general  charac- 
ter of  American  jurisprudence  on  this  subject,  we  would  state,  as 
strongly  prevailing  rules  here,  that  where  goods  are  supplied  to 
an  infant  which  are  not  necessaries,  the  father's  authority  must 
1)0  proved  to  make  him  liable ;  where  they  are  necessaries,  the 
father's  autliority  is  presumed,  unless  he  supplies  them  himself, 
or  was  ready  to  supply  them ;  where  the  infant  lives  with  the 
father,  or  under  his  control,  his  judgment  as  to  what  are  necessar 
ries  will  be  so  far  respected,  that  he  will  be  held  liable  only  for 


in  many  cases ;  but,  as  a  general  rule,  the 
obligation  of  a  ])arent  to  provide  for  his 
offspring  is  left  to  the  natural  and  inextin- 
guishable affection  which  Providence  has 
implanted  in  the  breast  of  every  parent. 
This  natural  obligation,  however,  is  not 
only  a  sufficient  consideration,  for  an  ex- 
press promise  by  a  father  to  pay  for  neces- 
saries furnished  his  child,  but  when  taken 
in  connection  with  various  circumstances 
has  been  held  to  be  sufficient  to  raise  an 
implied  promise  to  that  effect.  But  either 
an  express  promise,  or  circumstances  from 
which  a  promise  by  the  father  can  be  in- 
ferred, are  indispensably  necessary  to  bind 
the  parent  for  necessaries  furnished  his  in- 
fant child  by  a  third  person."  —  Owen  v. 
White,  5  Port.  (Ala.)  43.5  (1837),  seems  to 
deny  the  legal  obligation  of  the  father,  ex- 
cept on  a  contract,  express  or  implied  ;  but 
admits  that  such  "  contract  is  im])lied  where 
the  father  fails  in  his  duty  to  support  the 
child,  or  drives  him  from  home.  Then  the 
father  is  liable  for  a  suitable  maintenance." 
In  Varney  i'.  Young,  11  Vt.  '258  (1839), 
the  court  appear  to  deny  altogether  that 
the  moral  obligation  of  the  f;\ther  consti- 
tutes any  legal  obligation.  Dennett,  J., 
says:  "There  must  be  pi'oof  of  a  contract, 
express  or  implied,  a  prior  authority,  or  a 
subsequent  recofpiition  of  the  claim."  —  Per- 
haps the  strongest  case  in  the  American 
reports,  against  the  liabilitv  of  the  father, 
i-  (iordon  v.  Potter,  17  Vt.  350  (1845). 
There  the  defendant  told  his  minor  son  in 
the  spring  to  go  out  to  work,  and  in  the  fall 
he  would  get  him  some  winter  clothes.  The 
son  went  to  service  at  monthly  wages.  In 
June  following,  the  plaintiff  furnished  him 
with  cloth  and  trinimiiicjs  for  a  suit  of 
clothes.  The  father  knew  of  this  ])urchasc 
by  the  son,  and  furnished  him  vioneij  to  pay 
for  niakiwj  them  up ;  he  also  permitted  him 
to  wear  out  the  clothes.  It  did  not  clearly 
appear  whether  the  plaintiff  furnished  the 
goods  upon  the  sou's  or  the  father's  credit. 

344 


And  this  might  have  been  a  sufficient 
ground  for  the  decision  itself;  bat liedjield, 
J.,  went  much  further,  and  said :  "  But 
there  is  one  defect  in  the  case,  which  we 
think  must  clearly  and  indisputably  pre- 
clude any  recovery  against  the  father.  It 
does  not  appear  that  the  father  ever  gave 
the  son  any  authority,  either  expressly  or 
by  implication,  to  pledge  his  credit  for  the 
articles ;  but  the  contrary.  And  unless  the 
father  can  be  made  liable  for  necessaries 
for  his  infant  child,  against  his  own  will, 
tlien,  m  this  case,  the  plaintiff  must  fail  to 
recover.  I  know  there  are  some  cases,  and 
dicta  of  judges,  or  of  elementary  writers, 
which  seem  to  justify  the  conclusion  that 
the  parent  may  be  made  liable  for  necessa- 
ries for  his  child,  even  against  his  own  will. 
But  an  examination  of  all  the  cases  upon 
this  subject  will  not  justify  any  such  con- 
clusion." After  critically  examining  the 
American  and  English  authorities,  he  con- 
cluded :  "  It  is  obvious  that  the  law  makes 
no  provision  for  strangers  to  furnish  chil- 
dren with  necessaries,  against  the  will  of 
parents,  even  in  extreme  cases.  For  if  it 
can  be  done  in  extreme  cases  it  can  be  done 
in  every  case  where  the  necessity  exists; 
and  the  right  of  a  parent  to  control  his 
own  child  will  depend  altogether  u])on  his 
furnishing  necessaries,  suitable  to  the  vary- 
ing taste  of  the  times  There  is  no  stop- 
ping-place short  of  this,  if  any  interference 
whatever  is  allowed.  If  the  parent  aban- 
dons the  child  to  destitution,  the  public  au- 
thorities may  interfere,  and,  in  the  mode 
pointed  out  by  the  statute,  compel  a  proper 
maintenance.  But  this,  according  to  the 
p]nglish  common  law,  which  ])revails  in  this 
State,  is  not  the  right  of  every  intermed- 
dling stranger."  See  also  Raymond  v. 
Loyl,  10  Barb.  483;  Chilcott  w."  Trimble, 
13  Barb.  502;  Slielfon  v.  Springctt,  20  E. 
L.  &  E.  281  ;  8.  c.  II  C.  B.  462;  Atkyns 
V.  Pearce,  2  C.  B  (n.  8./  703 


CH.  XVll.]  INFANTS.  *  306 

things  furnished  to  the  infant  to  relieve  him  from  absolute  want ; 
where  the  infant  does  not  live  with  the  father,  but  has  voluntarily 
left  him,  the  authority  of  the  father  must  be  strictly  proved,  un- 
less, perhaps,  in  cases  of  absolute  necessity ;  and  where  he  has 
been  deserted  by  the  father,  or  driven  away  from  him,  either  by 
command  or  by  cruel  treatment,  there  the  infant  carries  with  him 
the  credit  and  authority  of  the  father  for  necessaries.  And 
wherever  the  question  is  how  far  the  father  is  liable  for  necessa- 
ries supplied  to  the  child,  this  word  "  necessaries  "  will  not  gen- 
erally be  understood  in  the  very  liberal  sense  given  to  it  when  the 
question  is  as  to  the  capacity  of  the  infant  to  contract,  but  will  be 
interpreted  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  And  if 
the  child  be  of  sufficient  age  and  strength  to  earn  by  proper  exer- 
tions the  whole  or  a  part  of  his  subsistence,  it  will  not  be  deemed 
"  necessary  "  that  the  aid  should  be  rendered  to  him  which 
it  would  be  "  necessary  "  to  *  give  to  an  infant  incapaci-  *  306 
tated  by  tender  years,  or  by  debility  of  mind  or  body,  from 
contributing  to  his  own  support. 

So  far  as  the  duty  of  support  certainly  belongs  to  the  parent  as 
a  legal  obligation,  and  is  neglected,  any  other  person  may  perform 
it,  and  will  be  regarded  as  performing  it  for  him ;  and,  on  general 
principles,  the  law  will  raise  a  promise  on  the  part  of  the  parent, 
to  compensate  the  party  who  thus  did  for  him  what  he  was  bound 
by  law  to  do.  (wi)  But  this  rule  is  carried  no  further  than  its 
reason  extends ;  and  is  guarded  by  many  restrictions  from  becom- 
ing the  means  of  injury  to  the  parent.  Thus,  we  have  seen,  that 
if  the  child  be  living  with  the  parent,  or,  as  it  is  said  in  some 
cases,  if  he  be  suh  potestate  parentis,  the  law  will  not  presume 
that  the  parent  neglects  the  child,  but  will  presume  a  due  care  of 
him,  until  the  contrary  is  shown ;  and  of  the  propriety  and  suffi- 
ciency of  the  clothing,  &c.,  the  parents  must  judge;  and  if  a 
stranger  under  such  circumstances  supplies  the  child  even  with 
necessaries  he  certainly  cannot  hold  the  parent  upon  the  contract 
implied  by  his  duty,  without  proving  a  clear  and  unquestionable 
abandonment  and  neglect  of  that  duty. 

If  the  supplier  seeks  to  make  the  parent  responsible,  on  the 

(7n)In  the  matter  of  Ryder,  11  Paige,  omission  of  duty,  on  the  part  of  the  parent, 
185,  Wabvorth,  Ch.,  says  :  "  A  stranger  in  supplying  the  child  with  necessaries." 
may  furnish  necessaries  for  the  child,  and  Equally  strong  are  Van  Valkinburg  y.  Wat- 
recover  of  the  parent  compensation  there-  son,  1.3  Johns.  480,  and  Pidgin  v.  Cram,  8 
for,  where  there  is  a  clear  and  palpable  N.  H.  350. 

345 


*  307  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

ground  that  his  authority  was  given  to  the  child,  then,  if  the  goods 
supplied  were  necessaries,  it  would  seem  from  the  cases,  as  we 
have  said,  that  slight  evidence  is  sufficient  to  prove  such  authority ; 
as  that  the  father  saw  the  son  wear  the  clothes,  or  knew  that  he 
had  received  them,  and  made  no  objection.  But  if  the  things  sup- 
plied are  strict  and  absolute  necessaries,  needful  for  the  child's 
subsistence,  or  if  the  child  is  living  away  from  the  parent,  under 
circumstances  which  indicate  a  dcsei'tiun  by  the  parent,  or  that 
the  child  has  been  expelled  from  his  house,  or  caused  to  leave  it 
by  the  wrongful  acts  of  the  parents,  then  the  authorities  and 
dicta  to  which  we  have  referred  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
whoever  supplies  the  wants  of  the  child  may  recover  from  the 
parent,  (n) 

*  307        *  It  has  been  held  in  England  that  a  father  was  under 

no  legal  obligation  to  educate  his  child,  and  could  not  be 
made  liable  for  the  expenses  of  his  instruction,  where  the  wife, 
being  cruelly  treated  at  the  husband's  house,  left  it,  taking  the 
children  with  her.  This  precise  question  has  not  occurred  in  this 
country,  but  the  weight  and  tendency  of  authorities  would  not  re- 
quire us  to  believe  that  the  decision  would  be  the  same  here  as  in 
England.  It  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts  that  where  a  wife 
leaves  a  husband  from  his  cruelty,  taking  her  child,  he  is  liable 
not  only  for  her  maintenance,  but  for  that  of  the  child,  if  he 
makes  no  effort  to  reclaim  it ;  and  this  liability  is  not  discharged 
by  her  return  to  his  house,  (nri)  If  the  wife  be  divorced,  with 
alimony,  and  the  care  of  the  children  be  given  to  her,  the  father 
has  been  held  liable  not  only  to  her  for  the  expenses  she  incurs 
in  their  support  and  education,  but  also  to  a  stranger  whom  she 

(n)  We  are  unable  to  discriniiiiate  these  or,  in  other  words,  tliat  the  things  supplied 

cases,  on  j)rinciplc,  from  any  Avhich  may  were  strict  and  absolute  necessaries.     Wo 

occur,    in   which   com])ensation    is   sought  have  some  doul)ts,  therefore  whether  even 

from  a  father  for  things  suiijjlied  to  an  in-  this   exception  would   always  be  allowed, 

fant,  whicli  were  absolutely  needed  for  his  Indeed,  we  are  disposed  to  regard  the  rule 

subsistence,  and  which  the  child  would  not  of  law,   in    this  country  generally,   if  not 

have  had  unless  they  were   sn])]ilied  by  a  univtMsally,  as  imposing  a  liability  on  the 

stranger.     Where  the  infant  has  unncccs-  father  for  all  supplies  to  an  infant,  wliich 

sarily  and  in  his  own  wrong  left  his  parent  were  so  absolutely  needed   that   he  must 

and  renounced  the  filial  relation,  it  seems  have  them  or  perish.     The  liability  may  be 

to  be  held  that  the  liability  of  the  parent  put  on  different  grounds  in  diflerent  coiirts, 

ceases.     But  in  the  jtrincijial  case  in  which  — in  some  on  the  ground  of  contract  and 

this  is  directly  decided  (Anj,^el  r.  McLcllan,  of  im])lied  authority,  and  in  others  on  the 

16  Mass.  28),  the  child  bad  absconded  to  Iciral  obligation  growing  out  of  the  moral 

avoid  arrest  for  felony;  and  although  the  oblil,^•ltion,  —  but  on  some  ground  or  other 

case  finds  that  "  he  was  in  distress  in  a  for-  we  think  it  woidd  generally  be  enforced, 
eign  country,"  it  does  not  appear  that  he  (nn)  Reynolds  v.  Sweetser,  1.5  Gray,  78. 

might  not  have  supported  himself  by  labor, 

340 


CH.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  308 

marries,  and  who  continues  to  support  the  children  ;  but  the 
authority  of  this  case  has  been,  to  say  the  least,  weakened,  (o) 
And  where  the  father  and  mother  separate,  and  the  father  permits 
the  mother  to  take  the  children  with  her,  then  the  father  consti- 
tutes the  mother  his  agent  to  provide  for  his  children,  and  is 
bound  by  her  contract  for  necessaries  for  them.  (/>)  ^  There 
is,  indeed,  authority  in  England  and  in  this  country,  for  holding 
that  if  a  parent  of  sufficient  ability  to  provide  suitably  for  his 
children  neglect  to  do  so  he  is  guilty  of  an  indictable  offence.  (9-) 

It  becomes  a  different  question  when  the  child  has  an  inde- 
pendent property  sufficient  for  his  own  maintenance  ;  what  then  is 
the  father's  obligation  ?  It  would  seem  that  the  rule  of 
law  *  formerly  Avas,  that  if  the  parent  had  abundant  means  *  308 
himself,  he  was  bound  to  provide  for  his  children,  even  if 
they  had  independent  property,  (r)  And  this  rule  is  enforced 
even  now  in  some  instances,  (s)  It  is,  however,  in  general,  re- 
laxed ;  and  courts  go  far  in  appropriating  the  means  of  the  child 
to  his  own  support,  although  the  father  may  also  be  entirely 
able  to  maintain  him.  (i)  And  where  the  father  is  without  means 
to  educate  and  support  his  children  in  a  manner  which  is  ren- 
dered suitable  by  their  position  and  expectations,  courts  of  equity 
will  not  only  make  an  allowance  out  of  the  estate  of  the  children, 
but  will,  if  necessary,  take  from  the  principal  of  a  vested  legacy 
for  the  proper  maintenance  and  education  of  the  legatee,  (m) 
Such  decrees  are  usually  made  for  the  future  maintenance  of  the 
child ;  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  is  a  positive  rule  prevent- 
ing retrospective  allowances.  (?;)  But  a  court  will  not,  unless 
for  very  strong  and  special  reasons,  make  an  allowance  to  the 
father,  out  of  the  infant's  estate,  for  the  past  maintenance  of  his 
child,  (w) 

(0)  Stanton  ?•.  Willson,  3  Day,  37.    This  (s)  In  the  matter  of  Kane,  2  Barb.  Ch. 

case  was  commented  upon  and  denied  in  375. 

Finch  V.  Finch,  22  Conn.  411,  and  it  was  (t)  Jcrvoise   v.  Silk,   Cooper,  Ch.  52; 

decided  by  a  majority  of  tlic  court  that  a  Maberly  v.  Turton,  14  Vcs.  499;  Simon 

divorced  wife  could  not  maintain  an  action  v.  Barber,  1  Tamlyn,  22. 

asainst  her  former  liusband  to  recover  for  (m)  Newport  y.  Cook,  2  Ashm.  332  ;  i?x 

the  support  of  their  infont   children,  the  parte  Green,  1  Jac.  &  W.  253.      See  also 

custody  of  whom  was  awarded  to  her.    Two  Carter  v.  RoUard,  11  Humph.  339. 

of  the  five  judges,  however,  adhered  to  the  [v)  In  the  matter  of   Kane,  2  Barb, 

decision  of  Stanton  v.  Willson.  Ch.  375. 

(/))  Kawlyns  v.  Vandyke,  3  Esp.  251.  (w)  Presley  i'.  Davis,  7  Eich.  Eq.  105; 

(7)  Rex  V.  Friend,  Russ.  &  R.  20.     See  and  see  Carmichael  v.  Hughes,  6  E.  L.  & 

also,  in  the  matter  of  Ryder,  11  Paige,  185.  E.  71. 

(r)  Dawes  v.  Howard,  4  Mass.  97. 

1  McMillen  v.  Lee,  78  111.  443. 

34T 


*  309  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I, 

Whether   the   mother  is  under  an   equal   obligation  with  the 

father  to  maintain  the  child,  the  father  being  dead,  seems  not 

to  be  quite  certain ;  but  the  weight  of  authority,  botli  in  England 

and  in  this  country,  might  justify  the  conclusion  that  she  is  not 

under  a  legal  obligation,  (jc)  ^  or  that  it  is  very  greatly 

*  309    qualified  in  important  particulars.     Thus,  if  the   *  child 

has  property,  the  mother  is  not  bound  for  the  child's  main- 
tenance where  the  father  would  be.  (^)  And  a  court  of  equity 
has  refused  to  compel  a  mother  to  furnish  the  means  of  educating 
a  child,  even  where  she  was  entirely  able  to  do  so ;  and  it  is  even 
said  that  the  court  has  no  power  to  do  this,  (jz)  A  husband  is 
not  responsible  for  the  child  of  his  wife  by  a  former  husband, 
unless  he  takes  him  into  his  house ;  but  if  he  does,  he  assumes 
the  responsibility  for  his  maintenance,  so  long  as  he  retains  him 
as  one  of  his  family,  (a)  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  relation 
which  he  in  this  case  sustains  to  the  child  rebuts  any  presump- 
tion which  might  otherwise  exist,  of  a  promise  or  obligation  to 
pay  the  child  for  his  services,  (5)  as  it  does  in  the  case  of  his  own 
children,  (c) 

Where  the  parent  is  thus  obliged  to  provide  for  the  child  a 
home,  and  a  sufficient  maintenance,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  he  has 
a  right  to  the  custody  of  the  child  during  his  minority,  and  is 

{x)  The  chancery  cases  which  assert  in  this  respect.     See,  against  the  mother's 

this  obligation,  appear  to  do  so,  on  the  obligation,  Tilton  v.  Kussell,  11  Ala.  497; 

ground  of  the  ability  of  the  motlicr  and  Kaymond  v.  Loyl,  10  Barb.  483  ;  Pray  v. 

the  need  of  the  children.     See  Hughes  v.  Gorhani,  31   Me.  241 ;  Coninionwealtli  v. 

Hughes,  1  Bro.  Ch.   387.      In  Benson  v.  Murray,  4  Binn.   487  ;  Passenger  R.  Co. 

Remington,  2  Mass.  113,    the  court  say:  v.  Stutlen,  64  Penn.  St.  375. 
"The  law  is  very  well  settled  that ;jarp;i/s  (y)  In  Dawes   v.  Howard,  4  Mass.  97, 

are   under   obligations   to   support  their  it  is  said,  that  where  minor  children  have 

chililren,  and   that  they  are  entitled  to  property  of  their  own,  the  father  is,  not- 

their  earnings."  In  Niglitingale  v.  With-  withstanding,  bound  to  support  them,  if 

ington,  l-')  Mass.  274,  Purker,  C  J.,  says  :  of  ability  ;  but  it  is   otherwise  with  the 

"  Uenerally  the  father,  and  in  case  of  his  mother. 

death  the  mother,  is  entitled  to  the  earn-  (z)  In  the  matter  of  Ryder,  11  Paige, 

ings  of  their  minor  children.     This  rigiit  185. 

must  be  founded  upon  the  obligation  of  (a)  Stone  v.  Carr,  3  Esp.  1 ;  Cooper  v. 

the  parents  to  nurture  and  support  their  Martin,  4  East,  82 ;  Tubb  v.  Harrison,  4 

children."      But    it   is   only  a  dictum  in  T.  R.  118;  Freto  t'.  Brown,  4  Mass.  G35; 

either  case;  and  in  neither  do  the  court  Minden  v.  Cox,  7  Cowen,  235. 
refer  to  an}'  authority  whatever  for  this  {b)  Williams   v.   Hutchinson,  5  Barb, 

rule  ;  nor  are  we  aware  of  any  direct  ad-  122  ;  s.  c.  3  Comst.  312. 
judication,  in   which  it  is  determmed  as  (c)  See  post,  Book  III.,  Ch.  IX.,  Sect, 

the  point  of  the  case,  that   the    mother  1. 
and  the  father  stand  on  the  same  footing 

1  A  mother  is  entitled  to  the  wages  of  a  minor  child  after  the  father's  death  only  so 
long  as  it  n^maiiis  in  her  family  and  is  piovidcd  for  by  her.  Uollingsworth  v.  Sweden- 
borg,  49  Ind.  378. 


CH.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  310 

entitled  to  all  his  earnings,  (d')  And  a  husband  taking  the 
children  of  his  wife  by  a  former  marriage  into  his  family,  has, 
primd  facie,  a  right  to  their  custody  and  their  earnings,  {dd}  On 
this  ground  it  lias  been  held  that  the  father  might  recover  the 
wages  of  the  son,  even  for  services  which  it  was  a  violation  of 
law  to  render,  if  the  father  did  not  know  of  this  violation,  (e) 
For  these  two  things,  this  obligation  and  this  right,  go  together. 
Thus,  if  the  father  separates  from  the  mother,  and  permits  the 
child  to  leave  him  and  go  with  her,  he  is  no  longer  entitled  to 
the  earnings  of  the  child,  and  has  no  power  to  avoid  his  reason- 
able contracts ;  (/)  and  therefore  the  son  may  in  such  case  make 
a  special  contract  with  his  employer,  which  is  valid  against  the 
father's  will.  And  if  the  parent  be  himself  an  insane  person  and 
a  pauper,  and  therefore  under  no  obligation  to  maintain  the  child, 
he  is  not  entitled  to  the  child's  earnings,  nor  is  the  town  which 
supports  the  parent  entitled  to  receive  the  child's  wages,  so  long 
as  the  child  himself  is  not  a  pauper.  (^)  And  it  has  been 
said  that  *  wherever  the  son  is  not  living  with  the  father,  *  310 
the  son  may  of  necessity  be  entitled  to  receive  the  wages 
of  his  labor,  and  that  the  father's  consent  to  the  son's  receipt  and 
appropriation  of  them  would  be  inferred  in  such  case  from  very 
slight  circumstances.  (A) 

It  is  certain  that  a  father  may,  by  an  agreement  with  his  minor 
child,  relinquish  to  the  child  the  right  which  he  would  otherwise 
have  to  his  services,  and  may  authorize  those  who  employ  him  to 
pay  him  his  wages,  and  will  then  have  no  right  to  demand  those 
wages,  either  from  the  employer  or  from  the  child.  (^■)  And  such 
an  agreement  may  be  inferred  from  circumstances ;  as  where  a 
father  left  his  child  to  manage  his  own  affairs,  and  make  and 
execute  his  own  contracts  for  a  considerable  time.  (/)  Or  even 
if  the  father  knew  that  the  son  had  made  such  a  contract  for  him- 


{d)  See  note  (x),  sup-a,  and  State  v.  Morse  v.  Welton,  6  Conn.  547 ;  Whiting 

Baird,  3  Green,  196;  McBride  v.  McBride,  v.  Earle,  3  Tick.  201 ;  Varney  v.  Young, 

1  Bush,  15.  11  Vt.  258 ;  Burlingaine  v.  Burlingame,  7 

{del}  Mulhern  v.  McDavitt,  16  Gray,  Cowen,  92  ;  Bray  v.  Wheeler,  3  Williams, 

404.  514.      In   Tillotson  v.  McCrillis,  11   Vt. 

(e)  Emery   v.  Kempton,  2   Gray,  257.  477,  it  is  held  that  a  father  may  give  to 

See,  in  this  connection,  Jenness  v.  Emer-  his  minor  son  a  part  as  well  as  the  whole 

Bon,  15  N.  H.  486.  of  his  time. 

(/)  Wodell  V.  Coggeshall,  2  Met.  89;  ( /)  Canover  v.  Cooper,  3  Barb.  115; 

Chilson  V.  Philips,  1  Vt.  41.  Clinton   v.   York,  26   Me.   167 ;  Stiles  v. 

(g)  Jenness  v.  Emerson,  15  N.  H.  486.  Granville,  6  Cush.  458  ;  Wodell  v.  Cogges- 

(h)  Gale  v.  Parrott,  1  N.  H.  28.  hall,  2  Met.  91 ;  Cloud  v.  Hamilton,  11 

(i)  Jenny    v.   Alden,   12    Mass.    375 ;  Humph.  104. 

349 


*  311  THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

self,  and  interposed  no  objection.  (A;)  And  it  has  been  held  that 
an  infant  whose  father  is  dead,  and  whose  mother  is  married 
again,  is  entitled  to  his  own  earnings.  (Z) 

It  is  very  common  in  this  country  to  see  in  the  newspapers  an 
advertisement  signed  by  a  father,  stating  that  he  has  given  to  his 
minor  son  '•  his  time,"  and  that  he  will  make  no  future  clahn  on 
his  services  or  for  his  wages,  and  will  pay  no  debts  of  his  con- 
tracting. Such  a  notice  would  undoubtedly  have  its  full  force  in 
reference  to  any  party  to  whom  a  knowledge  of  it  was  brought 
home.  And  if  a  stranger,  not  knowing  this  arrangement,  should 
employ  the  son,  he  might  still  interpose  it  as  a  defence,  if  the 
father  claimed  the  son's  wages.  But  if  a  stranger  supplied  a  son, 
at  a  distance  from  his  home,  with  suitable  necessaries,  in  igno- 
rance of  such  arrangement,  there  is  no  sufficient  reason  for 
holding  that  it  would  bar  his  claim  against  the  father.  And  we 
think   that  he   might   recover  from  the  father  for   strict 

*  311    necessaries,  even  if  he  knew  this  arrangement.     *  On  what 

ground  could  the  father  discharge  himself  from  his  lia- 
bility by  such  a  contract  ?  Even  if  the  father  had  paid  the  son  a 
consideration  for  the  release  of  all  further  obligation,  it  would  be 
a  contract  with  an  infant,  and  void  or  voidable,  because  certainly 
not  for  necessaries.  And  tlie  whole  policy  and  reason  of  the  law 
of  infancy  would  seem  to  be  opposed  to  permitting  a  father  to  cast 
his  son  in  this  way  upon  the  public,  and  relieve  himself  from  the 
obligation  of  maintenance. 

It  may  be  added,  that  while  an  infant  remains  under  the  care 
and  control  of  his  father,  and  is  in  fact  supported  by  him,  the 
infant  is  not  liable,  even  on  his  express  contract,  to  a  stranger 
for  necessaries  furnished  for  him.  One  reason  given  for  this,  is, 
that  it  would  interfere  with  his  father's  right  of  judging  how  he 
should  be  supported,  (n)  Where  services  are  rendered  at  the 
parent's  request,  it  will  be  presumed  that  credit  is  given  to  him 
alone,  and  in  that  case  the  infant  cannot  be  liable  even  for  neces- 
saries, (o)  And  it  is  held  that  the  emancipation  of  an  infant  by 
his  father  does  not  enlarge  his  capacity  to  contract.  (oo~) 

(k)  Whiting    v.   Earle,   3    Pick.  201;  4  Watts,  80;  Simms  ?;.  Norris,  5  Ala.  42 ; 

Armstrong  v.  McDonald,  10  Barb.  300.  Jolinson  v.  Lines,  (i  W.  &  S.  80;  Phelps  v. 

(I)  Freto  I'.  Brown.  4  Mass.  075.  Worcester,  11  N.  li.  51. 

(n)  Angel  i^.  McLcllan,  16  Mass.  28;  (o)  Duncomb  y.  Tickridge,  Aleyn,  94; 

Wailing  v.  Toll,  9  Johns.  141 ;  Hull  v.  Phelps  v.  Worcester,  11  N.  H.  51;  Simms 

Connolly,  3  McCord,  tj ;  Kline  v.  L'Am-  r.  Norris,  5  Ala.  42. 
ouroux,  2  Paige,  41'J  ;  Guthrie  v.  Murphy,  (oo)  Person  v.  Chase,  37  Vt.  047. 

350 


CII.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  312 

The  common-law  liability  of  a  parent  to  support  his  child 
ceases  altogether  when  the  infant  becomes  of  fall  age ;  and  then 
a  parent  would  not  be  bound  even  by  his  express  promise  to  pay 
for  necessaries  previously  furnished  to  the  child,  not  at  the  request 
of  the  parent,  (jt?)  If  they  were  furnished  at  his  request  it  would 
be  otherwise,  (g-) 

If  a  son  or  daughter  remains  with  the  parent  after  coming  of 
age,  rendering  services,  it  is  held  that  neither  he  nor  she  can 
recover  wages,  without  a  contract  for  them.  (5-9)  Because  if 
a  child  after  becoming  adult  continues  to  live  with  his  or  her 
parent,  the  law  implies  no  promise  of  wages  on  the  part  of  the 
parent,  (^qr)  But  the  jury  will  judge  from  all  the  evidence, 
whether  there  was  such  a  contract.  (5's) 

By  statute  of  43  Eliz.  c.  2,  the  father,  "  being  of  ability,"  is 
liable  to  contribute  to  his  child's  support  even  after  he  becomes 
of  age.  And  in  some  of  our  States  similar  provision  is  made,  (r) 
But  such  a  liability  is  wholly  statutory,  and  does  not  accrue  until 
proceedings  are  had  pursuant  to  the  statute,  (s)  So  at  common 
law  a  son  is  not  liable  for  the  support  of  an  infirm 
*  and  indigent  parent,  (i)  Nor  is  a  father  liable  at  common  *  312 
law  for  the  support  of  his  illegitimate  child.  The  only 
remedy  is  under  the  statute,  procuring  an  order  of  filiation,  and 
the  like,  (m) 

It  should  be  added,  that  a  father  is  not  liable  for  the  wilful  tort 
of  his  infant  child,  (y)  And  it  is  said  that  he  has  no  right,  re- 
sulting from  the  parental  relation,  to  maintain  an  action  for  in- 
jury to  his  child,  unless  there  be  some  injury  to  the  father ;  (w') 
but  it  is  enough  if  the  father  be  put  to  any  expense  for  the  care  or 

(p)  Mills  I.  Wyman,  3  Pick.  207.    See  (s)  Loomis  v.  Newhall,  15  Pick.  169; 

also  Cook  (•.  Bradley,  7  Conn.  57.  Mortimore  v.  Wright,  6  M.  &  W.  488; 

(f/)  Lootnis  V.  Newhall,  15  Pick.  159.  Gordon  v.  Potter,  17  Vt.  348;  Shelton  v. 

(77)   Leidig    v.     Coover's    Ex'ors,    47  Springett,  20  E.  L.  &  E.  281 ;  s.  c.  11  C. 

Pi-nn.  St.  534 ;  Adams   v.   Adams'   Adm.  B.  462. 

li3  Ind.  50.  (t)  Edwards  v.  Davis,  16  Johns.  281 ; 

{f/r)  Limey  v.  Vantyne,  40  Vt.  501.  Rex   v.  Munden,  1  Stra.  190.      But  see 

(7s)  Hart   V.    Hart's   Adm'x,   41    Mo.  Gilbert  v.  Lynes,  2  Eoot,  108;  Ex  parte 

441.  Hunt,  5  Cowen,  284. 

(r)  The  provision  in  the  Rev.  Stat,  of  («)  Furillio  v.  Crowther,  7  Dow.  &  R. 

Massachusetts,  ch.  46,  §  5,  is  very  broad  :  612  ;  Cameron   v.  Baker,  1   C.  &  P.  268  ; 

"  The  kindred  of  any  such  poor  person,  Moncrief  v.  Ely,  19  Wend.  405. 

if  any  he  shall  have,  in  the  line  or  degree  (v)  As  for  setting   the    father's   dog 

of    father    or     grandfather,    mother    or  upon  the  hog  of  the  plaintiff.      Tifft  v. 

grandmother,  children  or  grandchildren,  Tifft,  4  Denio,  175. 

by  consanguinity,  living  within  tiiis  State,  [w]  Stephenson  v.  Hall,  14  Barb.  222. 
and  of  sufficient  ability,  shall  be  bound 
to  support  such  pauper,  in  proportion  to 
their  respective  ability." 

351 


*  313  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

cure  of  the  child,  (a;)  Neither  can  he  give  a  valid  release  for  an 
assault  on  his  minor  child.  (?/) 

It  seems  to  be  held  that  a  father  cannot  maintain  an  action,  for 
loss  of  service,  against  a  railroad  company  by  whose  negligence 
the  child  was  killed,  (z)  If  this  be  law,  it  may  perhaps  be 
regretted  that  the  action  "joer  quod  servitium  aniisit^^  does  not 
extend  to  such  a  case. 

A  father  may  devise  away  all  his  property,  leaving  nothing 
whatever  to  his  infant  children,  or  for  their  support,  if  he  men- 
tions them  in  the  will  so  as  to  show  that  he  intends  this,  (a) 


SECTION  III. 

VOIDABLE   CONTRACTS    FOR   NECESSARIES. 

As  an  infant  is  not  permitted  to  enter  into  general  contracts, 
because  his  immature  judgment  would  expose  him  to  injury,  and 
as  he  is  nevertheless  permitted  to  contract  for  necessaries,  be- 
cause otherwise  he  might  suffer  for  the  want  of  them,  so 
*  313  this  *  exceptional  permission  is  qualified  in  an  important 
particular,  for  the  same  purpose  of  protecting  him  from 
wrong.  He  cannot  contract  to  pay  even  for  necessaries,  in  such 
wise  as  to  bar  an  inquiry  into  the  price  and  value.  The  law 
permits  persons  to  supply  him  with  necessaries,  and  have  a  valid 
claim  against  him  therefor  for  their  fair  worth ;  but  it  does  not 
permit  them  to  make  a  bargain  with  him  as  to  the  price,  which 
shall  bind  him  absolutely,  because  it  does  not  permit  him  to  de- 
termine this  price  for  himself,  by  reason  of  his  presumed  inability 
to  take  proper  care  of  his  own  interests ;  but  the  value  and  the 
price  may  be  determined  by  a  jury.  And  a  seal  to  the  instrument 
would  give  it  no  additional  force  in  this  respect,  but  the  infant 
would  still  be  bound  only  for  a  fair  value.  For  the  same  reason  an 
infant  cannot  be  bound  for  the  amount  in  an  account  stated ;  (i) 
nor  for  the  sum  mentioned  in  his  note,  although  given  for  neces- 

(x)  Dennis  v.  Clark,  2  Cush.  347.  {a)  See   Lord  Alvanley's  remarks   on 

iy)  Loomis    v.    Clinc,   4    Barb.    453;  this  power  of  the  father,  in  Rawlins  v. 

Eades  v.  Booth,  8  A.  &  E.  (n.  s.)  718.  GoUlfrap,  5  Ves.  444. 

(z)  Carey   v.  Berkshire  R.  R.   Co.    1  (b)  Ingledew  f.  Douglas,  2  Stark,  36; 

Cush.  475.      See,  however,  Ford  v.  Mon-  Truenian  v.  Hurst,  1  T.  R.  40;  Hedgeley 

roe,  20  Wend.  210.  v.  Holt,  4  C  &  P.  104 ;  Oliver  v.  Wood- 

352 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


314 


saries  ;  (e)  nor  for  the  amount  due  on  his  bond,  for  the  ancient 
distinction  which  held  him  on  a  bond  without  a  penalty,  but  not 
on  a  bond  with  penalty,  would  probably  be  now  disregarded.  (</) 
If,  however,  an  infant  gives  his  note,  his  bond,  or  any  other  in- 
strument, for  necessaries,  he  may  be  sued  upon  the  instrument, 
but  the  plaintiff  shall  recover  only  the  value  of  the  necessaries.  (?) 

Neither  can  an  infant  enter  into  contracts  of  business 
and  *  trade ;  for  this  is  not  necessary,  and  might  expose  *  314 
him  to  the  misfortune  of  entering  upon  adult  life  with  the 
burden  of  bankruptcy  resting  upon  him.  (/)  But  if  he  uses,  as 
necessaries  for  himself  or  his  family,  the  goods  furnished  to  him 
for  the  purposes  of  trade,  he  is  so  far  liable.  ((/)  This  liability  to 
pay  even  for  necessaries  seems  to  be  founded  only  on  his  actual 
necessities,  and  if  he  had  already  supplied  himself  with  sufficient 
clothing,  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  bound  to  pay  for  similar 
articles  subsequently  purchased,  although  they  might  be  suitable 
in  themselves,  and  although  he  had  avoided  payment  for  the  first 
purchase  on  the  ground  of  his  infancy.  (7i)  As  he  cannot  trade, 
neither  can  he  subject  himself  to  the  incidents  of  trade,  as  bank- 


rofEe,  4  M.  &  W.  ()50 :  Williams  v.  Moor, 
11  id.  2oG  ;  Beeler  v.  Young,  1  Bibb,  519 

(c)  McCrillis  v.  How,  3  N.  H.  348; 
Bouchell  V.  Clary,  3  Brevard,  194  ;  Swa- 
sey  V.  Vandcrhcyden,  10  Johns.  83 ;  Fen- 
ton  t-.  White,  1  Southard,  100;  McMinn 
r.  Richmonds,  6  Yerg.  9 ;  Hanks  v.  Deal, 
3  McCord,  257.  Some  of  these  cases 
declare  an  infant's  note,  thougli  given 
for  necessaries,  toiil,  but  it  is  conceived 
they  mean  voidable  only,  and  not  that 
such  note  is  not  susceptible  of  ratifica- 
tion. 

(d)  The  older  cases  hold  that  an  in- 
fant's bond,  at  least  if  given  with  a  pen- 
alti/,  is  absolutely  void,  not  voidable 
merel}',  althoiigh  given  for  necessaries. 
Ayliff  V.  Archdale,  Cro.  E.  920;  FLslier  v 
Mowbray,  8  East,  300  ;  Baylis  v.  Dinely, 
3  M.  &  Sel.  447;  Hunter  v.  Agnew,  1 
Fox  &  S.  15;  Allen  v.  Minor,  2  Gall,  70; 
Colcock  V.  Ferguson,  3  Desaus.  482.  —  It 
is  conceived,  however,  that  in  this  coun- 
try, bonds,  like  other  contracts,  are  only 
voidable,  and  may  be  ratified.  Conroe  v. 
Birdsall,  1  Johns.  Cas.  127.  The  mar- 
ginal note  to  this  case  erroneously  uses 
the  word  loid,  in  relation  to  such  bond  ; 
the  court  said  it  was  only  voidable. 

('')  Earle  v.  Reed,  10  Met.  387  ;  Dubose 
V.  AVheddon,  4  McCord,  221.  See  also 
Stone  V.  Dennison,  13  Pick.  1 ;  Breed  v. 
Judd,   1  Gray,  455,  that   wherever    the 

VOL.  I.  23 


form  of  an  ihfant's  contract  for  neces- 
saries is  such  that  the  consideration  is 
open  to  inquiry,  he  may  be  sued  upon  the 
contract  itself.  And  in  Bradley  i\  Pratt, 
23  Vt.  378,  interest  was  allowed  on  a 
promissory  note  given  by  an  infant,  and 
it  is  declared  that  there  is  no  general  rule 
exempting  infants  from  a  liability  to  pay 
interest  on  tlieir  just  debts. 

(/)  Wiiittingham  v.  Hill,  Cro.  J.  494; 
Why  wall  v.  Champion,  2  Stra.  1083;  Dilk 
V.  Keighlev.  2  Esp.  480 ;  Latt  v.  Booth, 
3  Car.  &  K.  292.  But  if  with  his  guard- 
ian's consent  he  is  carrying  on  a  certain 
business,  it  has  been  held  that  lie  might 
bind  himself  to  pay  for  articles  suitable 
and  necessary  for  that  business.  Rundell 
V.  Keeler,  7  Watts,  237.  Srd  qucrre.  Al- 
though an  infant  cannot  trade,  and  would 
not  be  bound  to  execute  any  contract  of 
trade  he  may  have  entered  into,  yet  if  he 
has  in  part  executed  such  contract  him- 
self he  may  sue  the  adult  for  non-per- 
formance on  his  part,  and  this  wliile  he  is 
yet  an  infant.  Warwick  v.  Bruce,  2  M. 
&  Sel.  205.  As  to  bankruptcy  of  an  in- 
fant see  post,  Chapter  on  Bankruptcy  and 
Insolvency  in  Third  Volume. 

(q)  Turberville  i:.  Whitehouse,  1  G..& 
P.  94;  s.  c.  12  Price,  G92. 

(h)  Burghart  v.  Angerstein,  6  C.  &  P; 
690. 

353 


*315 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


ruptcy   or   insolvency,  (i)    nor   is   he   liable   as   a  partner  of  a 

mercantile  firm.  (/)  ^     Nor  can  he  be  sued  on  his  cove- 

*  315    nant  as  an  *  apprentice,  (/c)     Nor  is  his  contract  for  labor 


(/)  For  no  man  can  be  a  bankrupt,  for 
debts  which  he  is  not  obliged  to  pay. 
Rex  V.  Cole,  1  Ld.  Raym.  44o,  per  Holt, 
C.  J.  ;  Ex  parte  Sydebotham,  1  Atk. 
14G  —  And  a  connnission  of  bankruptcy 
against  an  infant  is  void,  and  not  merely 
voidable.  Belton  v.  Hodges,  9  Bing.  3(35; 
O'Brien  v.  Currie,  3  C.  &  P.  283.  This  is 
the  English  rule  ;  but  in  this  country  it 
has  been  held  that  an  infant  is  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  the  bankrupt  law  of  the 
United  States  of  1841,  and  that  the  pro- 
ceedings might  be  in  his  own  name.  In 
re  Samuel  Book,  3  McLean,  317. 

{j}  If,  liowever,  an  infant  engages  in 
a  partnership,  he  must,  at  or  within  a 
reasonable  time  after  the  periotl  of  his 
coming  of  age,  notify  his  disaffirmance 
thereof  ;  otherwise  he  will  be  deemed  to 
have  confirmed  it,  and  will  be  bound  by 
subsequent  contracts  made  on  the  credit 
of  the  partnership.  Goode  u.  Harrison,  5 
B.  &  Aid.  147.  Diufley,  J.,  in  this  case, 
said  :  "  It  is  clear  that  an  infant  may  be 
in  partnership.  It  is  true  that  he  is  not 
liable  for  contracts  entered  into  during 
his  infancy  ;  but  still,  he  may  be  a  part- 
ner. If  he  is  in  point  of  fact  a  partner 
during  his  infancy,  he  may,  wlien  he 
comes  of  age,  elect  if  he  will  continue 
that  partnersliip  or  not.  If  he  continues 
the  partnersliip,  he  will  then  be  liable  as 
a  partner  ;  if  he  dissolves  the  partnership, 
and  if,  when  of  age,  he  takes  the  proper 
means  to  let  the  world  know  that  the 
partnership  is  dissolved,  then  he  will 
cease  to  be  a  partner.  But  the  founda- 
tion of  my  opinion  is  the  negligence  of 
Bennion  at  the  time  he  became  of  age. 
Suppose  an  infant  is  not  really  a  partner, 
and  that,  during  his  infancy,  he  never  in 
fact  enters  into  any  joint  purchase,  but 
that  he  holds  out  to  different  people,  '  I 
am  a  partn(?r  with  A,'  and  then  comes  of 
age.  Suppose  also  that  the  person  to 
whom  he  made  tlie  representation  fur- 
nishes A  with  goods,  A  representing  him- 
self to  be  a  partner  with  the  infant,  and 


the  latter  having  done  nothing  to  correct 
the  mistake  and  apprehension  in  the 
mind  of  the  seller  of  those  goods,  I 
should  think,  in  such  a  case  as  that,  the 
infant,  the  person  who,  when  he  was  an 
infant,  had  represented  lumself  as  being 
a  partner  with  A,  would,  by  suffering 
that  delusion  to  continue  when  he  be- 
came of  age,  and  neglecting  to  set  the 
matter  right,  be  liable  to  all  those  per- 
sons upon  whom  the  delusion  operated. 
That  is  the  justice,  and  as  it  seems  to  me, 
the  law,  of  the  case."  So  in  Miller  v. 
Situs,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  479,  it  was  held  that 
an  infant  partner,  who  afterwards  con- 
firmed the  contract  of  partnership,  by 
transacting  the  business  and  receivitig 
the  profits,  became  thereby  liable  on  all 
the  previous  liabilities  of  the  firm,  even 
such  as  were  not  known  to  hitn.  But  as 
to  the  last  point  see  contra,  Grabtree  v. 
May,  1  B.  Mon.  280. 

(k)  It  is  clear  that  an  infant  cannot  be 
sued  on  his  covenants  of  indenture.  See 
Gylbert  v.  Fletcher,  Cro.  C.  179  ;  Jennins 
r.  Pitiuan,  Hutton,  63;  Lvlly's  case,  7 
Mod.  15;  Whitley  v.  Loftus,  8  Mod.  190; 
Frazier  v.  Rowan,  2  Brevard,  47  ;  Mc- 
Knight  V.  Hogg,  3  Brevard,  44.  —  But  if 
the  infant  is  a  part\'  to  the  indenture,  or 
his  consent  is  expressed  in  it,  many  cases 
have  held  that  the  contract  of  apjirentice- 
ship  is  binding  absolutel}'  upon  him,  and 
that  he  cannot  dissolve  the  relation  thus 
created.  See  Rex  v.  Great  Wigston,  3  B. 
&  C.  484.  —  And  a  right  of  action  neces- 
sarily results  to  the  injured  party  for  a 
breach  thereof.  Woodruff  v.  Logan,  1 
Eng.  (Ark.)  276.  —  And  this,  because  it 
was  said  that  such  contracts  must  he  for 
the  infant's  benefit,  and  therefore  he 
should  not  avoid  them.  But  analogy  and 
principle  would  seem  to  require  that,  in- 
dependent of  any  statutory  provisions 
regulating  this  matter,  this  contract,  like 
all  otiiers,  should  be  voidable  at  his 
election.  See  the  cases  cited  in  the  next 
note.     Where  a  statute  allows  a  parent 


1  But  if  an  infant  actually  enters  into  a  partnership,  has  the  benefit  of  it  while  it 
lasts,  and  draws  out  the  greater  part  of  his  contribution,  he  must,  on  its  dissolution 
with  assets  insuffieient  to  pay  the  claims  of  all  the  ])artners,  bear  his  equal  and  propor- 
tionate share  of  the  loss  of  capital.  Moley  v.  Brine,  120  Mass,  .324.  The  fact  that  two 
infant  mortgagors,  after  one  of  them  became  of  age,  received  a  part  of  the  consideration 
and  made  a  ])art  payment  on  the  mortgage,  will  justify  the  inference  of  a  ratification. 
Keegan  v.  Cox,  116  Mass.  289.  For  facts  held  insufficient  to  justify  a  jury  in  finding 
that  there  was  a  ratification  of  firm  matters  by  an  infant  partner  on  becoming  of  age, 
sec  Minock  v.  Sliorthridge,  21  Mich.  304;  Todd  v.  Clapp,  118  Mass.  495;  Tobey  v. 
Wood,  123  Mass.  88. 

354 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


*316 


and  service  generally  binding.  (Z)  ^  But  enlistments  in  the  navy, 
though  made  without  the  consent  of  the  parent  or  guardian,  are 
binding,  and  tlie  infant  cannot  avoid  them ;  (w)  and  it  is  the  same 
as  to  the  army,  (n)  Neither  can  he  avoid  a  contract  whereby  he 
undertakes  to  do  what  he  is  under  a  legal  obligation  to  do ;  as  a 
bond  executed  under  a  statute,  to  indemnify  a  town  for  the  sup- 
port of  an  illegitimate  child ;  for  which  an  order  of  filiation  has 
been  made  upon  him.  (o)  ^  He  is  not  responsible  as  an 
innkeeper  for  *  losses  sustained  by  his  guests.  (|>)  Nor  *  316 
will  joining  her  husband  in  a  conveyance  bar  an  infant 
feme  covert  of  her  right  of  dower.  (5-) 


to  bind  liis  son  as  an  apprentice,  un- 
doubtedly an  indenture  executed  in  pur- 
suance of  such  statute  would  bind  all  the 
parties  to  it ;  and  the  infant  could  not 
dissolve  the  relation  thus  created,  but  it 
would  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
remedy  of  the  adult,  for  the  desertion  of 
the  apprentice,  would  be  an  adion  ayainst 
him  on  his  covenants.  See  also  Harper  v. 
Gilbert,  5  Cush.  417. 

(/)  Vent  V.  Osgood,  19  Pick.  572; 
Moses  r.  Stevens,  2  Pick.  o32  ;  Nickerson 
V.  Easton,  12  Pick.  110 ;  Francis  v.  Fel- 
mit,  4  Dev.  &  B.  498;  Thomas  v.  Dike, 
11  Vt.  273 ;  Peters  v.  Lord,  18  Conn.  337. 
And  if  an  infant  avoids  such  contract 
when  part  performed,  he  may  recover  on 
a  quantum  meruit  for  the  labor  actually 
performed  under  it.  Vent  v.  Osarood,  19 
Pick.  572  ;  Judkins  v.  Walker,  17^Me.  38  ; 
Mcdbury  v.  Watrous,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  110 
(overruling  the  contrarj^  cases  of  McCoy 
V.  Huffman,  8  Cowen,  84 ;  Weeks  r.  Leigh- 
ton,  5  N.  H.  ;343  ;  Harney  v.  Owen,  4 
Blackf.  337).  Deducting,  it  seems,  any 
injury  the  adult  may  have  sustained  by 
such  avoidance.  Thomas  v.  Dike,  11  Vt. 
278  ;  Moses  v.  Stevens.  2  Pick.  332  ;  Jud- 
kins r.  Walker.  17  Me.  38.  But  see 
Whitmarsh  v.  Hall,  3  Denio,  375,  contra, 
as  to  deducting  for  injury  to  the  adult. 

(m)  Commonwealth  v.  Gamble,  11  S. 
&  R.  93 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Murray,  4 
Binn.  487 ;   United  States  v.  Bainbridge, 


1  Mason,  71 ;  United  States  v.  Blakeney, 
3  Gratt.  405. 

(»)  The  statutes  of  the  United  States 
provide  that  the  enlistment  of  a  minor 
without  the  consent  of  his  parent  or 
guardian  cannot  be  avoided.  But  no 
person  under  the  age  of  eighteen  shall  be 
mustered  into  the  LTnited  States  service, 
and  the  oath  of  enlistment  taken  by  the 
recruit  shall  be  conclusive  as  to  his  age. 
12  Stat,  at  Large,  339. 

(o)  People  ('.  Moores,  4  Denio,  518. 
So  where  a  father  entered  on  land  in  the 
name  of  his  minor  son,  for  tlie  purpose  of 
defrauding  his  creditors,  and  afterwards 
sold  the  land,  which  his  son  by  his  direc- 
tion conveyed  by  his  own  deed,  during  his 
infancy,  to  the  purchaser,  it  was  held 
that  such  deed  was  one  which  the  law 
would  have  compelled  him  to  make,  and 
therefore  could  not  be  avoided  by  him  on 
arriving  at  full  age.  Elliot  v.  Horn,  10 
Ala.  348.  In  like  manner  equal  partition 
of  lands  binds  an  infant.  Bavington  v. 
Clark,  2  Penn.  St.  115;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hantz,  id.  333.  The  binding  effect  of 
proceedings  in  partition  in  Pennsjdvania, 
where  a  purpart  is  accepted  by  the  guar- 
dian, depends  upon  statutes.  Gilbach's 
Appeal,  8  S   &  P.  205. 

{p)  Holt,  C.  J.,  Williams  v.  Harrison, 
Carth.  161 ;  Crosse  v.  Androes,  1  Roll. 
Abr.  2,  D.  pi.  3. 

[q)  Cunningham  v.  Knight,  1  Barb.  399. 


1  Thus  an  infant  may  sue  on  a  quantum  meruit  on  an  avoided,  partially  executed 
labor  contract.  Gaffney  y.  Hayden,  108  Mass.  137;  Derocher  v.  Continental  Mills,  58 
Me.  217.  See  Shurtleff  r.  Millard,  12  R.  I.  272.  An  infant  is,  however,  bound  by  an 
executed  contract  for  his  services,  even  though  not  exclusively  for  necessaries,  if  it  was 
apparentlv  fair  and  reasonable,  and  the  other  partv  did  not  know  of  his  infancy.  Spicer 
V.  Earl,  4i  Mich.  191. 

2  A  "  recognizance"  given  by  an  infant  to  appear  in  a  higher  court  is  binding  upon 
him.    Fagin  v.  Goggin,  12  R.  I.  398.    An  infant  is  also  liable  for  the  services  of  an  attor- 


ney in  defending  him  in  a  bastardy  proceedinr 


Barker  v.  Hibbard,  54  N.  H.  539. 

355 


*  317  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

It  may  be  added,  that  an  infant  may  be  an  attorney  or  agent  to 
execute  a  new  poAver,  or,  indeed,  to  perform  any  act  which  he  has 
physical  and  mental  capacity  to  perform,  (r) 


SECTION  IV. 

OP   THE   TORTS   OF   AN   INFANT. 

An  infant  is  protected  against  his  contracts,  Init  not  against  his 
frauds  or  other  torts,  (.s)  But  only  for  those  committed  by  him- 
self, and  not  for  those  of  persons  representing  him,  as  he  cannot 
have  an  agent,  in  the  legal  sense  of  the  word,  (s.s-)  His  promis- 
sory note  given  as  a  compensation  for  his  torts  is  not  binding.  (0 
If  such  tort  or  fraud  consists  in  the  breach  of  his  contract,  then 
he  is  not  liable  therefor  in  an  action  sounding  in  tort,  because 
this  would  make  him  liable  for  his  contract  merely  by  a  change 
in  the  form  of  the  action,  which  the  law  does  not  permit,  (m)  ^ 
But  where  the  tort,  though  connected  by  circumstances  with  the 
contract,  is  still  distinguishable  from  it,  there  he  is  liable.  As  if 
he  hires  a  horse  for  an  unnecessary  ride  he  is  not  liable  for  the 

hire,  Imt  if  in  the  course  of  the  ride  he  wilfully  abuses  and 
*  317    injures  the  *  horse,  he  is  liable  for  the  tort,  (v)  ^     And  if 

he  should  sell  the  horse,  trover  would  lie,  nor  would  his 

(r)    Slic'ldnn    v.   Newton,   3    Oliio    St.  IMorrill  v.  Aden,  19  Vt.  505,  tliat  infancy 

494;  Tlioinjjson  r.  Lyon,  20  Mo.  155.  is  a  bar  to  an  action  fonndcd  on  a  false 

(s)  See  Stone  ?'.  Witliipool,  Latcli,  21 ;  and   fraudulent    warranty.      But   contra, 

Bullock  V.  Babcock,  .'J  Wend.  ;]91  ;  Hanks  Word    y.    Vance,    1    Nott   &  McC.    197  ; 

V.  Deal,  8  McCord,  257  ;  Green  v.  Sperry,  Peignc  v.  Sutcliffe,  4  McCord,  .387  ;   The 

16  Vt.  390;    Lewis  v.  Littlefield,  15  Me.  Peoille  v.  Kendall,  25  Wend.  399;    Jen- 

233;    Hartfield  v.  Roper,  21   Wend.  015,  ninjis  v.  Kundall,  8  T.  R.  337  ;   Gilson  v. 

620;    Brown  i;.  Maxwell,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  Spear,  .38  Vt.  311. 

592,  594  :  Homer  >■  Tliwinj?,  3  Pick.  492  ;  (v)  Campbell  r.  Stakes,  2  Wend.  137. 
School  I)i>t. '•.  Bragdon,  3  Foster  (N.  H.),  And  so  he  will  be  liable  in  trover  if  he 
516;  Walker  v.  Davis,  1  Gray,  506.  He  drive  the  horse  further,  or  on  a  different 
is  even  liable  for  his  own  torts,  though  route  from  that  for  which  he  has  en- 
he  act  bj'  his  father's  command,  Humpl)-  gaged  him.  Homer  ?'.  Thwing,  3  Pick 
rey  v.  Douglass,  10  Vt.  71  ;  or  through  492.  Approved  in  Green  v.  Sperry,  16 
the  agency  of  a  third  person,  Sikes  v.  Vt.  .390;  Towne  v.  Wilev,  23  Vt.  353. 
Johnson,  1«  Mass.  389.  And  see  Vasse  r.  Smitli,  iS  Cranch,  226. 

(,ss)   Bobbins  r.  Mount,  4  Rob.  553.  But  see  Witt  r.  Welsli,  (!  Watts,  9;    Pen- 

(/)  Hanks  i:  Deal,  3  McCord,  257.  rose  v.  Curren,  3  Rawle,  351  ;  1  Am.  Lead. 

(«)    See  West  v.  Moore,  14  Vt.  447;  Cas.  118,  119  (Isted.)  ;   10  Am.  Jur.  98; 

Brown    v.   Durham,   1    Root,   273;    and  11  id.  G9 ;  20  id.  264. 

1  That  infancy  is  a  bar  to  an  action  for  false  and  fraudulent  representations  by  a 
vendor  or  pledger  as  to  his  owncrshi])  of  property  sold  or  ])ledged,  see  Doran  v.  Smith, 
49  Vt.  3.'j.3,  and  17  Am.  Law  Reg.  n.  8.  42,  and  the  elaborate  note  of  E.  H.  Bennett 
in  the  latter,  at  p.  44. 

-  But  not  for  a  failure  to  drive  the  horse  skilfully.     Eaton  v.  Ilill,  50  N.  H.  235. 

35G 


CH.  XVII.] 


IN1PANTS. 


317 


infancy  bo  a  good  defence.  Nor  need  this  tort  or  fraud  be  subse- 
quent to  the  contract.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  bond  given  by  an 
infant  and  received  by  the  obligee  in  reliance  upon  his  false  and 
fraudulent  representations  of  his  being  of  full  age,  the  bond 
cannot  be  enforced  against  him.  (w^  But  as  soon  as  the  infant 
makes  and  delivers  it,  he  is  guilty  of  a  fraud,  for  which  an  ac- 
tion   may  at   once    be   maintained   for   any   loss  sustained,  (x) 


(w)  Conroe  v.  Birdsall,  1  Jolins.  Cas. 
127;  Brown  v.  McCuiio,  5  Saiulf.  224. 
Neither  will  liis  warrant  of  attorney  to 
confess  judgment  bind  him,  and  tiie  court 
caimot  make  it  good,  altliough  there  be 
fraud  in  the  infant.  Saunderson  v.  Marr, 
1  U.  Bl.  75.  See  also  Burley  v.  llussell, 
10  N.  H.  184;  Stoolfoos  v.  Jenkins,  12 
S.  &  K.  399. 

(./•)  Fitts  V.  Hall,  9  N.  H.  441  (over- 
ruling Johnson  i\  Pie,  1  Lev.  169).  Com. 
Dig.  Artion  oil  the  Cast  for  Deceit,  A.  10;  2 
Kent,  Com.  241,  n.  (c) ;  Reeves'  Dom. 
Rel.  259.  —  And  in  Wallace  i'.  Morss,  5 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  391,  an  infant  who  had 
fraudulently  obtained  goods  upon  credit, 
not  intending  to  pay  for  them,  was  held 
liable  in  an  action  for  the  tort.  But  see 
contra,  Brown  v.  McCune,  5  Sandf .  224 ; 
Price  V.  Hewett,  18  E.  L.  &  E.  522;  s.  c. 
8  Exch.  14G.  The  case  of  Fitts  v.  Hall, 
supra,  is  decidedly  condemned  in  1  Am. 
Lead.  Cas.  pp.  117,118,  where  the  learned 
editors  say  :  "  Tliis  decision,  which  di- 
rectly overrules  Johnson  v.  Pie,  1  Lev. 
169,  is  clearly  unsound  ;  the  representa- 
tion by  itself  was  not  actionable,  for  it 
was  not  an  injury  ;  and  the  avoidance  of 
the  contract,  which  alone  made  it  so,  was 
the  exercise  of  a  perfect  legal  right  on 
the  part  of  the  infant.  The  contract, 
in  such  a  case  as  Fitts  v.  Hall,  forms  an 
essential  part  of  the  right  of  action,  and 
no  liability  growing  out  of  contract  can 
be  asserted  against  an  infant.  The  test 
of  an  action  against  an  infant  is,  wliether 
a  liability  can  be  made  out  witliout 
taking  notice  of  the  contract.  It  is  ad- 
mitted, in  the  same  court,  that  such  an 
affirmation  as  in  Fitts  r.  Hall  does  not 
estop  the  infant  so  as  to  render  him  liable 
on  tlie  contract ;  which  implies  that  the 
avoidance  of  a  contract  induced  by  such 
a  representation  is  not  a  fraud."  In  the 
case  referred  to,  Parker,  C.  J.,  says : 
"  But  .Johnson  v.  Pie,  1  Lev.  169,  was 
'  case,  for  tliat  the  defendant  being  an  in- 
fant, affirmed  himself  to  be  of  full  age, 
and  by  means  thereof  the  plaintiff  lent 
him  .£100,  and  so  he  had  cheated  the 
plaintiff  by  this  false  affirmation.'  After 
verdict  for  the  plaintiif,  it  was  moved  in 
arrest  of  judgment  that  the  action  would 


not  lie  for  this  false  affirmation,  but  the 
plaintiff  ought  to  have  informed  himself 
by  others.  '  Keli/nt/e  and  Wyndhim  lield 
that  the  action  did  not  lie,  because  the 
affirmation  being  by  an  infant,  was  void  ; 
and  it  is  not  like  to  trespass,  felony,  &c., 
for  there  is  a  fact  done.  Twysden  doubt- 
ed, for  that  infants  are  chargeable  for 
trespasses,  Dyer,  105 ;  and  so,  if  he 
cheat  with  false  dice,  &c.'  The  report  in 
Levinz  states  that  the  case  was  ad- 
journed ;  but  in  a  note,  referring  to  1 
Keb.  905,  913,  it  is  stated  that  judgment 
was  arrested.  If  this  case  be  sound,  the 
present  action  cannot  be  sustained  on  the 
first  count.  From  a  reference  in  the 
margin,  it  seems  that  the  same  case  is 
reported,  1  Sid.  258.  Chief  Baron  Comijns, 
however,  who  is  himself  regarded  as  high 
authority,  seems  to  have  taken  no  notice 
of  this  case  in  his  Digest,  'Action  on  the 
case  for  Deceit,'  but  lays  down  the  rule 
that  '  if  a  man  affirms  himself  of  full 
age  when  he  is  an  infant,  and  thereby 
procures  money,  to  be  lent  to  him  upon 
mortgage,'  he  is  liable  for  the  deceit ;  for 
which  he  cites  1  Sid.  183;  Com.  Dig. 
Action,  &c.  A.  10.  We  are  of  opinion 
that  this  is  the  true  principle.  If  infancy 
is  not  permitted  to  protect  fraudulent 
acts,  and  infants  are  liable  in  actions  ex 
delicto,  whether  founded  on  jjositive 
wrongs,  or  constructive  torts,  or  frauds 
(2  Kent,  Com.  197),  as  for  slander  (Hods- 
man  V.  Grissel,  Noy,  129),  and  goods  con- 
verted (auth.  ante),  there  is  no  sound 
reason  that  occurs  to  us  why  an  infant 
sliould  not  be  chargeable  in  damages  for 
a  fraudulent  misrepresentation  wliereby 
another  has  received  damage."  But  it  is 
believed  that  the  true  ground  of  the  de- 
cision in  Fitts  V.  Hall  was  mistaken  in 
the  Am.  Lead.  Cases,  the  learned  authors 
being  misled  perhaps  by  the  marginal 
note,  in  which  it  is  said  that  "  An  infant 
is  answerable  for  a  fraudulent  represen- 
tation and  deceit,  wliich  is  not  connected 
with  the  subject-matter  of  a  contract,  but 
by  wliich  the  other  party  is  induced  to 
enter  into  one  with  liim,  ;/  he  afterwards 
avoids  the  contract  hi/  reason  of  his  infancy." 
Such  may  have  been  tiie  case  before  the 
court;  but  the  principle  to  be  deduced 

357 


*  318  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

*  318    As  lon.a-  as  the  bond  runs,  *  it  is  not  clear  that  he  will  not 

pay  it;  and  this  uncertainty  should  perhaps  reduce  the 
damages  to  a  nominal  amount.  But  when  he  refuses  to  pay, 
and  avoids  the  bond,  by  this  refusal  he  gives  no  new  cause  of 
action,  but  now  in  the  action  grounded  upon  the  original  tort,  full 
damages  may  be  given.  It  might  be  held,  however,  that  before 
any  action  could  be  maintained  for  the  fraud  in  making  such  a 
bond,  either  he  must  have  refused  payment,  or  else  the  bond 
should  be  returned  to  him ;  and  then  the  plaintiff  would  be  enti- 
tled to  recover  the  full  amount  of  the  bond.  And  if  goods  were 
sold  to  an  infant  in  reliance  upon  his  fraudulent  representations 
that  he  was  of  full  age,  the  seller  may  reclaim  them,  certainly  on 
his  refusal  to  pay,  if  not  before,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  never 
parted  with  his  property,  (y)  If  he  allows  a  person  to  buy  his 
property,  in  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser,  and  with- 
out informing  the  purchaser  that  he  is  an  infant,  it  has  been 
intimated,  tliat  he  cannot  recover  his  property  from  the  purcha- 
ser. (2)     The  reasons  for  this  view  are  not  satisfactory,  and  the 

doctrine  is  denied  in  another  case  in  the  same  State,  (a) 

*  319    *  When   goods   not    necessaries    are    sold    to    an    infant, 

without  fraudulent  representations  by  him,  with  a  knowl- 
edge by  the  seller  of  his  infancy,  and  the  infant  refuses  to  pay 
for  them,  and  also  refuses  to  return  the  goods,  although  they  are 
within  his  possession  and  control,  some  question  exists  as  to  the 
rights  of  the  seller.  Some  authorities  support  the  doctrine  that 
he  is  remediless,  regarding  the  incapacity  of  the  infant  as  his 
privilege  and  his  defence.  But  it  seems  unreasonable  and  unjust 
to  say  that  the  infant  may  refuse  to  pay  for  the  goods,  without 

from  the  decision  is,  that  a  fraudulent  the  more  silence  of  the  infant  as  to  his 

misrepresentation,    wliereby    money     or  age,   knowing   tliat   tiie  otiier   party  be- 

goods  are  olitained  by  an  infant,  is   itself  lieved  him  an  adult,  would  be  a  sufficient 

an  actionable  injury.    It  is  stated  in  Bac.  ground  to  enable  the  otlier  party  to  re- 

Abr.  IiifnucAj  ^-  Aqe  (I.),  ?,:  "  If  an  infant  claim  the  goods  so   jtarted  with.     See  20 

without  any  contract,  wilfully  takes  away  Am.  Jur.  2(i.j.      But  in  Stikeman  v.  Daw- 

the  goods  of  another,  trover  lies  against  son,  1  De  Gex  &  S.  IX),  it  was  held  that  in 

him.     Also  it  is  said,  that  if  he  take  the  the  absence  of  any  positive  misrepresen- 

goods  under  i)retence  that  he  is  of  full  tation,  the  mere  omission  of  the  infant  to 

age,  trover  lies,  because  it  is  a  wilful  and  disclose  his  minority  was  not  a  sufficient 

fraudulent    trespass."      So   an    infant  is  fraud  to  invalidate  the  contract.      So  his 

liable  for  a  fraudulent   execution    of    a  note  is  voidable,  although  the  i)ayee  did 

trust  confided  to  him.      Loop  v.  Loop,  1  not  know  of  his  iiifancy  an<l  altiiougli  he 

Vt.  177.  was  carrying  on  trade  as  an  adult.      Van 

(y)  Badger  1-.  riiinney,  15  Mass.  359  ;  Winkle  i-.  Ketcham,  3  Caines.  32o. 

Mills  V.  Graham,  4  B.  &  P.  140,  per.l/aHS-  (r)  Hall  v.  Timmons,  2  Rich.  Eq.  120. 

fiM,  C.  J. ;  Funics  i'.  Smith,  1  R(j11.  Abr.  (a)  Norris  v.  Wait,  2  llich.  Eq.  148. 
530,  C  pi.  3.     It  has  been  suggested  that 

358 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


320 


affecting  the  validity  of  the  sale  to  him.  It  should  scorn  enough 
if  the  infant  has  the  power  of  rescinding  the  sale.  This  is  an 
adequate  protection  ;  and  if  the  goods  are  out  of  his  possession 
when  the  sale  is  rescinded,  the  seller  may  be  wholly  without 
remedy.  But  when  the  sale  is  rescinded,  the  property  in  the  goods 
should  revest  in  the  seller,  so  far,  at  least,  that  if  he  finds  them 
in  the  possession  of  the  infant,  he  may  peaceably  retake  them  as 
his  own.  And  if  he  demands  them,  the  refusal  of  the  infant  to 
deliver  them  would  seem  to  be  a  tort  wholly  independent  of  the 
contract,  on  which  trover  might  be  maintained.  And  there 
are  authorities  which  sustain  this  view.  (6)     *  At  all  events,    *  320 


{b)  Judge  Reeve  states  similar  views 
in  liis  work  on  the  Domestic  Relations, 
p.  244.  He  siiys  :  "  But  it  seems  to  liave 
been  an  opinion  among  the  elementary 
writers,  that  if  a  contract  be  performed 
by  the  adult  to  the  infant,  and  then  the 
infant  refuse  to  perform  his  part,  and 
this  contract  be  rescinded ;  that,  in  such 
cases,  the  adult  has  no  remedy  to  recover 
the  consideration  paid  to  the  minor.  So 
that  if  a  minor  should  contract  to  pay  an 
adult  •'?50  for  a  horse,  sold  to  him  by  the 
adult,  and  then  the  minor  should  rescind 
the  contract,  that  the  adult  nmst  lose  his 
horse.  Or  if  a  minor  should  buy  a  horse, 
and  pay  for  him,  that  he  might  rescind 
the  contract,  and  recover  back  the 
money,  and  yet  retain  the  horse  ;  it  being 
a  presumption  of  law,  as  they  say,  that 
the  consideration  paid  or  delivered  by 
the  adult  was  intended  as  a  present  to 
the  minor.  This  doctrine  appears  to  me 
to  be  wholly  destitute  of  principle,  and 
not  supi>orted  by  the  authorities.  That 
tiie  minor  has  a  right  to  rescind  his  con- 
tract at  pleasure  is  not  controverted  ;  but 
when  rescinded  I  should  suppose  that  the 
contract  was  as  if  it  had  never  been,  and 
that  the  minor  could  never  retain  when 
he  had  rescinded.  I  apprehend  it  to  be 
a  sound  maxim,  and  which  is  founded 
in  the  highest  reason,  that  an  infant,  al- 
though he  may  always  use  his  privilege, 
as  a  shield  to  defend  himself  against  his 
own  contracts,  yet  he  shall  never  make 
use  of  it  as  an  offensive  weapon  to  injure 
others.  It  is  enough  that  an  infant  shall 
have  full  power  to  set  afloat  his  contract. 
In  doing  tliis  he  is  in  the  proper  use  of  his 
privilege ;  but  to  obtain,  by  that  means, 
property  from  others,  is  a  fraud,  and  is 
turning  his  privilege  into  an  offensive 
weapon,  which  the  law  will  not  indulge. 
It  is  true  that  the  lawful  exercise  of  tliis 
privilege  will  produce  the  effect  of  de- 
frauding others,  iii  many  cases.  As  where 


an  infant  has  bought  a  horse,  and  given 
his  note  for  the  value,  and  then  avoids 
his  note  by  a  plea  of  infancy ;  and  has 
sold  the  horse,  spent  the  money  received, 
and  is  unable  to  pay  the  value  of  the 
horse  ;  in  this  case  the  adult  may  be  de- 
frauded, but  it  is  because  the  minor  is 
unable  to  pay,  or  make  him  satisfaction. 
But  how,  in  point  of  principle  and  good 
sense,  would  the  case  be,  if  tlie  infant 
were  in  possession  of  the  horse  at  the 
time  he  avoided  the  note  "?  Would  not  the 
whole  contract  be  utterly  void,  and  as 
much  blotted  out  of  existence  as  if  it  had 
never  been  ?  and  would  not  the  horse 
then  be  the  property  of  the  adult,  the 
infant  having  received  the  full  benefit  of 
his  privilege ;  that  is,  the  privilege  of 
not  being  bound  by  his  contract  1  And  if 
the  property  of  the  horse  were  in  the 
adult,  he  might  retake  him  in  a  peaceable 
manner  prescribed  by  law,  and  might  de- 
mand him  of  the  infant ;  and  in  the  case 
of  refusal  might  bring  an  action  of  trover 
against  the  minor,  for  converting  the 
horse  to  his  own  use."  Judge  Meicalf,  in 
his  very  valuable  articles  on  the  Law  of 
Contracts,  in  the  American  Jurist,  says, 
vol.  XX.  p.  260 :  "  But  where  the  infant 
refuses  to  pay  for  articles  sold  to  him, 
the  other  party  cannot  retake  the  articles ; 
and  where  lie  has  received  money  for 
property  which  he  engaged  to  deliver  to 
the  purchaser,  and  afterwards  refuses  to 
deliver,  his  privilege  (as  it  is  termed)  is 
his  defence.  This  is  manifestly  inequit- 
able, and  Judge  Reeve  therefore  zealously 
contends  that  such  is  not  the  law.  But 
the  principles  of  the  law  of  infancy  seem 
to  lead  to  this  result,  and  the  authorities 
to  be  too  stubborn  to  be  resisted."  We 
confess  that  we  think  the  views  of  Judge 
Reeve  more  consonant  with  the  {)rinciples 
of  law,  as  well  as  of  equity.  The  infant 
is  not  bound  by  his  promise ;  but  this 
must  mean  that  the  promise  was  void,  or 

359 


321 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


it  seems  to  bo  admitted  that  if  the  infant  has  received  the  goods 
and  paid  for  them,  he  cannot  avoid  the  contract  and  recover  the 
money  paid,  without  redelivering  the  goods,  (c) 


*321  *  SECTION  V. 

OP   THE   EFFECT   OF   AN   INFANT's    AVOIDANCE   OF   HIS   CONTRACT. 

Every  executory  contract  may  be  avoided  by  an  infant,  and 
then  the  adult  dealing  with  him  is  relieved  from  his  part  of  the 
contract ;  as  if  the  contract  were  for  the  sale  of  a  horse,  by  the 
infant,  and  the  infant  refuses  to  deliver  the  horse,  the  adult  of 
course  may  refuse  to  pay  the  price.  But  if  it  be  executed  on  the 
part  of  the  adult,  —  as,  for  instance,  by  the  payment  in  advance 
for  the  horse,  —  and  the  infant  then  annuls  the  contract,  and  re- 
fuses to  deliver  the  horse,  the  rights  of  the  other  party  are  not  so 
certain,  (c/)  If,  previous  to  the  contract,  the  infant  fraudulently 
represented  himself  as  of  age,  we  have  seen,  that  for  this  fraud 
he  may  be  answerable.     But,  if  there  were  no  such  representa- 


may  be  made  void,  and  when  void  it  is  as 
if  it  liad  not  been ;  and  tlierefore  when 
the  infant  has  defeated  the  claim  of  the 
seller  for  tlie  price  by  avoiding  his  prom- 
ise, there  is  an  end  of  the  contract.  We 
see  no  sufficient  reason  for  connecting  his 
subsequent  wrong-doing,  in  refusing  to 
redeliver  the  property  with  the  contract, 
so  as  to  say  tlie  owner  now  sues  substan- 
tially for  a  breach  of  the  contract,  al- 
though formally,  in  tort.  He  demands, 
in  fact  as  well  as  in  form,  damages  for 
the  wrongful  detention  of  property  which 
is  his,  because  it  was  his,  and  has  never 
passed  out  of  him  but  by  a  contract 
which  the  infant  has  exercised  his  right 
of  rescinding.  We  tiiink  the  case  of 
Vasse  V.  Smith,  0  Cranch,  220,  rests  upon 
similar  principles.  There  the  defendant 
received  goods  as  supercargo,  but  dis- 
posed of  them  in  disobedience  to  the 
orders  of  the  owner,  who  brought  trover. 
The  defendant  pleaded  and  proved  in- 
fancy, and  the  court  below  held  it  to  be 
a  sufficient  ilcfence.  Marslidll,  C.  J.,  in 
delivering  the  o|)inion  of  the  Supreme 
(,'ourt,  said :  "  This  court  is  of  opinion 
that  infancy  is  no  complete  bar  to  an 
action  of  trover,  althougli  the  goods 
converted  be  in   his  possession,  in  virtue 

3G0 


of  a  previous  contract.  The  conversion 
is  still  in  its  nature  a  tort ;  it  is  not  an 
act  of  omission,  but  of  connnission,  and 
is  within  that  class  of  offences  for  which 
infancy  cannot  afford  protection.  .  .  . 
This  instruction  of  the  court  (below) 
must  have  been  founded  on  the  opinion 
that  infancy  is  a  bar  to  an  action  of 
trover  for  goods  committed  to  the  infant 
under  a  contract.  .  .  .  This  court  has 
already  stated  its  opinion  to  be,  that  an 
infant  is  chargeable  with  a  conversion, 
although  it  be  of  goods  which  came  law- 
fully to  his  possession."  And  see  Walker 
V.  Davis,  1  Gray,  506.  We  think  that 
Badsjer  r.  Phinney,  15  Mass.  359,  and 
Fitts  ?'.  Hall,  9  N.  H.  441,  imply  similar 
principles. 

(c)  Holmes  v.  Blogg.  8  Taunt.  508; 
Bailey  v.  Bamberger,  11  B.  Mon.  113; 
Smith  V.  Evans,  5  Humph.  70;  Cummings 
V.  Powell,  8  Tex.  80.  And  see  Harney  v, 
Owen,  4  I^lackf.  387  :  Weeks  v.  Leighton, 
5  N.  H.  343 ;  Medbury  v.  Watrous,  7  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  110. 

{(i)  See  Shaw  ;'.  Boyd,  5  S.  &  R.  309 ; 
Crvmes  v.  Day,  1  Bailev,  320  ;  Jones 
V.  Todd,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  301,  20  Am.  Jur. 
200. 


CII.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  322 

tions,  it  is  not  certain  that  the  adult  party  has  any  remedy.  He 
cannot  brhig  trover  for  the  horse,  for  it  was  never  his ;  nor  case, 
unless  he  can  found  his  action  upon  a  wrong  independent  of  the 
contract ;  we  should  say,  however,  he  can  now  recover  the  money 
on  the  ground  that  the  entire  avoidance  of  the  sale  has  left  the 
infant  in  possession  of  money  that  belongs  only  to  the  adult.  If 
the  infant  disaffirms  a  sale  that  he  has  made,  and  reclaims  the 
property  he  sold,  it  seems  now  quite  well  settled  that  he  must 
return  the  purchase-money,  (e)  ^ 

If,  during  infancy,  he  has  destroyed  or  parted  with  the  property 
he  purchased  before  a  demand  was  made  upon  him  for  it  subse- 
quently to  his  disaffirmance,  the  seller,  as  we  have  said,  may 
be  remediless  ;  unless  he  does  this  in  such  a  way,  or  *  under  *  322 
such  circumstances,  as  to  amount  to  a  tort ;  but  if  he  de- 
stroys or  disposes  of  the  property  after  coming  of  age,  this  must 
be  regarded  as  a  confirmation  of  the  contract.  (/)  And  it  has 
been  held  that  an  infant  can  rescind  his  purchase  and  recover  the 
price  he  paid,  only  when  he  is  ready  to  return  the  thing  purchased  ; 
nor  do  we  think  the  rule  would  be  unjust  to  the  infant  if  it  did 
not  permit  him  to  rescind  his  purchase,  unless  he  was  both  willing 
and  able  to  return  the  thing  purchased  in  substantially  as  good 
a  condition  as  when  he  purchased  it.  (^) 

If  an  infant  advances  money  on  a  voidable  contract  which  he 
afterwards  rescinds,  he  cannot  recover  this  money  back,  because 
it  is  lost  to  him  by  his  own  act,  and  the  privilege  of  infancy  does 
not  extend  so  far  as  to  restore  this  money  unless  it  was  obtained 
from  him  by  f raud.^    Whether  an  infant  who  has  engaged  to  labor 

(p)  Badger  v.  Phinney,  15  Mass.  363;  dorsement,  because  he  cannot  restore 
Hubbard  v.  Cumniings,  1  Greenl.  13 ;  the  maker  of  the  bill  or  note  to  the 
Smith  V.  Evans,  5  Humph.  70 ;  Farr  v.  same  condition  as  before.  See  Dulty 
Sumner,  12  Vt.  28.  See  also  Taft  &  Co.  v.  Brownfield,  1  Barr,  497  ;  Willis  v. 
V.  Pike,  14  Vt.  405 ;  Carr  v.  Clough,  6  Twambly,  13  Mass.  204 ;  Niglitingale  i.-. 
Foster  (N.  H.),  280;  Heath  v.  West,^8  id.  Witliington,  15  Mass.  272. 
101.  And  for  the  rule  in  Chancery,  that  (  /)  Cheshire  v.  Barrett,  4  McCord, 
if  an  adult  files  his  bill  to  set  aside  a  con-  241  ;  Deason  v.  Boyd,  1  Dana,  45 ;  Law- 
veyance  made  when  under  age,  he  must  son  v.  Lovejoy,  8  Greenl.  405. 
offer  to  restore  the  purchase-money,  {Jf)  Riley  v.  Mallory,  83  Conn.  201. 
see  Hillyer  v.  Bennett,  3  Edw.  Ch.  222.  See  also  Bryant  v.  Pottinger,  6  Bush, 
So  if  tlie  indorsee  of  an  infant  payee  is  473;  Kerr  v.  Bell,  44  Mo.  120;  Middle- 
paid,   the  infant  cannot    avoid    his    in-  ton  v.  Hoge,  5  Bush,  478. 

1  That  he  may  recover  personalty,  without  returning  the  money  or  property,  see 
White  V.  Branch,  51  Ind.  210;  Carpenter  v.  Carpenter,  45  Ind.  142.  An  infant  may 
rescind  an  executed  sale  of  his  personal  property  during  minority,  upon  returning  the 
consideration  received ;  and  that  too  through  the  intervention  of  an  agent.  Towle  v. 
Dresser,  7.3  Me.  252.  As  to  an  infant's  avoidance  before  his  majority,  see,  further, 
Dunton  V.  Brown,  :n  Mich.  182. 

'  Sliurtletf  V.  Millard,  12  R.  I.  272,  is  at  variance  with  the  text.      Potter,  J.,  says, 

361 


*  322  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

for  a  certain  period,  and,  after  some  part  of  the  work  is  performed, 
rescinds  the  contract,  can  recover  for  the  work  he  has  done,  has 
been  differently  decided.  (^)  The  principle  upon  which  the  rule 
is  founded  that  forbiils  the  infant's  recovery  of  money  advanced 
by  him  on  a  contract  which  he  has  rescinded,  would  appear  to 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  he  could  not  recover  for  the  work  he 
had  done ;  but  the  weight  of  authority  seems  to  be  the  other  way. 
As  to  the  time  of  an  infant's  disaftirmance  of  his  contract,  it  may 
be  said,  in  general,  that  he  cannot  avoid  a  sale  of  lands,  conclu- 
sively, until  of  full  age,  (Ji)  although  he  may  enter  while  under 
age,  and  take  and  hold  the  profits,  (j)  The  disaffirmance  may  be 
by  any  appropriate  legal  process,  or  by  any  act  on  his  part  show- 
ing conclusively  his  purpose  of  annulling  the  sale.  Contracts 
which  relate  only  to  the  person  or  to  personal  property  may  be 
avoided  at  any  time,  and  l)y  any  act  clearly  manifesting  this  pur- 
pose, (y)  Thus  he  may  avoid  a  sale,  and  his  guardian  may  bring 
trover  for  the  chattel  sold.  (Jc)  And  this  right  may  be  exer- 
cised against  all  equities  of  purchasers  from  the  grantee,  or  other 
persons,  (l) 

An  infant  stands  on  the  same  footing  as  an  adult,  in  respect  to 
his  rights  to  reclaim  money  on  a  failure  of  consideration,  or  because 
obtained  by  fraud,  or  to  rescind  contracts  for  good  cause. 

(7)  See  note  (/),  supra,  p.  *  315.  turn  to  the  contrary,  see  Boody  v.  Mc- 

(h)  Stafford  v.  Roof,  9  Cowen,  626 ;  Kenney,  23  Me.  517.     See  also  Farr  v. 

Bool  (.-.  Mix,  17  Wend.  120;   Matthewson  Sumner,  12  Vt.  28. 

V.Johnson,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  560 ;   Shipman  v.  {k)   See  cases  supra,  and  Shipnian  v. 

Horton,    17    Conn.    481 ;    Cummings    v.  Horton,  17  Conn.  481 ;  Carr  v.  Clough,  6 

Powell,  8  Tex.  80.     See  also  ante,  p.  *  294,  Foster  (N.  H. ),  280.     See  also  Cummings 

note  {  /).  V.  Powell,  8  Tex.  80. 

(i)   Stafford  1-.  Roof,  9  Cowen,  626.  (/)   Myers  v.    Sanders,   7    Dana,   506; 

(j)  See   supra,  note    (A).     For   a   die-  Hill  v.  Anderson,  5  Sm.  &  M.  210. 

"The  wci;,du  of  autliority,  and  wc  think,  of  reason,  is,  that  it  is  no  dffcncn  that  the 
minor  voluntarily  paid  the  mcney  ;  and  when  he  has  received  no  benefit  from  the 
contract,  he  has  a  right  to  recover  it  back;"  citing  and  reiving  on  Robinson  v. 
Weeks,  56  Me.  102,  10+. —  An  infant  may  recover  back  at  any  time  deposits  made  by 
him  with  brokers  l)y  way  of  margins  in  "stock  transactions,  and  lost.  Ruchizky  v.  De 
ILiven,  97  Penn.  St.  202.  In  that  case,  Gordon,  J.,  said,  "  The  doctrine,  that  where  an 
infant  has  executed  a  contract  and  has  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  it,  and  aficrw.irds,  on 
coming  of  age,  seeks  to  avoid  it,  he  must  "first  restore  the  con>ideration  which  he 
received ;  that  he  cannot  have  the  benefit  of  the  one  side  without  restoring  the 
equivalent  on  the  other,  —  this  rule  may,  and  certainly  does,  apply  in  certain  cases,  but 
as  a  general  rule  it  is  unsound,"  and  "  foreign  to  the  ease  in  hand." 

362 


CH.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  323 


*  SECTION  VI.  *  323 

OP   lUTIFICATION. 

As  the  liability  of  the  infant  is  defeated  by  the  law,  for  his 
protection,  therefore,  as  we  have  already  seen,  when  he  is  of  full 
age,  he  may,  if  he  pleases,  confirm  and  ratify  a  contract  entered 
into  by  him  dm-ing  infancy,  and  this  he  may  do  by  parol,  (m)  ^ 
But,  for  this  ratification,  a  mere  acknowledgment  that  the  debt 
existed,  or  that  the  contract  was  made,  is  not  enough,  (w)  By  a 
well-recognized  distinction,  while  the  deed  of  an  infant  cannot  be 
avoided  except  by  some  act  of  equal  force  with  the  deed,  acts 
insufificient  to  avoid  a  deed  may  suffice  to  affirm  or  ratify  it.  (iin)  ^ 
It  need  not  be  a  precise  and  formal  promise  ;  but  it  must  be  a 
direct  and  express  confirmation,  and  substantially  (though  it  need 
not  be  in  forni)  a  promise  to  pay  the  debt  or  fulfil  the  con- 
tract, (o)     It  must  be  made  with  the  deliberate  *  purpose    *  324 

(m)  In  England,  by  stat.  9  Geo.  IV.  the  case  out  of  the  said  statute;  and  per 

c.  14,  §  5,  it  is  now  necessary  that  the  PIntt,  B.,  and  Martin,  B.,  that  it  was  a 

new  promise  or  ratification  should  be  in  sufficient  ratification.     A  similar  statute 

writing,  and  signed  by  the  party  to  be  exists  in  Maine.  —  In  Baylis  y.  Dinely,  M. 

charged   thereby.     And   any  written    in-  &  Sel.  477,  it  seems  to  have  been  held 

strument  signed  by  the  part.y,  which  in  that  an  instrument  under  seal,  executed 

an  adult  would  be  an  adoption  or  rati-  while  the   maker   was   an  infant,  could 

fication  of  an  act  done  by  one  acting  as  not  be  affirmed  by  parol.     But  this  is  be- 

agent,   is   sufficient.     Harris    v.   Wall,    1  lieved  to  be  inconsistent  with  true  prin- 

Exch.  Vl'2\  Hartley  v.  Wharton,  11  A.  &  ciple  and  analogous  cases.     See  Hoyle  v. 

E.  934.     But  see  Mawson  r.  Blane,  26  E.  Stowe,  2   Dev.   &   B.    320;   Wheaton    v. 

L.    &    E.    5*>0.     The    defendant,    having  East,  5  Yerg.  41 ;  Houser  v.  Reynolds,  1 

while  an   infant,  accepted  a  bill  of   ex-  Hayw.  (N.  C.)  143.     But  see  Glamorgan 

change,  was  applied  to,  after  he  became  v.  Lane,  9  Mo.  446 

of  age,  on  behalf  of  the  holder,  and  then  (n)  Robbins  v.  Eaton,  10  N.  H.  561  ; 
wrote  to  him  as  follows  :  "  Your  brother  Thrupp  v.  Fielder,  2  Esp  628  ;  Ordi- 
tells  me  you  are  very  uneasy  about  the  nary  v.  Wherry,  1  Bailey,  28  ;  Bcnham 
£500  bill  drawn  by  Mr.  P.  on  me.  Pray  v.  Bishop,  9  Conn.  330  ;  Alexander  v. 
make  yourself  easy  about  it,  as  I  will  Hutcheson,  2  Hawks,  535 ;  Ford  v.  Phil- 
take  care  that  it  is  paid,  and  Sir  Henry  lips,  1  Pick.  203. 
P.  comes  to  England  in  June."  Hdd,  (im)  Irvine  v.  Irvine,  9  Wall.  617. 
per  Parke,  B..  and  AUh-rson,  B.,  that  this  (o)  See  Goodsell  v.  Myers,  3  Wend, 
was  not  a  sufficient  ratification  to  take  479  ;  Rogers  v.  Hurd,  4  Day,  57  ;  Wilcox 

1  A  proiriisc,  when  of  age,  to  pay  a  del)t  contracted  in  infjincy  "  as  a  debt  of  honor," 
when  of  abilitv.  is  not  a  sufficient  ratification  to  take  the  case  out  of  9  Geo.  IV,  c.  14,  §  5. 
Maccord  r.  Osl)orne,  1  C.  P.  D.  568. 

2  An  infant's  deed  is  voidable,  not  requiring  ratification  after  majority  to  give  it 
validity,  but  for  its  avoidance  requiring  some  clear  and  unmistakable  aft,  as  a  suit  to 
ri'jxaiu  possession,  to  cancel  the  deed,  and  the  like.  Tunison  v.  Chamblin,  88  111.  378. 
But  on  ri'sciuding  a  conveyance  of  land  he  is  bound  to  restore  the  consideration  if  he 
still  has  it,  otherwise  not.     Reynolds  v.  McCuriy,  100  111.  356. 

363 


*324 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


of  assiiminji'  a  lial)ility  from  which  he  knows  that  he  is  dis- 
charged by  law,  and  under  no  compulsion;  (jp)  and  to  the  party 
himself  or  his  agent.  Qq)  It  may  be  conditional,  and  in  that  case 
the  party  relying  upon  it  must  show  that  the  condition  has 
been  fulfilled,  (r)    But  it  seems  to  be  now  settled  that  a  rati- 


r.  Roath,  12  Conn.  550;  Halo  v.  Gerrish, 
8X.  H.  374;  Bigelow  v.  Grannis,  2  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  120;  Willard  v.  Hewlett,  19 
Wend.  oOl  ;  Enniions  v.  Murray,  16  N. 
H.  385.  Tlie  eases  are  well  collected  in 
Bingham  on  Infancy  (Am.  ed.),  p.  69, 
n. :  "  No  particular  words  seem  necessary 
to  a  ratification,  and  [)rovided  tliey  im- 
port a  recognition  and  confirmation  of 
his  promise,  they  need  not  be  a  direct 
promise  to  pay.  Whitnev  v.  Dutch,  1-i 
Mass.  400,  Parker,  C.  J. ;  Hale  r.  Gerrish, 
8  N.  H.  370;  as  'I  have  not  the  money 
now,  but  when  I  return  from  my  voyage 

1  will  settle  with  you ; '  and  '  I  owe  you, 
and  will  pay  you  when  I  return,'  hnve 
been  held  a  sufficient  ratification.  Mar- 
tin V.  Mayo,  10  Mass.  137  ;  also  these 
words, 'I  will  pay  it  (the  note)  as  soon 
as  I  can  make  it,  but  not  this  year.  I 
understand  the  holder  is  about  to  sue  it, 
but  she  had  better  not.'     Bobo  c.  Hansel, 

2  Bailey,  114.  So  a  promise  to  endeavor 
to  procure  the  money  and  send  it  to  the 
creditor  is  sufficient.  Whitney  r.  Dutch, 
15  Mass.  457 ;  and  where  a  minor  after 
coming  of  age  wrote  to  the  plaintiff,  '  I 
am  sorry  to  give  you  so  much  trouble  in 
calling,  but  I  am  not  prepared  for  you, 
but  will  without  neglect  remit  you  in  a 
short  time,'  this  was  held  a  sufficient 
ratification.  Hartley  v.  Wharton,  11  A. 
&  E.  934.  See  also  Harris  v.  Wall,  1 
Exch.  128,  where  it  is  said,  that  any 
written  instrument  signed  by  the  infant, 
which  in  the  case  of  adults  would  have 
amounted  to  the  adoption  of  the  act  of 
a  i)arty  acting  as  agent,  will,  in  the  case 
of  an  infant  who  has  attained  his  ma- 
jority, amount  to  a  ratification.  A  de- 
claration of  an  intention  to  ])ay  a  note, 
and  authorizing  an  agent  to  take  it  up, 
lias  been  luUl  a  good  ratification,  al- 
thougli  the  agent  had  done  nothin<i;  about 
it.  Urvis  1-.  Kimball,  3  N.  H.  314;  .-^ee 
further,  Best  v.  Givcns,  3  B.  Mon.  72  ; 
Taft  V.  Sergeant,  18  Barb.  320.  On  the 
other  hand,  an  admission  by  an  infant 
that  he  owed  the  debt,  and  that  the  adult 
ivoiild  (jH  his  ]i(ii/,  but  at  the  same  time 
refusing  to  give  liis  note,  was  considered 
no  ratification  of  the  original  promise. 
Hale  i;.  Gerrish,  8  N.  H.  374;  and  so 
these  words,  'I  owe  the  plaintiff,  but  am 
unable  to  pay  him,  V)ut  will  endeavor  to 
get  my  brother  bound  with  me.'     Ford 

364 


V.  Phillips,  1  Pick.  202;  likewise  the 
language,  '  I  consider  your  claim  as 
worthy  my  attention,  but  not  my  first 
attention,'  adding  he  would  soon  give  it 
.  the  attention  due  it.  Wilcox  v.  Roath, 
12  Conn.  550.  And  see  Dunlap  v.  Hales, 
2  Jones  (N.  C),  381 ;  and  where  a  minor 
gave  his  note,  a  part  of  which  he  sub- 
sequently paid,  and  in  his  will  made 
after  attaining  majority,  directed  the 
payment  of  his  just  debts,  this  was  held 
no  ratification  as  to  the  residue  of  the 
note.  Smith  v.  Mayo,  9  Mass.  62  ;  but 
see  Wright  v.  Steele,  2  N.  H.  51 ;  20  Am. 
Jur.  209;  Merchants  r.  Grant,  2  Edw. 
Ch.  544.  And  where  a  minor  received 
money,  which  he  promised  in  writing  to 
pay  to  another  when  requested,  and  on 
l)eing  applied  to,  said  it  was  not  conven- 
ient to  pay  then,  but  expressed  an  inten- 
tion to  do  so  on  his  arrival  at  Honduras  ; 
this  was  held  no  ratification  of  his  promise 
to  repay,  however  otherwise  he  might 
have  been  liable.  Jackson  v.  Mayo,  11 
Mass.  147.  Neither  is  a  submission  to 
arbitration,  whether  he  is  liable  or  not, 
on  his  note,  a  ratification.  Benham  v. 
Bishop,  9  Conn.  330 ;  nor  is  a  partial 
payment  any  ratification  of  the  remain- 
der. Tlirupp  V.  Fielder,  2  Esp.  628; 
Bobbins  v.  Eaton,  10  N.  H.  561  ;  Hinley 
i:  Margaritz,  3  Barr,  428.  If  the  rati- 
fication is  conditional,  as,  to  pay  when 
able,  the  plaintiff  must  show  the  hap- 
pening of  the  contingency,  but  not  that 
the  defendant  could  pay  without  i)icon- 
venicnce.  Thompson  r.  Lay,  4  Pick.  48 ; 
Cole  V.  Saxby,  3  Esp.  159.  See  also 
Davis  V.  Smith,  4  Esp.  .36  ;  Besford  v. 
Saunders,  2  H.  Bl.  116  ;  Martin  v.  Mayo, 
10  Mass  141  n.  (c)  ;  Everson  i-.  Carpen- 
ter, 17  Wend.  419." 

(/))  Ford  V.  Phillips,  1  Pick.  202  ; 
Smith  V.  Mavo,  9  Mass.  04 ;  Curtin 
v.  Patton,  11  'S.  &  R.  307  ;  Harmer  v. 
Killing,  5  Esp.  102;  Brooke  v.  Gaily,  2 
Atk.  34;  Hinely  v.  Margaritz,  3  Barr, 
428. 

(7)  Goodsell  V.  Mvers,  3  Wend.  479; 
Bigelow  V.  Grannis,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  120; 
Iloit  1-.  Underhill,  9  N.  H.  439. 

(?)  Thomjjsoii  V.  Lay,  4  Pick.  48  ;  Cole 
i\  Saxl)y,  3  Esp.  159.  See  also  Davis  v. 
Smith,  4  Esp.  30 ;  Besford  r.  Saunders, 
2  H.  Bl.  116;  Everson  v.  Carpenter,  17 
Wend.  419. 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


325 


fication  will  not  maintain  an  action  brought  before  such  ratifica- 
tion, (s) 

The  mere  fact  that  an  infant  does  not  disaffirm  a  contract  after 
he  is  of  full  age,  is  not,  necessarily,  of  itself  a  confirma- 
tion, (t)  *  but  this  fact  may  be  made  significant  by  circum-  *  325 
stances ;  thus,  if  coupled  with  a  continued  possession  and 
use  of  the  pro])erty,  or  a  refusal  to  redeliver  the  same,  and  an 
assertion  of  ownership,  it  may  frequently  raise,  by  implication  of 
law,  such  confirmation,  and  a  promise  to  i)ay  for  the  property, 
especially  if  either  this  intention  and  promise  to  pay  must  be  pre- 
sumed, or  else  a  fraud.  Indeed  any  act  of  ownership,  after  full 
age,  should  have  this  effect ;  but  it  must  be  unequivocal. 

The  purchases  of  an  infant  may  be  far  more  easily  ratified  than 
his  conveyances  of  real  estate.  To  affirm  the  latter  some  positive 
act  seems  to  be  necessary,  and  mere  acquiescence,  or  failure  to 
disaffirm,  although  continued  beyond  a  reasonable  time,  has  been 
adjudged  not  sufficient  to  bind  the  minor,  (w)     But  it  is  held  in 


(5)  Thornton  v.  Illingworth,  2  B.  & 
C.  8-24 ;  Ford  v.  Phillips,  1  Pick.  202  ; 
Thing  r.  Libbey,  16  Me.  55;  Morriani  v. 
Wilkins,  6  N."  H.  432  (overruling  the 
earlier  case  of  Wright  v.  Steele,  2  N.  H. 
51)  ;  Hale  v.  Gerrish,  8  N.  H.  374;  Good- 
ridge  r.  Ross,  6  Mot.  487. 

(0  Bennett's  note  to  Dublin  &  Wick- 
low  Railway  Co.  v.  Black,  10  E.  L.  &  E. 
558.  But  see /'OS?,  notes  (»)  and  {y).  As 
to  the  necessity  for  a  positive  act  of  con- 
firmation, see  Ferguson  r.  Bell,  17  Mo. 
347;  Dunlap  v.  Hales,  2  Jones  (N.  C), 
381.     Also  Harris  v.  Wall,  1  Exch   122. 

(h)  In  Jackson  i-.  Carpenter,  11  Johns. 
539,  an  infant  conveyed  land  to  A,  in  fee 
in  the  military  tract,  in  1784.  Afterwards 
in  1700,  and  ten  years  after  he  became  of 
age,  he  conveyed  the  same  premises  to  B. 
A  claimed  that  the  first  deed  was  only 
voidable,  and  not  void,  and  that  there 
liad  been  an  acquiescence  for  so  long  a 
time  after  the  infant  arrived  at  full  age, 
that  it  amounted  to  a  confirmation  of  the 
first  conveyance,  before  the  second  was 
executed.  But  the  court  said,  in  giving 
their  opinion  :  "  The  cases  cited  by  the 
defendant's  counsel,  to  this  point,  do  not 
support  it  to  tlie  extent  contended  for.  In 
all  of  them  it  appears  that  some  act  of 
the  infant,  after  he  is  twenty-one  years  of 
age,  is  req  aired  to  evince  his  assent;  they 
are  onh-  instances  of  purchases  made,  or 
leases  given,  rendering  a  rent  by  which 
either  the  continuance  in  possession  or 
receipt  of  the  rent  reserved  shows  his 
assent  afterwards.     In  the  present  case, 


no  act  of  the  infant  appears  since  he 
arrived  at  full  age,  by  wliich  this  assent 
could  be  inferred,  except  mere  omission. 
He  has  possessed  no  proi)erty,  nor  has  he 
received  rent.  The  confirmation  of  this 
sale,  consequently,  can,  in  no  point  of 
view,  turn  out  to  his  advantage,  nor  can 
his  neglect  to  do  anything  from  1784  till 
1796  destro;'  his  title.  It  would  be  con- 
trary to  the  benign  principles  of  the  law, 
by  which  the  imbecility  and  indiscretion 
of  infants  are  protected  from  injury  to 
their  property,  that  a  mere  acquiescence, 
without  any  intermediate  or  continued 
benefit,  showing  his  assent,  should  oper- 
ate as  an  extinguishment  of  his  title." 
So  in  Jackson  v.  Burchin,  14  Johns.  124, 
an  infant  in  1784,  and  while  between 
nineteen  and  twenty  years  of  age,  con- 
veyed wild  and  unoccupied  land  in  fee, 
and  in  1795  executed  another  conveyance 
of  the  same  premises,  not  having  in  the 
mean  time  after  his  arrival  at  full  age 
made  any  entry  on  the  premises.  It  was 
also  proved  that  the  infant,  after  he  came 
of  age,  had  stated  to  others  that  he  had 
sold  his  land  to  [the  first  grantee].  The 
defendant  also  offered  to  prove  that  the 
infant,  after  he  became  of  full  age,  de- 
clined to  sell  the  premises  on  one  occa- 
sion, because  he  had  previously  sold  it,  but 
this  was  overruled.  Spencer,  J.,  in  deliv- 
ering the  opinion,  observed :  "  I  perceive 
no  evidence  of  the  affirmance  of  the  first 
deed  bj-  the  infant  after  he  came  of  age." 
These  cases  were  commented  upon  in 
Boolr.  Mix,  17  Wend.  120.  and  the  court 

365 


326 


THE    LAW    OP    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


New  York  that  a  continuance  of  possession  and  acts  of  ownership 
after  coming  of  age,  ratify  the  contract.  (w?t)  It  has  been 
*  326  lield  in  England  that  an  infant's  bond  *  could  not  be  ratified 
but  by  an  instrument  of  equal  solemnity.  But  this  has  been 
doubted  for  strong  and  we  think  sullicient  reasons,  (v)  Wliether 
his  verbal  declarations  can,  in  any  event,  ratify  his  instrument 
under  seal,  may  not  be  certain ;  but  it  is  quite  certain  that  if,  in 
an  instrument  under  seal,  a  person  recites  or  refers  to  a  former 
instrument  also  under  seal,  made  while  he  was  a  minor,  this  is  a 
ratification  of  the  first,  (w)  Thus,  the  grant  of  lands  received 
during  infancy,  by  way  of  exchange  for  other  lands,  has  been  held 
to  be  a  confirmation  of  the  original  conveyance,  (a;)     And  if  a 


incline  to  the  same  general  doctrine.  So 
in  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58,  Mr. 
Justice  Story  observed :  "  To  assume,  as 
a  matter  of  law,  that  a  voluntary  and  de- 
liberate recognition  by  a  person,  after  his 
arrival  at  age,  of  an  actual  conveyance  of 
his  right,  during  his  non-age,  amounts  to 
a  confirmation  of  such  conveyance;  or  to 
assume  that  a  mere  acquiescence  in  the 
same  conveyance,  without  objection,  for 
several  months  after  his  arrival  at  age,  is 
also  a  confirmation  of  it,  are  not  maintain- 
able. Tlie  mere  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  a  conveyance  has  been  made,  is  not, 
per  se,  proof  of  a  confirmation  of  it."  In 
Lessee  of  Drake  v.  Ramsay,  5  Haram. 
251,  the  court  remarked:  "In  our  opin- 
ion lapse  of  time  mat/  frequently  furnish 
evidence  of  acquiescence,  and  tluis  confirm 
the  title  [of  tlic  first  purchaser] ;  but  of 
itself  it  does  not  take  away  tlie  right  to 
avoid  until  the  Statute  of  Limitations  takes 
effect."  The  same  doctrine  was  afterwards 
affirmed  in  Crosinger  v.  Lessee  of  Welch, 
15  0iiif),  r.to.  In  tlie  verj' able  case  of  Doe 
V.  Abernatiiy,  7  Blackf.  442,  it  appeared 
that  a  female  infant,  residing  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, executed  tliere  a  deed  of  bargain 
and  sale  for  land  situate  in  that  State. 
She  afterwards  married,  but  whether 
before  or  after  her  majority  did  not 
appear,  nor  ilid  it  appear  where,  after  the 
execution  of  tlie  deed,  she  and  her  hus- 
band iiad  resided,  nor  that  her  husband 
had  acquiesced  in  the  deed  after  he  knew 
of  it.  Held,  that  the  lapse  of  about  five 
years  after  the  wife's  majority,  without 
any  attempt  to  disaffirm  the  conveyance, 
did  n(jt,  under  the  circumstances,  prevent 
tiie  liusband  and  wife  from  disaffirming  it. 
In  IJoody  v.  McKenney,  2o  Me.  5"23,  Sliep- 
leij,  J.,  thus  lays  down  the  law  on  this 
subject :  "  When  a    person  has  made   a 

366 


conveyance  of  real  estate  during  his  in- 
fancy, and  would  affirm  or  disaffirm  it 
after  he  becomes  of  age,  in  such  case  the 
mere  acquiescence  for  years  to  disaffirm 
it  affords  no  proof  of  a  ratification.  There 
must  be  some  positive  and  clear  act  per- 
formed for  that  purpose.  The  reason  is, 
that  by  his  silent  acquiescence  he  occa- 
sions no  injury  to  other  persons,  and  se- 
cures no  benefits  or  new  rigiits  to  himself. 
Tiiere  is  nothing  to  urge  him  as  a  duty 
towards  others  to  act  speedilj'.  Language 
appropriate  in  other  cases,  requiring  liim 
to  act  within  a  reasonable  time,  would 
become  inappropriate  here.  He  may, 
therefore,  after  years  of  acquiescence,  by 
an  entry,  or  by  a  conveyance  of  the  estate 
to  another  person,  disaffirm  and  avoid  the 
conve\'ance  made  during  his  infancy." 
This  point  was  discussed  in  Hoyle  v. 
Stowe,  2  Dev.  &  B.  o20,  where  it  was  held 
that  some  act  of  affirmance  was  clearly 
necessary,  and  that  if  declarations  were 
sufficient  they  imist  be  clear  and  unequiv- 
ocal, and  made  with  a  view  to  ratification. 
In  Ilouser  v.  Keynolds,  1  Ilayw.  143,  such 
declarations  were  held  sufficient.  See, 
however,  Clamorgan  r.  Lane,  9  JMo.  446, 
and  note  (y)  below. 

{mi)  Henry  v.  Root.  38  N.  Y.  52G. 

(i)  Parol  ratification  was  claimed  in 
Baylis  c  Dinely,  3  Vi.  &  Sel.  477.  But  see, 
co^itra,  Hoyle  v.  Stowe,  2  Dev.  &  B.  320; 
Wheaton  (•.  East,  5  Yerg.  41 ;  Ilouser  v. 
Reynolds,  1  Ha3-w.  143  ;  Scott  v.  Buchan- 
an, 2  Humph.  468.  But  see  Clamorgan  v. 
Lane,  9  Mo.  446. 

(w)  See  Story  v.  Johnson,  2  Y.  &  Col. 
58(5;  Boston  Bank  v.  Chaniberlin,  15 
Mass.  220 ;  Phillips  v.  Green,  5  Monr. 
344. 

(x)  Williams  v.  Mabee,  3  Ilalst.  Cli. 
500. 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


*326 


minor  receives  and  retains  the  proceeds  of  a  sale  of  real  estate, 
he  is  estopped  from  denying  the  validity  of  the  sale,  (^xx^ 

In  some  cases  it  has  been  urged,  that  even  a  silent  acquiescence 
for  a  considerable  time  by  an  infant,  after  arriving  at  full  age,  is 
itself  a  ratification  of  his  conveyance,  (v/)  ^ 


(j-.r)  rursley  r.  Hays,  17  Towa,  Oil. 

(//)  In  Kliiif  r.  Bfcbf,  0  Conn.  404, 
where  an  infant,  having  executed  a  deed 
of  conveyance  in  1791,  at  the  age  of 
eighteen  years,  held  tlie  note  given  for 
the  consideration  four  years,  and  then 
married ;  her  husband  liehl  it  until  lier 
deatli  in  liSlo,  and  continued  to  liold  it 
eleven  years  at'terwards  ;  and,  during  tlie 
wliole  j)eriod,  tiiere  was  no  act  or  expres- 
sion of  disaffirmance,  and  the  grantee  was 
permitted  to  remain  in  the  undisturbed 
occupation  of  tiie  land,  it  was  held  that 
there  was  both  an  imjdied  and  a  tcicil  af- 
firmance. Ilosmer,  0.  J.,  said:  "The 
deed  in  question  has  been  ratified  by 
every  implied  mode  of  affirmance.  The 
consideration  note  was  held  by  P.  Bolles 
a  3"ear  after  her  arrival  at  full  age,  and 
before  her  marriage,  and  by  the  plaintiff 
has  been  held  ever  since.  During  all 
tins  period,  until  tlie  commencement  of 
the  plaintiff 's  action,  a  profound  silence 
was  observed  relative  to  the  disaffirm- 
ance of  the  contract;  and  the  defendant 
was  permitted  to  remain  in  the  unques- 
tioned occupation  of  the  land.  These 
acts  imply  an  affirmance  of  the  deed,  not 
imlike  the  holding  possession  of  land 
leased  or  exchanged,  and  authorized  the 
same  inference.  Besides,  the  omission  to 
disaffirm  alone,  for  eleven  years,  a  period 
almost  sufficient  to  give  title  by  posses- 
sion, is  an  acquiescence  in  the  convey- 
ance amounting  to  a  tacit  affirmance." 
This  case  was  cited  with  approbation  in 
Richardson  v.  Boright,  9  Vt.  368,  where 
Er-d field,  J.,  said :  "  In  the  case  of  every 
act  of  an  infant  merely  voidable,  he  must 
disaffirm  it  on  coming  of  full  age,  or  he 
will  be  bound  by  it."  See  also  Holmes 
V.  Blogg,  8  Taunt.  35,  Dallas,  J. ;  2  Kent, 
Com.  238. —  The  case  of  Wallace  v.  Lewis, 
4  Harring.  (Del  )  75,  is  a  strong  case 
against  the  right  of  disaffirmance.  There 
a  minor,  when  wanting  only  four  months 
of  his  uiajoritN',  conveyed  his  land  in  fee 
by  deed  in  proper  form,  and  the  purcha- 
ser went  into  immediate  possession,  and 
greatly  improved  the  promises.  The  in- 
fant, four  years  after,  brought  his  action 


of  ejectment  against  his  own  grantee,  to 
recover  the  same  premises.  It  was  held 
that  his  silence  iuY  four  years  after  he 
became  of  age  was  a  waiver  of  his  right 
to  disaffirm,  and  that  he  could  not  re- 
cover. And  see  also  Scott  v.  Buchanan, 
11  Humph.  408.  But  see  Aloore  v.  Aber- 
natliy,  7  Blackf.  442.  So  in  Wheaton  v. 
East,  5  Yerg.  41,  it  was  held  that  any  act 
of  a  minor,  from  which  liis  assent  to  a 
deed  executed  during  his  minority  may 
be  inferred,  will  operate  as  a  confirma- 
tion, and  prevent  him  thereafter  from 
electing  to  disaffirm  it.  Therefore  where 
the  minor  had  done  no  act  from  which  a 
dissent  or  disaffirmance  might  be  inferred, 
for  three  or  four  years  after  he  arrived  at 
twenty-one,  but  where  he  admitted  he 
had  sold  the  land,  said  he  was  satisfied, 
offered  to  exchange  other  lands  for  it, 
and  saw  the  bargainee  putting  on  im- 
provements without  objection,  it  wms  held 
that  these  were  sufficient  acts  from  which 
to  infer  a  confirmation.  We  have  thus 
fully  referred  to  the  authorities  on  the 
subject  of  the  ratification  of  conveyances, 
because  there  is,  as  will  be  seen  by  a  ref- 
erence to  the  foregoing  cases,  not  a  little 
conflict  between  them.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  to  purchases,  the  law  is  well  set- 
tled; and  if  an  infant  retains  property 
purchased,  whether  real  or  personal,  and 
gives  no  notice  of  an  intention  to  disaf- 
firm, for  an  unreasonable  length  of  time 
after  he  arrives  at  full  age,  and  especially 
if  he  uses  the  property,  sells  it,  or  mort- 
gages it,  or  exercises  any  unequivocal 
act  of  ownership  over  it,  without  any  no- 
tice to  the  other  party  of  an  intention  to 
disaffirm,  this  is  clearly  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  a  ratification.  Some  of  the 
leading  cases  on  this  subject  are  Boyden 
V.  Boyden,  9  Met.  519 ;  Boody  i-.  McKen- 
ny,  23  Me.  517 ;  Hubbard  v.  Cummings, 
1  Greenl.  11,  where  this  doctrine  is  ap- 
plied to  the  purchase  of  real  estate.  Co. 
Lit.  51  b;  Robbins  v.  Eaton,  10  N.  H. 
561 ;  Cheshire  v.  Barrett,  4  McCord,  241 ; 
Lawson  v.  Lovejoy,  8  Greenl.  405  (Ben- 
nett's ed.  n.);  Alexander  v.  Heriot,  Bai- 
ley, Ch.  223;  Armfield  v.  Tate,  7  Ired.  L. 


•  Delay  by  an  infont,  with  neglect,  after  becoming  of  age,  with  the  knowledge  that 
his  grantee  is  intending  to  and  does  make  valuable  improvements,  to  make  known  his 
intention  to  avoid  his  deed  in  season  to  prevent  the  same,  is  a  ratification  of  his  deed. 
Davis  V.  Dudley,  70  Me.  236. 

367 


327 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  327        *  If  any  act  of  disaffirmance  is  necessary  to  enable  an 

infant  after  attaining  his  majority  to  avoid  his  conveyance 

*  328    made  while  *  a  minor,  it  is  now  well  settled  that  the  exe- 

cution of  a  second  deed,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the 
former  deed,  is  itself  a  disaffirmance  of  the  former  deed,  although 
the  infant  had  not  previously  manifested  any  intention  to  avoid  it 
and  had  made  no  entry  upon  the  premises  conveyed.  The  old 
rule,  requiring  such  entry  before  the  infant  could  make  another 
conveyance,  has  long  since  been  done  away.  (2;)  In  some  of  our 
States,  however,  a  sale  of  lands  can  be  made  only  by  one  in  pos- 
session ;  and  in  that  case  the  infant  should  enter  before  making 
his  conveyance. 

A  question  has  been  raised  in  relation  to  ratification  by  an 
infant,  whether,  if  the  contract  be  one  of  those  which  is  declared 
to  be  not  voidable,  but  void,  any  ratification  could  restore  it. 


258;  Kitchen  v.  Lee,  11  Paige,  107;  Dea- 
son  V.  Boyd,  1  Dana,  45.  — And  wliere  an 
infant,  a  few  days  before  he  became 
twenty-one,  purcliased  a  note  and  drew 
an  order  on  a  tliird  person  for  the  pay- 
ment, but  whicli  was  not  paid,  of  whicli 
he  had  notice,  it  was  lield  in  a  suit  on 
sucli  order  several  years  afterwards,  tliat 
his  failure  to  return  the  note  and  disaf- 
firm the  contract,  after  he  became  of  aiie, 
warranted  the  inference  that  he  intended 
to  abide  by  it,  and  was  a  sufficient  an- 
swer to  the  defence  of  infancy.  Tliom- 
asson  r.  Boyd,  1-']  Ala.  419.  In  Delano 
V.  Blake,  11  Wend.  85,  where  an  infitnt 
took  the  note  of  a  third  person  in  pay- 
ment for  work  done,  and  retained  it  for 
eight  months  after  he  came  of  age,  and  then 
offered  to  return  it,  and  demanded  pay- 
ment for  his  work,  it  was  held,  in  an 
action  for  the  work  and  labor  performed 
by  him,  that  the  retaining  of  the  note  for 
such  a  length  of  time  was  a  ratification 
of  the  contract  made  during  infancy, 
especially  when,  in  the  mean  time,  tJie 
maker  of  the  ncte  had  become  insolvent, 
the  debt  lost,  and  tlie  offer  to  return  made 
on  the  heel  of  that  event.  In  Aldrich  v. 
Grimes,  10  N.  II.  104,  an  infant  bought 
personal  property,  with  a  right  of  return 
if  it  was  not  liked..  He  kept  it  two 
months  after  he  was  of  full  age,  and  after 
he  liad  liecn  requested  to  return  it  if  ho 
did  not  like  it.  It  was  held  a  confirma- 
tion. In  tlie  case  of  Smith  v.  Kelly,  1-] 
Met.  .309,  an  infant  bought  goods  that 
were  not  necessaries,  and  tiie  sellers,  three 
days  before  he  came  of  age,  brought  an 
action  against  liim  for  tlie  price,  and  at- 

3G8 


tached  the  goods  on  their  writ.  The 
goods  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  at- 
taching officer  at  the  time  of  the  trial  of 
the  action,  and  the  defendant  gave  no 
notice  to  the  plaintiffs,  after  he  came  of 
age,  of  his  intention  not  to  be  1'ound  by 
the  contract  of  sale.  Held,  that  there 
was  no  ratification  of  the  contract  of  sale 
by  the  defendant,  and  tliat  the  action 
could  not  be  maintained.  If  an  infant 
purcliase  land,  and  at  tlie  same  time  mort- 
gage it  for  tlie  purchase-money,  so  that 
the  whole  is  but  one  tnimfnctinn,  the  retain- 
ing of  possession  of  the  land  beyond  a 
reasonable  time  is  a  confirmation  of  the 
mortgage,  and  any  act  that  ratifies  the 
mortgage  affirms  the  deed.  Bigelow  v. 
Kinney,  3  Vt.  353 ;  Rlcliardson  v.  Bo- 
right,  9  id.  368 ;  Robbins  v.  Eaton,  10  N. 
H.  5fi2;  Dana  i:  Coombs,  C>  Greenl.  89; 
Huljbard  v.  Cummings,  1  id.  11  ;  Lynde 
V.  Budd,  2  Paige,  191.  —  Upon  the  whole 
it  may  be  said,  that  an  infant's  convey- 
ances are  not  ratified  by  a  bare  recogni- 
tion of  the  existence  of,  or  a  silent 
acquiescence  in  his  deed,  for  anj^  period 
less  than  the  period  of  statutory  limita- 
tion. See  the  cases  already  cited.  Has- 
tings V.  Delarhide,  24  Cal.  195. 

\:)  Cresinger  v.  Welch,  15  Ohio,  156; 
Hoyle  V.  Stowe,  2  Dev.  &  B.  320;  Tucker 
V.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  58;  .Jackson  v.  Car- 
penter, 11  .Johns.  539;  Jackson  v.  Bur- 
cliin,  14  id.  124.  But  to  constitute  a 
disaffirmance,  tlie  second  deed  must  be 
so  inconsistent  with  the  first,  that  both 
caimot  consistently  stand.  Eagle  Fire 
Company  r.  Lent,  0  Paige,  635;  Hingham 
on  Infancy  (Bennett's  ed.),  p.  60,  n. 


CII.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  329 

And  contracts  by  an  infant  for  purposes  of  trade  hare  been  de- 
clared absolutely  void.  But  the  exact  distinction  between  the 
void  and  the  voidable  contracts  of  an  infant  is  rather  obscure ; 
and  the  better  opinion,  as  well  as  the  stronger  reason,  seems 
to  be,  as  we  have  already  stated,  that  in  reference  to  its 
*  ratification,  no  contract  is  void  ;  or,  in  the  language  of  *  329 
Parke,  B.,  in  Williams  v.  Moore,  (a)  "  the  promise  of  an 
infant  is  not  void  in  any  case,  unless  the  infant  chooses  to  plead 
his  infancy."  (/>) 

The  rules  of  the  common  law  concerning  infancy  are  varied 
in  many  of  our  States  by  statutory  provisions.  In  some  of  them 
the  ratification  must  be  in  writing ;  but  a  note  or  memorandum 
expressing  the  intention  of  ratification  is  sufficient.  (W) 


SECTION  VII. 

WHO   MAY   TAKE   ADVANTAGE  OF   AN   INFANT'S   LIABILITY. 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  the  disability  of  infancy  is  the  personal 

privilege  of  the   infant  himself,  and  no  one  but  himself  or  his 

(a)  11  M.  &  W.  256.  lUingworth,  2  B.  &  C.  824,  speaking  of  an 
(6)  The  words  "  void  "  and  "  voidable  "  infant's  contract  of  trade,  calls  it  void,  but 
have  often  been  very  vaguely  used  when  the  case  clearly  shows  that  if  the  ratifi- 
applied  to  contracts,  and  the  word  void  cation  which  was  shown  in  the  case  had 
has  been  frequently  used  to  denote  merely  been  }i€foi-e  the  action  was  commenced, 
that  tlie  contract  was  not  binding,  and  as  instead  of  after,  the  infant  would  have 
expressing  no  opinion  whether  such  con-  been  bound,  a  conclusion  impossible  had 
tract  might  or  might  not  be  ratified,  the  contract  been  really  void.  So  an  in- 
Thus,  in  Conroe  r.  Birdsall,  1  Johns.  Cas.  fant's  acceptance  of  a  bill  of  exchange 
127,  the  marginal  note  indicates  that  the  has  been  called  "  void,"  but  it  is  only  void- 
court  held  the  contract  "  void,"  and  the  able,  and  is  susceptible  of  a  ratification, 
case  is  so  cited  in  Mason  i'.  Denison,  15  Gibbs  v.  Merrill,  3  Taunt.  o07.  Another 
Wend.  71 ;  and  in  2  Kent,  Com.  241 ;  but  instance  occurs  in  the  application  of  the 
the  language  of  the  court  was  :  "  The  word  "  void  "  to  fraudulent  contracts,  but 
bond  is  voidabie,  only  at  the  election  of  they  are  only  voidable,  and  if  the  person 
the  infant."  So  in  Curtin  v.  Patton,  11  defrauded  choose  to  ratify  he  may  do  so, 
S.  &  R.  311,  Mr.  Justice  Duncan,  speaking  and  hold  the  other  party.  Ayers  v.  Hew- 
of  an  infant's  contract  of  suretyship,  calls  ett,  19  Me.  281.  These  instances  are  suf- 
itin  one  place  "  absolutely  void,"  but  in  ficient  to  illustrate  the  vague  and  inde- 
the  very  next  lino  he  makes  use  of  such  finite  use  of  the  word  void,  and  may 
expressions  as  " conjirmimi,"  "distinct  acts  perhaps  serve  to  reconcile  the  conflicting 
of  confirmation,"  &c.,  plainly  showing  that,  language  of  some  cases,  and  to  account 
while  calling  the  contract  void,  he  did  not  for  the  application  of  the  word  "  void"  to 
mean  to  deny  that  it  was  susceplibl".  of  any  of  an  infant's  contracts.  See  also 
ratification,  and  if  so,  that  it  was  not  "  ab-  Arnold  v.  Richmond  Iron  Works,  1  Gray, 
solutel.y  void,"  but  only  voidable,  as  it  434,  and  n/jte,  p.  *295,  note  (7/). 
has  often  been  held  by  the  same  court.  (bb)  Stern  v.  Freeman,  4  Met.  (Ky.) 
Hinely  v.  Margaritz,  3  Barr,  428.  In  a  309. 
similar  manner,  Bayley,  J.,  in  Thornton  v. 

VOL.  I.                                          24  369 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  330  legal  representatives  can  take  advantage  of  it.  (c)  *  There- 
fore other  parties  who  contract  with  an  infant  are  bound 
by  it,  although  it  be  voidable  by  him.  Were  it  otherwise  this 
disability  might  be  of  no  advantage  to  him,  but  the  reverse.  Qd) 
Thus,  an  infant  may  sue  an  adult  for  a  breach  of  promise  of 
marriage,  although  no  action  can  be  brought  .against  an  infant 
for  that  cause,  (e)  And  an  infant  may  bring  an  action  on  a  mer- 
cantile contract,  though  none  can  be  brought  against  him.  (/) 
So  in  contracts  of  apprenticeship,  or  in  cases  of  hiring  and  ser- 
vice. ((/)  In  none  of  these  cases  can  the  adult  discharge  himself 
by  alleging  that  there  was  no  consideration  for  his  promise,  on 
the  ground  that  the  promise  of  the  infant  did  not  bind  him. 
The  mutuality  or  reciprocity  of  the  contract  or  obligation  is  not 
complete,  but  it  is  sufficient  to  bind  the  party  of  adult  age  to  his 

all  the  potatoes  then  growing  on  three 
acres  of  land,  at  so  much  per  acre,  to  be 
dug  up  and  carried  away  by  the  plaintiff ; 
and  the  plaintiff  paid  £40  to  the  defend- 
ant under  the  agreement,  and  dug  a  part, 
and  carried  away  a  part  of  those  dug,  but 
was  prevented  by  the  defendant  from  dig- 
ging and  carrying  away  the  residue.  It 
was  held  tliat  the  infant  was  entitled  to 
recover  for  this  breach  of  the  agreement. 
Lord  Ellenboroiuih,  C.  J. :  "  It  occurred  to 
me  at  the  trial,  on  tlie  first  view  of  the 
case,  that  as  an  infant  could  not  trade, 
and  as  this  was  an  executory  contract, 
he  could  not  maintain  an  action  for  tlie 
breach  of  it ;  but  if  I  had  adverted  to  the 
circumstance  of  its  being  in  part  executed 
by  the  infant,  for  he  had  paid  .£40,  and 
therefore  it  was  most  immediately  for  his 
benefit  tliat  he  sliould  be  enabled  to  sue 
upon  it,  otherwise  he  might  lose  the  ben- 
efit of  such  payment,  I  should  probably 
have  held  otherwise.  And  I  certainly 
was  under  a  mistake  in  not  adverting  to 
the  distinction  between  the  case  of  an 
infant  plaintiff  or  defendant.  If  the  de- 
fendant had  been  the  infant,  wliat  I  ruled 
would  have  been  correct ;  but  here  the 
plaintiff  is  the  infant,  and  sues  upon  a 
contract  partly  executed  by  him,  which 
it  is  clear  that  he  may  do.  It  is  certainly 
for  the  benefit  of  infants,  where  they  liave 
given  the  fair  value  for  any  article  of 
produce,  that  they  should  have  tlie  thing 
contracted  for.  And  it  is  not  necessary 
tliat  they  should  wait  imtil  they  come  of 
age  in  order  to  bring  the  action.  A  luin- 
driMl  actions  have  been  brought  by  infants 
for  breaches  of  promise  of  marriage,  and 
I  am  not  aware  that  this  objection  has 
ever  been  taken  since  the  case  in  Strange." 
i'j)  Eubanks  v.  Peak,  2  Bailey,  497. 


(c)  Parker  v.  Baker,  Clarke,  Ch.  136; 
Gullett  V.  Lumberton,  1  Eng.  (Ark.)  109; 
Rose  V.  Daniel,  3  Brevard,  438 ;  Voorliees 
V.  Wait,  8  Green  (N.  J.),  343.  This  priv- 
ilege extends  to  the  infant's  personal  rep- 
resentatives. Smith  V.  Mayo,  9  Mass.  62 ; 
Jefford  V.  Ringgold,  6  Ala.  544;  Martin 
V.  Mayo,  10  Mass.  137  ;  Hussey  v.  Jewett, 
9  Mass.  100 ;  Jackson  v.  Mayo,  11  Mass. 
147  ;  Parsons  v.  Hill,  8  Mo.  135 ;  Slocum 
V.  Hooker,  13  Barb.  536,  and  to  his  privies 
in  blood,  Bac.  Abr.  Infancy  (I.),  6;  Aus- 
tin i\  Cliarlestown  Female  Seminary,  8 
Met.  196;  Nelson  v.  Eaton,  1  Redfield, 
498.  But  not  to  his  assignees,  or  privies 
in  estate  only.  Id. ;  Whittingham's  case, 
8  Rep.  43 ;  Breckenridge's  Heirs  v.  Orms- 
by,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  236 ;  Hoyle  v.  Stowe,  2 
Dev.  &  B.  323.  Nor  to  a  guardian,  Oli- 
ver V.  Houdlet,  13  Mass.  237 ;  Irving  v. 
Crockett,  4  Bibb,  437.  It  is  on  this  ground, 
connected  with  others,  that  parties  to  ne- 
gotiable paper  cannot  take  advantage  of 
the  infancy  of  anj-  i)rior  party.  Jones  v. 
Darch,  4  Price,  300 ;  Grey  v.  Cooper,  3 
Dougl.  65;  Nightingale  )'.  Withington,  15 
Mass.  272 ;  Taylor  v.  Croker,  4  Esp.  187  ; 
Dulty  V.  Brownfield,  1  Barr,  497. 

(d)  Boyden  v.  Boyden,  9  Met.  519,  521, 
Sh'iw,  C.  J. ;  McGinn  r.  Shaeffer,  7  Watts, 
412,  414. 

(e)  Hunt  V.  Peake,  5  Cowen,  475 ;  Pool 
V.  Pratt,  1  D.  Cliip.  (Vt.)  252;  Willard  v. 
Stone,  7  Cowen,  22;  Holt  v.  Ward  Claren- 
cieux,  2  Stra.  937.  And  the  infant  may 
6ue  for  a  breach  of  such  promise  without 
averring  consent  of  his  or  lier  parent  or 
guardian.  Cannon  v.  Alsbury,  1  A.  K. 
Marsh.  76. 

(/)  In  Warwick  v.  Bruce,  2  M.  &  Sel. 
205,  the  defendant  on  the  12th  of  Octo- 
ber, agreed  to  sell  to  the  plaintiff,  a  minor, 

370 


CH.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  331 

part  of  the  contract.  But  if  a  person  of  adult  age  marry  one 
who  is  under  the  age  of  consent  (in  males  fourteen,  and  females 
twelve  years),  such  marriage  is  binding  upon  neither  party  ;  and 
it  is  by  the  rules  of  the  common  law  in  the  power  of  either 
to  disagree  when  the  infant  *  comes  to  the  age  of  consent,  *  831 
though  not  before.  (Ji)  But  we  shall  speak  of  this  more 
fully  when  treating  of  the  Contract  of  Marriage. 


SECTION  VIII. 

OF   THE   MAERIAGE   SETTLEMENTS   OP   AN   INFANT. 

The  power  of  an  infant  in  respect  to  marriage  settlements  has 
been  much  discussed.  It  seems  to  be  determined,  that  a  marriage 
settlement  upon  a  female  infant,  and  her  release  of  dower  in  con- 
sideration of  such  settlement,  are  valid,  (i)  But  whether  she  can 
bind  herself  by  a  settlement  of  her  own  estate  in  contemplation 
of  marriage,  seems  still  to  be  regarded  as  an  open  question,  (j) 
It  is  certain  that  a  female  infant  may  marry ;  and  therefore  it 
might  be  supposed  that  a  prudent  settlement  of  her  property,  in 
view  of  marriage,  would  come  within  the  reason  of  the  rule  which 
makes  valid  the  contracts  of  an  infant  for  necessaries.  Of  course 
such  a  settlement  would  be  within  the  power  of  chancery,  for  cor- 
rection or  avoidance,  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  mistake,  or  undue 
influence,  and  any  injurious  effect  would  be  prevented.  And  the 
court  would  always  pay  due  regard  to  the  youth  and  immature 
judgment  of  the  infant  wife.  But  to  say  that  a  young  woman 
may  marry,  but,  because  she  is  an  infant,  cannot  use  valid  pre- 
cautions to  secure  her  property  against  waste,  and  for  her  own 
benefit,  would  give  an  effect  to  her  legal  incapacity  entirely 
opposed  to  the  principle  that  the  disability  of  an  infant  is  a  privi- 
lege allowed  as  a  shield  and  a  protection,  not  as  a  burden  and  an 
injury.     It  has  therefore  been  held  that  such  settlement  is,  at  all 

(h)  Bac.  Abr.  Infancy  and  Age  (A.).  to  be  in  favor  of  her  having  such  power. 

(i)  Drur>  V.  Drury,  2  Eden,  39 ;  Earl  See  Atherley,  Treatise  on  Marriage  Set- 

of  Buckinghamshire  v.  Drury,  2  Eden,  tlements,   pp.   18-45.     But   in   that  case 

60;  Wihnot,  Opinions,  p.  177;  McCartee  Lord  ^Wo/i  held  that  she  was  not  so  bound 

V.  Teller,  2  Paige,"  511.  by  sucli  conveyance  or  agreement  to  con- 

(_;■)  Previous  to  Milner  v.  Harewood,  vey  as  tliat  she  might  not  avoid  it  on 

18  Ves.  259,  the  weight  of  authority  seemed  coming  of  age. 

371 


*  332  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

events,  only  voidable,  and  that  no  one  but  herself  can  avoid  it, 
and  she  need  not ;  but  may  afifirm  or  avoid  it  when  of  full 

*  332    age.     The  *  question  then  occurs,  whether  she  can  so  dis- 

athrm  it  after  majority,  if  still  married  ;  and  it  has  been 
said  that  the  preponderance  of  opinion  is  that  she  cannot,  {k} 
So  whether  a  male  infant  may  bind  himself  irrevocably  by  a  mar- 
riage settlement  of  his  own  estate  is  not  quite  certain.  (Z)  It  is 
not,  however,  easy  to  find  any  very  good  reason  which  would 
draw  a  distinction  between  the  sexes  in  this  particular,  and  make 
such  settlement  by  a  male  infant  absolutely  binding,  and  leave 
that  by  a  female  voidaljle  by  her  at  her  majority.  But  we  con- 
sider this  whole  subject  open  for  further  adjudication. 


SECTION  IX. 

infant's  liability  with  respect  to  fixed  property  acquired  by 

his  contract. 

It  is  of  importance  to  know  how  the  ordinary  principles  govern- 
ing the  contracts  of  infants  are  applied  to  the  case  where  an 
interest  in  property,  of  a  fixed  and  permanent  nature,  is  vested  in 
an  infant  by  means  of  his  contract.  Are  the  duties  attendant 
upon  the  occupation  of  fixed  property  separated  therefrom  when 
the  occupier  is  within  the  privilege  of  minority  ?  Where  the 
interest  devolves  by  direct  operation  of  law  (as  upon  marriage  or 
by  descent),  it  is  clear  that  the  duty  is  received  along  with  it  — 
transit  terra  cum  onere.  (7/z)  This  fundamental  maxim,  thus  un- 
dergoes no  general  relaxation  in  favor  of  infants;  its  operation 
is  only  affected,  if  at  all,  when  that  other  maxim,  that  an  infant's 
contract  shall  never  be  his  burden,  comes  in  conflict  with  it.     The 

question  arising  here  is  undoubtedly  one  of  no  little  diffi- 
*  333    culty  ;  but  it  has  been  so  determined  as  to  reconcile  *  the 

two  principles  without  impairing  either  of  them.     It  is  held 

{k)  Temple  v.  Ilawley,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  female  infants  can  settle  their  personal 

153.  estate  before  marriage,  definitively.     See 

(/)  In  Slocomb  v.  CAnhh,  2  Bro.  Cli.  545,  Strickland  v.  Coker,  2  Ch.  Cas.  21 1 ;  and 

it  seems  to  be  the  doctrine  tliat  a  male  Warburton  r.  Lytton,  cited  in  Lytton  v. 

infant  may  bar  himself  l)y  covenants  be-  Lytton,  4  Bro.  Ch.  441. 
fore  marriage  of  his  estate  by  curtesy,  (m)  Leeds  &  Thirsk  Railway   Co.  v. 

and  of  all  right  in  or  to  his  wife's  per-  Fearnley,  4  Exch.  2G. 
sonal  property.     And  that  botli  male  and 

372 


CH.  XVII.]  INFANTS,  *  334 

that  if  one  under  age  take  a  lease,  and  enter,  and  continue  in 
possession  after  claim  of  the  rent,  he,  like  any  other  person  (and 
by  the  same  process  as  any  other  person),  (m)  may  be  compelled 
to  pay  the  rent  he  has  contracted  to  ])ay.  (o)  Yet  he  may,  if  he 
choose,  disclaim  at  any  time,  and  thereby  exonerate  himself ;  (jt>) 
or  at  least  he  may  disclaim  at  any  time  before  the  rent  day  comes, 
and  have  relief  from  liability  for  the  past  occupation.  ( q)  No 
necessity  obliges  him  to  put  off  his  disclaimer  until  his  majority  ; 
for  it  is  common  learning  that  an  infant  may  void  matters  in  fait, 
either  within  age  or  at  full  age,  (r)  but  matters  of  record  (for  the 
reason  that  when  such  come  in  question,  his  nonage  is  to  be 
ascertained  by  inspection  of  the  court,  and  not  by  the  country) 
must  be  avoided  during  his  minority,  and  not  afterwards.  Yet 
when  it  is  said  he  may  avoid  during  minority,  what  is  to  be  under- 
stood is  rather  a  suspension  than  an  avoidance, — an  avoidance, 
as  it  were,  only  de  bene  esse.  Upon  arriving  at  full  age  he  may 
disaffirm  that  disaffirmance,  and  revive  the  original  contract,  (s) 
In  this  case  the  debt  incurred  by  his  former  occupation  under  the 
lease,  and  the  recovery  of  which  he  had  prevented  by  disavow- 
ing, also  revives.  Where  an  interest  vests  in  the  infant  (as  it 
appears  it  does  in  all  cases  where  he  accepts  a  lease  or  other 
conveyance  of  land,  or  an  assignment  of  a  share  in  permanent 
stock),  no  express  ratification  on  coming  of  age  is  requisite. 
The  interest,  being  vested,  continues  until  divested  by 
repudiation,  *  which  may  be  by  parol ;  and  his  acquiescence  *  334 
after  majority  will  be  taken,  after  a  reasonable  time,  as  a 
waiver  of  his  right  to  disclaim,  and  an  adoption  at  mature  age, 
of  the  act  of  his  infancy,  {t)     It  seems  (though  the  point  is  still 

(n)  Per  Parke,  B.,  Newry   &  Eniiis-  compare  Newry  &  Enniskillen  Railway 

killen  Railway  Co.  v.  Coombe,  3  Exch.  Co.  r.   Coombe,   3  Exch.  572,   575,  578. 

669.        ^  In  the  former  case  the  law  is  thus  sum- 

(o)  Newton,  C.  J.,  Bottiller  v.  Newport,  marily   stated   in    the   judgment   of    the 

21   H.  6,  31   B.,  cited  and  approved  by  court :  "  It  seems  to  us  to  be  the  sounder 

Parke,  B.,  in  Northwestern  Railway  Co.  principle,  that  as  the  estate  vests  as  it 

V.   McMichael,    5    Exch.    126 ;    Ketsey's  certainly  does,  the  burden  upon  it  must 

case,  Brownl.  120;  s.  c,  under  various  continue  to  be  obligatory  until  a  waiver 

names,  Cro.  J.  320, 2  Bulst.  69,  Roll.  Abr.  or    disagreement    by    the    infant    takes 

Ell/ants,  K.  place,   which,   if    made   after    full    age, 

ip)  Northwestern  Railway  Co.  v.  Mc-  avoids  the  estate  altogether,  and  revests 

Michael,  5  Exch.  125.  it  in  the  party  from   whom  the  infant 

(q)  Ketsey's  case,  Cro.  J.  320;  1  Piatt  purchased  ;  if  made  within  age,  suspends 

on  Leases,  528,  529.  it  only,  because  such  disagreement  may 

(/•)  Co.  Lit.  380  b;  Bac  Abr.  Infancy  be  again  recalled  when  the  infant  attains 

and  Age  {l.),7.  his   majority."— See    Bool    v.    Mix,    17 

(s)  Nortliwestern  Railway  Co.  v.  Mc-  Wend.  119,  132,  per  Brownsou,  J. 
Midiacl,  5  Exch.  114,  127;  with  which  (t)  Ba.c.  Abr.  Infunci/  and  ylr/e(I.),  8; 

'  373 


*  335  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

unsettled),  that  the  fact  that  the  rent  reserved  upon  a  lease  made 
to  an  infant  is  greater  than  the  land  is  worth,  in  no  respect  alters 
the  case ;  although  the  contract  is  now  manifestly  an  injurious 
one.  (u) 

Even  if  shares  in  a  railway  corporation,  or  other  public  com- 
pany holding  land,  are  personal  property,  (v)  the  holders  of  such 
shares,  since  they  acquire  a  vested  interest  of  a  permanent  nature, 
fill  a  position  analogous  in  this  respect  to  that  of  occupiers  of 
real  estate ;  and  the  infant  purchaser  of  a  share  in  such  a  corpora- 
tion incurs  a  liability  similar  to  that  of  an  infant  lessee,  (w) 
Thus  the  simple  plea  of  infancy  is  no  defence  to  an  action  for 
calls,  {x)  What  limits  are  to  be  set  to  the  analogy  is  undeter- 
mined. It  cannot  be  said  that  the  cases  which  have  as  yet  been 
adjudicated  are  authority  for  extending  it  to  other  than  stock  based, 
like  railroad  stock,  in  some  measure  upon  the  possession  of  land. 

There  is  no  principle  of  law  (though  such  has  sometimes  been 
supposed  to  exist),  placing  infants  on  the  same  footing  as  other 
persons  whenever  they  enter  into  contracts  which  owe  their  valid- 
ity, and  the  means  of  their  enforcement,  to  statutes.  In  all  stat- 
utes containing  general  words,  there  is  an  implied  or  virtual 
exception  in  favor  of  persons  whose  disability  the  common  law 
recognizes,  (y)  Thus  where  a  company  is  incorporated  by  stat- 
ute, and  by  a  general  clause  all  shareholders  are  subjected 

*  335    *  to  certain  liabilities,  and  enjoined  certain  duties ;  here 

the  same  abatement  of  the  rigor  of  the  provision  is  to  be 
made  with  regard  to  infants,  lunatics,  and  femes  covert,  which 
the  common  law  would  make  in  applying  a  common-law  rule.  (3)  ^ 

Com.   Dig.   Enfants   (C),   6;    Evelyn   v.  who  enjoys  the  land  demised  would  apply 

Chichester,  3  Burr.  1717  ;  La wson  I'.  Love-  here,  because  this  liability  rests  entirely 

joy,  8  Greenl.  405 ;  Robbins  v.  Eaton,  10  in  contract,  and  there  is  no  possession  of 

N.  H.  5G2 ;  Holmes  v.  Blogg,  8  Taunt.  39,  any  thing ;   all  that  the  party  gets  is  a 

40,  per  Dal/as,  J.  rv^ht  to  a  ])ortion  of  the  profits  of  the  un- 

((()  Northwestern  Railway  Co.  v.  Me-  dertaking."      But    see   Leeds   &   Thirsk 

Michael,  5  Exeh.  114.  Railway  Co.  v.  Fcarnlcy,  4  Exch.  26,  and 

{v)  Bligh  V.  Brent,  2  Y.  &  Col.  268;  especially  the  judgment  of  tiie  court  as 

Bradley  v.  Holdsworth,  3  M.  &  W.  422,  given  by  Baron   Parke  in    Northwestern 

424.  Railway  Co.  v.  McMichael,  6  Exch.  123. 

(w)  In  Newry  &  Enniskillen  Railway  (r)  Birkenhead,  Lancashire,    &   Che- 
Co.   V.  Coombe,  3  Exch.  577,  where  the  shire  Railway  Co.  v.  Pilcher,  5  Exch.  121. 
point   was    discussed,    J!olf>',    B.,  indeed,  (//)  Stowell  r.  Roch,  Plowd.  304. 
said:  "I  must  say  I  doubt  whether  the  (c)  In  tlie  Cork  &  Bandon   Railway 
doctrine  as  to  a  lease  granted  to  an  infant  Co.  v.  Cazenove,  10  Q.  B.  U35,  two  of  the 

1  Bradford  v.  French,  1 10  Mass.  3G5,  was  a  decision  that  an  infant  mortgagee  misrht 
make   the  "demand"  necessary  under  a  statiiti',  jirovidiug   that   a   mortgairce    might) 
demand  of  a  creditor  or  an  officer  attaching  mortgaged  personalty  the  amount  due,  failure 
to  pav  which  would  dissolve  the  iwtachment. 

374 


CH.  XVII.] 


INFANTS. 


336 


The  case  of  an  infant  whose  interest  in  his  land  or  stock  is  ac- 
quired by  marriage  or  descent  is  (as  we  have  seen)  quite  differ- 
ent ;  for  his  liability  is  cast  upon  him  by  direct  operation  of  law.  (a) 
So  where  a  minor  is  held  to  service  in  the  navy  by  force  of  a 
statute ;  (5)  it  is  not  the  contract  of  enlistment  which  binds  him, 
but  the  statutory  duty.  In  all  cases,  "  the  only  criterion  is  whether 
the  liability  is  derived  from  contract."  (c)  If  it  be  derived  from 
contract  the  common-law  exceptions  apply  to  it ;  otherwise,  not. 

Respecting  the  manner  of  pleading  the  defence  of  infancy  in 
cases  where  a  liability  is  charged  on  account  of  the  occupation  of 
land,  or  the  possession  of  stock,  and  of  replying  to  that  defence, 
the  following  conclusions  may  be  drawn  from  recent  decisions  in 
England.  First.  Where  a  jwWma/aae  liability  appears  in 
consequence  of  such  holding  of  land  or  stock,  the  *  simple  *  336 
plea  of  infancy  is  not  sufficient ;  the  defendant  must  also 
aver  that  the  interest  on  account  of  which  he  is  charged  came  to 
him  by  contract  and  that  he  has  disaffirmed  that  contract,  (c?) 
and  if  the  disaffirmance  be  after  he  arrived  at  age  he  must  aver 
that  it  was  within  a  reasonable  time  after  becoming  of  age.  (e) 


judges,  Lord  Denvian  and  Patteson,  J.,  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  since,  by  the 
statute,  a  shareholder  was  liable  to  the 
coni|>any  for  calls  in  his  character  of 
shareholder,  the  fact  of  infancy  made  no 
difference.  The  Court  of  Exchequer, 
which  had  previously  refused  assent  to 
this  doctrine  (see  Newry  Railway  Co.  v. 
Coombe,  o  Exch.'^OS,  and  Leeds  Railway 
Co.  V.  Fearnley,  4  Exch.  20,  32),  thus  ob- 
served upon  it  in  the  Northwestern  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  McMichael,  6  Exch.  124: 
"  We  cannot  say  that  we  concur  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Court  of  Queen's  Bench, 
as  reported  in  11  Jur.  802,  and  10  Q.  B. 
9.35,  if  it  goes  to  the  full  extent  that  all 
shareholders,  including  infants,  are  by  the 
operation  of  the  Railway  Acts  made  ab- 
solutely liable  to  pay  calls.  No  doubt 
the  statute  not  only  gave  a  more  easy 
remedy  against  the  holder  of  shares  by 
original  contract  with  the  company,  for 
calls,  and  also  attached  the  liability  to 
pay  calls  to  tiie  shares,  so  as  to  bind  all 
subsequent  holders  ;  but  we  consider,  as 
we  have  before  said,  that  there  are  im- 
plied exceptions  in  favor  of  infants  and 
lunatics  in  statutes  containing  general 
words  (Stowel  v.  Lord  Zoucli,  Plowd. 
364),  though  that  depends,  of  course,  on 
the  intent  of  the  legislature  in  each  case 
(see  Wilmot's  Notes  of  Opinions  and 
Judgments,  p.  194,  The  Earl  of  Bucking- 


hamshire I!.  Drury),  and  that  this  statute 
did  not  mean,  by  general  words,  to  de- 
prive infants  of  the  protection  which  the 
law  gave  them  against  improvident  bar- 
gains. Under  this  statute,  therefore,  our 
opinion  is,  tliat  an  infant  is  not  absolutely 
bound,  but  is  in  the  same  situation  as  an 
infant  acquiring  real  estate  or  any  other 
permanent  interest :  he  is  not  deprived  of 
the  right  which  the  law  gives  every  in- 
fant, of  waiving  and  disagreeing  to  a 
purchase  which  he  has  made;  and  if  he 
waives  it,  the  estate  acquired  by  the  pur- 
chase is  at  an  end,  and  with  it  his  liability 
to  pay  calls,  thougli  the  avoidance  may 
not  have  taken  place  till  the  call  was 
due." 

(a)  Parke,  B.,  Newry  &  Enniskillcn 
Railway  Co.  v.  Coombe,  3  Exch.  574; 
Leeds  &  Thirsk  Railway  Co.  v.  Fearnley, 
4  Exch.  26. 

(b)  See  United  States  v.  Bainbridge,  1 
Mason,  71. 

(c)  Parke,  B.,  Newry  &  Enniskillen 
Railway  Co.  v.  Coombe,  3  Exch.  569. 

(d)  Leeds  &  Thirsk  Railway  Co.  i'. 
Fearnley,  4  Exch.  26;  Cork  &  Bandon 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cazenove,  10  Q.  B.  935 ; 
s.  c.  11  Jur.  802. 

(fi)  Dublin  &  Wicklow  Railway  Co. 
V.  Black,  16  E.  L.  &  E.  656 ;  s.  c.  8  Exch. 
181. 

375 


*  337  THE   LAW   OP   CONTEACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

Second.  If  upon  the  simple  plea  of  infancy  being  put  in,  the 
plaintiff  take  issue  thereon,  and  the  defendant  obtain  a  verdict, 
the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  judgment  7ion  obstante  veredicto.  (/) 
Third.  Where  infancy,  the  contract,  and  the  disaffirmance,  are 
all  pleaded,  it  is  a  good  bar ;  and  if  the  defendant  has,  upon  com- 
ing of  age,  reaffirmed  the  contract,  it  is  for  the  plaintiff  to  allege 
this  fact  in  his  replication.  (^)  Fourth.  Supposing  the  law  to 
be  (which,  however,  it  seems  it  is  not)  that  an  infant  occupying 
under  a  lease,  wherein  exorbitant  rent  is  reserved,  may  defend 
against  the  recovery  of  such  rent,  without  giving  up  possession,  his 
plea,  in  addition  to  the  other  requisites,  must  distinctly  show  that 
at  the  time  of  pleading  it  he  is  still  a  minor.  (7i) 


SECTION  X. 

OF   ILLEGITIMATE   CHILDREN. 

All  persons  are  illegitimate  who  are  both  begotten  and  born 
out  of  lawful  wedlock.  If  begotten  before  wedlock,  and  born  an 
hour  after,  they  are  legitimate  at  common  law.  By  the  statutes 
of  many  of  our  States,  (i)  following  the  doctrine  of  the  Roman 
civil  law,  and  of  most  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  a 
*  337  *  subsequent  marriage  of  the  parents  legitimates  such 
children,  (j) 

In  England  the  common  law  conclusively  presumed  every  child 
to  be  legitimate,  if  the  parents  were  married  and  within  the  realm, 
when  the  child  might  have  been  begotten,  and  the  husband  not 
proved  to  be  impotent,  {k)  Now,  however,  there  as  well  as  here, 
it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  ;  but  the  presumption  in  favor  of  legi- 

(/)  Birkenhead,  Lancasliirc,  &   Che-  to  be  construed   favorably,   Swanson  v. 

shire  Railway  Co.  v.  Pilcher,  5  Exeh.  121.  Swanson,    2    Swan,   446.      But   see   Ed- 

{fj)  Newry  &  I^nniskillen  Railway  Co.  mondson  v.  Dvson,  7  Ga.  512. 
r.  Coombe,  3  Exch.  505.  (/)  Code   Civil,   No.   331;    2   Domat. 

(/()  Northwestern  Railway  Co.  r.  Me-  3fil ;    1    Ersk.   Inst.    116;    Butler's   note 

Michael,  5  Exch.  128.  (181),  to  Co.  Lit.      It  wa.s  in  reply  to  an 

(/)  This    is    so    in    Maine.   Vermont,  attempt  of  the  English  Bishops  to  intro- 

Massachusetts,    Connecticut,    Maryland,  duce  tliis  rule  of  tiie  civil   (and  canon) 

Virf^'inia,    Ohio,    Indiana,    Illinois,    Mis-  law  into  England,  that  tlie  Lords  made 

souri,     Georgia,    Alabama,     Mississippi,  their    famous     answer,    "  Nolamus    leges 

Louisiana,  Kentucky,  and  perhaps  some  Anqli(E  mutdri." 

other  States.      Staiutes  of   legitimation  [k)  1  Roll.  Abr.  358 ;  Co.  Lit.  244  a. 

are  valid,  Beall  v.  Beall,  8  Ga.  210;  and 

376 


CH.  XVII.]  INFANTS.  *  338 

timacy  can  bo  overthrown  only  by  clear  proof.  (I)  It  has  been 
held  in  England  that  the  evidence  of  the  husband  is  not  admis- 
sible to  prove  his  access  to  his  wife;(w)  and  in  this  country, 
that  the  evidence  of  the  wife  is  not  admissible  to  prove  his  non- 
access,  (w)  At  common  law  bastards  have  no  inheritable  blood  ; 
but  in  some  of  our  States  they  inherit  from  their  mothers,  and 
their  mothers  inherit  from  them,  under  various  qualifications,  (o) 
In  England,  and  generally  in  this  country,  the  putative  father  is 
chargeable,  by  statute  provisions  (and  by  them  only),  for  the 
support  of  his  illegitimate  child. 

In  England,  Courts  of  Equity  have,  in  some  cases,  been  very 
much  disposed  to  favor  bastards,  in  the  consideration  of  settle- 
ments or  devises  in  relation  to  them ;  (p)  and  in  other  cases 
have  been  extremely  severe,  {q}  In  this  country,  the  courts  have 
generally  been  liberal  towards  them,  (r)  But  while  a  devise  in 
favor  of  an  expected  (and  then  begotten)  illegitimate  child  has 
been  held  valid,  (s)  a  settlement  in  favor  of  future  illegiti- 
mate children  was  held  void,  (i)  *  It  has  been  held  in  *  338 
England  that  bastards  cannot  marry  within  the  prohibited 
degrees,  (tt) 

The  rights  of  the  mother  to  the  custody  of  the  child  have  been 
maintained  against  the  putative  father,  (v) 

(/)  Pcndrell  v.  Pendrell,  Stra.  925;  diana,  Illinois,  Virginia,  Kentucky,  Mis- 
Cross  V.  Cross,  3  Paige,  139 ;  Common-  souri,  Tennessee,  Nortli  Carolina,  Ala- 
wealth   V.  Wentz,    1   Ashm.    269 ;   Com-  bama,  Georgia. 

monwealth    v.   Shepherd,   6    Binn.   286;  {p)  Annandale  v.  Harris,  2  P.  Wms. 

Stegall  V.  Stegall,  2  Brock.  256  ;   Bury  v.  432. 

Phillpot,  2   Myl.  &  K.  349;    Patterson  v.  {q)  Prec.  Ch.  475;    1   Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 

Gaines,  6  How.  550,  589.     The  presunip-  123 ;  Gilb.  Eq.  139. 

lion  of  law  seems  to  be  less  in  Van  Aer-  (r)  Bunn  v.  Winthrop,   1  Johns.  Ch. 

nam  v.  Van  Aernam,  1  Barb.  Ch.  375.  338 ;  Harten  v.  Gibson,  4  Desaus.  139. 
But  see  Caujolle  v.  Ferrie,  23  N.  Y.  (9  (s)  Pratt  v.  Flamer,  4  Har.  &  J.  10. 

Smith)  90.  (0  Wilkinson    v.    Wilkinson,    N.    Y. 

(m)  Patchett  v.  Holgate,  3  E.  L.  &  E.  Leg.  Obs.  191. 
100.  (u)  Haines  v.  Jeffell,  1  Ld.  Eaym.  68. 

(n)  People  v.  The  Overseers,  15  Barb.  (v)  Robalina  v.  Armstrong,  15  Barb. 

286 ;  Parker  v.  Way,  15  N.  H.  45.  247. 

(o)  Vermont,  Connecticut,   Ohio,   In- 

37T 


339  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 


*339  *  CHAPTER  XYIII. 

OF   THE   CONTRACTS   OF   JLUIRIED   WOMEN. 

Sect.  I.  —  Of  the    General  Effect  of  3Iarriage  on  the  Rights  of 

the  Parties. 

At  common  law  the  disability  of  a  married  woman  is  almost 
entire.  Her  personal  existence  is  merged  for  most  purposes  in 
that  of  her  husband.  This  was  not  so  among  the  Anglo-Saxons, 
nor  with  the  earlier  Teutonic  races ;  and  must  be  explained  as 
one  of  the  effects  of  the  feudal  system.  It  was  a  principal  object 
of  that  system  to  make  the  whole  strength  of  the  State  available 
as  a  military  force ;  and  to  this  purpose  was  sacrificed  much  of 
the  consideration  and  respect  which  had  been  formerly  paid  by 
the  German  tribes  to  woman  and  her  rights  of  property,  and  which 
had  distinguished  these  tribes  from  the  nations  of  Rome,  Greece, 
and  the  East.  As  a  married  woman  could  not  be  a  soldier,  she 
was  permitted  to  have  but  imperfect  and  qualified  rights  of  prop- 
erty, because  property  was  then  bound  to  the  State,  and  made  the 
means  of  supplying  it  with  an  armed  force.  It  is  possible  that 
the  Teutonic  respect  for  woman  was  intensified  into  the  extrava- 
gance of  chivalry,  as  a  kind  of  compensation.  All  was  done  for 
her  that  could  be  done,  in  manners  and  in  social  usages  ;  because 
in  law,  and  in  reference  to  rights  of  property,  so  little  was  allowed. 
Dower  was  carefully  secured  to  her ;  but  the  exercise  of  her  own 
free  will  over  her  property  was  forbidden.  But  the  influence  of 
the  feudal  system  is  broken,  very  much  in  England,  and  far  more 
here.  And  among  the  effects  of  this  decay  of  a  system  in  which 
many  of  the  principles  and  forms  of  our  law  originated,  we  count 

the  changes  which  have  been  made  and  are  now  making 
*  340  in  the  law  which  defines  the  position  and  the  rights  *  of 

the  married  woman.  This  law  is  in  fact,  at  this  moment, 
in  a  transition  state  in  this  country.  It  seems  to  be  everywhere 
378 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  340 

conceded  that  the  old  rules  were  oppressive  and  unjust,  and  cer- 
tainly not  in  conformity  with  the  existing  temper  or  condition  of 
society.  Almost  everywhere  changes  are  made,  or  attempted ; 
and  the  necessity  of  change  is  not  denied.  But  in  some  parts  of 
our  country  the  slow  and  gradual  progress  of  these  changes  indi- 
cates a  belief  that  there  is  much  need  of  caution,  in  order  to  im- 
prove and  liberalize  the  marital  relation,  without  inflicting  upon 
it  great  injury.  We  know  that  in  those  States  in  which  the 
greatest  changes  have  been  made,  and  still  greater  are  desired  by 
some  persons,  there  are  those  who  think  mischief  has  already 
been  caused,  and  that  a  brief  experience  will  prove  the  inconven- 
ience and  danger  of  permitting  husband  and  wife  to  possess  in- 
terests and  properties  and  powers,  altogether,  or  in  a  great  degree, 
independent  and  equal.  The  tendency  of  this  would  seem  to  be, 
necessarily,  to  make  them  bargainers  with  each  other ;  and  as 
watchful  against  each  other,  as  careful  for  good  security,  as  strict 
in  making  terms  and  compelling  an  exact  performance  of  prom- 
ises or  conditions,  and  as  prompt  to  seek  in  litigation  a  remedy 
for  supposed  wrongs,  as  seller  and  buyer,  lender  and  borrower, 
usually  are ;  and  as  these  parties  may  be,  more  properly  and 
safely ,  than  husband  and  wife. 

We  place  in  a  note  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  a  synopsis  of  the 
statutory  provisions  of  the  several  States  affecting  the  law  of 
husband  and  wife  ;  but  shall  present  in  the  text  what  may  still  be 
regarded  as  common  law  on  this  subject,  and  in  force,  where  not 
changed  as  stated  in  the  synopsis,  (^aa) 

We  will  first  consider  the  effect  of  marriage  upon  the  contracts 
made  by  the  woman  before  her  marriage,  and  then  her  contracts 
made  after  marriage. 

(aa)  The  English  Statute  of  1870,  ch.  woman  shall  be  her  own,  and  that  her 

93,  changes  the  law  of  that  country  ma-  husband  is  not,  and  her  property  is,  liable 

terially,  providing,  with  much  detail,  that  for  her  ante-nuptial  debts. 
the  property  and  earnings  of  a  married 

379 


*  341  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 


*341  *  SECTION   II. 

OF  THE   CONTRACTS   OP   A   MARRIED   WOMAN   MADE   BEFORE 
MARRIAGE. 

The  contract  of  a  married  woman  made  before  her  marriage 
inures  to  the  benefit  of  her  husband ;  but  does  not  vest  in  him 
absolutely.  It  is  a  chose  in  action,  which  he  may  reduce  to  his 
own  possession  during  her  life.  If  he  does  not  so  reduce  it  to 
his  possession,  and  dies,  she  surviving  him,  it  becomes  again 
absolutely  hers,  (a)  ^  If  she  dies  before  he  has  reduced  it  to 
possession,  he  surviving,  he  may  enforce  the  contract  as  her 
administrator,  for  his  own  benefit.  (6)  And  it  has  been  said  that 
if  he  gets  possession  of  her  choses  in  action  after  her  death,  with- 
out suit,  they  are  his,  by  a  title  as  perfect  as  if  he  had  received 
letters  of  administration,  (c)  ^  And  if  administration  be  neces- 
sary, and  the  husband  dies  before  taking  out  letters  of  ad- 
ministration, the  right  to  take  them  goes  to  his  personal 
representatives  ;  and  if  another  party  becomes  administrator,  he 
will  be  regarded  as  a  trustee  for  the  husband  or  his  personal 
representatives,  {d}  He  may  reduce  such  chose  in  action  to  his 
possession  by  receiving  the  money  or  other  benefit  due  from  it,  or 
by  a  new  contract  with  the  debtor  in  substitution  for  the  wife's 

(a)  Co.  Lit.  351  I) ;    Obri.an  e-.  Ram,  3  Wms.   409;    Cas. -Temp.    Talb.    173;    2 

Mod.  18G;  Estate  of  Kintzinger,  2  Ashm.  Kent,  Com.  135;    Blonnerhassett  v.  Mon- 

455;  Legg  i-.  Legg,  8  Mass.  99;  Glasgow  sell,  19  Law  Times,  30. 
17.  Sands,  3  G.  &  J.  9G;  Stephens  r.  Beale,  (c)    Whitaker  v.  Whitaker,  6  Johns. 

4  Ga.  319  ;  Killcrease  y.  Killcrease,  7  How.  112.        We   cannot   but    entertain   some 

(Miss.)  311 ;   Rogers  v.  Hunipass,  4  Ired.  doubts  of  this.     But  see  Lowry  v.  Hous- 

Eq.  385  ;  Sayre  v.  Flournoy,  3  Kelly  (Ga.),  ton,  3  How.  (Miss.)  394  ;    Scott  v.  James, 

641.  3  id.  307  ;  Wade  r.  Grimes,  7  id.  425. 


(b)  1  Roll.  Abr.  910;  Elliot  v.  Collier 
3  Atk.  526,  1  Ves.  Sen.  15,  1  Wils.  108 
Donnington  v.  Mitchell,  1  Green,  Ch.  243 


{(I)  And  so  if  her  husband,  having  been 
appointed  administrator,  die  before  the  es- 
tate is  all  administered,  his  executor  or  ad- 


Brown  V.  Alden,  14  B.  Mon.  144.    He  holds  ministrator  is  entitled  to  be  administrator 

the  proceeds,  however,  as  assets  for  the  de  bouis  non,  in  preference  to  her  next  of 

payment  of  her  debts  contracted  before  kin.    Donnington  (".  Mitcliell,  1  Green,  Ch. 

marriage.  —  Heard    v.    Stamford,   3    P.  243;  Hendren  y.  Colgin,  4  Munf.  231. 

1  Sec  Mitchell  v.  Holmes,  L.  R.  8  Ex.  119. 

2  But  see  Gill  r.  Woods,  81  111.  64;  Woodman  v.  Woodman,  54  N.  IL  220;  Wilson 
f.  Breeding,  50  la.  629. 

380 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  342 

chose  in  action,  or  by  recovering  a  judgment  on  tlic  con- 
tract, (e)  1     *  But  the  husband's  pledging  the  wife's  note,    *  342 
and  afterwards  redeeming  it,  is  not  a  reduction  by  him.  (/) 

If  the  wife's  choscs  in  action  are  assigned  by  the  husband,  and 
not  otherwise  reduced  to  his  possession,  the  question  arises, 
whether  this  is  of  itself  a  reduction  to  possession.  And  if  not, 
has  the  assignee  acquired  a  right  to  reduce  them  to  his  own  posses- 
sion ?  And  if  so,  and  the  assignee  fails  to  do  this  during  the  life 
of  the  husband,  and  the  wife  survives  the  husband,  is  the  right  of 
reduction  to  possession  by  the  assignee  gone,  and  do  the  choses 
in  action  become  the  wife's  absolute  property  ? 

The  weight  of  authority  is  in  favor  of  the  latter  view.  The 
doctrine  to  be  drawn  from  the  cases  may  be  stated  thus  :  If  the 
husband  appoints  an  agent  with  authority  to  reduce  to  possession 
these  choses  in  action,  the  agent  may  go  on  and  do  this,  while  the 
husband  lives.  But  the  death  of  the  husband  revokes  the  agency, 
and  if  the  wife  is  living,  the  choses  in  action  become  absolutely 
hers,  because  they  are  unreduced  by  the  husband.  And  if  the 
husband  assign  them,  but  not  for  value,  this  assignment  has  only 
the  effect  of  a  naked  authority  to  the  assignee  to  reduce  them 
to  possession.  But  if  the  husband  assign  them  for  value,  the 
assignment  is  now  in  itself  a  reduction  to  possession  by  the  hus- 
band, and  the  choses  in  action  do  not,  on  the  husband's  death, 
return  to  the  wife,  although  there  was  n^  further  reduction  during 
his  life.  ((/) 

(e)  It  seems  that  any  act  on  the  part  of  session  by  the  husband.    Timbers  i'.  Katz, 

the  husband,  wliich  clearly  shows  "an  in-  6  W.  &  S.  290. 

tention  to  make  the  wife's  chose  in  action  {/)  Bartlett  i\  Van  Zandt,  4  Sandf. 

his  own,  as  mortgaging,  releasing,  taking  Ch.  390  ;  Latourette  v.  Williams,  1  Barb. 

a  new  security,  procuring  a  judgment  on  9.    See  as  to  reduction  by  agents,  Turton 

it,  appointing  another  as  agent  to  collect  v.  Turton,  6  Md.  375. 
the  money  who  actually  collects  it,  &c.,  {(j)  Schuyler  v.  Hoyle,  5  Johns.    Ch. 

is   a   sufficient   reduction   to    possession,  196 ;  Cartaret  v.  Paschal,  3  P.  Wms.  197  ; 

and  bars  the  wife's  right  of  survivorship.  Jewson  v.  Moulton,  2  Atk.  417  ;  Mitford 

But  mere  receipt  of  interest  on  the  wife's  v.  Mitford,  9  Ves.  87  ;    Kenny  v.  Udall,  5 

chose  in  action  is  not  a  reduction  to  pos-  Johns.  Ch.  464 ;    Lowry  v.   Thornton,  3 

session.     Hart  v.  Stephens,  (5  Q.  B.  937.  How.  (Miss.)  394.     That  the  assignment 

Nor  is  the  mere  fact  that  he  joined  with  must   be    for   value,   see    Saddington   v. 

her,  in  giving  a  receipt  for  the  principal.  Kinsman,    1    Bro.    Ch.   44 ;     Johnson   v. 

sufficient  evidence  of  a  reduction  to  pos-  Johnson,  1  Jac.  &  W.  472 ;   Hartman  v. 

Dowdel,  1  Rawle,  279. 

1  Payment  to  a  husband  of  the  cash  proceeds  of  a  sale  of  her  real  estate  makes  them  his 
absolutely,  Plummer  !\  Jarman,  44  Md.  632;  or  of  the  proceeds  of  a  note  for  the  pur- 
chase-money, Humphries  v.  Harrison,  30  Ark.  79;  unless  at  the  time  he  received  them 
he  promised  her  to  make  repayment,  and  obtained  possession  only  upon  the  faith  of 
such  promise,  Sahel  i-.  Slingluff,  .52  Md.  132.  The  receipt  by  the  joint  agent  of  the  hus- 
band and  wife  of  money  of  an  estate  of  which  she  is  administratrix,  and  of  which  a  dis- 

381 


*  343  THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

The  effect  of  an   assignment  in  Bankruptcy  and  Insolvency- 
is  considered   in   the   chapter   on   these   subjects  in   the   Third 
Yokime. 

*  343        *  Whether  a  creditor  of  the  husband  can  acquire  by  at- 

tachment in  a  suit  against  the  husband,  the  wife's  choses  in 
action,  has  been  much  disputed.  The  adjudications  of  this  coun- 
try seem  to  be  in  favor  of  his  right  to  do  so  ;  (7i)  not  however 
without  high  authority  and  strong  reasons  for  the  doctrine,  that 
the  husband's  right  to  reduce  these  choses  to  possession  is  strictly 
marital,  which  he  may  perhaps  himself  transfer,  but  which  cannot 
be  taken  from  him  in  invitum.  (^) 

It  seems  now  to  be  settled,  that  any  court  having  equity  powers, 
when  an  assignee  of  a  wife's  chose  in  action  requires  the  aid  of 
those  powers  to  reduce  them  to  his  possession,  will  compel  an 
adequate  provision  out  of  them,  for  the  wife  ;  reference  being  had 
not  merely  to  this  chose,  but  to  all  the  property  of  the  wife  which 
passes  to  the  husband. 

But  the  court  will  not  interfere  where  the  assignee  may  acquire 
complete  possession  without  its  aid.  (j)  Whether,  in  this  country, 
a  court  of  law  possessing  equity  powers,  would  use  them  for  the 
protection  of  the  wife,  if  an  assignee  of  her  choses  in  action 
sought  its  aid  to  reduce  them  to  possession  by  an  action  at  law, 
is  not  positively  settled  by  adjudication.  On  general  principles 
we  should  hope  that  it  would  do  so. 

Generally,  in  all  cases  where  the  right  of  action  would  survive 
to  the  wife,  the  husband  and  wife  must  join  in  an  action  there- 

(/i)  Dold  V.  Geiger,  2  Gratt.  98,  holds  yet  received.      See,   however,    Swoj'er's 

that  a    husband    cannot    protect    these  Appeal,   id.   377.     A   note  given   to  the 

choses   in  action  from  his  creditors   by  wife  during  coverture   is  only  a  chose  in 

settling  them  (m    his  wife.     Andrews  v.  action  to  which  these  rules  appl3%  as  it 

Jones,  10  Ala.  400,  qualifies,  if  it  does  not  does  not  become  the  husband's  unless  he 

deny  this.     Wheeler  r\  Bowen,  20  Pick,  reduces  it  to  possession.    Gates  r.  Madely, 

503  ;    Hay  ward  v.  Hay  ward,  id.  528,  and  6  M.  &  W.  423;  Hart  v.  Stephens,  0  Q  B. 

Strong  V.  Smith,  1  ]\let.  470,  assert  that  937  ;  Scarpellini  v.  Atcheson,  7  Q  B.  875. 
creditors  have  this  power.     Vance  y.  Mc-  (i)  Wheeler  v.  Moore,  13  N.  H.  478; 

Laughlin,  8  Gratt  280,  admits  the  validity  Poor  v.  Ilazleton,  15  N.  H.  504.     See  also 

of  the  attachment,  but  holds  that  it   is  Gallego   v.    Gallego,   2   Brock.   287,  and 

avoided   by   the   death   of   the   husband  Peacock  v.  Pembroke,  4  Md.  280. 
while  the  suit  is  pending.     Skinner's  Ap-  (  ;)   Duvall  v.  Farmers  Bank,  4  G.  & 

peal,  5  Penn.  St.  202,  holds  that  a  general  J.   282;    Whitesides   v.    Dorris.  7  Dana, 

assignment   by   the    husband   of   all  his  101  ;  Perryclear  v.  Jacobs,  2  Hill  (S.  C.), 

property  for  his  creditors  does  not  pass  Ch.  504;    Like  v.  Beresford,  3  Ves.  506; 

to  them  his  wife's  interest  in  a  legacy  not  Sleech  v.  Thorington,  2  Ves.  Sen.  ,502. 

tributive  share  belongs  to  her,  reduces  it  to  the  hubaml's  possession.  Dardicr  v. 
Chapman,  1 1  Ch.  1).  442 ;  but  where  a  husband  never  claimed  his  wiib's  money  as  his 
own,  a  disposition  of  it  by  his  will,  will  not  make  it  a  part  of  his  estate,  Grebill's 
Appeal,  87  Penn.  St.  105. 

382 


CH.  XVITI.]  MARRIED   WOMEN,  *  344 

for.  (A;)  As  all  her  beneficial  contracts  made  before  mar- 
riage inure  to  *  the  benefit  of  the  husband,  so,  on  the  other  *  344 
hand,  if  she  is  liable  for  any  debts  when  he  marries  her, 
this  liability  is  cast*on  him  jointly  with  her,  by  the  marriage ;  (?)  ^ 
even  if  he  were  an  infant  at  the  time  of  marriage,  (m)  And  this 
is  true  also,  although  the  debts  did  not  mature  and  become  pay- 
able until  after  the  marriage,  (w)  and  although  he  received  nothing 
with  her.  This,  however,  is  only  his  personal  liability,  and  docs 
not  survive  him.  If,  therefore,  he  dies  before  a  debt  is  paid,  his 
estate  is  not  liable  for  it,  unless  the  debt  was  put  in  suit  and  re- 
duced to  a  judgment  in  his  lifetime,  (o)  even  if  that  estate  con- 
tains or  consists  wholly  of  what  has  been  her  personal  property. 
But  her  separate  liability  revives  by  his  death,  (p)  although  her 
marriage  may  have  taken  from  her  and  given  to  him  or  his  repre- 
sentatives, all  her  means.  So  if  she  dies  before  the  debt  is  paid 
or  reduced  to  judgment,  his  liability  also  ceases.  (5-)  But  if  she 
leaves  choses  in  action  unreduced  to  possession  by  the  husband, 
and  after  her  death  he  or  his  representative  as  her  administrator, 
reduces  them  to  possession,  as  above  stated,  the  proceeds  of  these 
choses  in  action  must  be  applied,  in  the  first  place,  to  any  unpaid 
debts  of  hers,  and  only  the  balance  can  be  held  by  the  husband  or 
his  estate,  (r) 

A  discharge  of  the  husband  in  insolvency  or  bankruptcy  bars 
a  suit  against  husband  and  wife  for  her  debt.  And  it  has  been 
held  that  such  discharge  extinguished  her  debt ;  (s)  in  which 
case  it  could  not  revive  at  her  husband's  death.  But  in  equity  a 
satisfaction  of  the  debt  would  still  be  decreed  from  any  separate 
estate  held  by  her.  (f) 

(k)    Morse   v.   Earl.   13  Wend.    271 ;  1  Bailey,  Eq.  166  ;   Howes  v.  Bigelow,  13 

Ramsey  v.  George,  1  M.  &  Sel.  176 ;  Hoy  Mass.  384 ;    Chapline  v.  Moore,  7  Monr. 

V.  Rogers,  4  Monr.  225  ;  Milner  v.  Miines,  179 ;   Buckner  v.  Smyth,  4  Desaus.  371 ; 

3  T.  R.  631.  Mentz  v.  Renter,  1  Watts,  229. 

(0  Morris  v.  Norfolk,   1  Taunt.  212 ;  {p)  Woodman  v.  Cliapman,  1   Camp. 

Howes  V.  Bigelow,  13  Mass.  384  ;    Petkin  189. 

V.  Thompson,  13  Pick.  64  ;  Haines  i'.  Cor-  {q)  See  cases  above  cited, 

liss,  4  Mass.  659;   Dodgson  v.  Bell,  3  E.  (?•)    Heard  v.    Stamford,  3   P.    Wms. 

L.  &  E.  542;  s.  c.  5  Exch.  967.  409.  Cas.  Temp.  Talb.  173;   Donnington 

(m)    Butler    v.    Breck,    7   Met.    164;  v.  Mitchell,  1  Green,  Ch.  243;   Ryder  i?. 

Roach  V.  Quick,  9  Wend.  238.  Hulse,  24  N.  Y.  372. 

(n)    Heard   v.   Stamford,  Cas.   Temp.  (s)  Lockwood  v.  Salter,  2  Nev.  &  M. 

Talb.   173;    s.  c.  3  P.  Wms.  409;    Tho-  255. 
mond  V.  Earl  of  Suffolk,  1  P.  Wms.  469.  (t)  Mallory  v.  Vanderheyden,  cited  in 

(o)  Roll.  Abr.  351 ;  Heard  v.  Stamford,  2  Kent,  Com.  138,  n.  (a). 
3  P.  Wms.  409 ;   Witherspoon  v.  Dubose, 

1  Alexander  i;.  Morgan,  31  Ohio  St.  546. 

383 


*  345  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

Although  a  husband  cannot  contract  with  his  wife,  (u) 

*  345    he  *  may  make  her  a  valid  gift  of  a  chattel  or  of  a  chose  in 

action. 1     But  a  delivery  of  the  chattel,  or  of  the  evidence 
of  the  chose  in  action,  is  indispensable,  (v)  ^ 


SECTION  III. 

OP  THE   CONTRACTS   OP   A   MARRIED   WOMAN   MADE   DURING    HER 

MARRIAGE. 

By  the  rules  of  the  common  law,  a  married  woman  has  no 
power  to  bind  herself  by  contract,  or  to  acquire  to  herself  and 
for  her  exclusive  benefit  any  right,  by  a  contract  made  with  her.^ 
And  as  she  can  make  no  valid  contract,  the  husband  cannot  be 
bound  by  any  contract  which  she  may  attempt  to  make.  He  is 
responsible  for  her  torts  of  every  kind ;  but  if  the  tort  is  essen- 
tially connected  with  a  contract,  as  by  borrowing  money  on  false 
and  fraudulent  pretences,  it  is  held  that  the  husband  is  not  liable 
for  the  tort,  (w)  *  If  she  receives  money  or  property  by  gift  to 
herself  or  in  payment  for  her  services,  and  lends  it,  her  husband 
and  not  she  has  the  right  to  recover  it ;  and"  so  if  she  sell  any 
thing,  her  husband  has  the  right  to  recover  the  price.  He  may 
claim  the  earnings  of  her  personal  labor,  and  only  where  she 
alone  is  the  meritorious  cause  of  the  debt  due  can  she  be  joined 
in  an  action  for  it.  In  general,  whatever  she  earns,  she  earns  as 
his  servant,  and  for  him ;  for  in  law,  her  time  and  her  labor,  as 
well  as  her  money,  are  his  property,  (x)  ^ 

(u)  See  j)ost,  p.  *  359.  (w)   L.  A.  L.  Assoc,   v.  Fairhurst,  9 

(v)  Brown  v.  Brown,  23   Barb.   565  ;     Exch.  422. 
Lockwood  V.  CuUen,  4  Kob.  129.  {x)    See  Legg   v.  Lcgg,  8  Mass.  99 ; 

1  And  his  reservation  of  a  power  of  revocation  or  appointment  to  other  uses  does  not 
impair  the  validit}'  of  the  gift.  Jones  r.  Clifton,  101  U.  S.  225.  A  conveyance  of  real 
estate  by  deed  from  a  husl)and  to  his  wife,  intended  as  a  gift  in  pncsenii,  tliough  void  at 
law,  may  be  sustained  and  enforced  in  equity.     Ilnnt  v.  Johnson,  44  N.  Y.  27. 

2  As,  for  instance,  against  creditors  in  a  "gift  of  extravagant  furniture  in  the  common 
dwelling.  In  re  Pierce,  7  Bissell,  426.  —  Letters  alone  from  a  husband  to  his  wife, 
making  a  gift  to  his  wife,  will  not  effectuate  it.     Breton  v.  Woolven,  17  Ch.  D.  416. 

3  A  married  woman's  void  contract  cannot  be  enforced  after  her  divorce,  although 
she  then  renews  her  promise.     Putnam  v.  Tennyson,  ."jO  Ind.  456. 

*  As  her  false  representations  for  necessaries.     Woodward  v.  Barnes,  46  Vt.  3.32. 
6  Cambell  v.  Galbreath,  12  Bush,  459;  McDavid  v.  Adams,   77  111.  155;  Yopst  v. 
Yopst,  51  Ind.  61.     The  proceeds  of  their  joint  labor  also   belong   to  the  husband, 

384 


CH.  XVIII.] 


MARRIED   WOMEN. 


346 


*  If  A  enters  into  a  contract  with  the  wife  of  B,  not    *  346 
knowing  her  marriage,  and  she  having  no  authority  to  bind 
B,  and  not  professing  to  act  for  him,  the  wife  is  not  bound,  neither 
is  B  liable  upon  such  contract,  (y)    But  wliether  B,  who  may  ccr- 


Howes  I'.  Bigelow,  13  Mass.  384;  Wins- 
low  V.  Croker,  17  Me.  29;  Hoskins  v. 
Miller,  2  Dev.  360;  Hyde  v.  Stone,  9 
Cowen,  230 ;  Morgan  v.  Thames  Bank, 
14  Conn.  99 ;  Matter  of  Grant,  2  Story, 
312;  Hawkins  v.  Craig,  6  Monr.  257; 
Merrill  v.  Smith,  37  Me.  394.  And  not- 
withstanding the  husband  lives  apart 
from  his  wife,  and  in  a  state  of  continued 
adultery,  his  right  to  her  personal  prop- 
erty is  still  the  same,  so  long  as  the  re- 
lation of  husband  and  wife  continues. 
Russell  V.  Brooke,  7  Pick.  6-5 ;  Turtle  v. 
Muncy,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  82  ;  including  her 
earnings  both  before  and  after  marriage. 
Glover  v.  Proprietors  of  Drury  Lane,  2 
Chitt.  117  ;  Washburn  v.  Hale,  10  Pick. 
429 ;  Prescott  v.  Brown,  23  Me.  305.  In 
Messenger  v.  Clark,  5  Exch.  388,  it  was 
held  that  a  husband  is  entitled  to  the 
money  which  his  wife  saves  out  of  a 
weekly  allowance  given  by  him  for  her 
support,  they  living  separate  by  agree- 
ment. It  should  be  noted,  however,  that 
Rol/e,  B.,  puts  the  case  on  the  ground  that 
the  wife  had  invested  her  savings  in  stock 
(which  stock  she  afterwards  sold  and  gave 
away  the  proceeds),  and  he  held  that  al- 
though the  money  might  have  been  hers 
to  dispose  of  as  she  pleased,  yet  when  she 
bought  a  specific  chattel  with  a  part  of  it, 
that  cliattel  became  the  husband's. 

(y)  In  Smith  i-.  Plomer,  15  East,  607, 
it  was  held  tliat  a  tradesman  supphing  a 
married  woman  living  apart  from  her  hus- 
band with  furniture  upon  hire,  does  not 
thereby  divest  himself  of  the  present  right 
of  property  in  such  goods,  inasn^ich  as 
the  married  woman  was  incapable  of  ac- 
quiring it  by  anj'  contract ;  and  therefore 
if  the  slieriff  take  such  goods  in  execution, 
at  the  suit  of  the  husband's  creditor,  trover 
lies  by  the  tradesman.  But  if  the  contract 
had  been  valid,  the  goods  being  let  to  hire 
generality,  without  any  time  limited,  no- 
tice to  determine  the  contract  given  to  the 
sheriff's  officer,  and  not  to  tlie  other  con- 
tracting party,  would  not  be  sufficient  to 
determine  the  contract.  Lord  Eilenhor- 
ough,  C.  J. :  "  This  case  has  been  pre- 
sented during  parts  of  the  argument  in 


different  points  of  view  from  what  it  ap- 
peared in  at  the  trial.  In  order  to  main- 
tain trover,  the  plaintiff"  must  have  a 
present  right  of  property  in  the  goods  ; 
the  first  question  therefore,  is,  whether 
the  plaintiff  liad  put  the  right  of  prop- 
erty out  of  him  by  a  valid  contract  for 
the  hire  of  the  goods  with  Mrs.  East  ?  If 
the  contract  were  for  a  year  it  would  put 
the  property  out  of  him  for  that  time ;  or 
if,  according  to  Mrs.  East's  evidence,  the 
hiring  were  only  general,  without  deter- 
mining either  price  or  time,  it  would 
operate  as  a  contract,  for  a  reasonable 
price,  so  long  as  both  parties  pleased  ; 
and  still  the  property  would  be  out  of 
him  for  the  time,  if  it  were  a  valid  con- 
tract. That  brings  it  to  the  question 
whether  Mrs.  East,  being  a  married  wo- 
man, could  make  a  valid  contract  for  the 
hire  of  the  plaintiff's  goods.  Now  a  con- 
tract to  be  valid  must  bind  both  parties  ; 
but  she  being  married,  it  could  not  bind 
her.  It  is  said,  however,  that  it  would 
bind  her  husband,  being  for  necessaries 
for  her  use  ;  but  I  know  of  no  case  where 
a  husband  has  been  held  liable  upon  a 
contract  of  this  sort  made  by  his  wife 
living  apart  from  him,  as  for  necessaries ; 
and  no  such  case  was  made  before  the 
jury.  Tlien  has  he  confirmed  the  con- 
tract ?  There  is  no  such  evidence.  The 
case,  therefore,  stands  upon  her  own  con- 
tract unconfirmed,  which  is  liable  to  the 
infirmity  of  her  being  a  married  woman. 
It  was  argued  on  the  other  hand,  that 
supposing  the  contract  was  good,  tlie  no- 
tice given  by  the  plaintiff  to  tlie  sheriff's 
officer  would  have  determined  it ;  but  to 
that  I  cannot  accede  ;  for  to  determine  a 
contract  which  is  determinable  upon  no- 
tice, the  notice  should  be  brought  home 
to  the  other  contracting  party  ;  and  it  is 
not  enougli  that  it  should  be  given  to  one 
acting  adversely  under  some  supposed 
derivative  title  in  the  law  from  that 
party.  The  notice,  therefore,  wln'ch  was 
given  to  the  sheriff's  officer,  would  not 
alter  the  case.  The  conclusion  fs,  that 
this  action  lies,  because  the  plaintiff"  had 
the  present  right  of  property  in  him  at 


Eeynolds  v.  Eobinson,  64  N.  Y.  589  ;  Shaeffer  v.  Sheppard,  54  Ala.  244 ;  Bowden  v. 
Gray,  49  Miss.  547  ;  including  her  personal  apparel  purchased  with  the  same.  Hawkins 
V.  Providence,  &c.  R.  Co.,  119  Mass.  596.  Even  if  he  is  living  apart  in  adultery,  she 
cannot  _  bequeath  a  legacy  not  received  by  her  in  her  lifetime,  nor  reduced  by  him  to 
possession.     Vreeland  v.  Ryno,  11  C.  E.  Green,  160. 

VOL.  I.  25  385 


*  347  THE    LAAV    OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK    I. 

tainly  repudiate  the  contract,  can  elect  to  adopt  it,  and  enforce  it 
as  his  own  against  A,  may  well  be  doubted.  Upon  principle  we 
should  say  he  could  not,  because  there  is  a  total  want  of  reciprocity 
or  mutuality.  We  may  add  that  such  a  case  would  perhaps  fall 
within  the  rule,  tliat  no  act  is  capable  of  ratification  by  the  prin- 
cipal which  was  not  performed  by  the  agent  as  agent,  and  in  behalf 
of  the  principal.  (2) 

The  wife  may  be  the  agent  of  the  husband,  and  in  that 

*  347    *  character  may  make  contracts  which  bind  him  ;  and  this 

agency  need  not  be  expressed,  but  is  raised  by  law  from  a 
variety  of  circumstances.  Thus,  the  purpose  and  comfort  of  mar- 
ried and  domestic  life  would  be  defeated  or  obstructed  if  the  wife 
had  not  a  general  authority  to  hire  servants,  or  to  purchase  such 
articles  as  are  necessary  for  the  use  of  the  family ;  ^  and  the 
necessity  is  not  to  be  a  strict  one,  but  includes  whatever  things 
are  unquestionably  proper  to  be  used  in  the  family  ;  and  suited  to 
the  manner  of  life  which  the  husband  authorizes  ;  and  this  even 
after  her  adultery,  if  they  have  not  separated,  («)  And  therefore 
the  law  clothes  her  with  this  authorit3^  (6)     So,  whatever  she 

the  time,  inasmuch   as  the  married  wo-  to  do.     Cliurch  i:  Landers,  10  Wend.  79. 

man,  to  whom  he  sent  the  goods,  was  not  But  whether  the  husband  is  at  home  or 

capable  of  contracting  with  him  for  the  abroad,  tlie  wife  is  not  presumed  to  be 

hire,  so  as  to  take  tbe  property  out  of  his   agent   generally,   or   to   be    intrusted 

him."  with  any  otlier  authority  than  it  is  usual 

(z)  See  "Agents,"  ante,    p.  *  49,  note  and  customary  to  confer  upon  the  wife. 

(g).  Benjamin   v.  Benjamin,    15    Conn.   347 ; 

(a)  Robinson  v.  Greinold,  1  Salk.  119  ;  Sawyer  v.  Cutting,  23  Vt.  486  ;   Leeds  v. 

8.   c.   6   Mod.   171 ;    Bac.   Abr.   Baron  ^  Vail,  15  Penn.  St.  184.     And  an  innkeep- 

Feme  (H.).  er's  wife   has   no   autiiority   during   her 

(h)  The  wife  is  prima  facie  the  hus-  husband's  absence  to  board  or  lodge 
band's  agent  in  managing  tlie  affairs  of  his  guests  at  less  than  the  usual  rates, 
his  household.  Pickering  v.  Pickering,  Webster  v.  McGinnis,  5  Binn.  2.j5.  And 
6  N.  H.  124;  Mackinley  v.  McGregor,  the  wife  cannot  appear  and  manage  a 
3  Wliart.  369 ;  Felker  v.  Emerson,  16  Vt.  cause  at  nisi  prius  for  her  liusband,  al- 
653.  But  not  to  lend  his  property,  Green  though  he  is  at  the  time  in  custody  and 
V.  Sperry,  IG  Vt.  390,  altiiougii  where  the  cannot  appear  himself.  Cobbett  v.  Hud- 
husband  was  absent  from  home,  and  she  son,  10  E.  L.  &  E.  318 ;  s.  c.  15  Q.  B. 
let  her  husband's  horses  out  for  hire,  it  988. 
was  presumed  that  she  had  authority  so 

1  Thus  a  married  woman  purchasing  goods  for  ordinary  family  use  of  one,  know- 
ing her  to  be  such,  and  as  living  with  husband,  is  not,  in  ab.sence  of  express  agree- 
ment, individually  liable  therefor.  Powers  v.  Russell,  26  Mich.  179.  But  a  husband 
who  is  able  and  willing  to  supply  his  wife  with  necessaries,  and  who  has  forbidden  her 
to  pledge  his  credit,  cannot  be  "held  liable  for  necessaries  bought  by  her;  and  a 
tradesman,  without  notice  of  the  husband's  prohibition,  and  without  having  had 
previous  dealings  with  the  wife  with  his  assent,  cannot  maintain  an  action  against  hira 
for  the  price  of  articles  of  female  attire  suitable  to  her  station  in  life,  and  supplied  to  her 
upon  his  credit,  but  without  liis  knowledge  or  assent.  Debenham  v.  JNIellon,  5  Q.  B.  D. 
394,  affirmed  in  6  App.  Cas.  24  ;  Clark  v.  Cox,  .32  Mich.  204.  —  But  the  wife's  parent 
cannot  recover  for  necessaries  supplied  her,  if  the  husband  whom  she  has  left  was 
willing  to  su])port  her.     Catlin  v.  Martin,  69  N.  Y.  393.     But  see,  contra,  Burkctt  v. 

386 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  847 

purchases  for  herself,  the  husband  is  liable  for,  provided  it  be  such 
in  quality,  and  no  more  in  quantity,  than  is  suitable  for  the  station 
and  means  of  the  husband,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  permits 
her  to  live.  But  beyond  this  she  has  no  such  authority,  and  her 
contracts  for  other  things  are  wholly  void.  Thus,  an  agreement 
by  a  wife  for  the  sale  of  her  real  estate,  with  the  assent  of  her  hus- 
band, and  for  a  valuable  consideration,  is  said  to  be  void  in  law ; 
and  equity  has  refused  to  enforce  it.  (e) 

As  the  wife  may  be  the  agent  of  the  husband,  so  the  husband 
may  be  the  agent  of  the  wife,  in  transacting  such  business  as 
recent  statutes  enable  her  to  do  on  her  own  account ;  ^  and  it  is 
held  in  New  York,  the  Chief  Justice  dissenting,  that  she  may 
manage  her  separate  property  through  the  agency  of  the  husband 
without  subjecting  it  to  the  claims  of  his  creditors,  (cc)  But  the 
.case  shows,  and  it  must  be  certain,  that  if  she  permits  him  to 
assume  as  to  his  creditors  the  aspect  of  owner  of  her  property  so 
that  it  would  amount  to  actual  fraud  if  it  were  withheld  from 
them,  this  could  not  be  permitted.  If  she  holds  him  out  as  her 
agent  she  is  certainly  bound  by  his  acts.  (ccZ)  ^ 

In  every  case  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  under  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  court,  whether  articles  supplied  to  the  wife,  and  for 
which  it  is  sought  to  make  the  husband  liable  on  his  implied 
authority  to  her,  are  or  are  not  necessaries  in  this  sense ;  (t?)  ^ 

(c)  Lane  v.  McKeen,  15  Me.  304.  Clifford  v.  Laton,  3  C.  &  P.  15  ;   Holt  v. 

(cc)  Buckley  v.  Wells,  33  N.  Y.  518;  Brien,  4  B.  &  Aid.  252  ;  Seaton  v.  Bene- 
Abbey  v.  Deyo,  44  Barb.  374.  diet,  5  Bing.  28  ;  Montague  v.  Espinasse, 

(cd)  Read  v.  Earle,  12  Gray,  423.  1  C.  &  P.  356  ;  Spreadbury  v.  Chapman, 
See  also  Owen  v.  Cawley,  36  N.  Y.  600.  8  id.  371 ;  Atkins  v.  Cur  wood,  7  id.  756  ; 

(d)  Etherington  ?;.  Parrot,  Salk.  118;  Waithman  v.  Wakefield,  1  Camp.  120; 
McCutchen  v.  McGahay,  11  Johns.  281;  Purlong  v.  Hyson,  35  Me.  333. 

Trowbridge,  61  Me.  251,  where  the  husband  carried  her  to  and  left  her  at  the  parent's 
house.  —  A  wife  left  without  support  is  not  justified  in  parting  with  her  husband's  fur- 
niture in  payment  of  necessaries.  Edgerly  v.  Whalan,  106  Mass.  307.  See  Butts  v. 
Newton,  29  Wis.  632.  But  see  Ahern  v.  Easterby,  42  Conn.  546,  allowing  sale  of  a  stove 
to  pay  for  necessaries.  If  some  things  furnished  are  necessaries  and  others  not,  recovery 
mav  still  be  had  for  the  former.  Roberts  v.  Kelley,  51  Vt.  97.  See  Thorpe  v.  Shapleigh, 
67  Me.  235. 

1  As  such  he  may  collect  rents.  Walker  v.  Carrington,  74  111.  446 ;  purchase  real 
estate,  Coolidge  v.  Smith,  129  Mass.  554 ;  sell  it,  Lavassar  u.  Washburne,  50  Wis.  200  ; 
sell  her  personal  property.  Griffin  ik  Ransdell,  71  Ind.  440;  give  valid  notes,  Freiberg 
V.  Branigan,  18  Hun,  344;  act  as  her  clerk  and  assistant  in  her  business,  Cubberly  v. 
Scott,  98  111.  37  ;  and  carry  on  her  farm,  Bennett ;;.  Stout,  98  111.  47. 

2  Whether  she  has  by  her  acts  so  held  him  out  is  a  question  for  the  jury.  Ai'nold  v. 
Spurr,  130  Mass.  347.  — If  a  husband  and  wife  own  a  vessel  of  which  he  is  master,  they 
are  jointly  liable  on  his  contracts  for  its  employment  within  the  scope  of  a  master's 
authority.     Reiman  v.  Hamilton,  111  Mass.  245. 

^  Among  necessaries  have  been  held  to  be  medical  services,  Spaun  v.  Mercer,  8  Neb. 
357;  a  gold  watch  and  other  jewelry,  Raynes  v.  Bennett,  114  Mass.  424;  a  sewing- 

387 


*  348  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [i300K   I. 

*348  *  and  the  husband  may  show  that  the  articles  are  not 
necessaries  by  proof  that  the  wife  had  previously  suffi- 
ciently supplied  herself  elsewhere,  (e) 

An  important  fact  may  be,  the  possession  by  the  wife  of  a 
separate  income  or  other  distinct  means  of  her  own  ;  and  it  may 
be  necessary  to  ascertain  whether  the  tradesman  supplying  her 
dealt  with  her  on  her  own  account,  making  charges  to  her  alone, 
and  receiving  payment  from  time  to  time  from  her  alone ;  for 
such  facts  would  go  far  to  show  that  lie  dealt  with  the  wife  on 
her  own  credit,  and  not  on  her  husband's.  (/) 

But  if  the  articles  be  more  or  better  than  are  necessary  for  the 
wife,  still  the  husband  may  be  held,  not  upon  his  authority  as 
implied  by  the  law,  but  upon  sufficient  evidence  of  his  express 
authority  or  assent ;  and  for  this  purpose  comparatively  slight 
evidence  is  sufficient ;  and  the  mere  fact  that  he  saw  and  knew 
that  she  possessed  and  used  the  property,  or  even  that  she  had 
ordered  it,  and  he  made  no  objection,  may  be  enough  for  this 
purpose.  (^)  For  so  long  as  the  husband  lives  with  his  wife,  he 
is   liable   to  any  extent  for   goods  which   he   distinctly  permits 

(e)  Reneaux  v.  Teakle,  8  Exch.  080.         ings,  with  tradesmen,  are  understood  hy 

(f)  It  is  always  a  question  of  fact  both  parlies  to  be  upon  the  credit  of  her 
for  the  jury  whetlier  the  tradesman  gives  separate  funds  for  maintenance.  2  Story, 
credit  to  the  wife  for  articles  delivered  Eq.  §  1401.  See  also  Owens  v.  Dickin- 
to  her,  and  if  the  credit  is  once  given  to  son,  1  Craig  &  V.  48  ;  Murray  iy  Barlee, 
her,  the  liusband  will  not  be  liable,  al-  3  Myl.  &  K.  209  ;  N.  A.  Coal  Co.  v.  Dyett, 
though  the  articles  may  be  necessary,  7  Paige,  0  ;  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  id.  112; 
and  although  the  wife  lives  with  him,  Smith  o.  Sullivan,  11  How.  Pr.  368; 
and  he  sees  her  wear  them  without  ob-  Cromwell  v.  Benjamin,  41  Barb.  558. 
jection.  Bentlcy  r.  Griffin,  5  Taunt.  356;  (7)  Waithman  v.  VVakefield,  1  Camp. 
Metcalf  r.  Shaw,  3  Camp.  22  ;  Stammers  120.  The  mere  fact  tiiat  the  husband 
V.  Macomb,  2  Wend.  454 ;  Moses  ?•.  Fog-  sees  the  wife  wearing  the  goods  does 
artie,  2  llill  (S.  C.),  .335;  Sheldon  v.  not  vary  the  case,  if  it  be  shown  that  he 
Pendleton,  18  Conn.  417  ;  for  the  law  disapproved  of  the  conduct  of  tiie  wife 
does  not  allow  a  person  who  has  once  in  ordering  them.  Atkins  v.  Curvvood, 
given  credit  to  A,  knowing  all  the  facts,  7  C.  &  P.  756.  And  where  no  express 
afterwards  to  shift  his  claim  and  charge  authority  is  sliown,  the  extravagant  na- 
B.  Leggat  v.  Kced,  1  C.  &  P.  10.  And  ture  of  the  wife's  order  is  always  proper 
wherever  a  married  woman  lives  apart  to  be  taken  into  consideration  by  the 
from  her  husl)and,  having  a  separate  jury,  as  showing  that  the  wife  had  no 
estate  and  maintenance  secured  to  her,  such  authorit}-.  Lane  (•.  Ironmonger,  13 
there  may  be  good  ground  to  hold  that  M.  &  W.  368;'  Freestone  v.  Butclier,  9  C. 
all  her  debts  contracted  for  sucli  main-  &  P.  647 ;  Montague  v.  Benedict,  3  B. 
tenance,  and  in  the  course  of  her  deal-  &  C.  631 ;  Seaton  v.  Benedict,  5  Bing.  28. 

machine,  Willcy  v.  Ben<'h,  1  l.'j  Mass.  5.'J9  ;  reasonable  legal  expenses  in  the  prosecution  of 
tlic  wife  by  tlie  linsbaiid,  Warner  v.  Ilciden,  28  Wis.  517;  and  in  divorce  proceedings, 
Porter  v.  Briggs,  .'JS  la.  1G6  (contra,  Drais  v.  llogan,  50  Cal.  121  ;  Dow  v.  Evster,  79  III. 
254  ;  Whipple  v.  Giles,  55  N.  H.  1.39)  ;  dentistry  and  false  teeth.  Freeman  y.'Holnies,  62 
Ga.  556.  Among  non-neccs<aries,  "religious  instruction"  or  rent  of  pew,  St.  .John's 
Parish  v.  Bronson,  40  t'onn.  75  ;  and  a  gold  pencil-case,  a  cigar-case,  a  glove-box,  a 
scent-bottle,  a  guitar,  music,  and  a  ijur.-c  valued  at  .£20,  where  the  husband's  income 
as  clerk  was  .£400  a  year,  Pliillipson  v.  Ilayter,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  38. 

388 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  349 

her  to  purchase.  That  tlie  husband  may  withhold  his  authority, 
and  is  always  saved  from  liability  by  express  notice^ 
*  and  prohibition,  is  perhaps  more  clear  by  the  earlier  au-  *  349 
thorities  than  by  the  later.  It  was  long  since  decided  that 
if  the  wife  lives  with  the  husband,  and  he  prohibits  a  tradesman 
from  supplying  her  with  articles  of  dress,  he  cannot  be  made 
liable  for  them,  because,  in  the  language  of  Lord  Hale,  "  it  shall 
not  be  left  to  a  jury  to  dress  my  wife  in  what  apparel  they  think 
proper."  (Ji)  And  this  doctrine  is  maintained  by  many  cases, 
and  the  rule  to  be  gathered  from  them  would  seem  to  be,  that 
the  implied  authority  of  the  husband  may  always  be  rebutted  by 
proof  of  express  prohibition.  We  cannot  but  think  it  certain, 
however,  that  this  rule  would  be  greatly  modified,  at  least  in  this 
country,  under  circumstances  which  distinctly  required  such  mod- 
ification. As,  for  instance,  suppose  the  husband  to  be  rich  and 
penurious,  and  that  he  gave  his  wife  garments  enough  to  prevent 
her  suffering  from  cold,  but  only  of  such  coarse  fabric  or  mate- 
rials that  she  could  not  wear  them  in  the  street ;  or  that  from  bad 
temper  or  cruelty  he  gave  her  no  clothing,  so  that  for  decency's 
sake  she  was  obliged  to  remain  always  in  her  chamber,  and  even 
there  suffered  from  cold,  —  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  husband 
would  be  held  liable  in  such  cases,  the  law  resting  his  liability, 
if  necessary,  upon  an  absolute  presumption  of  his  authority ;  as 
has  been  held  in  the  case  of  his  turning  her  out  of  doors  without 
her  fault.  And  the  reason  and  justice  of  the  rule  would  be  fully 
satisfied  if  the  husband,  living  with  his  wife,  were  held  answer- 
able for  necessaries  supplied  to  her,  with  or  without  notice  of  pro- 
hibition ;  but  where  there  was  express  prohibition,  then  the  jury 
should  be  instructed  that  the  word  "  necessaries  "  should  be  con- 
strued very  strictly.  It  is  said :  "  The  law  will  not  presume  so 
much  ill  as  that  a  husband  should  not  provide  for  his  wife's  neces- 
sities." (i)  Tliis  should  not  be  presumed ;  but  when  it  is  proved, 
the  law  should  not  do,  nor  permit,  so  much  ill  as  to  leave 
her  without  necessaries.  The  later  authorities  seem  indeed  to 
change,  and,  as  we  think,  materially  for  the  better,  the  ground 

(/()  Manby  I'.  Scott,  1  Sid.  122;   Bac.     Bolton  v.  Prentice,  Stra.  1214;  Reneaux 
Abr.  Baron  Sr  Feme   (H.);    Etlierington     i;.  Teakle,  8  Excli.  080. 
V.  Parrot,  2  Ld.  Raym,  1006,  1  Salk.  118;  {i)  Lord  Hale,  in  Manby  v.  Scott,  1 

Sid.  109. 

1  To  bind  the  husband  after  notice,  the  seller  must  show  that  the  husband  failed  to 
make  an  adequate  supj^ly,  as  well  as  that  the  articles  are  necessaries.  Barr  v.  Armstrong, 
50  Mo.  577. 

389 


*  350  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

*  350    upon  which  the  liability  *  of  the  husband  for  necessaries 

furnished  to  the  wife  has  hitherto  rested.  Generally,  at 
least,  it  has  been  put  upon  her  agency  and  his  authority.  Un- 
doubtedly this  has  been  stretched  very  far,  and  authority  to  con- 
tract for  the  husband  sometimes  implied  from  circumstances 
which  not  only  suggest  no  rational  probability  of  any  such  au- 
thority, but  seem  to  be  strongly  opposed  to  this  supposition ;  it 
sometimes  appears  to  be  a  legal  supposition,  not  only  without 
fact,  but  opposed  to  fact.  It  seems,  indeed,  absurd  to  say,  that  a 
man  who  has  driven  his  wife  from  his  house  and  his  presence, 
and  manifested  by  extreme  cruelty  his  utter  hatred  of  her,  was  all 
the  time  constituting  her  his  agent,  and  investing  her  with  author- 
ity to  bind  him  and  his  property.  And  if  we  suppose  the  case, 
where  a  wife  perfectly  incapacitated  by  infirmity  of  body  or  mind 
from  making  any  contract  at  all,  is  supplied  with  necessaries  by 
one  who  finds  her  driven  from  home  and  ready  to  perish,  and  who 
now  comes  to  her  husband  for  indemnity,  we  cannot  doubt  that 
he  would  recover.  But  the  proposition  would  seem  too  absurd 
even  to  take  its  place  among  the  fictions  of  the  law,  that  the  wife, 
when  she  received  this  aid,  promised  in  the  husband's  name  that 
he  would  pay  for  it,  and  that  he  had  given  her  a  sufficient  author- 
ity to  make  this  promise  for  him.  For  these  and  other  reasons 
courts  now  show  a  tendency  to  rest  the  responsibility  of  the  hus- 
band for  necessaries  supplied  to  the  wife,  on  the  duty  which  grows 
out  of  the  marital  relation.  He  is  her  husband  ;  he  is  the  stronger, 
she  the  weaker ;  all  that  she  has  is  his ;  the  act  of  marriage 
destroys  her  capacity  to  pay  for  a  loaf  with  her  own  money  ;  and  as 
all  she  then  possesses,  and  all  she  may  afterwards  acquire,  are  his 
during  life  and  marriage,  upon  him  must  rest,  with  equal  fulness, 
if  the  law  would  not  Ijc  the  absolute  opposite  «of  justice,  the  duty 
of  maintaining  her,  and  supplying  all  her  wants  according  to  his 
ability.^  And  we  think  this  plain  rule  of  common  sense  and  com- 
mon morality  is  becoming  a  rule  of  the  common  law.  (/) 

(  /  )  In  Tload  v.  Logard,  6  Exch.  636,  harl  supplied  the  wife  with  necessaries, 
the  husband  was  a  lunatic,  confined  in  I/ilJ,  of  counsel,  says,  arguendo:  "Not 
an  asylum  as  dangerous,  and  the  plaintiff    only  has  it  never  been  decided  judicially 

1  A  wife's  services,  and  the  comfort  of  her  society,  are  due  in  return  for  the 
husband's  support,  Randall  v.  Randall,  37  Mich.  563  ;  and  any  contract  by  her  for  a 
compensation  to  care  for  her  husband  is  void.  Grant  ?;.  Green,  41  la.  88.  —  A  husband 
who  offers  to  support  his  wife  and  children  in  his  father's  house,  havin]"^  no  house  or 
means  of  hi-;  own,  and  she  refuses  because  of  the  fatlicr's  intemperance  and  abuse,  is  not 
liable  for  neglecting  to  su])port  her.     People  v.  Pettit,  74  N.  Y.  320. 

390 


CH.  XVIII.] 


MAREIED   WOMEN. 


351 


*  If  a  married  woman  carries  on  trade,  and  her  husband    *  351 
lives  with  her  and  receives  the  profits,  or  thej  are  applied 
to  the  maintenance  of  the   family,  the   law  presumes  that   she 
was  his  agent  in  this  trade,  and  had  his  authority  to  make  the 
necessary  purchases.  (A;)     So  an  authority  may  be  presumed  from 


that  by  the  mere  fact  of  marriage  a  man 
confers  on  his  wife  an  irrevocable  au- 
thority to  bind  liis  credit,  but  everything 
tends  to  show  that  lier  right  so  to  do  is 
derived  from  some  act,  real  or  supposed, 
of  the  husband,  done  after  the  marriage, 
and  which  he  must  be  in  a  condition  to 
persist  in  or  revoke."  Pollock,  C.  B., 
said :  "  This  rule  must  be  discharged. 
The  question  raised  by  it  is,  whether 
an  action  can  be  maintained  against  a 
defendant,  who  has  been  a  lunatic,  for 
things  supplied  for  the  necessary  support 
of  his  wife  during  the  lunacy.  It  ap- 
pears to  me  that  the  defendant  is  liable 
in  such  an  action.  The  action  is  founded 
on  this,  that  the  defendant  lias  taken  on 
lum  a  duty  —  having  contracted  marriage 
with  the  person  sustained  by  the  plain- 
tiff, he  has  thereby  become  in  point  of 
law  liable  for  her  maintenance,  and  if 
he  fails  to  provide  for  that  maintenance, 
except  under  certain  circumstances  which 
justify  him  in  withholding  it,  she  has  au- 
thority to  pledge  his  credit  to  procure  it. 
It  may  be  true,  as  stated  by  Mr.  /////, 
that  no  case  has  yet  arisen  in  which  this 
precise  point  was  brought  before  any 
court ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  none  of 
the  dicta  that  occur  in  any  of  the  cases 
cited  furnish  a  clew  to  decide  the 
present  one  adversely  to  the  plaintiff." 
Alderson,  B.,  in  the  course  of  the  trial, 
had  said  :  "  It  is  a  monstrous  proposition, 
that  a  man  who  drives  a  woman  out  of 
doors,  who  hates,  who  abominates  her, 
actually  gives  her  authority  to  make 
contracts  for  him."  He  and  J^ltitt,  and 
Martin,  BB.,  agreed  with  Pollock,  C.  B. 
Martin,  B.,  said  :  "  My  brother  Alderson 
has  stated  the  i-eal  truth  respecting  the 
obligation  of  the  defendant  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  his  liability ;  namely,  that  by 
contracting  the  relation  of  marriage,  a 
husband  takes  on  him  the  duty  of  sup- 
plying his  wife  with  necessaries ;  and  if 
he  does  not  perform  that  duty,  either 
through  his  own  fault,  or  in  consequence 
of  a  misfortune  of  this  kind,  the  wife 
has  in  consequence  of  that  relation  a 
right  to  provide  herself  with  them,  and 
the  husband  is  responsible  for  them. 
And  although  in  the  declaration  the 
debt  sued  on  is  alleged  to  be  the  debt 
of  the  defendant  contracted  at  his  re- 
quest, the  truth  is  that  it  is  the  wife 
who  contracts  the  debt,  while  tlie  hus- 


band is  responsible  for  it."  See  also 
Montague  v.  Benedict,  3  B.  &  C.  631, 
and  Seaton  v.  Benedict,  5  Bing.  28.  (In 
these  very  interesting  cases  on  the  liabil- 
ity of  the  husband  for  goods  furnished 
to  the  wife,  Mr.  Smith,  in  his  work  on 
Contracts,  p.  28G,  says  the  name  of  the 
defendant  is  fictitious,  and  borrowed 
from  Shaksj)eare's  Much  Ado  about 
Nothing,  the  defendant  being  actually  "a 
highly  respectable  professional  gentle- 
man," whose  name  is  not  given.)  A 
similar  doctrine  was  laid  down  in  Shaw 
V.  Thompson,  16  Pick.  198  (1834).  Shaw, 
C.  J.,  in  that  case  says  :  "  By  law  a  hus- 
band is  entitled  to  all  the  personal  prop- 
erty of  the  wife,  to  all  her  earnings  and 
acquisitions,  and  to  the  income  of  her 
real  estate ;  it  also  throws  on  him  the 
obligation  to  support  and  maintain  her." 
And  in  Sykes  v.  Halstead,  1  Sandf.  483, 
it  was  held,  that  where  a  husband  turns 
his  wife  away,  or  compels  her  to  go  by 
ill-treatment,  and  refuses  to  provide  for 
her,  he  gives  her  a  credit  with  the  whole 
conmiunity,  although  it  be  expressly  for- 
bidden by  him ;  and  she  has  a  right  to 
be  supported  by  him.  But  in  an  action 
for  goods  supplied  to  the  wife  on  her 
order  alone,  the  question  is  (in  the  ab- 
sence of  such  evidence  of  necessity  as 
may  show  an  agency  in  law)  whether 
there  was  any  agency,  or  authority  in 
fact,  and  not  whether  the  goods  were 
necessary.  Kead  i'.  Teakle,  24  E.  L.  & 
E.  33-2  ;  s.  c.  8  Exch.  680.  See  also  Kel- 
ler V.  Phillips,  39  N.  Y.  351. 

{k)  Petty  V.  Anderson,  2  C.  &  P.  38 ; 
Clifford  V.  Burton,  1  Bing.  199.  —  But  in 
Smallpiece  i:  Dawes,  7  C.  &  P.  40,  where 
A,  who  kept  a  fruit  shop  in  London, 
became  a  bankrupt  in  1824,  but  did  not 
surrender  to  his  commission,  and  from 
that  time  to  1833  the  business  was  car- 
ried on  by  his  wife,  to  whom  fruit  was 
supplied,  between  1828  and  1832,  to  an 
amount  exceeding  je266,  and  evidence 
was  given  to  show  that  A  was  seen  in 
London  a  few  times  between  1824  and 
18-33,  and  was  arrested  at  the  shop  in 
18.33,  and  that  he  attended  the  mar- 
riage of  his  two  daughters  at  Mary-le- 
bone  church ;  it  was  held  that  proof  of 
these  facts  was  not  sufficient  to  go  to  the 
jury  to  show  that  A's  wife  acted  as  his 
agent,  so  as  to  charge  him  with  the  price 
of  the  fruit. 

391 


*  352  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

*  352    habitual  *  acts  of  agency,  or  from  confirmation,  which  may 

be  express  or  imphed ;  as  where  a  wife  was  in  the  habit 
of  drawing,  indorsing,  accepting,  or  paying  bills  and  notes  for 
her  husband,  and  this  he  knew  and  sanctioned,  his  authority  to 
her  will  be  presumed.  {I)  Or  if  such  bills  and  notes  are  usually 
a  part  of  a  certain  business  which  is  intrusted  to  the  wife  by  the 
husband,  he  would  undoubtedly  be  held  liable  for  them.  Whether 
a  married  woman  can  borrow  money,  even  for  necessaries,  and 
her  husband  be  held  liable  on  his  implied  authority,  seems  not  to 
be  settled,  (m)  ^  If  the  lender  can  show  that  the  money  was 
used  by  the  husband,  then  he  can  hold  him.  It  has  been  held  in 
California  that  a  promissory  note  made  by  husband  and  wife 
jointly  does  not  bind  the  wife.  (m/?i)  The  mortgage  of  a  married 
woman  to  secure  her  own  promissory  note  which  she  had  power 
by  law  to  make,  is  valid,  (m/i) 

When  the  cohabitation  with  the  husband  ceases,  and  they  live 
separately,  then  a  new  state  of  things  arises,  and  with  it  new 
rules  of  law.  The  wife  separates  from  her  husband,  either  by 
his  fault,  or  by  her  own,  or  by  mutual  consent  and  agreement. 
In  the  fiirst  case  she  carries  with  her  all  her   rights   to   neces- 

(/)  Cotes  V.  Davis,  1  Camp.  485  ;  Bar-  money  lent  to  the  wife,  unless  his  request 
low  V.  Bishop,  1  East,  432 ;  Prestwick  v.  be  averred  and  proved.  Stone  v.  Mac- 
Marsliall,  7  Bing.  505.  His  authority  to  nair,  7  Taunt.  482 ;  Stepiienson  v.  Hardy, 
her  to  make  notes  in  his  name  cannot,  3  Wils.  388 ;  Walker  v.  Simpson,  7  W.  & 
however,  be  inferred  from  the  mere  fact  S.  83 ;  Grendell  v.  Godmond,  5  A.  &  E. 
that  he  knew  she  was  carrying  on  busi-  755 ;  Earle  v.  Peale,  1  Salk.  387 ;  Darby 
ness,  and  tliat  she  gave  the  note  in  the  v.  Boucher,  id.  279.  In  equity,  however, 
course  of  such  business;  and  on  a  note  the  lender  will  be  allowed  to  stand  in 
so  given  the  husband  is  not  liable  even  place  of  the  tradesmen,  and  to  have  sat- 
to  a  bond  fide  indorsee.  Reakert  v.  Sand-  isfaction  as  far  as  tliey  could,  had  they 
ford,  5  W.  &  S.  164.  —  Whenever  the  been  plaintiffs.  Harris  ?'.  Lee,  1  P.  Wms. 
Imsband  authorizes  the  wife  to  execute  482,  Prec.  Cii.  502 ;  Walker  v.  Simpson, 
notes  in  his  name,  tliey  must  purport  on  supra ;  Marlow  v.  Pitfielil,  1  P.  Wms.  558. 
their  face  to  be  made  in  his  behalf,  or  See  May  i'.  Skey,  10  Sim.  588,  18  Law 
by  her  as  agent,  or  he  will  not  be  bound.  Jour.  308.  And  where  money  was  ad- 
Alinard  v.  Mead,  7  Wend.  08.  —  But  in  vanced  to  tlie  wife  living  with  her  hus- 
the  case  of  Lindus  v.  Bradwell,  5  C.  B.  band,  and  he,  after  the  wife's  decease, 
582,  where  a  bill  of  excliange  addressed  promised  to  repay  the  same,  "  when  con- 
to  "  William  B."  was  accepted  by  his  venient,"  but  said  he  was  not  privy  to  the 
wife,  by  writing  her  own  name,  "  Mary  loan,  it  was  held  tliat  there  was  evidence 
B."  upon  the  back,  which  was  presented  to  go  to  the  jury  that  the  wife  had  bor- 
to  the  luisband  after  it  became  due,  who  rowed  the  money  with  the  sanction  of 
said  he  knew  all  about  it,  that  it  was  for  her  husband,  or  that  he  ratified  the  act, 
a  milliner's  bill,  and  that  he  would  pay  it  and  the  plaintiff  iiad  a  verdict.  West  v. 
shortly,  he  was  lield  liable  as  acceptor,  Wheeler,  2  Car.  &  K.  714. 
although  he  had  not  expressly  author-  (mm)  Brown  v.  Orr,  29  Cal.  120. 
ized  his  wife  so  to  accept  the  bill.  (mn)  Beals  -v.    Cobb,    51     Me.    348; 

(m)  At  law,  a  husband  is  not  liable  for  Frary  v.  Booth,  37  Vt.  78. 

^  A  bill  in  equity  may  be  brought  to  recover  money  lent  to  a  wife  deserted  by  her 
husband  for  the  purchase  of  necessaries.     Kcnyon  v.  Farris,  47  Conn.  510. 

392 


CH.  XVIIl.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  353 

saries,  and  he  who  supplies  them  to  her  may  hold  her  husband 
liable  for  their  price ;  (w)  ^  and,  as  it  has  lately  been  held,  for  the 
expenses  of  her  burial,  {nii)  ^  And  we  deem  it  to  be  the 
*  same  thing  in  law,  as  well  as  in  reason,  whether  he  *  353 
actually  expels  her  from  his  house  without  her  fault,  or 
compels  her  to  leave  his  house  by  cruelty  to  her,  or  by  his  mis- 
conduct in  it,  as  by  introducing-  a  prostitute  into  it.  (o)  ^  The 
dictum  of  Lord  Uldon,  that  ''  where  a  man  turns  his  wife  out  of 
doors  he  sends  with  her  credit  for  her  reasonable  expenses,"  is 
undoubtedly  law.  (|?)  And  we  should  say  that  he  turned  her  out 
of  doors,  in  this  sense,  when  he  obliged  her  to  fly  by  that  degree 
of  ill-treatment  which  would  induce  and  authorize  a  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction  to  grant  her  a  divorce.  Indeed  we  should  say 
that  a  less  degree  of  cruelty  would  authorize  her  to  escape  from 
him  and  his  house,  and  "  carry  his  credit "  with  her. 

(n)  Bolton  v.  Prentice,  2  Stra.  1214;  {nn)  Cunningham  u.  Rcardon,  98  Mass. 

Harris  v.  Morris,  4  Esp.  41 ;   Ilawlyns  v.  538. 

Vandyke,  3  Esp.  251 ;  Hodges  v.  Hodges,  (o)  In  the  case  of  Harwood  v.  Heffer, 

1  id.   441 ;   Aldis   v.   Chapman,    1   Selvv.  3  Taunt.  421,   where   the  evidence  was 

N.  P.  281 ;   McCutchen  v.  McGahay,  11  that  the  husband  treated  the  wife  with 

Johns.  281 ;  Houliston  i».  Smyth,  3  Bing.  great  cruelty,  and   confined   her  in  her 

127  ;  Howard  r.  Whetstone,  10  Ohio,  3o5;  chamber  under  pretence  of  insanity,  and 

Emmett  v.  Norton.  8  C.  &  P.  506 ;  Clem-  had  taken  another  woman  into  his  house, 

ent   V.   Mattison,  3    Rich.  93;    Fredd   v.  with    whom   he   cohabited,  and   on   this 

Eves,  4    Marring.    (Del.)    385;    Allen   v.  the  wife  escaped  ;  the  Court  of  Common 

Aldrich,  9  Foster  (N.  H.),  63.     And  if  a  Pleas,    in    1811,   apparently    overlooking 

wife  is  justified  in  leaving  her  husband,  the  fact  of  the  husband's  cruelty,  did  not 

a  request  on  his  part  that  she  will  return  think   that  the   mere   introduction  of   a 

will  not  determine  his  liability  for  neces-  prostitute  into  the  family  was  sufiicient 

saries  supplied  to  her  during  the  separa-  to  justify  the  wife's  leaving,  and  taking 

tion.      Emery  v.  Emery,  1  Y.  &  J.  501.  up  necessaries  on  her  husband's  account. 

Where,  liowever,   the   person    supplying  But  this  doctrine  has  since  been  decidedly 

the  wife  with  necessaries  relies  upon  her  condemned,   and   we   think   it   unsound, 

husband's  ill-treatment  as  good  cause  for  See  Houliston  v.  Smyth,  10  Moore,  482 ; 

her  leaving  him,  he  must  show  aflirraa-  s.  c.  3  Bing.  127  ;   Hunt  v.  DeBlaquiere, 

tively  that  the  separation  took  place  in  5   Bing.  562 ;   Fredd  v.  Eves,  4  Harring. 

consequence  of  the  husband's  misconduct.  (Del.)  385.     It  is  said  by  Bro7ison,  C.  J., 

It  is  not  enough  to  prove  that  there  were  in  Blowers  v.   Sturtevant,   4   Denio,  46, 

quarrels   and    personal   conflicts   between  that  the  doctrine  contained  in  Harwood 

them,  unless  it  be  shown  that  the  hus-  v.  Heffer  cannot  be  law  in  a   Christian 

band  was  the  offending  party.     Blowers  country. 

V.  Sturtevant,  4  Denio,  46.    And  see  Reed  (p)  Rawlyns  v.  Vandyke,  3  Esp.  250. 

V.  Moore,  5  C.  &  P.  200.  And  see  Breinig  v.  Meitzler,  23  Penn.  St. 

157. 

1  If  the  wife  has  left  him  for  good  and  sufficient  cause,  Thorpe  v.  Shaplcigh,  67  Me. 
235  ;  Hultz  v.  Gibbs,  66  Penn.  St.  360 ;  hut  if  a  husband  whose  wife  left  him  without 
her  fault  makes  sufficient  provision  for  her,  or  which  she  accepts,  he  is  not  then  liable, 
Crittenden  v.  Schermerliorn,  39  Mich.  661  ;  Smyley  v.  Reese,  53  Ala.  89. 

'^  Whether  he  is  her  legatee  or  not,  Sears  v.  Giddey,  41  Mich.  590  ;  and  may  remove 
her  remains  from  one  burial-place  to  another,  if  he  has  not  freely  consented  to  their  in- 
terment in  the  former  place,  Weld  v.  Walker,  130  Mass.  423. 

3  Bazeley  v.  Forder,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  559  ;  Hultz  v.  Gibbs,  66  Penn.  St.  360.  But  if  a 
wife  leaves  her  husband  because  of  his  cruelty,  one  receiving  her  for  illicit  purposes  can- 
not recover  for  her  support.     Almy  v.  Wilcox,  110  Mass.  443. 

393 


*354 


THE   LAW   OF   COXTBACTS. 


[book  I. 


Where  hu.sVjand  and  wife  live  together,  there  is  a  presumption 
of  law  arising  from  cohabitation,  that  the  husband  assents  to  con- 
tracts made  by  the  wife  for  the  supply  of  articles  suitable  to  their 
station,  means,  and  way  of  life,  (q)     But  when  this  cohab- 

*  354    itation   *  ceases,  then,   h»y   the    English    authorities,   the 

presumption  of  law  is  against  his  assent ;  and  tiie  husband 
is  not  liable  unless  such  presumption  be  rebutted  by  showing  his 
authority  from  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  separation,  or 
the  conduct  of  the  husband,  or  the  condition  of  the  wife,  and  the 
nature  of  the  articles  supplied  to  her.  (r)  And  where  the  husband 
and  wife  live  separate,  there  the  party  supplying  her  may  be  re- 
garded, in  the  words  of  Lord  Mansfield,  as  standing  in  her  place. 
And  it  is  for  him  to  make  strict  inquiry  into  the  terms,  cause, 
and  character  of  the  separation  ;  for  he  trusts  her  at  his  peril,  if 
the  separation  has  taken  place  by  the  husband's  act,  and  against 
the  wife's  will,  still,  if  it  be  for  her  adultery,  it  was  so  far  a  justifi- 
able act  that  the  husband  is  no  longer  bound  even  for  strict 

*  355    necessaries  supplied  to  his  wife,  f^j     Whether  *  this  rule 


(y)  Ethftrington  v.  Parrot,  1  Salk.  118; 
McCutchen  o.  McGahay,  11  .John.H.  281 ; 
'¥Tt-A(\  I).  Kvosi,  4  ifarring.  (Del.;  '-iH'j. 
Cohabitation  in  ho  Htronj(  (:vi<h:Wi(:  of  a»- 
8t-rit  and  autliorily  by  tbfj  biigband,  that 
bo  will  bfc  liable  for  noot-Hsarioii  fumi.Hbod 
the  wife,  althouj^h  they  wore  not  lej^ally 
married,  and  although  the  tradesman 
knew  it,  Watiion  v.  Tbrelkeld,  2  E«p, 
6Ji7;  Robinson  ».  Xahon,  1  Camp.  24o; 
Blades*  ;;.  Free,  '.)  li.  &  (J.  107.  lint  co- 
habitation h  not  conclimoe  evidence  of  an 
authority  Ui  purchase  even  neces.Harie.H ; 
and  it  may  be  rebutted,  as  by  showing 
that  the  husband  supplied  her  sufficiently 
liimself,  or  that  he  gave  her  sufficient 
ready  money  to  make  the  purchase.^. 
Manby  «.  Scott,  1  Sid.  ]<>U ,  Itesolution 
iii.  2  Smith,  Ix-ad.  Cas.  ('Jd  ed.)  '^'A.  Of 
Wiurse,  the  proof  of  such  facts  lies  on  the 
Iiusband.  Clifford  y  r.,aton.  '-i  C.  &  1*. 
ly;  lita  v.  Durkee,  JiG  111.  uOii. 

(r)  The  English  authorities  are  uni- 
form that  if  the  husband  and  wife  live 
separate  and  apart,  the  presumption  of 
law  is  against  the  husband's  liability, 
even  for  the  wife's  necessaries,  and  that 
the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  tradesman 
to  show  that  the  separation  took  ]>\a.Mi 
under  such  circurnsfances  as  to  continue 
the  husband's  liability.  Clifford  w.  f>at.on, 
•J  C.  &,  I',  lo;  .Mainwaririi;  «.  I>eslie,  2  id. 
r/)?;  liird  w.  Jonr-s,  .'5  Man.  &  R.  121; 
Edwards  v.  Towels,  o  Man.  &  G  024; 
Ilindley   v.  Westmeath,  6  B.  &  C.  2(X); 

304 


Blowers  <;.  Sturtevant,4  f3enio,  40;  Walk- 
er v.  Simpson,  7  W.  &  S.  8!i ;  <^/any  /'. 
I'atton,  2  Ashm.  140.  But  in  Runuiey  v. 
Keyes,  7  N'.  H.  o71,  where  the  question  as 
to  the  burden  of  proof  and  the  presumfv 
tions  of  law  in  such  case  were  much 
discussed,  the  rule  is  adopted  that  the 
burden  of  proof  is  on  the  husband  to  show 
that  the  separation  was  not  tlirough  hi« 
fault,  and  prima  fufic,  his  liability  still 
continues  for  his  wife's  necessaries.  See 
al.so  Frost  v.  Willis,  13  Vt.  2(r2 ;  ('Anw-.y 
on  Husband  and  Wife,  28;  Jiea  v.  Dur- 
kee,  2.0  111.  ;7>;i 

f«j  Ilardie  v.  Grant,  8  C.  &  P.  .012; 
Hunter  v.  Houcher,  y  Pick.  280;  C'hild  ». 
Hardyman,  2  Stra.  87o;  .Vlainwaring  v. 
Sands,  1  id.  7W;  Morris  «.  .Martin,  id. 
047.  And  in  sudi  case  no  notice  to  the 
tradesman  of  the  wife's  adultery  and  sep- 
aration is  necessary  in  order  to  discharge 
tiie  husband  from  liis  liability.  Morris 
V.  Martin,  1  Stra.  047;  -Mainwaring  v. 
Sands,  id.  W>  — ()r  if  any  notice  is  neces- 
sary, general  notoriety  is  sufficient.  Pnr- 
kf.r,  C.  J.,  in  Hunter  '■.  Boucher,  '•'>  VutV. 
289.  And  in  like  manner  if  the  husband 
and  wife  live  apart  by  consent,  he  paying 
her  a  sufficient  maintenance,  he  is  not 
liable  for  her  necessaries,  she  having 
been  guilty  of  adultery  after  the  separa- 
tion. Cragg  V.  Bowman,  0  Mod.  147. 
And  the  same  rule  applies  where  the  wife 
voluntarily,  and  without  afiy  fault  of  the 
husband,  elopcH  from  him,  but  has  not 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  o55 

of  law  would  be  moditiod  bv  the  power  given  in  our  States  io 
the  husband,  to  obtain  a  divoree  a  riiwulo  from  the  wife  for 
her  adultery,  may  be  doubted.  We  see  no  g-ood  reason  why  it 
should  be.  and  our  eases  whieh  touch  upon  this  question  seem  to 
adopt  the  English  view.  {^O  But  more  question  may  exist  as  to 
another  part  of  the  English  law  on  this  subject ;  for  it  has  been 
there  distinctly  decided,  that  if  the  husband  commits  adtdtery, 
and  brings  his  adulteress  into  his  house,  and  treats  his  wife  with 
great  cruelty,  and  then  turns  her  out  into  the  streets,  and  she 
afterwards  commits  adultery,  and  then  being  repentant,  i^tVers  to 
return  to  him.  and  is  wholly  without  means  of  subsistence,  never- 
theless no  action  for  furnishing  her  \vith  ueeessaries  is  maintain- 
able, (j/^  But  this  is  certainly  very  severe  law.  aiul  our  eoiu'ts 
would  be  very  reluctant  to  apjdy  it.  If  the  husband  rests  his 
defence  upon  the  wife's  adultery,  it  nuist  be  very  strictly  juoved, 
and  a  verdict  in  an  action  for  criminal  conversation  is  not  ailmis- 
sible  as  evidence  to  prove  it.  (^r")  If  after  such  adultery  the 
husband  receives  her  back  into  his  house,  he  must  maintain  her 
as  before ;  and  cannot  discharge  himself  of  his  liability  for  neces- 
saries supplied  to  her  if  she  leaves  him  afterwards,  or  even  if  he 
sends  her  away,  but  by  proof  of  a  new  act  of  adultery  ;  so  it  has 
been  held,  (^w^ 

been  iiuilty  of  actual  achiltory  ;  in  suoli  boforo  soon,  any  man  livinji  with  any 
case  the  husband  oaiuiot  l>o  niaiio  haMo  \vt)nian,  (is  mai)  <im</  wit?,  is  lial>lo  lor  lior 
for  nocossarios  furnishod  tho  witV  by  suiiiH>rt.  althou;^li  thoy  woiv  novor  mar- 
third  jiorsons.  altiioni:l»  thoy  had  no  riod.  and  tho  tradosman  know  it.  Watson 
knowloiiiio  of  tho  olopomont.  Hrown  v.  r.  ThrolkoM,  2  Ksp.  lioT  ;  Hobinson  v. 
Patton,  o  llunii>h.  loo:  MoCutolion  r.  Nahon.  1  (,\anip.  2-16;  Ulados  r.  Kroo,  0 
MoUaliay.    11    .lohns.    "JSl  :    llindlov    v.  K  &  V.  UH. 

Marquis   of   Wistmoath,  (>  1?.  .>i  l\"-JlX);  (/)  Soo  lluntor  r.  IVniohor,  8  Tick.  291. 

Cany  r.  Tatton,  2  .\shn».  1 10.     llowovor.  (it)  (.lovior  r.   llanoook.  (>  T.  K.  (>0;?. 

altl\ou^h   tho  wife  bo  actually  guilty  of  And  it  has  likowiso  boon  hold  in  F.njjland 

adultery,  yot  ir' colMbitation  coutinui-.  tho  that  a  husband  is  not  liablo  to  tlio  junalty 

luisband  is  still  liable  for  her  nooossarios.  of  stat.  6  (.ioo.  IV.  o.  SS.  §  ;»,  for  nogloet- 

Norton  r.  Kazan,  1  H.  &  P.  221) ;  Harris  c.  inj;  and  rofusiuii  to  maintain   his  wife, 

Morris,  4  Ksp.  41.     l,ot  a  woman  bo  over  who  has  loft  him  and  oommitinl  adultery, 

so   vioious,  yot    while   she   oohabils    with  allhoui;h    ho    has   hiinsoll'    siiuo   her  ile- 

lior  husbai\d  ho  is  bound  to  providi' nooos-  parturo  boon  jiviilty  of  tho  same  orinio. 

saries  for  her,  and  is  liable  to  tho  actions  Kinji  r.  Klintan,  1  H.  i'^  Ail.  227. 
of  sueh  persons  as  furnish  her  with  them  ;  (r)   llardie  r.  (.irant,  8  0.  &  P.  512. 

for  his  bariiain  was  to  take  her  for  better  Because  it  is  »r.\-  ii>(<i  alius  jxiiYfS. 
or  for  worse.      Tor  //<>//,  C.  J.,  in  Kobi-  («•)  Harris  r.  Morris,  4  Ksp.  41.     This 

son  r.  liosnold,  t>  Mod.  171.      For  contin-  was  an  action  of  assumpsit  to  recover  for 

uod  cohabitation  after  knowlcd<:o  of  hor  nooossarios   furnished   to  tlio  di  fondant's 

ndtdtcry  is  a  condonation  of  hor  olTcnco.  wife.     It  appeared  that  tho  wife  had  for- 

Qnincy  r.  (.Juinoy.  10  N.  11.272;    Hall  /•.  morly  oIojhhI   for  adtdtery,  and  boon  in 

Hall,  4  id.  4t>2.    And  even  if  tho  husband  tho  Magdalen  .Asylum ;  Imt  that  the  de- 

liad  no  knowledge  of  hor  adultery,  yet  if  fondant   had  aflci-wards  taken  hor  back, 

ho  ooutimio  to  live  with  hor  ho  would  be  //</./,  that   nitdor  these  eiri'umslances  he 

liable  for  hor  necessaries  ;  for,  as  wo  have  was  liable.      Lord   /v.  j.;/,")   said:   "Willi 


*  356  THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

If  the  wife  leaves  the  husband  without  just  cause,  and 

*  356    refuses  *  to  coliabit  with  him,  then  it  is  certain  that  she 

loses  all  right  to  a  maintenance  from  him.  ^  For  the 
opposite  rule  would  encourage  a  wilful  breach  of  the  marriage 
vow  and  duty,  and  weaken  the  wholesome  influences  which  keep 
together  those  who  have  solemnly  agreed  to  live  together,  {x)  By 
the  civil  law  also,  if  a  wife  leave  her  husband  without  his  fault, 
he  is  not  obliged  ei  cequalite?'  s ub mini str are.  (y)  But  if  after 
deserting  him  she  offers  to  return,  we  think  his  obligation  to  re- 
ceive or  maintain  her  must  depend  upon  the  circumstances  of  her 
separation,  its  length,  and  her  conduct  during  the  separation ; 
thus,  if  she  commit  adultery,  before  or  after  her  elopement,  he  is 
under  no  obligation  whatever  to  receive  her.  If  no  sufficient  ob- 
jection arises  from  these  circumstances,  then  he  is  bound  to 
receive  her;  otherwise  not.  (2) ^  And  if  she  leaves  him  invol- 
untarily, even  by  compulsion  of  law,  as  by  imprisonment  for  non- 
payment of  a  fine  and  costs,  it  would  seem  that  the  husband  is  not 
discharged  from  his  liability  to  maintain  her.  (a)  We  repeat, 
therefore,  that  if  the  wife  lives  separate  from  her  husband,  it  is 
obvious,  from  the  many  questions  which  may  be  raised,  that  it  is 

respect    to    lier   having    been    formerly  to  receive  her,  his  liability  for  her  future 

guilty  of  adultery,  and  having  been  in  the  necessaries  is  thereby  revived.     McCutchen 

Magdalen  Asylum,  though  an  adulterous  v.  McGahay,    11  Johns.  281  ;  Clement  v. 

elopement  will  prevent. the  husband  from  Mattison,  3  Rich.  L.  93;  Cunningham  v. 

being  liable  for  articles  furnished  to  tiie  Irwin,  7  S.  &  R.  247.  — And  if  such  appli- 

wife  during  tlie  term  of  her  elopement,  cation  is   made  to  the  husband    by  some 

that  is  no  answer  now.    The  husband  has  third  person  on  behalf  of  the  wife,  and  he 

taken  her  back,  and  she  was  from  that  without  questioning  such  third  person's  au- 

time  entitled  to  dower ;    she   was  sponte  thority,  puts    his    refusal   on   some   other 

retracta,  and  of  course  entitled  to  mainte-  ground,  it  will  be  equivalent  to  a  personal 

nance   during  coverture,  if  her  husband  application  by  the  wife  herself.     McGahay 

turned  her  out  of  doors."    And  where  the  v.  Williams,  12  Johns.  293.    So  if  husband 

husband  left  his  wife  who  had  been  guilty  and  wife  separate  by  consent,  and    ])rovi- 

of  adultiry,  still  living  in  his  house  witii  sion  is  made  by  him  for  her  maintenance,  if 

two  children   bearing  his  name,  he  was  the  wife,  during  such  separation,  purchase 

held  liable  for  necessaries  su])plied  her,  necessaries,  and  the  parties  subscijuently 

by  one  who  did  not  know  tlie   circum-  cohabit  together,  the  husband  will  be  liable 

stances.     Norton  v.  Fazan,  1  B.  &  P.  226.  for  them.     Kcnnick  v.  Ficklin,  3  B.  Men. 

(x)  Manhv  v.  Scott,  1  Sid   129;    Brown  160;  Rea  u.  Durkee.  25  III.  503. 

V    Patton,  3  Humph.   135;    McCutchen  i'.  (y)   Dig.  Lib.  28,  Tit.  3. 

McGahav.  11  Johns  281;   Ilindlov  r.  Msir-  (z)   In   Henderson  v.   Stringer,  2  Dana, 

quis  of  Westmcath,  6  B.  &  C.  200;  Wil-  293,  it  is  said;    "  If  she  offers   to  return, 

liams  y.  Prince,  3  Strob.   L.  490 ;  Allen  i-.  and  he,  without  siifftn'pnt  cause,  refuses  to 

Aldrich,  9  Foster  {  N.  H.),  03. — If,  how-  receive  her,  his  liability  is  revived." 

ever,  she  ofteis  to  return,  not  having  been  (a)  Bates  ;;.  Enright,  Sup.  Ct.  of  Me.  21 

guilty  of  adultery,  and  the  husband  refuses  Law  Rep.  53. 

'  For  late  cases,  sec  Thorne  r.  Kathan,  .'SI  Vt.  .520;  Bcvier  v.  Galloway,  71  111.  517; 
Schnuckle  r    Bierman,  89  111.  4.')4  ;  Ilarttmann  r.  Tcgart,  12  Kan.  177. 

-  If,  however,  she  return*,  and  he  receives  her,  he  does  not  become  lialilc  for  her 
necessary  support  during  the  sc])aration.     Oinson  v.  Heritage,  45  Ind.  73. 

396 


CH.  XYIII.] 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


357 


incumbent  on  one  who  would  supply  her  with  necessaries  on  the 
husband's  credit,  but  without  his  express  authority,  to  look  cau- 
tiously into  all  the  facts  and  circumstances.  (^) 

When  the  separation  takes  place  by  the  consent  and  agreement 
of  both  parties,  something  of  uncertainty  arises,  from  the 
*  conflict  between  the  unwillingness  of  the  law  to  permit  *  357 
and  sanction  such  violation  of  marriage  obligation  and 
duty,  on  the  one  hand,  (^>6)  and  on  the  other  its  disposition  to 
allow  such  a  separation  under  circumstances  which  give  it  a 
color  of  reason,  and  to  hold  all  parties  to  their  contracts  made 
in  relation  to  it,  so  far  as  may  be  done  without  placing  the  power 
of  a  dissolution  of  marriage  too  much  in  the  hands  of  the  married 
parties.  (6t?)  Thus,  it  is  said  by  Sir  William  Scott,  that  the  obli- 
gations of  the  marriage  contract  are  not  to  be  relaxed  at  the 
pleasure  of  one  party,  or  at  the  pleasure  of  both,  (c)  And  it  is 
well  settled  that  they  cannot  by  any  contract  destroy  each  other's 
rights.  Let  the  covenant  of  separation  be  never  so  formal  or  sol- 
emn, either  party  may  at  any  time  insist  upon  a  restoration 
of  all  the  rights  which  belong  to  the  relation  of  marriage,  {d} 
But  if   after  such  a  deed,  and  a  separation  consequent  upon  it, 


(6)  See  Blowers  v.  Sturtevant,  4  Dcnio, 
4G. 

(hh)  See  a  strono:  case  to  this  effect, 
Collins  V.  Collins,  PhiU.  (N.  C.)  Eq.  153. 

(be)  For  recent  cases  arising  under  arti- 
cles of  separation,  see  Griffin  v.  Banks,  o7 
N.  Y.  621  ;  Hitner's  appeal,  54  Pcnn.  St. 
110  ;  Carley  v.  Green,  12  Allen,  104. 

(c)  See  Evans  v.  Evans,  1  Hagg.  Cons. 
118:  Oliver  r.  Oliver,  id  361. 

(d)  Mortimer  i-.  Mortimer,  2  Hagg. 
Cons.  318.  In  tliis  case,  Sir  Wilhnm  Scott, 
in  commenting  npon  a  plea  in  bar  to  a  suit 
for  the  restitution  of  conjugal  rights,  ob- 
served :  "  The  seventh  and  eighth  articles 
plead  the  circumstance  which  led  to  the 
deed  of  separation,  and  tiiedeed  is  exhibi- 
ted. The  objection  taken  against  these 
articles  is,  that  deeds  of  separation  are  not 
pleadable  in  the  ecclesiastical  court,  and 
most  certainly  they  are  not,  if  pleaded  as 
a  bar  to  its  further  proceedings  ;  for  this 
court  considers  a  private  separation  as  an 
illegal  contract,  implying  a  renunciation 
of  stipulated  ilutics  —  a  dereliction  of 
those  mutual  offices  which  the  parties  are 
not  at  liberty  to  desert — an  assumption 
of  a  fal.«e  character  in  both  parties  con- 
trary to  the  real  status  persons,  and  to  the 
obligations  which  botli  of  them  have  con- 
tracted in  the  sight  of  God  and  man,  to 


live  together,  '  till  death  them  do  pirt,' 
and  on  which  the  solemnities  both  of  civil 
society  and  of  religion  have  stamped  a 
binding  authority,  from  which  the  parties 
cannot  release  thciuselves  by  any  private 
act  of  tlieir  own,  or  for  causes  which  the 
law  itself  has  not  pronounced  to  be  suffi- 
cient, and  sufficiently  proved."  See  also 
Sullivan  v.  Sullivan,  2  Adams.  Eccl.  303; 
Siuith  r.  Smith,  2  Hagg.  Eccl.  (supp.)  n. 
(rt).  —  Although  a  deed  of  separation 
upon  mutual  agreement,  on  account  of 
unhappy  differences,  contain  a  covenant 
not  to  bring  a  suit  for  restitution  of  con- 
jugal rights,  j'et  it  is  no  bar  to  such  a  suit. 
Westmeath  v.  Westiueath,  2  Hagg.  Eccl. 
(supp.)  115.  —  That  deeds  of  separation 
between  husband  and  wife  amount  to 
nothinor  more  than  a  mere  permission  to 
one  party  to  live  separate  froiu  the  other, 
and  confer  no  release  of  the  marriage  con- 
tract on  eilher  part}^  and  that  neither  can 
violate  them,  see  Warrcnder  r.  Warren- 
der,  2  CI.  &  F.  561 ;  Lord  St.  John  r. 
Lady  St.  John,  11  Ves.  526,  532;  Wilkes 
i\  Wilkes,  2  Dickens,  791  ;  Marquis  of 
Westmeath  r.  INIarchioness  of  Westmeath, 
1  Dow  &  C.  511);  Gnth  i:  Guth,  3  Bro.  Cli. 
614,  seems  contra,  but  this  case  is  n<it  of 
good  authority. 

397 


*358 


THE   LAW   OP    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


the  husband  institutes  proceedings  to  recover  the  society  of  his 
wife,  the  deed,  though  no  bar,  may  still  be  evidence  as  to  the 
character  of  the  separation,  and  if  this  be  shown  to  have  arisen 
from  his  misconduct,  either  by  the  deed  itself  or  otherwise,  he 

cannot  succeed,  (e)  Nevertheless,  where  such  separation 
*  358    is  made  by  an  *  instrument  to  which  a  third  person  is  a 

party,  and  is  a  trustee  for  the  wife,  and  tlie  husband  agrees 
with  this  trustee  to  give  him  a  sufficient  sum  for  her  mainten- 
ance, such  trustee  may  maintain  an  action  on  the  agreement.  (/) 

(e)  Kex  V.  Mary  Mead,  1  Burr.  542. 
This  case  was  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  at 
the  instance  of  a  husband  to  bring  up  the 
body  of  his  wife,  wlio  had  separated  from 
him,  and  wlio  was  then  living  with  her 
mother.  Tlie  motlier  brought  lier  daugh- 
ter into  court,  and  the  substance  of  the 
return  on  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was 
"  that  her  husband  liaving  used  her  very 
ill,  in  consideration  of  a  great  sum  which 
she  gave  him  out  of  her  separate  estate, 
consented  to  lier  living  alone,  executed 
articles  of  separation,  and  covenanted,  (under 
a  large  penalty)  'never  to  disturb  her  or 
any  person  with  whom  she  should  live;' 
that  she  lived  with  her  mother  at  her  own 
earnest  desire  ;  and  that  this  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  was  taken  out  with  a  view  of  seiz- 
ing her  by  force,  or  some  other  bad  pur- 
pose." The  court  held  this  agreement  to 
be  a  formal  renunciation  by  the  husband  of 
his  marital  right  to  seize  lier,  or  force  her 
back  to  live  with  him.  And  they  said 
that  a?!//  attempt  of  tlie  husband  to  seize 
her  by  force  and  violence  would  be  a 
breach  of  the  peace.  They  also  declared, 
that  any  attempt  made  by  the  husband  to 
molest  her,  in  her  present  return  from  West- 
minster Hall,  would  be  a  contempt  of  court. 
And  they  told  the  lady  she  was  at  full  lib- 
erty to  go  wiiere  and  to  whom  she  pleased. 
And  where  tlie  wife  voluntarily  lived 
apart  from  her  husband,  without  coercion 
on  the  part  of  any  one,  it  was  iield  that 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  should  not  be 
granted  to  her  husban'.l.  but  that  the  rem- 
edy, if  there  was  no  good  cause  for  her 
remaining  apart,  was  solely  in  the  Eccle- 
siastical Courts.  Ex  parte  Sandiland,  12 
E.  L.  &  E.  40;5. 

(  /■)  Jec  1-.  Thurlow,  2  B.  &  C.  547  ;  s. 
c.  4  Dow.  &  R.  11  ;  Wilson  v.  Mushett,  3 
B.  &  Ad.  74o.  In  this  case  the  defendant 
gave  a  bond  to  A  and  B,  conditioned  for 
the  payment  of  an  annuity  to  his  wife, 
unless  slie  sliould  at  any  time  molest  him 
on  account  of  iier  debts,  or  for  living 
apart  from  her.  By  indenture  of  the 
same  date  between  the  above  parties  and 
the  wife,  reciting  that  defendant  and  his 

398 


wife  had  agreed  to  live  separate  during 
their  lives,  and  that,  for  the  wife's  main- 
tenan(;e,  defendant  had  agreed  to  as- 
sign certain  premises,  &c.,  to  A  and  B, 
and  had  given  them  an  annuity  bond  as 
above  mentioned;  it  was  witnessed  that 
defendant  assigned  the  premises,  &c.,  to 
them,  in  trust  for  the  wife,  and  he  cove- 
nanted with  A  and  B  to  live  separate 
from  her,  and  not  molest  her  or  interfere 
with  her  property  ;  and  power  was  given 
her  to  dispose  of  the  same  by  will,  and  to 
sell  the  assigned  premises,  &c.,  and  buy 
estates  or  annuities  with  tlie  proceeds. 
Tlie  wife  covenanted  with  the  defendant 
to  maintain  herself  during  her  life  out  of 
the  above  property,  unless  she  and  the 
defendant  should  afterwards  agree  to 
live  together  again  ;  and  that  he  should 
be  indemnified  from  her  debts.  The  in- 
denture (except  as  to  the  assignment), 
and  also  the  bond,  were  to  become  void 
if  the  wife  should  sue  the  defendant  for 
alimony,  or  to  enforce  cohabitation.  And 
it  was  i^rovided  that  if  the  defendant  and 
his  wife  should  thereafter  agree  to  live  together 
again,  such  cohabitation  should  in  )io  ivai/  (dter 
tlie  trusts  created  btj  the  indenture.  There 
was  no  exjiress  covenant  on  the  part  of 
the  trustees.  The  defendant  and  his  wife 
separated,  and  afterwai'ds  lived  togetlier 
again  for  a  time,  and  this  fact  was 
pleaded  to  an  action  by  the  trustees 
upon  the  annuity  bond,  as  avoiding  that 
security.  Held,  on  demurrer  to  tlie  plea, 
that  the  reconciliation  was  no  bar  to  an 
action  on  this  bond,  since  it  did  not  ap- 
pear tiiat  the  bond,  and  the  indenture  of 
even  date  with  it,  were  not  really  exe- 
cuted with  a  view  to  immediate  separa- 
tion ;  and  althougli  there  might  be  parts 
of  the  indenture  which  a  court  of  equity 
Avould  not  enforce  under  the  circum- 
stances, yet  there  was  nothing,  on  a 
view  of  the  whole  instrument,  to  prevent 
this  court  from  giving  effect  to  the  clause 
which  provided  for  a  continuance  of  the 
trusts  notwithstanding  a  reconciliation. 
See  also  Logan  v.  Birkett,  I  Myl.  &  K. 
225. 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  359 

And  if  the  trustee  agrees  to  hold  the  husband  liarmless  on  his 
liability  for  his  wife,  and  indemnify  him  against  any  further 
expenditure  for  her,  the  husband  may  maintain  an  action  on  such 
agreement,  (g)  Without  the  intervention  of  such  third 
party,  the  *  husband  and  wife  cannot  contract  together,  *  359 
being  but  one  person  in  the  view  of  the  law.  (Ji)  ^  But 
such  agreement  must  be  absolute  and  unconditional,  and  not  de- 
pendent upon  the  contingency  of  a  future  separation,  nor  upon 
the  wife's  future  consent  to  live  separate,  for  then  it  is  regarded 
as  an  inducement  to  separation,  and  is  therefore  wholly  void,  (i)  ^ 
And  if  the  covenant  be  in  general  to  pay  an  annuity  to  the  wife, 
the  consideration  for  it  being  the  separation,  and  in  the  nature 
of  a  continuing  consideration,  a  subsequent  reconciliation  and 
cohabitation  discharges  the  husband  from  his  obligation.  (/) 
But  the  agreement  may  be  expressly  to  pay  to  her  or  for  her 
use  such  annuity  during  her  life,  and  then  it  is  not  affected  by  a 
subsequent   cohabitation,  (k)     And   it   would    seem,  that  if   the 

(17)  Summers  v.  Ball,  8  M.  &  W.  596,  promissory  notes,  made  by  the   defend" 

where  a  deed  of  separation  between  bus-  ant's  testator  to   the  plaintiff,  his   wife, 

band  and  wife  contained  a  covenant  by  during  coverture.     The  consideration  of 

the  wife  and  lier  trustees,  that  slie,  her  the  notes  was  certain  property  wliich  the 

executors  or  administrators,  or  the  trus-  plaintiff   lield   in   lier   own  right,  which 

tees,  or   some   or   one   of   them,   should  passed  to  her  Imsband.     The  court  held 

and  would  at  all  times  save,  defend,  and  that  the  action  could  not  be  sustained, 

keep  harmless  and  indemnified   tlie  bus-  In  Sweat   v.   Hall,  8  Vt.  187,  the  same 

band  from  and  against  the  debt  or  debts,  doctrine  has  been  established, 

sum  or   sums  of   money,  which  she  the  (?)   Westmeath  v.   Salisbury,  5  Bligh 

wife  had  tlien,  at  the  time  of  the  making  (n.  s.),  393;    Durant  v.  Titley,  7  Price, 

of   the  indenture,    contracted,  or   which  577  ;    Hindley  v.  Westmeath,  6  B.  &  C. 

she  should,  at  anj^  time  thereafter  during  200;    Jee   v.   Thurlow,  2   B.    &  C.  547; 

the  separation,  contract.     Held,  that  this  Jones  v.  Waite,  9  CI.  &  F.  101. 

covenant  included  debts  previously  con-  ( /)  Scholey  v.  Goodman,  1  C.  &  P.  36. 

tracted  by  the  wife  for  necessaries  while  (k)  Wilson   v.  Mushett,   3   B.  &   Ad. 

living  with  tlie  husband.  743.     In  this  case  Lord   Ttnterden,  C.  J., 

(h)  Co.  Lit.  112  a;  Keeve,  Dom.  Rel.  said:  "I  think  it  is  impossible  for  us, 
89,  90 ;  Marshall  r.  Rutton,  8  T.  R.  545  ;  sitting  in  a  court  of  law,  to  say  that  this 
Carter  v.  Carter,  14  Sm.  &  M.  59.  He  deed,  and  the  bond  on  wliich  the  action 
cannot  convey  property  directly  to  her.  is  brought,  were  avoided  by  the  reconcil- 
Martin  v.  Martin,  1  Greenl.  394.  —  There  iation  alleged  in  the  plea.  The  argument 
is  a  recent  case  upon  this  point,  decided  for  the  defendant  must  be,  that  if  the 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts,  husband  and  wife  had  agreed  to  live  to- 
by the  name  of  Jackson  v.  Parks,  10  gether  again,  even  for  a  few  hours,  and 
Cush.    550.     It  was   assumpsit   on    two  afterwards  separated,  all  the  provisions 

1  In  New  York,  a  married  woman  may,  by  statute,  sue  her  husband  to  enforce 
any  right  affecting  her  separate  property,  in  any  form  of  action,  in  the  same  manner  that 
she  might  sue  any  stranger.^  Wright  v.  Wright,  54  N.  Y.  4.37.  Adam;  v.  Curtis,  4 
Lansing,  164,  held  that  a  married  woman,  carrying  on  no  separate  business,  who  performed 
labor  and  services,  at  her  husband's  request,  for  the  firm  of  which  he  was  a  member, 
might  sue  the  members  of  the  firm,  including  her  husband,  for  her  ser\nces. 

"^  An  indenture  in  which  a  husband  agrees  to  pay  to  a  trustee  money  for  the  sup- 
port of  his  wife,  made  in  contemplation  of  an  immediate  separation,  which  takes  place, 
is  not  void  as  against  public  policy.     Fox  v.  Davis,  1 13  Mass.  255. 

399 


360 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book 


*  360  annuity  is  *  expressly  to  be  paid  during  the  continuance  of 
a  separation  by  mutual  consent,  and  the  husband  forfeits 
his  marital  rights  by  his  own  misconduct,  he  can  no  longer  put  an 
end  to  the  separation,  nor  to  his  obligation  to  pay  the  annuity.  Q) 
And  if  such  an  agreement  to  pay  an  annuity  do  not  expressly 
except  adultery  on  her  part,  neither  that  nor  a  divorce  because  of 
it  would  discharge  his  obligation,  (w)  Such  is  the  doctrine  of 
the  English  courts ;  and  in  Massachusetts,  it  was  held  where  real 
estate  was  secured,  the  income  to  be  paid  to  the  wife  during  her 
life,  and  to  her  husband  during  his  life,  if  he  survived  her,  and 
she  was  divorced  from  him  for  his  adultery,  and  afterwards  died, 
he  was  still  entitled  to  the  income  during  his  life,  (pnm)  But  it 
must  be  remembered  that  such  divorce  in  England  would  have 
formerly  been  only  (unless  by  act  of  Parliament)  a  mensd  et 
thoro ;  whereas  in  this  country  it  would  be  a  vinculo,  and  thus 
might  perhaps  put  an  end  to  such  obligation.  There  is  now, 
however,  in  England,  a  court  having  full  power  to  decree  divorces 
a  vinculo  ;  and  the  rules  of  law  hitherto  applied  in  that  court  are 
similar  to  those  in  force  in  this  countrv. 


of  the  deed  were  put  an  end  to  by  condo- 
nation. I  think  that  upon  tliis  deed  we 
cannot  come  to  such  a  conclusion. 
Whether  a  court  of  equity  would  en- 
force all  the  trusts  or  not  is  a  question 
with  which  we  have  nothing  to  do.  One 
proviso  of  the  deed  is,  that  if  the  defend- 
ant and  his  wife  shall  thereafter  agree  to 
cohabit  again,  such  cohabitation  shall  in 
no  way  alter  the  trusts  thereby  created, 
but  they  shall  stand  valid,  and  of  as  full 
effect  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  well 
during  such  cohabitation  as  in  case  they 
again  live  separate;  and  it  is  said  that 
this  is  inconsistent  with  other  parts  of 
the  instrument  of  separation.  But  I  do 
not  see  the  objection.  The  settlement 
made  on  the  wife  may  have  been  in- 
tended to  continue  at  all  events  as  an  al- 
lowance in  the  nature  of  pin-money.  At 
least,  I  cannot  say  tliat  a  deed  like  this 
becomes  altogether  void  on  a  reconcilia- 
tion. It  would  be  contrary  to  the  ex- 
press provision  of  the  deed^  inserted, 
perhaps,  in  contemplation  that  the  wife 
might,  under  some  circumstances,  choose 
rather  to  live  with  her  husband  again, 
enjoying  the  annuity  settled  upon  her, 
than  to  continue  separate." 

(/)  Whoregood  v.  Whoregood,  1  Cli. 
Cas.  250. 

(m)  Baynon  v.  Batley,  8  Bing.  256, 
Jee  V.  Thurlow,  2  B.  &  C.  547.  By  deed 
of  three  parts,  between   husband,   wife, 

400 


and  trustee,  reciting  that  differences  ex- 
isted, and  tliat  the  husband  and  wife  had 
agreed  to  live  separate,  the  husband  cove- 
nanted to  pay  an  annuity  to  the  wife, 
during  so  much  of  her  life  as  he  should 
live,  and  the  trustee  covenanted  to  indem- 
nify tlie  husband  against  the  wife's  debts, 
and  that  she  should  release  all  claim  of 
jointure,  dower,  and  thirds.  Held,  that 
this  deed  was  legal  and  binding,  and  tliat 
a  plea  by  the  husband  that  the  wife  sued 
in  the  Ecclesiastical  Court  for  restitution 
of  conjugal  rights,  and  that  he  put  in 
an  allegation  and  exhibits,  charging  her 
with  adultery,  and  that  a  decree  of  di- 
vorce a  mensd  et  thoro  was  in  that  cause 
pronounced,  was  not  a  sufficient  answer 
to  an  action  by  the  trustee  for  arrears  of 
the  annuity.  Ablott,  C.  J. :  "The  only 
question  is  upon  the  sufficiency  of  the 
pi.  a.  It  has  been  decided  that  a  plea 
stating  the  commission  of  adultery  by 
the  wife,  is  not  sufficient,  upon  this 
ground,  that  if  the  husband,  when  exe- 
cuting such  a  deed  as  tliis,  thinks  proper 
to  enter  into  an  unqualified  covenant  he 
must  be  liound  by  it.  Had  lie  wished  to 
make  the  non-connnission  of  adultery  a 
condition  of  paying  the  annuity  to  his 
wife,  he  should  liave  covenanted  to  pay 
it  tjttnm  dill  atsta  vixerit." 

{mill)  Babcock  v.  John  Smith,  22  Pick. 
Ul. 


CII.  XVIII.] 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


3G1 


If,  upon  such  separation,  property  has  been  settled  on  the  wife 
and  children  for  their  support,  it  would  be  upheld  against  subse- 
quent creditors,  unless  the  settlement  were  shown  to  be  in  fraud 
of  them,  or  otherwise  not  in  good  faith,  (n) 

If  there  be  separation  by  consent,  and  a  specific  sum  settled 
upon  the  wife,  which  is  reasonably  sufficient  for  her  necessi- 
ties, then  the  husband  is  not  liable  for  necessaries  supplied  to 
her.  (o)  Nor  is  he  so  liable  even  if  the  party  so  furnish- 
ing *  goods  did  not  know  of  the  provision  made  for  the  *  361 
wife ;  unless  this  party  had  supplied  her  before,  and  the 
separation  was  recent  and  not  notorious  ;  (p}  the  fact  of  separa- 
tion, if  he  knew  it,  was  enough  to  put  him  upon  inquiry.  But  the 
party  supplying  necessaries  to  a  separated  wife  is  not  bound  to 
show  that  no  provision  is  made  for  her  ;  if  the  husband  would 
otherwise  be  bound,  and  undertakes  to  relieve  himself  from  his 
liability  by  the  fact  of  such  provision,  the  burden  of  proving  it 
lies  on  him  ;  (^q)  and  if  it  be  inadequate  or  not  duly  paid,  he  is 


(n)  Hobbs  v.  Hull,  1  Cox,  445 :  Ste- 
phens V.  Olive,  2  Bro.  Cli.  91 ;  Nunn  v. 
Wilsmor,  8  T.  E.  521. 

(o)  Angler  r.  An^ier,  Gilb.  Eq.  152 ; 
Stephens  v.  Olive,  2  Bro.  Cli.  90  ;  Todd  v. 
Stokes.  1  Salk.  116,  1  Ld.  Raym.  444. 
This  allowance  must  be  reasonalaly  suffi- 
cient for  the  wife  to  the  satisfaction  of  a 
jury ;  and  the  mere  acquiescence  on  the 
part  of  the  wife  in  the  sum  paid  will  not 
necessarily  exonerate  the  husband.  Hodg- 
kinson  v.  Fletcher,  4  Camp.  70 ;  Liddlow  v. 
Wilmot,  2  Stark.  87  ;  Emmett  v.  Norton, 
8  C.  &  P.  506.  The  sum  stipulated  by 
the  husband  must  have  been  actiialJi/  paid, 
or  the  husband  is  not  discharged,  and  the 
wife  is  not  driven  to  her  remedy  on  the 
instrument  of  separation,  but  may  bind 
her  husband  on  her  contracts.  Nurse  v. 
Craig,  5  B.  &  P.  148 ;  Hunt  v.  De  Bla- 
quiere,  5  Bing.  550. 

(/))  In  Eawlins  v.  Van  Dyke,  3  Esp. 
250,  Lord  ElJon  is  reported  to  have  held, 
tliat  in  cases  of  separation  between  man 
and  wife,  if  the  tradesman's  demand  is 
for  necessaries  it  is  incumbent  on  the 
husband,  in  order  to  discharge  himself,  to 
show  that  the  tradesman  had  notice  of 
the  separation.  But  this  doctrine  was 
directly  repudiated  in  the  late  case  of 
Mizen  v.  Pick,  3  M.  &  W.  481,  and  Alder- 
son,  "B.,  theie  said:  "I  do  not  see  how 
notice  to  the  tradesman  can  be  material. 
The  question  in  all  these  cases  is  one  of 
authority.  If  a  wife,  living  separate  from 
her  husband,  is  supplied  by  him  with 
sufficient  funds  to  support  herself  —  with 

VOL.  I. 


every  thing  proper  for  her  maintenance 
and  support — then  she  is  not  his  agent 
to  pledge  his  credit,  and  he  is  not  liable." 
It  has  likewise  been  held  in  this  country 
that  if  the  tradesman  was  not  accustomed 
to  trust  tlie  wife  before  separation, 
neither  express  notice  nor  general  noto- 
riety of  the  fact  of  separation  is  neces- 
sary to  discharge  the  husband.  Cany  v. 
Patton,  2  Ashm.  140 ;  and  see  Baker  v. 
Barney,  8  Johns.  72 ;  Mott  v.  Comstock, 
8  Wend.  544;  Wilson  v.  Smvth,  1  B.  & 
Ad.  801. 

(q)  See  Frost  v.  Willis,  13  Vt.  202; 
Rumney  v.  Keyes,  7  N.  H.  571 ;  Clancy  on 
Husband  &  Wife,  28.  But  in  Mott  v. 
Comstock,  8  Wend.  544,  it  was  held,  that 
if  a  husband  professes  to  provide  for  hia 
wife,  who  lives  apart  from  him,  it  is  in- 
cumbent upon  a  party  who  his  been  ex- 
pressli/  torhidd.n  to  (jive  her  credit  to  show 
clearly  and  affirnnatively  that  the  hus- 
band did  not  supply  her  with  necessaries 
suitable  to  her  condition,  before  he  can 
charge  him  for  supplies  furnished  her ; 
and  this  seems  to  be  the  better  law.  But 
in  McClallen  v.  Adams,  19  Pick.  333, 
where  the  wife  of  the  defendant,  being 
afflicted  with  a  dangerous  disease,  was 
carried  by  him  to  a  distance  from  his 
residence,  and  left  under  tlie  care  of  the 
plaintiff  as  a  surgeon,  and  after  the  lapse 
of  some  weeks,  the  plaintiff  performed 
an  operation  on  her  for  the  cure  of  the 
disease,  soon  after  which  slie  died,  it  was 
held,  in  an  action  by  the  plaintiff  against 
the  defendant,  to  recover  compensation 
26  401 


*3G2 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


liable,  (r)     But  he  is  not  liable,  even  if  the  separation  were  not 
by  deed,  and  there  is  no  written  agreement  between  them 

*  362    as  *  to  the  allowance,  if  it  be  in  fact  paid  to  her.  (s)     And 

he  is  also  mider  no  liability  if  sufficient  necessaries  be  pro- 
vided for  her  by  another  person  and  none  by  him.  Q) 

The  rule  of  law  is,  that  if  a  wife  be  separated  from  her  hus- 
band, with  her  consent,  he  is  liable  for  necessaries  supplied  to  her 
only  where  in  fact  she  has  no  other  means  of  obtaining  them. 
But  under  any  circumstances  of  separation,  the  husband  may  be 
held  to  answer  to  articles  of  the  peace  against  him,  if  occasioned 
by  his  violent  conduct  towards  her,  (m)  and  even  held  liable  to 
pay  the  bill  of  the  attorney  whom  she  employs  for  that 

*  363    purpose,  (v)^     But  he  has  been  held  not  liable  to  pay  *  the 


for  his  services,  that  the  performance  of 
the  operation  was  within  tl:e  scope  of  the 
plaintiff's  authority,  if  in  his  judgment 
it  was  necessary  or  expedient,  and  that 
it  was  not  incumbent  on  liim  to  prove 
tliat  it  was  necessary  or  proper  under  the 
circumstances,  or  tliat  before  he  per- 
formed it  he  gave  notice  to  the  defendant, 
or  that  it  would  have  been  dangerous  to 
the  wife  to  wait  until  notice  could  be 
given  to  the  defendant. 

(r)  Hodgkinson  v.  Fletcher,  4  Camp. 
70;  Liddlow  v.  Wilmot,  2  Stark.  87; 
Emmett  v.  Norton,  8  C.  &  P.  506 ;  Hunt 
i;.  De  Blaquiore,  5  Bing.  550.  —  It  has 
been  held  that  notwithstanding  the  hus- 
band pay  the  wife  a  sufficieut  allowance, 
yet  if  he  expressly  promise  to  pay  the 
debts  she  has  contracted  during  sucli  sep- 
aration, he  is  bound  by  sucli  promise. 
Harrison  v.  Hall,  1  Mood.  &  R.  185; 
Hornbuckle  v.  Hornbury,  2  Stark.  177. 
But  these  cases  seem  certainly  very 
anoniiiloiis,  and  difficult  to  be  supported, 
since  if  the  allowance  was  duly  paid,  and 
was  adequate,  the  husband's  promise 
would  be  nundum  pactum. 

(s)  No  deed  of  separation  is  actually 
necessary  ;  it  is  sufficient  if  a  separation 
actually  took  place.  Hodgkinson  v. 
Fletcher,  4  Camp.  70  ;  Emery  r.  Neigh- 
bour, 2  Halst.  142;  Lookwood  (•.  Thomas, 
12  Johns.  248;  Kimball  r.  Keyes,  11 
Wend.  33.  But  if  the  separate  niain- 
tenance  be  secured  by  deed,  it  is  held 
that  the  deed  is  void  unless  executed  by 
a  trustee  on  the  part  of  the  wife.  Ewers 
V.  Ilutton,  3  Esp.  255. 

(t)  It  is  immaterial  from  what  source  the 


wife's  provision  comes,  provided  it  be  suffi- 
cient and  permanent.  Liddlow  v.  Wil- 
mot, 2  Stark.  80 ;  and  see  Dixon  v.  Hurrell, 
8  C.  &  P.  717.  The  case  of  Thompson 
V.  Hervey,  4  Burr.  2177,  sometimes  cited 
as  deciding  that  the  provision  must  .be 
derived  from  the  husband  in  order  to  dis- 
charge him,  seems  to  have  proceeded 
rather  on  the  ground  that  the  provision 
was  purely  voluntary,  and  during  the 
pleasure  of  the  grantor,  and  therefore 
that  creditors  could  not  be  supposed  to 
rely  upon  it. 

(m)  Turner  v.  Rookes,  10  A.  &  E.  47. 
This  was  an  action  of  assumpsit  to  re- 
cover for  services  rendered  by  the  plain- 
tiff, as  solicitor,  to  the  defendant's  wife,  in 
exhibiting  articles  of  the  peace  against 
the  defendant.  It  appeared  that  the  de- 
fendant and  his  wife  had  been  separated 
for  seven  years,  she  living  upon  a  main- 
tenance of  £112  per  annum,  which  the 
defendant  had  secured  to  her  by  deed. 
The  cause  of  separation  did  not  appear. 
It  further  appeared  that  the  defendant 
had  used  such  threats  and  violence 
against  his  wife  as  authorized  her  to  ex- 
hibit articles  of  the  peace  against  him. 
It  was  luld  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled 
to  recover. 

(v)  Shepherd  v.  Mackoul,  3  Camp.  326. 
But  this  was  on  the  ground  that  in  that 
particular  case  the  step  was  actually  ne- 
cessary on  the  part  of  the  wife.  See 
Brown  v.  Ackroyd,  5  E.  &  B.  819 ;  and 
also  i)reccding  note.  In  Shelton  v.  Pendle- 
ton, 18  Conn.  417,  where  A,  the  wife  of 

B,  without  his  assent  in  fact,  employed 

C,  an  attorney  and  counsellor  at  law,  to 


^  So  a  husband  unsuccessfully  prosecuting  his  wife,  to  compel  her  to  find  sureties  to 
keep  the  peace,  is  liable  for  the  reasonable  fees  of  her  attorneys,  as  necessaries.  Warner 
V.  Heidcn,  28  Wis.  517. 

402 


CH.  XVIII.] 


MARRIED    WOMEN. 


363 


bill  of  an  attorney  whom  she  employs  to  procure  an  indictment  of 
him.  (tc) 

In  this  country  if  questions  of  this  kind  come  before  the  court 
on  a  petition  by  the  wife  for  a  divorce,  it  is  not  uncommon  for 
the  court  if  satisfied  of  the  wife's  destitution,  and  in  view  of  all 
the  circumstances  they  deem  it  just  and  expedient,  to  require  the 
husband  to  provide  for  the  expenses  of  the  proceedings  against 
him. 

A  liability,  very  similar  to  that  which  falls  upon  one  who  is  le- 
gally a  husband,  rests  also  upon  him  who  lives  with  a  woman  as 
his  wife,  who  is  not  so.  If  he  holds  her  out  to  the  public  as  his 
wife,  then  he  promises  the  public  that  he  will  be  as  responsible 


prosecute,  on  A's  behalf,  a  petition  to  the 
superior  court  against  B,  for  a  divorce 
from  him,  for  a  legal  and  sufficient  cause, 
with  a  prayer  for  alimony,  and  1he  cus- 
tody of  tlie  minor  children,  and  C  per- 
formed services  and  made  disbursements, 
in  the  prosecution  of  sucli  petition,  which 
was  fully  granted,  and  thereupon  brought 
liis  action  against  B  for  a  reasonable 
remuneration ;  it  was  held,  1st,  that  the 
facts  in  tlie  case  showed  that  C  looked 
for  paj-ment  and  gave  credit  to  A  alone  ; 
2d,  that  the  services  and  disbursements 
in  question  were  not  necessaries,  for 
which  B  as  the  husband  of  A  was  liable ; 
3d,  that  C's  claim  derived  no  strength 
from  tlie  fact  that  to  the  petition  for  a 
divorce  was  appended  a  prayer  for  ali- 
mony and  the  custody  of  the  minor  chil- 
dren ;  4th,  that  consequently  C  was  not 
entitled  to  recover.  Church,  C.  J.,  com- 
menting on  the  case  of  Shepherd  v. 
Mackoul,  said  :  "  The  common  law  defines 
necessaries  to  consist  only  of  necessary 
food,  drink,  clotliing,  washing,  physic, 
instruction,  and  a  competent  place  of 
residence.  And  we  know  of  no  case 
■which  has  professed  to  extend  the  cata- 
logue of  necessaries,  imless  it  be  Shepherd 
V.  Mackoul,  3  Carap.  32G.  That  was  an 
action  by  an  attorney  to  recover  of  a 
husband  a  hill  for  assisting  his  wife  to 
exhibit  articles  of  the  peace  against  him. 
And  Lord  Etlcnhorowih  said,  that  the  de- 
fendant's liability  would  depend  upon 
the  necessity  of  the  measure  ;  and  if  that 
existed,  she  might  cliarge  her  husband 
for  the  necessary  expense  as  much  as  for 
necessary  food  or  raiment.  It  is  manifest 
that  the  court  considered  that  case  as 
falling  literally  witliin  tlie  established 
doctrine  of  the  common  law  on  this  sub- 
ject—  the  necessity  of  preserving  the 
life  and  health  of  the  wife.    The  duty  of 


providing  necessaries  for  the  wife  is 
strictly  marital,  and  is'  imposed  by  the 
common  law,  in  reference  only  to  a  state 
of  coverture,  and  not  of  uivorce.  By 
that  law,  a  valid  contract  of  marriage 
was  and  is  indissoluble,  and  therefore  by 
it  the  husband  could  never  have  been 
placed  under  obligation  to  provide  for 
the  expenses  of  its  dissolution.  Such  an 
event  was  a  legal  impossibility.  Neces- 
saries are  to  be  provided  by  a  husband 
for  his  wife,  to  sustain  her  as  his  wife, 
and  not  to  provide  for  her  future  con- 
dition as  a  single  woman,  or  perhaps  as 
the  wife  of  another  man.  It  was  on  this 
principle  that  the  aforesaid  case  of  Shep- 
herd V.  Mackoul  was  decided  ;  and  the 
latter  case  of  Ladd  v.  Lynn,  2  M.  &  W. 
205,  in  which  it  was  holden  that  a  hus- 
band was  not  liable  for  expenses  incurred 
by  the  wife  in  procuring  a  deed  of  separa- 
tion, proceeded  upon  the  same  principle." 
(w)  Because  that  is  not  necessary. 
Grindell  v.  Godmond,  5  A.  &  E.  755.  Nor 
for  the  counterpart  of  the  deed  of  sejiar- 
ation,  procured  by  the  wife's  trustee, 
unless  he  expressly  promise  to  pay.  Ladd 
V.  Lynn,  2  M.  &  W.  265;  Coffin  v.  Dun- 
liam,  8  Cush.  404.  Nor  is  a  husband 
liable  to  an  attornej'  for  professional 
services  rendered  to  the  wife  in  defending 
against  his  petition  for  a  divorce  for  lier 
fault,  nor  on  her  petition  against  him  for 
his.  Wing  v.  Hurlburt,  15  Vt.  607  ;  Dor- 
sey  V.  Goodenow,  Wright,  120.  See  supra, 
p.  *348,  note  3.  And  see  Shelton  v.  Pen- 
dleton, cited  in  the  preceding  note.  Nor 
is  the  woman  herself  liable,  unless  she 
expressly  promise  to  pay  tliem,  after  the 
divorce.  Wilson  v.  Burr,  25  Wend.  386. 
If  there  is  evidence  of  an  express  agree- 
ment to  pay  such  bills,  the  husband  may 
then  be  liable.  Williams  v.  Fowler,  1 
McClel.  &  Y.  269. 

403 


364 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


for  her  as  if  she  were  so.  (a;)  Hence  he  is  liable,  as  for  his 
wife,  to  a  tradesman  v'ho  knew  that  they  were  not  married,  (y) 
The  gromid  of  his  liability  is  not  that  he  deceived  persons  into 
an  erroneous  belief  that  she  was  his  wife,  but  that  after  volun- 
tarily treating  her  as  such,  and  so  inducing  persons  to  believe  that 
he  would  continue  to  treat  her  as  such,  he  cannot  recede  from 
the  liabilities  which  he  thus  assumes.  But  this  liability  ceases 
with  cohabitation ;  he  is  not  responsible  for  necessaries  supplied 
to  her  afterwards,  even  where  they  had  lived  together  a  long 

time,  and  she  had  left  him  because  of  his  ill  conduct.  (2) 
*  36-4    *  Proof  of  cohabitation  seems  to  be  sufficient  prima  facie 

evidence  in  an  action  against  husband  and  wife  for  her  debt 
before  marriage,  (a) 


[x)  Watson  V.  Trelkcid,  2  Esp.  637; 
Robinson  v.  Nahon,  1  Camp.  245;  Blades 
V.  Free,  9  B.  &  C.  167 ;  Munro  v.  De  Che- 
mant,  4  Camp.  215;  Carr  f.  King,  12 
Mod.  372;  Graham  v.  Brettle,  18  Law 
Times,  1«5. 

(y)  Watson  v.  Trelkeld,  2  Esp.  637; 
Kobinson  v.  Nahon,  1  Camp.  245;  Ryan 
V.  Sams,  12  Q.  B.  460. 

(z)  Munro  v.  De  Chemant,  4  Camp. 
215.  But  in  Ryan  v.  Sams,  12  Q.  B.  460, 
the  facts  wore  that  the  defendant  and  a 
Mrs.  S.,  his  mistress,  lived  together  as 
husband  and  wife  four  years,  and  occu- 
pied three  residences  successively.  At 
each  time  of  their  coming  into  a  house, 
plaintiff  was  employed  to  do  work  and 
furnish  materials  for  the  fitting  up.  Mrs. 
S.  as  well  as  the  defendant  gave  direc- 
tions ;  and  the  defendant  sanctioned  her 
orders  and  paid  the  bills.  The  plaintiff 
knew  that  she  was  only  his  mistress. 
While  residing  in  the  tiiird  house  they 
separated;  but  Mrs.  S.,  without  defend- 
ant's sanction,  sent  for  plaintiff  to  that 
house,  wliich  she  had  not  yet  left,  and 
ordered  fittings  up  for  a  new  house  of 
her  own.  Tlie  plaintiff  did  the  work, 
and  had  not,  in  the  mean  time,  any  notice 
of  the  separation,  lleld,  in  an  action  for 
the  last-mentioned  work  and  goods,  that 
it  was  a  proper  question  for  the  jury 
whether  or  not  the  defendant  had  given 
the  plaintiff  reason  to  believe  that  Mrs. 
S.,  at  the  time  of  the  orders,  continued  to 
be  the  defendant's  agent ;  and  that,  on 
their  finding  in  the  affirmative,  the  de- 
fendant was  liable.  Lord  Denman,  C.  J.: 
"In  Munro  r.  De  Chemant,  4  Camp.  215, 
it  may  be  presumed  that  the  parties  had 
lived  long  separate;  and  it  is  consistent 
with  the  statement  there  that  Lord  Ellpn- 
borough  may  have  noticed  that  circum- 
stance as  important  if  the  parlies  were 

404 


not  married,  but  told  the  jury, 'If  yon 
think  they  are  proved  to  have  been  niau 
and  wife  the  case  will  be  different.'  And 
the  order  there  seems  to  iiave  commenced 
a  new  account.  Here  the  defendant 
sanctions  orders  to  the  plaintiff  in  the 
name  of  Stanley,  while  the  person  in 
question  is  living  with  him  under  that 
name,  and  she  afterwards  gives  orders  to 
the  plaintiff  in  the  same  name,  circum- 
stances apparently  continuing  unaltered. 
It  would  be  unreasonable  to  expect  more 
evidence  in  such  a  case."  And  in  Blades 
v.  Free,  9  B.  &  C.  167,  where  a  man  who 
had  for  some  years  cohabited  with  a 
woman  that  passed  for  his  wife,  went 
abroad,  leaving  her  and  her  family  at  his 
residence  in  this  country,  and  died  abroad, 
it  was  field,  that  the  woman  might  hare 
the  same  authority  to  bind  him  by  her 
contracts  for  necessaries  as  Lf  she  had 
been  his  wife ;  but  that  his  executor  was 
not  bound  to  pay  for  any  goods  supplied 
to  her  after  his  death,  although  before 
information  of  his  death  had  been  re- 
ceived. 

(a)  Tracey  v.  McArlton,  7  Dowl.  P.  C. 
532.  And  see  Norwood  v.  Stevenson, 
Andrews,  227.  But  to  be  liable  for  the 
wife's  torts  committed  before  coverture,  « 
marriage  de  facto  is  not  suflBcient ;  and  a 
man  with  whom  a  woman  already  mar- 
ried contracts  matritnony,  her  first  and 
lawful  husband  still  living,  is  not  respon- 
sible for  her  torts  committed  Vx'fore  cov- 
erture. Overholt  v.  Elswell,  1  Ashm. 
200.  And  the  same  reasoning  would  seem 
to  apply  to  her  debts  contracted  before 
coverture.  And  a  husband  is  not  liable 
for  the  debts  of  his  wife  dntn  sola,  unless 
tiie  wife  herself  was  liable  for  them  at 
the  time  of  her  marriage.  Caldwell  v. 
Drake,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  247. 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  365 

In  England,  it  has  been  decided,  that  if  a  marriage  has  taken 
place  de  facto^  the  husband  cannot  defend  against  an  action 
brought  on  promises  made  by  the  wife  before  coverture,  by  show- 
ing that  the  marriage  was  illegal,  and  therefore  void,  because  only 
the  spiritual  courts  can  take  cognizance  of  such  questions.  (6) 
But  in  this  country,  as  we  have  no  such  courts,  the  defence  could 
not  be  objected  to  on  these  grounds. 


♦SECTION  IV.  *365 

OP  THE  DISABILITY  OP  A   WIPE  TO   ACT  AS   A   SINGLE  WOMAN. 

This  disability  is  almost  entire  at  common  law.  The  usages  of 
this  country,  recognized  more  or  less  distinctly  by  the  courts, 
have  lessened  this  somewhat,  and  the  recent  legislation  of  most 
of  the  States,  has  modified  it  very  materially  ;  as  may  be  seen  in 
the  synopsis  at  the  close  of  this  chapter,  (c) 

Even  at  common  law  there  were  some  exceptions.  Thus,  a 
wife  might  purchase  land  in  fee,  and  the  grant  would  not  be  void. 
But  it  would  be  voidable  by  the  husband  by  any  act  distinctly 
expressing  his  dissent;  and  voidable  also  by  the  wife  after  her 
husband's  death,  (c?)  Her  conveyance  of  her  real  estate  was 
absolutely  void  at  common  law.  But  the  usages  of  this  country, 
from  the  earliest  colonial  times,  have  so  modified  this  rule,  that 
a  conveyance  by  her  and  her  husband,  jointly,  of  her  land,  is 
valid ;  but  not  by  separate  deeds,  (^cld)  ^     In  some  of  the  States 

(b)  Norwood  V.  Stevenson,  Andrews,  law  of  New  York.  It  seems  that  it  does 
227.  not,  unless  she  distinctly  consent  that  the 

(c)  See  Yale  v.  Dederer,  18N.  Y.  265;  debt  should  be  created  on  the  credit  of 
8.  c.  22  N.  Y.  450 ;  68  N.  Y.  329,  for  an  that  estate,  and  should  bind  it. 
examination  of  the  question  how  far  and  {d)  Co.  Lit.  352  a  ;  2  Bl.  Com.  292. 
when  the  note  of  a  married  woman  binds  (dd)  Baxter  v.  Bodkin,  25  Lid.  172. 
her  separate  estate  under  the  existing 

^  So  a  subsequent  assent  of  the  husband  renders  her  deed  valid,  if  the  wife  has  not 
meanwhile  repudiated  the  conveyance,  Vv'^ing  v.  Schramm,  79  N.  Y.  619  ;  or  where  a 
deed  is  expressed  as  the  wife's,  but  the  husband  signs  and  acknowledges  it  with  her, 
Thompson  v.  Lovrein,  82,Penn.  St.  4.32.  But  if  a  husband  is  insane,  the  wife's  deed  is 
void.  Leggate  v.  Clark,  111  Mass.  303.  —  A  wife's  mortgage,  without  husband's  joinder, 
is  also  void.  Weed,  &c.  Co.  v.  Emerson,  115  Mass.  .^54;  Herdman  v.  Pace,  85  III.  345 ; 
Yager  v.  Mcrkle,  26  Minn.  429  ;  as  well  as  her  assignment  of  a  mortgage,  ]\Ioore  v. 
Cornell,  68  Penn.  St.  320.  —  Where  a  husband  and  wife  are  both  named  "parties  of 
the  first  part,"  and  then  such  parties  as  "grantors,"  it  is  a  good  deed,  and  binds  them 
both.     Thornton  v.  Exchange  Bank,  71  Mo.  221. 

405 


*  366  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

precautions  are  taken  by  statute  to  secure  her  actual  consent,  by 
requiring  that  she  should  be  examined  concerning  tliis  matter 
by  a  magistrate,  without  her  husband  being  present,  (e)  ^ 

She  may  relinquish  her  dower,  by  executing  with  her  husband 
his  deed  of  the  land ;  provided  that  apt  words,  to  indicate  her 
purpose  of  release,  are  in  the  deed ;  for  these  are  necessary  to 
make  the  release  effectual.  (/)  Generally,  she  cannot  release 
her  dower  by  her  own  separate  deed ;  but  in  a  very  few  of  the 
States  it  is  said  that  she  may.  (^) 

The  agreement  of  a  wife  for  a  sale  of  her  real  estate, 

*  366    though  *  made  with  the  assent  of  the  husband,  is  said  to 

be  wholly  void  at  law  and  in  equity.  (Ji)  ^  Nor  will  she  be 
held  after  her  husband's  death  on  any  of  her  covenants  of  war- 
ranty, unless  so  far  as  they  may  operate  upon  her  by  way  of 
estoppel,  (i)  ^ 

In  England,  a  married  woman,  trading  independently  of  her 
husband  within  the  city  of  London,  may,  by  the  "  o-ustom  of  Lon- 
don," sue  and  be  sued  as  a  feme  sole,  with  reference  to  such 
dealings  of  trade,  (y)  But  even  there  the  husband  should  be 
made  a  party  to  the  suit,  (Ic)  though  she  will  be  treated  as  the 
substantial  party.  Elsewhere  in  England  she  can  act  as  a  single 
woman  only  when  the  legal  existence  of  her  husband  may  be 
considered  as  extinguished,  wholly  or  for  a  definite  period  ;  as  in 
case  of  outlawry,  abjuration  of  the  realm,  or  transportation  for 
life,  or  for  a  limited  term.  (Z)     In  this  country,  however,  in  part 

(e)  2  Kent,  Com.  152.  v.  Vanderheyden,  17  Johns.  167.     See  as 

(/)  Catlinw.  Ware,  9  Mass.218;  Luff-  to   estoppel,  Hill  v.  West,  8   Ohio,  225, 

kin  V.  Curtis,  13  Mass.  223.  opposing  Jackson  v.  Vanderheyden,  and 

(g)  Ela  V.  Card,  2  N.  H.  175;  Gordon  agreeing  with  the  Massachusetts  cases. 
V.  Haywood,  id.  405;  Fowler  v.  Shearer,  ( /)   Bac.  Abr.  Baron  c^  Feme  (M). 

7  Mass.  14 ;  Rowe  v.  Hamilton,  3  Greenl.  (k)  Caudell   v.    Shaw,  4   T.    R.    361 ; 

63.     But  see  Powell  v.  Monson  Man.  Co.  Beard  v.  Webb,  2  B.  &  P.  93;  Starr  v. 

3  Mason,  347,  and  Hall  ('.  Savage,  4  Ma-  Taylor,    4    McCord,    413;    Laughan    v. 

son,  273;  Lawrence  v.  Heister,  3  Har.  &  Bewett,  Cro.  C.  68. 

J.  371 ;  Mancliester  v.  Hough,  5  Mason,  (/)  Marshall  v.   Riitton,  8   T.  R.  545. 

67  ;  2  Kent,  Com   153.  And  a  married  woman  cannot  there  be 

[h)  Butler  y.  Buckingham,  5  Day,  492;  sued  on  her  contracts,  altliough  she  live 

Watrous  v.  Chalker,  7  Conn.  224.  apart   from    her   husband   in  a  state  of 

(/)  Fowler    v.    Shearer,   7    Mass.    21 ;  adultery,  and  there  exist  a  valid  divorce 

Colcord  V.  Swan,  7  Mass.  291 ;  Jackson  a  mensd  el  thoro,  and  she  contract  during 

'  A  wife's  deed  is  void,  unless  the  statute  formalities  are  fully  complied  with, 
Wentworth  v.  Clark,  33  Ark.  432 ;  but  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  statute  is 
sufficient,  Thayer  v.  Torrey,  8  Vroom,  339;  Hamar  v.  Medskcr,  60  Ind.  413  ;  Laughlin 
V.  Freara,  14  W.  Va.  322 ;  Allen  v.  Lenoir,  53  Miss.  321  :  Little  v.  Dodge,  32  Ark.  453. 

2  Nor  can  she  bind  herself  to  l)uy  land.     Robinson  v.  Robinson,  II  Bush,  174. 

3  Nor  are  her  heirs  and  devisees  answerable  on  her  covenants.  Foster  v.  Wilcox,  10 
R,  I.  443. 

406 


CH.  XVIII.] 


MAREIED   WOMEN. 


367 


by  statute,  as  in  Pennsylvania  and  South  Carolina,  (m)  and  as  an 
effect  of  the  powers  and  privileges  now  given  to  the  wife  in  many 
States,  and  to  some  extent  by  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  the  law, 
as  we  have  already  intimated,  is  much  more  reasonable, 
*  and  a  married  woman  may  act  as  if  unmarried,  under  *  367 
many  circumstances ;  as  for  continued  abandonment,  (w) 
alienage,  and  non-residence,  or  the  privity  and  acquiescence  of  the 
husband,  although  not  expressed  by  deed,  (o) 

It  may  be  added,  that  the  husband  is,  in  general,  held  for  the 
torts,  or  frauds  of  the  wife,  committed  during  coverture.  If 
committed  by  his  order,  he  is  alone  liable.  If  while  she  is  in  his 
company  the  law  presumes  his  order ;  but  this  presumption  may 
be  overcome  by  evidence.^     Where  both  are  liable,  and  must  be 


such  separation  in  the  assumed  character 
of  a  single  woman.  Lewis  v.  Lee,  3  B.  & 
C.  291,  5  Dow.  &  K.  98:  Faithorne  v. 
Blaquire,  6  M.  &  Sel.  73;  Turtle  v.  Wors- 
ley,  3  Dougl.  290.  But  see  Cox  v. 
Kitchin,  1  B.  &  P.  338.  Neither  is  her 
personal  representative  liable  under  such 
circumstances,  although  he  have  abun- 
dant assets.  Clayton  v.  Adams,  0  T.  R. 
604.  But  if  the  legal  existence  of  the 
husband  is  considered  as  extinguished, 
the  wife  ma}^  contract  as  a  feme  sole. 
Lady  Belknap's  case.  Year  Book,  1  Hen. 
4,  1  a;  Lean  v.  Shutz,  2  W.  Bl.  1195; 
Marsh  v.  Hutchinson,  1  B.  &  P.  231 ;  Ex 
parte  Franks,  7  Bing.  762,  1  M.  »Sc  Scott, 
1 ;  Carrol  v.  Blencow,  4  Esp.  27  ;  Stretton 
V.  Busnach,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  140. 

(m)  In  Pennsylvania  and  South  Caro- 
lina a  wife  may  become  a  sole  trader,  and 
become  liable  as  such,  in  imitation  of  the 
custom  of  London.  Starr  v.  Taylor,  4 
McCord,  413 ;  Newbiggin  v.  Pillans,  2 
Bay,  162  ;  McDowall  v.  Wood,  2  Nott  & 
McC.  242 ;  Burke  v.  Winkle,  2  S.  &  R. 
189;  Jacobs  v.  Featherstone,  6  W.  &  S. 
346.  She  must,  however,  in  order  to 
have  the  privilege  of  contracting  as  a 
feme  sole,  be  technicallv  a  trader.  Mc- 
Daniel  v.  Cornwell,  1  Hill  (S.  C),  428. 
The  privilege  does  not  extend  to  a  woman 
who  is  a  common  carrier.  Ewart  v. 
Nagel,  1  McMull.  50.  Nor  to  one  who 
was  separated  from  her  husband,  and 
supported  herself  by  her  dailj'  labor. 
Robards  v.  Hutson,  3  McCord,  475. 
Keeping  a  shop  as  a  milliner  brings  her 
within  the  privilege.  Surtell  v.  Brails- 
ford,  2  Bay,  333.  But  her  privilege  to 
contract  as  afe7ne  sole  extends  no  further 
than  to  such  contracts  as  are  connected 


with  her  trade.  McDowall  v.  Wood,  2 
Nott  &  McC.  242.  And  see  Wallace  v. 
Rippon,  2  Bay,  112. 

(w)  If  the  husband  is  banished,  then, 
as  we  have  seen,  by  the  laws  of  England 
and  of  this  country,  a  wife  may  contract 
as  a  feme  sole.  Wright  r.  Wright,  2  De- 
saus.  244.  And  the  law  is  the  same 
whether  he  is  banished  for  his  crimes,  or 
has  voluntarily  abandoned  his  wife.  Rliea 
V.  Rhenner,  1  Pet.  105;  Chapman  v. 
Lemon,  11  How.  Pr.  235.  The  voluntary 
absence  of  the  husband,  however,  must 
be  more  than  temporary  in  order  to  have 
this  effect.  Robinson  v.  Reynolds,  1  Aik. 
174 ;  Gregory  v.  Pierce,  4  Met.  478 ;  Com- 
monwealth t'.  Collins,  1  Mass.  116;  Chou- 
teau V.  Merry,  3  Mo.  254.  If  it  amount 
to  absolute  and  complete  desertion,  then 
it  may  be  sufficient.  Cases  supra,  and 
likewise  Ayer  v.  Warren,  47  Me.  217. 
Whether  tlie  imprisonment  of  the  hus- 
band for  life,  or  a  term  of  years,  in  our 
State  prisons,  will  have  tlie  same  effect, 
is  more  doubtful.  See  21  Am.  Jur.  8; 
1  Swift,  Dig.  36;  Cornwall  v.  Hoyt,  7 
Conn.  427.  If  the  husband  is  an  alien, 
and  never  resided  in  this  country,  the 
wife  may  sue  and  be  sued  as  a  feme  sole. 
Kay  V.  Duchess  de  Picnne,  3  Camp.  123; 
Deerly  v.  Mazarine,  1  Salk.  116;  Robin- 
son V.  Reynolds,  1  Aik.  174;  De  Gaillon 
V.  L'Aigle,  1  B.  &  P.  356,  compared  with 
Farrer  v.  Granard,  4  B.  &  P.  80.  But 
this  rule  is  qualified  in  Barden  v.  Kever- 
berg,  2  M.  &  W.  61,  in  which  it  is  held 
that  she  is  responsible  only  if  she  repre- 
sents herself  as  a.  feme  sole,  or  the  i)laintiff 
has  knowledge  of  the  facts. 

(o)  McGrath  v.  Robertson,  1  Desaus. 
445. 


1  Her  defence  of  coercion  should  be  set  up  in  the  pleadings.    Clark  v.  Bayer,  32  Ohio 
St.  299.     See   Handy  r.  Foley,  121   Mass.  259;  Ferguson  y.  Brooks,  67  Me.  251.     A 

407 


*  368  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

sued  jointly,  the  remedy,  by  imprisonment  or  execution,  must 
be  sought  of  the  husband  alone.  ( jt>)  But  if  the  tort  of  the  wife 
alone  be  punishable  by  imprisonment,  this  punishment  falls  on 
her  alone.  If  the  wife  be  sued  jointly  with  her  husband,  for  her 
libel  (and  perhaps  for  other  torts),  the  damages  shall  be  the 
same  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  (g-)  If  the  husband  assumes  to 
be  the  agent  of  the  wife,  and  in  that  capacity  commits  a  fraud,  it 
is  said  that  she  cannot  be  made  liable,  because  she  has  no  power 
to  make  her  husband  her  agent,  (r)  But  this  we  think  may  be 
doubted. 


*368  ♦SECTION   V. 

OP   THE   SEPARATE   ESTATE    OP   A    MARRIED    WOMAN,    AND    OP 
SETTLEMENTS   IN   HER   FAVOR. 

If  the  wife  has  a  separate  estate,  this  is  usually  reached  in 
equity.  Thus,  if  she  join  with  her  husband  in  making  a  promis- 
sory note,  this  separate  estate  is  chargeable  with  it.  (&*)  ^  Perhaps, 
however,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  promise  was  made  with  spe- 
cial reference  to,  or  was  received  on  the  credit  of  her  separate 
estate.  (^)  Our  courts  now  protect  with  great  care  any  separate 
estate  of  the  wife,  and  any  reasonable  agreement  in  her  favor,  (u) 
Nor  will  they  interfere  to  vary  or  discharge  it  but  for  strong 
cause  and  on  certain  evidence,  (v)  Nor  will  the  wife  herself  be 
permitted  to  waive  such  an  agreement  if  it  were  made  after  mar- 


!5 


Ip)  3B1.  Com.  414.  Ikelheimer,  26  Ala.  332;   Collins  v.  Ru- 

(q)  Austin  v.  Wilson,  4  Cush.  273.  dolph,  19  Ala.  G16. 

(r)  Birdseye  y.  Flint,  3  Barb.  500.  (0  Conn    v.    Conn,    1    Md.    Ch.   212; 

(s)  Yale  w.  Dederer,  21  Barb.  286 ;  s.  c.  Cherry    v.    Clements,    10    Humph.    552; 

18  N.  Y.  265 ;  22  N.  Y.  450 ;  68  N.  Y.  .329  ;  Burch  v.  Breckenridge,  16  B.  Mon.  482. 
Bell  V.  Kellar,  18  B.  Mon.  381 ;  Ozley  v.  [u]  See  Stilley  v.  Folger,  14  Ohio,  649. 

\v)  Rogers  v.  Smith,  4  Barr,  93. 

husband  is  liable  in  replevin  for  his  wife's  unlawful  detention  of  chattels  under  a  claim 
of  title  in  herself.     Choen  v.  Porter,  66  Ind.  194. 

1  Contracts  by  a  married  woman  for  necessaries  or  her  separate  estate's  benefit  are 
enforceable  against  it.  Priest  v.  Cone,  51  Vt.  495  ;  as  for  money  borrowed  for  the  avowed 
purpose  of  benefiting  her  estate,  and  her  note  is  received  in  reliance  upon  her  statement, 
although  the  money  was  in  fact  otherwise  applied,  McVey  v.  Cantrell,  70  N.  Y.  295  ; 
see  Dale  v.  Robinson,  51  Vt.  20;  or  for  services  rendered  in  borrowing  money  to 
lift  a  mortgage  from  her  separate  estate,  Patrick  v.  Littell,  36  Ohio  St.  79  ;  or  a  bond 
for  part  of  the  purchase-money  of  her  estate,  Garland  v.  Pamplin,  32  Gratt.  305 ;  but 
not  for  money  lent  to  her  on  an  agreement  that  it  should  be  applied  to  the  use  of  her 
husband  or  his  firm,  Nourse  v.  Henshaw,  123  Mass.  96.  —  She  is  not  liable  as  surety  on  a 
guardian's  bond  without  expressing  an  intention  to  bind  her  separate  estate.  Gos- 
man  v.  Cruger,  69  N.  Y.  87. 

408 


CH.  XVIII.]  MAERIED   WOMEN.  *  369 

riage,  and  obviously  intended  to  benefit  her  children,  (w)  And 
if  the  wife's  debts  are  contracted  before  marriage,  the  remedy 
against  her  separate  estate  is  suspended  during  her  marriage,  (a;) 
But  if  contracted  after  marriage,  they  are  primd facie,  chargeable 
on  her  separate  estate.  (^)  i  It  will  be  seen  in  the  synopsis  at 
the  close  of  the  chapter,  that  the  statutes  of  many  States  contain 
provisions  for  the  security  of  the  wife's  separate  estate. 

Whether  a  wife,  acting  with  her  husband,  may  dispose  of  land 
conveyed  to  trustees  for  her  separate  use,  when  no  power  of  dis- 
position is  given  her,  is  not  certain.  The  better  rule  seems  to  be, 
that  she  may,  if  the  trust  instrument  is  silent,  but  not  if  it  con- 
tain express  prohibitions  or  restrictions,  (z)  After  some 
*  fluctuation  it  seems  that  the  English  courts  incline  to  *369 
permit  a  wife,  with  the  consent  of  the  trustees  and  the 
husband,  to  alienate  funds  or  modify  a  trust  created  for  her 
benefit.  But  it  would  also  seem,  that  in  this  country  the  wife  is 
protected  against  her  own  acts,  and  that  such  a  trust  cannot  be 
discharged  or  changed  unless  by  order  of  court,  (a)  And  if  lands 
so  held  in  trust  are  sold  by  the  husband  under  an  agreement  to 
purchase  with  the  proceeds  other  lands  to  be  held  under  the  same 
trust,  the  lands  so  purchased  by  him  are  protected  from  his  cred- 
itors. (5)  But  where,  by  such  a  trust,  the  wife  may  dispose  of 
the  fund,  for  ever,  but  dies  without  disposal,  it  goes  to  her  hus- 
band, (e)  Nor  can  a  second  husband  interfere  with  a  trust  created 
by  a  first  husband,  (c?)     It  has  however  been  held,  on  grounds 

(w)  Tenner  v.  Taylor,  1  Sim.  169.  is  held  in  Connecticut,  Imlay  v.  Hunting- 

(x)  Vanderheyden      v.      Mallory,      1  ton,   20   Conn.   146,   175.      In   Alabama, 

Comst.  452.      See  Dickson  v.  Miller,  11  Bradford  v.  Greenway,  17  Ala.  797.     In 

Sm.  &  M.  594.  Korth  Carolina,  Harris  v.  Harris,  7  Ired. 

(y)   Greenoughy.  Wigginton,  2  Greene  Eq.  Ill,  and  in  Virginia,  Hume  v.  Hord, 

(la.),  435 ;  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  7  Paige,  5  Gratt.  374. 
112.  (a)  Leggett  v.  Perkins,  2  Comst.  297; 

(z)  So  held  in  New  York,  in  Jaques  v.  L'Amoureux  v.  Van  Rensselaer,  1  Barb. 

Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  17  Johns.  Ch.  34;   Rogers  i-.  Ludlow,- 3  Sandf.  Ch. 

548.      In  Maryland,  in  5  Md.  219  ;  Tarr  104 ;    Noyes  v.  Blakeman,  2    Seld.  567 ; 

V.  Williams,  4  Md.  Ch.  68 ;  Williams  v.  Cruger  v.  Jones,  18  Barb.  467.     The  Su- 

Donaldson,   id.    414.      In    Tennessee,   in  prerne  Court  of  the  United  States  have 

Marshall   v.    Stephens,   8   Humph.   159 ;  held  that  a  court  of  equity  should  pro- 

Litton   V.   Baldwin,  id.    209.      In   South  tect  such  a  trust  for  the  collateral  rela- 

Carolina,  Nix  v.  Bradley,  6  Rich.  Eq.  53 ;  tives,  if  intended  for  their  benefit.    Neves 

Adams  v.  Mackey,  id.  75.      In  Georgia,  v.  Scott,  9  How.  196. 
Wylly  V.  Collins,  9  Ga.  228.      In  Missis-  (h)  Barnett  v.  Goings,  8  Blackf.  284. 

sippi,  Doty  v.  Mitchell,  9  Sm.  &  M.  435.  (r)  Brown  v.  Brown,  6  Humph.  127; 

And  in  Rhode  Island,  Metcalf  r.  Cooke,  2  Wilkinson  v.  Wright,  6  B.  Mon.  576.   ^ 
R.  1.355.     That  she  cannot  make  such  (d)  Cole   v.  O'Neill,  3  Md.  Ch.  1/4; 

disposition  unless  the  power  be  given  her,  Robert  v.  West,  15  Ga.  122. 

1  ConUn  V.  Cantrell,  64  N.  Y.  217. 

409 


370  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [I 


lOOK    I. 


which  seem  to  us  doubtful,  that  where  a  wife  has  power  to  dis- 
pose of  lands  under  a  trust,  and  executes  that  power  by  selling 
them,  and  with  the  proceeds  buys  other  lands,  these  other  lands 
do  not  come  under  the  original  trust,  and  become  subject  to  the 
original  power,  (e)  If  she  has  the  power  to  sell,  she  may  make 
a  valid  contract  to  sell.  (/) 

A  married  woman  may  contract  with  her  husband,  for  a  settle- 
ment for  her  benefit,  in  good  faith,  and  for  a  valuable  considera- 
tion, and  courts  of  equity  will  sustain  it,  and  even  do  what  may 
be  necessary  to  complete  such  a  contract,  if  interrupted  by  death 
or  accident.  (^)  If  made  in  good  faith  in  pursuance  of  an  ante- 
nuptial agreement,  it  seems  that  this  is  valid,  without  other  consid- 
eration than  the  marriage,  that  being  a  good  and  sufficient 
*  370  one.  (Ji)  But  if  wholly  voluntary,  it  is  *  void  against 
existing  creditors,  although  made  in  good  faith,  but  not 
against  subsequent  creditors,  (i)  ^ 

To  any  contract  of  a  third  person  for  the  benefit  of  a  wife, 
there  must  be  a  distinct  assent  of  the  husband  ;  but  this  may  be 
proved  by  implication,  as  by  depositing  money  to  her  credit  in  a 
bank,  and  giving  the  deposit-book  to  her  with  the  knowledge  of 
the  husband.  (/) 

In  New  York,  the  statute  requirements  as  to  making  a  will,  are 
held  not  to  determine  the  age  at  which  a  married  woman,  with 
power  to  make  a  will,  may  exercise  that  power.  (Jc)  And  the 
same  rule  would  probably  be  adopted  elsewhere. 

Formerly,  the  rights  which  the  husband  acquired  over  the 
property  of  his  wife  by  his  marriage,  were  not  only  carefully 
protected,  but  any  disposition  of  her  property  by  the  wife,  made 
before  marriage,  in  derogation  of  his  rights,  was  held  to  be  void 

(p)  Newlin   V.   Freeman,  4  Ired.  Eq.  bert  v.  Winn,  5  Md.  QQ.     See  also,  in  re- 

312.  lation  to  post-nuptial  settlements,  Kinnard 

(  f)  Van  Allen  v.  Humphrey,  15  Barb.  v.  Daniel,  13   B.  Mon.  496 ;   Thomson  v. 

555."  Dougherty,  12  S.  &  R.  448 ;  Magniac  v. 

{(/)  Livingston  I'.  Livingston,  2  Johns.  Thompson,  1  Baldw.  344;   Duffy  v.  Ins. 

Ch.'  537;   Coates   v    Gealach,  44  Penn.  Co.  8  W.  &  S.  413;  Sexton  v.  Wiieaton.B 

St.  43.  Wheat.  229 ;  Picquet  v.  Swan,  4  Mason, 

(/()   Reade  v.  Livingston,  3  Johns.  Ch.  443. 
481.  (  /)  risk  V.  Cushman,  6  Cush.  20. 

(0  Borst  V.  Corey,  16  Barb.  136 ;  Al-  (k)  Strong  v.  Wilkin,  1  Barb.  Ch.  9. 

1  But  a  voluntary  settlement  by  a  husband  upon  his  wife  directly,  without 
impairing  the  claims  of  existing  creditors,  is  valid,  although  reserving  a  power  of 
revocation,  or  appointment  to  other  uses,  Jones  v.  Clifton,  101  U.  S.  225  ;  and  a  deed 
of  land,  which  is  but  a  i-easonahlc  provision  for  her,  by  a  hust)and  to  his  wife,  in  con- 
sider;ition  of  love  and  affection,  is  valid  as  against  an  heir,  Majors  v.  Everton,  89  111. 
56  ;  Ilorder  v.  llorder,  23  Kan.  391. 

410 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  370 

on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  fraud  upon  him.  Doubtless  there 
may  now  be  such  disposition  of  property  by  the  wife,  in  actual 
fraud  of  the  husband,  (kk')  But,  in  this  country,  nothing  less 
than  such  a  fraud,  certainly  proved,  would  be  permitted  by  our 
courts  to  invalidate  the  acts  of  an  unmarried  woman,  in  favor  of 
a  husband  subsequently  married.  We  give  in  the  note  some 
authorities  on  this  subject.  (I) 

Again  we  must  refer  to  the  synopsis  of  the  statutes  concerning 
married  women,  which  follows  immediately.  The  reader  will  also 
find  the  cases  cited  in  this  note  bearing  on  this  question.  {II) 
The  law  on  this  interesting  subject  must  be  regarded  however 
as  still  in  a  transition  condition,  and  changes  in  it  are  quite 
frequent. 

(H)  Duncan's  Appeal,  43   Penn.   St.  (U)  Huff  v.  Wright,  39  Ga.  41 ;  Rich- 

67  ;  Belt  v.  Ferguson,  3  Grant,  289.  ardson  v.  Stodder,  100  Mass.  528 ;  Marsh 

(/)  St.  George  v.  Wake,  1  Myl.  &  K.  v.  Marsh,  43  Ala.  677 ;  Corning  v.  Lewis, 

610;   Bill  V.  Cureton,  2  Myl.  &  K.  503;  54  Barb.  51 ;  Demott  r.  McMuUen,  8  Abb. 

Strathmore  v.  Bowes,  2  Bro.  345;  s.  c.  1  Pr.  (n.  s.)  335;   Smith  v.  Allen,  1  Lans. 

Ves.  Jun.  22  ;  Tucker  v.  Andrews,  13  Me.  101 ;  Boyles'  Estate,  1  Tuck.  4;  Walker 

124;  Jordan  v.  Black,  Meigs,  142;  Ram-  t'.  Walker,  9  Wall.  743;  Melley  v.  Casey, 

say  V.  Joyce,  1  McMuU.  Eq.  236*  Logan  99  Mass.  241;  Guiick  y.  Grover,  4  Vroom, 

V.  Simmons,  3  Ired.  Eq.  487.  463;  Dutton  v.  Dutton,  30  Ind.  452. 

411 


*371  THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 


SYNOPSIS 

Of  the  Statutes  in  the  different  States  and  Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia 
concerning  the  Rights  and  Powers  of  Married  Woinen,  and  of  the  Husband  in 
relation  to  her  Property. 

Tn  Alabama,  the  wife's  separate  estate  is  alone  liable  for  antenuptial  debts, 
Code  1876,  §2704.  All  her  property  held  before,  or  acquired  after,  marriage 
is  secured  to  her  separate  use,  free  from  the  husband's  debts,  §  2705.  The 
husband  is  her  trustee,  and  entitled  to  the  profits,  §  2706.  Husband  and  wife 
may  jointly  sell  and  convey  her  estate  in  an  instrument  attested  by  two  wit- 
nesses, §  2707,  or  acknowledged  in  tlie  usual  manner,  §  2708.  The  proceeds  of 
such  a  sale  are  her  separate  estate,  which  the  husband  may  use  for  her  benefit. 
They  cannot  contract  with  each  other  to  sell  any  property,  §  2709.  He  may 
receive  property  coming  to  her,  §  2710.  Her  estate  is  liable  for  necessai'ies  for 
the  family,  §  2711.  If  a  suit  therefor  is  brought  against  a  husband,  and  exe- 
cution is  not  satisfied,  her  separate  estate  may  be  sold  by  order  of  court,  §  2712. 
She  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will,  §2713.  If  the  husband  is  unfit  to 
manage  her  estate  (or  his  estate,  or  abandons  her,  or  has  no  property  except 
what  is  exempt  from  execution),  she  may  be  vested  with  the  powers  of  a  feme 
sole,  §§  2719,  2728,  2729.  If  the  husband  is  insane,  she  may  convey  her  real 
estate  as  if  unmarried,  the  deed  to  be  attested  by  two  disinterested  witnesses, 
Acts  of  1869-70,  p.  187.  Her  estate  is  liable  for  reasonable  attorney's  fees 
for  its  benefit.  Acts  of  1880-81,  p.  36.  -^2,000  worth  of  real  estate,  including 
the  homestead,  and  $1,000  worth  of  personal  estate,  ai"e  exempted  from  exe- 
cution, §  2820. 

In  Arizona,  all  of  a  mai'ried  woman's  property  owned  before  marriage  and 
acquired  thereafter  by  gift,  devise,  bequest,  or  descent,  is  her  separate  prop- 
erty. Compiled  Laws  of  1877,  p.  328,  §  1,  of  which,  if  of  the  age  of  twenty-one 
years,  she  has  the  sole  control,  and  may  convey  without  the  husband's  join- 
der, as  fully  as  if  unmarried,  p.  332,  §  1.  All  after-acquired  property,  except 
as  above,  is  common  property,  p.  328,  §  2.  Such  separate  estate  must  be  in- 
ventoried and  recorded  to  exempt  it  from  the  husband's  debts,  p.  328,  §§3,  4, 
5.  During  the  wife's  nonage  the  husband  shall  control  her  separate  property, 
but  may  not  convey  it  except  by  a  writing  signed  by  her  with  certain  formalities, 
p.  328,  §  6.  If  she  sells  for  his  benefit  or  he  uses  the  proceeds  with  her  written 
consent,  it  is  a  gift  to  him,  p.  328,  §  7.  If  the  husband  mismanages,  a  trustee 
may  be  appointed,  p.  328,  §  8.  The  husband  has  sole  charge  of  the  common 
property,  which  includes  the  profits  of  her  estate,  unless  otherwise  provided  by 
the  terms  of  the  gift  to  her,  p.  329,  §  9.  She  takes  no  dower,  p.  329,  §  10. 
One  half  of  the  common  pi-operty  at  death  gops  to  the  survivor,  and  the  other 
half  to  the  other's  issue,  subject  to  debts  ;  if  no  issue,  the  whole  to  the  sur- 
vivor so  subject,  p.  329,  §  11.  On  divorce,  tiie  common  property  is  equally 
divided,  except  for  adultery  and  extreme  cruelty,  in  which  cases  the  court  has 
a  discretion  towards  the  guilty  party,  p.  329,  §  12.  Her  separate  property  con- 
tinues liable  for  her  debts  after  marriage,  p.  329,  §  13.  Married  women  may 
carry  on  business  on  complying  with  certain  regulations,  pp.  330,  331,  §§  24, 
25,  26,  in  doing  which  she  must  be  responsible  for  her  children's  maintenance, 
p.  331,  §  27;  and  her  husband,  unless  he  consents  in  writing,  will  not  be  re- 
sponsible for  her  trade  debts,  p.  331,  §  29.  She  may  insure  her  husband's 
life,  free  from  his  debts,  unless  the  premium  exceeds  <$300,  payable  to  hei'self, 
p.  332,  §  32,  or  payable  to  her  children  or  guardian,  §  33. 

412 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  371 

In  Arkansas,  the  before  or  after  acquired  real  or  personal  property  of  a 
married  woman  is  her  separate  estate,  free  from  her  husband's  debts,  and  she 
may  convey  or  dispose  of  it  by  will  as  if  unmarried.  Const,  of  lS7i,  Art.  9, 
§  7.  But  her  property  is  liable  for  his  debts  contracted  by  him  as  her  agent 
for  the  support  of  herself  and  children.  Laws  of  1873,  p.  382,  §2.  She  may 
contract  with  reference  to  her  property,  do  business  and  perform  any  services 
on  her  sole  account,  and  her  earnings  are  her  own,  and  she  alone  may  sue  or 
be  sued  with  reference  thereto,  §  3.  Her  husband  is  not  liable  on  any  of  her 
contracts,  §  4.  The  husband  cannot  bind  a  child  to  service,  dispose  of  it,  or 
appoint  a  testamentary  guardian  therefor,  without  the  mother's  consent,  if 
living,  §  7.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued  as  if  unmarried,  §  9.  She  must  have 
her  real  estate  recorded  in  her  name  in  her  county,  §  10.  Contracts  of  service 
for  more  than  a  month  must  be  in  writing  and  approved  by  the  husband.  Laws 
of  1875,  p.  230,  §  2. 

In  California,  a  married  woman,  either  personally  or  by  agent,  independ- 
ently of  her  husband,  may  transfer  her  shares  of  stock,  receive  the  dividends 
and  grant  proxies  thereon,  as  if  unmarried.  Code  of  1872,  §325.  She  may 
hold  shares  in  homestead,  and  loan  and  savings  corporations,  bought  with  her 
own  earnings  and  those  of  her  children,  or  with  property  bequeathed  or  given 
to  her  by  others  than  her  husband.  §§  561,  575.  Her  conveyance  of  her  real 
estate  and  her  power  of  attorney  given  for  that  purpose  are  ineffective  unless 
acknowledged  by  her,  apart  from  her  husband,  to  have  been  made  and  given 
freely,  when  they  have  the  same  effect  as  if  slie  were  unmarried,  §§  1093,  1094, 
1186,  1187.  She  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will  as  if  unmarried,  §  1273. 
She  may  sue  or  be  sued  alone  concerning  her  estate  or  homestead,  when  the 
action  is  between  herself  and  husband,  or  when  living  apart  from  her  husband 
by  reason  of  his  desertion  or  their  mutual  agreement  in  writing,  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure  of  1872,  §370.  If  the  husband  and  wife  are  sued  together,  she  may 
defend  in  her  own  right  and  for  him  also  if  he  neglect  so  to  do,  §  371.  She 
may  become  a  sole  trader  on  due  notice  and  petition  to  the  court,  §§  1811, 
1812,  1813.  She  may  invest  therein  of  the  community  or  her  husband's 
separate  property  not  exceeding  ^500,  §  1814.  On  leave  of  court  she  may 
carry  on  the  business  specified  in  her  own  name,  and  the  investments  and 
profits  belong  to  her,  free  from  the  husband's  debts,  and  she  has  the  same 
rights  and  liabilities  as  if  unmarried,  §  1819.  Slie  is  also  liable,  as  such 
trader,  for  the  maintenance  of  her  minor  children,  and  her  husband  is  not 
liable  for  her  debts  unless  he  so  consents  in  writing,  §§  1820,  1821. 

In  Colorado,  all  of  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage,  with  its 
profits,  and  all  received  from  any  source  save  her  husband,  including  however 
ornaments,  money,  and  apparel  from  him,  is  her  separate  property,  free  from 
his  debts  or  disposal.  General  Laws  of  1877,  §  1747.  She  may  dispose  of  per- 
sonal estate  as  if  unmarried,  §  1748.  She  may  sue  or  be  sued  alone  touching 
her  person,  property,  or  reputation,  §  1749.  She  may  dispose  by  will  of  one 
half  of  her  property  only  away  from  lier  husband,  unless  he  consents  in  writ- 
ing, §  1750.  She  may  trade  or  labor  on  her  sole  account,  and  her  earnings 
and  profits  are  her  own  to  use  or  invest  ;  she  may  sue  or  be  sued  touching  the 
same,  and  the  same  are  liable  to  execution,  §  1752.  Marriage  contracts  are 
valid,  §1753.  The  husband  is  liable  for  her  antenuptial  debts  only  to  tlie 
extent  of  property,  or  its  proceeds,  derived  from  her,  lier  death  not  freeing 
him  from  such  liability,  §§  1754,  1755.  When  a  woman,  in  debt  and  owning 
land,  marries,  a  joint  judgment  for  the  same  against  husband  and  wife  is  to  be 
levied  on  such  land  alone,  §  1756.  The  husband's  sole  deed  can  convey  no 
part  of  the  wife's  land,  §  1757.  She  may  give  any  written  instrument  to  pay 
money,  and  if  for  her  estate's  benefit,  she  may  be  sued  thereon,  the  judgment 
be  a  lien  on  her  land,  which  may  be  levied  on  therefor,  §  1758.  She  may  sell 
and  convey  her  propertv,  sue  and  be  sued,  and  contract  in  every  way  on  her 
sole  liability,  as  if  unmarried,  §§  1759,  1761.  The  covenants  of  a  deed  do  not 
bind  her,  §  183.  She  may  be  a  special  partner  with  her  husband  or  another, 
and  may  so  contract  as  if  unmarried,  and  in  relation  to  partnership  matters 

413 


*  372  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

may  be  a  witness  for  or  against  the  husband,  §  1993.  She  may  with  her 
husband  adopt  a  cliild,  §  2.  Her  husband  must  join  or  be  joined  in  suits, 
unless  relating  to  her  separate  estate  or  between  themselves,  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure  of  1877,  §  6.     If  sued  together  she  may  defend  herself,  §  7. 

In  Connecticut,  a  married  woman's  real  estate,  the  result  of  her  labor, 
and  the  proceeds  of  its  sale,  if  invested  in  her  name  or  that  of  her  trustee,  is 
her  separate  property  ;  and  she  may  convey  it,  as  if  unmarried,  by  leave  of 
court,  if  abandoned  for  three  years  by  her  liusband.  Gen.  Sts.  of  Conn,  of 
1875,  Tit.  14,  c.  2,  §§  1,  2.  All  the  before  and  after  acquired  personal  property 
of  a  woman,  married  since  June  22,  1849,  and  the  proceeds  of  its  sale,  are  held 
in  trust  by  the  husband  to  enjoy  the  income  subject  to  her  and  the  minor 
children's  support,  to  apply  such  part  of  the  principal  as  may  be  necessary  for 
her  support,  or  otherwise  with  her  written  consent  ;  on  his  death  the  rest  to 
be  transferred  to  her,  if  living,  otherwise  to  her  legatees  or  representatives. 
A  portion  of  such  trust  property,  equivalent  to  any  of  her  antenuptial  debts 
paid  by  him,  is  to  vest  in  him  absolutely,  §  3.  The  husband  cannot  sell  her 
property,  unless  she,  if  living,  or  her  representatives  or  the  guardians  of  the 
minor  children,  consent  in  writing,  and  all  reinvestments  must  be  in  his  name 
as  trustee,  §  4.  As  trustee  he  is  accountable  to  the  probate  court,  §  5.  If  aban- 
doned her  property  vests  in  her  ;  and  she  may,  during  the  abandonment,  sue 
and  be  sued,  and  do  business  as  if  unmarried,  §  6.  She  may  insure  her  hus- 
band for  the  benefit  of  herself  and  children,  up  to  $300  premium.  Payment  to 
her  of  money  lent  or  deposited  by  her  or  for  personal  services,  is  as  valid  as  if 
she  were  unmarried,  §  8.  If  the  husband  is  insane,  she  may,  by  leave  of  the 
probate  court,  convey  her  land  as  if  unmarried.  Tit.  4,  c.  5,  §  17.  Her  convey- 
ance of  real  estate,  to  be  effectual,  must  be  executed  jointly  with  the  husband, 
and  duly  acknowledged  and  recorded,  and  his  conveyance  of  the  same  alone  is 
invalid.  Tit.  18,  c.  6,  §  10.  On  her  death,  intestate,  the  husband,  if  without 
curtesy,  has  a  lien  on  her  real  estate  for  improvements  made  by  him  with  her 
assent,  or  for  the  mutual  benefit,  Tit.  18,  c.  7,  §  15.  She  may  be  sued  as  if 
unmarried  upon  any  antenuptial  cause  of  action,  and  upon  any  postnuptial 
contract  made  on  her  personal  credit  for  the  benefit  of  herself,  her  family,  or 
her  estate,  and  for  any  tort,  imless  coerced  by  the  husband,  and  her  property 
attached  and  levied  upon.  Tit.  19,  c.  5,  §  9  ;  and  in  like  manner,  on  a  joint 
contract  with  the  husband,  for  the  benefit  of  her  or  the  joint  estate,  §  10. 
Likewise  she  may  sue,  if  doing  business,  upon  any  right  accruing  therefrom, 
§  11.  In  a  civil  action  by  or  against  her,  the  husband  may  be  joined,  but 
judgment  is  to  be  entered  only  in  favor  of  or  against  the  one  for  or  against 
whom  a  cause  of  action  is  found,  and  costs  taxed  for  or  against  that  one  only, 
§  12.  In  all  marriages  contracted  after  March  16,  1877,  neither  husband  nor 
wife  acquires  any  rights  in  any  before  or  after  acquired  property  of  the  other 
except  as  survivor.  She  has  her  earnings,  may  contract  with  third  persons, 
and  convey  her  property,  real  and  personal,  as  if  unmarried.  Her  property  is 
liable  for  her  debts,  but  not  for  the  husband's,  Acts  of  1877,  c.  114,. §  1-  All 
purchases  of  either  husband  or  wife  are  j^resumed,  in  the  absence  of  notice,  to 
be  on  his  or  her  private  account;  but  both  are  liable  if  for  the  family  support, 
the  joint  benefit,  her  reasonable  apparel,  or  support  while  abandoned  by  him. 
She  shall  be  indemnified  by  him  for  what  she  may  have  expended  for  the 
family  support  if  he  has  proi^erty,  §2.  If  married  before  ]\Iarch  10,  1877, 
any  husband  and  wife  may  agree  in  writing  to  abandon  all  existing  and  mu- 
tual rights  in  each  other's  property,  and  when  recorded,  this  act  shall  apply 
to  such  marriage  as  well,  §  5.  A  married  woman,  so  long  as  a  conservator 
is  over  her  husband,  may  exercise  every  right  touching  her,  estate  as  if  un- 
married, Acts  of  1881,  c.  149.  The  conservator  of  a  married  woman  whose 
husband  is  capable  of  taking  care  of  her  has  charge  only  of  her  separate 
estate,  not  of  her  person  or  other  estate  ;  but  if  the  husband  has  aban- 
doned her,  of  her  person  and  estate  also  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  Acts  of 
1882,  c.  6,  §1. 

In  Dakota,  a  married  woman  must  support  her  husband  out  of  her  separ- 

414 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  .373 

ate  estate,  when  he  has  none,  has  not  deserted  her,  and  is  too  infirm  to 
support  himself,  Code  of  1877,  §  77.  She  may  contract  with  her  husband  or 
a  third  person,  as  if  unmarried,  subject  in  transactions  with  lier  husband  to 
tlie  rules  of  trusts,  §  79:  She  may  hold  property  with  her  husband,  jointly  or 
in  common,  may  convey  her  property  without  his  consent,  and  may  record"  an 
inventory  of  the  same  duly  acknowledged,  §  82.  She  is  not  answerable  for 
his  acts,  and  has  no  dower.  Her  earnings  and  other  accumulations  and  her 
minor  children's  earnings,  while  apart  from  her  husband,  are  her  separate 
property,  which  is  alone  liable  for  her  debts,  contracted  before  or  after  mar- 
riage, §  83.  She  is  not  liable  for  necessaries,  if  he  neglects,  unless  she 
abandons  him,  but  on  an  agreement  of  separation  she  is  liable  for  her  support, 
unless  expressly  stipulated,  §§  84,  85.  If  of  age,  she  may  execute  a  power 
without  her  husband's  concurrence,  unless  its  terms  prevent;  but  it  nnist  be 
acknowledged,  §§  315,  316.  A  general  power  to  dispose,  without  his  concur- 
rence, of  a  present  or  future  estate  in  land  given  her  in  fee,  is  valid,  §  335, 
and  so  of  a  special  power  to  so  dispose  of  any  less  estate,  §  3i2.  She  may 
dispose  by  will  of  all  her  property,  §  684.  If  she  sues  or  is  sued,  the  action 
proceeds  in  all  respects  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  §  77;  and  judgment  is 
entered  and  enforced  in  like  manner  against  her  property  alone,  §  292.  Any 
instrument  may  be  executed  and  acknowledged  by  a  married  woman  as  if 
unmarried,  Laws  of  1881,  c.  2,  §  2. 

In  Delaware,  a  married  woman,  her  husband  joining,  may  convey  her  land, 
but  must  acknowledge  the  same  apart  from  her  husband,  Code  of  1874,  pp. 
478,  501,  §§  1469,  1614.  Her  real  estate,  mortgages,  stocks,  and  silver  plate 
owned  before  and  acquired  after  marriage  remain  her  separate  property 
subject  to  her  antenuptial  debts,  but  not  subject  to  her  husband's  disposition, 
or  his  debts  or  contracts.  She  may  not  convey  her  separate  property,  nor 
dispose  of  the  proiits  without  her  husband's  consent  under  seal.  The  husband 
is  entitled  to  curtesy,  p.  478.  She  may  reinvest,  with  his  consent,  a  mortgage 
debt  paid  to  her,  or  tlie  proceeds  of  property  so  sold  in  other  real  estate  or 
stocks  or  mortgages,  the  same  to  remain  her  separate  property,  p.  478.  If  the 
husband  fails  to  support  her  while  living  apart  from  him,  she  is  entitled  to  her 
property,  if  distinguishable  from  his,  free  of  his  debts,  and  she  may  sue  and  be 
sued  and  contract  about  it.  If  living  apart  without  his  default,  he  is  not,  but 
otherwise  is,  liable  for  her  debts ;  when  they  again  cohabit,  he  becomes  liable 
for  all  her  debts  contracted  during  the  separation,  p.  479.  A  judgment  for 
antenuptial  debts  may  be  recovered  against  her  alone,  p.  479,  §  2.  She  may 
receive  her  wages  for'labor  not  for  her  family,  sue  therefor  in  her  own  name, 
hold  against  all,  including  the  husband,  and  deposit  sul^ject  to  her  sole  right  to 
withdraw  without  the  husband's  consent,  §  3.  She  may  sue  or  be  sued  touch- 
ing her  separate  property,  as  if  unmarried;  but  he  cannot  sue  alone  respecting 
it,  although  she  may  join  him  in  her  suits.  She  may  make  contracts  and  sue 
and  be  sued  thereon  as  if  unmarried,  §  4.  She  may,  if  twenty-one  years  of 
age,  dispose  of  her  property  by  will;  but  if  intestate  it  goes  to  her  heirs 
subject  to  curtesy.  Ante-marriage  settlements  may  be  made  to  define  mar- 
riage rights  and  in  case  of  descent.  If  she  dies  without  issue  the  husband 
has  a  life  estate  in  one-half  of  her  real  estate  after  payment  of  her  debts,  §  5 
as  amended.  Acts  of  1875,  c.  165.  She  m.ay  release  to  the  husband  the  control 
of  her  property  and  the  income  for  the  mutual  benefit,  and  in  writing  revoke 
it,  pp.  479,  480,  Act  of  1873.  All  before  and  after  acquired  property  other 
than  from  her  husband  is  her  separate  property,  and  the  profits  thereof  are 
subject  to  neither  his  disposal,  nor  debts.  Laws  of  1875,  p.  289,  §  1.  A  married 
woman  may,  as  if  unmarried,  buy  real  estate  and  secure  the  purchase-money 
by  any  appropriate  instrument  with  a  warrant  of  attorney,  upon  which  the 
husband  is  not  liable  unless  a  party  thereto,  §  3. 

In  Florida,  all  the  property' of  a  married  woman  owned  before  or  ac- 
quired after  marriage  is  her  separate  estate,  and  not  liable  for  the  husband's 
debts,  McClellan's  Digest,  c.  150,  §  1.  The  rights  of  husband  and  wife,  de- 
rived under  the  Spanish  law,  when  in  force,  remain  the  same,  subject  to  ior- 

415 


*  373  THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

malities  of  conveyance,  §  2.  Her  separate  estate,  both  that  owned  before  and 
acquired  after  marriage,  is  the  husband's,  §§  3,  4.  She  cannot  sue  him  for  the 
])iolits,  nor  can  he  charge  for  his  care,  §  5.  Her  property  can  only  be  conveyed 
jointly  with  the  Imsband  with  due  formabties,  §  6.  Her  estate  is  alone  bable 
for  her  antenuptial  debts,  §  7.  Her  estate  must  be  inventoried  and  recorded 
to  be  free  from  liability  for  his  debts,  —  any  omission  will,  however,  confer  no 
rights  upon  the  husband,  §  8.  A  married  woman  may  convey  her  real  estate 
as  if  unmarried  if  the  husband  joins,  if  due  formalities  are  observed,  and  if  she 
privily  acknowledges  that  her  act  is  free,  §  9.  All  former  conveyances  by  a 
married  woman  with  husband's  joinder,  made  valid,  §  10.  She  may  con- 
vey her  estate  or  release  dower  by  attorney,  if  the  power  be  executed  in  the 
presence  of  two  witnesses,  duly  acknowledged  and  recorded,  and  the  husband 
joins,  §  11.  A  married  woman  may,  after  due  proceedings  had,  be  licensed 
by  the  court  to  become  a  free  dealer  and  to  manage  her  own  estate,  sue  and  be 
sued,  and  contract  in  all  respects  as  if  unmarried,  §§  13,  14,  15.  A  married 
woman  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will  as  if  unmarried,  §  16. 

In  Georgia,  all  the  property  of  the  wife,  at  the  marriage  or  after  acquired, 
remains  her  separate  property,  liable  for  her  debts  only,  Code  of  1882,  §§  1753, 
1754.  When  separate  from  her  husband,  her  own  and  her  children's  acquisi- 
tions vest  in  her;  and  if  she  dies  intestate  they  go  to  her  children,  failing  which, 
to  her  next  of  kin,  §  1756.  The  husband  is  liable  for  necessaries,  unless  she 
leaves  him  without  provocation,  when  notice  relieves  him,  §  1757.  She  may 
with  her  husband's  consent  become  a  public  trader,  and  may  contract,  sue  and 
be  sued,  as  if  unmarried,  and  tlie  profits  are  her  own,  §  1760.  When  the  hus- 
band or  wife  dies  without  issue,  the  survivor  is  the  sole  heir;  but  if  she  dies 
intestate  leaving  children,  the  children  and  the  husband  share  alike,  §§  1761, 
1702.  She  may  deposit  of  her  own  or  her  children's  earnings  up  to  ^2000,  in 
any  savings  bank  of  the  State  subject  to  her  control  as  if  unmarried,  §  1772. 
Her  paraphernalia,  consisting  of  her  own  and  her  children's  apparel,  her 
watch,  suitable  ornaments  and  useful  personal  articles,  is  not  subject  to  her 
husband's  debts  or  contracts,  §  1773.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued  alone  when 
the  action  concerns  her  separate  property,  is  between  her  husband  and  herself, 
and  when  she  is  separated  from  him,  §  1774.  The  wife  as  to  her  separate 
estate  may  act  as  if  unmarried,  but  must  comply  with  every  restriction  of  the 
marriage  contract.  She  cannot  bind  it  by  suretyship  or  by  assuming  her  hus- 
band's debts;  and  any  sale  of  it  to  her  husband's  creditor  to  extinguish  his 
debt  is  void,  §  1783.  Her  contract  of  sale  of  her  separate  estate  with  her  hus- 
band or  trustee  is  invalid  unless  by  leave  of  county  court,  §  1785.  A  loan  may 
be  made  to  her  with  the  consent  of  the  husband,  who  is  liable  for,  but  has  no 
control  over  it,  to  be  used  strictly  for  the  proposed  purpose,  on  penalty  of  con- 
version, §§  2134,  2135.  She  may  make  a  will,  where  power  so  to  do  is  reserved 
in  the  creation  of  her  estate  or  by  marriage  contract,  where,  with  an  estate 
absolute  or  in  expectancy,  the  husband  consents  thereto,  where  in  execution  of 
a  vested  power,  and  where,  if  abandoned  or  divorced,  she  controls  her  earnings 
as  if  unmarried,  §  2410.  Prescription  does  not  run  against  hei-.  §  2686,  nor  the 
Statute  of  Limitations,  §  2926,  unless  attaching  before  marriage,  §  2927. 

In  Idaho,  all  the  property  of  a  wife,  owned  before  or  acquired  after  mar- 
riage by  gift,  bequest,  devise,  or  descent,  is  her  separate  property.  Revised 
Laws  of  1874  and  1875,  p.  034,  §  1.  All  other  acquired  property  is  common, 
§  2.  Her  separate  estate  must  be  inventoried  and  recorded,  upon  which  it 
will  be  free  of  his  debts,  §§  3,  4,  5.  The  husband  shall  manage  it,  but  no 
conveyance  or  lien  is  effective  unless  in  writing,  signed  by  both,  and  acknowl- 
edged by  her  apart  from  him,  §  0.  Any  sale  by  her  for  the  husband's  benefit 
or  his  use  of  such  proceeds  with  her  written  consent,  is  an  irrevocable  gift  to 
him,  §  7.  If  he  mismanages,  a  trustee  may  be  appointed  by  and  subject  to  the 
court  to  pay  over  the  profits  as  directed,  §  8.  The  husband  controls  the  com- 
mon property,  including  profits  of  her  property,  unless  the  latter  by  express 
provision  are  to  be  applied  to  her  use,  when  they  are  not  liable  for  his  debts, 
§  9.     Neither  curtesy  nor  dower  is  allowed,  §  10.     On  divorce,  except  for  adul- 

416 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  374 

tery  or  some  cruelty,  the  common  property  is  to  be  equally  divided,  otherwise 
the  Ruilty  party  will  have  what  the  court  allows,  §  12.  Her  property  alone  is 
liable  for  antenuptial  debts,  §  13.  In  all  marriages  subsecpient  to  Januaiy  G, 
1875,  and  in  prior  marriages,  as  regards  acquisitions  subsequent  thereto,  mu- 
tual rights  are  governed  by  this  act,  unless  in  conflict  with  marriage  contracts, 
§§  14,  15.  If  the  wife  dies,  the  common  property  is  the  husband's,  if  he  has 
not  abandoned  her,  otherwise  she  may  dispose  of  one  half  by  will,  failing 
which  it  goes  to  her  other  heirs.  When  the  husband  dies,  one  half  of  the 
same  goes  to  her,  and  the  other  half  may  be  disposed  of  by  his  will,  failing 
which,  to  his  descendants,  if  any,  subject  to  his  debts,  family  allowance,  and 
expenses.  Laws  of  1879,  p.  50.  She  may  sue  or  be  sued  about  her  property  or 
homestead,  or  if  deserted,  or  having  agreed  in  writing  to  live  apart  from  her 
husband,  General  Laws  of  1880-81,  p.  35,  §  185.  When  sued  together,  she  may 
defend  in  her  right  and  for  him,  if  he  neglect,  §  18G.  All  her  property  and  its 
profits,  with  her  personal  earnings,  are  exempt  from  execution  against  her 
husband,  p.  98,  §  1:39.  A  married  woman  may  become  a  sole  trader  by  leave 
of  court,  on  due  proceedings  had,  p.  200,  §§  885-891.  She  must  make  oath 
of  her  purpose  to  support  herself  and  dependants,  and  not  to  defiaud  creditors, 
and  that  no  more  than  $500  of  her  capital  came  from  the  husband,  §  892;  she 
may  then  carry  on  business  as  if  unmarried,  is  liable  for  her  minor  children's 
maintenance,  and  her  husband,  unless  giving  written  assent,  is  not  liable  for 
her  business  debts,  §§  893-95. 

In  Illinois,  a  married  woman  may  sue  and  be  .sued  alone  as  if  immarried, 
Revised  Statutes  of  1880,  c.  68,  §  1.  "^She  may  contract  as  if  unmarried,  but 
without  her  husband's  consent  .she  may  not  become  a  co-partner,  unless  he  has 
deserted  her,  is  insane,  or  in  the  penitentiary,  §  9.  She  may  use  and  sue  for 
her  earnings  as  if  unmarried.  §  7.  A  married  woman  may  own,  in  her  individ- 
ual right,  property  obtained  by  descent,  gift,  or  purchase,  and  manage,  sell, 
and  convey  the  same  as  the  husband  can  his  property;  but  if  living  together,  a 
transfer  to  him,  to  be  valid  against  third  persons,  must  be  in  writing  and  ac- 
knowledged and  recorded  like  chattel  mortgages,  §  9.  She  is  equally  liable 
with  her  husband  for  family  expenses  and  the  children's  education,  and  may 
be  sued  therefor  singly  or  jointly,  §  15.  If  when  eighteen  years  old  she  joins 
her  husband  in  the  conveyance  of  her  real  estate,  she  is  bound  as  if  unmarried, 
c.  30,  §  18;  and  her  acknowledgment  may  be  taken  as  if  unmarried,  §  19.  If 
she  dies  intestate  without  issue,  the  husband  is  entitled  to  one  half  of  the  real 
estate  and  the  whole  of  the  personal  estate  absolutely;  if  she  leaA'es  issue,  to 
one  third  of  the  personal  property  absolutely;  if  no  i.s.sue  or  kindred,  to  the 
whole  of  her  estate,  c.  39,  §  1.  A  homestead  to  the  value  of  $1,000  is  exempt 
from  attachment  for  debt,  and  so  continues  while  occupied  by  the  survivor  or 
the  children  until  the  youngest  is  twenty-one  years  of  age,  or  if  the  husband 
or  wife  deserts  the  family,  in  favor  of  the  occupier,  c.  52,  §§1,2.  She  may 
cause  the  life  of  her  husband  to  be  insured  for  her  own  use,  or  that  of  her  chil- 
dren, if  she  dies  before  it  accrues;  but  if  the  premium  is  paid  in  fraud  of  his 
creditors,  an  amount  equal  to  the  sum  so  paid  with  interest  shall  inure  to 
their  benefit,  c.  73,  §  54.  Her  separate  property  is  chargeable  with  the  support 
of  poor  relatives,  c.  109,  §  2. 

In  Indiana,  a  married  woman  may  sue  alone  touching  her  separate  prop- 
erty and  when  the  suit  is  between  herself  and  husband,  Revised  Statutes  of 
1881,  c.  2,  §  254.  The  wife  of  a  person  who  has  absented  himself  from  home 
for  five  years  has  the  same  rights  and  powers  as  if  unmarried  to  make  con- 
tracts, deeds,  and  acquittances  during  the  absence,  c.  6,  §  2231.  If  she  die, 
testate  or  intestate,  one  third  of  her  real  estate  descends  to  her  husband  sub- 
ject to  its  proportion  of  her  antenuptial  debts,  c.  7,  §  2485.  A  wife's  per- 
sonal property  at  the  marriage  or  acquired  afterwards  by  descent,  devise,  or 
gift,  remains  her  own  like  her  real  estate.  If  the  husband  dies  first,  it  goes  to 
her;  if  she  dies  first,  it  is  distributed  like  her  real  estate,  §  2488.  If  she  dies 
intestate  without  issue  but  leaving  parents,  three  fourths  of  her  property  go 
to  her  husband  and  one  fourth  to  the  parents  or  the  survivor,  but  if  only  $1,000 
VOL.  I.  27  417 


*  375  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

in  all,  the  whole  goes  to  the  husband.  If  she  leaves  no  issue  nor  parents,  the 
whole  goes  to  the  liusband,  §§  2489,  2490.  A  married  woman  may  dispose  of 
her  property  by  will,  c.  9,  §  2557.  A  married  woman's  lands  and  the  profits 
are  her  separate  property  as  fully  as  if  unmarried,  free  of  her  husband's  debts, 
but  she  cannot  convey  or  incumber  them  unless  he  joins  in  a  deed,  c.  71,  §  5116. 
A  married  woman  may  acquire  property  by  conveyance,  gift,  devise,  or  descent, 
or  by  purchase  with  her  own  money,  and  control  the  same  and  the  profits,  as 
if  unmarried.  She  may  likewise  contract  about  and  dispose  of  her  personal 
property,  but  not  the  real,  unless  the  husband  joins,  §  5117.  Her  covenants 
for  title  and  official  bonds  bind  her  as  if  unmarried,  §  5118.  But  her  contract 
of  suretyship  is  void,  §  5119.  The  husband  is  not  liable  for  her  business  debts 
on  her  sole  account,  or  if  in  partnership  other  than  with  himself,  nor  for  im- 
provements on  her  property  by  her  authority,  §  5122.  She  alone  is  liable  for 
such  improvements,  made  by  his  order  with  her  consent  in  writing,  §  5123.  She 
has  the  same  exemption  of  property  from  seizure  and  sale  for  debt  as  household- 
ers, §  5124.  The  husband  is  liable  for  her  antenuptial  debts  to  the  extent  only 
of  personalty  received  through  her  or  derived  from  the  sale  or  profits  of  her 
land,  §  5125.  Judgment  for  such  diibts  may  be  rendered  against  them  jointly, 
to  be  levied  on  her  land  only,  §  5127.  The  husband  can  convey  no  interest 
in  her  land  by  his  separate  deed,  §  5128.  Suits  about  such  land  are  to  be 
brought  against  them  jointly,  or  if  living  apart,  against  her  alone,  §  5129. 
She  may  do  business  and  labor  on  her  separate  account,  the  profits  of  which, 
other  than  for  her  husband  or  family,  are  her  separate  property,  §  5130.  She 
may  sue  as  if  unmarried  for  damages  to  her  person  or  character,  such  to  be 
her  separate  property,  §  5131.  If  it  shall  appear  to  be  beneficial  to  her,  a 
married  woman  may,  by  leave  of  court,  convey  or  incumber  her  real  estate 
■without  the  husband's  joinder,  §  5137. 

In  Iowa,  a  married  woman  may  convey  and  contract  about  her  real  estate 
like  other  persons.  Revised  Code  of  1880,  Tit.  13,  c.  5,  §  1935.  The  convey- 
ance of  husband  and  wife  together  passes  the  estate  of  either,  unless  the  con- 
trary appears  ;  but  in  such  a  conveyance  of  her  property,  he  is  not  bound  by 
the  covenants  unless  so  expressed,  §§  1936,  1937.  A  married  woman  may  own 
property  acquired  by  descent,  gift,  or  purchase,  and  dispose  of  the  same  and 
devise  it  by  will  precisely  as  the  husband,  Tit.  15,  c.  2,  §  2202.  Her  property 
cannot  be  the  subject  of  contract  with  her  husband,  nor  liable  for  his  debts, 
§  2203.  If  the  husband  gains  possession  of  her  property  before  or  after  mar- 
riage, she  may  sue  for  or  about  it  as  if  unmarried,  §  2204.  Her  conveyance, 
transfer,  or  lien  to  the  husband  is  as  valid  as  between  other  persons,  §  2206. 
If  the  husband  or  wife  abandons  the  other,  and  is  absent  from  the  State  for  a 
year,  or  imprisoned,  the  other,  by  leave  of  court,  may  use  his  or  her  property 
to  support  the  family  or  pay  debts ;  and  all  acts  so  done  bind  both  and  the 
property  of  both,  §§  2207,  2208.  The  husband  and  wife  may  each  appoint  the 
other  an  attorney  in  fact,  revocable  at  pleasure,  to  dispose  of  each  other's  prop- 
erty for  the  mutual  benefit,  §  2210.  The  wife  may  receive,  hold,  and  sue  for 
personal  wages,  and  may  sue  and  be  sued  touching  her  rights  and  property 
as  if  unmarried,  §  2211.  The  husband  and  wife  or  their  property  or  incomes 
are  not  liable  for  the  other's  antenuptial  debts,  nor  for  the  other's  separate 
debts,  §  2212.  She  may  contract  and  sue  and  be  sued  respecting  the  same  as 
if  unmarried,  §  2213.  The  family  expenses  and  children's  education  are  charge- 
able upon  the  property  of  both  or  either,  and  joint  or  separate  suit  may  be 
brought,  §  2214.  Neither  husband  nor  wife  can  remove  the  other  or  the 
children  from  the  homestead  without  mutual  consent;  and  if  he  deserts  her, 
she  may  have  custody  of  minor  children,  unless  the  court  directs  otherwise, 
§  2215.  The  homestead,  consisting  of  half  an  acre  in  a  town  plat,  or  four 
acres  without,  up  to  t^SOO  in  value,  is  exempt  from  judicial  sale,  except  in 
certain  cases,  and  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  may  continue  to  occupy,  Tit. 
13,  c.  8,  §§  1988-2010. 

In  Kansas,  all  the  property  of  a  woman  at  the  marriage,  and  its  profits,  and 
subsequently  acquired  by  descent,  devise,  and  bequest,  or  by  gift  other  than 

418 


CH.    XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  375-376 

from  her  husband,  is  her  separate  property,  free  from  his  disposal  or  debts 
Dassler's  Compiled  Laws  of  1879,  c.  (J2,  §  3136.  A  married  woman  may  dis- 
pose of  her  property  and  contract  about  it  the  same  as  a  married  man  with  his 
own,  §  3137.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued,  as  if  unmarried,  §  31 3S.  She  may 
trade  or  labor,  and  her  profits  and  earnings  are  her  own,  and  may  be  used  and 
invested  in  her  own  name,  §  3139.  If  ma^rried  without  the  Stated  and  the  hus- 
band moves  within,  she  continues  to  enjoy  prior  property  riglits,  §  3140. 
Marriage  contracts  or  settlements  remain  valid,  §  3141.  A  homestead  of  one 
hundred  and  sixty  acres  without  a  town  or  city,  or  of  one  acre  witliin,  is 
exempt  from  forced  sale,  except  with  their  joint  consent,  for  taxes,  purchase- 
money,  and  improvements,  c.  38,  §  2497. 

In  Kentucky,  the  husband  has  only  the  use  of  the  before  or  after  acquired 
property  of  the  wife,  with  power  to  rent  the  i-ealty  for  not  more  than  three  years, 
and  to  receive  the  rent.  If  she  dies  during  such  term,  the  rent  goes  to  li'im,  if 
living,  subject  to  her  debts;  if  he  dies,  to'her  or  representatives,  like  subject, 
General  Statutes  of  1873,  p.  518,  §  1.  Such  realty  or  rent  is  not  liable  for  his, 
but  is  for  her,  ante  and  post  nuptial  debts,  for  her  and  family  necessaries,  in- 
cluding the  husband's,  procured  by  a  writing  signed  by  her,  remedy  for  which 
may  be  against  her  alone,  or  both.  His  inchoate  curtesy  and  right  to  use  or 
rent  her  realty  is  free  of  his  separate  debts  during  her  'life,  §  2.  They  may 
jointly  convey  her  land,  §  3.  The  husband  is  not  liable  for  her  antenuptial 
debts,  except  to  the  value  of  what  he  may  receive  by  her  otlier  than  realty,  but 
is  liable  for_ necessaries,  §  4.  If  he  deserts,  does  not  suitably  provide  for  her, 
or  is  in  penitentiary  for  more  than  a  year,  she  may,  by  leave  of  court,  act  as  if 
unmarried,  even  to  conveying  her  property,  §  5.  'She  may,  by  leave  of  court, 
do  business  as  if  unmarried,  and  dispose  of  her  property  and  profits  by  will  or 
deed,  if  no  intent  to  defraud  his  creditors  appears,  §§  6,  7.  If  her  real  estate 
is  taken  for  a  public  use,  the  compensation  may  be  appropriated,  by  the  court 
for  her  benefit,  p.  522,  §  9.  A  married  woman  whose  husband  resides  with- 
out the  State  may  acquire  property,  contract,  and  sue  and  be  sued  as  if  un- 
married, but  the  husband  on  petition  may  be  restored  to  his  marital  rights, 
§  10.  Her  convej'ance  of  her  2:)roperty  may  be  by  a  joint  or  separate  deed, 
but  by  the  latter  only  when  the  husband  first  conveys.  She  must  acknowl- 
edge the  same  apart  from  her  husband,  p.  258,  §§  20,  21.  If  shares  of  bank 
stock  are  taken  for  or  transferred  to  a  married  woman  for  her  use,  the  hus- 
band takes  no  interest  or  dividends.  If  she  dies,  it  goes  to  her  heirs;  but  she 
may  dispose  of  it  by  will  with  his  consent,  or,  if  instrument  creating  the  trust 
so  provides,  she  may  receive,  but  not  anticipate,  the  dividends,  p.  532,  §  15.  She 
may  make  deposits,  and  her  checks  or  I'eceipts  are  as  valid  as  if  she  were  un- 
married, §  16.  A  separate  or  trust  estate  conveyed  or  devised  to  her  may  be 
sold  and  conveyed,  if  the  instrument  conveying  or  creating  does  not  forbid, 
and  the  husband  and  trustee  join,  her  interest  in  the  proceeds  remaining  the 
same,  §  17.  A  married  woman's  earnings  may  be  paid  to  her  directly,  free  of 
the  debts  or  control  of  the  husband,  p.  533,  note.  She  may  by  will  dispose  of 
an  estate,  secured  to  her  separate  use  by  deed  or  devise,  or  in  the  exercise  of  a 
■written  power  to  make  a  will,  p.  832,  §  4. 

In  Louisiana,  a  married  woman,  even  if  separate  in  estate  from  her  husband, 
cannot  alienate,  grant,  mortgage,  or  acquire,  by  gratuitous  or  incumbered  title, 
imless  he  concurs  or  gives  his  written  consent,  Revised  Code  of  1870,  Art. 
122.  Her  separation  from  him  divides  property  and  dissolves  the  community 
of  acquets  and  gains,  making  his  authorization  unnecessary.  Art.  123,  She 
may  contract  by  leave  of  court,  if  the  husband  refuses.  Art.  125.  If  twenty- 
one  years  of  age,  she  may,  by  the  husband's  authority  and  leave  of  court, 
borrow  or  contract  for  her  separate  benefit,  and  to  secure  the  same  give  secu- 
rity affecting  her  separate  paraphernal  or  dotal  estate.  In  so  doing  it  must 
appear  to  the  court  that  the  money  is  to  be  borrowed  or  the  debt  contracted 
solely  for  her  separate  advantage.  Arts.  126,  127,  128.  If  of  the  age  of  twenty- 
one  Years,  a  married  woman  may,  with  the  husband's  consent  after  examina- 
tion 'apart  from  him,  renounce  in  favor  of  a  third  person  her  mati'imonial, 

419 


*  377  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

paraphernal,  dotal,  and  other  rights,  Art.  129.  She  may,  if  a  public  merchant, 
without  the  husband's  authority,  bind  herself  respecting  her  trade,  and  the 
husband  also,  if  a  community  of  property  exists  between  them.  She  is  a  pub- 
lic merchant  if  she  carries  on  a  separate  trade,  but  not  if  she  simply  retails  the 
mei'chandise  of  her  husband's  commerce,  Art.  131.  If  the  husband  is  inter- 
dicted or  absent,  she  may,  by  leave  of  court,  sue  and  be  sued,  or  contract,  Art. 
132.  Every  general  authority,  though  stipulated  in  the  marriage  contract,  is 
void,  except  respecting  the  administration  of  her  property.  Art.  133.  The  wife 
may  make  her  last  will  without  his  authority.  Art.  135.  The  husband  or  wife 
may,  either  by  marriage  contract  or  during  the  marriage,  give  to  the  other  in 
full  property,  all  that  he  or  she  might  give  to  a  stranger,  Art.  1746.  But  all 
such  donations  during  marriage,  though  termed  inter  vivos,  are  always  revo- 
cable. Art.  1749.  They  may,  by  marriage  contract,  determine  the  rights  of 
propel  ty ;  but  cannot  change  the  legal  order  ot  descents  (this  restriction  not 
affecting  donations  inlfr  vivos  or  such  moiii'i  causa,  or  donation  by  the  marriage 
contract  according  to  the  rules  for  donations),  nor  de)'0gate  from  the  husband's 
rights  over  the  person  of  his  wife  and  children,  or  as  head  of  the  family,  nor 
with  respect  to  children,  if  he  survive  tlie  wife,  nor  from  the  prohibitory  dis- 
pensations of  the  Code,  Arts.  232.5-2327,  2336.  The  property  of  married 
persons  is  divided  into  "separate"  and  "common;"  and  the  separate  prop- 
erty of  the  wife  into  "dotal"  and  "  extra-dotal,"  or  "paraphernal."  The 
"  dotal "  is  that  which  the  wife  brings  to  the  husband  to  assist  him  in  bearing 
the  expenses  of  the  marriage  establishment.  Arts.  2334,  2335,  2337.  The  wife 
has  a  legal  mortgage  on  her  husband's  immovables  (which  he  may  release  by 
giving  a  special  mortgage  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  family  meeting,  &c.,  or  in 
accordance  with  stipulations  in  the  marriage  contract);  but  it  shall  not  be 
lawful  to  stipulate  that  no  mortgage  shall  exist.  Arts.  2378-2380;  and  a  privi- 
lege on  his  immovables  for  the  restitution  of  her  dowry,  &c..  Arts.  2376-2380, 
2390.  A  partnership,  or  community,  of  acquets  or  gains  exists  by  operation 
of  law  in  all  cases  But  the  parties  may  modify  or  limit  it,  or  agree  that  it 
shall  not  exist;  in  which  case  there  are  provisions,  preserving  to  the  wife  the 
administration  and  enjoyment  of  her  property  and  the  power  of  alienating  it 
as  if  paraphernal,  with  reference  to  the  expenses  of  the  marriage  and  liability 
of  the  husband,  Arts.  2332,  2399,  2401,  2424.  This  community  consists 
of  the  profits  of  all  the  effects  of  which  the  husband  has  the  administration  and 
enjoyment,  either  of  right  or  in  fact;  of  the  produce  of  the  reciprocal  industry 
and  labor  of  both  husband  and  wife;  and  of  the  estates  which  they  may 
acquire  during  marriage,  either  by  donations  made  jointly  to  them  both,  or  by 
purchase,  or  in  any  similar  way,  even  though  the  purchase  be  in  the  name  of 
one  and  not  of  both.  Debts  contracted  during  marriage  enter  into  this  part- 
nership, and  must  be  acquitted  out  of  the  common  fund;  but  those  contracted 
before  marriage,  out  of  individual  effects.  Arts.  2102,  2403.  The  husband  is 
the  head  and  master  of  the  community;  administers  its  effects,  disposes  of  the 
revenue,  and  may  alienate  by  an  unincumbered  title,  without  the  wife's  con- 
sent. He  cannot  convey  inter  vivos  the  immovables  gratuitously,  the  commu- 
nity, nor  any  portion  of  the  movables,  except  to  establish  the  children ;  but  he 
may  the  movables.  If  he  disposes  of  the  common  estate  by  fraud  to  injure  the 
wife,  she  may  sue  his  heirs  for  one-half.  Art.  2373.  If  decreed  separate  in 
property,  she  must  contribute  proportionately  to  the  household  expenses  and 
the  children's  education,  and  must  do  both  alone  if  he  has  nothing.  Art.  2435. 
When  separate  by  contract  or  judgment  in  person  or  property,  she  has  the  free 
administration  of  her  estate,  and  may  dispose  of  movables,  but  not  immov- 
ables, ^/ithout  the  husband's  consent,  or  on  refusal  by  leave  of  court.  Art.  2436. 
She  may,  with  the  husband's  consent,  give  her  dotal  effects  to  establish  their 
children  or  her  children  by  a  former  marriage.  Arts.  2358,  2359. 

In  Mainp;,  a  married  woman  may  own  property  acquired  by  descent,  gift,  or 
purchase,  and  may  manage,  sell,  and  convey  it,  and  devise  it  by  will,  without 
the  husband's  joinder  or  a.ssent;  but  real  estate  from  or  paid  for  by  him  or 
from  his  relatives  she  cannot  convey  without  such  joinder,  unless  held  as  secu- 

420 


CH.  XVIII,]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  378 

rity  or  in  payment  of  a  bona  Jide  debt  from  the  husband.  Her  property  paid 
for  out  of  his  property,  or  conveyed  by  him  without  consideration,  is  liable  for 
his  prior  debts,  Revised  Statutes  of  1871,  c.  61,  §  1.  A  wife  married  since 
March  22,  1844,  loses  no  right  by  the  Act  of  that  date,  nor  does  a  husband  ac- 
quire any  right  to  her  property  thereby,  nor  are  his  prior  rights  affected  by  this 
Act.  She  may  release  to  her  husband  the  right,  revocable  iu  writing,  to  con- 
trol the  whole  or  any  part  of  her  property,  and  dispose  of  the  income  for  the 
mutual  benefit,  §  2.  She  may  receive  her  personal  wages  other  than  for  her 
family,  sue  for  in  her  own  name,  and  hold  against  him  or  third  persons,  §  3. 
A  liusband,  married  since  April  26,  1852,  is  not  liable  for  her  antenuptial 
debts,  nor  for  those  contracted  after  in  her  own  name.  She  is  liable  for  both, 
may  be  sued  therefor  singly  or  jointly  with  him,  and  her  property  attached  and 
levied  on,  as  if  unmarried,  §  4.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued  alone,  or  jointly 
with  the  husband,  touching  her  property  and  personal  rights,  as  if  unmarried; 
and  the  husband  may  not  settle  such  suits  without  her  written  consent,  §  5  as 
amended  by  Statute  of  1876,  c.  112.  If  she  dies  intestate,  her  property  goes 
to  her  heirs,  but  by  an  antenuptial  settlement  they  may  arrange  marriage 
rights  and  bar  all  rights  not  so  secured,  §  6.  If  he  abandons  her  or  is  impris- 
oned, leaving  her  no  maintenance,  she  may,  by  leave  of  court,  make  contracts, 
and  receive  for  disposal  her  personal  property  from  the  holder  and  give  a  valid 
discharge.  Her  husband  and  herself  are  bound  by  such  contracts,  and  she 
may,  during  such  absence,  sue  and  be  sued,  and  execution  be  enforced  on  all 
her  acts,  as  if  unmarried.  He  may  be  made  a  party  on  his  return,  §§  7,  8.  If 
her  real  estate  is  taken  for  a  public  use,  the  compensation  is  to  be  so  invested 
as  to  secure  her  equal  benefit,  §  9.  If  she  enters  or  remains  in  the  State  with- 
out living  with  her  husband,  she  may  contract,  dispose  of  her  property,  and 
sue  and  be  sued  as  if  unmarried.  When  he  claims  his  marital  rights,  her 
contracts  and  suits  are  affected  as  if  they  were  then  first  married,  §  10.  Her 
estate  is  liable  for  the  expenses  of  her  last  sickness,  §  11. 

In  Maryland,  a  married  woman's  property,  real  and  personal,  at  the  mar- 
riage, or  after  acquired  by  purchase,  gift,  grant,  devise,  bequest,  or  inheritance, 
is  free  of  her  husband's  debts;  but  no  transfer  to  a  wife  from  him  is  valid  if  in 
fraud  of  creditors.  Revised  Code  of  1878,  Art.  51,  §  19.  She  holds  her  prop- 
erty for  her  separate  use,  and  may  devise  it  as  if  unmarried,  or  convey  it  by  a 
joint  deed;  but  if  he  is  insane,  by  a  separate  deed  or  mortgage.  If  she  dies 
intestate  with  issue,  the  husband  has  a  life  estate  in  all  her  property;  if  with- 
out issue,  a  life  estate  in  the  real,  and  the  personal  absolutely.  On  a  joint  con- 
tract she  may  be  sued  jointly  and  the  judgment  be  collected  as  if  they  were  un- 
married, §  20.  She  may,  but  need  not,  have  a  trustee  appointed;  if  without, 
she  may  sue  to  protect  her  property,  as  if  ttnmarried,  §§  21,  22,  Acts  of  1882, 
c.  265,  §  7.  She  may  insure  her  husband's  life,  payable  to  herself  free  of  all 
claims,  or  if  she  die  first,  to  her  children,  descendants,  their  guardian  or  legal 
representatives,  §§  24,  25.  Her  receipt  for  deposits  by  her  are  valid,  but  if  the 
deposit  is  in  fraud  of  creditors  the  latter  may  attach,  §  27.  If  she  makes  a 
lease  with  covenants,  she  may  be  distrained  upon  for  rent  or  suffer  a  re-entry, 
§  28.  In  all  deeds  to  her,  she  may  bind  herself  and  assigns  by  covenants,  as 
if  unmarried,  §  29.  A  married  woman  may  convey  or  mortgage  her  property, 
the  husband  joining,  and  execute  and  acknowledge  the  same  or  a  bill  of  sale 
like  other  grantors,  without  a  private  examination,  and  may  release  dower  by  a 
joint  or  separate  deed,  §  30.  Her  property,  and  not  her  husband,  is  liable  for 
her  antenuptial  debts.  Acts  of  1880,  c.  253,  §  31.  Suits  for  such  debts  may 
be  brought  against  her  as  if  unmarried,  joining  her  husband;  but  judgment 
shall  pass  against  her  and  her  estate  only;  and  she  may  appoint  an  attorney  at 
law  to  act  for  her,  §§  32,  33.  She  is  entitled  to  her  earnings,  and  may  dispose 
of  the  same,  as  if  unmarried,  the  same  to  be  liable  for  any  debts  incurred  in  so 
earning  them,  for  which  she  may  be  sued  as  if  unmarried,  and  the  husband 
defend  in  her  name;  but  no  judgment  can  be  entered  "  without  proof,"  imless 
they  jointly  consent  in  writing,  Acts  of  1882,  c.  265,  §  7.  If  a_ lease  vests,  by 
deed,  will,  or  operation  of  law,  in  a  married  woman,  she  is  liable  on  all  its 

421 


*  378-379  THE  LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

covenants  running  with  the  land,  as  if  unmarried,  Acts  of  1882,  c.  385,  §  1. 
If  she  dies  intestate,  without  issue,  lier  personal  property,  including  choses  in 
aclion,  devolves  on  the  husband  absolutely,  without  administration,  unless  she 
leaves  debts;  but  if  with  issue,  the  same  devolves  on  her  administrator,  the 
surplus  to  be  distributed  to  the  husband  for  life  only,  thence  to  her  descend- 
ants per  stirpes,  the  estate  to  be  invested  by  and  subject  to  the  order  of  the 
court,  Acts  of  18SL',  c.  477,  §  32. 

In  Massachusetts,  all  of  a  woman's  property  at  her  marriage  remains  her 
separate  property,  and  a  married  woman  may  receive,  receipt  for,  liold,  man- 
age, and  dispose  of  property,  as  if  unmarried;  but  without  her  husband's 
wiTtten  consent  she  cannot  impair  his  curtesy,  Public  Statutes  of  1882, 
c.  147,  §  1.  She  may  make  contracts  as  if  unmarried,  but  not  with  her  hus- 
band, §  2.  A  husband  and  wife  cannot  transfer  property  to  each  other, 
except  tliat  he  may  give  her  wearing  apparel,  and  articles  of  personal  use  and 
ornament  up  to  'f2,0U0,  if  not  in  fiaud  of  creditors,  §  3.  Her  labor  for  other 
than  her  husband  and  children,  unless  expressly  agreed  otherwise,  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  on  her  separate  account,  §  4.  She  may  be  an  executrix,  ad- 
ministratrix, guardian,  or  trustee,  and  may  bind  herself  and  the  estate  she 
represents  without  his  act  or  assent,  §  5.  A  married  woman  may  make  a 
will  as  if  unmarried,  but  may  not,  without  the  husband's  written  consent,  de- 
prive him  of  curtesy  or  of  more  than  one  half  of  her  personal  estate,  §  6.  She 
may  sue  and  be  sued  as  if  unmarried,  but  no  suits  can  be  had  between  hus- 
band and  wife,  §  7.  She  is  not  liable  for  her  husband's  debts,  nor  her  prop- 
erty on  an  execution  against  him  unless  she  fails  to  recoid  a  certificate  that 
she  is  doing  business  on  separate  account,  §§  8,  11.  The  husband  is  not 
liable  for  an  antenuptial  or  postnuptial  debt,  except  when  such  a  certificate 
is  not  recorded,  §  9.  Her  contracts  touching  her  property,  trade,  business,  la- 
bor, or  services  do  not  bind  him  or  his  property,  except  on  failure  to  record  such 
a  certificate,  but  bind  her  and  her  property  as  if  unmarried,  §  10.  AMien  she 
does  or  proposes  to  do  business  on  her  separate  account,  a  certificate  giving 
their  names,  its  nature  and  the  place  with  street  and  number,  must  be  re- 
corded, failure  to  do  which  renders  the  property  employed  lial)le  for  the  hus- 
band's debts  and  the  husband  liable  on  all  contracts  as  if  made  by  himself, 
§  11.  She  may  have  a  trustee  appointed  to  take  charge  of  her  property,  §  13. 
If  her  real  estate  is  taken  by  eminent  domain,  the  compensation  tlierefor  may 
be  invested  so  as  to  secure  her  the  same  benefit  as  from  tlie  property  taken, 
§  14.  If  she  comes  into  the  State  without  her  husband,  she  may  act  as  if  un- 
married, §  29.  AVhen  husband  and  wife  come  into  the  State  and  reside  as 
such,  she  retains  all  her  property,  and  subsequent  rights  accrue  as  if  the  time 
of  their  coming  was  the  time  of  their  marriage,  §  30.  If  he  deserts  her  or  is 
in  the  state-prison,  not  leaving  a  maintenance,  she  may,  by  leave  of  court,  dis- 
pose of  her  property  or  of  any  undisposed  personal  property  coming  to  him  by 
reason  of  the  maniage,  as  if  unmarried,  during  such  absence  or  imprison- 
ment, §  31.  Her  personal  wages  are  not  liable  to  ti-ustee  process  in  a  suit 
against  the  husband,  c.  183,  §  29.  If  she  dies  intestate,  without  issue  living, 
he  takes  of  her  real  estate  in  fee  up  to  $5  000,  and  curtesy  in  the  remainder  ; 
if  she  dies  without  kindred,  tlie  whole  in  fee,  c.  124,  §  1.  If  a  married 
woman  dies  leaving  issue  and  personal  estate  undisposed  of  by  will,  one  half 
of  the  same  goes  to  the  husband,  Stat,  of  1882,  c.  141. 

In  Michigan,  a  married  woman's  propeity  at  the  marriage  and  afterwards 
ac(iuired  in  any  way  is  her  estate  free  of  her  husband's  debts,  and  may  be 
contracted  about,  sold,  transferred,  mortgaged,  conveyed,  devised,  and  be- 
queathed as  if  she  were  unmarried,  Compiled  Laws  of  1871,  vol.  ii.  §  4083. 
Any  trustee  of  hers  may  convey  to  her  all  or  a  part  of  the  pi'operty  or  the 
income  for  her  separate  use,  §  4804.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued  touching  her 
sole  projierty,  as  if.  unmarried  ;  and  where  the  husband's  jiroperty  cannot  be 
sold  or  encumbered  without  her  consent  in  due  form  or  is  exempt  from  judicial 
process,  she  may  sue  in  her  own  name,  §  4805.  Her  husband  is  not  liable 
on  her  property  contracts,  but  she  may  be  sued  on  her  contracts  where  he  is 

422 


CH.    XVIII.]  MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  380 

not  liable  or  refuses  to  perform,  §  4806.  If  he  deserts  her  or  is  in  the  state- 
prison  without  providing  for  her,  she  may,  if  twenty-one  years  of  age,  by 
leave  of  court,  convey  lier  real  estate  or  dispose  of  any  undisposed-of  personal 
estate  brought  to  the  husband  by  the  marriage,  §  4770.  She  may  also  re- 
ceive such  personal  estate  as  is  due  the  husband  in  her  right,  and  give  a  valid 
discharge,  §  4777.  All  such  proceeds  she  may  use  as  if  her  own  and  unmar- 
ried, and  while  deserted,  she  may  contract  in  iier  own  name,  sue  and  be  sued, 
make  and  execute  instruments  in  her  own  name,  all  of  which  shall  be  as  bind- 
ing asif  the  marriage  took  place  thereafter,  §§  4778-47S8.  When  her  real 
estate  is  taken  by  eminent  domain,  the  compensation  may  be  so  invested  as  to 
afford  the  same  benefit  as  the  undamaged  estate  would  have,  §  4793.  If  she 
comes  from  another  State  without  her  husband,  she  may  act  in  all  respects  as 
if  unmarried  ;  and  when  her  husband  comes,  the  effect  is  as  if  the  marriage 
took  place  at  his  arrival,  §§  4795-4797.  She  may  insure  his  life  for  her  bene- 
fit up  to  S300  premium,  and  may  make  such  insurance  payable,  if  slie  dies 
before  him,  to  her  children  or  dispose  of  it  by  will,  §§  4808,  4809.  She  may 
execute  a  power,  if  of  age.  by  grant  or  devise,  without  the  husband's  concur- 
rence, unless  in  terms  prohibited,  §  4178.  If  entitled  to  an  estate  in  fee  and 
empowered  to  dispose  of  it  during  the  marriage,  she  may  create  any  estate,  as 
if  unmarried,  §  4197.  If  she  dies  intestate,  one  third  of  her  personal  estate 
goes  to  the  husband,  and  the  remainder  to  her  children  ;  but  if  one  child  only, 
one  half  to  him  ;  if  no  cliildien  or  issue,  nor  parents,  nor  brothers  or  sisters  or 
issue,  the  whole  goes  to  him.  A  homestead  of  forty  acres  without,  or  a  lot  in, 
a  town,  city,  or  village,  up  to  .Spl,500,  is  exempt  from  judicial  sale,  §  6137.  Her 
acknowledgment  to  a  deed  or  otlier  instrument  affecting  real  property,  and 
those  taken  since  Aug.  4,  1875,  may  be  taken  as  if  she  were  unmarried, 
Stat,  of  1877,  p.  50. 

In  Minnesota,  all  of  a  married  woman's  property,  owned  before  or  after 
marriage,  contiimes  her  separate  pi'operty,  and  she  may  receive,  take,  hold, 
use,  and  enjoy  it  and  its  profits  and  all  avails  of  her  contracts  and  industry 
free  from  her  husband's  control  and  debts,  as  if  unmarried.  General  Statutes 
of  1878,  c.  69,  §  1.  She  is  bound  by  her  contracts  and  responsible  for  her 
torts,  and  her  property  is  liable  therefor,  as  if  she  were  unmarried.  She  may 
contract,  as  if  unmarried,  but  not  to  sell  or  convey  real  estate  other  than  by 
a  mortgage  to  secure  purchase  money  or  a  lease  for  three  years  or  less,  unless 
the  husband  joins,  and  no  curtesy  attaches  against  such  a  mortgage,  §  2. 
She  is  not  liable  for  his  debts,  nor  is  he  for  hers  other  than  for  necessaries, 
§  3.  The  husband  and  wife  may  not  contract  with  each  otlier  touching  real 
estate,  but  may  in  respect  to  all  other  matters,  as  if  they  were  not  married. 
But  where  rights  of  creditors  and  bo?id  fide  purchasers  come  in  question,  they 
are  held  to  have  notice  of  each  other's  debts  and  contracts,  §  4.  If  she  is 
deserted  by  him  for  a  year  or  is  entitled  to  a  divorce,  she  may,  by  decree  of 
court,  bar  his  curtesy  and  have  power  to  dispose  of  her  lands,  as  if  unmarried, 
§  5.  Antenuptial  settlements  are  unaffected,  and  the  husband  is  not  ex- 
empted from  liability  for  her  torts,  §  6.  If  a  married  woman  deposits  in  a 
savings  bank,  the  trustees  may  repay  her,  and  her  receipt  shall  be  a  discharge 
as  against  third  persons,  c.  33,  §  62.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued  alone,  as  if  un- 
married, where  the  husband  would  not  be  a  necessary  party  aside  from  the 
marriage  relation,  c.  66,  §  29.  A  homestead  of  eighty  acres  without,  or  a  lot 
within,  a  town  of  over  5,000  inhabitants,  or  half  an  acre  in  a  lesser  town,  is 
exempt  from  judicial  sale,  c.  68,  §  1.  The  surviving  husband  or  wiie  is  enti- 
tled to'  the  homestead  of  the  deceased  for  life,  free  of  debts,  c.  46,  §  2.  A  married 
■woman  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will,  as  if  unmarried,  c.  47,  §  1.  If  the 
wife  dies  intestate  leaving  issue,  the  husband  is  entitled  absolutely  to  an  undi- 
vided third  of  all  her  real  estate,  free  of  any  disposition  of  the  same  to  which  he 
did  not  assent,  but  subject  proportionally  to  her  debts;  if  without  kindred,_to 
the  whole  of  such  real  estate,  §  3.  All  uudisposed-of  personal  estate  is  admin- 
istered as  intestate  estate,  c.  47,  §  4. 

In  Mississippi,  a  married  woman  has  the  same  capacity  to  acquire,  hold, 

423 


*  381  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

manage,  control,  use,  enjoy,  and  dispose  of  all  property,  contract  about  it, 
bind  herself  personally,  sue  and  be  sued,  with  all  the  rights  and  liabilities 
thereof,  as  if  unmarried,  Revised  Code  of  1880,  c.  42,  §  11G7.  Husband  and  wife 
may  sue  each  other,  §  11 G8.  Slie  may  dispose  of  her  estate  by  will,  as  if 
unmarried,  §  11(J9.  Dower  and  curtesy  are  abolished,  §  1170.  If  she  dies 
with  issue,  leaving  estate  undisposed  of,  it  descends  to  her  husband  and 
descendants  in  equal  parts;  if  without  issue,  the  husband  inherits  the  whole, 
§  1171.  If  she  fails  to  make  satisfactory  provision  for  her  husband  in  her  will, 
he  may  renounce  the  same  and  become  entitled  to  the  same  share  as  if  she  had 
died  intestate,  except  that,  if  she  leaves  no  issue,  he  shall  be  entitled  to  only 
one  half  of  her  estate,  §  1172.  If  her  will  contains  no  provision  for  him,  he 
has  the  same  share  as  in  the  case  of  an  unsatisfactory  provision,  §  1173.  Her 
provision  by  will  for  him  is  in  bar  of  any  share  of  her  estate,  unless  otlierwise 
expressed,  §  1174.  If  the  husband  has  separate  property  at  the  death  of  the 
wife,  testate,  equal  to  his  share  of  her  estate,  he  cannot  renounce;  but  if  less, 
he  may  have  the  difference  made  up  to  him ;  or  if  only  one  fifth,  the  whole, 
§  1175.  If  the  husband  appropriates  her  property  or  its  income,  he  shall  be 
her  debtor  for  a  year  ;  but  if  she  permits  him  to  use  the  income,  or  her  estate 
for  family  support,  he  is  not  chargeable,  §  1176.  They  cannot  contract  wdth 
each  other  for  compensation  for  services  rendered,  nor  can  he  rent  or  carry  on 
business  with  his  wife's  plantation,  houses,  cattle,  or  tools,  or  with  any  of  her 
means,  but  all  business  so  done  is  on  her  account  by  him  as  agent  as  to 
persons  without  notice,  unless  written  contract  to  the  contrary  is  executed 
by  them,  acknowledged  and  recorded,  §  1177.  No  transfer  of  goods  or  lands 
between  them  is  valid  against  third  persons  unless  in  writing,  acknowledged 
and  recorded,  possession  of  jjroperty  nut  being  equivalent  to  record,  §  1178. 

In  Missouri,  a  married  woman,  deserted  or  whom  her  husband  fails  to  sup- 
port, may,  by  leave  of  court,  sell  and  convey  her  real  estate  or  any  undisposed- 
of  personal  estate,  which  he  has  in  her  right,  or  receive  any  such  personal 
property  from  the  holder  and  give  a  valid  discharge  therefor,  and  her  earn- 
ings and  those  of  her  minor  children,  free  of  his  debts,  and  use  the  proceeds 
of  such  sales,  personal  property  and  earnings,  to  support  herself  and  family. 
Revised  Statutes  of  1879,  c.  bl,  §§  3284-3288.  When  her  real  estate  is  taken 
by  eminent  domain,  the  compensation  therefor  may  be  invested  so  as  to  se- 
cure her  the  same  benefits  as  such  real  estate,  §  3289.  The  wife  of  a  man 
under  guardianship  may,  by  leave  of  court,  join  with  the  guardian  in  convey- 
ing her  real  estate,  and  release  dower  in  so  doing,  §  3290.  While  the  hus- 
band is  in  the  penitentiary,  she  may  do  business  and  sue  and  be  sued,  as  if 
unmarried,  as  well  as  be  entitled  to  the  rights  of  an  abandoned  wife,  §  3291. 
A  married  woman,  living  apart  from  her  husband  by  reason  of  ill-usage,  may, 
by  leave  of  court,  have  the  sole  use  and  enjoyment  of  her  real  estate,  §§  3292- 
3294.  Her  real  estate,  its  income  and  the  proceeds  of  its  sale  and  her  hus- 
band's interest  in  that  owned  by  her  at  the  marriage  and  afterwards  acquired 
by  gift,  grant,  devise,  or  inheritance,  are  free  of  his  debts  and  cannot  be  con- 
veyed by  him  without  her  joinder;  but  the  annual  products  are  liable  for  family 
necessaries,  for  labor  and  materials  thereon,  and  for  improvements,  §  3295. 
Her  personal  property  at  marriage  and  acquired  after  by  gift,  bequest,  or  in- 
heritance, or  by  pui'chase  with  separate  money,  or  personal  wages  or  compen- 
sation for  personal  injuries,  with  the  profits  thereof,  remains  her  separate 
property,  free  from  his  debts,  except  what  he  has  become  possessed  of  with 
her  express  assent  in  writing,  but  is  subject  to  her  antenuptial  debts  and 
for  his  debts  for  family  necessaries,  §  3296.  The  husband's  property,  except 
such  as  he  may  have  acquired  from  the" wife,  is  exempt  from  all  her  antenup- 
tial debts.  Laws  of  1881,  p.  161. 

In  Montana,  a  married  woman  may  sue  alone  concerning  her  separate  prop- 
erty or  homestead ;  when  the  action  is  between  her  husband  and  herself,  or 
when  living  apart  from  him,  she  may  sue  and  be  sued  alone.  If  sued  with  him, 
she  may  defend  for  herself  and  for  him,  if  he  neglect.  Revised  Statutes  of 
1879,  p.  42,  §§  7,  8.     She  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will  without  her 

424 


CH,  XVllI.]  MARRIED    WOMEN.  *  381 

husband's  consent,  p.  271,  §  435.  If  she  dies  intestate,  leaving  a  child  or  its 
issue,  the  husband  takes  an  equal  share  of  her  property;  if  more  than  fone 
child,  he  takes  one  third;  if  no  issue  or  kindred,  he  takes  the  whole,  p.  282, 
§  534.  When  she  dies,  the  entire  coinmnnity  property  goes  to  him,  except  that 
she  may  dispose  by  will  of  the  portion  for  her  support,  p.  285,  §  550.  She 
may  convey  her  real  estate  with  her  husband,  being  examined  privily  as  to  the 
same,  p.  441,  §§  196-199.  All  her  before  and  after  acquired  property  is  free  of 
her  husband's  debts,  except  for  family  necessaries,  such  property  to  be  thus 
exempt  to  be  recorded,  p.  588,  §  8G(5.  She  may  do  business  on  her  own  ac- 
count, p.  589,  §  867,  on  filing  a  declaration  to  become  individually  responsible 
for  her  business  debts,  §  868.  She  may  then  do  business  in  her  own  name,  all 
the  property  therein  belongs  to  her  free  of  his  debts,  and  she  may  sue  and  be 
sued  concerning  it,  §  869.  She  is  then  responsible  for  her  children's  nuxinte- 
nance,  §  870.  She  may  not  invest  more  than  $10,000,  unless  her  declarations 
state  under  oath  that  the  surplus  is  not  from  the  husband's  funds,  §  871. 
Neither  he  nor  his  property  is  liable  for  her  business  debts  unless  he  consents 
in  writing,  §  872.  A  homestead  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  without  a 
town,  city,  or  village,  or  one  fourth  of  an  acj-e  within,  up  to  $2,500,  is  exempt 
from  judicial  process,  p.  101,  §  311. 

In  Nebraska,  all  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage  and  its  profits, 
and  that  coming  to  her  by  descent,  devise,  or  the  gift  of  other  than  her  hus- 
band, or  acquired  by  purchase,  remains  her  separate  property,  as  if  unmarried, 
and  free  from  his  debts  or  disposal.  Compiled  Statutes  of  1881,  c.  53,  §1. 
She  may  bargain,  sell,  and  convey,  and  contract  concerning  her  property  as 
fully  as  a  married  man,  §  2.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued,  as  if  unmarried,  §  3. 
She  may  do  business  and  service  on  sole  account,  and  her  earnings  therefrom 
are  her  sole  property,  and  may  be  used  and  invested  in  her  own  name,  §  4.  A 
woman  married  without,  if  her  husband  comes  to  reside  in  this  State,  enjoys 
rights  there  acquired,  §  5.  The  husband's  property  is  not  liable  for  her  ante- 
nuptial debts,  §  7.  She  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will,  as  if  unmarried, 
c.  23,  §  123.  She  may  likewise  manage,  control,  lease,  or  convey  her  real  estate 
by  deed  or  will,  c.  73,  §  42.  A  homestead  up  to  $2,000,  and  one  hundred 
and  sixty  acres  without,  or  two  lots  within,  an  incorporated  city  or  village, 
are  exempt  from  execution,  c.  36,  §  1. 

In  Nevada,  all  the  property  of  a  married  woman  at  the  marriage  or  after 
acquired  by  gift,  bequest,  devise,  or  descent,  with  its  profits,  is  her  separate 
property,  which,  with  the  exception  of  money,  must  be  inventoried,  acknowl- 
edged, and  recorded  from  time  to  time  as  acquired,  Compiled  Laws  of  1873, 
§§  151-155.  The  husband  has  the  control  and  absolute  disposition  of  the 
community  property,  with  certain  exceptions,  §  156.  Curtesy  and  dower  are 
abolished,  §  157.  She  may,  without  the  husband's  consent,  dispose  of  her 
property  in  any  manner,  §  158.  Her  earnings,  as  to  his  debts,  and  if  living 
apart  from  her  husband,  those  of  herself  and  minor  children,  are  her  own 
absolutely,  §  164.  If  he  allows  her  to  use  her  earnings,  it  is  a  gift,  and  with 
the  profits,  they  belong  to  her,  §  165.  Her  separate  property  is  alone  liable 
for  her  debts,  §§  166,  167.  They  may  contract  with  each  other,  as  if  unmar- 
ried, like  persons  occupying  a  confidential  position  towards  each  other,  §  169. 
She  must  support  the  husband  if  not  able  to  suppui  t  himself,  §  174.  If  living 
apart  from  him,  she  may  sue  alone,  §  175.  She  may  dispose  of  her  property 
by  deed  and  by  will,  §  184.  She  may,  by  leave  of  court,  become  a  sole  trader, 
and  may  sue  and  be  sued  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  business,  while  the  hus- 
band isnot  liable  for  her  contracts  unless  made  with  his  written  assent.  She 
is  then  liable  for  her  children's  maintenance,  §  223. 

In  New  Hampshire,  a  married  woman  holds  to  her  own  use,  free  of  her 
husband's  control,  all  before  or  after  acquired  property,  if  not  the  result  of  a 
payment  or  pledge  of  his  property.  General  Laws  of  1878,  c.  183,  §  1.  While 
her  husband  is  insane,  duiing  his  abandonment  of  her  without  leaving  a  suit- 
able maintenance,  or  when  a  cause  of  divorce  exists  by  his  act,  she  may  hold 
and  use  the  earnings  of  her  minor  children,  and  use  such  property  as  he  may 

425 


*  382  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

leave,  for  the  family  maintenance,  §§  2,  3.  If  the  wife  of  an  alien  or  citizen 
of  another  State  resides  apart  from  him  in  tlie  State  for  six  months,  she  may 
hold  property,  as  if  unmarried,  and  have  the  care  of  and  expend  tlie  earnings 
of  her  minor  children;  and  when  he  comes  into  the  State,  the  effect  is  of  a 
marriage  of  that  date,  §§  4,  5.  The  wife  of  a  man  under  guardianship  may 
join  his  guardian  in  conveying  her  real  estate,  §  9.  If  of  age,  she  may  join 
her  husband  in  any  conveyance  of  real  estate;  and  in  release  of  dower,  if 
not  of  full  age,  §  10.  She  may,  if  of  full  age,  dispose  of  her  jiroperty  by  will, 
but  not  to  the  impairment  of  the  husband's  rights,  §  11.  As  to  third  persons, 
she  has  the  same  riglits,  may  make  contracts,  and  sue  and  be  sued,  as  if  un- 
married, but  no  undertaking  on  her  husband's  behalf  is  binding  except  her 
release  of  dower  and  homestead  in  a  mortgage,  §  12,  as  amended  by  the  Laws 
of  1879,  c.  57,  §  27.  She  may  have  a  trustee  appointed  to  manage  her  prop- 
erty, §  14.  Wliile  he  is  insane,  or  the  member  of  a  religious  society  believing 
marriage  unlawful,  or  is  in  a  state-prison,  or  a  cause  of  divorce  exists  by  his 
act,  she  may,  by  leave  of  court,  have  a  just  share  of  his  estate  set  off  to  her, 
and  may  convey  it  so  as  to  bar  dower,  homestead,  and  curtesy,  §§  15-17.  lie 
is  not  liable  for  her  antenuptial  debts,  §  18.  A  homestead  to  the  value  of 
$.500  is  exempt  from  execution,  c.  138,  §  1.  The  husband  is  entitled  to  cur- 
tesy; and  if  she  dies  without  issue  intestate,  or  testate  with  no  provision  for 
him  in  her  will,  or  if  he  waives  provision,  to  one  third  of  her  personal  prop- 
erty; or  if  without  issue,  to  one  lialf  of  the  same;  but  neither  to  curtesy  nor 
share  if  he  deserted  her  or  failed  to  maintain  her  within  three  years  of  her 
death,  c.  202,  §  15,  as  amended  by  the  laws  of  1879,  c.  37.  If  she  dies  with 
issue  by  him,  the  husband  may  waive  provision  for  him  in  her  will  and  release 
curtesy,  and  become  entitled  to  one-third  part  of  her  real  estate  in  fee;  if 
without  issue  by  him,  to  a  life-interest  in  one  third  of  her  real  estate;  if  with- 
out issue,  to  one  half  of  her  real  estate  in  fee,  c.  202,  §  16.  Any  antenuptial 
settlement  in  his  favor  bars  his  claims  upon  her  estate,  §  17.  Mutual  devises 
and  bequests  are  in  lieu  of  rights  in  each  other's  estate,  unless  otherwise 
expressed,  §  18. 

In  New  Jersey,  the  property  of  any  woman  married  since  July  4,  1852,  at 
the  marriage  continues  her  separate  property,  as  if  unmarried.  Revision  of 
1877,  p.  636,  §  1.  All  the  property  of  any  woman  "now  married"  is  her 
separate  property,  as  if  unmarried,  except  the  liability  for  the  husband's  debts 
contracted  before  July  4,  1852,  §  2.  All  the  property  and  j^rofits  acquired  by 
a  married  woman  after  July  4,  1852,  in  any  way,  is  her  sole  property,  as  if 
unmarried,  §  3.  Her  future  earnings  and  their  investments  are  to  be  her  sole 
property,  as  if  unmarried,  §  4.  She  may  contract  and  enforce  the  same,  as  if 
unmarried,  except  as  accommodation  indorser,  guarantor,  or  surety,  or  to 
answer  for  the  debt  or  default  of  a  third  person.  §  5.  She  is  bound  by  the 
covenants  in  her  deed  of  land,  §  7.  She  may,  without  the  concurrence  of  her 
husband,  receive  and  receipt  for  property,  as  if  unmarried,  §  8.  She  may,  if 
of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  dispose  of  her  property  by  will,  as  if  unmar- 
ried, without  impairing  the  husband's  interest  in  her  real  property,  §  9.  She, 
and  not  the  husband,  is  with  her  property  liable,  and  may  be  sued,  as  if  un- 
married, for  her  ante  and  post  nuptial  debts,  §  10.  She  may  sue  alone,  touch- 
ing her  separate  property,  as  if  unmarried,  §  11.  She  cannot  convey  her  real 
estate  without  her  husband,  except  when  specially  provided,  nor  impair  his 
curtesy,  nor  can  they  contract  with  or  sue  each  other,  §  14.  Her  property  is 
not  subject  to  his  disposal  or  debts,  §  15.  She  may  make  deposits  in  a  savings 
bank  free  of  the  husband's  control,  p.  1009,  §66.  If  living  separate  from 
her  husband,  she  may,  without  his  consent,  sell  and  convey  any  contingent 
interest  in  any  real  property,  other  than  what  came  from  her  husband,  as  if 
unmarried.  Laws  of  1880,  c.  62.  Any  conveyance  in  pursuance  of  a  power  of 
attorney  executed  by  a  married  woman  with  the  husband  is  as  effectual  as  if 
she  were  unmarried.  Laws  of  1882,  c.  08. 

In  New  Mexico,  persons  of  either  sex,  not  otherwise  prohibited  by  law, 
may  make  a  will,  General  Laws  of  1880,  p.  26,  §  1.     Married  persons,  having 

426   . 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  382 

no  direct  heir,  may  constitute  each  other,  mutually,  as  heirs,  §  10.  One  half 
of  the  wife's  property,  testate  or  intestate,  after  deducting  tlie  common  debts 
of  the  marriage  and  her  private  debts,  belongs  to  the  husband,  p.  32,  §§  4,  5. 
When  her  property  amounts  to  .$5,000,  and  the  heirs  be  not  descendants,  or  iu 
the  absence  of  these  it  exceeds  this  sum,  after  certain  deductions  are  made, 
the  liusbaud  is  entitled  to  one  fourtli,  if  without  this  aid  he  would  remain 
poor,  §7.  When  the  husband  or  wife  dies  without  legitimate  children,  the 
survivor  takes  all  tlie  acquired  property  of  the  marriage  community,  p.  30. 

In  New  Yokk,  the  property  of  a  married  woman  at  the  marriage  and  its 
income  remains  her  separate  property,  free  from  the  disposal  or  debts  of  her 
husband,  as  if  she  were  unmarried.  Revised  Statutes  of  1882,  vol.  iiii 
p.  2330.  A  married  woman  may  take  by  descent,  gift,  grant,  devise,  or  be- 
quest from  other  than  her  husband,  and  hold  to  her  separate  use,  and  convey 
and  devise,  property  and  its  income,  free  from  her  husband's  disposal  and 
debts,  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  ib.  A  trustee  of  her  property,  on  her 
written  request  and  by  leave  of  court,  may  convey  to  her  all  or  a  j^art  of  such 
property  or  its  income  for  her  sole  use  and  benefit,  ib.  Mariiage  contracts 
are  valid,  ib.  A  married  woman's  property,  coming  to  her  by  descent, 
will,  or  gift,  by  business  or  labor  on  her  sole  account,  owned  at  the  marriage, 
and  its  income,  remains  her  property,  may  be  used,  collected,  and  invested  in 
her  own  name,  free  from  her  husband's  control  or  debts,  except  such  latter  as 
were  contracted  for  family  necessaries,  p.  2338.  She  may  dispose  of  her  per- 
sonal property,  carry  on  business  and  perform  labor  on  her  separate  account, 
and  her  earnings  are  her  property,  and  may  be  used  or  invested  in  her  own  name, 
ib.  She  may  sell,  convey,  and  contract  about  her  real  estate  in  all  respects 
as  if  unmarried,  and  may  covenant  so  as  to  bind  her  separate  property,  ib. 
Neither  her  contracts  touching  her  separate  estate  or  business  bind  her  hus- 
band, ib.  A  joint  action  may  be  brought  against  them  for  her  antenuptial  debt, 
but  the  judgment  binds  her  separate  estate  only,  or  her  husband  only  to  the 
extent  of  her  property  acquired  by  him,  p.  2337.  She  may  insure  his  life  for 
her  sole  use  up  to  ^500  premium,  p.  2335.  She  may,  if  without  issue,  dispose 
of  such  insurance  by  will,  ib.  She  may  hold  any  patent  received  by  her  and  its 
proceeds,  and  may  iise  and  dispose  of  it  as  if  unmarried,  ib.  If  of  age,  she  may 
give  and  execute  a  power  of  attorney  as  if  unmarried,  p.  2339;  may  assign 
or  surrender,  with  his  assent,  a  policy  on  his  life  for  her  benefit,  vol.  ii. 
p.  1515;  and  may  acknowledge  instruments,  or  proof  of  execution  be  taken, 
as  if  unmarried,  vol.  iii.  p.  2233;  she  may  sue  and  defend  as  if  single,  and 
the  husband  should  not  be  joined  in  a  suit  affecting  her  separate  estate,  vol. 
iv.  p.  90;  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  §  450. 

In  North  Caholina,  a  married  woman  is  alone  liable  for  her  antenuptial 
contracts,  Revised  Statutes  of  1873,  p.  590,  §§  13,  14.  The  husband  must  be 
joined  in  a  suit  against  her,  but  judgment  will  not  issue  against  him  for  her  an- 
tenuptial debts  or  postnuptial  contracts,  §  15.  But  he  may  be  liable  for  costs 
for  misconduct  in  such  a  suit,  or  discharged  from  the  defence,  §  10.  She  cannot 
contract  to  bind  her  property  without  the  husband's  written  consent,  ex- 
cept for  necessary  personal  expenses,  for  family  support,  or  for  discharging 
antenuptial  debts,  unless  she  is  a  free  trader,  §  17.  She  may  by  an  ante- 
nuptial contract,  or  by  the  husband's  written  consent,  acknowledged  and 
recorded,  become  such  a  trader,  and  contract  as  if  unmarried,  §§  18-20. 
She  may,  after  due  notice,  cease  to  be  a  trader,  and  return  to  her  disability, 
except  as  to  incurred  liablity  or  subsequent  fraud,  §  22.  She  must  be  joined 
by  her  husband  in  a  conveyance  of  her  real  estate,  except  in  a  lease  up  to 
three  years,  §  26.  She  may  contract  with  her  husband,  but  may  not,  with- 
out leave  of  court,  thereby  charge  her  real  estate  longer  than  three  years, 
§§  27,  28.  Her  separate  income,  if  saved,  is  her  separate  property;  but  if  he 
receives  it  without  objection,  he  is  liable  to  account  for  it  but  a  year,  §  29. 
She  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will  as  if  unmarried,  but  not  to  imi>air 
curtesy,  §  31.  If  she  dies  intestate,  in  whole  or  in  part,  he  holds  her  per- 
sonal estate,  subject  to  her  debts.     If  lie  then  dies  before  administering,  it 

427 


*  382  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

passes  into  his  estate,  still  so  subject,  §  32.  She  may  insure  his  life  up  to 
^300  premium  out  of  his  estate,  and  dispose  of  her  interest  therein  by  will, 
§  34.  In  executing  an  instrument  for  registry,  she  must  acknowledge  after  a 
separate  examination  by  the  proper  officer,  Laws  of  1876,  1877,  p.  320. 

In  Ohio,  a  married  woman's  real  estate,  at  the  marriage  or  after  acquired, 
■with  its  income,  remains  her  separate  proj^erty  and  under  her  control.  She 
may  in  her  own  name  contract  for  its  improvement,  or  lease  it  for  not  more 
than  three  years.  It  is  subject  to  curtesy,  but  not  during  her  life  to  her  hus- 
band's debts  or  control.  Revised  Statutes  of  1880,  §  3108.  Her  personal 
property  at  the  marriage,  or  after  acquired  in  any  way,  remains  her  separate 
property  and  under  her  sole  control,  free  of  husband's  debts,  except  such  as 
he  has  reduced  to  i^ossession  with  her  express  assent  to  dispose  of  for  his  own 
use  and  benefit,  §  3109.  Her  property  is  liable  in  a  joint  action  against  hus- 
band and  wife  for  an  antenuptial  cause  against  her,  for  her  tort  during  the 
marriage,  or  for  her  contract  for  the  improvement  of  her  real  estate,  §  3110. 
If  the  husband  deserts  her,  or  neglects  to  provide  for  his  family,  she  may  con- 
tract for  her  own  and  minor  children's  labor,  and  collect  the  earnings,  and,  by 
leave  of  court,  act  as  an  unmarried  woman  in  acquiring  and  disposing  of  prop- 
erty, in  making  contracts,  and  in  suing  and  being  sued,  after  which  he  ceases 
to  be  liable  upon  her  contracts,  §  3111.  If  the  husband  joins  a  sect  not  be- 
lieving in  marriage,  she  may  have  a  just  part  of  his  property,  and  may  have 
the  care  of  a  minor  cliild  and  its  proportion  of  his  property ;  and  all  his  dispo- 
sitions of  his  property  tending  to  deprive  his  wife  and  children  of  support  are 
void,  and  may  be  recovered,  §§  3113-3117.  She  must,  in  disposing  of  her 
real  estate,  join  with  her  husband,  and  acknowledge  the  same  after  a  separate 
examination  touching  the  same,  §§  4107-4109.  A  married  woman  may  sue 
and  be  sued  alone  only  concerning  her  separate  property,  upon  her  written 
obligation,  her  firm  business,  to  set  aside  a  deed  or  will,  to  collect  a  legacy, 
or  if  the  suit  is  between  her  husband  and  herself,  §  4996.  Judgment  may 
be  enforced  against  her  and  her  property  as  if  unmarried;  but  she  is  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  all  exemptions  to  heads  of  families,  §  5319.  She  may 
insure  her  husband's  life  for  her  benefit;  and  insurance  on  the  life  of  any 
person  may  be  transferred  to  her  and  inure  to  her  separate  use,  and  in  case 
she  die  before  due,  to  her  children,  or  if  no  children,  on  her  death  revert  to 
the  party  insured  or  his  transferee.  She  may  sell  or  assign  such  insurance 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  party  insured,  §  3629.  If  a  married  woman 
dies  intestate,  without  children  or  their  legal  representatives  or  kindred,  all 
her  property  belongs  to  tlie  husband,  §§  4158-4160,  4163.  She  may  make 
a  will,  §  5914. 

In  Oregon,  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage  or  after  acquired 
by  gift,  devise,  or  descent,  is  free  of  her  husband's  debts  and  contracts,  and  is 
to  be  registered,  Revised  Statutes  of  1872,  p.  95,  §  5.  She  can  sue  and  be 
sued  alone  only  touching  her  separate  estate,  or  when  the  action  is  between 
herself  and  husband,  p.  110.  She  must  be  joined  by  her  husband  in  con- 
veying her  real  estate,  but  in  so  doing  is  not  bound  by  the  covenants,  p.  515, 
§  2.  She  may  make  a  will  subject  to  curtesy,  p.  788,  §  3.  Her  property 
and  earnings  are  free  from  his  control,  p.  663,  §  4.  If  deserted,  she  may, 
by  leave  of  court,  act  as  if  unmarried,  even  to  the  sale  and  conveyance  of  her 
property,  §  5. 

In  Pennsylvaxia,  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage  and  after- 
terwards  acquired  of  every  kind  remains  her  separate  property,  free  from  her 
husband's  debts  or  disposal  without  her  written  consent  duly  acknowledged. 
He  is  not  liable  for  her  antenuptial  debts,  Brightly's  Purdon  Digest  of  1872, 
p.  1005,  §  13.  She  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will,  §  14.  She  is  liable 
with  her  husband  for  family  necessaries,  §  15.  She  must  join  him  in  her 
suits,  §  20.  She  may  have  a  trustee,  §  19.  She  may  lend  him  money  and 
take  a  mortgage  tlierefor  in  her  trustee's  name,  §  21.  If  deserted  or 
unprovided  for  by  him,  she  may  act  as  an  unmarried  trader,  and  have  exclu- 
eive  charge  of  her  children,  §§24-26.     The  husband,  by  desertion  or  neglect 

428 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  382 

for  a  year,  loses  his  curtesy  and  all  intestate  rights  to  her  estate,  and  to  ap- 
point a  guardian  for  the  children  by  will,  §§  27,  28.  She  may  buy  a  sewing- 
machine  for  her  own  use,  §  37.  Her  personal  earnings,  after  leave  of 
court,  are  her  property,  §§  38,  39.  She  may,  at  the  discretion  of  the  trus- 
tees, receive  payment  of  her  deposits  in  a  bank,  or  interest  thereon,  without 
the  assent,  and  free  from  the  debts,  of  the  husband,  Brightly's  Purdon 
Digest,  1873-1878,  p.  1827.  She  may  transfer  her  personal  jiroperty  with  due 
acknowledgment,  p.  1899.  She  may  sell  and  transfer  stocks  as  if  unmar- 
ried, p.  2037.  She  may  hold  stock  in  savings  fund,  building  or  loan  associa- 
tions, with  full  privileges,  may  alone  sell,  assign,  transfer,  or  withdi-aw  it,  may 
borrow  money  of  such  associations,  and  secure  it  by  transfer  of  the  stock,  by 
other  securities,  or  by  a  bond  and  mortgage  on  her  estate,  if  the  husband  joins 
in  the  latter.  All  dues  may  be  collected  of  her,  and  the  stock  is  free  from 
her  husband's  debts.  Acts  of  1879,  p.  17,  §  7. 

In  Rhode  Island,  a  married  woman's  property  before  marriage,  or  be- 
coming hers  thereafter,  or  acquired  by  her  own  industry,  and  its  income, 
remains  her  separate  property,  free  of  her  husband's  debts.  Public  Statutes 
of  1882,  c.  160,  §  1.  The  proceeds  of  its  sale  may  be  invested  in  her  name 
with  the  same  effect  as  if  unsold,  §  2.  The  husband's  receipt  for  her  income 
is  sufficient,  unless  she  has  given  notice  otherwise,  when  her  receipt  alone  is 
sufficient,  as  it  is  in  all  cases  for  the  payment  to  her  of  her  property,  §  3.  She 
may,  by  joining  her  husband,  convey  by  deed  her  real  property,  furniture, 
plate,  jewels,  shares  of  stock,  savings  deposits,  and  mortgage  debts  due  her; 
and  the  husband  cannot  alone  convey  such  property  of  hers,  §§  4,  5.  She 
may  sell,  convey,  and  contract  with  reference  to  the  rest  of  her  property  as  if 
unmarried;  but  may  not  transact  business  as  a  trader,  §6.  If  of  age,  the 
husband  and  wife  may  convey  her  property  by  joint  or  separate  deeds,  which, 
to  be  effective,  must  be  acknowledged  by  her  on  an  examination  apart  from 
her  husband,  §§  7-9.  If  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  she  may  dispose  of 
her  real  estate,  and  if  of  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  of  her  personal  property  by 
will;  but  not  to  impair  curtesy  or  her  husband's  right  to  administer  without 
accounting  upon  her  undisposed-of  personal  estate,  §§  13,  14.  Her  property 
is  liable  for  her  antenuptial  debts  and  upon  her  authorized  contracts,  as  if  she 
were  unmarried,  §  15.  Upon  authorized  contracts  she  can  sue  and  be  sued 
alone;  in  all  other  matters,  if  without  a  trustee,  the  husband  must  be  joined, 
§  16.  Judgments  recovered  upon  such  suits  become  her  property,  §  17.  She 
may  have  a  trustee  appointed  over  her  property,  §  18.  The  rights  of  husbands 
accruing  before  the  digest  of  1844  went  into  operation  remain  the  same,  §  20. 
Life  insurance  up  to  S10,000  on  any  life  for  her  benefit  inures  to  her  separate 
use,  may  be  sued  for  by  her,  and  she  may  have  a  trustee  appointed  to  hold  the 
proceeds,  §§  21,  22.  If  she  is  of  age,  and  is  deserted,  or  not  provided  for  by 
him  (if  able)  for  six  months,  she  may,  by  leave  of  court,  sell  and  convey  her 
property,  have  her  minor  children's  earnings,  and  sue  and  be  sued  as  if  un- 
married, §  23.  She  may  control,  transfer,  and  withdraw  her  deposits  in  savings 
banks  and  the  interest  thereon,  c.  153,  §  58.  If  she  die  intestate  without 
issue  or  kindred,  her  property  goes  to  her  husband,  c.  187,  §  4. 

In  South  Carolina,  a  married  woman's  property,  at  the  marriage  or  after 
acquired  in  any  way,  is  her  separate  property  free  of  her  husband's  debts, 
General  Statutes  of  1882,  §  2035.  She  may  devise,  bequeath,  or  convey  it  as 
if  unmarried;  if  she  dies  intestate,  with  issue,  the  husband  takes  one-third  of 
her  estate;  if  without  issue,  one  half;  if  without  issue,  parents,  brothers,  sis- 
ters or  issue,  or  lineal  ancestor,  two-thirds ;  if  without  issue  or  kindred,  the 
whole  of  her  estate;  and  she  may  execute  all  legal  instruments  as  if  un- 
married, §§  2036,  1845.  She  can  purchase,  take  conveyances,  and  contract 
with  reference  to  her  property,  as  if  unmarried,  and  her  husband  is  not  liable 
for  her  debts  except  when  contracted  for  her  necessary  support,  §  2037.  She 
may  sue  and  be  sued  alone  touching  her  separate  property,  or  when  the  action 
is  between  her  husband  and  herself,  judgment  to  be  enforced  as  if  she  were 
unmarried,  Code  of  1882,  §  135. 

429 


*  382  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

In  Tennessee,  life  insurance,  effected  by  a  married  woman  upon  her  hus- 
band's life,  inures  to  her  benefit  and  tliat  of  her  children  free  of  his  debts, 
Compiled  Statutes  of  1871,  §  2479.  The  proceeds  of  her  property  cannot  be 
paid  to  any  person  except  by  her  consent  on  privy  examination,  or  by  their 
joint  deed  or  power  of  attorney,  §  2483.  She  may  dispose  of  her  separate 
estate  by  will,  §§  2168,  2484.  If  deserted  by  him,  or  leaving  him  for  ill-treat- 
ment, after-acquired  property  by  her  is  free  of  his  debts  or  disposal  during 
the  separation,  §  2485.  If  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  she  may  dispose  of 
her  interest  in  real  estate  by  will,  deed,  or  otherwise,  as  if  unmarried,  §  2480  a. 
She  may  disjiose  of  her  real  estate  in  any  manner  without  his  consent  or  con- 
currence after  privy  examination  thereto  before  the  proper  official,  §  2486  b. 
Unless  in  case  of  a  settled  estate  upon  her,  the  power  is  withheld,  §  2486  c. 
Her  pi'operty  is  liable  for  debts  for  necessaries  for  herself  and  children,  as  if 
she  were  unmarried,  §  2180  d.  Her  pi'operty  must  be  scheduled  and  registered, 
§  2480  e.  Her  separate  property  is  liable  for  her  antenuptial  debts.  Acts  of 
1877,  p.  104.  Her  property  is  not  subject  to  her  husband's  debts  or  contracts 
except  by  her  consent  in  writing.  Acts  of  1879,  p.  182,  c.  141. 

In  Texas,  all  a  married  woman's  property  before  marriage  and  acquired 
after  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent,  and  the  increase  of  land  acquired,  is  her  sep- 
arate property,  but  is  under  the  husband's  sole  management.  Revised  Statutes 
of  1879,  Art.  2851.  All  her  other  after-acquired  property  is  common,  and  may 
be  disposed  of  by  the  husband  alone.  Art.  2852.  At  the  dissolution  of  the 
mari-iage  all  their  effects  are  regarded  as  common,  unless  proved  otherwise, 
Art.  2853.  She  may  contract  debts  for  family  necessaries  and  for  the  benefit 
of  her  separate  property,  for  which  they  may  be  jointly  sued.  Arts.  1205,  2854; 
and  execution  levied  on  her  separate  or  the  common  property  at  the  discretion 
of  the  plaintiff,  Art.  2855.  If  the  husband  fails  to  support  her  or  to  educate 
the  children  from  the  proceeds  of  her  property,  slie  may,  by  decree  of  court, 
have  so  much  as  may  be  necessary.  Art.  2856.  If  the  husband  fails  to  sue 
alone  or  jointly  with  her  for  her  propeity,  she  may,  by  leave  of  court,  sue  for 
it  alone.  Art.  1204.  She  may  dispose  of  her  property  by  will.  Art.  4857.  If 
she  die  intestate  with  issue,  the  husband  is  entitled  to  one  third  of  the  per- 
sonal estate,  and  an  estate  for  life  in  one  third  of  her  land;  if  without  issue, 
to  the  whole  of  the  personal  estate  and  one  half  of  the  land  absolutely;  if 
without  issue,  or  parents,  brothers,  or  sisters  or  issue,  to  the  whole  of  her  prop- 
erty. Art.  1640.  A  homestead  of  two  hundred  acres  without,  or  lots  up  to 
S5,000  within,  a  town  or  city,  are  exempt  from  a  forced  sale.  Art.  2336. 

In  Utah,  a  mari-ied  woman's  property  at  the  marriage  and  afterwards  ac- 
quired by  gift,  devise,  or  descent,  and  its  income,  is  her  separate  property,  and 
may  be  managed  and  disposed  of  as  if  unmarried.  Compiled  Laws  of  1876, 
p.  342,  §  1020.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued,  §  1021.  No  dower  exists,  §  1022. 
She  may  dispose  of  all  her  estate  by  will,  p   271,  §  689. 

In  VEnMOXT,  a  married  woman  doing  business  in  her  own  name  may  sue 
and  be  sued  in  all  matters  connected  therewith,  as  if  unmarried,  and  execution 
issue  against  her  separate  estate.  Revised  Laws  of  1880,  §  2321.  Personalty 
acquired  by  descent  is  held  to  her  sole  use,  §  2322.  Stocks  and  bonds  given 
her  by  a  parent,  and  the  income,  are  hers,  free  from  the  husband's  debts,  ex- 
cept for  family  necessaries  and  the  improvement  of  her  real  estate,  and  may 
be  disposed  of  by  her  as  if  unmarried,  §  2323.  The  annual  products  of  her 
realtj^  the  proceeds  of  its  sale,  and  her  husband's  interest  therein  are  free  of 
his  debts,  except  that  such  annual  products  are  liable  for  family  necessaries 
and  for  labor  and  materials  on  her  real  estate  after  November  20,  1801.  Her 
husband,  without  her  joinder,  cannot  dispose  of  such  ^nnual  products  or  his 
interest,  §  2325.  When  her  realty  is  taken  for  a  public  use,  the  compensation 
may  be  so  invested  as  to  yield  the  same  benefit  that  such  undamaged  realty 
woidd  have  afforded,  §  2326.  If  deserted  or  unprovided  for,  she  may  contract 
for  and  be  entitled  to  the  earnings  of  herself  and  minor  children ;  may,  by 
leave  of  court,  hold  and  dispose  of  jiroperty,  contract,  and  sue  and  be  sued  in 
her  own  name,  but  he  will  not  be  liable  on  such  contracts,  or  rights  vested 

430- 


CH.  XVIII.]  MARRIED   WOMEN.  *  382 

prior  to  January  1,  1871;  she  may  also  sell  her  realty  and  undisposed-of  per- 
sonalty coming  to  him  through  her,  and  receive  personalty  due  him,  all  the 
proceeds  of  which  she  may  use,  during  his  absence,  for  the  family  suppoit, 
§§  2327-2330.  If  forced  to  live  apart  from  him  by  his  ill-treatment,  she 
may,  by  leave  of  court,  have  the  sole  benefit  of  her  real  estate,  §§  2331-2333. 
While  he  is  in  State  prison,  she  may  do  business,  sue  and  be  sued,  and  have 
the  same  privileges  as  when  deserted,  §  2334.  She  may  insure  his  life  up  to 
S300  premium  free  of  his  debts,  §  2340.  She  may  dispose  of  her  propei-ty  by 
will,  §  2039.  If  she  dies  intestate  and  without  issue,  the  husband,  if  he  does 
not  elect  to  take  curtesy,  takes  all  her  property  if  not  over  ^2,000,  if  more 
than  that,  he  takes  $2,000  and  half  of  the  remainder;  if  without  issue  or  kin- 
dred, he  takes  the  whole,  §  2230.  Her  earnings  deposited  in  a  savings  bank 
are  exempt  from  trustee  process,  §  3577. 

In  Virginia,  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage,  and  its  profits 
and  income,  and  that  acquired  by  her  as  a  sole  trader,  is  her  separate  property, 
free  of  her  husband's  disposal  and  debts;  and  she  may  contract  with  reference 
thereto  and  dispose  of  it,  and  sue  and  be  sued,  as  if  unmarried,  if  he  contracts 
with  her  touching  her  property  other  than  that  acquired  by  her  in  trade,  and 
is  joined  in  suits  affecting  her,  Acts  of  1876-1877,  p.  333,  §  1.  A  married 
woman's  property,  acquired  by  gift,  grant,  purchase,  descent,  or  devise,  is  her 
separate  estate,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  above  Act  of  1877,  free  of  her 
husband's  debts;  and  she  may  dispose  of  it  by  will,  but  not  to  the  impairment 
of  cuitesy;  and  if  a  minor,  her  guardian  is  not  to  turn  her  estate  over  to  her 
until  she  reaches  the  age  of  twenty-one  years.  Acts  of  1877-1878,  p.  247.  If 
she  dies  intestate,  the  whole  of  her  personal  property  goes  to  the  husband;  if 
intestate,  without  issue  or  kindred,  the  whole  of  her  real  estate  goes  to  her 
husband.  Code  of  1873,  c.  119,  §§  1,  10. 

In  Washingtox  Teruitory  a  married  woman  may  acquire,  hold,  and  dis- 
pose of  property,  and  sue  and  be  sued,  as  if  unmarried.  Code  of  1881,  §  2396. 
She  has  no  more  of  disability  in  civil  matters  than  the  husband,  and  may 
equally  in  her  own  name  appeal  to  the  courts,  §  2398.  She  has  equal  right 
to  earnings  and  estate  of  children,  §  2399.  Her  property  at  the  marriage,  and 
after  acquired  by  gift,  devise,  or  inheritance,  and  its  income  and  profits,  is  free 
of  her  husband's  debts  and  contracts,  and  she  may  manage,  lease,  sell,  convey, 
encumber,  and  dispose  of  it  by  will  precisely  as  her  husband  can,  §  2400.  If 
he  gets  control  of  it,  she  may  sue  for  it  as  if  unmarried,  §  2401.  She  may  con- 
stitute him  her  attorney  in  fact,  as  if  unmarried,  §  2403.  She  may  receive 
and  sue  for  her  personal  earnings,  and  may  sue  and  be  sued  for  the  protection 
of  her  rights,  as  if  unmarried,  §  2404.  Neither  she,  nor  the  rent  or  income 
of  her  property,  are  liable  for  his  antenuptial  debts,  nor  for  his  separate  debts, 
§  2405.  She  may  contract  and  enforce  and  be  held  by  them  as  if  unmarried, 
§  2406.  Her  property  is  jointly  or  separately  liable  for  family  expenses  and 
children's  education,  §  2407.  Property  acquired  by  her  other  than  by  gift, 
devise,  or  inheritance,  is  community  iiroperty,  which  personalty  the  husband 
manages  and  disposes  of,  but  not  more  than  one  half  by  will,  §  2409.  He  can- 
not dispose  of  community  realty  unless  she  joins,  §  2410.  On  her  death,  one 
half  of  the  community  property  goes  to  him,  the  other  half  being  subject  to 
her  disposal  by  will,  §2411.  If  without  issue,  the  whole  goes  to  him,  §  2412. 
If  separate  from  him,  her  earnings  and  accumulations,  and  those  of  minor 
children  with  her,  are  her  separate  property,  §  2413.  Dower  and  curtesy  are 
abolished,  §  2414.  If  she  dies  intestate  with  one  child,  he  takes  one  half  of 
her  property;  with  more  than  one  child,  he  takes  one  third;  if  without  issue 
but  parents,  he  takes  one  half;  if  without  issue  or  parents,  or  brother  or  sister, 
he  takes  the  whole,  §  3302. 

In  West  Virginia,  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage,  and  con- 
veyed to  her  other  than  by  her  husband,  and  its  profits,  is  her  sole  property,  as 
if  unmarried,  free  from  her  husband's  control  and  debts,  Kelly's  Revised 
Statutes,  vol.  ii.  c.  122,  §§1,2.  She  may  take  property  by  gift,  grant,  devise, 
or  descent  from  other  than  her  husband,  and  hold,  convey,  and  devise  it  and  its 

431 


*  382  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  I. 

profits  as  if  unmarried,  free  from  his  debts  and  disposal;  but  unless  apart 
from  him  he  must  join  in  her  deed  of  conveyance,  §  '6.  Her  trustee  on  her 
■written  request  may,  by  leave  of  court,  convey  her  property  to  her,  §  4.  She 
may  insure  her  husband's  life  up  to  $150  premium  free  of  his  debts,  §  5.  She 
may  hold,  enjoy,  and  dispose  of  a  patent  free  of  her  husband's  debts,  §  7. 
She  may  receive  and  receipt  for  her  deposits  in  a  bank,  §  8.  She  may  be  sued 
jointly  with  him  for  her  antenuptial  debt,  but  the  judgment  will  bind  her 
property  alone,  §  10.  The  husband  is  liable  for  her  antenuptial  debts  only  to 
the  extent  of  her  separate  property  acquired  by  him,  §  11.  She  may  sue  and 
be  sued  alone  concerning  her  separate  property,  when  between  her  husband 
and  herself,  and  when  living  apart  from  him,  §  12.  If  living  apart  from  him, 
she  may  do  business  in  her  own  name,  and  the  jiroperty  used,  the  profits  and 
earnings  realized,  will  be  her  separate  property,  free  from  the  debts  and  con- 
trol of  her  husband,  §  13. 

In  WiscoNSix,  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage,  including 
realty  held  jointly  with  her  husband,  is  her  separate  property,  with  its  profits, 
free  of  his  debts  and  disposal.  Revised  Statutes  of  1878,  c.  108,  §§  2340, 
2341.  She  may  receive  property  by  inheritance,  gift,  grant,  devise,  or  bequest 
other  than  from  her  husband,  and  hold,  convey,  and  devise  it  and  its  profits  as 
if  unmaiTied,  free  from  his  debts  and  disposal,  §  2342.  Her  personal  earnings, 
except  those  from  her  husband,  are  her  own,  free  of  his  debts  and  control, 
§  2343.  If  deserted  or  unprovided  for,  she  may  do  business  in  her  own  name, 
and  collect  the  profits  and  her  and  her  minor  cliildren's  earnings,  and  apply 
them  to  the  family  support,  free  from  his  debts  or  control,  §  2344.  She  may 
sue  and  be  sued  touching  her  property  or  personal  earnings,  and  judgment 
enforced  against  her  property,  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  §  2345.  She  is  liable, 
as  if  unmarried,  for  antenuptial  debts  contracted  after  April  3,  1872,  §  2346. 
Slie  may  insure  her  husband  or  another  person  for  her  benefit  up  to  $150  pre- 
mium, §  2347.  She  may,  if  of  age,  convey  her  real  estate,  as  if  unmarried, 
c.  100,  §  2221.  She  may,  if  eighteen  years  of  age,  dispose  of  all  her  real  and 
personal  estate  by  will,  c.  103,  §§  2277,  2281.  Her  deposits  in  a  savings  bank 
and  profits  are  her  own  solely,  payable  to  her,  and  her  receipt  therefor  is  a 
discharge,  c.  94,  §  2020.  If  she  dies  intestate,  without  issue,  her  i-eal  and  per- 
sonal property  goes  to  her  husband,  c.  101,  §  2270;  c.  169,  §  3935. 

In  Wyoming,  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  marriage,  and  afterwards 
acquired  in  any  way  other  than  from  her  husband,  is  her  separate  property. 
and  may  be  enjoyed  by  her  as  if  unmarried,  free  from  the  debts  and  control  of 
her  husband.  Compiled  Laws  of  1876,  c.  82,  §  1.  She  may  contract  about,  sell, 
and  convey  her  personalty  as  if  unmarried,  §  2.  She  may  sue  and  be  sued 
touching  her  property,  person,  and  reputation  as  if  unmarried,  §  3.  She  may 
make  a  will  as  if  unmarried,  §  4.  She  may  do  business  and  perform  services, 
and  the  earnings  and  profits  are  her  own,  and  may  be  used  by  her,  and  do  all 
acts  relating  to  the  same,  as  if  unmarried,  §  5.  Her  husband  is  not  liable  for 
her  antenuptial  debts  unless  he  assumes  them  in  writing,  §  6.  If  she  dies 
intestate  with  issue,  one  half  of  her  property  goes  to  him;  if  without  issue,  three 
fourths;  but  if  no  more  than  $10,000,  the  whole,  c.  42,  §  1. 

In  the  District  of  Columbia,  a  married  woman's  property  at  the  mar- 
riage, or  acquired  during  marriage  in  any  other  way  than  by  gift  or  conveyance 
from  her  husband,  is  her  own  as  absolutely  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  free  from 
her  husband's  disposal  and  debts.  Revised  Statutes  of  1873-1874,  §  727.  She 
may  convey,  devise,  and  bequeath  her  property  as  if  unmarried,  §  728. 
She  may  contract  and  sue  and  be  sued  in  her  own  name  in  all  matters  relating 
to  her  separate  property  as  if  unmarried,  §  729.  Her  husband  and  his  prop- 
erty are  not  liable  upon  her  contract  or  suit,  but  a  judgment  may  be  enforced 
against  her  separate  property  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  §  730. 

432 


CH.  XIX.]  PERSONS  OP  INSUFFICIENT  MIND.  *  383 


*  CHAPTER  XIX.  *383 

PERSONS    OF   INSUFFICIENT   MIND   TO    CONTRACT. 

Sect.  I.  —  Non  Compotes  Mentis. 

They  who  have  no  mind,  "  cannot  agree  in  mind "  with 
another ;  and  as  this  is  the  essence  of  a  contract,  they  cannot 
enter  into  a  contract.  But  there  is  more  difficulty  when  we  con- 
sider the  case  of  those  who  are  of  unsound  mind,  partially  and 
temporarily ;  and  inquire  how  the  question  may  be  affected  by 
the  cause  of  this  unsoundness. 

Mere  mental  weakness,  or  inferiority  of  intellect,  will  not  in- 
capacitate a  person  from  making  a  valid  contract ;  nor  is  it  easy 
to  define  the  state  of  mind  which  will  have  this  effect.  There 
must  be  such  a  condition  of  insanity  or  idiocy,  as,  from  its  char- 
acter or  intensity,  disables  him  from  understanding  the  nature 
and  effect  of  his  acts,  and  therefore  disqualifies  him  from  trans- 
acting business  and  managing  his  property,  (^ad)  ^  And  an  adult 
person  although  of  unsound  mind  can  become  liable  on  an  implied 
contract  for  necessaries,  (a J)  ^ 

It  was  once  held  that  no  man  could  discharge  himself  from  his 
liability  under  a  contract  by  proof  that  when  he  made  it  he  was 
not  of  sound  mind ;  on  the  ground  that  no  man  should  be  per- 
mitted to  stultify  himself,  (a)      This  is  not  now  the  law,  either 

(aa)  Dennett  y.  Dennett, 44  N.  H.  531 ;  (ah)  Ex  parte  Nothington,  1   Ala.  (S. 

Bond  V.  Bond,  7  Allen,  1 ;  Hovey  v.  Chase,  C.)  400. 

52  Me.  -304;  Somers  v.  Pumphrey,  24  Ind.  (a)  Litt.  §§  405,  406;  Beverley's  case, 

231 ;  Hovey  v.  Hovey,  55  Me.  256  ;  Cole-  4  Eep.  126 ;   Stroud  v.  Marshall,  Cro.  E. 

man  v.  Frazer,  3  Bush,  300.  398  ;  Cross  v.  Andrews,  id.  622.    But  this 

1  For  this  reason  a  monomaniac's  deed  cannot  be  set  aside  when  his  monomania 
had  no  reference  to  the  transaction  of  which  the  conveyance  was  the  result  and  does 
not  affect  his  business  judgment.     Burgess  v.  Pollock,  53  la.  2'73. 

2  But  an  insane  person  is  not  liable  on  an  implied  contract  for  expenses  at  an 
asylum,  into  which  she  was  received  at  the  request  and  on  the  express  agreement  of 
another  to  pay  for  her  board  and  other  expenses.  Mass.  Gen.  Hospital  v.  Fairbanks, 
129  Mass.  78. 

VOL.  I.  28  433 


384 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


in  England  or  this  country.     If  one  enters  into  a  contract  while 

deprived  of  reason,  and  afterwards  recovers  his  reason,  he  may 
repudiate   that  contract.  (5)  ^     It  is  said  that  an  insane 

*  384    person  *  may  be  arrested  at  common  law,  in  a  civil  ac- 
tion, (c)     We  have  much  doubt  of  this  as  a  rule,  at  least 

in  this  country. 

The  deed  of  an  insane  person  is  not  void,  but  it  is  voidable.  ^ 


was  contrary  to  the  rnosf  ancient  author- 
ities. See  2  BI.  Com.  291.  —  In  Waring 
V.  Waring,  12  Jur.  947  (1848),  the  nature 
and  the  degrees  of  insanity  are  Very  fully 
considered.  It  is  difficult  to  define  insan- 
ity, or  to  discriminate  it  precisely  from 
mere  weakness  of  mind,  or  disturbed 
imagination.  Absolute  sanity  of  mind 
may  or  may  not  be  predicated  of  any 
person,  accordingly  as  we  include  therein 
more  or  less  perfect  power  of  thought 
and  accuracy  of  judgment.  In  Waring 
V.  Waring,  Lord  Bnnu/hdm  holds  that  no 
mind  which  is  insane  upon  any  one  point 
can  be  wholly  sound  on  any  subject.  If 
by  this  any  thing  more  is  meant  than  that 
an  unsound  mind  is  not  a  sound  one,  the 
proposition  is  opposed  to  the  general,  if 
not  universal  opinion  of  mankind.  And 
perhaps  all  experience  demonstrates  that 
a  mind  may  be,  in  relation  to  some  one 
point,  what  would  be  called  insane  by  all 
persons,  and  yet  on  others  be  judged  to 
be  sane,  if  tried  by  any  of  the  tests  usu- 
ally applied  to  this  question. 

(b)  In  Gore  v.  Gibson,  13  M.  &  W.  623, 
the  action  was  assumpsit  by  the  indorsee 
against  the  indorser  of  a  bill  of  exchange. 
The  defendant  pleaded  that  when  he  in- 
dorsed the  bill  he  was  so  intoxicated  as 
to  be  unable  to  comprehend  the  meaning, 
nature,  or  effect  of  the  indorsement;  of 
which  the  plaintiff  at  the  time  of  the  in- 
dorsement had  notice.  Held,  to  be  a 
good  answer  to  the  action.  Parke,  B. : 
"  Where  the  party,  when  he  enters  into 
the  contract,  is  in  such  a  state  of  drunk- 
enness as  not  to  know  what  he  is  doing, 
and  particularly  when  it  appears  that  this 
is  known  to  the  other  party,  the  contract 
is  void  altogether,  and  he  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  perform  it.  A  person  who  takes 
an  obligation  from  another  under  such 
circumstances  is  guilty  of   actual  fraud. 


The  modern  decisions  have  qualified  the 
old  doctrine,  that  a  man  shall  not  be  al- 
lowed to  allege  his  own  lunacy  or  intoxi- 
cation, and  total  drunkenness  is  now  held 
to  be  a  defence."  See  Mitchell  v.  King- 
man, 5  Pick.  431 ;  Webster  v.  Woodford, 
3  Day,  90;  Grant  v.  Thompson,  4  Conn. 
203;  Lang  v.  Whidden,  2  N.  H.  435; 
Seaver  v.  Phelps,  11  Pick.  304 ;  Arnold 
V.  Richmond  Iron  Works,  1  Graj^  434 ; 
McCreight  v.  Aiken,  1  Rice,  56;  Yates  v. 
Boen,  2  Stra.  1104;  Baxter  v.  Earl  of 
Portsmouth,  5  B.  &  C.  170;  Rice  v.  Peet, 
15  Johns.  503;  Owing's  case,  1  Bland, 
377;  Horner  v.  Marshall,  5  Munf.  466; 
Fitzgerald  v.  Reed,  9  Sm.  &  M.  94.  And 
an  administrator  may  avoid  a  contract 
by  showing  the  insanity  of  the  testator  at 
the  time  of  making  it.  Lazell  v.  Pinnick, 
1  Tyler,  247.  —  So  insanity  is  a  good 
defence  to  an  action  of  slander,  and 
evidence  that  the  defendant  was  a 
weak-minded  man,  and  at  times,  both 
before  and  after  the  speaking  of  the 
words,  totally  deranged,  is  competent 
evidence  in  ascertaining  whether  he  was 
insane  at  the  time  of  speaking  them. 
Bryant  v.  Jackson,  6  Humph.  199.  — 
And  it  is  no  answer  that  the  same  party 
when  contracting  was  not  apprised  of  the 
other's  insanity,  and  did  not  suspect  it, 
and  did  not  overreach  such  insane  per- 
son, or  practise  any  fraud  and  unfairness 
upon  him.  Seaver  v.  Phelps,  11  Pick. 
304.  And  the  dictum  of  Lord  Tentcrden, 
in  Brown  v.  Joddrell,  1  Mood.  &  M.  105, 
to  the  contrary,  is  inconsistent  with  mod- 
ern decisions.  The  modern  rule  seems  to 
be  somewhat  qualified  in  Morris  v.  Clay, 
8  Jones,  L.  216.  — Insanity  is  no  defence 
to  an  action  of  trover.  Morse  v.  Craw- 
ford, 17  Vt.  499. 

(c)  Person  v.  Warren,  14  Barb.  488 ; 
Bush  V.  Pettibone,  4  Comst.  300. 


^  The  burden  of  proving  the  restoration  to  reason  is  upon  him  who  seeks  to  enforce 
a  contract  against  the  one  alleging  insanity.  Elston  v.  Jasper,  45  Tex.  409.  See 
Turner  v.  Rusk,  5.3  Md.  65.  —  An  insane  person's  contract  made  during  a  lucid 
interval  is  binding,  McCormick  v.  Littler,  85  III.  62 ;  as  well  as  a  contract  ratified 
during  a  lucid  interval,  although  entered  into  when  insane,  Blakeley  v.  Blakeley,  6 
Stewart,  502,  and  reporter's  note. 

2  Matthiesson,  &c.  Co.  ?'.  McMahon,  9  Vroom,  5.36,  decided  the  general  rule  to 
be  that  contracts  with  lunatics  and  insane  persons  are  invalid,  subject  to  the  qualifica- 

434 


CH.  XIX,]  PERSONS   OF   INSUFFICIENT   MIND.  *  385 

His  heirs  may  avoid  as  to  the  grantee  or  subsequent  purchasers, 
although  the  deed  was  not  obtained  by  fraud,  nor  for  an  inade- 
quate consideration,  (^cc)  ^ 

He  may  repudiate  a  contract  made  by  him  when  insane, 
although  his  temporary  insanity  was  produced  by  his  own  act,  as 
by  intoxication,  (c?)^  But  he  must  not  make  use  of  his  intoxica- 
tion as  a  means  of  cheating  others.  If  he  made  himself 
drunk  *  with  the  intention  of  avoiding  a  contract  entered  *  385 
into  by  him  while  in  that  state,  it  may  well  be  doubted 
whether  he  would  be  permitted  to  carry  this  fraud  into  effect. 
And  if  he  bought  goods  while  drunk,  but  keeps  them  when  sober, 

(cc)  Hovey  v.  Hobson,  53  Me.  451.  Wigglcsworth  v.  Steers,  1  Hen.  &  M.  70. 

{d)  In  Pitt  V.  Smith,  3  Camp.  33,  Lord  It  seems  to  be  held  in  equity  that  intoxi- 
E/lenborom/h  held  that  an  agreement  cation  does  not  avoid  a  contract,  unless 
signed  by  an  intoxicated  man  is  void,  on  the  intoxication  was  produced  by  the 
the  ground  that  such  a  person  "  has  no  otiier  party  or  unless  fraud  had  been 
agreeing  mind."  And  he  reasserted  this  practised  upon  liim.  Cory  v.  Gory,  1 
rule  in  Fenton  v.  HoUoway,  1  Stark.  12(3.  Ves.  Sen.  19  ;  Johnson  v.  Medlicott,  3  P. 
See  Cooke  v.  Clay  worth,  18  Ves.  15;  Wms.  1;30,  n. ;  Stockley  v.  Stocklev,  1 
Cole  V.  Robbins,  Bull  N.  P.  172;  Barrett  Ves.  &  B.  23;  Cooke  v.  Clayworth,  18 
V.  Buxton,  2  Aik.  1(57  ;  Burroughs  v.  Ves.  12 ;  Crane  v.  Conklin,  Saxton,  346. 
llichmond,  1  Green  (N.  J.),  233;  Foot  y.  Dealing  with  persons  non  compotes  raises 
Tewksbury,  2  Vt.  97  ;  Reynolds  v.  Wal-  a  presumption  of  fraud  ;  but  it  may  be 
ler,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  1(54;  Reinicker  i\  rebutted;  and  if  the  evidence  of  good 
Smith,  2  Har.  &  J.  421 ;  Curtis  v.  Hall,  1  faith  and  of  benefit  to  the  unsound  per- 
Southard,  361 ;  Rutherford  v.  Ruff,  4  son  is  clear,  equity  will  not  interfere. 
Desaus.  364;  Seymour  v.  Delaney,  3  Jones  y.  Perkins,  5  B.  Mon.  225.  —  As  to 
Cowen,  415;  Duncan  v  McCullough,  4  frauds  on  drunkards,  see  Gregory  v. 
S  &.  R.  484 ;  Taylor  v.  Patrick,  1  Bibb,  Frazer,  3  Camp.  454 ;  Brandon  v.  Old,  3 
168;  Prentice  v.  Achorn,  2  Paige,  30;  C.  &  P.  440.  Some  of  the  above  author- 
Harrison  ;;.  Lemon,  3  Blackf.  51 ;  Drum-  ities  certainly  seem  to  be  inconsistent 
niond  V.  Hopper,  4  Harring.  (Del )  327.  with  tiie  principle,  that  a  person  in  a 
And  the  legal  representatives  of  a  party  state  of  intoxication  has  no  agreeing 
contracting  while  intoxicated  have  the  mind,  and  therefore  there  never  was  a 
same  right  as  the  party  himself  to  avoid  contract  between  the  parties.  We  think 
such  contract,  although  the  drunkenness  this  principle,  however,  the  true  one. 
was   not   procured   by   the  sober  party. 

tion  that  a  contract  made  in  good  faith  with  a  lunatic  for  a  full  consideration  which 
has  been  executed  without  knowledge  of  the  insanity,  or  such  information  as  would 
lead  a  prudent  person  to  the  belief  of  the  incapacity,  will  be  sustained,  as  in  Lan- 
caster Bank  v.  Moore,  78  Penn.  St.  407,  where  the  insanity  of  the  maker  of  a  note, 
discounted  for  him  by  a  bank  without  notice  of  his  insanity,  was  held  no  defence.  But 
Van  Patton  v.  Beals,  46  la.  62,  decided  that  a  person  of  unsound  mind  signing  as 
surety  a  note  for  an  antecedent  debt  is  not  liable^  though  person  taking  the  note  did 
not  know  of  his  mental  unsoundness. 

1  Great  weakness  of  mind,  also,  together  with  a  grossly  inadequate  consideration,  will 
afford  ground  for  the  setting  aside  a  conveyance  upon  seasonable  application.  Allore 
V.  Jewell,  94  U.  S.  506.     See  Taylor  v.  Atwood,  47  Conn.  498. 

2  The  contract  of  a  man  too  drunk  to  know  what  he  is  about  is  capable  of  ratifi- 
cation by  him  when  he  becomes  sober,  as  in  Matthews  v.  Baxter,  L.  R.  8  Ex.  134, 
where  Martin,  B.,  said :  "  I  think  that  a  drunken  man  when  he  recovers  his  senses 
might  insist  on  the  fulfilment  of  his  bargain,  and  therefore  that  he  can  ratify  it  so  aa 
to  bind  himself  to  a  performance  of  it."  An  habitual  drunkard  is  simply  in- 
competent to  execute  a  deed  upon  proof  that  at  the  time  his  understanding  was 
clouded  or  his  reason  dethroned  bv  actual  intoxication,  or  of  general  unsoundness  of 
mind.     Van  Wyck  v.  Brasher,  81  N.  Y.  260. 

435 


*  386  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  I. 

his  drunkenness  is  no  answer  to  an  action  for  tlie  purchase- 
money.  (^)  1  A  distinction  has  been  taken  between  express  con- 
tracts and  those  implied  by  law,  as  for  money  paid,  goods  sold, 
&G.  And  it  is  said  that  these  last  contracts,  especially  where  the 
things  furnished  were  necessaries,  cannot  be  defeated  by  showing 
the  drunkenness  of  the  defendant.  (/) 

If  the  condition  of  lunacy  be  established  by  proper  evidence 
under  proper  process,  the  representatives  and  guardians  of  the 
lunatic  may  avoid  a  contract  entered  into  by  him  at  a  time  when 
he  is  thus  found  to  have  been  a  lunatic,  although  he  seemed  to 
have  his  senses,  and  the  party  dealing  with  him  did  not  know  him 
to  be  of  unsound  mind,  (g)  But  this  rule  has  one  important  quali- 
fication, quite  analogous  to  that  which  prevails  in  the  case  of  an 
infant,  and  resting  undoubtedly  on  a  similar  regard  for  the  inter- 
ests of  the  lunatic.  This  is,  that  his  contract  cannot  be  avoided, 
if  made  bond  fide  on  the  part  of  the  other  party,  and  for  the 

*  386    procurement  of  necessaries,  (A)  ^  which,  *  as  in  the  case  of 

(e)  See  Aldersnn,  B.,  in  Gore  v.  Gibson,  Earl  of  Portsmouth,  5  B.  &  C.  170,  2  C.  & 
13M.&W.  023.  From  Sentance  ^^  Poole,  P.  178,  a  tradesman  supplied  a  person 
3  C.  &  P.  1,  it  might  be  inferred  that  an  with  goods  suited  to  his  station,  and  after- 
indorsement,  made  in  a  state  of  complete  wards,  by  an  inquisition  taken  under  a 
intoxication,  could  not  be  enforced  commission  of  lunacy,  that  person  was 
against  the  drunkard  by  a  bona  Jide  found  to  have  been  lunatic  before  and  at 
holder  without  knowledge  of  the  circum-  the  time  when  tlie  goods  were  ordered 
stances.  Such  a  rule  must  rest  on  the  and  supplied.  It  was  held,  that  this  was 
assumption  that  tlie  act  was  amdlitij;  but  not  a  sufficient  defence  to  an  action  for 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  one  could  indorse  the  price  of  tlie  goods,  the  tradesman,  at 
a  bill  or  note  in  such  a  way  that  its  ap-  the  time  when  he  received  tlie  orders 
pearance  would  excite  no  suspicion,  and  and  supplied  the  articles,  not  having  any 
yet  be  so  drunk  as  to  know  nothing  of  reason  to  suppose  that  the  defendant 
what  he  was  doing ;  and  unless  the  in-  was  a  lunatic.  Abbot,  C.  J. :  "I  was  of 
dorser  were  utterly  incapacitated,  it  opinion  at  the  trial  that  the  evidence 
should  seem  that  a  third  party,  taking  given  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  was 
the  note  innocently  and  for  value,  ought  not  sufficient  to  defeat  the  plaintiff's  ac- 
to  hold  it  against  him.  tion.     It   was   brought   to   recover  their 

( /)  Gore  V.  Gibson,  13  M.  &  W.  623.  charges  for  things  suited  to  the  state  and 

(fj)  McCrillis  v.  Bartlett,  8  N.  H.  569.  degree  of  the  defendant,  actually  ordered 

See  Smith  v.  Spooner,  3  Pick.  229;  Man-  and  enjoyed  by  him.     At  the  time  when 

son  V.  Felton,  13  Pick.  206.  the  orders  were  given  and  executed.  Lord 

(A)  Richardson  v.  Strong,  13  Ired.  L.  Portsmouth  was  living  with  his  family, 

100;   Gore  v.  Gibson,  13  M.  &  W.  023;  and  there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  that 

Niell  V.  Morley,  9  Ves.  478 ;  McCrillis  v.  the   plaintiffs   knew  of    his   insanity.     I 

Bartlett,  8  N.  H.  509.     In  Baxter  v.  The  thought    the    case   very   distinguishable 

1  Nor  can  the  maker's  drunkenness  be  set  up  against  the  innocent  indorsee  of  a 
negotiable  note.  McSparran  v.  Neeley,  91  Penn.  St.  17.  See,  however,  as  to  a  maker's 
insanity,  McClain  v.  Davis,  77  Ind.  419,  contra.  But  in  a  suit  by  a  bond  fide  indorsee  of 
a  note  against  a  lunatic,  the  consideration  may  be  inquired  into.  Moore  v.  Hershey, 
90  Penn.  St.  196. 

2  A  lunatic,  and  after  his  death  his  personal  representative,  is  liable  for  necessaries. 
Van  Horn  v.  Hauu,  10  Vroom,  207  ;  and  for  money  borrowed  to  pay  his  debts,  Lan- 
caster Co.  Bank  v.  Moore,  78  Penn.  St.  407 ;  or  of  which  has  had  the  benefit. 
Mutual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hunt,  79  N.  Y.  54L     See  Young  v.  Stevens,  48  N.  H.  133. 

436 


CH.  XIX.] 


PERSONS   OF   INSUFFICIENT   MIND. 


*3S6 


infants,  would  not  be  restricted  to  absolute  necessaries,  but 
would  include  such  things  as  are  useful  to  him,  and  proper 
for  his  means  and  station.  And  it  has  been  reccntl}^  held,  that 
a  bond  fide  contract  made  with  a  lunatic,  who  was  apparently- 
sane,  cannot  be  rescinded  by  him  or  his  representatives,  unless 
the  parties  can  be  placed  in  statu  quo.  (z)  ^ 

The  statutes  of  the  different  States  provide  that  idiots,  lunatics, 
drunkards,  and  all  persons  of  unsound  mind,  may  be  put  under 
guardianship.  And  the  finding  by  a  competent  court  of  the  fact 
of  lunacy,  and  the  appointment  of  a  guardian,  are  held  to  be 
conclusive  proof  of  such  lunacy,  and  all  subsequent  contracts 
are  void.  (/)     In    England,  an   inquisition    is  only  presumptive 


from  an  attempt  to  enforce  a  contract 
not  executed,  or  one  made  under  cir- 
cumstances which  might  have  induced 
a  reasonable  person  to  suppose  tlie  de- 
fendant was  of  unsound  mind.  The 
latter  would  be  cases  of  imposition  ;  and 
I  desired  that  my  judgment  might  not 
be  taken  to  be  that  such  contracts  would 
bind,  although  I  was  not  prepared  to  say 
that  they  would  not." 

(i)  Molton  1-.  Camroux,  12  Jur.  800 
(1848);  s.  c.  2  Exch.  487;  in  error,  4 
Exch.  17.  See  also  Niell  v.  Morley,  9 
Ves.  478;  Price  v.  Berrington,  7  E.  L.  & 
E.  254;  Fitzhugh  v.  Wilcox,  12  Barb. 
235.  In  Dane  v.  Kirkwall,  8  C.  &  P. 
679,  it  was  he/d,  that  to  constitute  a 
defence  to  an  action  for  use  and  occu- 
pation of  a  house,  taken  by  the  defend- 
ant under  a  written  agreement,  at  a 
stipulated  sum  per  annum,  it  is  not 
enough  to  show  that  the  defendant  is 
a  lunatic,  and  that  the  house  was  un- 
necessary for  her ;  but  it  must  also  be 
shown  that  the  plaintiff  knew  this,  and 
took  advantage  of  the  defendant's  situa- 
tion; and  if  that  be  shown,  the  jury 
sliould  find  for  the  defendant ;  and  they 
cannot,  on  these  facts,  find  a  verdict  for 
the  plaintifE  for  any  smaller  sum  than 
that  specified  in  the  agreement 

(,/)  Fitzhugh  V.  Wilcox,  12  Barb.  2.35; 
Wadsworth  v.  Slicrman,  14  Barb.  169. 
Contra  in  Pennsylvania,  In  re  Gangwere's 
Estate,  14  Penn.  St.  417.  In  Leonard  v. 
Leonard,  14  Pick.  280,  the  court  said  : 
"  It  is  suggested,  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant, that  an  inquisition  of  lunacy 
in  England  is  not  conclusive  on  tlie 
question  of  sanity  ;  but  it  is  a  sufficient 


answer,  that  such  an  inquisition  is  very 
different  from  the  proceedings  in  a  court 
of  probate  under  our  statute.  The  plain- 
tiff insists  that  the  guardianship  is  con- 
clusive of  the  disability  of  the  ward,  in 
relation  to  all  subjects  on  which  the 
guardian  can  act,  and  that  i  the  only 
mode  of  preventing  this  operation  is  by 
procuring  the  guardianship  to  be  set 
aside.  And  there  can  be  no  question 
but  that  the  judge  of  probate  has  power 
to  reconsider  the  subject,  and  if  it  shall 
appear  that  the  cause  for  the  appointment 
of  a  guardian  has  ceased,  or  that  the 
guardian  is  an  improper  person  for  the 
office,  the  letter  of  guardiansliip  may  be 
revoked.  McDonald  v.  Morton.  1  Mass. 
543.  In  the  case  of  VVhite  v.  Palmer,  4 
Mass.  147,  it  was  held,  that  the  letter  of 
guardiansliip  was  competent  evidence  of 
the  insanity  of  the  ward,  and  the  reason- 
ing tends  to  show  that  it  is  conclusive ; 
but  this  was  not  the  question  then  before 
the  court.  If  this  were  not  the  general 
principle  of  the  law,  the  situation  of  the 
guardian  would  be  extremely  unpleasant, 
and  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to 
execute  the  trust.  In  every  action  he 
might  be  obliged  to  go  before  the  jury 
upon  the  question  of  sanity,  and  one 
jury  might  find  one  way,  and  another 
another.  We  are  of  opinion,  that  as  to 
most  subjects,  the  decree  of  the  probate 
court,  so  long  as  the  guardianship  con- 
tinues, is  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
disability  of  the  ward ;  but  that  it  is 
not  conclusive  in  regard  to  all.  For  ex- 
ample, the  ward,  if  in  fact  of  sufficient 
capacity,  may  make  a  will,  for  this  is  an 
act   which   the  guardian  cannot  do   for 


1  Rusk  V.  Fenton,  14  Bush,  490.  But  an  exchange  by  one  whose  mental  incapacity 
is  apparent  to  any  one  of  ordinary  observation  is  void,  and  his  guardian,  .subse(iuently 
appointed,  may  recover  his  property  without  tender  of  that  received  by  him.  Halley 
V.  Troester,  Iz  Mo.  73. 

437 


*  387  THE  LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

*  387    *  evidence  as  to  other  parties.  (Jc)     But  it  has  been  held, 

that  even  where  the  statute  expressly  declares  all  the  con- 
tracts of  a  lunatic  under  guardianship  void,  or  disables  him  from 
entering  into  contracts,  it  is  not  the  purpose  nor  effect  of  such 
provisions  to  annul  his  contract  for  necessaries,  if  made  in  good 
faith  by  the  other  party,  and  under  circumstances  which  justify 
the  contract.  (Z)  If  a  lunatic  be  sued,  or  a  claim  is  made  upon 
him,  perhaps  any  person,  though  not  expressly  authorized,  may 
in  his  case,  as  in  that  "of  an  infant,  make,  in  good  faith,  a  legal 
tender  for  him,  which  shall  inure  for  his  benefit. 

Courts  of  law,  as  well  as  equity,  afford  protection  to  those 
who  are  of  unsound  mind.  They  endeavor  to  draw  a  line  be- 
tween sanity  and  insanity,  but  cannot  so  well  distinguish  between 
degrees  of  intelligence.  Against  the  consequence  of  mere  impru- 
dence, folly,  or  that  deficiency  of  intellect  which  makes  mistake 
easy,  but  does  not  amount  to  unsound  or  disordered  intellect, 
even  equity  gives  no  relief,  unless  the  other  party  has  made  use 
of  this  want  of  intelligence  to  do  a  certainly  wrongful  act.  (m)  ^ 
It  may  be  said  that  a  lower  degree  of  intellect  suffices  ordinarily 
to  make  a  will  than  is  required  to  make  a  valid  contract,  (n) 

In  this  country,  where  provision  is  made  by  statute  that  persons 
of  unsound  mind  may  be  put  under  guardianship,  this  may  be 
done  upon  a  representation  and  request,  either  of  the  authorities 
of  the  town  in  which  he  resides,  or  of  his  friends  or  relatives ; 
and  after  proper  inquiry  into  the  facts,  and  into  the  evidence 
and  character  of  the  insanity.  The  guardian  so  appointed  gives 
bonds  for  the  due  management  and  care  of  the  estate  and  person 
of  the  insane.     He  then  is  put  into   possession  of  the  estate  of 

him.     But  the  transaction  now  in   qucs-  of  witnesses  not  medical  men,  relative  to 
tion  falls  within  the  j^eneral  rule."     So,  the  sanity  of  a  j)arty,  are  not  admissible, 
proceedings  in  a  court  of  equity,  estab-  yet  their  opinions,  in  connection  with  the 
fishing  the  lunacy  of   a   party,  are  ad-  facts  upon  which  they  are  founded,  may 
missible    to    prove    the    lunacy    in    an  be.     Grant   v.  Thompson,  4   Conn.  203; 
action  at  law,  against  third  persons  not  McCurry  v.  Hooper,  12  Ala.  823. 
a   party    to    the   proceedings   in    equity.  (k)  Sergeson  v.  Sealey,  2  Atk.  412; 
McCreight    v.  Aiken,   1    Rice,   5G.     And  Faulder  v.  Silk,  3  Camp.  12(J.     And  the 
creditors  of  an  obligor  to  a  bond,  if  not  same    rule    was    recognized    in    Hart    v. 
interested  in  the   result,  are   competent  Deamer,  G   Wend.  4!)7.     See   also   Hop- 
witnesses  to  prove  the  obligor's  lunacy,  son  v.  Boyd,  G  B.  Mon.  200. 
Hart  V.  Deamer,  6  Wend.  497.     And  to          (/)  McCrillis  v.  Bartlett,  8  N.  H.  669. 
prove  a  party's  lunacy  at  the   time   of          (m)  Osmond    ?;.  Fitzroy,   3    P.   Wnis. 
making  a  contract,  evidence  of  the  state  120;    1   Fonbl.  Eq.  (5lh  ed.)  C6  ;    Lewis 
of    his    mind    hi  fore,    at,    and   after   such  v.  Pead,  1  Ves.  Jr.  10. 
time  is  admissible.     Grant  v.  Thompson,          (n)  Converse  v.  Converse,  21  Vt.  168. 
4  Conn.  203.     Although  the  mere  opinion 

^  See  Marmou  v.  Marmon,  47  la.  121. 

438 


CH.  XIX.]  PERSONS   OF   INSUFFICIENT   MIND.  *  388 

his  ward,  and  has  the  general  disposition  *  and  control  of    *  388 
it.     For  their  powers  and  duties,  see  the  preceding  chap- 
ters on  Guardians  and  on  Trustees. 

Similar  provisions  are  often  made  with  respect  to  persons  men- 
tioned in  the  next  section. 


SECTION  II. 

SPENDTHRIFTS. 

In  regard  to  these  persons,  the  appointment  of  a  guardian,  and 
the  depriving  them  of  all  power  over  their  own  property,  is  gen- 
erally put  on  the  ground  of  a  danger  that  they  may  become 
chargeable  to  the  town  or  other  body  corporate  who  will  be 
bound  to  support  them  if  they  become  paupers.  The  application 
must  come,  therefore,  from  the  authorities  of  such  town  ;  and  set 
forth  that  the  party,  by  drinking,  gaming,  or  other  debauchery, 
is  so  spending  and  wasting  his  means  as  to  be  in  danger  of  becom- 
ing chargeable.  Here  also  there  is  to  be  a  judicial  inquiry  into 
the  facts,  after  due  notice  to  the  alleged  spendthrift ;  and  upon 
a  finding  of  the  facts  in  accordance  with  the  petition,  a  guardian 
is  appointed  as  before,  and  after  such  appointment  all  contracts 
of  the  spendthrift,  except  for  necessaries,  are  void.  Where  a 
provision  is  made  for  recording  such  complaint  and  petition  in 
a  public  registry,  no  valid  contract,  except  for  necessaries,  can 
be  made  by  the  spendthrift,  after  such  record,  provided  a  guar- 
dian be  subsequently  appointed  on  the  petition,  (o)  And  it  has 
been  held  that  the  acknowledgment  or  new  promise  of  a  spend- 
thrift under  guardianship  is  not  sufficient  to  take  a  former  prom- 
ise out  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  (jo) 

(o)  It  was  held  in  Smith  v.  Spooner,  3  (p)  In  Mason  v.  Felton,  13  Pick.  206, 
Pick.  229,  that  the  Massachusetts  statute  Shaw,  C.  J.,  said :  "  The  question,  then, 
of  1818,  c.  GO,  which,  in  case  a  guardian  is,  whether  a  spendthrift,  under  guardian- 
shall  be  appointed  to  a  spendthrift,  sliip  is  competent  to  make  a  valid  con- 
avoids  "every  gift,  bargain,  sale,  or  tract  for  the  payment  of  money.  The 
transfer  of  any  real  or  personal  estate,"  plaintiff  relies  upon  Smith  v.  Spooner, 
made  by  the  spendthrift  after  the  com-  3  Pick.  220,  as  decisive.  But  we  tliink 
plaint  of  the  selectmen  to  the  judge  of  that  that  case  turns  upon  a  very  differ- 
probate,  and  the  order  of  notice  there-  ent  principle.  That  action  was  brought 
on  shall  have  been  filed  in  the  registry  upon  a  note  executed  after  a  complaint 
of  deeds,  does  not  apply  to  promissory  made  by  the  selectmen  and  before  the 
notes.  But  this  case  is  explained  by  actual  appointment  of  a  guardian.  It 
Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Mason  v.  Felton,  13  Pick,  depended,  therefore,  wholly  upon  the 
208,  as  depending  wholly  upon  the  con-  construction  of  the  statute  of  1818,  pro- 
struction  of  the  statute  of  1818.  viding,  that  after  such  complaint  made, 

439 


389  THE   LAW  OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 


*389  *  SECTION  in. 

SEAMEN. 

The  reckless  and  improvident  habits  of  seamen,  and  their  ina- 
bility to  protect  themselves  against  the  various  parties  with  whom 
they  deal,  have  induced  courts  both  of  law  and  equity  to  extend 
to  them  a  certain  kind  of  disability  for  their  protection ;  that  is, 
certain  contracts  with  seamen,  taking  away  their  rights,  or  laying 
them  under  wrongful  obligations,  are  annulled.  A  number  of 
statutes  have  been  enacted  both  in  England  and  in  this  country 
in  relation  to  the  shipping  articles,  as  they  are  termed,  or  the 
contracts  by  which  seamen  engage  their  services  for  a  voyage. 
The  Act  by  which  this  subject  is  principally  governed  at  this  time 

is  that  of  1813,  c.  2.  And  it  has  been  very  distinctly  de- 
*  390    cided,  that  any  stipulations  in  shipping  articles  *  which 

derogate  from  the  general  rights  and  privileges  of  seamen, 
will  be  held  void  in  admiralty,  and  to  a  certain  extent  at  com- 
mon law,  unless  it  shall  be  made  apparent  by  proof  on  the  part 
of  the  owner,  that  the  nature  and  effect  of  such  stipulations  were 
explained  to  and  understood  by  the  seamen,  and  an  additional 
compensation  allowed  him,  fully  adequate  to  all  that  he  lost  by 

and   a  copy   filed   witli   the  register  of  thrift  and  those  dependent  on  him.   Tiiese 

deeds,  every  gift,  bargain,  sale,  or  trans-  considerations  form  a  marked  distinction 

fer  of  real  or  personal  estate,  shall  be  between  the  case  of  an  actual  adjudica- 

void.     It    was    decided    on    the    ground  tion,   conclusively   fixing    the    disability 

that  before   the   actual   appointment    of  contemplated    by   the    statute,   and    ap- 

a   guardian   there   was   no   disability  to  pointing  a  guardian  to  act  in  place   of 

make  contracts,  except  the  specific  dis-  the  person  disabled,  and  the  limited  and 

ability  created  by  the  statute ;  that  such  temporary  restraint    established   by  the 

a  disability  ought  not  to  be  extended  by  statute  of    1818,  on  the  construction  of 

construction,  being  in    derogation   of   a  which  the  case  of  Smith  v.  Spooner,  was 

general  right  and  power  of  persons  over  decided.     But  tliere  are   several  expres- 

ilieir  own  property;  and  that  the  mak-  sions,  in   the   opinion   of    the   court,   in 

ing  of  a  promissory  note  was  not  a  gift,  that  case,  implying  a  distinction  in  their 

sale,  or  transfer  of  property  within  the  minds  between  the  case  of  a  person  ac- 

meaning   of    the    act.     It    is    to    be    re-  tually  under  guardianship,  and  that  of 

marked,  that   the   disability  created   by  a   person   in  relation    to   whom    the  in- 

this  act  is  to  take  effect  upon  a  mere  cipient  measures  have  been  taken  to  es- 

complaint,   before  any   adjudication,   or  tablish  such  a  guardianship.     The  court 

even  inquiry  into  the  truth  of  the  facts  speak  of  the  note,  made  after  complaint 

charged,    and    before    the    appointment  filed,   but  before  the   appointment  of  a 

of   a   responsible   officer  competent  and  guardian,  as  a  note  made  '  on  the  eve  of 

bound  to  take  charge  of   the  property,  a  disability  to  contract.'     And  the  clos- 

and  provide  for  the  wants  of  the  spend-  ing  remarks,  in  tlie  opinion  of  the  chief 

440 


CH.  XIX.] 


PEESONS  OF  INSUFFICIENT  MIND. 


391 


the  stipulation,  (^q)     In  the  case  of  The  Juliana,  referred 
*  to  bj  Judge  Stori/  in  Harden  v.  Gordon,  the  true  doc-    *  391 
trine  on  this  subject  is  set  forth  by  Lord  Stowell  with  great 
clearness  and  force.     Tlie  general  principle  in  all  these  decisions 


justice,  strongly  implied  the  same  conclu- 
sion." Shearman  v,  Akins,  4  Pick.  283; 
and  see  Pittam  v.  Foster,  1  B.  &  C.  248 ; 
Ward  y.  Hunter,  6  Taunt.  210. 

(7)  Brown  v.  Lull,  2  Sumner,  443; 
Harden  v.  Gordon,  2  Mason,  541 ;  3  Kent, 
Com.  193 ;  The  Juliana,  2  Dodson,  504. 
In  Brown  v.  Lull,  supra,  Story,  J.,  speak- 
ing of  the  effect  of  a  stipulation  in  the 
shipping  articles,  which  in  that  case  was 
relied  ujion  as  controlling  the  right  of 
the  seaman  to  wages,  said :  "  It  is  well 
known  that  the  shipping  articles,  in  their 
common  form,  are  in  perfect  coincidence 
with  the  general  principles  of  the  mari- 
time law  as  to  seamen's  wages.  It  is 
equally  well  known  that  courts  of  admi- 
ralty are  in  the  habit  of  watching  with 
scrupulous  jealousy  every  deviation  from 
these  principles  in  the  articles  as  injuri- 
ous to  the  rights  of  seamen,  and  founded 
in  an  unconscionable  inequality  of  bene- 
fits between  the  parties.  Seamen  are  a 
class  of  persons  remarkable  for  their  rash- 
ness, thoughtlessness,  and  improvidence. 
They  are  generally  necessitous,  ignorant 
of  the  nature  and  extent  of  their  own 
rights  and  privileges,  and  for  the  most 
part  incapable  of  duly  appreciating  their 
value.  They  combine,  in  a  singular  man- 
ner, the  apparent  anomalies  of  gallantry, 
extravagance,  profusion  in  expenditure, 
indifference  to  the  future,  credulity, 
whicli  is  easily  won,  and  confidence, 
which  is  readily  surprised.  Hence  it  is 
that  bargains  between  them  and  sliip- 
owners,  the  latter  being  persons  of  great 
intelligence  and  shrewdness  in  business, 
are  deemed  open  to  much  observation 
and  scrutiny ;  for  tliey  involve  great  in- 
equality of  knowledge,  of  forecast,  of 
power,  and  of  condition.  Courts  of  ad- 
miralty on  this  account  are  accustomed  to 
consider  seamen  as  peculiarly  entitled  to 
their  protection  ;  so  that  they  have  been, 
by  a  somewhat  bold  figure,  often  said  to 
be  favorites  of  courts  of  admiralty.  In 
a  just  sense  they  are  so,  so  far  as  the 
maintenance  of  tlieir  rights  and  the  pro- 
tection of  their  interests  against  the  ef- 
fects of  the  superior  skill  and  shrewdness 
of  masters  and  owners  of  ships  are  con- 
cerned. Courts  of  admiralty  are  not  by 
their  constitution  and  jurisdiction  con- 
fined to  the  mere  dry  and  positive  rules  of 
the  common  law.  But  they  act  upon  the 
enlarged    and    liberal    jurisprudence  of 


courts  of  equity,  and  in  short,  so  far  as 
their  powers  extend,  they  act  as  courts 
of  equity.  Whenever,  therefore,  any 
stipulation  is  found  in  the  sliipping  arti- 
cles which  derogates  from  the  general 
rights  and  privileges  of  seamen,  courts 
of  admiralty  hold  it  void,  as  founded 
upon  imposition,  or  an  undue  advantage 
taken  of  their  necessities  and  ignorance 
and  improvidence,  unless  two  things  con- 
cur :  first,  that  the  nature  and  operation 
of  the  clause  is  fully  and  fairly  explained 
to  the  seamen ;  and  secondly,  tiiat  an 
additional  compensation  is  allowed,  en- 
tirely adequate  to  the  new  restrictions 
and  risks  imposed  upon  them  thereby. 
This  doctrine  was  fully  expounded  by 
Lord  Stowell,  in  his  admirable  judgment 
in  the  case  of  the  Juliana  (2  Dodson, 
504) ;  and  it  was  much  considered  by 
this  court  in  the  case  of  Harden  v.  Gor- 
don (2  Mason,  541,  566,  557) ;  and  it  has 
received  the  high  sanction  of  Mr.  Chan- 
cellor Kent  in  liis  Commentaries  (ill.  §  40, 
p.  193).  I  know  not,  indeed,  that  this 
doctrine  has  ever  been  broken  in  upon  in 
courts  of  admiralty  or  in  courts  of  equity. 
The  latter  courts  are  accustomed  to  apply 
it  to  classes  of  cases,  far  more  extensive 
in  their  reach  and  operation ;  to  cases 
of  young  heirs  selling  their  expectancies  ; 
to  cases  of  reversioners  and  remainder- 
men dealing  witli  tlieir  estates ;  and  to 
cases  of  wards  dealing  with  their  guar- 
dians ;  and  above  all,  cases  of  seamen 
dealing  with  their  prize-money,  and  other 
interests.  If  courts  of  law  have  felt 
themselves  bound  down  to  a  more  lim- 
ited exercise  of  jurisdiction,  as  it  seems 
fiom  the  cases  of  Appleby  v,  Dodd  (8 
East,  300),  and  .Jesse  v.  Roy  (1  C.  M.  & 
K.  310,  329,  339),  that  they  are,  it  is  not 
that  the}'  are  insensible  of  the  justice 
and  importance  of  these  considerations, 
but  because  they  are  restrained  from 
applying  them  by  the  more  strict  rules 
of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  common  law, 
which  they  are  called  upon  to  admin- 
ister." In  the  case  of  The  Betsy  & 
Rhoda,  in  the  District  Court  of  Maine,  3 
N.  y.  Leg.  Obs.  215,  it  was  held  that  a 
negotiable  note  taken  by  a  seaman  for 
wages,  will  not  extinguish  his  claim  for 
wages,  nor  his  lien  on  the  ship,  unless  he 
be  informed  of  this  effect,  and  have  ad- 
ditional security  given  him  by  way  of 
compensation. 

441 


391 


THE  LAW  OP   CONTEACTS. 


[book  I. 


is,  that  where  a  man  has  made  a  promise  to  one  who  has  taken 
a  wrongful  advantage  of  his  circumstances  or  his  necessities,  he 
shall  not  be  bound  by  such  promise.  And  the  same  principle  has 
been  enforced  against  seamen  ;  as  where  in  the  course  of  a  voyage 
they  compelled  the  master  to  make  a  new  contract  with  them  for 
higher  wages,  by  threats  of  desertion.  (?-)  And  contracts  made 
with  pilots  or  salvors,  under  circumstances  of  necessity,  for  exor- 
bitant or  unjust  compensation,  have  been  set  aside  on  the  same 
principle.  But,  in  general,  contracts  respecting  the  wages  of 
seamen  will  be  construed  liberally  in  their  favor,  in  all  cases 
where  there  may  be  room  for  such  construction.  As  where  by 
the  usual  clause  no  seaman  was  entitled  to  his  wages,  or  any  part 
thereof,  until  the  arrival  of  the  ship  at  the  port  of  discharge,  the 
words  italicized  are  not  construed  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
earning  of  wages,  but  only  as  determining  the  time  and  place  of 
payment,  (s) 


(r)  Bartlett  v.  Wyman,  14  Johns.  261. 
In  this  case  the  court  said,  that  the  new 
contract  made  by  the  master  was  not 
binding  on  liim,  because  made  "  in  con- 
travention of  the  policy  of  the  Act  of 
Congress  of  the  20tli  July,  1790.  This 
statute  requires,  under  a  penalty,  every 
master  of  a  ship  or  vessel,  bound  from  a 
port  in  the  United  States  to  any  foreign 
port,  before  he  proceeds  on  the  voj'age, 
to  make  an  agreement  in  writiug  or  print 
■with  every  seaman  or  mariner  on  board, 
with  the  exception  of  apprentices  or  ser- 
vants, declaring  the  voyage  and  term  of 
time  for  which  the  seaman  or  mariner 
shall  be  shipped.  In  the  present  case 
this  was  done,  and  the  rate  of  wages 
fixed  at  seventeen  dollars  per  month  for 
the  whole  voyage.  To  allow  the  sea- 
man, at  any  intermediate  port,  to  exact 
higher  wages,  under  the  threat  of  desert- 
ing the  ship,  and  to  sanction  this  exaction 
by  holding  the  contract,  thus  extorted, 
binding  on  the  master  of  the  ship,  would 
be  not  only  against  the  jjlain  intention  of 
the  statute,  but  would  be  holding  out 
encouragement  to  a  violation  of  duty,  as 
well  as  of  contract.  The  statute  protects 
the  mariner,  and  guards  his  rights  in  all 
essential  points ;  and  to  put  the  master 
at  the  mercy  of  the  crew  takes  away  all 
reciprocity." 

(s)  Swift  V.  Clark,  15  Mass.  173; 
Johnson  v.  Sims,  1  Pet.  Ad.  215 ;  Flan- 
ders' Marit.  Law,  §  404  ;  The  Schooner 
Emulous  &  Cargo,  1  Sumner,  207  ;  The 
A.  D.  Patchin,  1  Blatch.  C.  C.  414.     And 

442 


in  the  George  Home,  1  Hagg.  Ad.  370, 
on  an  engagement  to  go  '"from  London 
to  Batavia,  the  East  India  stas  or  else- 
where, and  until  the  final  arrival  at  any 
port  or  ports  in  Europe."  It  was  held, 
that  upon  the  arrival  of  the  ship  at 
Cowes  for  orders  (as  previously  agreed 
between  the  owners  and  masters),  the  sea- 
men were  not  bound  to  proceed  on  a  fur- 
ther voyage  to  Rotterdam.  But  in  Webb 
V.  Duckingfield,  13  Jolms.  391,  where  a 
seaman  who  had  signed  shipping  articles, 
by  which  he  engaged  not  to  absent  him- 
self from  the  vessel  without  leave,  "  un- 
til the  voyage  was  ended,  and  the  vessel 
was  discharged  of  her  cargo,"  on  the 
vessel's  arriving  at  her  last  port  of  dis- 
charge, and  being  there  safely  moored, 
refused  to  remain  and  assist  in  dischar- 
ging the  cargo,  but  absented'  himself 
without  leave  ;  it  was  held,  that  by  such 
desertion  he  had  forfeited  his  wages.  — 
So  mutinous  and  rebellious  conduct  of 
the  mariner,  if  persisted  in,  forfeits  their 
right  to  wages.  Relf  v.  Ship  Maria,  I 
Pet.  Ad.  186.  —  So  does  desertion  ;  and 
the  statute  of  the  United  States,  declar- 
ing any  unauthorized  absence  of  a  sea- 
man from  liis  ship  for  forty-eight  hours 
to  be  desertion,  applies  to  all  cases  where 
the  seaman  does  not  return  within  such 
time,  although  he  may  have  been  pre- 
vented by  the  sailing  of  the  ship.  For 
the  ship  is  not  bound  to  wait  for  him, 
but  he  is  bound  to  rejoin  the  ship  within 
that  period,  suo  periculo.  Cofiin  v.  Jen- 
kins, 3  Story,  108. 


CH.  XIX.]  PERSONS   OF   INSUFFICIENT  MIND.  *  392 


♦SECTION  IV.  392 

PERSONS   UNDER   DURESS. 

A  contract  made  by  a  party  under  compulsion  is  void ;  because 
consent  is  of  the  essence  of  a  contract,  and  where  there  is  com- 
pulsion there  is  no  consent,  'for  this  must  be  voluntary,  (t^  Such 
a  contract  is  void  for  another  reason.  It  is  founded  on  wrong. 
The  violence  was  itself  an  injury  to  the  party  suffering  it ;  the 
party  using  the  violence  had  no  right  to  do  so,  and  cannot  estab- 
lish a  right  on  his  own  wrong-doing. 

It  is  not,  however,  all  compulsion  which  has  this  effect ;  it  must 
amount  to  durities,  or  duress.  But  this  duress  may  be  either 
actual  violence,  or  threat.  (?t)  ^  And  actual  violence,  if  not  so 
slight  as  to  be  quite  unimportant,  is  sufficient  to  annul  a  contract 
made  under  its  influence.  Imprisonment  in  a  common  jail  or 
elsewhere,  is  duress  of  this  kind ;  but  to  have  this  effect  it  must 
either  be  unlawful  in  itself,  or,  if  lawful,  then  it  must  be  accom- 
panied with  such  circumstances  of  unnecessary  pain,  privation, 
or  danger,  that  the  party  is  induced  by  them  to  make  the 
contract,  (y) 

(/)  1  Eoll.  Abr.  688.  by  imprisonment,  either  the  imprison- 
(m)  1  Bl.  Com.  131.  ment  or  the  duress  after  must  be  tortious 
(y)  Watkins  v.  Baird,  6  Mass.  511;  and  unlawful.  If,  therefore,  a  man,  sup- 
Richardson  V.  Duncan,  3  N.  H.  508 ;  posing  that  he  has  cause  of  action  a- 
Stouffer  V.  Latshaw,  2  Watts,  167  ;  Nel-  gainst  another,  by  lawful  process  cause 
8on  V.  Suddarth,  1  Hen.  &  M.  350.  —  An  him  to  be  arrested  and  imprisoned, 
arrest,  though  for  a  just  cause,  and  un-  and  the  defendant  voluntarily  executed 
der  lawful  authority,  yet  if  it  be  for  an  a  deed  for  his  deliverance,  he  cannot 
unlawful  purpose,  is  duress  of  imprison-  avoid  such  deed  by  duress  of  imprison- 
ment. Severance  v.  Kimball,  8  N.  H.  ment,  although,  in  fact,  the  plaintiff  had 
386.  —  In  Watkins  v.  Baird,  supra,  Par-  no  cause  of  action.  And  although  the 
sons,  C.  J.,  observed:  "It  is  a  general  imprisonment  be  lawful,  yet  unless  the 
rule,  that  imprisonment  by  order  of  law  deed  be  made  freely  and  voluntarily,  it 
is  not  duress ;  but  to   constitute  duress  may  be  avoided  by  duress.     And  if  the 

1  In  McPherson  v.  Cox,  86  N.  Y.  472,  it  was  held  that  the  refusal,  under  the  circum- 
stances, by  a  person  who  could  alone  get  clearance  for  a  vessel  at  the  custom-house,  to 
clear  her  until  the  master  had  signed  a  bill  of  lading  and  a  certain  agreement,  where- 
upon the  master  signed,  constituted  duress.  —  A  threat,  however,  made  by  a  husband 
to  his  wife  that  he  would  poison  himself  unless  .she  signed  a  promissory  note,  is  not  duress 
such  as  will  avoid  the  note  as  to  her,  Wright  v.  Remington,  12  Vroom,  48;  affirmed 
in  14  Vroom,  451 ;  nor  is  the  refusal  to  pay  a  claim  in  full,  thereby  compelling  a 
creditor,  by  reason  of  a  pecuniary  strait,  to  receipt  in  full  for  a  part  payment,  duress, 
if  the  debtor  is  not  the  cause  of  the  creditor's  embarrassment.  Hackley  v.  Headley, 
45  Mich.  569. 

443 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  I. 


*  393        *  Duress  by  threats  does  not  exist  wherever  a  party  has 

entered  into  a  contract  under  the  influence  of  a  threat,  but 
only  where  such  a  threat  excites  a  fear  of  some  grievous  wrong ; 
as  of  death,  or  great  bodily  injury,  or  unlawful  imprisonment. 
It  is  a  rule  of  law,  which  is  applied  to  many  cases,  that  where  the 
threat  is  of  an  injury  for  which  full  and  entirely  adequate  com- 
pensation may  be  expected  from  the  law,  such  duress  will 

*  394    not,  *  of  itself,  avoid  a  contract,  for  the  threatened  person 

ought  to  have  sufficient  resolution  to  resist  the  threat  and 
rely  upon  the  law ;  as  where  the  threat  is  of  an  injury  to  property, 


imprisonment  be  originally  lawful,  yet  if 
the  party  obtaining  the  deed  detain  the 
prisoner  in  prison  unlawfully  by  covin 
with  the  jailer,  this  is  a  duress  which 
will  avoid  the  deed.  But  when  the  im- 
prisonment is  unlawful,  although  by 
color  of  legal  jjrocess,  yet  a  deed  ob- 
tained from  a  prisoner  for  his  deliver- 
ance, by  him  who  is  a  party  to  the  un- 
lawful imprisonment,  may  be  avoided 
by  duress  of  imprisonment.  In  Allen,  92, 
debt  was  sued  on  a  bond,  and  duress  of 
imprisonment  pleaded  in  bar.  The  plain- 
tiff had,  on  charging  the  defendant  with 
felony  in  stealing  a  horse,  procured  a 
warrant  from  a  justice,  on  which  the 
defendant  was  arrested  and  imprisoned, 
and  sealed  the  bond  to  the  plaintiff  to 
obtain  his  discharge,  which  was  done, 
the  horse  appearing  to  be  his  own  horse. 
RoUe,  J.,  directed  the  jury,  that  the  pro- 
ceedings being  had  to  cover  the  deceit, 
the  bond  was  obtained  by  duress.  And, 
in  our  opinion,  it  is  a  sound  and  correct 
principle  of  law,  when  a  man  shall 
falsely,  maliciously,  and  without  prob- 
able cause,  sue  out  a  process,  in  form 
regular  and  legal,  to  arrest  and  imprison 
another,  and  shall  obtain  a  deed  from  a 
party  thus  arrested,  to  procure  his  deliv- 
erance, such  deed  may  be  avoided  by 
duress  of  Imprisonment.  For  such  im- 
prisonment is  tortious  and  unlawful,  as 
to  the  party  procuring  it ;  and  he  is  an- 
swerable in  damages  for  the  tort,  in  an 
action  for  a  false  and  malicious  prosecu- 
tion ;  tlie  suing  of  legal  process  being 
an  abuse  of  tlie  law,  and  a  proceeding 
to  cover  the  fraud.  And  although  Dridg- 
tnan,  in  Lev.  68,  69,  is  made  to  say,  that 
imprisonment  in  custody  of  law  by 
the  king's  writ,  will  not  be  duress  to 
avoid  a  deed,  when  the  arrest  is  without 
cause  of  action,  because  the  party  has 
his  remedy  by  action  of  the  case,  yet 
this  must  be  a  mistake,  as  there  is  no 
remedy  hy  action  for  suing  a  groundless 
Buit,  unless  the  suit  be  without  probable 

444 


cause  and  malicious.  And  if  it  be,  cer- 
tainly the  imprisonment  is  wrongful,  as 
to  the  party  who  mahciously  procured 
it." —  In  Kichardson  v.  Duncan,  3  N.  H. 
508,  it  was  held,  that  where  there  is  an 
arrest  for  improper  purposes,  without 
just  cause,  or  an  arrest  for  just  cause, 
but  without  lawful  authority,  or  an  ar- 
rest for  a  just  cause,  and  under  lawful 
authority,  for  an  improper  purpose,  and 
the  person  arrested  pays  money  for  his 
enlargement,  he  may  be  considered  as 
having  paid  the  money  by  duress  of  im- 
prisonment, and  may  recover  it  back  in 
an  action  for  money  had  and  received. 
—  But  an  agreement  by  a  prisoner  to 
pay  a  just  debt,  made  while  under  lec/al 
imprisonment,  cannot  be  avoided  on  the 
ground  of  duress.  Shephard  v.  Watrous, 
SCaines,  166  ;  Crowell  v.  Gleason,  1  Fairf. 
325;  Meek  y.  Atkinson,  1  Bailey,  84. — 
But  a  bond  given  for  the  maintenance  of 
a  bastard  child,  as  required  by  some  stat- 
ute, is  void  for  duress,  if  the  warrant 
and  other  proceedings  before  the  magis- 
trate are  not  according  to  the  statute. 
Fisher  v.  Shattuck,  17  Pick.  252.  —  So  a 
bond  executed  through  fear  of  unlawful 
imprisonment  may  be  avoided  on  ac- 
count of  duress.  Whitefield  v.  Longfel- 
low, 13  JNle.  116.  —  But  contra,  as  to  a 
mortgage  given  as  security  for  payment 
of  a  sura  to  the  county,  as  the  con- 
dition of  a  pardon.  Rood  v.  Winslow,  2 
Dougl.  (Mich.)  68.  — A  threat  by  a  judg- 
ment cre(htor  to  levy  his  execution,  is 
not  such  duress  as  to  make  void  an  a- 
grecment  to  pay  the  sura  due.  Wilcox 
V.  Rowland,  23  Pick.  167;  Waller  i: 
Cralle,  8  B.  Mon.  11.  — Nor  a  threat  of 
lawful  iraprisonraent.  Eddy  v.  Herrin, 
17  Me.  338 ;  Alexander  v.  Pierce,  10  N. 
H.  497.  —  And  a  note  given  to  obtain  the 
release  of  property  from  an  illegal  levy  of 
an  execution,  is  not  void.  Bingham  v. 
Sessions,  6  Sni.  &  M.  18.  See  Bowker  v. 
Lowell,  49  Me.  429 ;  Hackett  v.  King,  6 
Allen,  58. 


CH.  XIX.] 


PERSONS   OP   INSUFFICIENT   MIND. 


S% 


or  of  a  slight  injury  to  the  person,  (w}  But  no  verdict  could 
compensate  adequately  for  loss  of  limb,  or  for  great  per- 
sonal violence,  *  and  no  man  shall  be  held  bound  to  incur  *  395 
such  a  danger.  These  distinctions,  however,  would  not 
now  probably  have  a  controlling  power  in  this  country  ;  but  where 
the  threat,  whether  of  mischief  to  the  person  or  the  property,  or 
to  the  good  name,  was  of  sufficient  importance  to  destroy  the 


(w)  Atlee  V.  Backhouse,   3   M.  &  W. 
642  ;  Sumner  v.  Ferryman,  11  Mod.  201 ; 
Astley  V.  Reynolds,  Stra.  715.      It  is  on 
tliis   ground,   perliaps,   that    in    England 
duress  of  one's  property  is  not  sufficient  to 
avoid  a  contract.     Atlee  v.  Backhouse,  3 
M.   &    W.   650 ;    where    Parke,  B.,  said : 
"There  is  no  doubt  of   the   proposition 
laid  down  by  Mr.  Erie,  that  if  goods  are 
wrongfully  taken,  and  a  sum  of  money  is 
paid,  simply  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
possession  of  those  goods  again,  without 
any  agreement  at  all,  especially  if  it  be 
paid   under  protest,  that  money  can    be 
recovered   back ;   not  on  the  ground    of 
duress,  because   I  think  that  the  law    is 
clear,    although   there    is   some   case    in 
Viner's   Abridgment,  Duress    (B.),  3,    to 
the  contrary,  that   in  order  to   avoid    a 
contract  by  reason  of  duress,  it  must  be 
duress    of    a   man's   person,   not   of    his 
goods ;  and  it  is  so  laid  down  in  Shep. 
Touch,  (p.  61);  but  the  ground  is,  that 
it  is  not  a  voluntary  payment.     If   my 
goods   have    been    wrongfully    detained, 
and  I  pay  money  simply  to  obtain  them 
again,  that  being  paid  under  a  species  of 
duress   or  constraint   may  be   recovered 
back ;  but  if,  while  my  goods  are  in  pos- 
session of  another  person,  I  make  a  bind- 
ing agreement  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of 
money  and   to  receive  them   back,  that 
cannot  be  avoided  on  the  ground  of  du- 
ress."    Skeate  v.  Beale,  11  A.  &  E.  983. 
In    this  case  Lord   Denman,  C.  J.,  said : 
"  Wq  consider  the  law  to  be  clear,  and 
founded  on  good  reason,  that  an  agree- 
ment  is  not  void   because    made   under 
duress   of   goods.     There   is   no    distinc- 
tion in  this  respect  between  a  deed  and 
an  agreement  not  under  seal ;  and,  with 
regard    to   the   former,  the   law    is   laid 
down  in  2  Inst.  483,  and  Shep.  Touch.  61, 
and  the  distinction  pointed  out  between 
duress  of  or  menace  to  the  person,  and 
duress  of   goods.     The  former  is  a  con- 
straining   force,    which   not    only   takes 
away  the  free  agency,  but  may  leave  no 
room  for  appeal  to  the  law  for  remedy  ; 
a   man,  therefore,  is  not   bound   by  the 
agreement  which   he   enters   into  under 
such   circumstances ;   but  the   fear  that 
goods  may  be  taken  or  injured  does  not 


deprive  an)''  one  of  his  free  agency  who 
possesses  that  ordinary  degree   of   firm- 
ness wliicli  the  law  requires  all  to  exert." 
In  this  country,  however,  it  has  been  held, 
that  duress  of  goods  would  under  some 
circumstances    avoid    a   man's    note   or 
bond.      Sasportas    v.   Jennings,    1    Bay, 
470;  Collins  v.  Westbury,  2  id.  211.     In 
this  last  case  the  law  was  thus  laid  down 
by  the  court :  "  So  cautiously  does  the 
law  watch  over  all  contracts,  that  it  will 
not  permit  any  to  be  binding  but  such  as 
are  made  by  persons  perfectly  free,  and 
at  full  liberty  to  make  or  refuse  such  con- 
tracts, and  that  not  only  witli  respect  to 
their  persons,  but  in  regard  to  their  goods 
and  chattels  also.     Contracts  to  be  binding 
must  not   be  made  under  any  restraint  or 
fear  of   their  persons,  otherwise  they  are 
void.  .   .  .  So,  in  like  manner,  duress  of 
goods  will   avoid  a   contract,  where  an 
unjust    and   unreasonable    advantage   is 
taken  of  a  man's  necessities,  by  getting 
his  goods   into  his  possession,  and  there 
is    no    other  speedy  means  left  of    getting 
them  buck  aynin  but  by  giving  a  note  or 
a  bond,   or  where  a  man's  necessities  may 
be  so  great   as  not  to  admit  of  the  ordi- 
nary process  of  law,  to  aiford  him  relief, 
as  was     determined   in   this   court   after 
solemn    agreement,  in  the   case   of  Sas- 
portas  V.  Jennings,  1  Bay,  470 ;  also  in 
the    case   of    Astley  v.    Reynolds,   Stra. 
915."    See  also  Nelson  v.  Suddarth,  1  Hen. 
&  M.  .3-50 ;  Foshay  v.  Ferguson,  5  Hill  (N. 
Y.),  158,  where  Bro7ison,  J.,  said:  "I  en- 
tertain no  doubt  that  a  contract  procured 
by  threats  and  the  fear  of  battery,  or  the 
destruction  of  property,  may  be  avoided 
on  the  ground  of  duress.     There  is  noth- 
ing but  the  form  of  a  contract  in  such  a 
case,  without    the  substance.      It  wants 
the  voluntary  assent  of  the  party  to  be 
bound    by    it.       And    why    should    the 
wrong-doer   derive   an    advantage   from 
his  tortious  act  ?     No  good   reason   can 
be  assigned  for  upholding  such  a  trans- 
action."  Although  in  England  a  contract 
may  not  be  avoided  for  duress  of  goods, 
yet  money  paid  under  such  duress  may 
be  recovered  back.     See   Gates  v.  Hud- 
son, 5  E.  L.  &  E.  469 ;  s.  c.  6  Exch.  346. 

445 


395 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book 


threatened  party's  freedom,  the  law  would  not  enforce  any  con- 
tract which  he  might  be  induced  by  such  means  to  make.  And 
where  there  has  been  no  actual  contract,  but  money  has  been 
extorted  by  duress,  under  circumstances  which  give  to  the  trans- 
action the  character  of  a  payment  by  compulsion,  it  may  be 
recovered  back,  (x)  ^ 

A  contract  made  under  duress  is  not,  however,  strictly  speak- 
ing, void,  but  only  voidable ;  because  it  may  be  ratified  and  af- 
firmed by  the  party  upon  whom  the  duress  was  practised.  (^)  ^ 


(.r)  Chase  v.  Dwinal,  7  Greenl.  134 ; 
Gates  V.  Hudson,  5  E.  L.  &  E.  469;  s.  c. 
6  Exch.  346.  But  where  a  person  has 
paid  the  amount  of  taxes  assessed  upon 
him,  he  cannot  recover  it  back,  upon  the 
ground  that  the  assessment  was  illegally 
made,  if  there  be  no  proof  that  lie  was 
compelled  to  pay  any  portion  thereof  by 
duress  of  his  person  or  seizure  of  his 
property,  or  that  any  part  was  paid 
under  protest,  and  to  avoid  such  arrest 
or  seizure.  The  mere  fact  that  the  taxes 
were  paid  to  collectors,  who  had  warrants 
for  the  collection,  affords  no  satisfactory 
proof  of  payment  by  duress.  Smith  v. 
Readfield,  27  Me.  145.  See,  as  to  pay- 
ments under  legal  duress,  Eleetwood  v. 
New  York,  2  Sandf.  475 ;  Harmony  v. 
Bingham,  1  Duer,  229 ;  Mayor  v.  Leffer- 
man,  4  Gill,  425. 

(7j)  Shep.  Touch.  62,  288.  The  privi- 
lege of  avoiding  a  contract  for  reason  of 
duress  is  personal,  and  none  can  take 
advantage  of  it  but  the  party  himself. 
Huscombe  v.  Standing,  Cro.  J.  187  ;  Bay- 
lie  V.  Clare,  2  Brownl.  276  ;  McClintick 
V.  Cummins,  3  McLean,   158.     Perhaps, 


however,  this  privilege  extends  to  sure- 
ties. It  was  so  hdd  in  Fisher  v.  Siiattuck, 
17  Pick.  252.  But  the  contrary  was  ex- 
jjressly  adjudged  in  Huscombe  !>.  Stand- 
ing, Cro.  J.  187.  See  also  McClintick  v. 
Cummins,  3  McLean,  158.  In  this  case 
it  is  said  tiiat  the  father  and  son  may 
each  avoid  his  obligation  by  duress  of 
tiie  other ;  and  so  a  Imsband  by  duress  of 
his  wife.  See  also  Bac.  Abr.  Duress  (B.). 
For  other  cases  illustrating  the  law  of 
duress,  compulsion,  and  oppression,  see 
Baxendale  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  11.  Co. 
27  L.  J.  C.  137;  Baxendale  v.  Great 
Western  R.  R.  Co.  32  L.  J.  C.  225,  33  ib. 
197  ;  Tamvaco  v.  Simpson,  3  L.  J.  C.  268 ; 
Eraser  v.  Pendleberry,  31  L.  J.  C.  1 ;  At- 
kinson V.  Denby,  30  L.  J.  Exch.  361 ;  Pid- 
dington  v.  South-Eastern  R.  R.  Co.  27  L. 
J.  C.  295 ;  Garton  v.  Bristol  &  Exeter  R. 
R.  Co.  28  L.  J.  Exch.  169.  In  these  last 
cases  the  plaintiffs  recovered  excessive 
charges  which  they  had  paid  to  railroad 
companies  who  had  refused  to  carry 
goods,  or  to  deliver  goods  carried,  unless 
these  payments  were  made. 


1  If  one,  knowing  he  has  no  just  claim  against  another,  arrests  him  or  attaches  his 
goods,  a  payment  by  the  latter  to  release  himself  or  goods,  is  a  payment  under  duress, 
and  can  be  recovered  back  in  an  action  for  money  had  and  received.  Chandler  v. 
Sanger,  114  Mass.  364.  So  if  A.  obtains  possession  of  a  deed  and  uses  it  to  extort 
money  from  B.,  as  price  of  its  preservation  for  defence  of  his  title  and  threatens, 
expressly  or  impliedly,  to  withhold  or  destroy  it  unless  B.  complies  with  his  demands, 
a  payment  by  B.  is  to  be  deemed  involuntary  and  may  be  recovered  back.  Motz  v. 
Mitchell,  91  Penn.  St.  114. 

2  A  father  may  avoid  a  mortgage  which  he  was  induced  to  sign  by  threats  of  the 
prosecution  and  imprisonment  of  his  son.     Harris  v.  Carmody,  131  Mass.  51. 

446 


CH.  XX.]  ALIENS.  *  396 


*  CHAPTER  XX.  *396 

ALIENS. 

An  alien,  by  the  definition  of  the  common  law,  is  a  person  born 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  and  allegiance  of  this  country,  excepting 
only  the  children  of  public  ministers  abroad,  whose  wives  are 
American  women.  But  the  statute  of  29th  January,  1795,  de- 
clared that,  "  the  children  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  born 
out  of  the  limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  shall  be 
considered  as  citizens  of  the  United  States."  The  statute  of  the 
14th  April,  1802,  is  more  obscure  on  this  subject,  and  is  regarded 
by  high  authority  (a)  as  leaving  this  question  in  some  doubt. 
We  do  not  believe  that  the  courts  of  this  country  would  apply  to 
this  question  those  principles  of  the  common  law  of  England 
which  oppose  the  provision  of  the  statute  of  1795.  This  cannot, 
however,  be  regarded  as  certain,  until  it  is  settled  by  competent 
adjudication  or  statutory  provision. 

It  is  said  that  a  foreign  born  child  of  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  is  subject  to  a  double  allegiance ;  but  on  reaching  maturity 
he  has  the  right  to  elect  one  and  repudiate  the  other,  and  such 
election  is  conclusive  upon  him.  (aa)     And  it  has  been  held  that 

(a)  Chancellor  A'e«;  says,  2  Com.  52:  29th,  1795,  was  not  so;   for  it  declared 

"  It   [this   statute]    applied   only  to   the  generally  '  that  the  children  of  citizens  of 

children  of  persons  who  then  were  or  had  the  United  States,  born  out  of  the  limits 

been  citizens  ;  and  consequently  the  bene-  and  jurisdiction   of   the    United    States, 

fit  of  this  provision  narrows  rapidly  by  shall   be  considered    as    citizens  of    the 

the  lapse  of   time  ;    and  the  period  will  United  States.'     And  when  we  consider 

soon  arrive  when  there  will  be  no  statu-  tlie  universal   propensity  to    travel,   the 

tory  regulation  for  the  benefit  of  children  liberal  intercourse  between  nations,  the 

born  abroad,  of  American  parents,  and  extent  of  commercial  enterprise,  and  the 

they  will  be  obliged  to  resort  for  aid  to  genius  and  spirit  of  our  municipal  insti- 

the  dormant  and   doubtful  principles  of  tutions,  it   is   quite   surprising   that   the 

the  English  common  law.    .  .  .  But  the  rights  of  the  children  of  American  citi- 

whole   statute   provision   is   remarkably  zens,  born  abroad,  should,  by  the  existing 

loose  and  vague  in  its  terms,  and  it  is  act  of  1802,  be  left  so  precarious,  and  so 

lamentably    defective,  in  being  confined  far  inferior   in   the   security  which  had 

to  the   case  of   children  of  parents  who  been  given  in  like  circumstances  by  the 

were  citizens  in  1802,  or  had  been  so  pre-  English  statutes." 
viously.      The  former   act  of    January  (aa)  Ludlam  v.  Ludlam,  26  N.  Y.  356. 

447 


*  397  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

a  child  of  aliens  born  in  this  country,  is  primd  fade  a  citizen 
thereof,  although  his  mother  was  here  only  for  the  purpose  of 
being  confined,  (ah') 

At  common  law  an  alien  cannot  acquire  title  to  real  property 

by  descent,  nor  by  grant,  nor  by  operation  of  law.     Nor  can  he 

give  good  title  by  grant ;  nor  can  he  transmit  good  title 

*  397    *  to  his  heir,  (b)     If  an  alien  take  land  by  purchase,  he 

may  hold  it  until  office  found,  and  may  bring  an  action  for 
the  recovery  of  possession ;  (c)  but  if  he  die,  the  land  passes  at 
once  to  the  State,  without  any  inquest  of  office,  (d)  His  title  can- 
not be  called  in  question  in  a  collateral  proceeding  between  indi- 
viduals ;  (dd)  for  an  alien  may  take  and  hold  by  deed  or  devise 
as  against  all  but  the  sovereign  ;  (de)  and  the  rule  that  an  alien 
may  take  land  by  purchase  is  valid  in  equity  as  well  as  law.  (df) 
But  the  severity  of  these  rules  has  been  very  much  mitigated  in 
this  country,  somewhat  by  adjudication,  but  more  by  the  various 
statutes  of  the  States,  in  many  of  which,  and  in  the  constitutions 
of  some,  there  are  provisions  modifying  the  principles  of  the 
common  law  relative  to  aliens,  (e)  ^ 

In  respect  to  personal  property,  and  the  various  contracts  in 
relation  to  it,  and  the  obligations  which  these  contracts  impose 

(ah)  Munro  v.  Merchant,  28  N.  Y.  9.  Eamircs   v.    Kent,   2   Cal.    558,    that    an 

(h)   Calvin's  case,  7  Eep.  25  a  ;    Col-  alien  could  not  be  deprived  of  land  or  of 

lingwood  V.  Pace,  1  Vent.  417  ;  Jackson  any  rights  incident  to  its  ownership,  by 

V.  Lunn,  3  Johns.  Cas.  109 ;    Levy  v.  Mc-  proof  of  alienage  in  any  proceeding  but 

Cartee,  6  Pet.  102  ;    Jackson  v.  Green,  7  in  an  inquest  of  office. 

Wend.  333;   Jackson  v.  Fitzsiniinons,  10  [d)   Co.  Lit.  2  b;    Willion  r.  Berkley, 

Wend.  1 ;    Cross  i'.  De  Valle,  1  Wallace,  Plowd.  229  b,  230  a ;   Fox  v.  Southack, 

5.  12    Mass.    143;     Fairfax   v.    Hunter,    7 

(c)  Waugh   V.   Riley,   8   Met.   295.—  Cranch,  619;  Orr  v.  Hodgson,  4  Wheat. 

Savage,  C.  J.,  in  Bradstreet  v.  Supervisors  453.     See  also  Wilbur  v.  Tobey,  16  Pick. 

of  Oneida  County,  13  Wend.  548,  decided  179  ;  Foss  v.  Crisp,  20  id.  124  ;   People  v. 

that  notwithstanding  the  ancient  rigor  of  Conklin,    2    Hill    (N.  Y.),    67;    Banks  r. 

the  common   law,  sucli  an  action  might  Walker,  3  Barb.  Ch.  438. 

be  mainfained.     "  If  it  is  the  property  of  (dc!)  Harley  v.  State,  40  Ala.  689. 

the  alien  against  everybody  but  the  gov-  (de)  Osterman  v.  Baldwin,  6  Wallace, 

ernment,  he  has  the  right  to  use  it ;    and  116. 

if  necessary  to  prosecute  for  it,  surely  the  {df)  Cross  v.  De  Valle,  1  Clifford,  282. 

right  to   prosecute  is   necessarily  conse-  (e)   This  subject  is  very  fully  consid- 

quent  upon  his  right  to  its  enjoyment."  ered,  and  presented  with  great  clearness, 

—  In  Texas  an  alien   cannot  hold  prop-  and  an  abimdant  illustration,  in  2  Kent, 

erty  except  in  particular  cases.      Merle  Cora.  lect.  xxv. 

V.  Andrews,  4  Tex.  200.     It  was  held  in 

1  A  sale  of  lands  in  Texas,  before  her  separation  from  Mexico,  by  a  citizen  to  a  non- 
resident alien,  passed  the  title  to  the  latter,  who  thereby  acquired  a  defeasible  estate 
in  them,  which  he  could  hold  until  deprived  thereof  by  the  supreme  authority,  upon 
the  official  ascertainment  of  the  fact  of  his  non-residence  and  alienage,  or  upon  the 
denouncement  of  a  private  citizen.  Phillips  v.  Moore,  100  U.  S.  208.  See  also  Hauen- 
stein  V.  Lynhara,  100  U.  S.  483. 

448 


CH.  XX.] 


ALIENS. 


398 


upon  him,  and  the  remedies  to  which  he  may  resort  for  breach  of 
them,  the  alien  stands  very  much  upon  the  same  footing  as  the 
citizen.  An  alien  resident  within  a  State  was  entitled  to  the 
benefit  of  the  insolvent  laws.  (/)  The  bankrupt  law  now  in 
force  by  section  19th  permits  any  person  to  become  a  bankrujjt 
"  residing  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  and  owing 
debts  provable  under  this  Act."  And  he  may  be  made  a  bank- 
rupt under  the  provisions  respecting  involuntary  bankruptcy. 

The  recent  statute  concerning  trade-marks,  as  will  be  seen 
in  our  chapter  on  that  subject,  admits  aliens  to  its  advantages. 
And  before  the  statute  in  some  interesting  cases  respecting  trade- 
marks, it  was  determined  that  he  was  entitled  to  the  same 
protection  as  our  citizens.  (^)  The  right  *  to  confiscate  *  398 
the  debts  and  property  of  alien  enemies  is  declared  to  exist 
in  Congress,  by  the  highest  judicial  authority ;  (A)  but  the  exer- 
cise of  this  right,  it  may  well  be  hoped,  will  never  be  attempted,  (i) 
But  even  alien  enemies  residing  in  this  country  may  sue  and  be 
sued  as  in  time  of  peace,  on  the  ground  that  their  residence  is 


(/)  Judd  V.  Lawrence,  1  Cush.  531. 
"  The  insolvent  laws  extend  in  terms  to 
all  insolvent  debtors  residing  within  this 
Commonwealth ;  and  this  language  un- 
questionably embraces  aliens  as  well  as 
native  or  naturalized  citizens,  unless  it 
can  be  shown  that  such  was  not  the  in- 
tention of  the  legislature.  It  has  been 
argued  that  this  appears  by  the  author- 
ity given  to  the  commissioner  to  assign 
all  the  debtor's  estate,  real  and  personal, 
whereas  an  alien  caunot  hold  or  effectu- 
ally assign  real  estate.  But  if  this  were 
so,  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  the 
personal  estate  of  an  alien  insolvent 
debtor  should  not  be  distributed  among 
his  creditors  under  the  insolvent  laws  as 
well  as  the  personal  estate  of  native  citi- 
zens who  have  no  real  estate.  But  it  is 
not  true  that  aliens  cannot  liold  and  as- 
sign real  estate.  It  is  true  an  alien  can- 
not take  by  descent,  but  he  may  take  by 
purchase  or  devise,  and  can  hold  against 
all  except  the  Commonwealth,  and  can 
be  divested  only  by  ofBce  found,  and, 
until  office  found,  can  convey.  And 
whatever  title  the  insolvent  debtor  could 
convey  by  deed  may  be  assigned  by 
statute." 

(g)  Coats  V.  Holbrook,  2  Sandf.  Ch. 
586;  Taylor  v.  Carpenter,  id.  603;  3 
Story,  4.58  ;  11  Paige,  292  ;  2  Woodb.  & 
M.  1.  Woodbury,  J.,  in  a  long  opinion 
reviewing  the  authorities   both   Enghsh 


and  American,  sustains  the  doctrine  of 
tiie  text,  and  reprehends  in  the  strongest 
terms  any  attempt  to  place  aliens  in  our 
courts  upon  a  footing  different  from  our 
citizens,  contending  that  the  want  of 
reciprocity  of  rights  to  our  citizens  in 
foreign  courts  tnigiit  be  a  good  reason 
for  legislation  by  Congress,  but  would 
not  be  for  this  court  to  deny  to  aliens 
rights  guaranteed  to  them  by  the  Consti- 
tution, and  which  a  court  could  not  deny 
without  an  exercise  of  judicial  legisla- 
tion. "  The  cannibal  of  the  Fejees  may 
sue  here  in  a  personal  action,  though 
having  no  courts  at  home  for  us  to  resort 
to."  "  An  alien  is  not  now  regarded  as 
'the  outside  barbarian  '  he  is  considered 
in  China."  "  In  the  courts  of  the  United 
States  they  are  entitled,  being  alien 
friends,  to  tiie  same  protection  of  their 
rights  as  citizens."  Sfory,  ,].,  3  Story, 
434.  —Barry's  case,  2  How.  65;  5  id.  103. 
An  alien  was  allowed,  as  to  regaining 
the  custody  of  his  child  from  his  wife 
and  her  connections,  the  same  remedies 
and  principles  as  are  granted  to  the 
citizens. 

(  h)  Brown  v.  United  States,  8  Cranch, 
110;  The  Adventure,  id.  228,  229;  Ware 
V.  Hylton,  3  Dallas,  199. 

(i)  A  very  powerful  argument  against 
the  right  itself  was  made  by  Alexander 
Hamilton,  in  his  letters  signed  Camillus, 
published  in  1795. 

29  449 


*  398  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   I. 

lawful  until  they  are  ordered  away  by  competent  authority,  and 
this  residence  gives  them  a  right  to  protection.  (/)  During  this 
residence,  the  alien  is  equally  bound  with  the  citizen  to  obey  all 
the  laws  of  the  country,  which  do  not  apply  specifically  and 
exclusively  to  citizens. 

(j)  Wells  V.  Williams,  1  Ld.  Eayra.     Clarke  v.  Morey,  10  Johns.  69;  Russell  v. 
282  ;  Daubigny  v.  Davallon,  2  Anst.  462;     Skip  with,  6  Biun.  241. 

450 


CH.  XXI.]  OUTLAWS,   ETC.  *  422 


*  CHAPTER  XXL  *422 

OP  OUTLAWS,  PERSONS  ATTAINTED,  AND  PERSONS  EXCOMMUNICATED. 

The  process  of  Outlawry  was  common  in  England  under  the 
Saxon  kings.  By  it  a  person  was  placed  wholly  out  of  the  pro- 
tection of  the  law,  so  that  he  was  incapable  of  bringing  any  action 
for  redress  of  injury  ;  and  it  also  worked  a  forfeiture  of  all  goods 
and  chattels  to  the  king.  Until  some  time  after  the  Conquest 
it  was  confined  to  cases  of  felony ;  but  then  it  was  extended  by 
statute  to  all  actions  for  trespass  vi  et  armis.  By  later  statutes  it 
has  been  extended  to  other  civil  actions.  Aiji  outlaw  might  be 
arrested  by  the  writ  of  capias  utlagatum,  and  committed  until 
the  outlawry  was  reversed.  But  this  reversal  was  granted  on  any 
plausible  ground,  if  the  party  came  into  court  himself  or  by  attor- 
ney ;  the  process  being  used  in  modern  times  merely  to  compel 
appearance,  (a)  In  some  of  our  older  States  process  of  outlawry 
was  permitted  and  regulated  l)y  statute ;  but  it  never  had  much 
practical  existence  in  this  country,  and  is  now  wholly  disused.  (6) 

Attainder,  by  the  common  law,  was  the  inseparable  conse- 
quence of  every  sentence  of  death.  Attainder  for  treason  worked 
a  forfeiture  of  all  estates  to  the  king,  and  such  "  corruption  of 
blood  "  that  he  could  neither  inherit,  nor  could  any  one  inherit 
from  him ;  he  was  utterly  deprived  of  all  rights,  and  wholly  inca- 
pacitated from  acting  under  the  protection  of  the  law,  either  for 
himself  or  for  another.  In  the  words  of  Blackstone,  "  the  law 
sets  a  note  of  infamy  upon  him,  puts  him  out  of  its  protection,  and 
takes  no  further  care  of  him  than  to  see  him  executed ; " 
and  "  by  an  anticipation  of  his  punishment  he  *  is  already  *  423 
dead  in  law."  (e)  During  the  conflicts  in  England  between 
different  claimants  of  the  throne,  and  between  the  sovereign  and 

(a)  3  Bl.  Com.  284.  (c)  4  Bl.  Com.  380. 

(6)  See  7  Dane,  Abr.  318. 

451 


*  423  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   I. 

the  people,  this  tremendous  engine  of  oppression  was  unsparingly 
used,  and  sometimes  under  circumstances  which  gave  to  it  the 
character  of  extremest  cruelty.  It  may  well  be  believed  that 
such  a  process  would  not  find  favor  among  us,  either  when  we 
were  colonics,  or  after  we  had  become  States ;  and  it  has  no 
existence   here. 

Excommunication  expels  a  person  from  the  Church  of  England, 
and  as  the  civil  law  comes  in  aid  of  the  ecclesiastical  power  of  that 
country,  it  has  been  of  great  moment  there  ;  and  as  it  worked  a 
disability  almost  entire,  it  was  an  instrument  of  great  power  in 
the  hands  of  the  ecclesiastical  authorities.  But  in  this  sense  ex- 
communication can  have  no  existence  in  this  country,  as  we  have 
no  national  church,  recognized  and  armed  by  the  civil  law.  We 
have,  however,  churches,  which,  with  us,  are  only  voluntary  asso- 
ciations organized  for  religious  purposes.  As  such  they  are  recog- 
nized and  protected  by  the  law.  They  must  have  the  right  to 
determine  as  to  their  own  membership,  and  to  provide  for  this  by 
forms  and  by-laws,  which,  if  they  contradict  no  principles  or  pro- 
visions of  law,  and  interfere  with  no  personal  rights,  would  doubt- 
less be  regarded  by  the  courts,  {d}  But  all  questions  which  come 
up  in  relation  to  the  rights  or  contracts  of  a  person  severed  from 
such  society,  by  an  act  of  "  excommunication,"  would  be  governed 
by  the  general  principles  of  the  law  of  property,  or  of  the  law  of 
contracts. 

(d)  Farnsworth  v.  Storrs,  5  Cush.  412. 

452 


BOOK   11. 


CONSIDERATION    AND    ASSENT. 


*BOOK     II.  *427 

CONSIDERATION   AND  ASSENT. 


CHAPTER   I. 

CONSIDEEATION. 

Sect.  I.  —  The  Necessity  of  a  Consideration. 

A  PROMISE  for  which  there  is  no  consideration  cannot  be  en- 
forced at  law.  This  has  been  a  principle  of  the  common  law  from 
the  earliest  times,  (a)  ^  It  is  said  to  have  been  borrowed  from  the 
Roman  law.  The  phrase  "  nudum  pactum  "  —  commonly  used  to 
indicate  a  promise  without  consideration  —  certainly  was  taken 
from  that  law  ;  but  it  does  not  mean  with  us  precisely  what  the 
Roman  jurists  understood  by  it.  By  the  civil  law  gratuitous  prom- 
ises could  be  enforced  only  where  they  were  made  with  due  for- 
mality, and  in  prescribed  language  and  manner ;  then  such 
agreement  was  a  '■'■  pactum  verbis  prescriptis  vestitum,''^  and  where 
such  promise  was  not  so  made  it  was  called  a  "  nudum  pac- 
tum" (b)  that  is,  nudum  because  not  vestitum.  But  an  agree- 
ment thus  formally  ratified,  or  "  vestitum,"  was  enforced  without 
reference  to  its  consideration  ;  whereas  a  "  nudum  pactum"  or 
promise  not  formally  ratified,  was  left  to  the  good  faith  of  the 
promisor,  the  law  refusing  to  aid  in  its  enforcement,  unless  the 

(a)  17  Ed.  IV.  ch.  4,  pi.  4;  3  Hen.  VI.     Register  for  1854,  in  which  the  cases  on 
c.  36,  pi.  33 ;  Bro.  Abr.  Action  sur  k  Case,     the  whole  topic  are  ably  collected. 
40.  —  See  on  the  subject  of  Consideration  [h)  Vin.  Com.  de  Inst.  lib.  3,  tit.  14,  p. 

articles  by  "  E.  L.  P.""  in  the  March,  May,     659  (ed.  1755) ;  Id.  lib.  3,  De  Verborum 
and  July  numbers  of  the  American  Law     Obligationibus,  tit.  16,  p.  677;    Cod.  lib. 

7,  tit.  52  (6th  ed.),  Gothofred. 

1  An  oral  agreement  in  substitution  for  a  written  agreement,  not  within  the  Statute 
of  Frauds,  needs  no  new  consideration.     Brown  v.  Everhard,  52  Wis.  205. 

455 


*  428  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  II. 

promisee  could  prove  a  distinct   consideration.      The   principle 
of  this  is,  obviously,  that  if  a  contract  be  not  founded 

*  428    *  upon  a  consideration,  it  shall  not  be  enforced,  unless 

ratified  in  such  a  way  as  may  show  that  it  was  deliberate, 
intentional,  and  distinctly  understood  by  both  parties.  The  rule 
was  intended  to  protect  parties  from  mistake,  inadvertence,  or 
fraud.  A  similar  rule  or  practice,  grounded  on  a  similar  purpose, 
prevails  on  the  continent  of  Europe  ;  where  contracts  which  are 
properly  ratified  and  confirmed,  before  a  public  notary  or  similar 
magistrate,  are  valid  without  inquiry  into  their  consideration ; 
while  a  private  contract  can  be  enforced  only  on  proof  of  a  con- 
sideration. And,  indeed,  it  can  only  be  the  same  principle  which 
makes  reasonable  an  ancient  and  well-established  distinction  in 
the  common  law,  by  virtue  whereof  a  contract  under  seal  is  in 
general  valid  without  reference  to  the  consideration ;  not  by  way 
of  exception  to  the  rule  that  no  promise  can  be  enforced  which 
was  not  made  for  a  consideration,  but  because,  as  it  is  said,  the 
seal  implies  a  consideration.  The  only  real  meaning  of  this  must 
be,  that  the  act  of  sealing  is  a  deliberate  and  solemn  act,  implying 
that  caution  and  fulness  of  assent  which  the  rule  of  the  civil  law 

was  intended  to  secure,  (c)     Whether  this  inference  from 

*  429    the  use  of  a  seal  can  now  be  made  with  sufficient  *  force 

to  sustain  the  very  great  difference  made  by  the  law  be- 
tween sealed  instruments  and  those  which  have  no  seal,  might 
be  doubted.  The  distinction  rests  now,  perhaps,  more  on  the 
difficulty  of  disturbing  a  rule  established  by  long  use  and  of  very 
extended  operation,  (c^)     And  in  some  of  the  States  by  usage, 

(c)  That  this  is  the  real  (listiuction  be-  cause  or  consideration  they  were  made, 
tween  contracts  under  seal  and  contracts  As  if  I,  by  deed,  promise  to  give  you 
not  under  seal,  see  Plowden,  arguendo,  £20,  here  you  shall  have  an  action  of 
in  Sharrington  v.  Strattou,  Plowd.  308.  debt  upon  this  deed,  and  the  considera- 
" Words,"  says  he,  "pass  from  man  to  tion  for  my  promise  is  not  examinable; 
man  lightly  and  inconsiderately;  but  it  is  sufficient  to  say  it  was  the  will  of 
where  the  agreement  is  by  deed  there  the  party  who  made  the  deed."  See  2 
is  more  time  for  deliberation ;  for  when  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  456.  See  also  Morley 
a  man  passes  a  thing  by  deed,  first,  there  v.  Boothby,  3  Bing.  Ill ;  Fallowes  i\  Tay- 
is  the  determination  of  the  mind  to  do  it;  lor,  7  T.  R.  477;  Shubrick  v.  Salmond,  3 
and  upon  that  he  causes  it  to  be  written,  Burr.  1639;  Fonbl.  Eq.  vol.  i.  p.  344,  n. 
which  is  one  part  of  deliberation,  and  (a). —  Some  writers  on  contracts  have 
afterwards  he  puts  his  seal  to  it,  which  said  that  specialties  do  not  require  a  con- 
is  another  part  of  deliberation ;  and  last-  sideration  to  render  them  obligatory  at 
ly,  he  delivers  the  writing  as  his  deed,  law ;  but  this  seems  to  be  somewhat  in- 
which  is  the  consummation  of  his  reso-  accurate.  The  existence  of  a  consideration 
lution;  so  that  there  is  great  deliberation  seems  to  be  as  essential  in  the  case  of 
used  in  the  making  of  deeds,  for  which  deeds  as  in  simple  contracts,  but  that 
reason  they  are  received  as  a  lien  final  existence  is  conclusively  presumed  from 
to  the  party,  and  are  adjudged  to  bind  the  nature  of  tlie  contract, 
the  party,  without  examining  upon  what  (c/)  In  Ortucau  v.  Dickson,  13  Cal.  33, 

456 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION.  *  429 


and  in  others  by  statutory  provisions,  the  want  or  failure  of 
consideration  may  be  a  good  defence  to  an  action  on  a  sealed 
contract.  (c?c?)  ^ 

By  the  general  rule  only  a  creditor  of  the  grantor  can  avail 
himself  of  the  fact  that  a  deed  was  without  consideration,  (de} 
because  as  between  the  parties  to  a  deed  there  is  no  need  of  a 
consideration,  (c^) 

By  the  civil  law,  and  the  modern  continental  law,  the  consid- 
eration is  the  cause  of  the  contract.  This  principle  is  quoted  and 
apparently  adopted  by  Plow  den ;  and  it  has  been  recently  ac- 
knowledged by  high  judicial  authority,  and  the  cause  distinctly 
discriminated  from  the  motive,  (e) 

Doubts  have  been  expressed  whether  a  contract  reduced  to 
writing  was  not  in  this  respect  the  same  as  one  under  seal.  (/) 
But  this  question  is  now  abundantly  settled ;  and  both  in  this 
country  and  in  England  a  consideration  must  be  proved,  where 
the  contract  is  in  writing  but  not  under  seal,  as  much  as  if  the 
contract  were  oral  only.  (^)  The  exception  to  this  rule  in  the 
case  of  mercantile  negotiable  paper  is  considered  elsewhere. 

it    is    said    that   the    difference    between  sideration   with    motive.     Motive    is    not 

sealed  and  unsealed  instruments  is  now  the  same  thing  with  consideration.     Con- 

a  mere  unmeaning  and  arbitrary  distinc-  sideration  means  sometliing  which  is  of 

tion,  made  by  technical  law,  and  not  sus-  some  value  in  the  eye.  of  the  law,  moving 

taiued  by  reason.  from  the  plaintiff;  it  may  be  some  benefit 

{dd)  See  Gray  v.  Handkinson,  1  Bay,  to  the  defendant,  or  some  detriment  to  the 

278;  State  y.  Gaillard,  2  id.  11  ;   Swift  v.  plaintiff;    but   at   all   events   it   must   be 

Hawkins,  1  Dallas,  17;  Solomon  y.  Kim-  moving    from    the    plaintiff.     Now    that 

mel,  5  Binn.  232;    Case  y.  Boughton,  11  which  is  suggested  as  the  consideration 

Wend.  106;  Leonard  v.  Bates,  1  Blackf.  here,  a  pious  respect  for  the  wishes  of 

173;  Coyle  v.  Fowler,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  473;  tlie  testator,  does  not  in  any  way  move 

Pebbles !•.  Stephens,  1  Bibb,  500;  Walker  from   the  plaintiff;    it    moves    from    the 

r.  Walker,   13   Ired.  L.  335;   Matlock  v.  testator;    therefore,   legally   speaking,   it 

Gibson,  8  Eich.  L.  437  ;   Martin   v.  Bar-  forms  no  part  of  the  consideration."     See 

ton  Iron  Works,  35  Ga.  320.  also  Lilly  v.  Hays,  5  A.  &  E.  548 ;  Smith, 

[de]  Hatch  v.  Bates,  54  Me.  136.  Cont.  p.  88,  n.  — In  Mouton  v.  Noble,  1 

(df)  Laberee  v.  Carleton,  53  Me.  211.  La.  An.   192,  Euslis,  C.  J.,  said:  "Civil- 
(e)  Thomas  v.  Thomas,  2  Q.  B.  851.  ians   use   the  word   cause   in   relation   to 

In    this    case    the    defendant    contended,  obligations  in  the  same  sense  as  the  word 

that   the   motive  with   which    an    agree-  consideration  is  used  in  the  jurisprudence 

ment  had  been  made,  was  a  part  of  the  of  England  and  the  United  States." 

legal  consideration,   and  that   the   decla-  (/)  Rann  v.  Hughes,  3  T.  11.  350,  n. 

ration   ought   to   have  set  out  the  same  (a),  7  Bro.  P.  C.  550;    Pillans   i'.    Van 

with   the  other   considerations,   but   Pat-  Mierop,  3  Burr.  1670. 

teson,   J.,  said     "It  would    be   giving  to  (g)  Cook    v.    Bradley,    7    Cxjnn.    57; 

'causa'  too   large   a  construction    if    we  Dodge  v.  Burdell,   13   Conn.   170;   Bean 

were   to   adopt   the  view   urged   for  the  v.   Burbank,    16   Me.   458;    Beverleys   v. 

defendant;  it  would  be  confounding  con-  Holmes,  4  Munf.  95;   Brown  v.  Adams, 

1  But  in  those  States  such  a  defence  is  not  good  upon  a  voluntary  promisein 
writing,  under  seal,  to  pay  a  sum  of  money,  for  value  received,  where  the  parties 
intended  there  should  be  no  consideration.  Aller  v.  Aller,  11  Vroom,  446.  See 
further  as  to  sealed  instruments,  Burkholder  v.  Plank,  69  Peuu.  St.  225. 

457 


*  430  THE   LAW   OP    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   II. 

It  has  been  held,  quite  generally,  that  where  the  considera- 
tion is  expressed  in  a  written  contract  no  other  can  be 

*  430  .  proved,  (A)  *  unless  there  are  words  which  indicate  other 

considerations ;  («*)  because  this  would  be  an  alteration  of 
the  contract  by  evidence  aliunde.  The  same  rule  is  said  to  be 
applied  in  equity,  unless  relief  is  sought  against  the  instrument 
on  the  ground  of  fraud  or  mistake  ;  (/)  but  many  decisions  of 
weight  allow  the  maker  of  a  written  promise,  or  of  a  deed,  to 
prove  other  and  additional  considerations  besides  those  expressed 
in  the  contract.  (Jc)  ^  Where  the  consideration  is  not  expressed  it 
may  be  proved.  (V)  And  where  the  contract  declares  that  it  was 
made  for  a  valuable  consideration,  this  is  primd  facie  evidence  of 
such  consideration,  (m) 


SECTION  II. 

KINDS   OF   CONSIDERATION. 

The  civil  law  division  of  all  considerations  into  four  species, 
very  clearly  stated  by  Blackstone,  is  logically  exact  and  exhaus- 
tive ;  (n)  but  it  has  never  been  so  far  introduced  into  the 
*  431    common  *  law  as  to  be  of  much  practical  utility  in  deter- 
mining questions  of  law. 

1    Stew.   (Ala.)    51;    Burnet   v.  Bisco,  4  Reynolds,   8   B.    Mon.    596;    Mitchell   v. 

Johns.  235;    People   v.   Shall,  9    Cowen,  Williamson,  6  Md.  210. 
778;  Roper  v.  Stone,  Cooke,  499;  Clark  (i)  Maigley  v.  Hauer,  7  Johns.  341. 

V.  Small,  6  Yerg.  418;  Perrine  v.  Cheese-  (j)  Clarkson  v.  Hauway,  2  P.  Wms. 

man,  6    Ilalst.   174.  —  The   consideration,  203;  Peacock  r.  Monk,  1   Ves.  Sen.  127 

however,  need  not  be   expressed   in   the  Fihner  v.  Gott,  7  Bro.  P.  C.  70. 
writing.    It  may  be  proved  aliunde.    Ting-  (k)  Emmons  v.  Littlefield,  13  Me.  233 

ley  V.  Cutler,  7  Conn.  291;  Arms  i>.  Ash-  Tyler  v.  Carlton,  7   Greenl.   175;  Wallis 

ley,  4  Pick.  71  ;  Cummings  y.  Dennett,  26  v.  Wallis,  4   Mass.    135,    Parsons,    C.    J. 

Me.  397;    Moutou    v.   Noble,   1    La.  An.  Quarles   v.   Quarles,   id.  680;    Wilkinson 

192;    Thompson    v.    Blanchard,    Comst.  y.  Scott,  17  id.  249. 

335;  Patchin  v.  Swift,  21   Vt.  292.     The  (/)  Orms  v.  Ashley,  4  Pick.  71;  Ting- 
admission  of  a  consideration  in  the  writ-  ley  v.  Cutler,  7  Conn.  291. 
ing,  is  of  course  prima  facie  evidence  of  (tn)   Whitney  v.  Stearns,  16  Me.  394. 
its    existence.      Whitney    v.    Stearns,    16  See   Sloan  v.  Gibson,  4  Mo.  33.     Contra, 
Me.  394.  Glen  Cove  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harrold,  20 

(/()   Schermerhorn  v.  Vanderheyden,  1  Barb.  298. 
Johns.   139;  Veacock   v.  McCall,  Gilpin,  (?;)  "  These  valuable  considerations  are 

329 ;    Emery   v.   Chase,    5    Greenl.   232  ;  divided  by  the  civilians  into  four  species  : 

Howes  V.  Barker,  3  Johns.  506;  Cutter  r.  1.  Do,  ut  des ;  as  when  I  give  money  or 

1  That  oral  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  real  consideration  of  a  written  contract, 
see  Farnsvvorth  v.  Boardman,  131  Mass.  115,  as  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  to 
show  that  no  debt  ever  existed  between  the  parties,  Hannan  v.  Hannan,  123  Mass. 
441;  or  of  an  assignment  of  letters-patent,  Hebbard  v.  Haughian,  70  N-.  Y.  54. 

458 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  43X 

The  fundamental  distinction  in  tlio  common  law  is  between 
those  cases  where  the  consideration  is  a  benefit  to  him  who  makes 
the  promise,  and  those  in  which  it  is  an  injury  to  him  who  re- 
ceives the  promise.  For  it  is  a  perfectly  well-settled  rule,  that  if 
a  benefit  accrues  to  him  who  makes  the  promise,  or  if  any  loss  or 
disadvantage  accrues  to  him  to  whom  it  is  made,  and  accrues  at 
the  request  or  on  the  motion  of  the  promisor,  although  without 
benefit  to  the  promisor,  in  either  case  the  consideration  is  suificient 
to  sustain  assumpsit,  (o)  ^ 

Considerations  at  common  law  may  be  good,  or  valuable.  The 
definition  of  Blackstone  is  this :  "  A  good  consideration  is  sucfi 
as  that  of  blood,  or  of  natural  love  and  affection,  when  a  man 
grants  an  estate  to  a  near  relation ;  being  founded  on  motives  of 
generosity,  prudence,  and  natural  duty.  A  valuable  consideration 
is  such  as  money,  marriage,  or  the  like,  which  the  law  esteems 
an  equivalent  given  for  the  grant;  and  is  therefore  founded  in 
motives  of  justice."  (jt?)     A  valuable  consideration  is  usually  in 

goods,  on  a  contract,  that  I  shall  be  re-  vant  hires  himself  to  his  master  for  cer- 
paid  money  or  goods  for  them  again.  Of  tain  wages,  or  an  agreed  sum  of  money, 
this  kind  are  all  loans  of  money  upon  here  the  servant  contracts  to  do  his  mas- 
bond  or  promise  of  repayment ;  and  all  ter's  service,  in  order  to  earn  that  specific 
sales  of  goods  in  which  there  is  either  an  sum.  Otherwise,  if  he  be  hired  generally ; 
express  contract  to  pay  so  much  for  them,  for  then  he  is  under  an  implied  contract 
or  else  the  law  implies  a  contract  to  pay  to  perform  this  service  for  what  it  shall 
so  much  as  they  are  worth.  2.  The  sec-  be  reasonably  worth.  4.  The  fourth 
ond  species  is,  Facio,  ut  facias,  as  when  I  species  is.  Do,  ut  facias ;  Avhich  is  the  di- 
agree  with  a  man  to  do  his  work  for  rect  counterpart  of  the  preceding.  As 
him,  if  he  will  do  mine  for  me ;  or  if  when  I  agree  with  a  servant  to  give  him 
two  persons  agree  to  marry  together,  or  such  M'ages  upon  his  performing  such 
to  do  any  other  positive  acts  on  both  work ;  M'hich  is  nothing  else  but  the  last 
sides.  Or  it  may  be  to  forbear  on  one  species  inverted  ;  for  servusfacit,  ut  herus 
side  in  consideration  of  something  done  det,  and  hertjLs  dat,  ut  servus  facial."  2  BI. 
on  the   other,   as,    that  in   consideration  Com.  444. 

A,   the    tenant,    will    repair    his    house,  (o)  Com.  Dig.  Action  upon  the  Case  upon 

•B,   the   landlord,    will    not    sue    him    for  Assumpsit  (B.)  1  ;    Pillans  v.  Van  Mierop, 

waste.     Or  it  may  be  for  mutual  forbear-  3  Burr.  1670;   Nerot  v.  Wallace,  3  T.  R. 

ance  on  both  sides  ;   as,  that  in  considera-  24;  Bunn  r.  Guy,  4  East,  194;   Willats  v. 

tion  that  A  will  not  trade  to  Lisbon,  B  Kennedy,  8  Bing.  5 ;    Miller  v.  Drake,  1 

will  not  trade   to   Marseilles ;    so   as  to  Caines,  45 ;    Powell  v.   Brown,  3   Johns. 

av(|^  interfering  with  each  other.    3.  The  100;     Forster    v.    Fuller,    6    Mass.    58; 

thim  species  of  consideration  is,  Fac;o,  «<  Townsley  v.    Sumrall,  2   Pet.   182;    Hil- 

des,  when  a  man  agrees  to  perform  any-  dreth   v.   Piukerton   Academy,  9   Foster 

thing  for  a  price,  either  specifically  men-  (N.  H.),  227;    Haines  v.  Haines,  6  Md. 

tioned,  or  left  to  the"  determination  of  the  435. 
law  to  set  a  value  to  it.     And  when  a  ser-  (p)   2  Bl.  Com.  297.     In  Coyle  v.  Fow- 

1  Thus  where  a  broker,  relying  upon  a  promise  of  his  principal  to  indemnify  him 
against  loss,  resists  a  call  for  a  "  margin,"  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  "  Board 
of  Stock  Brokers,"  of  which  he  is  a  member,  and  is  in  consequence  .suspended,  the 
injury  so  caused  is  a  good  consideration  for  the  promise.  White  r.  Baxter,  71  N.  Y. 
254  ;  or  a  mortgagee  waives  his  security  in  consideration  of  an  agreement  to  put  tho 
mortgaged  property  up  at  auction  and  divide  the  proceeds  in  a  certain  way,  Bradshaw 
V.  McLougldin,  39  Mich.  480.  See  also  Conover  v.  Stillwell,  5  Vroom,  56  ;  Gordon  v. 
Dalby,  30  la.  223. 

459 


*  432  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  II. 

some  way  pecuniary,  or  convertible  into  money  ;  marriage,  which 
it  is  now  settled  is  a  valuable  consideration,  (g)  ^  is  the  principal 
exception  to  this. 

An  equitable  consideration  is  sufficient  as  between  the  parties, 
although  it  be  not  valuable ;  but  only  a  valuable  consider- 

*  432    ation  *  is  valid  as  against  a  third  party,  as  a  subsequent 

purchaser,  (r)  whose  debt  existed  when  the  contract  was 
made  ;  an  attaching  creditor,  or  the  like.  It  is  at  least  true  that 
an  equitable  consideration  is  sufficient  in  all  conveyances  by  deed, 
and  in  transfers  not  by  deed,  but  accompanied  by  immediate  pos- 
session, (s)  But  where  there  is  a  promise,  performable  of  course 
in  future,  and  the  consideration  is  only  moral,  there  it  might 
have  been  said  formerly  that  the  law  was  not  positively  settled. 
But  the  late  cases  settle  the  question  definitively.  Mr.  Baron 
Parke  has  said,  "  a  mere  moral  consideration  is  nothing."  (^)  ^ 

ler,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  473,  it  is  said  :  "  A  plea  Cord,  504  ;    Ewing   v.   Ewing,   2   Leigh, 

that   a  note  was   executed   without   any  337  ;  Carpenter  v.  Dodge,  20  Vt.  595.    In 

'good'  consideration  would  not  be  a  bar  Smith  v.  Smith,  7  C.  &  P.  401,  it  was  held 

to  a  suit  on  the  note,  because  it  is  imma-  that  a  gift  from  a  father  to  a  son  of  a 

terial  whether  there  was  a  'good'  consid-  watch,  chain,  and  seals,   was  valid  upon 

eratiou   or    not,   provided    there    was    a  delivery,  and  the  father  could  not  after- 

'  valuable  '    consideration  ;    and  there  not  wards  revoke  the  gift. 
only  might  be  a  'valuable'  consideration  [t)  Jennings  v.  Brown,  9  M.  &  W.  501. 

in  the  absence  of  a  'good'  consideration,  This  subject  was   examined  at  length  in 

but  the   two   considerations    are   seldom  the  case  of  Eastwood  v.  Keuyon,  11  A.  & 

united.     When  there  is  a  '  lyoof/ '  consid-  E.  438,  where  it  was  AeW  that  a  pecuniary 

eration    there    is    not    generally    also    a  benefit,  voluntarily  conferred  by  the  plain- 

'  valuable  '   consideration,   and   e   converso.  tiff  and  accepted  by  the  defendant,  is  not 

There  may  be  a  '  valuable '  consideration,  such  a  consideration   as   will  support  an 

which  is  not  valid  in  laiv."  action  of  assumpsit  on  a  subsequent  ex- 

(q)   Whelan  v.  Whelan,  3  Cowen,  537 ;  press  promise  by  the  defendant  to  reim- 

Sterry  v.  Arden,  1  Johns.  Ch.  261  ;  Barr  v.  burse  the  plaintiff.     Therefore,  where  the 

Hill,  Addison,  276;   Hustin  v.  Cantril,  11  declaration  in  assumpsit  stated,  that  the 

Leigh,  136  ;  Magniac  v.  Thompson,  7  Pet.  plaintiff  was  executor  of  tlie  father  of  the 

348 ;  Smith  v.  Allen,  5  Allen,  454.  defendant's  wife,  who  died  intestate  as  to 

(?•)  Lord  Tenterden,  C.  J.,  in  Gully  v.  his  land,  leaving  the  defendant's  wife,  an 

Bishop  of  Exeter,  10  B.  &  C.  606;  Ciiitty  infant,  his  only  child  and  heir;  that  the 

on  Cont.  28.  plaintiff  acted  as  her  guardian  and  agent 

(s)    Noble    v.    Smith,    2    Johns.    52;  during  infancy,  and  in  that  capacity  ex- 

Grangiac  v.  Arden,  10  Johns.  293;  Pitts  pended  money  on  her  maintenance  and 

V.   Mangum,  2  Bailey,  588 ;    Pearson  v.  education,   in    the   management   and  im- 

Pearson,  7  Johns.  26 ;  Frisbie  r.  McCarty,  provement  of  the  land,  and  in  paying  the 

1  Stew.  &  P.  56 ;   Fowler  v.  Stuart,  1  Mc-  interest  of  a  mortgage  on   it ;    that   the 

1  A  woman  being  regarded  as  a  purchaser  for  value  of  all  property  accruing  to  her 
by  virtue  of  the  marriage  or  an  ante-nuptial  agreement.  Derry  v.  Derry,  74  Ind.  560. 
Thus  a  promise  to  marry,  subseciuently  performed,  is  a  valid  consideration  for  a 
promissory  note,  Wriglit  v.  Wright,  54  N.  Y.  437 ;  or  for  a  conveyance  of  lands  to 
the  wife,  however  fraudulent,  if  she  liad  no  knowledge  of  tlie  fraud,  Prewit  v.  Wilson, 
103  U.  S.  22 ;  and  equally  for  a  promise  of  the  wife  to  allow  her  intended  husband  the 
use  of  her  land,  on  which  he  proceeds  to  make  improvements,  Stratton  v.  Stratton, 
58  N.  H.  473. 

2  Freeman  v.  Robinson,  9  Vroom,  383.  A  testator's  desire  to  equalize  the  pro- 
visions of  his  will  is  an  insufficient  consideration  to  support  a  note  given  for  that 
purpose  only.     West  v.  Cairns,  74  Ind.  265. 

460 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


433 


Neither  the   rule  which  so   distinctly   postpones   *  moral    *433 
considerations   to   those   which   are   pecuniary,   nor   that 


estate  was  benefited  thereby  to  the  full 
amount  of  such  expenditure ;  tliat  the 
plaintiff,  being  unable  to  repay  himself 
out  of  the  personal  assets,  borrowed 
money  of  A  on  his  promissory  note ; 
that  the  defendant's  wife,  when  of  age 
and  before  marriage,  assented  to  the  loan 
and  the  note,  and  requested  the  plaintiff 
to  give  up  the  management  of  the  prop- 
erty to  her,  and  promised  to  pay  the  note, 
and  did  in  fact  pay  one  year's  interest  on 
it ;  that  the  plaintiff  thereupon  gave  up 
the  management  accordingly;  that  the 
defendant,  after  his  marriage,  assented  to 
the  plaintiff's  accounts,  and  upon  such  ac- 
counting, a  certain  sum  was  found  due  to 
the  plaintiff  for  moneys  so  spent  and  bor- 
rowed ;  that  the  defendant,  in  right  of  his 
wife,  received  all  the  benefit  of  the  plain- 
tiff's said  services  and  expenditure,  and 
thereupon,  in  consideration  of  the  prem- 
ises, promised  the  plaintiff  to  pay  and  dis- 
charge the  note.  Held,  on  motion  in  ar- 
rest of  judgment,  that  the  declaration  was 
bad,  as  not  disclosing  a  sufficient  consid- 
eration for  the  defendant's  promise.  And 
Lord  Deiiman  said,  in  giving  judgment : 
"  Most  of  the  older  cases  on  this  subject 
are  collected  in  a  learned  note  to  the  case 
of  Wennall  v.  Adney,  3  B.  &  P.  249,  and 
the  conclusion  there  arrived  at  seems  to 
be  correct  in  general,  'that  an  express 
promise  can  only  revive  a  precedent  good 
consideration,  which  might  have  been  en- 
forced at  law  through  the  medium  of  an 
implied  promise,  had  it  not  been  sus- 
pended by  some  positive  rule  of  law  ;  but 
can  give  no  original  cause  of  action,  if  the 
obligation,  on  which  it  is  founded,  never 
could  have  been  enforced  at  law,  though 
not  barred  by  any  legal  maxim  or  statute 
provision.'  Instances  are  given  of  void- 
able contracts,  as  those  of  infants,  ratified 
by  an  express  promise  after  age,  and  dis- 
tinguished from  void  contracts,  as  of  mar- 
ried women,  not  capable  of  ratification  by 
them  when  widows ;  Lloyd  v.  Lee,  1 
Stra.  94 ;  debts  of  liankrupts  revived  by 
subsequent  promise  after  certificate,  and 
similar  cases.  Since  that  time,  some 
cases  have  occurred  upon  this  subject 
which  require  to  be  more  particularly 
examined.  Barnes  ?•.  Hedley,  2  Taunt. 
184,  decided  that  a  promise  to  repay  a 
sum  of  money,  with  legal  interest,  wliich 
sum  had  originally  been  lent  on  usurious 
terms,  but  in  taking  the  account  of  which 
all  usurious  items  had  been  by  agreement 
struck  out,  was  binding.  Lee  v.  Mugger- 
idge,  5  Taunt.  36,  upheld  an  a,ssumpsit  by 
a  widow,  that  her  executors  should  pay  a 


bond  given  by  her  while  a  feme  covert  to 
secure  money  then  advanced  to  a  third 
person  at  her  request.  On  the  latter  oc- 
casion the  language  of  Mansjie/il,  C.  J., 
and  of  the  whole  Court  of  Common  I'lcas, 
is  very  large,  and  hardly  susceptilde  of 
any  limitation.  It  is  conformable  to  the 
expressions  used  by  the  judges  of  this 
court  in  Cooper  v.  Martin,  4  East,  76, 
where  a  step-father  was  permitted  to  re- 
cover from  the  son  of  his  wife,  after  lie 
had  attained  his  full  age,  upon  a  declara- 
tion for  necessaries  furnished  to  him  while 
an  infant,  for  which,  after  his  full  age,  he 
promised  to  pay.  It  is  remarkable  that 
in  none  of  these  was  there  any  allusion 
made  to  the  learned  note  above  referred 
to,  which  has  been  very  generally  thought 
to  contain  a  correct  statement  of  the  law. 
The  case  of  Barnes  i-.  Hedley  is  fully  con- 
sistent with  the  doctrine  in  that  note  laid 
down.  Cooper  r.  Martin  also,  when  fully 
examined,  will  be  found  not  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  it.  This  last  case  appears  to 
have  occupied  the  attention  of  the  court 
much  more  in  respect  of  the  supposed 
statutory  liability  of  a  step-father,  which 
was  denied  by  the  court,  and  in  respect  of 
what  a  court  of  equity  would  hold  as  to  a 
step-father's  liability,  and  rather  to  have 
assumed  the  point  before  us.  It  should, 
however,  be  observed,  that  Lord  Ellenhor- 
ough,  in  giving  his  judgment,  says  :  '  The 
plaintiff  having  done  an  act  beneficial  for 
the  defendant  in  his  infancy,  it  is  a  good 
consideration  for  the  defendant's  promise 
after  he  came  of  age.  In  such  a  case  the 
law  will  imply  a  request,  and  tlie  fact  of 
the  promise  has  been  found  by  the  jury  ; ' 
and  undoubtedly  the  action  would  have 
lain  against  the  defendant  whilst  an  in- 
fant, inasmuch  as  it  was  for  necessaries 
furnished  at  his  request  in  regard  to 
which  the  law  raises  an  implied  promise. 
The  case  of  Lee  v.  Muggeridge  nuLst, 
however,  be  allowed  to  be  decidedly  at 
variance  with  the  doctrine  in  tiie  note 
alluded  to,  and  is  a  decision  of  great 
authority.  It  should,  however,  be  ob- 
served, that  in  that  case  there  was  an 
actual  request  of  the  defendant  during 
coverture,  though  not  one  binding  in  law  ; 
but  the  ground  of  decision  there  taken 
was  also  equallv  applicable  to  Littlefield 
r.  Shee,  2  B.  &"Ad.  811,  tried  by  Gasdee, 
J.,  at  N.  P.,  when  the  learned  judge  held, 
notwitlistanding,  that  '  the  defendant  hav- 
ing been  a  married  woman  when  the  goods 
were  supplied,  her  husband  was  originally 
liable,  and  there  was  no  consideration  for 
the  promises  declared  upon.'     After  time 

461 


434 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  II. 


which  seems  to  embrace  marriage  within  the  same  cate- 
*  434    gory  as  *  money,  appears  at  first  sight  very  creditable  to 

the  common  law.  There  is,  however,  one  reason  which 
doubtless  had  much  influence  in  establishing  this  rule ;  and  that 
is,  the  extreme  difficulty  of  deciding  between  considerations  bear- 
ing a  moral  aspect,  which  were  and  which  were  not  sufficient  to 
sustain  an  action  at  law.  And  the  rule  may  now  be  stated  as 
follows :  a  moral  obligation  to  pay  money  or  to  perform  a  duty 
is  a  good  consideration  for  a  promise  to  do  so,  where  there  was 
originally  an  obligation  to  pay  the  money  or  to  do  the  duty,  which 


taken  for  deliberation,  this  court  refused 
even  a  rule  to  show  cause  why  the  nonsuit 
filiould  not  be  set  aside.  Lee  v.  Mugger- 
idge  was  cited  on  the  motion,  and  was 
sought  to  be  distinguished  by  Lord  Ten- 
terden,  because  there  the  circumstances 
raising  the  consideration  were  set  out 
truly  on  the  record,  but  in  Littlefield  v. 
Shee  the  declaration  stated  the  considera- 
tion to  be,  that  the  plaintiff  had  supplied 
tlie  defendant  with  goods  at  her  request, 
which  the  plaintiff  failed  in  proving,  inas- 
much as  it  appeared  that  the  goods  were 
in  point  of  law  supplied  to  the  defendant's 
husband,  and  not  to  her.  But  Lord  Ten- 
ttrden  added,  that  the  doctrine  that  a  moral 
obligation  is  a  sufficient  consideration  for 
a  subsequent  promise,  is  one  which  should 
be  received  witli  some  limitation.  This 
sentence,  in  truth,  amounts  to  a  dissent 
from  the  authority  of  Lee  v.  Muggeridge, 
where  the  doctrine  is  wholly  unqualified. 
The  eminent  counsel  who  argued  for  the 
plaintiff  in  Lee  r.  Muggeridge,  spoke  of 
Lord  Mansfield  as  having  considered  the 
rule  of  nudum  pactum  as  too  narrow,  and 
maintained  that  all  promises  deliberately 
made  ought  to  be  held  binding.  I  do  not 
find  this  language  ascribed  to  him  by  any 
reporter,  and  do  not  know  M'hether  we 
are  to  receive  it  as  a  traditional  report,  or 
as  a  deduction  from  what  he  does  appear 
to  have  laid  down.  If  the  latter,  the  note 
to  Wennall  v.  Adney  shows  the  deduction 
to  be  erroneous.  If  the  former.  Lord  Ten- 
lerden  and  this  court  declared  that  they 
could  not  adopt  it  in  Littlefield  v.  Shee. 
Indeed  the  doctrine  would  annihilate  the 
necessity  for  any  consideration  at  all,  inas- 
much as  the  mere  fact  of  giving  a  promise 
creates  a  moral  obligation  to  perform  it." 
The  same  doctrine  was  supported  by  the 
later  ciise  of  Kaye  v.  Button,  7  Man.  &  G. 
807.  —  The  case  of  Lee  v.  Muggeridge  is 
clearly  wrong,  and  inconsistent  with  many 
subse(iuent  cases  in  England  and  this 
country,  where  the  doctrine  is  now  almost 
universally  recognized,  whatever  it  may 

462 


have  been  in  some  earlier  cases,  that  a 
mere  moral  obligation  is  not  sufficient  to 
support  an  express  promise.  Thus,  where 
a  son,  who  was  of  full  age,  and  had  ceased 
to  be  a  member  of  his  father's  family,  was 
suddenly  taken  sick  among  strangers,  and, 
being  poor  and  in  distress,  was  relieved  by 
the  plaintiff;  and  afterwards  the  father 
wrote  to  the  plaintiff,  promising  to  pay 
the  expense  incurred,  it  was  held  that  such 
a  promise  would  not  sustain  an  action. 
Mills  V.  Wyman,  3  Pick.  207 ;  White  v. 
Bluett,  24  E.  L.  &  E.  434.  So  where  the 
plaintiff  had  furnished  necessaries  to  a 
person,  indigent  and  in  need  of  relief,  and 
his  son,  who  was  of  sufficient  ability, 
signed  and  delivered  this  writing  to  the 
plaintiff,  namely  :  "  This  maj^  certify  that 
tlie  debt  now  due  from  my  father  to  A  [the 
plaintiff],  I  acknowledge  to  be  for  neces- 
saries of  life,  and  of  such  a  nature  that  I 
consider  myself  hereby  obligated  to  pay 
A  $60  towards  said  debt,  now  due,  pro- 
vided my  father  does  not  settle  with  A  in 
his  lifetime  ; "  it  was  held  that  this  contract 
was  void,  for  want  of  consideration.  Cook 
V.  Bradley,  7  Conn.  57.  See  also  Loomis 
V.  Newhall,  L5  Pick.  159,  similar  to  MiUs 
V.  Wyman ;  Hawley  ?'.  Farrar,  1  Vt.  420  ; 
Ingraham  v.  Gilbert,  20  Barb.  152;  Bates 
V.  Watson,  1  Sneed,  376 ;  Parker  v.  Car- 
ter, 4  Munf.  273,  where  a  promise  by  a 
son  to  pay  a  debt  for  his  father  was  held 
void  for  want  of  consideration.  McPher- 
son  ?'.  Rees,  2  Penr.  &  W.  521  ;  Smith  v. 
Ware,  13  Johns.  257,  where  a  lot  of  land 
was  sold,  described  in  the  deed  as  supposed 
to  contain  ninety-three  acres,  but  was 
found  to  be  five  or  six  acres  short,  the 
promise  of  the  seller  to  pay  for  deficiency 
was  held  to  be  without  consideration. 
Frear  v.  Hardenbergh,  5  Johns.  272, 
where  a  promise  to  pay  for  labor  of  the 
plaintiff  on  land  recovered  from  him  by 
the  defendant  in  a  suit  at  law,  was  held 
void  for  want  of  consideration.  This  case 
was  cited  with  approbation  in  Society  v. 
Wheeler,  2  Gallis.  143. 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


434 


was  enforceable  at  law  but  for  the  interference  of  some  rule  of 
law.  Thus  a  promise  to  pay  a  debt  contracted  during  infancy, 
or  barred  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations  or  bankruptcy,  is  good 
without  other  consideration  than  the  previous  legal  obligation,  (m)  i 
It  must,  however,  be  distinct  and  specific ;  (mi)  and  it  has  been 
held  that  the  payment  of  interest,  or  even  payment  of  part  of  the 
principal  and  its  indorsement  on  the  note  by  the  debtor  himself, 
is  not  sufficient  to  warrant  a  jury  in  finding  a  new  promise  to  pay 
the  whole  debt,  (wv)  Where  such  promise  is  made,  it  does  not 
seem  to  be  necessary  to  declare  upon  it  as  the  foundation  of  a 
suit,  but  an  action  may  be  brought  upon  the  old  promise,  and  the 
new  promise  will  have  the  effect  of  doing  away  the  obstruction 
otherwise  interposed  by  the  bankruptcy  and  discharge,  (uw)  But 
if  the  promise  is  conditional,  then  the  party  seeking  to  enforce  it 


(m)  Earnest  v.  Parke,  4  Rawle,  452 ; 
Rogers  v.  Stephens,  2  T.  R.  713;  Hawkes 
V.  Saunders,  Cowi).  290 ;  Cooke  v.  Brad- 
ley, 7  Conn.  57 ;  Prewett  v.  Caruthers, 
12  Sm.  &  M.  491 ;  Walbridge  v.  Harroon, 
18  Vt.  448;  Patten  v.  Ellingwood,  32  Me. 
163;  Franklin  v.  Beatty,  27  Miss.  347; 
Otis  V.  Gazlin,  31  Me.  ^567 ;  Scouton  v. 
Eislord,  7  Johns.  36;  Fleming  v.  Hayne, 
1  Stark.  370;  Freeman  v.  Fenton,  1  Cowp. 
544  ;  Twiss  v.  Massey,  1  Atk.  67  ;  Ex  parte 
Burton,  id.  255 ;  Birch  v.  Sharland,  1  T. 
R.  715;  Besford  v.  Saunders,  2  H.  Bl. 
116;  Brix  v.  Braham,  8  J.  B.  Moore,  261, 
1  Bing.  281 ;  Erwin  v.  Saunders,  1  Cowen, 
249 ;  Shippey  v.  Henderson,  14  Johns.  178; 
Maxim  v.  Morse,  8  Mass.  127;  Way  v. 
Sperry,  6  Cush.  238;  Best  v.  Barber,  3 
Dougl.  188;  Trumbull  v.  Tilton,  1  Foster 
(N.  H.),  128.  The  promise  should  be 
made  after  the  decree  in  bankruptcy  dis- 
charging the  debt  —  a  promise  made  after 
the  petition  in  bankruptcy  was  filed  mere- 
ly, but  before  the  decree,  is  not  sufficient. 
Stebl»ins  v.  Sherman,  1  Sandf.  510.  In 
England,  however,  by  statute  6  Geo.  IV. 
c.  16,  a  promise  by  a  bankrupt  must  be 
in  ivritincj,  and  signed  by  the  bankrupt,  or 
by  some  person  thereto  by  him  lawfully 
authorized.  —  A  promise  by  a  debtor  to 
pay  a  debt  which  has  been  voluntarilij  re- 
leased by  the  creditor  is  not  binding,  for 
want  of  consideration.  Warren  v.  Whit- 
ney, 24  Me.  561  ;  Snevily  v.  Read,  9 
Watts,  396 ;  Montgomery  v.  Lampton,  3 
Met.  (Ky.)  519,  where  the  distinction  is 


broadly  taken  between  a  discharge  by 
force  of  positive  law  and  a  voluntary  dis- 
charge._  And  this  although  tlie  release 
was  given  without  consideration,  and 
merely  to  enable  the  debtor  to  testify 
in  a  suit  against  the  creditor,  in  which 
he  could  not  have  otherwise  testified 
because  of  a  legal  interest.  Valentine 
V.  Foster,  1  Met.  520.  But  see  Willing 
V.  Peters,  12  S.  &  R.  177. 

(uu)  It  must  be  an  absolute  and  uncon- 
ditional promise  to  pay  the  debt.  Brown 
V.  Collier,  8  Humph.  510.  The  words, 
"  I  have  always  said,  and  still  say,  that 
she  shall  have  her  pay,"  spoken  to  an 
agent  of  the  creditor,  may  be  construed 
by  the  jury  as  an  express  promise  to  pay. 
Pratt  V.  Russell,  7  Cush.  462. —  Mere 
statements  to  tliird  persons  that  he  had 
promised  to  pay  the  debt  are  not  in 
themselves  sufficient.  They  afford  some 
ground  to  raise  the  presumption  of  a 
promise,  but  are  not  such  in  themselves. 
Prewitt  V.  Caruthers,  12  S.  &  M.  491 ; 
Yoxtheimer  v.  Keyser,  1 1   Penn.  St.  365. 

{uv)  Merriam  v.  Bayley,  1  Cush.  77; 
Cambridge  Institution  for  Savings  v.  Lit- 
tlefield,  6  Cush.  210. 

(uw)  WiUiams  v.  Dyde,  Peake,  Cas. 
68;  Maxim  v.  Morse,  8  Mass.  127;  Ship- 
pey V.  Henderson,  14  Johns.  178;  Depuy 
V.  Swart,  3  Wend.  135.  — If  the  old  debt 
was  due  by  note  or  specialty,  a  parol  pro- 
mise merely  will  not  sustain  an  action  on 
the  note  or  specialty  itself.  Graham  v. 
Hunt,  8  B.  Mon.  7. 


1  In  IngersoU  v.  Martin,  58  Md.  67,  the  rule  is  stated  to  be  that  while  a  pre-existing 
debt  released  by  operation  of  law,  will  support  a  new  promise  to  pay,  a  debt  volun- 
tarily released  by  the  creditor,  is  insufficient.  To  the  same  effect,  see  Hale  v.  Rice,  124 
Mass.  292  ;  Hockett  v.  Jones,  70  Ind.  227. 

463 


*435 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book   II. 


must  sliow  that  the  condition  has  been  satisfied  ;  as  if  the  debtor 
promised  to  pay  when  he  was  able,  then  the  creditor  must  prove 
his  abihty.  (ux')  In  such  case,  and  perhaps  in  all,  it  would  be 
safer  to  rely  upon  the  new  promise  as  the  ground  of  the  action, 
and  upon  the  old  promise  only  as  the  consideration  for  the  new 
one,  (w^)  as  in  many  cases  it  has  been  held  that  the  new  promise 
does  not  revive  the  negotiability  of  a  bill  or  note,  but  binds  the 
insolvent  only  to  the  person  to  whom  the  contract  was  made,  (uz^ 
The  contrary  has  however  been  hold,  (wa) 

The    morality    of   the    promise,  however    certain,  or   however 

urgent  the  duty,  does  not  of  itself  suffice  for  a  consideration.     In 

fact,  the  rule  amounts  at  present  to  little  more  than  permission 

to  a  party  to  waive  certain  positive  rules  of  law  which 

*  435    *  would  protect  him  from  a  plaintiff  claiming  a  just  and 

legal  debt,  (y) 

Perhaps  an  illustration  of  the  rule,  that  a  moral  obligation  does 
not  form  a  valid  consideration  for  a  promise,  unless  the  moral 
duty  were  once  a  legal  one,  may  be  found  in  the  case  of  a  widow, 
who  promises  to  pay  for  money  expended  at  her  request  or  lent 
to  her  during  her  marriage.  It  has  been  held  in  England,  in  a 
case  examined  in  a  former  note,  (w)  that  this  promise  was  bind- 
ing, and  there  are  many  dicta  to  that  effect  in  this  country ;  (x) 


(ux)  Besford  v.  Saunders,  2  H.  Bl, 
116;  Fleming  u.  Hayne,  1  Stark.  370; 
Branch  Bank  v.  Boykin,  9  Ala  320; 
Scouton  V.  Eislord,  7  Johns.  36 ;  Bush  v. 
Barnard,  8  id.  407. —  So  iu  promises  by 
an  adult  to  pay  "  when  he  is  ahle  "  a  debt 
contracted  during  infancy,  tlie  defendant's 
ability  to  pay  must  be  shown.  Penn  r. 
Bennett,  4  Camp,  205 ;  Cole  v.  Saxbv,  3 
Esp.  160,  Davies  i-.  Smith,  4  id.  "36; 
Thompson  v.  Lay,  4  Pick.  48;  Eversou 
V.  Carpenter,  17  Wend.  419  So  uf  a 
promise  to  pay  a  debt  barred  by  the 
Statute  of  Limitations.  Tanner  v.  Smart, 
6  B.  &  C.  603 ;  Havdon  v.  Williams,  7 
Bing.  163;  Gould  r. 'Shirley,  2  Mo.  &  P. 
581  ;  Tompkins  v.  Browu,  I  Denio,  247  ; 
Laforge  v.  Jayue,  9  Penn.  St.  410. 

((((/)  Penn  v.  Bennett,  4  Camp.  205; 
Fleming  (;.  Ilavne,  1  Stark.  371 ;  Wait  v. 
Morris,  6  Wend.  394. 

(uz)  Depuy  v.  Swart,  3  Wend.  135; 
Moore  v.  Viele,  4  id.  420;  Walbridge  v. 
Harroon,  18  Vt.  448,  White  u.  Cushing, 
30  Me.  267 ;  Graham  v.  Hunt,  8  B. 
Mon.  7. 

(na)  Way  v.  Sperry,  6  Cush.  238. 

(v)  Way  V.  Sperry,  6  Cush.  238  ,  Tur- 
ner V  Chrisman,  20  Ohio,  332;  Dodge  v, 

464 


Adams,  19  Pick.  429,  Ehle  v.  Judson, 
24  Wend.  97;  Warren  v.  Whitney,  24 
Me.  561  ;  Geer  v.  Archer,  2  Barb'  420. 
In  this  last  case  it  was  /lelcl  that  an  ex- 
press promise  can  only  revive  a  prece- 
dent good  consideration,  which  might 
have  been  enforced  through  the  me- 
dium of  an  implied  promise,  had  it  not 
been  suspended  by  some  positive  rule  of 
law,  but  can  give  no  original  right  of 
action,  if  the  obligation  on  which  it  ivS 
founded  never  could  have  been  enforced 
at  law,  though  not  barred  by  any  legal 
maxim  or  statute  provision  But  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  moral  obligation, 
in  order  to  be  a  good  foundation  for  an 
express  promise,  should  be  such  that, 
without  the  express  promise,  an  action 
could  once  hare  been  sustained  upon  it.  But, 
if  it  could  have  beeu  made  available  in  a 
defence,  it  is  equally  within  the  rule. 
See  also  Nash  ;-•.  Russell,  5  Barb.  556 ; 
Mardis  r.  Tyler,  10  B.  Mon.  382;  Wat- 
kins  V.  Halstead,  2  Sandf.  311,  and  page 
*381,  ante. 

(w)   See  note  (t),  ante. 

(x)  Cook  r.  Bi-adley,  7  Conn.  57; 
Hatchell  v.  Odom,  2  13ev.  &  B.  302; 
Elile  V.  Judson,  24  Wend.  97 ;    Geer  v 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  436 

but  the  current  of  recent  decision  in  England  is  in  favor  of  the 
view,  that  the  promise  of  a  married  woman  has  not,  when  given, 
any  legal  force,  and  therefore  is  not  voidable,  but  void  ;  and  can- 
not be  ratified  by  a  subsequent  promise  after  the  coverture  has 
ceased,  nor  be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  consideration  for  a  new 
promise ;  and  we  have  therefore  expressed  our  belief,  in  that  note, 
that  the  case  of  Lee  v.  Muggeridge  is  not  law.  (y)  ^  And  a  late 
case  in  New  York  takes  the  same  ground  very  decidedly.  (2)  It 
has,  however,  been  held  that  the  promise  of  a  widow  to  pay  for 
goods  furnished  during  her  coverture,  on  the  faith  of  her  separate 
estate,  was  binding,  (a) 

It  seems  to  have  been  held  in  England,  formerly,  that  while  a 
promise  in  consideration  of  future  illicit  cohabitation  was  cer- 
tainly void,  a  promise  in  consideration  of  past  cohabitation,  es- 
pecially if  grounded  upon  seduction  by  the  promisor,  was 
*  sufficient.  It  appears  to  be  now  held,  that  the  considera-  *  436 
tion  is  equally  insufficient  in  either  case.  (5)  2 


SECTION   III. 

ADEQUACY   OF   CONSIDERATION. 

If  the  consideration  is  valuable  it  need  not  be  adequate;  that 
is,  the  court  will  not  inquire  into  the  exact  proportion  between 
the  value  of  the  consideration  and  that  of  the  thing  to  be  done 
for  it.  (c)  ^     But  it  must  have  some  real  value  ;  and  if  this  be  very 

Archer,  2  Barb.  420.     This  was  express-  (6)  It  appears  to  be  so  determined  by 

ly  held  in  Franklin  v.  Beatty,  27  Miss.  Beaumont   v.  Eeeve,  8  A.  &   E.  (n.  s") 

347.  483,  although  the  court  had  some   diffi- 

(ij)  Littlefield  v.  Shee,  2  B.  «fc  Ad.  811 ;  ciilty  in  coming  to  this  conclusion.     See 

Meyer  v.  Haworth,  8  A.  &  E.  467 ;  East-  also  on  this  point  Binnington  v.  Wallis, 

wood   V.   Kenyon,   11    id.   438.     See  also  4  B.  &  Aid.  6.50;   Jennings  v.  Brown,  9 

Lloyd  V.  Lee,   1    Stra.  94,  and  note  (0,  M.  &  W.  496 ;  Annandale  v.  Harris,  2  P. 

ante.  Wms.  432 ,    Walker  v.  Perkins,  1  W.  Bl. 

{z)  Watkins    r.    Halstead,    2     Sandf.  517;    Eastwood  v.  Kenyon,  11   A    &  E. 

311  ;   and  see   Waters   v.  Bean,  15    Ga.  438. 

358.  (c)  Skeate  v.  Beale,  11  A.  &  E.  983; 

(a)  Vance  v.  Wells,  8  Ala.  399.  Hitchcock  v.  Coker,  6  id.  438,  456 ;   Hub- 

1  See  Hayward  v.  Barker,  52  Vt.  429. 

2  It  was  said  in  Wallace  v.  Rappleye,  103  111.  229,  that  an  agreement  m  consider- 
ation of  past  illicit  cohabitation,  if  valid  at  all,  must  l)e  under  seal.  —  An  undertaking  by 
the  putative  father  to  support  his  illegitimate  cliild  is  upon  a  sufficient  consideration, 
Hook  V  Pratt,  78  N.  Y.  371  ;  but  to  make  such  a  child  his  heir  requires  a  valuable 
consideration,  Wallace  r.  Rappleye,  103  111.  229. 

3  "  The  adequacy  of  the  consideration  is  for  the  parties  to  consider  at  the  tmie  of 

VOL.  I.  30  465 


437 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   II. 


small,  this  circumstance  may,  even  by  itself,  and  still  more  when 
connected  with  other  indications,  imply  or  sustain  a  charge  of 

fraud,  (c?)  The  courts,  both  of  law  and  of  equity,  refuse 
*437    *to   disturb    contracts   on   questions   of    mere    adequacy, 

whether  the  consideration  is  of  benefit  to  the  promisor,  or 
of  injury  to  the  promisee.  ^  Nevertheless,  if  an  agreement  be 
unreasonable  or  unconscionable,  but  not  in  such  a  way  or  to  such 
a  degree  as  to  imply  fraud,  courts  of  equity  will  not  decree  a 
specific  performance,  (e)  and  though  courts  of  law  will  not  de- 
clare the  contract  void,  they  will  give  only  reasonable  damages 
to  the  plaintiff  who  seeks  compensation  for  a  breach  of  it.  (/) 


bard  v.  Coolidge,  1  Met.  84;  Whittle  v. 
Skinner,  23  Vt.  532 ;  Sanborn  v.  French, 
2  Foster  (N.  H.),  246;  Fhillipps  r.  Bate- 
man,  16  East,  372;  Kirwan  r.  Kirwan,  2 
Cr.  &  M.  623 ;  Cole  v.  Trecothick,  9  Ves. 
246;  Flover  r.  Sherard,  Ambl.  18;  Mac- 
Ghee  V.  Morgan,  2  Scb.  &  L.  395,  n.  (a)  ; 
Low  i\  Barcliard,  8  Ves.  133;  Speed  v. 
Phillips,  3  Anst.  732 ;  Harlan  v.  Harlan, 
20  Fenn.  St.  303 ;  Davidson  v.  Little,  22 
id.  245. 

(d)  Cockell  V.  Taylor,  15  E.  L.  &  E. 
101 ;  s.  c.  15  Beav.  103  ;  Edwards  r.  Bnrt, 
id.  435 ;  s.  c.  2  DeG.  M.  &  G.  55 ;  John- 
son V.  Dorsey,  7  Gill,  269 ;  Wormack  v. 
Rogers,  9  Ga.  60;  Jndge  *'.  Wilkins,  19 
Ala.  765  ;  Milnes  r.  Cowley,  8  Frice,  620 ; 
Preble  r.  Boghurt,  1  Swanst.  329 ;  Mayor 
V.  Williams,  6  Md.  235.  Mere  folly'  or 
weakness  or  want  of  judgment,  will  not 
defeat  a  contract.  This  is  well  illustrated 
by  tlie  case  of  James  r.  Morgan,  1  Lev. 
Ill;  s.  c.  1  Ivel).  569.  An  action  was 
bronglit  in  special  assumpsit,  on  an  agree- 
ment to  pay  for  a  horse  a  barley-corn 
a  nail,  for  every  nail  in  the  horse's 
shoes,  and  double  every  nail,  which  came, 
there  being  thirty-two  nails,  to  five  hun- 
dred quarters  of  barley;  and  on  a  trial 
before  Hyde,  J.,  the  jury  imder  his  di- 
rection, gave  the  full  value  of  the  horse, 
^8,  as  damages ;  and  it  is  to  be  collected 
that  the  contract  was  considered  valid ; 
for  the  report  states,  that  there  was  after- 
wards a  motion  to  the  court  in  arrest  of 
judgment,  for  a  small  fault  in  the  declara- 
tion, which  was  overruled,  and  the  plain- 
tiff had  judgment.  See  Chittj^  Cont.  32. 
And  where  in  an  action  of  assumpsit  it 
WHS  alleged,  that  in  consideration  of  2s. 
6d.  paid,  and  £4  1 7s.  Gd.  to  be  paid,  the 


defendant  promised  to  deliver  two  rye- 
corns  on  the  next  Monday,  and  double 
in  geometrical  progression  every  succeed- 
ing Monday  (or  every  other  Monday),  for 
a  year,  wiiich  would  have  required  the 
delivery  of  more  rye  than  was  grown  in 
the  whole  year,  the  court  on  demurrer 
seemed  to  consider  the  contract  good ; 
and  Powell,  J.,  said,  that  although  the 
contract  was  a  foolish  one,  yet  it  would, 
hold  good  in  law,  and  that  the  defendant 
ought  to  pay  something  for  his  folly  ;  but 
no  judgment  was  given,  the  case  being 
compromised.  Thornborrow  ?\  Whiteacre, 
2  Ld.  Ravm.  1164.  See  Chitt}-,  Cont.  32 ; 
Birdsong"^  v.  Birdsong,  2  Head,"^  289. 

(e)  Osgood  V.  Franklin,  2  Johns.  Ch. 
23;  Mortlock  v.  Buller,  10  Ves.  292; 
Gastjue  r.  Small,  2  Strob.  Eq.  72. 

(  /')  Thus,  where  an  execution  creditor 
proposed  to  discharge  tlie  execution,  with- 
out putting  it  into  an  officer's  hands,  if  the 
debtor  would  give  his  note  for  the  debt 
and  costs,  and  also  the  sum  which  an  offi- 
cer might  charge  for  collecting  the  execu- 
tion, and  such  note  was  given,  pa3-a1)le  in 
oats,  at  a  very  low  price  per  busliel ;  the 
court  held,  that  though  the  note  was  not 
usurious,  yet  it  was  unconscionable,  and 
they  deducted  tlie  sum  included  in  the 
note  as  officer's  fees  from  the  amount  of 
the  verdict  on  the  note.  Cutler  r.  How,  8 
Mass.  257.  See  Cutler  v.  Johnson,  id.  266. 
—  So,  where  the  defendant  hired  a  cow 
and  calf  of  the  plaintiff,  and  agreed  to 
return  them  in  one  year,  with  si.x  dollars 
for  the  use  of  them,  and,  if  not  then  de- 
livered, six  dollars  annually  until  deliv- 
ered, it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  en- 
titled to  recover  the  value  of  the  cattle, 
with  six  dollars  for  the  use  of  them  for 


making  the  agreement,  not  for  the  court  when  it  is  sought  to  be  enforced."  Per  Black- 
burn, J.,  in  Bolton  v.  Madden,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  55.  — A  single  consideration  is  sufficient  to 
support  all  the  promises  of  a  contract.     Harris  i:  Venables,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  235. 

1  Mere  inadequacy  is  insufficient  except  as  bearing  upon  tlie  question  of  fraud  or 
undue  influence.     Earl  v.  Feck,  64  N.  Y.  596 ;  Cumming's  Appeal,  67  Penn.  St.  404. 

466 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  433 

When   adequacy  of   consideration  becomes   material,  whether  it 
exists  is  a  question  for  the  court,  {g') 

As  the  consideration  must  have  some  value  and  reality,  the 
assumption  of  a  supposed  danger  or  liability,  which  has  no  foun- 
dation in  law  or  in  fact,  is  not  a  valuable  or  sufficient  consider- 
ation, (A)  nor  is  the  performance  of  that  which  the  party  was 
under  a  previous  valid  legal  obligation  to  do;(z)i  and  where 
one  through  mistake  of  the  law  acknowledges  himself  under  an 
obligation  which  the  law  does  not  impose,  he  is  not  bound  by 
such  promise ;  (/)  although,  in  general,  ignorance  of  the  law  is 
no  excuse  or  defence,  for  if  it  were,  a  "  premium  would  be  held 
out  to  ignorance."  (Jc) 


*  SECTION  IV.  *438 

PREVENTION   OP   LITIGATION. 

The  prevention  of  litigation  is  a  valid  and  sufficient  considera- 
tion ;  for  the  law  favors  the  settlement  of  disputes.  (Z)  Thus, 
a  mutual  submission  of  demands  and  claims  to  arbitration  is 
binding  so  far  as  this,  that  the  mutual  promises  are  a  considera- 
tion each  for  the  other,  (in)     But  the  submission  must  be  mutu- 

one  year  only,  and  interest  on  that  sura  into  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  and 

from  the  expiration  of  the  year  until  the  settling  the  boundaries  of  two  provinces 

cattle  were  delivered.     Baxter  v.  "Wales,  of   America,   and    providing  for   mutual 

12  Mass.  365.  conveyances,  &c.    It  Avas  objected  amongst 

(g)  Best,  C.  J.,  in  Homer  v.  Ashford,  3  other  tilings,  that  the  agreement  was  mere- 

Bing.  327.  ly  voluntary,  and  that  equity  never  de- 

(h)  Cabot  V.  Haskins,  3  Pick.  83.  crees  specifically  without  a  consideration. 

(i)  Harris  v.  AYatson,  Peake,  Cas.  72;  Upon  which  the  Chancellor  (Lord  Hard- 

Stilk  ?•.  M}Tick,  2  Camp.  317  ;  Callaghan  wicke)  observed,  that  it  was  true  that  the 

V.  Hallett,  "1  Caines,  104;  Willis  v.  Peck-  court   never   decrees   specifically  without 

ham,  1  Br.  &  B.  515;  Collins  v.  Godefroy,  consideration;  but  that  the  agreement  in 

1   B.   &  Ad.  950;   Sweauy  v.   Hunter,   1  question  was  not  without  consideration; 

Murphey,  181 ;  Smith  v.  Bartholomew,  1  for  though  nothing  valuable  was  given  on 

Met.  276  ;  Crowhurst  r.  Laverack,  16  E.  the  face  of  the  articles  as  a  consideration, 

L.  &E.  497;  s.  c.  8  Exch.  208;  L'Amo-  the   settling   boundaries,  and   peace  and 

reux  V.  Gould,  3  Seld.  349.  quiet,  formed  a  mutual  consideration  on 

(j)  Warder  v.   Tucker,  7  Mass.  449;  each  side;  and  in  all  cases  make  a  consid- 

Preeman  v.  Boynton,  id.  483  ;  May  r.  Cof-  eration  to  support  a  suit  in  chancery,  for 

fin,  4  id.  347 ;  Silvernail  v.  Cole,  12  Barb,  performance   of    the  agreement   for  set- 

685  ;  Ross  v.  McLauchlan,  7  Gratt.  86.  tling  the  boundaries.     See  also  AViseman 

(k)  Bilbie  v.  Lumley,  2  East,  469.  v.  Roper,  1  Chanc.  158;  Stapilton  v.  Sta- 

(l)  Penn  v.  Lord  Baltimore,  1  Ves.  Sen.  pilton,  1  Atk.  3. 
444.     In  this  case  a  hill  was  filed  in  chan-  {m)  Hodges  v.  Saunders,  17  Pick.  470; 

eery  to  enforce   specific   performance   of  Jones  v.  Boston  Mill  Corp.  4  id.  507  ;  Wil- 

articles  of  agreement  under  seal,  entered  liams  v.  The  Commercial  Exchange  Co. 

1  As  the  completing  a  contract,  already  partially  performed,  to  build  a  railroad,  in 
consideration  of  additional  compensation.    Ayres  v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.,  52  la.  473. 

467 


*439 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book  II. 


ally  binding ;  that  is,  equally  obligatory  on  both  parties,  or  the 
consideration  fails.  On  the  same  ground  a  mutual  compromise  is 
sustained,  (w)  With  the  courts  of  this  country,  the  prevention 
of  litigation  is  not  only  a  sufficient,  but  a  highly  favored 
*  439  consideration  ;  (o)  and  no  investigation  *  into  the  character 
or  value  of  the  different  claims  submitted  will  be  entered 
into  for  the  purpose  of  setting  aside  a  compromise,  it  being  suffi- 
cient if  the  parties  entering  into  the  compromise  thought  at  the 
time  that  there  was  a  question  between  them.  (^:))  ^ 

So  giving  up  a  suit  or  any  equivalent  proceedings,  instituted 
to  try  a  question  of  which  the  legal  result  is  doubtful,  is  a  good 
consideration  for  a  promise  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  for  an  aban- 
donment thereof.  (5)  ^     And  in  these  cases  inequality  of  consid- 


29  E.  L.  &  E.  429;  s.  c.  10  Exch.  569; 
Com.  T)ig.  Action  upon  the  Case  on  As- 
sumpsit (A.  1),  (B.  2). 

(n)  Durham  v.  Wadlington,  2  Strob. 
Eq.  258  ;  Van  Dyke  v.  Davis,  2  Mich.  145  ; 
Hoge  V.  Hoge,  1  Watts,  216.  In  this  case 
Gibson,  C.  J.,  held  that  a  compromise  of  a 
doubtful  title  was  binding  upon  the  par- 
ties, altliough  ignorant  of  their  rights,  un- 
less vitiated  by  fraud  sufficient  to  avoid 
any  otlier  contract.  In  Cavode  <>.  McKel- 
vey,  Addison,  56,  where  conflicting  titles 
of  lands  were  settled  by  one  claimant  pur- 
chasing the  title  of  the  other,  it  was  held 
that  the  settlement  was  a  good  considera- 
tion to  support  such  purchase,  altliough 
the  title  was  bad.  In  O'Kesou  y.  Barclay, 
2  Penu.  St.  531,  an  action  for  .slander  was 
compromised  by  the  defendant  agreeing 
to  give  the  plaintiff  a  certain  sum.  Held, 
by  the  Supreme  Court,  reversing  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  below,  that  there  was  a 
sufficient  consideration  for  the  promise, 
although  the  words  laid  in  the  declaration 
were  not  actionable. 

(o)  See  in  addition  to  the  cases  in  the 
last  note,  Zane  v.  Zane,  6  Munf .  406  ;  Tay- 
lor V.  Patrick,  1  Bibb,  168  ;  Fisher  r.  May,''2 
id.  448 ;  Truett  v.  Chaplin,  4  Hawks,  178 ; 
Brown  v.  Sloan,  6  Watts,  .321 ;  Stoddard 
V.  Mix,  14  Conn.  12  ;  I! ice  v.  Bixler,  1  W. 
&  S.  456  ;  Barlow  c.  (Jcean  Ins.  Co.  4  Met. 
270. 

(p)  Ex  parte  Lucy,  21  E.  L.  &  E.  199; 
MiUs  V.  Lee,  6  Monr.  91  ;  Moore  v.  Eitz- 
water,  2  Hand.  (Va.)  442;  Bennet  v. 
Paine,  5  Watts,  259 ;  Pierson  v.  McCahill, 
21  Cal.  122. 


(ci)  In  Longridge  v.  Dorville,  5  B.  & 
Aid.  117,  it  was  lieid  that  the  giving  up  a 
suit,  instituted  to  try  a  question  respecting 
which  the  law  is  doubtful,  is  a  good  con- 
sideration for  a  promise  to  pay  a  stipulated 
sum ;  and  therefore  where  a  ship,  having 
on  board  a  pilot  required  by  law,  ran  foul 
of  another  vessel,  and  proceedings  were 
instituted  by  tlie  owners  of  the  latter  to 
compel  the  owners  of  the  former  to  make 
good  the  damage,  and  tlie  former  vessel 
was  detained  until  bail  was  given,  and 
pending  .such  proceedings,  the  agent  of 
the  owners  of  tlie  vessel  detained  agreed, 
on  the  owners  of  the  damaged  vessel  re- 
nouncing all  claims  on  the  other  vessel, 
and  on  their  proving  the  amount  of  the 
damage  done,  to  indemnify  them,  and  to 
pay  a  stipulated  sum  by  way  of  damages ; 
it  was  hel.d  that  there  being  contradictory 
decisions  as  to  tlie  point  whether  ship- 
owners were  liable  for  an  injury  done 
while  their  ship  was  under  the  control  of 
the  pilot  required  by  law,  there  was  a  suf- 
ficient consideration  to  sustain  the  promise 
made  by  the  agents  of  the  owners  of  the 
detained  vessel  to  pay  the  stipulated  dam- 
ages.—  But  in  Watters  v.  Smith,  2  B.  & 
Ad.  889,  where  this  case  was  relied  upon, 
the  case  was  tliat  B  &  C  being  jointly  in- 
debted to  A,  tlie  latter  sued  B  alone.  lie 
remonstrated  ujjon  the  hardship  of  the 
case,  alluded  to  circumstances  which  would 
probably  reduce  the  plaintiff's  demand  if 
lie  gained  a  verdict,  and  proposed  to  put 
an  end  to  the  action  by  paying  part  of  the 
debt,  and  the  costs  of  the  suit.  This  was 
agreed  to,  and  a  receipt  given  for  the  sum 


1  Clark  V.  Gam  well,  125  Mass.  428  ;  Flannagan  v.  Kilcome,  58  N.  H.  443.  A  com- 
promise iu  gooil  faith  of  a  disputed  claim  is  binding,  although  it  turns  out  that  the 
claim  was  wholly  unfounded.  CaUisher  v.  Bischoffsheim,  L.  K.  5  Q.  B.  449 ;  Wehrum 
V.  Kuhn,  GI  N.  Y.  623. 

"  If  the  assignee  of  a  bankrupt  desists  from  proceedings  against  a  co-assignee,  who 

468 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


440 


eration  does  not  constitute  a  valid  objection  ;  it  is  enough  if 
there  be  an  actual  controversy,  of  which  the  issue  may  fairly  be 
considered  by  both  parties  as  doubtful.  But  a  promise  by  a  son 
not  to  complain  of  his  father's  distribution  of  his  estate,  is 
*no  consideration  for  the  father's  promise  not  to  sue  a  *440 
note  given  by  the  son.  (r)  It  has  been  said  that  equity 
regards  the  termination  of  family  controversies  as  a  sufficient 
consideration  for  an  agreement,  even  if  the  controversies  had  no 
good  foundation,  (rr)  i 

A  promise  to  pay  money,  in  consideration  that  the  promisee 
would  abandon  proceedings  in  which  the  public  are  interested,  is 
not  sustainable,  because  such  consideration  is  void  on  grounds  of 
public  policy,  (s)  ^  So  obtaining  the  passage  of  a  law  by  corrupt 
means  is  no  valid  consideration,  (i) 


paid,  which  was  stated  to  be  for  debt  and 
costs  iu  that  action.  A  having  afterwards 
sued  C,  it  was  held,  that  the  compositiou 
above  mentioned  did  not  operate  as  a  dis- 
charge of  the  whole  debt,  but  only  to  re- 
lieve B,  and  tlierefore  it  was  no  defence 
for  C.  —  In  Wilkinson  v.  Byers,  1  A.  &  E. 
106,  the  Court  of  King's  Bench  held,  that 
where  an  action  has  been  commenced  for 
an  unliquidated  demand,  payment  by  the 
defendant  of  an  agreed  sum  iu  discharge 
of  such  demand,  is  a  good  consideration 
for  a  promise  by  the  plaintiff  to  stay  pro- 
ceedings and  pay  his  own  costs.  And,  per 
Littledede,  J.,  even  in  the  case  of  a  liqui- 
dated demand,  the  same  promise  made  in 
consideration  of  the  payment  of  such  de- 
mand, may  be  enforced  iu  an  action  of  as- 
sumpsit, when  the  agreement  has  been 
such  that  the  court  would  stay  proceedings 
if  the  plaintiff  attempted  to  go  on.  See 
Wilb^ir  V.  Crane,  13  Pick.  284;  Mills  v. 
Lee,  6  Monr.  97  ;  Union  Bank  v.  Geary,  5 
Pet.  114;  Bennet  v.  Paine,  5  Watts,  259; 
Muirhead  v.  Kirkpatrick,  21  Penn.  St. 
237;  Livingston  r.  IJugan,  20  Mo.  102; 
Hey  V.  Moorhouse,  6  Bing.  N.  C.  52; 
Stracy  v.  Bank  of  England,  6  Bing.  754 ; 
Atlee  r.  Backhouse,  3  M.  &  W.  648  ;  Rich- 
ardson V.  Mellish,  2  Bing.  229 ;  Thornton 
V.  Fairlie,  2  Moore,  397,  408,  409. 

(r)  White  v.  Bluett,  24  E.  L.  &  E.434. 

(rr)   Smith  v.  Smith,  36  Ga.  184. 

(s)  In  Coppock  V.  Bower,  4  M.  &  W. 
361,  a  petition  having  been  presented  to 
the  House  of  Commons  against  the  return 


of  a  member,  on  the  ground  of  bribery,  the 
petitioner  entered  into  an  agi'eement,  in 
consideration  of  a  sum  of  money,  and  upon 
other  terms,  to  proceed  no  further  with 
the  petition.  Lord  Ahimjer  said  :  "  Then 
the  next  ciuestion  is,  whether  this  is  an 
unlawful  agreement;  and  I  think  that 
though  it  may  not  be  so  by  any  statute, 
yet  it  is  unlawful  by  the  common  law. 
Here  was  a  jietition  presented  on  a  charge 
of  bribery.  Now  this  is  a  proceeding  in- 
stituted not  for  the  benefit  of  the  individ- 
uals, but  of  the  public ;  and  the  only 
interest  in  it  wliich  the  law  recognizes  is 
that  of  the  pulilic.  I  agree  that  if  the 
person  who  prefers  that  jjetition  finds,  in 
the  progress  of  the  inquiry,  that  he  has 
no  chance  of  success,  he  is  at  liberty  to 
abandon  it  at  any  time.  But  I  do  not 
agree  that  he  may  take  money  for  so 
doing,  as  a  means  and  with  the  effect  of 
depriving  the  puldic  of  the  beuelit  which 
would  result  from  tlie  investigation.  It 
seenis  to  me  as  unlawful  to  do  so  as  it 
would  be  to  take  money  to  stop  a  prosecu- 
tion for  a  crime.  In  either  case  the  pros- 
ecutor might  say  that  he  is  not  bound,  at 
his  own  expense,  to  continue  an  inquiry  in 
which  the  public  alone  are  interested ;  but 
such  a  reason  does  not  amount  to  an  ex- 
cuse, wliere  he  receives  money  for  discon- 
tinuing the  proceedings."  Keir  v.  Leeman, 
9  A.  &  E.  (n.  s.)  371 ;  Wall  v.  Charlick, 
N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  July,  1850,  230. 

(t)  Marshall  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  B.  R. 
Co.  16  How.  314. 


has  misused  money  of  the  estate,  on  receiving  a  note  towards  the  payment  of  the 
amount,  the  note  is  upon  a  good  consideration.     Abbott  v.  Fisher,  124  Mass.  414. 

1  A  family  compromise  made  in  good  faith  and  full  knowledge  will  lie  sustained  on 
slighter  ground  than  one  between  strangers.     Bierer's  Appeal,  92  Penn.  St.  265. 

^  Or  an  agreement  iu  consideration  of  withholding  suit  upon  a  bond  not  to  expose 

469 


*441 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book   II. 


SECTION  V. 


FORBEARANCE. 


An  agreement  to  forbear  for  a  time,  proceedings  at  law  or  in 
equity,  to  enforce  a  well-founded  claim,  is  a  valid  consideration 
for  a  promise,  (li)  ^     But  this  consideration  fails  if  it  be 
*  441    shown  *  that  the  claim  is  wholly  and  certainly  unsustain- 
able at  law  or  in  equity ;  (v)  ^  but  mere  proof  that  it  is 


(m)  See  1  Eoll.  Abr.  24,  pi.  33;  Com. 
Dig.  Action  upon  the  Case  npon  Assuiiip- 
sH  (B.  1) ;  3  C]iitty,  Com.  L.  66,  67.  — In 
Atkiusou  V.  Bayntum,  1  Biiig.  N.  C.  444, 
one  M.  being  in  custody  pursuant  to  a 
warrant  of  attorney,  by  which  he  had 
agreed  that  execution  shouhl  issue  from 
time  to  time  for  certain  instalments  of  a 
mortgage  debt,  the  defendant,  in  consider- 
ation that  the  plaintiff  would  discharge  M. 
out  of  custody,  undertook  that  he  should, 
if  necessary,  be  forthcoming  for  a  second 
execution ;  it  was  held,  tliat  the  defend- 
ant's contract  was  valid.  —  As  to  the  mode 
of  declaring  in  such  case,  see  Willats  v. 
Kennedy,  8  Bing.  5  ;  Moston  v.  Burn,  7  A. 
&  E.  19.  In  this  country  the  same  gen- 
eral principles  are  recognized.  Thus,  if 
one  promise  to  pay  the  debt  of  another, 
in  consideration  that  the  creditor  will 
"forbear  and  give  further  time  for  tlie 
payment "  of  tlio  debt ;  this  is  a  sufficient 
consideration,  though  no  particular  time 
of  forbearance  he  stipulated  ;  the  creditor 
averring  that  he  did  thereupon  forbear, 
from  such  a  day  till  such  a  day.  King  v. 
Upton,  4  Greenl.  387.  See  also  Elting  v. 
Vanderlyn,  4  Johns.  237 ;  Muirhead  v. 
Kirkpatrick,  21  Peuu.  St.  237.  — So  an 
agreement  l^y  a  surety  to  forbear  a  suit 
against  his  principal,  ajler  he  shall  have  paid 
the  debt  of  the  principal,  is  a  good  consid- 
eration to  support  a  promise,  although  at 


the  time  of  the  agreement  the  surety  had 
no  cause  of  action  against  the  principal. 
Hamaker  i'.  Eberley,  2  Binn.  506.  —  So  a 
promise  to  forbear,  for  six  months,  to  sue 
a  third  person,  on  a  just  cause  of  action, 
is  a  valid  and  sufficient  consideration  for  a 
promissory  note.  And  in  a  suit  on  such 
note  by  the  payee  against  tlie  maker,  the 
burden  of  proof  is  not  on  tlie  payee,  to 
show  that  he  has  forborne  according  to 
his  promise,  but  on  the  maker,  to  show 
that  he  has  not.  Jennison  v.  Stafford,  1 
Cush.  168.  See  also  Giles  v.  Ackles,  9 
Barr,  147;  Silvis  i;.  Ely,  3  W.  &  S.  420; 
Watsou  ?'.  Randall,  20  Wend.  201  ;  Eord 
V.  Rehman,  Wright,  434  ;  Gilman  v.  Kib- 
ler,  5  Humph.  19;  Colgin  v.  Henley,  6 
Leigh,  85  ;  Rood  c.  Jones,  1  Dougl.  (Mich.) 
188  ;  Martin  v.  Black's  Ex'rs,  20  Ala.  309 ; 
McKiuley  v.  Watkins,  13  111.  140. 

((')  Gould  V.  Armstrong,  2  Hall,  266; 
Lowe  V.  Weatherby,  4  Dev.  &  B.  212; 
Jones  V.  Ashburnham,  4  East,  455  ;  Smith 
V.  Algar,  1  B.  &  Ad.  604 ;  Martin  v.  Black's 
Ex'rs,  20  Ala.  309  ;  New  Hampshire  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Colcord,  15  N.  H.  119.  The 
case  of  Wade  v.  Simeon,  2  C.  B.  548,  well 
illustrates  this  principle.  In  that  case  the 
declaration  stated  that  the  plaintiff  had 
brought  an  action  against  the  defendant 
in  the  Exchequer  to  recover  certain  mon- 
eys ;  that  the  defendant  pleaded  various 
pleas,  ou  which  issues  in  fact  had  been 


and  make  public  the  commission  of  the  crime  of  adultery  by  the  obligee  with  the 
obligor's  wife.     Brown  v.  Brine,  1  Ex.  D.  5. 

1  But  payment  of  part  of  a  debt  due  aud  payable  is  not  a  valid  consideration  for 
an  agreement  to  forbear  to  sue,  Warren  r.  Hodge,  121  Mass.  106  ;  Carraway  v. 
Odeneal,  56  Miss.  223  ;  as  the  payment  of  the  principal  of  a  note  in  consideration  of 
a  promise  to  relea.se  the  interest  due  thereon,  Willis  r.  Gammill,  67  Mo.  730. 

'■^  Thus  an  agreement  to  forbear  to  prosecute  a  suit  by  a  woman  for  her  seduction, 
is  no  consideration  for  a  promise.  Cline  r.  Templetou,  78  Ky.  550.  A  written  promise 
to  pay  a  firm  draft,  accepted  liy  the  promisor  as  a  partner  to  avoid  the  vexation  of  a 
suit  when  he  expressly  disclaims  l^eiug  a  partner,  and  such  is  the  fact,  is  without 
consideration.  MulhoUand  v.  Bartlett,  74  111.  58.  See  Barkley  v.  Hanlau,  55  Miss. 
606. 

470 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


442 


doubtful  will  not  invalidate  *  the  consideration,  {tv')  Nor  *  442 
is  it  necessary  that  the  forbearance  should  extend  to  an 
entire  discharge  ;  any  delay,  which  is  real  and  not  merely  color- 
able, is  enough,  (.x)  Nor  is  it  material  whether  the  proceedings 
to  be  forborne  have  been  commenced  or  not.  (v/)  Nor  need  the 
agreement  to  a  delay  be  for  a  time  certain  ;  for  it  may  be  for  a 
reasonable  time  only,  and  yet  be  a  sufficient  consideration  for 
a  promise.  (2)  ^     But  in  declaring  on  a  promise  made  on  such  a 


joined,  which  were  ahout  to  be  tried  ;  aud 
that,  in  consideration  that  the  plaintiff 
would  forbear  proceeding  in  that  action 
until  a  certain  day,  the  defendant  prom- 
ised on  that  day  to  pay  the  amount,  but 
that  he  made  default,  &c.  Plea,  that  the 
plaintiff  never  had  any  cause  of  action 
against  the  defendant  in  resjjcct  to  the 
subject-matter  of  the  action  in  the  Ex- 
chequer, which  he,  the  plaintiff,  at  the 
time  of  the  commencement  of  the  said  ac- 
tion, and  thence  until  and  at  the  time  of 
the  making  of  the  promise  well  knew.  To 
this  plea  there  was  a  general  demurrer. 
Tynda!,  C.  J.,  said :  "  By  demurring  to 
the  plea,  the  plaintiff  admits  that  he  had 
no  cause  of  action  against  the  defendant 
in  the  action  therein  mentioned,  and  that 
he  knew  it.  It  appears  to  me,  therefore, 
that  he  is  estopped  from  saying  that  there 
was  any  valid  consideration  for  the  de- 
fendant's promise.  It  is  almost  contra 
honos  mores,  and  certainly  contrary  to  all 
the  principles  of  natural  justice,  that  a 
man  should  institute  proceedings  against 
another,  when  he  is  conscious  that  he  has 
no  good  cause  of  action,  in  order  to  con- 
stitute a  binding  promise,  the  plaintiff 
must  show  a  good  consideration,  some- 
thing beneficial  to  the  defendant,  or  detri- 
mental to  the  plaintiff.  Detrimental  to 
the  plaintiff  it  cannot  be  if  he  has  no 
cause  of  action ;  and  beneficial  to  the  de- 
fendant it  cannot  Ije ;  for  in  contempla- 
tion of  law,  the  defence  upon  such  an  ad- 
mitted state  of  facts  must  be  successful, 
and  the  defendant  will  recover  costs,  which 
must  be  assumed  to  be  a  full  compensation 
for  all  the  legal  damage  he  may  sustain. 
The  consideration,  therefore,  altogether 
fails.  On  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  it  has 
been  urged,  that  the  cases  cited  for  the 
defendant  were  not  cases  where  actions 
had  already  been  brought,  but  only  cases 
of  promises  to  forbear  commencing  pro- 
ceedings. I  must,  however,  confess  that, 
if  it  were  so,  I  do  not  see  that  it  would 
make  any  substantial  difference.  The 
older  cases,  and  some  of  the  modern  ones, 


too,  do  not  afford  any  countenance  to  that 
distinction.  In  Tooley  v.  Wiudliam,  (Jro. 
E.  20G  (more  fully  reported  2  Leon.  10.')), 
it  is  stated  that  the  plaintiff  had  purcliased 
a  writ  out  of  Chancery  against  the  defend- 
ant, to  the  intent  to  exhibit  a  bill  against 
him ,  upon  the  return  of  tlie  writ,  which 
was  for  the  profits  of  certain  lands,  which 
the  father  of  the  defendant  had  taken  in 
his  lifetime,  the  defendant,  in  considera- 
tion he  would  surcease  his  suit,  promised 
to  him  that  if  he  could  prove  that  his  fa- 
ther had  taken  the  profits  or  had  posses- 
sion of  the  land  under  the  title  of  the  fa- 
ther of  the  plaintiff,  he  would  pay  him  for 
the  profits  of  the  land ;  and  tlie  court  held 
that  tlie  promise  was  without  consideration 
and  void.  There  the  suit  was  in  existence 
at  the  time  of  the  making  of  the  i)rom- 
ise.  So,  in  Atkinson  v.  ISettree,  A\  ille.s, 
482,  an  action  had  been  commenced  at 
the  time  the  promise  was  made.  These 
cases  seem  to  me  to  establish  tlie  principle 
upon  wliich  our  present  judgment  rests, 
and  I  am  not  aware  that  it  is  at  all  op- 
posed by  Longridge  v.  Dorville."  See  also 
Barber  v.  Fox,  1  Vent.  159,  2  Wms.  Saund. 
1.34;  Randall  v.  Harvey,  Palm.  394;  At- 
kinson V.  Settree,  Willes,  482  ;  King  v. 
Hobbs,  Yelv.  26 ;  Hammond  v.  Poll,  March, 
202  ;  Llovd  v.  Lee,  1  Stra.  94 ;  Goodwin  v. 
Willoughby,  Latch,  141,  Poph.  177;  Sil- 
vernail  v.  Cole,  12  Barb.  685. 

[w)  Longridge  v.  Dorville,  5  B.  &  Aid. 
117  ;  Zane  v.  Zane,  6  Munf.  406 ;  Blake  v. 
Peek,  11  Vt.  483,  Truett  v.  Chaplain,  4 
Hawks,  178. 

(x)  Sage  I'.  Wilcox,  6  Conn.  81.  Here 
the  delay  was  one  year.  Baker  v.  Jacob, 
1  Bulst.  41.  Here  the  delay  was  2^,  fort- 
night, or  thereabouts.     See  also  ante,  note 

(y)  Wade  v.  Simeon,  ante,  note  (r), 
Hamaker  v.  Eberley,  2  Binn.  506. 

(z)  Lonsdale  v.  Brown,  4  Wash.  C.  C. 
148;  Sidwell  v.  Evans,  1  Penn.  St.  385; 
Downing  v.  Funk,  5  Rawle,  69 ;  Hakes  v. 
Hotchkiss,  23  Vt.  235.  See  also  ante, 
note  (u). 


1  On  an  agreement  to  extend  time  of  payment  and  forbear  to  sue,  if  no  definite 

471 


*443  THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK    11. 

consideration,  the  plaintiff  must  allege  and  prove  the  actual  time 
of  forbearance,  and  if  this  be  judged  by  the  court  to  be  reason- 
able, the  action  will  be  sustained  ;  (a)  but  where  the  stay  of  action 
is  wholly  uncertain,  or  such  as  can  be  of  no  benefit  to  the  debtor 
or  detriment  to  the  creditor,  it  is  not  enough,  (i) 

It  is  not  enough  to  allege  in  the  declaration  that  disputes  and 
controversies  existed  concerning  a  certain  debt,  and  that  the 
promise  on  which  the  action  is  brought  was  made  in  considera- 
tion that  the  plaintiff  promised  not  to  sue  for  that  debt ;  for  this 
is  no  allegation  that  a  debt  actually  existed,  and  there  must  be 
such  an  allegation;  but  with  it  there  may  be  an  allegation  of 
disputes  and  controversies  concerning  its  amount,  (c)  It 
*  443  seems  *  to  be  settled,  that  a  general  agreement  to  forbear 
all  suits  is  to  be  construed  as  a  perpetual  forbearance ;  (c?) 
and  a  promise  resting  on  the  consideration  of  such  forbearance 
is  no  longer  binding,  when  a  suit,  which  was  to  be  forborne,  is 
commenced. 

It  is  not  material  that  the  party  who  makes  the  promise,  in  con- 
sideration of  such  forbearance,  should  have  a  direct  interest  in 
the  suit  to  be  forborne,  or  be  directly  benefited  by  the  delay,  (e) 

(a)  King  ?'.  Upton, 4  Greenl.  387 ;  Barne-  bound  to  prove  at  the  trial  the  existence 
hurst  r.  Cabbot,  Hardr.  5.  of  a  debt  to  some  amount ;  he  might  not, 

(b)  Jones  r.  Ashburnham,  4  East,  455  ;  indeed,  be  bound  to  prove  the  full  amount, 
Nelson  v.  Serle,  4  M.  &  W.  795  ;  Bixler  v.  but  simply  to  show  such  a  claim  as  to  lay 
Ream,  3  Penn.  St.  282.  See  also,  Rix  v.  a  reasonable  ground  for  the  defendant's 
Adams,  9  Vt.  233.  making  tlie  promise  :  whereas,  in  the  pres- 

(c)  Edwards  v.  Baugh,  11  M.  &  W.  eut  case,  he  would  not  have  to  prove  any- 
641.  Lord  Abimjer,  C.  B. :  "The  declara-  thing  beyond  the  fact  that  there  had  been 
tion  only  alleges  that  certain  disputes  and  a  dispute  between  himself  and  the  defend- 
controversies  were  pending  between  the  ant  as  to  the  existence  of  a  dcl)t.  A  man 
plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  whether  the  may  threaten  to  bring  an  action  against 
defendant  was  indebted  to  the  jdaiutiff  in  any  stranger  he  may  happen  to  meet  in 
a  certain  sum  of  money.  There  is  notli-  the  street.  Where  an  action  is  depending, 
ing  in  the  use  of  the  word  '  controver,«y '  the  forbearing  to  prosecute  it  is  a  sufficient 
to  render  this  a  good  allegation  of  consid-  consideration  for  a  promise  to  pay  a  cer- 
eration.  The  controversy  merely  is,  that  tain  sum  of  money ;  for,  besides  other  ad- 
the  plaintiff  claims  the  debt,  and  tlie  other  vantages,  the  party  promising  would  save 
denies  it.  The  case  might  have  been  dif-  the  extra  costs  which  he  would  have  to 
ferent,  if  the  declaration  had  said, '  Where-  pay,  even  if  he  were  successful." 

as  the  defendant  was  indebted  to  the  plain-  {d)  Clark   r.    Russell,  3    Watts,  213; 

tiff  in  divers  sums  of  money,  for  money  Sidwell  v.  Evans,  1  Penn.  St.  385. 

lent,  and  also  on  an  account  stated,  that  a  (e)   Smith  v.  Algar,  1   B.  &  Ad.  603. 

dispute  arose  as  to  the  amount  of  the  debt  See  Emmott  i\  Kearns,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  559. 

so  due;  and  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  all  In  Maud  r.  Waterhouse,  2  C."&  P.  579,  it 

controversies  respecting  it,  it  was  agreed  was  held  that  if  a  person,  employed  by  the 

that  tlie  plaintiff,  in  consideration  of  re-  administrator  of  a  deceased  debtor  to  wind 

ceiving  £100,  should  not  sue  the  defend-  up  the  concerns  of  the  deceased's  business;, 

ant  in  respect  to  his  original  claim.'     In  give  an  undertaking  to  a  creditor  of  the 

that  case  the   plaintiff  would  have  been  deceased,  to  furnish  money  to  meet  an  ac- 

time  is  agreed  on,  a  reasonable  time  will  be  presumed.  Calkins  v.  Chandler,  36 
Mich.  320. 

472 


•  CE.  I.]  CONSIDEEATION.  *  444 

It  is  enough  that  he  requests  such  forbearance ;  for  the  benefit  to 
the  defendant  will  be  supposed  to  extend  to  him,  and  it  would 
also  be  enough  to  make  the  consideration  valid,  that  the  creditor 
is  injured  by  the  delay.  But  there  must  have  been  some  party 
who  could  have  been  sued.  (/)  And  in  cases  in  which  the  person 
to  be  forborne  is  not  mentioned,  but  the  forbearance  may  be  un- 
derstood to  be  forbearance  of  whoever  might  be  sued,  the 
promise  founded  on  such  consideration  is  *  binding,  if  *  444 
there  be  any  person  liable  to  suit,  though  the  defendant 
himself  is  not  liable. (^) 

In  general,  a  waiver  of  any  legal  right,  at  the  request  of  an- 
other party,  is  a  sufficient  consideration  for  a  promise  ;  (7i)  i  or  a 
waiver  of  any  equitable  right ;  (^)  and  so  it  is,  although  it  be  a 
waiver  of  an  action  for  a  tort,  by  committing  which  the  person 
doing  the  wrong  gained  a  benefit,  although  the  other  party  suf- 
fered no  real  injury  from  it.  {J}  Forbearance  to  eject  a  tenant 
at  wall  is  a  sufficient  consideration  for  a  guaranty  of  past  and 
future  rent.  Q'j}     So  is  forbearance  by  a  collector  to  enforce  the 

ceptance  which  such  creditor  has  given,  in  •  W.  died  intestate,  and  tliat  at  the  time  of 
furtherance  of  an  accommodation  arrange-  the  making  and  dehvery  of  the  note  no 
ment  for  delaying  payment,  in  the  hope  administration  had  been  granted  of  his 
that  funds  may  be  forthcoming,  he  is  ha-  effects,  nor  was  there  any  executor  or  ex- 
hle  on  such  undertaking,  thougli  he  was  ecutors  of  his  estate,  nor  any  person  liable 
merely  a  clerk,  and  had  no  interest  in  the  for  the  debt  so  remaining  due  to  the  plain- 
goods  sold  by  the  creditor,  and  had  not  tiff  as  aforesaid ;  and  the  defendant  averred 
received  any  fimds  which  he  could  apply  that  there  never  icas  any  consideration  for 
to  the  discharge  of  the  debt.  the  said  note  except  as  aforesaid.  Held, 
(f)  Jones  1-.  Ashburnham,  4  East,  455;  that  the  plea  was  a  good  answer  to  the 
Nelson  v.  Serle,  4  M.  &  W.  795.     In  this  declaration. 

case,  to  a  declaration  in  debt  on  a  promis-  (g)  See  Jones  v.  Ashburnham,  4  East, 

sory  note  for  £24,  dated  January  3d,  1837,  455. 

made   by  the   defendant,  payable  twelve  (h)  Stebbins    v.    Smith,   4    Pick,   97; 

months  after  date  to  the  plaintiff,  the  de-  Smith  v.  Weed,  20  Wend.  184;  Haigh  v. 

fendant  pleaded  that  one  J.  W.,  before  Brooks,  10  A.  &  E.  309 ;  s.  c.  2  Per.  & 

and   at   his   death,  was   indebted  to   the  D.477 ;  3  id.  452 ;  Farmer  v.  Stewart,  2 

plaintiff  in  £24  for  goods  sold,  which  sum  N.  H.  97  ;  Nicholson  v.  May,  Wright,  660; 

was  due  to  the  plaintiff  at  the  time  of  the  Hinman  r.  Moulton,  14  Johns.  466  ;   Wil- 

making  of  the  promissory  note  in  the  dec-  liams  v.  Alexander,  4  Ired.  Eq.  207  ;  Wa- 

laration    mentioned;    that    the    plaiutiff,  terman  r.  Barratt,  4  Harriug.  (Del.)  311. 

after  the  death  of  J.  W.,  applied  to  the  (?)  Whitbeck  r.  Whitbeck,  9  Cowen, 

defendant   for   pavment ;    whereupon,   in  266;  Thorpe  ^•.  Thorpe,  1  Salk.  171 ;  s.  c. 

compliance  with  his  request,  the  defend-  12  Mod.  455. 

ant,  after  the  death  of  J.  W.,  for  and  in  (/)  Davis   v.  Morgan,  4   B.  &  C  8; 

respect  of  the  debt  so  remaining  due  to  Brealey  v.  Andrew,  2  Nev.  &  P.  114;  s.  c. 

the  plaintiff  as  aforesaid,  and  for  no  other  7  A.  &  E.  108. 

consideration  whatever,  made  and  deliv-  (jj)  Vinal    v.   Richardson,    13   Allen, 

ered  the  note  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  J.  521. 

1  The  release  of  a  party  from  the  performance  of  a  contract  forms  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration to  account  for  money  paid  him  under  the  contract.  Cutter  v.  Cochrane, 
116  Mass.  408;  as  well  as  the  rescission  of  a  subsisting  contract,  which  one  of  the 
parties  refuses  to  fulfil,  for  a  new  agreement  between  the  same  parties,  KoUius  v. 
Marsh,  128  Mass.  16. 

473 


*  445  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  II. 

collection  of  taxes  by  a  sale  of  the  land  a  good  consideration  for 
the  owner's  promise  to  pay  the  tax.  (jk') 

And  a  promise  to  pay  one  if  he  would  prove  a  debt  against  a 
deceased  husband,  (/c)  or  to  pay  a  debt  denied  to  be  due,  if  the 
party  creditor  would  swear  to  it,  rests  upon  a  sufficient  consider- 
ation. And  in  an  action  upon  such  promise,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  defendant  cannot  show  that  the  plaintiff  was  mistaken  or 
swore  falsely.  (Z) 

The  incurring  of  a  liability  in  consequence  of  the  promise  of 
another,  is  held  to  be  a  good  consideration ;  (wt)  and  a  subsisting 
legal  obligation  to  do  a  thing  is  a  good  consideration  for  a  promise 
to  do  that  thing,  (w) 


*  445  *  SECTION  VI. 


ASSIGNMENT   OP   DEBT. 

An  assignment  of  a  debt  or  a  right  is  a  good  consideration  for 
a  promise  by  the  assigTiee.  (o)  ^ .  Such  assignment  may  not  be 
good  at  law,  but  it  is  valid  in  equity  ;  and  courts  of  law,  for  many 
purposes,  and  to  a  certain  extent,  recognize  the  validity  of  the 
transfer,  if  the  assignee  obtains  a  benefit  which  the  law  con- 
siders a  sufficient  and  a  proper  consideration  to  found  a  promise 
upon,  (i?)  But  if  the  transaction  amounts  to  maintenance,  which 
is  illegal,  the  consideration  fails,  and  the  promise  is  void. 

(jk)  Burr  V.  Wilcox,  13  Allen,  269.  Buck,  11  Vt.  166,  it  was  held  that  a  prom- 

(k)  ■  Traver  v. ,  1  Sid.  57.  ise  by  one  already  legally  liable  for  a  debt, 

(/)  Brooks  ('.  Ball,  18  .Jolius.  337.  iu  consideration  of  such  liability  to  pay,  if 

{m)   Underbill  v.  Gibson,  2  N.  H.  352;  waited  on  a  certain  time,  creates  uo  new 

Homes  v.  Dana,  12  Mass.  190;  Bryant  v.  liability;  and  that  a  promise  to  pay  the 

Goodnow,  5  Pick.  228.      See  also  Chapin  debt  of  another,  if  waited  on  a  certain 

V.  Lapham,  20  id.  467  ;  Blake  v.  Cole,  22  time,  leaving  the  debt  to  be  enforced  dur- 

id.  97;  Ward  v.  Fryer,  19  Wend.  494.    In  ing  that  time  against  the  debtor,  is  not 

Baileyville  ?;.  Lowell,  20  Me.  178,  it  was  binding.      And   see,  to   the  same  effect, 

determined,   that   an   agreement    l)y   the  Deacon  v.  Gridley,  28  E.  L.  &  E.  345 ; 

owiier  of  an  execution  against  the  iuhabi-  s.  c.  15  C.  B.  295. 

tants  of  a  town,  that  if  they  would  at  once  (o)  Loder    v.   Chesleyn,    1     Sid.    212; 

assess  the  amount  required,  and  collect  the  Moulsdale    r.   Birchall,   2    W.    Bl.    820; 

same,  he  would  make  a  certain  discount,  is  Price  v.  Seaman,  4  B.  &  C.  525  ;  s.  c.  7 

founded   on   sufficient  consideration,  and  Dow.  &  li.  14;   Graham  r.  Gracie,  13  Q. 

will  be  enforced.  B.  .548;  Whittle  v.  Skinner,  23  Vt.  532; 

(n)  Cook  V.  Bradley,  7  Conn.  57  ;  War-  Harrison  v.  Knight,  7  Tex.  47  ;  Edson  v. 

ner  v.  Booge,  15   Johns.  233;  Jewett  v.  Fuller,  2  Fo.ster'^(N.  H.),  185. 
Warren,    12    Mass.   300.      In   Russell  v.  (p)  Price  v.  Seaman,  4  B.  &  C.  525,  7 

1  A  pre-existing  debt  is  a  good  cousideratiou  for  an  assignment  of  a  chose  in  action. 
Putnam  v.  Storv,  132  Mass.  205. 

474 


CH.  L] 


CONSIDERATION. 


446 


SECTION  VII. 


WORK  AND   SERVICE. 


Work  and  service  are  a  very  common  consideration  for  a  prom- 
ise, and  always  sufficient,  if  rendered  at  the  request  of  the  party 
promising,  (q)  This  request  may  often  be  implied ;  it  is  so, 
generally,  from  the  fact  that  the  party  making  the  promise  ac- 
cepts and  holds  the  benefit  resulting  from  the  work  or  ser- 
vice, (r)  And  it  is  an  equally  sufficient  consideration  for 
a  *  promise,  if  the  work  or  service  be  rendered  to  a  third  *  446 
party  at  the  request  of  the  promisor ;  (s)  and  such  request 
will  often  be  implied  from  very  slight  circumstances  ;  as  in  the 
case  of  clothing  supplied  to  a  child,  where  the  mere  knowledge 
and  silence  of  the  father  are  enough,  (f) 

If  the  work  and  service  rendered  are  merely  gratuitous,  and 
performed  for  the  defendant  without  his  request  or  privity,  how- 
ever meritorious  or  beneficial  they  may  be,  they  afford  no  cause 
of  action,  (u)  and   perhaps  no  consideration  for   a   subsequent 


Dow.  &  R.  14,  10  Moore,  34,  2  Bing.  437  ; 
Peate  v.  Dicken,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  430 ;  s.  c.  5 
Tyr.  116.  And  an  assignment  of  a  chose 
in  action  need  not  be  by  deed.  Howell  v. 
Mclvers,  4  T.  R.  690 ;  Health  v.  Hall,  4 
Taunt.  326. 

(v)  Hunt  V.  Bate,  Dyer,  272,  n.;  1 
Roll.  Abr.  1 1 ,  pi.  2,  3.  In  Taylor  v.  Jones, 
1  Ld.  Raym.  312,  it  was  held  that  giving  a 
soldier  leave  of  absence  at  the  instance  of 
a  third  person  is  a  good  consideration  for 
a  promise  from  him  to  the  captain  to  bring 
him  back  in  ten  days,  or  pay  a  sum  of 
money. 

(r)  1  Wms.  Saund.  264,  n.  (1) ;  Tipper 
V.  Bicknell,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  710.  In  that 
case  tlie  declaration  stated  that  the  de- 
fendants being  in  possession  of  certain 
mortgage  deeds,  of  which  H.  R.  was  de- 
sirous to  obtain  an  assignment  by  the 
payment  of  £500,  the  plaintiff  consented 
at  H.  R.'s  request  to  accept  bills  to  that 
amount  drawn  by  H.  R.,  upon  H.  R.'s  pro- 
curing the  defendants  to  deliver  the  mort- 
gage deeds  to  the  plaintiff  as  security ;  that 
the  defendants,  in  consideration  of  the 
plaintiff  accepting  the  bills,  undertook  to 
deliver  the  deeds  to  him  upon  his  paying 
them  the  amount  of  the  bills.    Held,  a  suf- 


ficient consideration  for  the  defendant's 
promise.  And  see  Lewis  v.  Trickey,  20 
Barb.  387. 

(s)   See  cases  cited  supra,  note  (7). 

(t)  Law  V.  Wilkins,  6  A.  &  E.  718; 
Nichole  v.  Allen,  3  C.  &  P.  36.  See,  how- 
ever, Mortimore  i-.  Wright,  6  M.  &  W. 
485,  where  Lord  Abinger  denies  these  cases 
to  be  sound  law.  It  is  a  question  for  the 
jury  whether  the  circumstances  are  suffi-  ' 
cient  in  any  particular  case.  Baker  v. 
Keen,  2  Stark.  501.  See  further,  as  to 
this  point,  ante,  p.  *299,  note  (h),  et  seq. 

(u)  Hunt  r.  Bate,  Dyer,  272  a;  1  Roll. 
Abr.  11  pi.  1;  Haves  r.  Warren,  2  Stra. 
933;  Roscorla  r.  Thomas,  3  Q.  B.  234; 
Jeremy  v.  Goochman,  Cro.  E.  442 ;  Dog- 
get  r.  'Yowell,  Moore,  643  ;  Hines  v.  But- 
ler, 3  Ired.  Eq.  307.  See  also  ante,  p. 
*432,  note  [t).  —  So,  in  Frear  v.  Harden- 
bergh,  5  Johns.  273,  where  A  entered  on 
land  belonging  to  B,  and  without  his 
knowledge  or  authority  cleared  it,  made 
improvements,  and  erected  buildings,  and 
B  afterwards  promised  to  pay  him  for  the 
improvements  he  had  made,  it  was  held, 
that  the  work  having  been  done,  and  the 
improvements  made  without  the  request 
of  B,  the  promise  was  a  nudum  pactum,  on 

475 


*  447  THE   LATV   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   II. 

promise,  although,  as  we  have  seen,  a  precedent  request  may  in 
law  be  presumed  from  the  promisor's  acceptance  of  the  service. 
So  if  a  workman  employed  and  directed  to  do  a  particular  thing 
choose  to  do  some  other  thing,  without  the  direction  or  assent 
of  the  employer,  the  implied  promise  of  the  employer  to  pay  for 
his  labor  will  not  extend  to  the  new  work ;  (y)  but  if  the  work  is 
accepted  by  the  employer,  it  would  be  a  sufficient  consideration 
for  a  promise  to  pay  for  it,  and  such  acceptance  might  imply 
such  promise. 


*447  *  SECTION  VIII. 

TRUST   AND    CONFIDENCE. 

Trust  and  confidence  in  another  often  form  a  sufficient  consid- 
eration to  hold  that  other  to  his  undertaking.  As  if  one  intrusts 
money,  goods,  or  property  of  any  kmd,  to  any  person,  on  the 
faith  of  that  person's  promise  to  act  in  a  certain  way  in  reference 
to  those  goods,  or  that  money  or  property,  such  person,  having 
accepted  the  trust,  will  be  held  to  his  promise,  because  the  trust 
is  itself  a  sufficient  consideration  for  a  promise  to  discharge  and 
execute  the  trust  faithfully,  (zf)  ^     For  if  a  person  makes  a  mere 

which  no  action  could  be  maintained. —  without  the  privity  or  request  of  B,  he 

But  perhaps  the  strongest  case  to  be  found  was  not  entitled  to  recover  for  it. 
in  the  American  reports  in  illustration  of  (r)   Hort    v.   Norton,    1    McCord,   22. 

this  principle,  is  that  of  Bartholomew  v.  See  also  Phetteplace  r.  Steere,  2  Johns. 

Jackson,  20  Jolms.  28.     A  owned  a  wheat  442. 

stubble-field,  in  which  B  had  a  stack  of  {w)  Doctor  &  Stud.  Dial.  2,  c.  24;  Holt, 

wheat,  which  he  had  promised  to  remove  C.  J.,  in  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  2  Ld.  Raym. 

in  due  season  for  preparing  the  ground  for  919.     Thus,  where  a  coffee-house   keeper 

a  fall   crop.      The  time  for   its   removal  accepted  a  large  sum  of  money  from  the 

having   arrived,  A  sent  a  message  to  B,  plaintiff,   and   promised    to    take    proper 

requesting  the  immediate  removal  of  the  care  of   it   for   a   certain    period,  it  was 

stack  of  wheat,  as  he  wished,  on  the  next  held    that    an    action    would    lie    on   this 

day,  to  burn  the  stubble  on  the  field.      B  promise  for  gross   neglect    and  want   of 

having  agreed  to  remove  the  stack  by  ten  caution,   whereby    the    money   was    lost, 

o'clock  the  next  morning,  A  waited  till  Doorman  i:  Jenkins,  2  A.  &  E.  256.     So 

that  time,  and  then  set  fire  to  the  stubble  where  the  plaintiff  delivered  the  sum  of 

in  a  remote  part  of  the  field.      The  fire  £700  to  the  defendant,  to  be  laid  out  by 

spreading  rapidly,  and  B  not  appearing  to  him  in  the  purchase  of  an  annuity,  and 

remove  the  stack,  A  removed  it  for  him.  the  defendant   promised   to   get   the   an- 

Held,  that  as  A  performed  the   service  unity  well   and  properly  secured,  but  was 

1  As  in  Hammond  i:  Hussey,  51  N.  H.  40,  where  a  teacher  undertook  to  examine 
pupils  for  admission  to  a  high  school  at  the  request  of  the  school  committee,  and  was 
held  liable  for  a  false  report  tliat  the  plaintiff  was  not  (jualified.  See  Jenkins  r.  Bacon, 
111  Mass.  373,  which  was  to  the  effect,  that  a  person  gratuitously  undertaking  to  buy  and 
keep  a  government  bond  for  another  is  responsible  for  its  loss  to  the  extent  of  its 
value,  irrespective  of  his  negligence  ;  Morton,  J.,  dissenting  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
for  the  jurv  to  decide  whether  he  was  liable  or  not  by  reason  of  negligence. 

'  476 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION. 


448 


gratuitous  promise,  and  then  enters  upon  the  *  perform-  *  448 
ance  of  it,  he  is  held  to  a  full  execution  of  all  he  has 
undertaken.  Questions  involving  this  principle  seldom  arise  ex- 
cept in  the  case  of  bailments,  and  will  l)e  considered  hereafter 
when  we  treat  of  that  subject.  Here  we  will  only  say,  that 
in  general,  an  agent  without  remuneration  cannot  be  required 
to  undertake  an  employment  or  trust,  or  held  liable  for  not  doing 
so ;  but  if  he  undertake  and  begin  it,  he  is  liable  for  the  cousc"^ 
quences  of  neglect  or  omission  in  completing  his  work. 


SECTION  IX. 

A   PROMISE   FOR   A   PROMISE. 

A  promise  is  a  good  consideration  for  a  promise,  (x)  i    And  it 
is  so  previous  to  performance  and  without  performance.     As  if 

guilty  of  gross  neglect  and  want  of  care,  eration.  See  also  the  case  of  Wheatley 
whereby  both  the  money  and  tlie  annuity  v.  Law,  Cro.  J.  668,  where  a  similar 
were  lost,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  declaration  was  held  good,  if  the  case  is 
was  entitled  to  maintain  an  action  against  correctly  reported.  Where  the  defend- 
the  defendant,  to  recover  compensation  ant  received  certain  notes  from  the  plain- 
for  the  injury  he  had  sustained,  although  tiff  to  collect  or  return,  it  was  held  that 
the  defendant  was  to  receive  no  reward  the  delivery  of  the  notes  constituted  a 
for  his  services.  Whitehead  v.  Greetham,  consideration  for  the  defendant's  agree- 
10  Moore,  182,  2  Bing.  464,  McClel.  ment,  and  that  if  he  neglected  to  use 
&  Y.  205.  In  the  aljsence  of  an  exjjress  ordinary  diligence  in  endeavoring  to  col- 
undertaking  to  procure  (jood  security,  the  lect  them,  he  was  liable  therefor  to 
party  would  only  be  bound  to  use  reason-  the  plaintiff.  Robinson  l\  Threadgill,  13 
aide  care  and  caution.  Dartnall  v.  How-  Ired.  L.  39.  And  where  the  plaintiff  iu- 
ard,  6  Dow.  &  R.  443;  s.  c.  4  B.  &  C.  trusted  "  divers  boilers  of  great  value  "  to 
34.5.  In  Shillibeer  v.  Glyn,  2  M.  &  W.  the  defendant,  to  be  weighed,  and  the  de- 
143,  the  declaration  stated  that  the  plain-  fendant  promised  to  return  them  in  the 
tiff  being  about  to  proceed  to  Northamp-  same  state  and  condition  that  they  were 
ton,  paid  money  to  tlie  defendants  in  Lon-  in  at  the  time  he  received  them,  but  .•^ent 
don,  that  they  might  cause  it  to  be  paid  them  back  in  detaclied  pieces  and  unfit 
to  him  at  Northampton  on  a  certain  day;  for  use,  it  was  held  that  the  ])laintiff  was 
that  the  defendants  received  the  money  entitled  to  maintain  an  action  on  the 
for  that  purpose  from  the  plaintiff,  and  promise,  to  recoA-er  compensation  for  the 
that  tliereupon  afterwards,  in  consider-  injury  he  had  sustained.  Bainbridge  v. 
ation  of  the  premi.ses,  the  defendants  Firmstone,  8  A.  &  E.  743 ;  s.  c.  1  Per.  & 
promised  to  cause  the  money  to  be  paid  D.  3 ;  and  see  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  vol.  i.  p. 
to    the    plaintiff    at    Northampton.     The  96  (ed.  1841). 

court   were    inclined    to    hold    that    the  {x)  Nichols    v.    Raynbred,    Hob.    88; 

declaration   disclosed  a  sufficient  consid-  Hebden   v.  Rutter,   1    Sid.   180;    Straug- 

1  In  Backus  i-.  Spaulding,  116  Mass.  418,  where  the  plaintiff  in  consideration  of  a  sum 
of  money  lent  to  him  by  the  defendant's  testator,  and  of  a  note  made  to  him  l)y  the 
latter  for  the  payment  of  an  additional  sum  in  four  montlis,  made  and  dcli\ercd  to 
him  a  note  for  the  amount  of  both  sums,  payable  in  six  years,  togctlicr  with  an 
assignment,  as  collateral  security  for  the  payment  thereof,  of  a  contract  relating  to 
certain  real  estate,  it  was  held,  that  the  promise  of  the  plaintiff  to  pay  his  note  at 

477 


448 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  ii. 


one  promises  to  become  a  partner  in  a  firm,  and  another  promises 
to  receive  liim  into  the  firm,  both  of  these  promises  are  binding, 
each  being  a  sufiicient  consideration  for  tlie  otlier.  (z/)  So  a 
promise  by  a  seller  to  refund  in  case  of  deficiency  in  the  thing 
sold  is  a  good  consideration  for  a  promise  to  pay  for  any  excess 
therein,  (j)y)  If  one  promises  to  teach  a  certain  trade,  this  is  a 
consideration  for  a  promise  to  remain  with  the  party  a  certain 
length  of  time  to  learn,  and  serve  him  during  that  time ;  but,  with- 
out such  promise  to  teach,  tlie  promise  to  remain  and  serve, 
though   it  be  made    in   expectation   of  instruction,  is   void,  {z) 


borough  V.  Warner,  4  Leon.  3  ;  Gower  v. 
Capper,  Cro.  E.  543 ;  Parke,  J.,  in  Weut- 
worth  V.  Bullen,  9  B.  &  C.  840;  Cart- 
wright  V.  Cook,  3  B.  &  Ad.  703 ;  Miller 
?•.  Drake,  1  Caiaes,  45 ;  Kice  v.  Sims,  8 
Kich.  L.  416;  Garret  v.  Malone,  id.  335 ; 
James  (;.  Fulcrod,  5  Tex.  512;  Dockray 
V.  Dunn,  37  Me.  442;  The  New  York 
and  New  Haven  Railroad  Co.  v.  Pixley, 
19  Barb.  428;  Kiester  v.  Miller,  25  Penn. 
St.  481.  So  in  White  v.  Demilt,  2  Hall, 
405,  it  was  held,  that  in  an  action  for  the 
breach  of  the  defendant's  contract  to  sell 
and  deliver  certain  goods  to  the  plaintiff, 
the  promise  of  the  latter  to  accept  the 
goods  and  pay  for  them  is  a  good  con- 
sideration for  the  defendant's  promise  to 
deliver  them.  So  in  Howe  r.  O'Mally,  1 
Murphey,  287,  A  conveyed  to  B  a  tract  of 
laud  coutaining  221  aci'es  more  or  less. 
Some  years  afterwards  it  was  mutually 
agreed  to  have  the  land  surveyed,  and  if 
it  were  found  to  contain  more  than  221 
acres,  the  defendant  should  pay  the  plain- 
tiff ten  dollars  per  acre  for  the  excess ; 
if  it  fell  short,  the  plaintiff  was  to  refund 
to  the  defendant  at  the  same  rate.  Here 
are  mutual  promises,  and  one  is  a  good 
consideration  to  support  the  other. 

(y)  McNeill  *'.  Heed,  2  M.  &  Scott,  89  ; 
S.  c'  9  Bing.  68. 

(yy)  Seward  v.  Mitchell,  1  Cold.  87. 

(z)  Thus  where  the  defendant  had 
signed  a  written  agreement  to  the  fol- 
lowing effect :  "  I  hereby  agree  to  remain 
with  Mrs.  Lees,  of  302  Regent  Street, 
Portland  Place,  for  two  years  from  the 
date  hereof,  for  the  purpose  of  learning 
the  business  of  a  dressmaker,  &c.  As 
witness  my  hand  this  5th  day  of  June, 
1826,"  it  was  held,  that  as  the  agreement 
was  all  on  one  side,  nothing  being  con- 
tracted to  be  done  or  performed  by  Mrs. 
Lees  as   a  consideration   or   inducement 


for  the  defendant's  remaining  two  years 
in  her  service,  it  was  a  nudum  pactum ; 
and  that  no  action  consequently  could  be 
brought  upon  it  against  the  defendant, 
for  leaving  her  mistress,  and  commenc- 
ing business  on  her  own  account  before 
the  expiration  of  the  two  years.  Lees  v. 
Whitcomb,  2  Mo.  &  P.  86  ;  s.  c.  5  Bing. 
34.  So,  where  the  written  agreement  was 
in  the  following  terms  :  "  Memorandum  of 
an  agreement  made  the  17th  of  August, 
1833,  by  which  I,  William  Bradley  of 
Sheffield,  do  agree  that  I  will  work  for 
and  with  John  Sykes,  of  Sheffield  afore- 
said, manufacturer  of  powder-flasks  and 
otlier  articles,  at  and  in  such  work  as 
he  shall  order  and  direct,  and  no  other 
person  whatsoever,  from  this  day  hence- 
forth, duriug  and  until  the  expiration  of 
twelve  mouths,  and  so  on  from  twelve 
montlis'  end  to  twelve  months'  end,  until 
I  shall  give  the  said  John  Sykes  twelve 
months'  notice  in  writing  that  I  shall  quit 
his  service,"  it  was  hel'l,  that  as  tliis  en- 
gagement was  entirely  unilateral,  and 
nothing  was  to  be  given  or  done  by  John 
Sykes  as  a  consideration  for  Bradley's 
promise  to  work  for  him  by  the  year,  and 
no  one  else,  the  agreement  was  a  nudum 
pactum,  and  could  not  be  enforced.  Svkes 
r.  Dixon,  9  A.  &  E.  693 ;  s.  c.  1  Per.  &  D. 
463.  See  also  Bates  v.  Cort,  3  Dow.  & 
R.  676.  So  where  the  defendant  signed 
the    following    instrument :  "  Mr.   James 

,  as  you  have  a  claim  on  my  brother 

for  £5  17s.  9f/.,  for  boots  and  shoes,  I 
hereby  undertake  to  pay  the  amount 
within  six  weeks  froni  this  date,  14th 
January,  1833,"  it  was  hdd,  that  the 
promise  being  without  consideration,  was 
a  nudum  pactum,  and  gave  no  cause  of 
action.  James  v.  Williams,  5  B.  &  Ad. 
1109. 


maturity,  and  the  delivery  of  the  collateral  security  for  the  performance  of  that 
promise,  constituted  a  sufficient  consideration  for  the  promise,  contained  in  the  note 
received  by  him,  to  pay  the  sum  therein  exjjressed  at  an  earlier  date. 

478 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


*449 


The  reason  of  *  this  is,  that  a  promise  is  not  a  good  con-    *  449 
sideration  for  a  promise  unless  there  is  an  absohite  nmtual- 
ity  of  engagement,  so  that  each  party  has  the  right  at  once  to 
hold  the  other  to  a  positive  agreement,  (a)  ^ 

*This  has  been   doubted,  from   the    seeming   want   of    *450 
mutuality  in  many  cases  of  contract.     As  where  one  prom- 
ises to  see  another  paid,  if  he  will  sell  goods  to  a  third  person ; 


{a)  McKinley  v.  Watkins,  13  111.  140; 
Lester  v.  Jewett,  12  Barb.  502;  Nichols 
V.  Kaynbred,  Hob.  88 ;  Kingston  r.  Phelps, 
Peake,  227 ;  Biddell  v.  Dowse,  6  B.  &  C. 
255;  Hoi^kins  r.  Logan,  5  M.  &  W.  241; 
Burton  v.  G.  N.  E.  Co.  9  Exch.  507 ;  Dor- 
sey  V.  Rockwood,  12  How.  126.  This 
necessity  for  the  mutuality  of  the  obli- 
gation, in  order  to  render  either  party 
bound,  is  well  illustrated  by  the  later  case 
of  the  Governor  &  Copper  Miners  v.  Fox, 
16  Q.  B.  239.  In  that  case  a  corpora- 
tion brought  an  action  on  an  executory 
contract,  seeking  to  recover  damages 
for  its  non-performance.  The  declara- 
tion stated  that  in  consideration  that 
the  plaintiffs  would  sell  to  the  defend- 
ants iron  rails,  the  defendants  agreed  to 
furnish  to  the  plaintiffs  sections  of  the 
said  railways,  averring  mutual  promises, 
and  alleging  as  a  breach  the  non-delivery 
of  the  sections  by  the  defendants.  It  ap- 
peared that  the  plaintiffs  were  incorpo- 
rated by  a  charter,  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  on  the  business  of  copper  miners, 
and  that  the  contract  in  question,  which 
■was  not  under  seal,  had  been  made  by  an 
agent  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiffs  with  the 
defendants.  Held,  that  the  action  coixld 
not  be  maintained  by  the  corporation,  as 
the  contract  was  not  under  seal,  and  did 
not  fall  within  any  of  the  exceptions  to 
the  general  rule,  that  a  corporation  can 
only  bind  itself  by  deed ;  that  tJie  contract 
was  not  incidental  or  ancillary  to  carry- 
ing on  the  business  of  copper  miners,  and 
was  therefore  not  binding  on  the  corpora- 
tion; that  no  other  charter  authorizing 
the  company  to  deal  in  iron  could  be 
presumed  to  exist,  the  charter  which  was 
given  in  evidence  not  supporting  such  an 
authority;  and  that,  as  the  corporation 
could  not  be  sued  upon  this  contract,  and 
as  the  alleged  promise  by  them  formed 
the    consideration    for    the     defendant's 


promise,  the  corporation  could  not  sue 
upon  the  contract.  ^\.nd  srinhh,  tliat  the 
doctrine  cannot  be  su])ported,  tluit  a  cor- 
poration may  sue  as  plaintiff  iijion  a  sinijile 
contract,  upon  the  ground  tiiat  by  so  do- 
ing they  are  estopped  from  objecting  that 
the  contract  was  not  binding  upon  them. 
At  all  events  such  an  estoppel  could  only 
support  an  action  of  covenant,  as  upon  "a 
contract  under  seal.  See  also  Payne  r. 
New  South  Wales  Co.  28  E.  L.  &  E.  579 ; 
s.  c.  10  Exch.  283.  — If,  however,  a  con- 
tract like  the  above,  although  not  origi- 
nally binding  upon  one  party,  by  reason 
of  some  defect  or  informality  in  the  exe- 
cution, or  for  any  other  cause,  and  there- 
fore not  originatlij  binding  upon  the  other 
party,  nevertheless  be  executed  by  the  party 
not  originally  liable,  the  other  party  can- 
not refuse  performance  on  the  ground 
that  the  contract  Avas  not  originally  bind- 
ing. Fishmonger's  Company  v.  Kol)ert- 
son,  5  Man.  &  G.  131.  In  like  manner  in 
Phelps  !'.  Townsend,  8  Pick.  392  (1829), 
where  the  defendant,  by  an  agreement 
signed  only  by  himself,  had  placed  his 
sou  as  an  apprentice  to  the  plaintiffs  to 
learn  the  art  of  printing,  therein  prom- 
ising that  his  son  should  stay  Mith  tiiem 
until  he  was  twenty-one,  &c. ;  which  the 
son  failed  to  perform.  On  the  trial  the 
defendant  objected  that  the  contract  was 
void  for  want  of  mutuality,  it  not  being 
signed  by  the  ])laintiffs,  and  that  there 
was  no  obligation  on  the  plaintiffs  to  do 
anything  which  might  form  a  consider- 
ation for  the  defendant's  promise.  But 
the  court  said,  "  that  the  acceptance  of 
the  contract  by  the  plaintiffs,  and  the 
execution  of  it  in  part  by  receiving  the 
apprentice,  created  an  obligation  on  tiieir 
part  to  maintain  and  in.«truct  the  defend- 
ant's son."  See  also  Commercial  Bank  v. 
Nolan,  7  How.  (Miss.)  508. 


1  But  where  a  dealer,  in  response  to  an  advertisement,  sent  in  a  tender  to  supply 
stores  to  a  railway  for  a  period  named  for  certain  prices,  "in  such  quantities  as  the 
railway's  store-keeper  might  order  from  time  to  time,"  and  the  railway  accepted 
his  tender,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  against  the  dealer  on  his  refusal  to  delner  goods 
ordered  by  the  railway,  that  there  was" sufficient  consideration  for  the  dealer's  promise 
to  supply  "the  goods,  although  there  was  no  binding  contract  on  the  part  of  the  railway- 
to  order  any.    Great  Northern  Railway  v.  Witham,  L.  II.  9  C.  P.  16. 

479 


*  451  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK    II. 

or  promises  to  give  a  certain  sum  if  another  will  deliver  up 
certain  documents  or  securities,  or  if  he  will  forbear  a  demand, 
or  suspend  legal  proceedings  or  the  like.  (5)  Here  it  is  said  that 
the  party  making  the  promise  is  bound,  while  the  other  party  is 
at  liberty  to  do  anything  or  nothing.  But  this  is  a  mistake. 
The  party  making  the  promise  is  bound  to  nothing  until  the 
promisee  within  a  reasonable  time  engages  to  do,  or  else  does  or 
begins  to  do,  the  thing  which  is  the  condition  of  the  first 

*  451    promise.     *  Until    such   engagement   or   such    doing,  the 

promisor  may  withdraw  his  promise,  because  there  is  no 
mutuality,  and  therefore  no  consideration  for  it.  But  after  an 
engagement  on  the  part  of  the  promisee  which  is  sufficient  to 
bind  him,  then  the  i^romisor  is  bound  also,  because  there  is  now 
a  promise  for  a  promise,  with  entire  mutuality  of  obligation.  So, 
if  the  promisee  begins  to  do  the  thing,  in  a  way  which  binds  him 
to  complete  it,  here  also  is  a  mutuality  of  obligation.  But  if 
without  any  promise  whatever,  the  promisee  does  the  thing  re- 
quired, then  the  promisor  is  bound  on  another  ground.  The  thing 
done  is  itself  a  sufficient  and  a  completed  consideration ;  and  the 
original  promise  to  do  something,  if  the  other  party  would  do 
something,  is  a  continuing  promise  until  that  other  party  does 
the  thing  required  of  him. 

(b)  In  Kenuaway  v.  Treleavau,  5  M.  performed  rests  with  one  of  the  contract- 

&  W.  501,  Purke,  B.,  is  reported  to  have  ing  parties.     A  guaranty  falls  under  that 

said,  while   discussing  the  suffidency  of  class,  when  a  party  says,  '  In   case   you 

the  consideration  for  a  guaranty,  which  choose  to  employ  this  man  as  your  agent 

was  in  these  terms:  "Truro,  July  12th,  for  a  week,  1  will  be  responsible  for  all 

1838.     Messrs.  Kennaway  &  Co.     Gentle-  such  sums  as  he  shall  receive  during  that 

men  —  I  hereby  guarantee  to  you,  Messrs.  time,  and  neglect  to  pay  over  to  you,'  the 

Kennaway  &   Co.,  the  sum  of   ^250,  in  party  indemnified  is  not  therefore  bound 

case  Mr.  Paddon,  of,  «&c.,  should  defauJt  in  to  employ  the  per-son  de.signated  by  the 

his  capacity  of  agent  and  traveller  to  you.  guaranty ;  hut  if  he  do  employ  him,  then 

William  S.  Treleavau."    "  There  is  a  case  the  guaranty  attaches  and  becomes  l)ind- 

iu  the  books  of  Newbury  v.  Armstrong,  ing  on  the  party  who  gave  it.     It  is  there- 

6  Bing.  201,  which  strongly  resembles  the  fore  no  objection  in  the  present  case  to 

present.      There    the    guaranty    was    in  say  that  tlie  jJaintiffs  were  not  obliged 

these  terms :  '  I  agree  to  be  security  to  to  take  Paddon  into  their  service ;   they 

you  for  T.  C.  for  whatever,  while  in  your  might  do  so  or  not,  as  they  pleased ;  but 

employ,  you  may  trust  him  with,  and  in  having   once   done   so,  the  guarantee  at- 

case  of  default  to  make  the  same  good ; '  taches  and  the  defendant  becomes  respon- 

and  the  contract  was  held  to  be  good,  on  silde  for  the  default."     See  also  Yard  v. 

the  ground  that  the  future  employment  Eland,   1    Ld.   Raym.  368 ;    Caballero   v. 

of  the   party  was  a  sufficient   considera-  Slater,  25  E.  L.  &  E.  285;  s.  c.  24  C.  B. 

tion.     It  is  said,  and  truly,  that  in  the  300 ;  L'Amoreux  r.  Gould,  3   Seld.  349. 

present   case  there  was  no  binding   con-  The   binding   obligation  of  contracts   or 

tract  on  the  plaintiffs,  and  that,  notwith-  promises  to  do  some  thing,  provided,  or 

standing    the    guaranty,    they  were    not  on   condition,   or  when   the   other   paity 

bound  to  employ  Paddon.     But  a  great  shaU  do  some  other  thing,  is  also  recog- 

number  of  the  cases  are  of  contracts  not  nized  in  Mozley  v.  Tinkler,  1  C.  M.  &  R. 

binding  on  both  sides  at  the  time  when  692. 
made,  and  in  which  the  whole  duty  to  be 

480 


CH.  1.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  452 

A  very  large  proportion  of  our  most  common  contracts  rests 
upon  this  principle.  Thus,  in  the  contract  of  sale,  the  proposed 
buyer  says,  I  will  give  you  so  much  for  these  goods ;  and  he  may 
withdraw  this  offer  before  it  is  accepted,  and  if  his  withdrawal 
reaches  the  seller  before  the  seller  has  accepted,  the  obligation  of 
the  buyer  is  extinguished ;  but  if  not  withdrawn,  it  remains  as  a 
continuing  offer  for  a  reasonable  time,  and,  if  accepted  within 
this  time,  both  parties  are  now  bound  as  by  a  promise  for  a 
promise ;  there  is  an  entire  mutuality  of  obligation.  The  buyer 
may  tender  the  price  and  demand  the  goods,  and  the  seller  may 
tender  the  goods  and  demand  the  price,  (c)  This  subject,  how- 
ever, belongs  rather  to  the  topic  "  Assent." 

A  written  agreement  to  submit  disputes  and  claims  to  arbitra- 
tion must  be  signed  by  all  parties,  or  it  is  obligatory  upon  none. 
For  no  party  can  hold  another  to  the  award,  without  showing 
that  he  himself  would  have  been  equally  bound  by  it.  (cZ) 

It  should  be  added,  that  the  common  law  makes  an  ex- 
ception *  to  this  requirement  of  mutuality,  in  the  case  of  *  452 
contracts  between  infants  and  persons  of  full  age ;  follow- 
ing in  this  respect  the  civil  law,  and  the  law  prevailing  on  the 
continent  of  Europe.  The  infant  is  not  bound,  while  the  adult  is  ; 
the  infant  may  avoid  his  contract,  but  the  adult  cannot,  (e) 
This  rule  has  been  applied  to  the  contract  of  future  marriage,  as 
well  as  to  other  contracts.  Where  a  man  of  full  age  enters  into 
such  contract  with  a  woman  who  is  a  minor,  if  he  breaks  the 
contract  she  has  her  remedy  by  action.  (/)  If  she  breaks  it  he 
has  no  action.  But  a  woman  under  age  may  perhaps  be  bound 
by  a  marriage  contract  properly  securing  her  interests,  and  delib- 
erately entered  into,  with  tlie  approbation  of  her  parents  or  guar- 
dians. ((/) 

(c)  Thus,  in  Wliite  v.  Demilt,  2  Hall,  (e)  See  ante,  p.  *329. 

405,  the  plaintiff  brought  an  action  for  (/)  Holt  v.  Ward  Clarencieux,  2  Stra. 

the  non-delivery  of  certain  goods  sold  him  937  ;  Hunt  v.  Peake,  5  Cowen,  475;  Wil- 

by  the  defendant.     One  ground  of  defence  lard  v.  Stone,  7   Cowen,  22 ;   Cannon  _  v. 

was  want  of  consideration  for  the  defend-  Alsbury,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  78.  —  So  an  in- 

ant's  promise.     But  the  court  said,  that  fant  may  maintain  an  action  on  a  mer- 

the  promise  of  the  plaintiff  to  accept  and  cantile  contract,  although  _  he  would  not 

pay  for  the  goods  Avas  a  good  considera-  be  bound  himself.     Warwick  v.  Bruce,  2 

tion  for  the  defendant's  promise  to  deliver  M.  &  Sel.  205. 

them.     See   also   Babcock  v.  Wilson,   17  {g)  Anslie   v.  Medlycott,   9    Ves.    14  ; 

Me.  372;  Appleton  t'.  Chase,  19  Me.  74.  Simson    v.    Jones,   2    Russ.    &    M.   305; 

{d)  Kingston   v.  Phelps,   Peake,   Cas.  Durnford  w.  Lane,  1  Bro.  Ch.  Ill;  Fou- 

227;   Biddell  v.  Dowse,  6  B.  &  C.  255;  blanque,  Eq.  74;  and  see  ante,  p.  *  330. 
s.  c.  9  Dow.  &  K.  404 ;  Antram  v.  Chace, 
15  East,  212. 

VOL.  I.                                                        31  481 


*453 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  II. 


SECTION  X. 


SUBSCRIPTION   AND   CONTRIBUTION. 


Where  several  promise  to  contribute  to  a  common  object, 
desired  by  all,  the  promise  of  each  may  be  a  good  consideration 

for  the  promise  of  the  others.  (K)  ^  If  there  be  a  chartered 
*  453    *  company  or  corporation,  one  who  subscribes  agreeably  to 

the  statute  and  by-laws  acquires  a  right  to  his  shares  ;  and 
as  the  company  is  under  an  obligation  to  give  him  the  shares,  this 
would  be  a  consideration  for  the  promise,  and  would  make  his 
subscription  obligatory  on  him.  (t)  ^ 


{h)  Society  in  Troy  v.  Perry,  6  N.  H. 
164;  George  v.  Harris,  4  id.  533;  Hanson 
V.  Stetson,  5  Pick.  506 ;  State  Treasurer 
;;.  Cross,  9  Vt.  289;  University  of  Ver- 
mont I'.  Buell,  2  Vt.  48  ;  Commissioners 
V.  Perry,  5  Ilamm.  58 ;  Ohio,  &c.  College 
V.  Love,  16  Ohio,  20;  Comstock  v.  Howk, 
15  Midi.  237.  — It  is  on  this  ground  that 
subscriptions  to  charitable  or  Ijenevolent 
objects  have  often  been  held  binding, 
when  there  was  no  other  consideration 
for  each  subscriber's  promise  than  the 
promise  of  other  subscribers.  It  must  be 
confessed,  however,  that  there  are  many 
authorities  which  seem  to  hold  it  neces- 
sary in  such  cases  that  there  shall  be 
some  promise  or  engagement  by  the  com- 
mittee corporation,  or  other  person  to 
whom  the  subscription  paper  runs,  or  that 
something  should  be  done  on  their  part, 
as  the  erection  of  the  building,  providing 
materials  or  the  like,  in  order  to  render 
the  subscription  binding.  The  cases  of 
Limerick  Academy  v.  Davis,  11  Mass. 
114;  Bridgewater  Academy  v.  Gilbert,  2 
Pick.  579;  Troy  Academy  v.  Nelson,  24 
Vt.  189;  Gittings  v.  Mayhew,  6  Md. 
113;  Phipps  V.  Jones,  20  Penn.  St.  2G0; 
Barnes  v.  Perine,  9  Barb.  202 ;  Wilson  v. 
Baptist  Education  Soc.  10  Barb.  309; 
Gait's  Ex'rs  v.  Swain,  9  Gratt.  633; 
L'Amoreux  v.  Gould,  3  Seld.  349 ;  and 
others  favor  this  view.  See  also  No.  42 
Am.  Jut.  281-283 ;  Foxcroft  Academy  v. 


Favor,  4  Greenl.  382,  n.  (Bennett's  ed.). 
This  point  was  very  fully  discussed  in  the 
case  of  Hamilton  College  v.  Stewart,  2 
Denio,  403;  s.  c.  1  Const.  581.  It  was 
there  held,  that  the  endowment  of  a  liter- 
ary institution  is  not  a  sufficient  consider- 
ation to  uphold  a  subscription  to  a  fund 
designed  for  that  object.  And  although 
there  is  annexed  to  the  subscription  a 
condition  that  the  subscriljers  are  not  to 
be  bound  unless  a  given  amount  shall  be 
raised,  no  request  can  be  implied  there- 
from against  the  subscribers  that  the  in- 
stitution shall  perform  the  services  and 
incur  the  expenses  necessary  to  fill  up  the 
subscription.  Accordingly,  where  the  de- 
fendant subscribed  $800  to  a  fund  for  the 
payment  of  the  salaries  of  the  officers  of 
Hamilton  College,  and  a  condition  was 
annexed  that  the  subscribers  were  not  to 
be  bound  unless  the  aggregate  amount  of 
subscriptions  and  contributions  should  be 
$50,000;  it  was  held,  that  there  was  no 
consideration  for  the  undertaking,  and 
that  no  action  would  lie  upon  it,  al- 
though there  was  evidence  tending  to 
show  that  the  whole  amount  had  been 
subscribed  or  contributed  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  condition.  But  see 
Barnes  v.  Perine,  9  Barb.  202 ;  Johnston 
r.  Wabash  College,  2  Cart.  (Ind.)  555; 
Edinboro'  Academy  v.  Dobinson,  37  Penn. 
St.  210. 

[i)  Chester  Glass  Company  v.  Dewey, 


1  Thus  Higert  v.  Trustees,  &c.  Univ.  53  Ind.  326,  held  that  the  mutual  promises  of 
certain  subscribers  towards  the  erection  of  a  college  building  constituted  a  sufficient 
consideration  for  the  promise  of  each. 

2  Upon  a  contract  in  writing  by  which  the  subscribers  agree  "  to  and  with  each 
other  "  to  associate  themselves  into  a  corporation  for  a  specified  purpose,  the  name  of 
which  was  to  be  determined  bv  the  members  thereof,  and  to  "  pay  to  the  treasurer  of 

482 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  453 

On  the  important  question,  how  far  voluntary  subscriptions 
for  charitable  purposes,  as  for  alms,  education,  religion,  or  other 
public  uses,  are  binding,  the  law  has  in  this  country  passed 
through  some  fluctuation,  and  cannot  now  be  regarded  as  on  all 
points  settled.  Where  advances  have  been  made,  or  expenses  or 
liabilities  incurred  by  others  in  consequence  of  such  subscriptions, 
before  any  notice  of  withdrawal,  this  should,  on  general  princi- 
ples, be  deemed  sufficient  to  make  them  obligatory,  provided  the 
advances  were  authorized  by  a  fair  and  reasonable  dependence  on 
the  subscriptions  ;  and  this  rule  seems  to  be  well  established.  (/)  i 
And  the  expenses  or  liabilities  need  not  have  been  incurred  by 

16  Mass.  94.  In  this  case,  certain  indi-  v.  March,  3  Scam.  198;  Macon  v.  Shep- 
viduals  having  associated  in  ^vriting  for  pard,  2  Humph.  335 ;  University  of  Ver- 
the  purpose  of  carrying  on  a  particular  mont  v.  Buell,  2  Vt.  48 ;  Canal  Fimd  v. 
manufacture,  and  being  afterwards  incor-  Perry,  5  Hamm.  58 ;  Barnes  v  Ferine,  9 
porated  for  the  same  purpose,  one  who  Barb.  202 ;  Homes  v.  Dana,  1 2  Mass  1 90. 
subscribed  the  \vriting  after  the  incorpo-  In  this  last  case  sundry  persons  agreed  to 
ration,  became  thereby  a  member  of  the  lend  to  the  editors  of  the  Boston  Patriot 
corporation,  and  was  held  to  pay  the  sum  the  sums  set  against  their  names,  which 
he  had  subscribed.  But  where  one  sub-  was  to  be  paid  to  one  of  their  number  as 
scribed  an  agreement  to  take  shares  in  a  agent.  This  agent  therefore  made  ad- 
corporation  after  the  passage  of  the  act  of  vances  to  the  editors,  and  it  was  held, 
incorporation,  but  before  any  meeting  of  that  he  had  an  action  against  each  sub- 
the  persons  incorporated  and  their  associ-  scriber.  The  court  said  the  only  question 
ates,  it  was  held,  that  such  agreement  which  could  arise  in  the  case  was,  Avhether 
could  furnish  no  evidence  of  a  contract  Larkin  was  induced  to  advance  his  money 
with  tlie  C(jrporation.  New  Bedford  Turn-  by  the  subscription.  See  also  Thompson 
pike  V.  Adams,  8  Mass.  138.  And  there  r."  Page,  1  Met.  570,  and  Farmington 
is  no  privity  of  contract  between  a  party  Academy  i\  Allen,  14  Mass,  172;  Collier 
signing  and  a  committee  appointed  by  his  v.  B.  E.  Society,  8  B.  Mon.  68 ;  Mouton 
co-signers  at  a  meeting  which  he  did  not  v.  Noble,  1  La.  An.  192;  Brouwer  i'.  HiD, 
attend;  althou-^h  the  committee  pro-  1  Saudf.  620;  Plank  Road  i'.  Griffin,  21 
ceeded  and  expended  money.  Curry  v.  Barb.  454 ;  Troy  Academy  v.  Nelson,  24 
Eogers,  1  Poster  (N.  H.),  247.              "  Vt.  189;  Watkins  v.  Eames,  9  Cash.  537; 

( /)  Bryant   v.  Goodnow,  5  Pick.  228 ;  McLure  v.  Wilson,  43  111.  356. 
"Warren  v.  Stearns,  19  id.  73;  Robertson 

said  corporation  "  the  amount  set  against  their  respective  names,  an  action  may  be 
maintained  in  the  name  of  the  corporation,  after  it  is  organized,  against  a  subscriber, 
upon  the  allotment  to  him  of  the  shares  sub.scribed  for.  Athol  Music  Hall  Co. 
V.  Carey,  116  Mass.  471.  See  also  Davis  v.  Smith  American  Organ  Co.  117  Mass. 
456. 

1  A  gratuitous  subscription,  to  promote  the  objects  for  which  a  corporation  is 
established,  cannot  be  enforced  unless  the  promisee  has,  in  reliance  on  the  promise 
sued  on,  done  something,  or  incurred  or  assumed  some  liability  or  obligation ;  and  it 
is  not  sufficient  that  others  were  led  to  subscribe  by  the  subscription  sought  to  be  en- 
forced. Cottage  Street  Church  v.  Kendall,  121  Mass.  528.  In  Maine  Central  Insti- 
tute V.  Haskell,  73  Me.  140,  it  was  declared  that  when  a  subscription  is  accepted  and 
money  expended  for  the  contemplated  purpose,  "  it  becomes  a  conijJeted  contract 
binding  on  both  parties ;  the  promise  to  pay  and  at  least  the  implied  jjromise  to 
execute,  each  being  a  consideration  for  the  other."  See  to  the  same  point  Presby- 
terian Society  v.  Beach,  74  N.  Y.  72;  Carr  v.  Bartlett,  72  Me.  120;  Simpson  College 
V.  Bryan,  50  la.  294;  Des  Momes  Univ.  v.  Livingston.  57  la.  307.  — But  the  death  of 
a  subscriber  before  his  promise  is  acted  upon  by  the  spending  of  m()ney  or  the  m- 
curring  of  any  liability  revokes  his  subscription.  Pratt  v.  Elgin  Baptist  Society,  93 
111.  475;  Beach  v.  First  Methodist  Church,  96  Ul.  177;  Helfenstein's  Estate,  77  Penn. 
St.  328. 

483 


*454 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS, 


[book   II. 


the  plaintiff  if  others  of  the  subscribers  incurred  tliem  on  the 
faith  of  the  defendant's  subscription,  (^y)  Further  than 
*  454  this  it  is  not  easy  to  go,  unless  such  *  subscriptions  are 
held  to  be  binding  merely  on  grounds  of  puljlic  policy.  To 
say  that  they  are  obligatory,  because  they  are  all  promises,  and 
the  promise  of  each  subscriber  is  a  valid  consideration  for  the 
promise  of  every  other,  seems  to  be  reasoning  in  a  vicious  circle. 
The  very  question  is,  are  the  promises  binding ;  for  if  not,  then 
they  are  no  consideration  for  each  other.  To  say  that  they  are 
binding  because  they  are  such  considerations,  is  only  to  say  that 
they  are  binding  because  they  are  binding ;  it  assumes  the  very 
thing  in  question.  (A;) 

Where  subscriptions  are  made  upon  the  condition  that  they  are 
not  valid  unless  a  certain  sum  be  raised,  all  of  the  subscribers 
must  be  equally  liable,  and  if  some  subscribe  only  to  make  up  the 
sum  or  to  induce  others,  they  themselves  not  to  be  called  on,  no 
subscription  is  binding.  (Z:^)  The  sum  to  be  raised  need  not  have 
been  paid  in,  but  is  raised  when  the  subscriptions  of  solvent  and 
responsible  persons  are  received  to  the  full  amount.  (kV) 

It  is  now  common  to  put  a  seal  to  such  a  subscription  book  or 
paper.     Sometimes  a  seal  is  put  to  each  name.     Sometimes  one 


(jj)  Miller  v.  Ballard,  4G  111.  377. 

(k)  That  such  subscriptions  are  valid 
where  no  expenses  or  liabilities  are  in- 
curred because  of  them,  and  ou  the  ground 
of  mutuality  of  promise,  seems  at  least  to 
be  implied  in  some  cases.  See  George  v. 
Harris,  4  N.  li.  533.  Prom  tliis  case  it 
would  appear,  that  such  a  subscription 
may  at  all  events  be  treated  as  an  agree- 
ment of  the  suljscribers  by  and  with  each 
other,  upon  the  failui-e  to  perform  which 
by  any  one  of  them,  the  others  can  join  in 
an  action  of  assumpsit  against  him  to  re- 
cover tlie  amount  of  his  subscription.  See 
also  Society  in  Troy  r.  Perry,  6  N.  H. 
164;  Same  v.  Goddard,  7  id.  435;  Fisher 
?».  Ellis,  3  Pick.  323 ;  Amlierst  Academy 
V.  Cowls,  6  id.  427.  In  the  last  two  cases 
a  promissory  note  was  given  in  discharge 
of  the  subscription.  Eut  it  is  not  easy  to 
see  how  that  strengtliened  the  obligation. 
In  Ives  r.  Sterling,  6  Met.  310,  the  court 
notice  the  conflict  of  opinion,  without  at- 
tempting to  reconcile  it.  In  New  York 
the  autliorities  are  in  similar  conflict.  See 
Whitestown  v.  Stone,  7  Johns.  112;  Mc- 
Auley  V.  Billinger,  20  id.  89.  In  Stewart 
V.  Trustees  of  Hamilton  College,  1  Comst. 
581 ;  s.  c.  2  Denio,  403,  Wuiworth,  C,  had 

484 


held,  that  where  several  persons  subscribe 
for  an  object  in  which  all  are  interested, 
as  the  support  of  institutions  of  religion  or 
learning,  in  the  community  where  they 
reside,  the  promise  of  each  subscriber  is 
the  consideration  of  the  promise  of  each 
other.  But  the  Court  of  Appeals  does  not 
appear  to  adopt  this  view.  It  was  held, 
however,  in  botli  courts,  that  if  the  trus- 
tees agreed  to  endeavor  to  raise  a  certain 
sum  in  consideration  of  the  subscription, 
tliis  would  make  it  binding.  There  are 
cases  so  obscurely  stated  that  it  is  not  easy 
to  see  whether  the  court  intend  to  say  that 
such  subscriptions  are  bmding  without  the 
proof  of  expense  or  liability  actually  in- 
curred in  consequence  of  them,  See  Caul 
V.  Gibson,  3  Barr,  416;  Collier  v.  Baptist 
Educational  Society,  8  B.  Mon.  68  ;  Barnes 
V.  Perine,  9  Barb.  202 ;  s.  c.  2  Kern.  18. 
In  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  ik  Garvey, 
53  111.  401,  a  .subscriber  was  held  liable  for 
his  subscription  because  the  trustees  had 
borrowed  money  on  tlie  faith  thereof. 

[kk)  New  York,  &c.  Co.  v.  De  Wolf, 
31  N.  Y.  273. 

{ki.)  Westminster  College  v.  Gamble, 
42  Mo.  411. 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  455 

seal,  with  a  declaration  in  the  heading,  or  in  the  in  testimonium, 
that  each  subscriber  adopts  and  uses  it  as  his  seal.  In  any  such 
case  it  would  seem,  on  general  principles,  that  the  objection  of 
want  of  consideration  could  not  be  brought  against  an  action  on 
the  subscription,  (km') 

In  general,  subscriptions  on  certain  conditions  in  favor 
of  *  the  party  subscribing  are  binding  when  the  acts  stipu-    *  455 
lated  as  conditions  are  performed.  Q) 


SECTION  XI. 

OP   CONSIDERATION   VOID    IN   PART. 

It  sometimes  happens  that  a  consideration  is  void  in  part ;  and 
the  question  arises  whether  this  fact  makes  the  whole  considera- 
tion invalid,  and  the  promise  itself  of  no  obligation.  If  one  or 
more  of  several  considerations,  which  are  recited  as  the  ground 
of  a  promise,  be  only  frivolous  and  insufficient,  but  not  illegal,  and 
others  are  good  and  sufficient,  then  undoubtedly  the  consideration 
may  be  severed,  and  those  which  are  void  disregarded,  while  those 
which  are  valid  will  sustain  the  promise,  (m)  ^  But  where  the 
consideration  is  entire  and  incapable  of  severance,  then  it  must 
be  wholly  good  or  wholly  bad.  If  the  promise  be  entire,  and  not 
in  writing,  and  a  part  of  it  relate  to  a  matter  which  by  the  statute 
of  frauds  should  be  promised  in  writing,  such  part  being 
void,  avoids  the  whole  contract,  (n)  but  if  it  be  *  such  in    *  456 

(hm)  Ball  v.  Dunsterville,  4  T.  R.  313 ;  plaintiff  to  hire  of  her  a  house,  and  furni- 

Cooch  ?■.  Goodman,  2  Q.  B.  580,  598.  ture  for  the  same,  at  the  rent  of,  &c.,  and 

{I)  Williams  CoUege  v.  Danforth,  12  thereupon,  in  consideration  tliat  the  plain- 
Pick.  541 .  tiff  would  take  posse.'<siou  of  the  said  house 

(?n)  Parish   i-     Stone,    14    Pick.    198;  partly  furuislied,  and  would,  if  complete 

King  V.  Sears,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  48;  Jones  r.  furniture  were  sent  into  the  said  house  by 

Waite,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  341 ;    Sheerman  v.  the  defendant  in  a  reasonable  time,  become 

Thompson,  II  A.  &  E.  1027  ;  Best  r.  Jolly,  tenniit  to  the  defendant  of  the  said  house, 

I  Sid.  38 ;  Cripps  v.  Golding,  1  Roll.  Abr.  with  aU  tlie  said  furniture,  at  the  aforesaid 

30,  Action  sur   Case,  pi.  2 ;  Bradburne  v.  rent,  and  pay  the  same  quarterly  from  a 

Bradburne,  Cro.  E.  149  ;  Coulstou  ?•.  Carr,  certain  day,  namely,  &c.,  the  defendant 

id.    848;    Crisp    r.    Gamel,    Cro.    J.    127;  promised  the  plaintiff  to  send  into  the  said 

Shackell  v.  Rosier,  2  Bing  N.  C  646,  per  house,  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the 

Tindal,  C.  J.  plaintiff's  taking  possession,  all  the  fumi- 

(n)  Mechelen?'.  Wallace,  7  A.  &E.49;  ture  necessary,  &c.      Held,  that  the  de- 

s.  c.  2  Nev.  &  P.  224.      Here  the  declara-  fendant's  agreement  to  send  in  furniture 

tion  stated  that  the  defendant  wished  the  was  an  inseparable  part  of  a  contract  for 

1  Erie  Railway  v.  Union,  &c.  Co.  6  Vroom,  240. 

485 


*  456  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  II. 

its  nature  that  it  may  be  divided,  and  the  part  not  required  to  be 
in  writing  by  the  statute  may  be  enforced  without  injustice  to  the 
promisor,  that  portion  of  the  agreement  will  be  binding,  (o) 


SECTION  XII. 

ILLEGALITY   OF   CONSIDEEATION. 

In  general,  if  any  part  of  the  entire  consideration  for  a  promise, 
or  any  part  of  an  entire  promise,  be  illegal,  whether  by  statute  or 
at  common  law,  the  whole  contract  is  void,  (p)  ^  Indeed  the 
courts  go  far  in  refusing  to  found  any  rights,  upon  wrong-doing. 
Thus,  no  action  can  be  maintained  for  property  held  for  an  illegal 
purpose,  as  for  making  counterfeit  coin,  (g)  ^ 

No  contract  to  violate  a  law  of  a  State,  —  as,  for  example,  to 
sell  liquors  contrary  to  a  statute,  —  can  be  enforced  within  that 
State.  (/')     There  must,  however,  be  an  illegal  intent  of   some 

an  Interest  in  lauds,  and  therefore  came  &  M.  18  ;  Gamble  v.  Grimes,  2  Cart.  (Ind.) 

within  Stat.  29  Car.  II.,  which,  in  such  392;  Carleton  v.  Bailey,  7  Foster  (N.  H.), 

case,  requires  the  agreement,  or  a  memo-  230 ;  Hoover  v.  Pierce,  27  Miss.  13.     See 

randum  thereof,  to  he  in  writing.      See  also  Howdeu  v.  Simpson,  10  A.  &  E.  815; 

also  Chater  v.  Beckett,  7  T.  R.  203 ;  Lord  Hall  v.  Dyson,  10  E.  L.  &  E.  424 ;  s.  c.  17 

Lexington  v.  Clarke,  2  Vent.  223;  Thomas  Q.  B.  785;  Sherman  v.  Barnard,  19  Barb. 

V.   Williams,   10  B.   &  C.  664;    Wood  v.  291. 

Benson,  2  Tyr.  93  ;  Mayfield  v.  Wadsley,  (q)  Discs  of  German  silver  were  seized 

2  B.  &  C.  357 ;  Foquet  v.  Moore,  16  E.  L.  on  their  way  to  a  place  in  which  the  ap- 

&  E.  466 ;   s.  c.  7  Exch.  870 ;   Irvine  v.  pearance  of  Mexican  silver  dollars  was  to 

Stone,  6  Cush.  508  ;  Noyes's  Ex'r  v.  Hum-  have  been  given  them,  and  no  action  could 

phreys,  1 1  Gratt.  636 ;  Collins  v.  Merrell,  be  maintained  for  their  recovery.      Spald- 

2  Met.  (Ky.)  163.  iug  v.  Preston,  21  Vt.  1.      See  also  Bloss 

(o)  Irvine  v.  Stone,  6  Cush.  508 ;  Wood  v.  Bloomer,  23  Barb.  604,  where  a  promise 

V.  Benson,  2  Tyr.  93 ;  Rand  v.  Mather,  11  to  make  and  sell  forged  trade-marks  was 

Cush.  1.  held  void. 

(/))  Collins  V.  Blantern,  2  Wils.  347;  (r)  Territt  r.  Bartlett,  21  Vt.  184.    See 

Benyon  v.  Nettlefokl,  2  E.  L.  &  E,  113;  also  Wooton  v.  Miller,  7  Sm.  &  M.  380. 

Donallen  v.  Lennox,  6  Dana,  91 ;  Brown  See,  however,  as  qualifying  the  rule,  when 

V.  Langford,  3  Bil)h,  500;   Hinesbiirg  v.  the  contract  is  not  made  within  that  State, 

Sumner,  9  Vt.  23  ;  Armstrong  v.  Toler,  1 1  McConihe  v.  McMann,   1    Williams,  95  ; 

Wheat.  258;  Woodruff  r.  Hinman,  11  Vt.  Backman   v.   Wright,    1    Williams,    187; 

592;  Buck  v.  Albee,  26  Vt.  184;  Deering  Smith  v.  Godfrey,  8  Foster  (N.  H.j,  379; 

V.  Chapman,  22  Me.  488;  Filson  r.  Himes,  Sortwell  v.  Hughes,  1   Curtis,  C.  C.  244; 

5  Barr,  452  ;  Dedham  Bank  /•.  Chickering,  Read  v.  Taft,  3  R.  I.  175.      See  also  Keu- 

4   Pick.   314;    Perkins    i\   Cummings,    2  nett  i'.  Chambers,  14  How.  38,  as  to  illegal 

Gray,  258;  Coulter  v.  Robertson,  14  Sm.  contracts. 

1  Widoe  V.  Webb,  20  Ohio  St.  431.  Although  a  note  given  without  knowledge  of 
the  illegality  for  a  turnpike  assessment,  void  for  a  failure  to  include  all  the  land  liable, 
is  without  consideration,  the  maker,  with  such  knowledge,  may,  for  tlie  purpose  of 
completing  the  road,  give  a  further  note  for  that  purpose,  against  which  that  defence 
will  not  avail.     Williams  r.  Pendleton,  &c.  Turnpike,  76  Ind.  87. 

2  Nor  for  the  price  of  goods  sold  in  aid  of  the  Rebellion,  Hanauer  v.  Doane, 
12  WaU.  342.      An  agreement  by   a  pliysician  that  another  may  practise  medicine 

48G 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  457 

kind  ;  mere  knowledge  that  an  illegal  use  may,  or  even  will,  be 
made  of  the  thing,  seems  not  to  be  enough,  (.s) 

Agreements  to  raise  prices,  or  fares  for  freight  or  passage  on 
boats,  have  been  held  void,  as  a  kind  of  conspiracy,  and  as  against 
public  policy,  (t) 

*  A  distinction  must  be  taken  between  the  cases  in  which  *  457 
the  consideration  is  illegal  in  part,  and  those  in  which  the 
promise  founded  on  the  consideration  is  illegal  in  part.  If  any 
part  of  a  consideration  is  illegal,  the  whole  consideration  is  void  ; 
because  public  policy  will  not  permit  a  party  to  enforce  a  promise 
which  he  has  obtained  by  an  illegal  act  or  an  illegal  promise, 
although  he  may  have  connected  with  this  act  or  promise  another 
which  is  legal.  But  if  one  gives  a  good  and  valid  consideration, 
and  thereupon  another  promises  to  do  two  things,  one  legal  and 
the  other  illegal,  he  shall  be  held  to  do  that  which  is  legal,  («)  ^ 
unless  the  two  are  so  mingled  and  bound  together  that  they 
cannot  be  separated ;  in  which  case  the  whole  promise  is  void. 

A  distinction  has  been  taken  between  the  partial  illegality  of 
a  consideration  when  against  a  statute,  and  when  against  common 
law.  There  are  cases  which  sustain  this  distinction,  (z;)  but  we 
think  it  rests  upon  no  sound  principle ;  and  it  has  been  held,  on 
good  grounds,  that  the  violation  of  a  merely  local  or  municipal 

(s)  Kreiss  v.  Seligman,  8  Barb.  439.  contract  contains  distinct  undertakings, 
(t)  Stanton  v.  Allen,  5  Denio,  434,  and  some  of  which  are  legal  and  some  illegal, 
Hooker  i-.  Vandewater,  4  id.  349.  See  the  former  will  be  in  certain  cases  upheld, 
also  Hilton  i'.  Eckerslej,  32  E.  L.  &  E.  though  the  latter  are  void."  And  the 
198;  s.  c.  6  E.  &  B.  47.  principle  was  fully  recognized  in  Bank  of 
(u)  Thus,  in  the  Bishop  of  Chester  v.  Australasia  v  Bank  of  Australia,  6  E.  F. 
John  Freland,  Ley,  79,  Mutton,  J.,  lays  Moore,  152.  See  also  Chase's  Ex'r  v. 
down  the  rule  tliat  when  a  good  thing  and  Burkholder,  18  Penn.  St.  50. 
a  void  thing  are  put  together  in  the  same  {v)  Norton  v.  Simmes,  Hob.  14;  Ma- 
grant,  the  common  law  makes  such  con-  leverer  i-.  Redshaw,  1  Mod.  35.  Twisden, 
struction  that  the  grant  shall  be  good  for  J.;  Com.  Dig.  Covenant  (F.);  Bac.  Abr. 
that  which  is  good  and  void  for  that  which  Conditions  (K.);  Hacket  v.  Tilly,  II 
is  void.  This  principle  is  also  distinctly  Mod.  93 ;  I3utler  v.  Wigge,  1  Wms. 
recognized  in  Kerrison  v.  Cole,  8  East,  Saund.  66  a,  n.  (1);  1  Pow.  on  Cont.  199; 
236.  See  also  Norton  v.  Simmes,  Hob.  14.  Lee  v.  Coleshill,  Cro.  E.  529;  Pearson  v. 
And  in  the  case  of  Leavitt  d.  Palmer,  3  Humes,  Carter,  230 ;  MosdeU  t-.  Middleton, 
Comst.  37,  Bronson,  J.,  said:  "It  is  un-  1  Vent.  237;  Van  Dyck  v.  Van  Beuren,  1 
doubtedly  true  that  where  a  deed  or  other  Johns.  362. 

in  his  name,  personate  him  when  applied  to  by  patients  for  medical  treatment,  and 
prescribe  for  them  in  his  name,  is  against  public  policy  and  wiU  not  be  enforced. 
Jerome  v.  Bigelow,  66  111.  452. 

1  As  if  two  classes  of  items,  one  legal  and  the  other  illegal,  are  embraced  in  the 
same  account,  recovery  may  be  had  upon  the  lawful  items.  Goodwin  v.  Clark,  65 
Me.  280.  But  where  shares  of  stock  were  surrendered  for  new  shares,  a  part  of 
which  were  to  be  used  in  bribing  certain  persons  and  the  rest  returned  to  the  person 
surrendering,  the  agreement  to  return  the  remainder  was  held  void,  as  well  as  tlie  por- 
tion relating  to  bribery.     Tobey  v.  Robinson,  99  HI.  222. 

487 


*  458  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  II. 

law,  avoids  a  contract  as  effectually  as  if  the  law  were  of  univer- 
sal application,  (w)  A  statute  has  no  more  power  in  avoiding  a 
contract  partially  opposed  to  it  than  the  common  law,  (a;) 
*458  unless  it  contain  an  express  provision  that  all  *  such  agree- 
ments shall  be  wholly  void,  (?/)  and  then  the  contract  is 
entirely  void ;  as  for  example,  a  promissory  note  even  in  the 
hands  of  an  innocent  indorsee,  (z)  But,  while  the  law  is  suffi- 
ciently distinct  where  the  whole  consideration  or  the  whole  prom- 
ise is  illegal,  questions  still  remain,  where  the  illegality  is  but 
partial,  which  can  only  be  determined  by  further  adjudication. 

Where  the  consideration  is  altogether  illegal,  it  is  insufficient 
to  sustain  a  promise,  and  the  agreement  is  wholly  void.  This 
is  so  equally,  whether  the  law  which  is  violated  be  statute  law  or 
common  law.  It  has  been  held  in  England,  (a)  that  where  a 
statute  provided  a  penalty  for  an  act,  without  prohibiting  the  act 
in  express  terms,  there  the  penalty  was  the  only  legal  consequence 
of  a  violation  of  the  law,  and  a  contract  which  implied  or  required 
such  violation  was  nevertheless  valid.  But  Lord  Solt  (i)  denied 
the  doctrine ;  and  Sir  James  Mansfield  established  a  better  rule  of 
law,  (c)  holding  that  where  a  statute  provides  a  penalty  for  an 
act,  this  is  a  prohibition  of  the  act.  We  apprehend  that  this  has 
always  been  the  prevailing,  if  not  the  uncontradicted  rule  of  law, 

(w)  Beman  v.  Tugnot,  5   Sandf.  153;  119,  so  far  as  it  may  be  considered  as  hav- 

Harris  v.  Kuimels,  12  How.  80.  ing    recognized    any   distinction   of    this 

(x)  The  merit  of  exploding  this  vener-  kind,  is  not  in  our  opinion  sound  law, 
able  error  of  supposing  a  distinction  be-  (/y)  Thus,  where  the  statute  declares  a 

tween    contracts    void     by    statute     and  certain  contract  to  be  "  void  to  all  intents 

contracts  void  by  common  law,  belongs  to  and  purposes  whatever,"  it  has  been  held, 

the   Hon.   T heron   Metcalf,  of   ]\Iassacliu-  that  if  such  a  contract  also  contain  stipu- 

setts,  who,  with  his  well-known  acuteuess  lations  not  within  the  intent  of  the  statute, 

and  accuracy,  has  pointed  out  the  origin  the  latter  will  be  considered  void  by  force 

of  the  error,  and  shown  its  fallacy.      23  of  the  statute.    See  Crosley  i\  Arkwright, 

Am.  Jur.  2.      And  it  may  now  be  consid-  2  T.  R.  603:  Dann  v.  Dollman,  5  id.  641. 
ered  as  fully  established  that,  although  a  (s)  Bridge  v.  Hubbard,  15  Mass.  96, 

contract  contain  some  provisions  or  prom-  Hay  v.  Ayling,  3  El.  &  E.  416,  n. ;  s.  C- 16 

ises  which  are  void  by  statute,  yet,  if  it  Q.  B.  423. 

also    embrace    other    agreements    which  (a)    Comyns   v.  Boyer,  Cro    E    485 ; 

would   be  valid,  if   standing   alone,  they  and  see  Gremare  v.  Le  Clerk  Bois  Valon, 

may   still    be   enforced.      See   Monys   r.  2  Camp.  144. 

Leake,  8  T.  R.  411 ;   Kerrison  i'.  Cole,  8  (b)  Bartlett  r.  Vinor,  Carth.  252;  s.  c 

East,  231  ;  Doe  r.  Pitcher,  6  Taunt  359  ;  Skin.  322.    Ilott,  C.  J.,  here  said  :  "Every 

Greenwood  v.  Bishop  of  London,  5  Taunt,  contract  made  for  or  about  any  matter  or 

727  ;  Newman  v.  Newman,  4  jVL  &  Sel.  66 ;  thing  which  is  prohibited  or  made  unlaw- 

Wigg  I'.  Shuttleworth,  13  East,  87  ;  Gas-  ful   by   any   statute,  is   a  void   contract, 

kell  V.  King,  1 1  East,  165  ;  Howe  v.  Synge,  though  the  .'statute  itself  does  not  mention 

15  id.  440;  Tinckler  v.  Prentice,  4  Taunt,  that  it  sliall  be  so,  but  only  inflicts  a  pen- 

549  ;  Fuller  v.  Abbott,  4  id.  105  ;  Shackel  alty  on  the  offender,  because  a  penalty  im- 

V.  Rosier,  2  Bing.  N.  C.   646 ;   Jones  v.  plies  a  prohibition,  though  there  are  no 

Waite,  5  id.  841.     The  case  of  Jarvis  v-  prohibitory  words  in  the  statute." 
Peck,  1  Hoff.  Ch.  479;  s.  c.  10  Paige,  Ch.  (c)  Drury  v.  Defontaine,  1  Taunt.  136. 

488 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


459 


on  this  subject,  in  this  country,  (d}  Tliis  rule  is  said  not 
to  apply,  however,  where  the  *  penalty  is  for  some  other 
purpose  than  to  make  the  act  illegal,  as  to  raise  a  revenue, 
&c.     We  think  this  distinction  very  diflicult.  (e) 


*, 


459 


SECTION  XIII. 


IMPOSSIBLE    CONSIDERATIONS. 


Impossible  considerations  are  wholly  bad  and  insufficient.  We 
have  seen  that  a  consideration  which  one  cannot  perform  with- 
out a  breach  of  the  law  is  bad,  and  so  is  one  which  cannot 
be   performed   at   all.  (/)     The    reason   is   obvious   from   such 


(d)  This  principle  is  sustained  by  nu- 
merous adjudged  cases.  Wlieeler  v.  Rus- 
sell, 17  Mass.  258;  Coombs  v.  Emery,  14 
Me.  404  ;  Springfield  Bank  v.  Merrick,  1.4 
Mass.  322;  RusseU  v.  De  Grand,  15  Mass. 
39;  Seideubender  v.  Charles,  4  S  &  R. 
159;  Mitchell  v.  Smith,  1  Binn.  118; 
Sharp  V.  'Teese,  4  Halst.  352  ;  De  Beguis 
V.  Armistead,  10  Binn.  107  ;  s.  c.  3  M.  & 
Scott,  516 ,  Cope  v.  Rowlands,  2  M.  &  W. 
149 ;  Fergussou  v.  Norman,  5  Bing.  N.  C. 
86;  Territt  v.  Bartlett,  21  Vt.  184,  Ban- 
croft V.  Dumas,  21  Vt.  456;  Bell  i-  Quin, 
2  Sandf.  146,  Eberman  v.  Reitzell,  1  W. 
&  S.  181  ,  Hale  v.  Henderson,  4  Humph, 
199;  Elkins  u.  Parkiiurst,  17  Vt.  105; 
Brackett  v.  Hovt,  9  Foster  (N.  H.),  264; 
Griffith  V.  Wells,  3  Denio,  226.  — And  the 
repeal  of  a  prohibitory  act  will  not  per  se 
render  valid  a  contract  made  during  the 
existence  of  tiie  act,  contrary  to  its  pro- 
visions. But  the  legislature  may  give  a 
remedy  by  express  enactment.  Milne  v. 
Huber,  3  McLean,  212.  A  recent  appli- 
cation of  the  general  principle  of  the  text 
was  made  in  Jackson  v.  Walker,  5  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  27.  By  the  laws  of  New  York 
every  contrilmtion  of  money  intended  to 
promote  the  election  of  any  person  or 
ticket  is  prohibited  by  the  statute  (1  R.  S. 
136,  §  6),  except  for  defraying  the  ex- 
penses of  printing,  and  the  circulation  of 
votes,  handbills,  and  other  papers,  pre- 
vious to  such  election ;  and  this,  whetber 
the  immediate  purpose  for  which  the 
money  is  designed  be  in  itself  corrupt  or 
not.  Accordingly,  where  the  defendant 
agreed  to  pay  the  plaintiff  $1,000,  in  con- 
sideration that  the  latter,  who  had  built 
a  log  cabin,  would  keep    it  open  for  the 


accommodation  of  political  meetings  to 
further  the  success  of  certain  persons 
nominated  for  members  of  Congress,  &c., 
it  was  held  that  the  agreement  was  illegal, 
and  could  not  be  enforced.  See  also  the 
recent  case  of  CundeU  v.  Dawson,  4  C.  B. 
376. 

(e)  In  Cundell  v  Dawson,  4  C.  B.  376, 
Wilde,  C  J.,  intimated,  that  statutes  en- 
acted simply  for  the  security  of  the  rev- 
enue, did  not  come  within  the  principle. 
And  in  Smith  v.  Mawhood,  14  M.  &  W. 
452,  it  was  held  that  the  excise  act,  re- 
quiring certain  things  of  dealers  in  to- 
bacco, did  not  avoid  a  contract  of  sale  of 
tobacco  by  one  not  complying  with  these 
requisitions,  as  their  effect  is  only  to  im- 
pose a  penalty.  But  where  it  appears  to 
be  the  intention  of  tlie  legislature  to  pro- 
hibit a  contract  as  well  as  to  impose  a 
penalty  for  making  it,  such  contract  is  il- 
legal and  void,  although  the  prohibition  be 
intended  only  for  purposes  of  revenue. 
And  see  Abbot  i\  Rogers,  30  E.  L.  &  E. 
446,  s.  c.  16  C.  B.  277,  and  Lewis  v. 
Welch,  14  N.  H.  294  ;  Ellis  r.  Higgins,  32 
Me.  34,  and  Hill  v.  Smith,  Morris  (la.),  70. 

if)  5  Vin.  Abr.  110,  111,  Condition 
(C.f  a,  (D.)  a;  1  Roll.  Abr.  419;  Co.  Lit. 
206  a;  2  Bl.  Com.  -341  ;  Sliep.  Touch.  164. 
See  22  Am.  Jur.  20-22.  In  Nerot  v. 
Wallace,  3  T.  R.  17,  a  promise  was  made 
by  the  defendant  to  tlie  assignees  of  a 
bankrupt,  when  the  latter  was  oii  his  last 
examination,  that  in  consideration  that 
the  assignees  would  forbear  to  have  the 
bankrupt  examined,  and  that  tlie  commis- 
sioners would  desist  from  taking  such  ex- 
amination touching  moneys  alleged  to  have 
been  received  by  the  bankrupt,  and  not  ac- 

489 


*460 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   II. 


*  460  *  consideration  no  possible  benefit  or  advantage  could  be 
derived  to  the  one  party,  and  no  detriment  to  the  other ; 
and  if  that  which  is  offered  or  provided  as  a  consideration  cannot 
happen,  the  mere  words  alone  are  a  nullity.  It  is  undoubtedly 
possible,  that  one  may  make  a  promise  which  is  utterly  impossi- 
ble to  perform,  and  nevertheless  the  promisee  may  derive  a  posi- 
tive advantage  from  the  mere  fact  that  the  promise  is  made.  In 
such  a  case,  supposing  the  transaction  free  from  all  taint  of  fraud, 
this  advantage  would  be  a  good  consideration,  but  not  the  prom- 
ise by  itself. 

But  a  promise  is  not  void,  merely  because  it  is  difficult,  or  even 
improbable.  And  it  seems,  that  if  the  impossibility  applies  to 
the  promisor  personally,  there  being  neither  natural  impossi- 
bility in  the  thing,  nor  illegality  nor  immorality,  then  he  is 
bound  by  his  undertaking,  and  it  is  a  good  consideration   for 


counted  for,  he,  the  defendant,  would  pay- 
such  money  to  tlie  assignees.  Tliis  prom- 
ise was  held  by  the  court  to  be  illegal,  as 
being  against  the  policy  of  tlie  bankrupt 
laws.  And  Lord  Kenyon  observed  :  "  I  do 
not  say  that  this  is  nudum  pactum  ;  but  the 
ground  on  which  I  found  my  judgment  is 
this  ;  that  every  person,  who  in  considera- 
tion of  some  advantage,  either  to  himself 
or  to  another,  promises  a  benefit,  must 
have  the  power  of  conferring  that  benefit  up 
to  the  extent  to  which  that  henefii  professes  to 
go,  and  that  not  onltj  in  fact,  but  in  law. 
Now  the  promise  made  to  the  assignees  in 
this  case,  which  was  the  consideration  of 
the  defendant's  promise,  was  not  in  their 
power  to  perform,  because  the  commis- 
sioners had  nevertheless  a  right  to  exam- 
ine the  bankrupt.  And  no  collusion  of  the 
assignees  could  deprive  the  creditors  of 
the  right  of  examination  which  the  com- 
missioners would  procure  them.  The  as- 
signees did  not  stipulate  only  for  their  own 
acts,  but  also  that  the  commissioners  should 
forbear  to  examine  the  bankrupt ;  but 
clearly  they  had  no  right  to  tie  up  the 
hands  of  the  commissioners  by  any  such 
agreement."  And  Ashhurst,,].,  observed: 
"  In  order  to  found  a  consideration  for 
a  promise,  it  is  necessary  that  the  party 
by  whom  the  promise  is  made  ehoidd 
hare  tlie  power  of  carryinej  it  into  effect, 
and  secondly,  that  the  thing  to  be  done 
should  in  itself  be  legal.  Now  it  seems 
to  me  tliat  the  consideration  for  this 
promise  is  void,  on  both  tliese  grounds. 
The  assignees  have  no  right  to  control  the 
discretion  of  the  commissioners;  and  it 
would  1)6  criminal  in  them  to  enter  into 
such   an   agreement,   because  it   is   their 

490 


duty  to  examine  the  bankrupt  fully,  and 
the  creditors  may  call  on  them  to  jjerforra 
it.  And  for  the  sanae  reason  the  thing  to 
be  done  is  also  illegal."  —  And  so  in  Bates 
V.  Cort,  2  B.  &  C.  474,  which  may  perhaps 
be  regarded  as  an  extreme  case,  the  dec- 
laration stated,  that  by  agreement  between 
the  plaintiff  and  G.  G.,  the  plaintiff  agreed 
to  sell  and  deliver  to  G.  G.,  a  lace  macliine 
for  £220,  to  l)e  paid  thus  :  £40  on  delivery, 
and  the  residue  by  weekly  payments  of 
one  pound,  which  were  to  be  paid  to  the 
defendant  as  trustee  for  the  plaintiff,  and 
in  case  of  any  default  the  plaintiff  was  to 
have  back  the  machine,  and  in  considera- 
tion of  the  premises,  and  of  the  weekly 
payments,  the  plaintiff,  at  the  recjuest  of 
the  defendant,  promised  to  take  the  ma- 
chine and  pay  tlie  balance  should  there  be 
any  default  in  G.  G.  in  the  weekly  pay- 
ments. It  was  held  that  this  promise  was 
a  nudum  pactum,  and  void.  And  by  the 
court  •  "  The  declaration  affects  to  show 
the  legal  operation  of  the  agreement. 
Now  tliat  states  that  the  agreement  bound 
the  defendant  to  take  the  machine,  not  the 
plaintiff  to  deliver  it.  The  declaration 
does  not  even  show  that  it  was  in  the 
plaintiff's  power  to  deliver  the  machine, 
for  it  is  not  stated  that  he  had  ever  got  it 
back  from  the  original  vendee.  There 
certainly  is  an  allegation  of  willingness  to 
let  the  defendant  take  the  machine,  but 
that  does  not  appear  to  have  been  in  pur- 
suance of  any  jire-existing  agreement,  nor 
does  the  whole  import  any  obligation  on 
the  plaintiff  to  let  the  defendant  take  it. 
The  declaration  is  therefore  bad,  no  suffi- 
cient consideration  for  the  defendant's 
promise  being  shown." 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  ^Q^ 

*  the  promise  of  another,  (g)  i  The  reason  of  this  appears  *  461 
to  be,  that  if  a  party  binds  himself  to  such  an  undertaking, 
he  may  either  procure  the  thing  to  be  done  by  tliose  who  can  do 
it,  or  else  pay  damages  for  not  doing  it.  The  party  receiving 
such  a  promise  may  know  that  the  promisor  himself  cannot  do 
the  thing  he  undertakes,  but  may  not  know  that  he  has  not 
already  made,  or  has  it  not  in  his  power  to  make,  such  arrange- 
ment with  him  who  can  do  it  as  will  secure  its  being  done.  He 
has  a  right,  therefore,  to  expect  that  it  will  be  done,  and  to  pay 
for  such  promise  or  undertaking,  either  by  his  own  promise  or 
otherwise.  But  if  the  thing  undertaken  is  in  its  own  nature  and 
obviously  impossible,  he  cannot  expect  it  will  be  done ;  and  to 
enter  into  any  transaction  based  upon  such  undertaking,  is  a 
fraud  or  a  folly  which  the  law  will  not  sanction.  Hence,  it  would 
seem  that  an  engagement  by  one,  entered  into  with  a  second 
party,  that  a  third  party  shall  do  something  which  the  first 
cannot  do,  is  a  good  consideration  for  a  promise  by  the  second 
party.  (A)     The  cases  which  seem  to  oppose  this  rule  arc,  gener- 

(^)  See  Co.  Lit.  206  a,  n.  1  ;  Piatt  on  the  bank  and  to  the  proper  officers,  and 
Gov.  569;  3  Chitty  on  Com.  Law,  101  ;  that  it  is  impossible  to  make  the  invest- 
Blight  V.  Page,  3  B.  &  P.  296,  u. ;  Wors-  meat  with  their  consent.  I  siiould  say 
ley  V.  Wood,  6  T.  R.  718,  Kenyan,  C.  J.  then  that  no  sufficient  answer  was  given. 
And  see  Tuffnell  v.  Constable,  7  A.  &  E.  the  law  not  forbidding  tlie  thing  to  be 
798,  arguendo.  In  tliis  case  there  was  a  done,  and  there  being  no  breach  of  moral 
covenant  to  invest  a  sum  in  bank  annul-  duty  involved  in  it,  and  the  defendants 
ties,  or  other  government  stock,  in  the  cor-  l)eing  under  covenant  to  perform  it.  But 
porate  names  of  the  arclideacou  of  C,  the  if  an  actual  impossibility  were  shown,  the 
vicar  of  W.,  and  the  churchwardens  of  W.,  parties  might  go  to  a  court  of  equity  to 
the  dividends  to  be  held  and  received  by  the  restrain  proceedings  in  an  action  on  the 
archdeacon,  vicar,  and  churchwardens,  for  covenant,  they  showing  that  they  liad 
the  time  being,  in  trust  for  the  support  of  done  all  in  their  power  to  fulfil  it.  The 
a  parish  scliool  for  poor  children,  and  in  testator  in  this  case  must  be  taken  to  have 
further  trust  for  tlie  disposition  of  coals,  Ivuown,  when  he  covenanted,  wliether  the 
&c.,  among  poor  persons  of  the  parish,  law  would  permit  a  fulfilment  of  the  cove- 
Held,  on  general  demurrer  to  a  declara-  nant  or  not ;  or,  perhaps  it  should  rather 
tion,  that  an  action  lay  upon  such  cove-  be  said,  whether  the  course  of  practice 
nant,  no  impossibility  of  performance  would  or  would  not  allow  it  to  be  carried 
appearing,  inasmuch  as  the  investment  into  effect."  —  So  it  will  be  no  excuse  for 
might  at  any  rate  be  lawfully  made  in  the  the  non-performance  of  an  agreement  to 
corporate  names  of  the  present  archdeacon,  deliver  goods  of  a  certain  quantity  or 
vicar,  and  churchwardens.  And  Llit/edale,  quality,  that  they  could  not  be  obtained  at 
J.,  said,  in  giving  judgment :  "  The  de-  the  particular  season  when  the  contract 
fendants  allege  that  they  cannot  invest  was  to  be  executed.  Gilpius  v.  Consequa, 
this  stock,  because  the  parties  named  in  1  Pet.  C.  C.  91  ;  Youqua  v.  Nixon,  id.  221. 
the  bequest  are  not  corporations  for  that  (h)  Thus  a  promise  to  procure  the  con- 
purpose,  and  the  investment  could  not  be  sent  of  a  landlord  to  the  assignment  of  a 
effected  at  the  bank.  But  the  answer  is,  lease  is  binding.  Lloyd  i;.  Crispe,  5  Taunt, 
let  them  show  that  they  have  applied  at  249.     And  where  one  of  several  partners 

1  But  "  if  from  the  nature  of  things  the  thing  to  be  delivered  is  lialde  to  perish, 
then  there  is  an  implied  condition  that,  if  the  delivery  becomes  impossible  owing  to 
the  thing  perishing  without  default  of  the  seller,  he  is  excused."  Blackburn,  J.,  m 
IloweU  V.  Couplaud,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  462,  466. 

491 


*  462  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   II. 

*  462    ally,  at  least,  *  cases  in  which  the  consideration  was  open 

to  the  objection  of  illegality,  (z) 
By  the  Code  Napoleon,  B.  3,  tit.  3,  c.  4,  s.  1,  it  appears,  that 
while  a  promise  to  do  an  impossible  thing  is  null,  a  promise  not 
to  do  an  impossible  thing  is  a  sufficient  foundation  for  an  obliga- 
tion which  rests  upon  it.  We  have  no  such  distinction  in  the 
common  law. 


SECTION  XIV. 

FAILURE   OF   CONSIDERATION. 

When  the  consideration  appears  to  be  valuable  and  sufficient, 
but  turns  out  to  be  wholly  false  or  a  mere  nullity,  or  where  it 
may  have  been  actually  good,  but  before  any  part  of  the  contract 
has  been  performed  by  either  party,  and  before  any  benefit  has 
been  derived  from  it  to  the  party  paying  or  depositing  money  for 
such  consideration,  the  consideration  wholly  fails,  there  a  prom- 
ise resting  on  this  consideration  is  no  longer  obligatory,  and 
the  party  paying  or  depositing  money  upon  it  can  recover  it 
back.  (/)  1    But  where  the  consideration  fails  only  in  part,  prin- 

in  a  firm  agreed  to  introduce  the  plaintiff  charge  a  debt  due  to  his  master.  Al- 
(a  stranger)  into  it,  it  was  decided  that  tliough  this  decision  is  sometimes  cited  as 
the  agreement  was  valid,  although  the  showing  that  a  contract  is  void  if  the  con- 
other  partners  were  ignorant  of  its  exist-  sideratiou  is  impossible,  yet  it  may  be 
ence,  and  their  assent  was  of  course  esseu-  rested  more  properly  on  the  ground  that 
tial  to  the  admission  of  the  plaintiff,  the  consideration  was  illegal.  The  same 
McNeil  r.  Reed,  2  M.  &  Scott,  89  ;  s.  c.  9  may  be  said  of  Nerot  v.  Wallace,  3  T.  R. 
Bing.  08.  17,  sufn-a,  note  (/),  p.  *459. 

(i)  Thus  in  Harvey  i".  Gibbons,  2  Lev.  ( /)  Woodward  v.  Cowing,  13  Mass. 
161,  which  was  a  writ  of  error  on  a  judg-  216;  Moses  v.  Macferlan,  3  Burr.  1012; 
ment  in  Shrewsbury  court,  where  the  Spring  i;.  Coffin,  10  Mass.  34;  Lacoste  v. 
plaintiff  declared  that  he  being  bailiff  Tlotard,  1  Rep.  Const.  Ct.  467 ;  Wharton 
to  J.  S.,  the  defendant,  in  consideration  v.  O'Hara,  2  Nott  &  McC.  65 ;  Pettibone 
that  he  would  discharge  him  of  £20  due  v.  Roberts,  2  Root,  258 ;  Boyd  v.  Ander- 
to  J.  S.,  promised  to  expend  £40  in  re-  son,  1  Overt.  438;  Murray  v.  Carret,  3 
pairing  a  barge  of  the  plaintiffs,  —  verdict  Call,  373;  Treat  v.  Urono,  26  Me.  217; 
and  judgment  for  the  jilaintiff,  upon  non  Sauford  v.  Dodd,  2  Day,  437  ;  Colville  v. 
assumpsit,  were  reversed,  tlie  consideration  Besley,  2  Denio,  139.  The  failure  of  con- 
being  illegal,  for  the  plaintiff  cannot  dis-  sideration  must  be  total.    Charlton  v.  Lay, 

1  Where  a  person  bought  the  exclusive  right  to  use  a  certain  patent  in  a  place, 
where  he  knew  no  such  right  could  be  obtained,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  forming 
a  company  to  use  the  patent  there,  and  of  inducing  persons  to  buy  shares  under  a 
belief  that  such  exclusive  right  could  be  had,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  recover 
back  the  purchase-money  on  the  ground  of  failure  of  consideration,  having  got  what 
he  paid  for.  Begbie  r.  Phosphate  Sewage  Co.  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  491  ;  affirmed  in  1  Q.  B.  D. 
679.  —  A  license  to  sell  a  patented  article  is  a  good  consideration  for  a  note  for  the 
price,  unless  the  invention  is  so  useless  as  to  avoid  the  patent.  Wilson  v.  Hentges,  26 
Minn.  288. 

492 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


463 


ciples  analogous  to  those  which  govern  an  inquiry  into  the  ade- 
quacy of  a  consideration  would  be  applied  to  it.  If  there 
*were  a  substantial  consideration  left,  although  much  *  4G3 
diminished,  it  would  still  suffice  to  sustain  the  contract. 
But  if  the  diminution  or  failure  were  such  as  in  effect  and  reality 
to  take  away  all  the  value  of  the  consideration,  it  would  be  re- 
garded as  one  that  had  wholly  failed.  But  if  the  consideration, 
and  the  agreement  founded  upon  it,  both  consisted  of  several 
parts,  and  a  part  of  the  consideration  failed,  and  the  appropriate 
part  of  the  agreement  could  be  apportioned  to  it,  then  they  might 
be  treated  as  several  contracts,  and  a  recovery  of  money  paid  be 
had  accordingly.  (Z:) 


5  Humph.  496 ;  Dean  v.  Mason,  4  Conn. 
428.  The  measure  of  damages  in  such  a. 
case  is  the  sum  paid ;  no  allowance  is  to 
be  made  for  the  plaintiff's  loss  and  disap- 
pointment. Xeel  V.  Deens,  1  Nott  &  McC. 
210.  No  action  lies  on  an  agreement 
promising  to  pay  for  tuition  for  a  speci- 
fied time,  if,  during  the  whole  of  that 
time,  the  promisor  was  prevented  by  ill- 
ness from  attending  and  receiving  the 
tuition.  Stewart  v.  Loring,  5  Allen,  306. 
(i)  Franklin  v.  MiUer,  4  A.  &  E.  605, 
Littledale,  J.  In  this  case  the  declaration 
stated,  that  defendant,  being  indebted  to 
certain  persons,  agreed  to  repay  the  plain- 
tiff the  amoimt  of  all  accounts  which  he 
should  settle  for  the  defendant ;  and  also 
to  pay  the  plaintiff  £40  a  quarter  on 
stated  days,  till  the  said  debts  should  be 
fully  settled ;  and  tlie  plaintiff  agreed  to 
advance  to  the  defendant  £1  per  week, 
and  certain  other  sums,  out  of  tlie  sums  of 
£40 ;  that,  in  consideration  of  the  plain- 
tiff's promise,  the  defendant  agreed  to  per- 
form the  contract  on  his  part ;  that  the 
plaintiff  paid  debts  for  the  defendant  to  di- 
vers persons  (naming  them),  to  the  amount 
of  £281 ;  that  the  whole  amount  of  debts 
was  not  yet  settled ;  and  that  several  sums 
of  £40  had  become  due  from  the  defend- 
ant imder  the  agreement,  which  had  been 
paid  to  the  amount  of  £160  only,  but  the 
rest  were  unpaid.  Plea,  as  to  two  of  tlie 
sums  of  =£40,  that,  before  they  became  due, 
the  plaintiff  had  omitted  to  pay  certain  of 
the  debts  due  to  creditors  of  the  defendant 
(naming  them),  other  than  the  creditors 
named  in  the  declaration,  which  he  might 
have  paid  ;  and  had  also  omitted,  after  the 
last  payment  of  £40,  to  pay  the  defendant 
£1  per  week ;  wherefore  the  defendant,  in 
a  reasonable  time,  and  before  the  two 
sums  in  question  were  due,  rescinded  the 
contract.  Eeplication,  that  before  and  at 
the  time  of  the  last  payment  of  £40,  the 


defendant  was  indebted  to  the  plaintiff  in 
the  sum  of  £50  and  more,  in  respect  to 
the  moneys  paid  by  the  plaintiff  fur  tlie 
defendant  as  iu  the  first  count  mentioned; 
and  that  the  said  £40  was  insufficient  to 
discharge  the  amount  in  which  the  de- 
fendant was  so  indebted  to  the  plaintiff, 
and  for  wliicli  the  agreement  was  a  secu- 
rity. Held,  that  the  plea  was  bad,  as 
showing,  at  most,  only  a  partial  failure  of 
performance  by  the  plaintiff,  which  did 
not  authorize  the  defendant  to  rescind  the 
contract.  —  So  in  Ritchie  v.  Atkinson,  10 
East,  295,  where  tlie  master  and  the 
freighter  of  a  vessel  of  400  tons  mutually 
agreed  in  writing,  that  the  ship,  being 
every  way  fitted  for  the  voyage,  sliould, 
with  all  convenient  speed,  proceed  to  St. 
I'etersburg,  and  there  load  from  the 
freighter's  factors  a  complete  cargo  of 
hemp  and  iron,  and  proceed  therewith  to 
London,  and  ddiver  the  same  on  being  paid 
freight  for  hemp,  £5  per  ton,  for  iron,  5.s-  a 
ton,  &c.,  one  half  to  be  paid  on  right  de- 
livery, the  other  at  three  months ;  held, 
that  the  delivery  of  a  complete  cargo  was 
not  a  condition  precedent ;  but  that  the 
master  might  recover  freiglit  for  a  short 
cargo  at  the  stipulated  rates  per  ton ;  the 
freighter  having  liis  remedy  in  damages 
for  such  short  deliverv.  —  Likewise  in  Kob- 
erts  V.  Havelock,  3  13.  &  Ad.  404,  a  ship 
outward  boimd  with  goods,  being  damaged 
at  sea,  put  into  a  harbor  to  receive  some 
repairs  which  had  become  necessary  for 
the  continuance  of  the  voyage,  and  a  ship- 
wright was  engaged  and  undertook  to  juit 
her  into  thorough  repair.  Before  this 
was  completed  he  rerpiired  payment  for 
the  work  already  done,  without  which  he 
refused  to  proceed;  and  the  vessel  re- 
mained in  an  unfit  state  for  sailing.  Ueld, 
that  the  shipwright  might  maintain  an 
action  for  the  work  already  done,  tliough 
the  repair  was  incomplete,  and  the  vessel 

493 


464 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book    II. 


It  is  often  difficult  to  say  whether  a  consideration  is  divisible 
and  capable  of  apportionment,  or  so  entire  that  it  must  stand  or 

fall  together.  (?)  Perhaps  no  better  rule  can  be  given 
*464    than  *that  if  the  thing  to  be  done  be  in  its  own  nature 

separable  and  divisible,  and  there  be  no  express  stipulation 
or  necessary  implication  which  makes  it  absolutely  one  thing, 
and  that  part  which  fails  may  be  regarded,  to  use  the  language  of 
the  court  in  one  case,  "  not  as  a  condition  going  to  the  essence  of 
the  contract,"  (?72)  in  such  case  the  failure  does  not  destroy  the 


thereby  kept  from  continuing  her  voyage, 
at  the  time  when  the  action  was  brought. 

(/)  Thus,  in  Adlard  v.  Booth,  7  C.  & 
P.  108,  it  was  held,  that  where  a  printer 
has  been  employed  to  print  a  work,  of 
which  the  impression  is  to  be  a  certain 
number  of  copies,  if  a  fire  break  out  and 
consume  the  premises  before  the  whole 
number  has  been  worked  off,  the  printer 
cannot  recover  anything,  although  a  part 
has  actually  been  delivered.  While  in 
Cutler  V.  Close,  5  C.  &  P.  337,  where  a 
party  contracted  to  supply  and  erect  a 
warm  air  apparatus,  for  a  certain  sum,  it 
was  held,  in  an  action  for  the  price  (the 
defence  to  which  was,  that  the  apparatus 
did  not  answer),  that,  if  the  jury  thought 
it  was  substantial  in  the  main,  though  not 
quite  so  complete  as  it  miglit  be  under 
the  contract,  and  could  be  made  good  at 
a  reasonable  rate,  the  proper  course 
would  be  to  find  a  verdict  for  the  plain- 
tiff, deducting  such  sum  as  would  enable 
the  defendant  to  do  what  was  requisite. 
This  question  frequently  arises  on  special 
contracts  to  do  certain  work,  according  to 
certain  plans,  or  certain  specifications,  and 
the  contract  is  not  strictly  complied  with. 
Here  is  a  partial  failure  of  consideration, 
and  the  plaintiff,  in  seeking  to  recover  for 
the  labor  and  materials  expended,  will  be 
compelled  to  deduct  for  his  partial  failure, 
and  the  defendant  may  rely  upon  this  in 
reduction  of  damages,  and  is  not  driven  to 
his  cross  action.  Chapel  v.  Hickes,  2  Cr.  & 
M.  214.  And  in  such  case  the  plaintiff  is 
not  entitled  to  the  actual  value  of  the 
work,  per  se,  but  only  the  agreed  price 
minus  such  a  sum  as  would  complete  the 
work  according  to  the  contract.  Thorn- 
ton V.  Place,  1  Man.  &  R.  218.  In  the 
case  of  Ellis  v.  Hamlen,  3  Taunt.  53,  it 
was  k(dd,  that  if  a  buihler  undertakes  a 
work  of  specified  dimensions  and  mate- 
rials, and  deviates  from  the  specification, 
he  cannot  recover,  upon  a  c/imntum  vale- 
bant, for  the  work,  labor,  and  materials. 

(m)  Lucas  r.  Godwin,  3  IJing.  N.  C. 
746,  Bosanquet,  J.  In  that  case  the  plain- 
tiff contracted  to  build  cottages  by  the 

494 


lOth  of  October;  they  were  not  finished 
till  the  15th.  Defendant  having  accepted 
the  cottages,  it  was  held,  that  plaintiff 
might  recover  the  value  of  his  work,  on  a 
declaration  for  work,  labor,  and  materials. 
—  The  former  practice  of  compelling  a 
party  to  pay  the  full  sum  for  specified 
labor,  and  then  driving  him  to  his  cross 
action  if  the  work  was  not  done  according 
to  contract,  was  alluded  to  by  Parke,  B., 
in  Mondel  v.  Steel,  8  M.  &  W.  870.  In 
that  case,  it  was  held,  after  mature  consid- 
eration, that  in  all  actions  for  goods  sold 
and  delivered  with  a  warranty,  or  for  work 
and  labor,  as  well  as  in  actions  for  goods 
agreed  to  be  supplied  according  to  a  con- 
tract, it  is  competent  for  the  defendant  to 
show  how  much  less  the  subject-matter  of 
the  action  was  worth  by  reason  of  the 
breacli  of  the  contract;  and  to  the  extent 
that  he  obtains,  or  is  capable  of  obtaining, 
an  abatement  of  price  on  that  account,  he 
must  be  considered  as  having  received 
satisfaction  for  the  breach  of  contract ;  and 
he  is  precluded  from  recovering  in  another 
action  to  that  extent,  but  no  more.  See 
also  Chapel  r.  Hickes,  2  Cr.  &  M.  214. 
So  in  Allen  ?-.  Cameron,  3  Tyr.  907,  where 
the  plaintiff  contracted  to  sell  and  plant 
trees  on  the  defendant's  land,  and  also  to 
keep  them  in  order  for  two  years  next 
after  the  planting,  it  was  held,  that  evi- 
dence of  non-performance  by  the  plaintiff 
of  any  part  of  his  contract,  by  which  the 
trees  had  become  of  less  value  to  the  de- 
fendant, was  admissible  to  reduce  the 
damages  in  an  action  on  the  agreement 
for  their  price,  and  for  planting  them. 
Lord  Ellenhorongh  seems  to  have  laid  down 
the  just  rule  on  this  subject  in  Farnsworth 
V.  Ciarrard,  1  Camp.  38.  It  was  there 
held,  that  where  the  plaintiff  declares  on 
a  quantum  meruit  for  work  and  labor  done 
and  materials  found,  the  defendant  may 
reduce  the  damages,  by  showing  that  the 
work  was  improperly  done;  and  may  en- 
title himself  to  a  verdict  by  showing  that 
it  was  wholly  inadequate  to  answer  the 
purpose  for  which  it  was  undertaken  to  be 
performed. 


CH, 


I-] 


CONSIDERATION. 


4G5 


rights   growing   out  of   the  performance  of   the  residue. 

But  the  other  *  party  may  have  his  claim  or  action  for    *465 

damages  arising  from  such  faikire.  (n) 

In  Vermont  it  seems  to  be  the  law,  that  the  maker  of  a  note 
cannot  avail  himself  of  a  partial  failure  of  the  consideration, 
unless  he  has  offered  to  rescind  the  contract,  (o) 

The  bargain  may,  perhaps,  be  such  as  to  preclude  an  inquiry 
into  failure  of  consideration.  As  if  one  buys  a  cargo  of  corn  to 
arrive,  "  the  quantity  to  be  taken  from  the  bill  of  lading,"  and 
that  quantity  is  pctid  for,  the  buyer  cannot  recover  back  a  part  of 
the  price,  because  the  cargo  is  short,  nor  could  the  seller  demand 
more  if  it  went  beyond  the  bill;  supposing  good  faith  on  both 
sides,  (i?)  Here,  however,  if  a  few  bags  or  bushels  only,  instead 
of  the  cargo  bargained  for,  should  arrive,  it  would  seem  difficult 
to  hold  the  buyer  for  the  whole  price.  Such  contracts  are  like 
those  for  the  purchase  of  land,  where  the  contents  or  dimensions 
of  the  lot  are  stated  with  the  addition  of  "  more  or  less."  The 
intention  being  to  prevent  an  unimportant  variation 
*  from  annulling  the  bargain,  or  raising  new  questions ;  *  466 
but  not  to  prevent  the  effect  of  a  failure  of  consideration, 


(n)  Although  it  was  formerly  held  that 
the  only  remedy  was  by  cross  action,  Tye 
V.  Gwynne,  2  Camp.  346 ;  Moggridge  v. 
Jones,  3  id.  38,  yet  the  party  may  now  re- 
sort to  the  cross  action  or  not,  at  his  elec- 
tion. This  subject  was  examined  with 
much  ability  and  at  great  length,  l)y 
Dewey,  J.,  in  Harrington  ?-.  Stratton,  22 
Pick.  510,  where  it  was  held,  that  in  an 
action  by  the  payee  against  the  maker  of 
a  promissory  note  given  for  the  price  of  a 
chattel,  it  is  competent  for  tlie  maker  to 
prove,  in  reduction  of  damages,  that  the 
sale  was  effected  by  means  of  false  repre- 
sentations of  the  value  of  the  chattel,  on 
the  part  of  the  payee,  although  the  chattel 
has  not  been  returned  or  tendered  to  him. 
And  the  learned  judge,  in  the  course  of 
his  opinion,  said :  "  The  strong  argument 
for  the  admission  of  such  evidence  in  re- 
duction of  damages  in  cases  like  the  pres- 
ent, is,  that  it  will  avoid  circuity  of  action. 
It  is  always  desirable  to  prevent  a  cross 
action  where  full  and  complete  justice  can 
be  done  to  the  parties  in  a  single  suit ;  and 
it  is  upon  this  ground  that  the  courts  have 
of  late  been  disposed  to  extend  to  tlie 
greatest  length,  compatible  with  the  legal 
rights  of  the  parties,  the  principle  of  al- 
lowing evidence  in  defence  or  in  reduction 
of  damages  to  be  introduced,  rather  than 


to  compel  the  defendant  to  resort  to  his 
cross  action.  As  it  seems  to  us,  the  same 
purpose  will  be  further  advanced,  and  with 
no  additional  evils,  by  adopting  a  rule  on 
this  subject  equally  broad  in  its  applica- 
tion to  cases  of  actions  on  promissory 
notes,  between  the  original  parties  to  tlie 
same,  as  to  actions  on  the  original  con- 
tract of  sale,  and  holding  that,  in  either 
case,  evidence  of  false  representations  as 
to  the  quality  or  character  of  the  article 
sold,  may  be  given  in  evidence  to  reduce 
the  damages,  although  the  article  has  not 
been  returned  to  the  vendor." — See  also 
Mixer  i\  Coburn,  1 1  Met.  559 ;  Perley  i'. 
Balch,  23  Pick.  286 ;  Hammat  r.  Emerson, 
27  Me.  308 ;  Coburn  v.  Ware,  30  Me.  202 ; 
Spalding  v.  Yandercook,  2  "\\'end.  431 ; 
Drew  V  Towle,  7  Foster  (N.  H.),  412; 
Albertson  v.  Ilalloway,  16  Ga.  377.  The 
cases  of  Scudder  v.  Andrews,  2  McLean, 
564;  Pierce  v.  Cameron,  7  Kich.  L.  114; 
Pulsifer  v.  Hotchkiss,  12  Conn.  234,  and 
some  others  seem,  however,  not  in  accord- 
ance with  this  principle.  See,  however, 
as  to  this  last  case,  Andrews  v.  Wheaton, 
23  Conn.  112. 

(o)  Burton  v.  Schermerhom,  21  Vt. 
289. 

(p)  Covas  v.  Bingham,  22  E.  L.  &  E. 
183;  s.  c.  2E.  &B.  836. 

495 


*  4G7  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   II. 

which,  though  not  absolutely  complete,  and,  therefore,  strictly 
speaking,  partial  and  not  total,  is  still  so  large  as  to  be  substan- 
tially total. 

While  it  is  true  that  a  failure  of  consideration  is  a  good  ground 
for  the  recovery  of  the  money  paid,  it  is  a  familiar  and  well- 
settled  principle  of  law,  that  where  a  person,  with  full  knowledge 
of  all  the  circumstances  pays  money  voluntarily,  and  without 
compulsion  or  duress  of  persons  or  goods,  he  shall  not  afterwards 
recover  back  the  money  so  paid.  (5-)  But  money  paid  by  a  mis- 
take of  fact  which  causes  an  unfounded  belief  of  a  liability  to  pay, 
may  generally  be  recovered  back,  Qqq)  even  if  the  mistake  arises 
from  negligence  ;  (g-r)  but  not  if  the  mistake  affects  only  the  mo- 
tives of  the  party  in  paying  the  money,  and  not  his  obligation  to 
pay  it.  {qs) 


SECTION  XV. 

RIGHTS   OF    A    STRANGER   TO    THE   CONSIDERATION. 

In  some  cases,  in  which  the  consideration  did  not  pass  directly 
from  a  plaintiff,  and  the  promise  was  not  made  directly  to  him,  it 
has  been  made  a  question  how  far  he  might  avail  himself  of  it, 
and  bring  an  action  in  his  own  name,  instead  of  the  name  of  the 
party  from  whom  the  consideration  moved,  and  to  whom  the 
promise  was  made.  It  seems  to  have  been  anciently  held  (r)  as 
a  rule  of  law  (though  not  universally  so),  (s)  that  no  stranger 
to  the  consideration  of  an  agreement  could  have  an  action  on 
such  agreement,  although  it  were  made  expressly  for  his  benefit ; 
and  this  rule  has  been  recognized  and  enforced  in  modern 
*  467    times,  (t)     But  it  is  certain  that  if  the  *  actual  promisee 

(7)  This   riile    is   well    considered    in  (qr)  Kelly  !\  Solari,  9  M.  &  W.  54,  58  ; 

Forbes  v.  Appleton,  5  Cush.   117.      For  Bell  r.  Gardiner,  4  M.  &  G.  1 1 ;  Townsend 

illustrations  of  the  kind  of  duress  which  r.  Crowdy,  8  C.  B  (n.  s.)  477. 

avoids  it,  see  Preston  v.  Boston,  12  Pick.  {qs)  Aiken  v.   Short,  25  L.  J.  Exch. 

7,  and   Boston  &   Sandwich  Glass  Co.  v.  321;  Chambers  r.  Miller,  32  L.  J.  C.  30; 

Boston,   4    Met.    181.      Also   Fulliam   r.  Martin  v.  Morgan,  1  B.  &  B.  289. 

Down,  6  Esp.  26,  n. ;    Hills  v.   Street,  5  (r)  Crow    r.    Rogers,    1     Stra.    592; 

Bing.  37  ;  Snowdon  v.  Davis,  1  Taunt.  359.  Bourne  )'.  Mason,  1  \^ent.  6;  s.  c.  2  Keb. 

(qq)  Cox  I'.  Prentice,  3  M.  &  S.  344  ;  457,  Bull.  N.  P.  134.    And  in  the  late  case 

Dails  V.  Lloyd,  12  Q.  B.  531  ;   Townsend  of  Jones  v.  Robinson,  1  Exch.  456,  Parke, 

V.  Crowdy,  29   L.  J.  C.  300 ;   Barber  v.  B.,  says :  "  It  is  true  that  no  stranger  to 

Brown,  26  L.  J.  C.  41  ;  Milnes  v.  Duncan,  the  consideration  can  sue." 

6  B.  &  C.  671 ;  Standish  r.  Ross,  3  Exch.  (s)  Dutton  r.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318,  332; 

527  ;    Mills  v.  Alderbury  Union,  3  Exch.  s.  c.  T.  Jones,  103,  2  Lev.  210. 

590.  {t)  Price  r.  Easton,  4  B.  &  Ad.  433 ; 

496 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


4G8 


is  merely  the  agent  of  the  party  to  he  benefited,  that  party 
may  sue  upon  the  promise,  whether  his  relation  to  and  interest 
in  the  agreement  were  known  or  not.  (u)  This,  however,  rests 
upon  the  ground  that  the  consideration  actually  moves  from  such 
party,  and  that  he  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  stranger  to  it.  But  it 
seems  to  be  held  in  recent  cases,  that,  while  the  rule  itself  is  not 
denied,  it  would  generally  be  held  inapplicable  where  the  benefi- 
ciary has  any  concern  whatever  in  the  transaction,  (v)  In  some 
cases,  the  actual  promisee  would  be  considered  only  the  agent  of 
the  beneficiary,  and  in  others  the  beneficiary  would  be  regarded 
as  the  trustee  of  the  party  to  whom  the  promise  was  directly 
made,  and,  as  such  trustee,  might  maintain  an  action  in  his  own 
name,  (iv)  In  this  country,  the  right  of  a  third  party  to  bring  an 
action  on  a  promise  made  to  another  for  his  benefit,  seems 
to  be  somewhat  *  more  positively  asserted ;  (a;)  ^  and  we    *  468 


s.  c.  1  Nev.  &  M.  303.  In  this  case  the 
declaration  stated,  that  W.  P.  owed  the 
plaintiff  ^£13,  and  that  in  consideration 
thereof,  and  that  W.  P.,  at  the  defendant's 
request,  had  promised  the  defendant  to 
work  for  him  at  certain  wages,  and  also, 
in  consideration  of  W.  P.  leaving  the 
amount  which  might  he  earned  hy  him  in 
the  defendant's  hands,  he,  the  defendant, 
undertook  and  promised  to  pay  the  plain- 
tiff the  said  sum  of  £13.  Averment,  that 
W.  P.  performed  his  part  of  the  agree- 
ment. Judgment  arrested,  because  the 
plaintiff  was  a  stranger  to  the  considera- 
tion. And  Littledale,  J.,  said  :  "  This  case 
is  precisely  like  Crow  v.  Rogers,  and  must 
be  governed  by  it." 

(»)  As  in  the  familiar  instance  of  prin- 
cipals suing  for  goods  sold  by  their  factors, 
who  may  be  supposed  perhaps  to  have 
been  the  principals,  and  to  whom  alone 
the  promise  was  made.  Hornby  v.  Lacy, 
6  M.  &  Sel.  166;  Coppin  v.  Craig,  7 
Taunt.  243;  Morris  v.  Cleasby,  1  M.  & 
Sel.  576. 

(v)  Thus,  in  the  case  of  Lilly  v.  Hays, 
1  Nev.  &  P.  26;  s.  c.  5  A.  &  E.  550,  it 
was  held,  that  if  A  remits  money  to  B  to 
pay  C,  and  B  promises  C  to  pay  it  to  him, 
C  can  maintain  an  action  against  B  for 
money  had  and  received.  And  Patteson, 
J.,  there  said  :  "  The  only  question  in  this 
case  is,  whether  there  is  a  consideration 
moving  from  the  plaintiff.  It  is  said,  that 
such  is  the  rule  of  law  hitherto  adhered 
to ;  and  to  that  I  agree.  But  in  an  action 
for  money  had  and  received,  there  seldom 


is  a  direct  consideration  moving  from  tlie 
plaintiff.  Here,  the  defendant,  though  not 
the  general  agent,  became  the  agent  of 
Wood,  in  tliis  transaction ;  therefore,  tlie 
consideration  did  move  from  tlie  plaintiff, 
through  the  instrumentality  of  VVood." 
—  See  also  Jones  v.  Robinson,  1  Exch. 
454;  Thomas  v.  Thomas,  2  Q.  B.  85; 
Hinkley  v.  Fowler,  15  Me.  285;  Carnegie 
V.  Morrison,  2  Met.  401 ;  Dolph  v.  White, 
2  Kern.  296. 

(iv)  In  Pigott  V.  Thompson,  3  B.  &  P. 
149,  Lord  Alcanley  is  reported  to  have 
said  :  "  It  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  wheth- 
er, if  A  let  land  to  B,  in  consideration  of 
which  the  latter  promises  to  pay  the  rent 
to  C,  his  executors  and  administrators,  C 
may  maintain  an  action  on  that  jjroinise. 
I  have  little  doubt,  however,  tliat  tlie  ac- 
tion might  be  maintained,  and  that  the 
consideration  M'ould  be  sutiicient ;  though 
my  brothers  seem  to  think  differently  on 
this  point.  It  appears  to  me  that  C  w(ndd 
be  only  a  trustee  for  A,  who  might  for 
some  reason  be  desirous  that  the  money 
should  be  paid  into  the  hands  of  C.  In 
case  of  marriage,  it  is  often  necessary  to 
make  contrncts  in  this  manner,  and  the 
personal  action  is  given  to  the  trustees  for 
the  benefit  of  the  feme  covert." 

(x)  See  22  Am.  Jnr.  16-20;  Hind  v. 
Holdship,  2  Watts,  104;  Arnold  v.  Lyman, 
17  Mass.  400;  Bridge  r.  Niagara  Ins.  Co. 
1  Hall,  247;  Jackson  r.  Mayo,  11  Mass. 
152,  n.  («);  Hinkley  v.  Powler,  15  Me. 
285;  Hall  ;•.  Marston,  17  I\Iass.  575;  Fel- 
ton  V.  Dickinson,  10  id.  287;  Delaware  & 


1  Helms  V.  Kearns,  40  Ind.  124.      But  see  Exchange  Bank  v.  Rice,  107  Mass.  37, 

contra. 


82 


497 


*  469  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  II. 

think  it  would  be  safe  to  consider  this  a  prevailing  rule  with 
us ;  indeed  it  has  been  held  that  such  promise  is  to  be  deemed 
made  to  the  third  party  if  adopted  by  him,  though  he  was  not 
cognizant  of  it  when  made.  (//) 

But  where  the  promise  is  made  under  seal,  and  the  action 
must  be  debt  or  covenant,  then  it  must  be  brought  in  the  name 
of  the  party  to  the  instrument ;  and  a  third  party  for  whose  bene- 
fit the  promise  is  made  cannot  sue  upon  it.  (2)  ^ 


SECTION   XVI. 

THE   TIME    OF   THE   CONSIDERATION. 

Considerations  may  be  of  the  past,  of  the  present,  or  of  the 
future.  When  the  consideration  and  the  promise  founded  upon 
it  are  simultaneous,  then  the  consideration  is  of  the  present  time  ; 
the  whole  agreement  is  completed  at  once,  and  the  consideration 
and  the  promise  are  concurrent.  When  the  consideration  is  to  do 
a  thing  hereafter,  it  is  of  the  future,  and  is  said  to  be  executory ; 
when  the  promise  to  do  this  is  accepted,  and  a  promise  in  return 
founded  upon  it,  this  latter  promise  rests  on  a  sufficient  founda- 
tion, and  is  obligatory.  When  the  consideration  is  wholly  past, 
it  is  said  to  be  executed ;  and  in  relation  to  considerations  of  this 
kind,  many  nice  questions  have  arisen. 

It  may  be  stated,  as  the  general  rule,  that  a  past  or  ex- 
*  469    ecuted  *  consideration  is  not  sufficient  to  sustain  a  promise 
founded  upon  it,  unless  there  was  a  request  for  the  consid- 
eration previous  to  its  being  done  or  made.     This  request  should 
be  alleged,  in  a  declaration  which  sets  forth  an  executed  consid- 

H.  Canal  Co.  v.  Westchester  Co.  Bank,  4  the  three.  Cabot  v.  Haskins,  3  Pick.  83. 
Denio,  97 ;  Beers  v.  Robinson,  9  Penu.  St.  See  also  Farrow  v.  Turner,  2  A.  K.  Marsh. 
229.  This  question  was  fully  examined  496  ;  Crocker  i'.  Higgins,  7  Conn.  347  ; 
in  the  case  of  Carnegie  v.  Morrison,  2  Met.  Miller  v.  Drake,  1  Caines,  45.  See  also 
381,  by  Shaw,  C.  J.,  the  old  case  of  Dut-  Bigelow  v.  Davis,  16  Barb.  561. 
ton  V.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318,  being  adopted  ^(y)  Lawrence  v.  Fox,  20  N.  Y.  268; 
as  good  law,  and  in  Brewer  v.  Dyer,  7  Stenian  t\  Harrison,  42  Penn.  St.  49. 
Cush.  337,  the  same  doctrine  is  reaffirmed.  (z)  Lord  Southampton  v.  BroAvn,  6  B. 
—  In  like  manner,  the  American  courts  &C.  718;  Offly  r.  Ward,  1  Lev.  235 ;  San- 
have  held,  that  a  promise  to  three,  upon  a  ders  v.  Filley,  12  Pick.  554;  Johnson  v. 
consideration  moving  from  them  and  a  Foster,  12  Met.  167;  Hinkley  v.  Fowler, 
fourth  person,  will  support  an  action  by  15  Me.  285. 

2  Flynn  v.  No.  American  Jus.  Co.  115  Mass.  449;  CroweU  v.  Currier,  12  C.  E. 
Green,  152. 

498 


CH.  I.]  CONSIDERATION.  *  469 

eration,  as  that  on  which  the  promise  is  founded  that  is  sought  to 
be  enforced.  Without  such  previous  request  a  subsequent  prom- 
ise has  no  force ;  because  the  consideration  being  entirely  com- 
pleted and  exhausted,  it  cannot  be  considered  that  it  would  not 
have  been  made  or  given,  but  for  a  promise  which  is  subsequent 
and  independent.  A  familiar  illustration  is  afforded  by  the  case  of 
a  guarantor.  If  one  lends  money  to  another,  and  at  a  subsequent 
time  a  third  party,  who  did  not  request  the  loan,  and  is  not  benefited 
by  it,  promises  to  see  that  it  is  repaid,  such  promise  is  void,  be- 
cause no  consideration  passes  from  the  promisee  to  the  promisor. 
But  if  the  promisor  requests  the  loan,  or  if  his  promise  is  made 
previous  to  the  loan,  or  at  the  same  time,  then  it  will  be  supposed 
that  the  loan  is  made  because  of  the  promise.  It  will  also  be 
supposed,  that  the  promisor  is  benefited  by  the  loan  because  he 
requests  it,  or,  at  least,  that  the  lender  parts  with  his  money  in 
consequence  of  the  promise,  and  this  is  a  detriment  to  him,  at  the 
instance  of  the  promisor,  which  is  equally  good  by  way  of  a  con- 
sideration. 

But  this  previous  request  need  not  always  be  express,  or 
proved,  because  it  is  often  implied.  As,  in  the  first  place,  where 
one  accepts  or  retains  the  beneficial  result  of  such  voluntary  ser- 
vice. Here,  the  law  generally  implies  both  a  previous  request 
and  a  subsequent  promise  of  repayment.  No  one  can  compel 
another  to  accept  a  gratuitous  and  unrequested  service ;  no  one 
can  makG  himself  the  creditor  of  another,  without  his  consent,  or 
against  his  will.  But  if  that  other  chooses  to  accept  such  service, 
or  the  service  being  rendered  voluntarily,  chooses  to  retain  all 
the  benefit  thereof  to  himself,  this  puts  the  service  on  the  same 
footing,  in  the  law,  as  one  rendered  at  request,  and  for  which  a 
promise  is  made.  The  cases  where  goods  are  supplied  to  an 
infant,  and  the  father  is  held  responsible,  often  fall  within  this 
rule.  («) 

(a)  Thus,  in  Law  r.  Wilkin,  6  A.  &  E.  assume  that  he  concealed  them.    My  broth- 

718  which  was  an  action  against  a  father  er  Storks  admits  that,  if  the  father  had 

for  goods  supplied  to  his  minor  son,  who  seen  them,  an  implied  authority  would  be 

was  away  at  school.     The  only  evidence  .shown."     Som  the  Fishmonger  sC^^ 

to  charge  the  father  was,  that  the  boy,  Robertson  5  Man.  &G.  192.  / '"^'f -<--';. 

when  he  went  home  for  the  holidays,  took  said,  that  if  persons  receive  '|f  eueht  Irora  a 

the  clothes  witli  him,  but  was  not  wearing  contract  on  which  tl'fy^yould  not  Je  origi- 

them ;  and  that  he  returned  to  school  with  nally  bound,  this  would  bind  them,  and  ren- 

them.     Coleridge,  J.,  said:  "The  defend-  der  them  liable  for  the  fulfi  ment  of  the 

ant's  son  was  sent  to  school  in  want  of  contract,     ^oe   r    Taniere    13   Jur    119^ 

clothes.     When  they  were  supplied,  and  So  where  one  built  a  school-house,  imder 

he  went  home  with  them,  we  are  not  to  a  contract  with  persons  assummg  to  act 

499 


470 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  II. 


*  470        *  And,  in  the  second  place,  where  one  is  compelled  to  do 

for  another  what  that  other  should  do,  and  was  compella- 
ble to  do.  Here  also  the  law  implies,  not  only  a  previous  request 
that  the  thing  should  be  done,  but  also  a  promise  to  compensate 
for  the  doing  of  it.  (6)  ^     As  where  one  is  surety  for  another,  and 

pays  the  debt  which  the  other  owes.     Here  the  surety  can 

*  471    recover  *  what  he  pays,  without  proving  that  the  priucipal 

debtor  either  requested  him  to  pay  the  money,  or  promised 
to  repay  him  ;  for  the  law  implies  all  this.  In  receiving  him  as 
surety,  or  in  requesting  him  to  become  his  surety,  he  will  be 
considered  as  having  requested  him  to  pay  the  debt ;  and  if  such 
request  to  pay  the  debt  were  express,  the  general  principles  of 


as  a  district  committee,  but  who  had  in 
fact  no  authority,  yet  a  district  school  was 
afterwards  Ivcpt  in  it  by  direction  of  tlie 
authorized  school  agent,  this  was  held  to 
be  an  acceptance  of  the  house  by  the  dis- 
trict, and  they  were  held  lial)le  to  pay  the 
reasonable  value  of  the  building.  Abbot 
V.  Hermon,  7  Greeul.  (Bennett's  ed.)  118,  n. 
See  also  Rol)erts  v.  Marston,  20  Me.  275  ; 
Hayden  r.  Madison,  7  Greeul.  76;  Weston 
V.  Uavis,  24  Me.  374 ;  Hatch  v.  Purcell,  I 
Foster  (N.  H.),  544 ;  Newell  i\  Hill,  2  Met. 
180.  So  if  a  conveyance  of  an  interest  in 
land  be  made  in  the  common  form  of  a 
quit-claim  deed,  containing  this  stipula- 
tion, "  provided  said  grantee  shall  pay  said 
grantor  or  his  assigns,  twenty-two  dollars 
annually  from  this  date  on  demand,"  un- 
til the  happening  of  a  certain  event ;  and 
the  grantee  holds  under  the  deed,  but  fails 
to  make  the  annual  payments  wlien  de- 
manded, the  grantor  may  sustain  an  ac- 
tion of  assumpsit  against  tlie  grantee,  to 
recover  the  money.  Huff  r.  Nickerson,  27 
Me.  106.  —  But  if  one  build  a  house  for 
his  own  convenience  on  the  land  of  an- 
other, by  his  permission,  there  is  no  im- 
plied agreement  on  the  part  of  the  owner 
of  the  land  to  pay  tlie  value  of  such  iiouse. 
WeUs  V.  Banister,  4  Mass.  514.  Neither 
can  a  school  district  Ije  liekl  liable  for  un- 
authorized repairs  upon  tlieir  school-house, 
from  the  fact  that  they  afterwards  used 
the  house;  for  this  acceptance  and  hold- 
ing of  the  repairs  cannot  be  considered  as 
voluntary,  because  the  house  could  not 
weU  be  used  without  making  use  of  the 
repairs.  Davis  v.  Bradford,  24  Me.  349. 
—  So  the  law  will  not  imply  a  promise  on 
the  part  of  a  ])aupcr  to  jjay  from  his  estate 
moneys  expended  by  the  town  of  his  set- 
tlement for  his  support.     Cliarlestown  v. 


Hul)l)ard,  9  N.  H.  195  ;  Deer  Isle  v.  Eaton, 
12  Mass.  328. 

(h)  .Jeff revs  v.  Gurr,  2  B.  &  Ad.  833; 
Pownal  V.  Ferrand,  6  B.  &  C.  439.  In  this 
case  the  indorser  of  a  bill,  being  sued  by 
the  holder,  paid  him  part  of  the  sum  men- 
tioned in  the  bill ;  and  it  was  held,  that  he 
might  recover  tlie  same  from  the  acceptor 
in  an  action  for  money  paid  to  his  use. 
And  Bayleij,  J.,  said :  "  Tlie  law  is,  that 
a  pai'ty,  by  voluntarily  paying  the  debt  of 
another,  does  not  ac(iuire  any  right  of  ac- 
tion against  that  other  ;  but  if  I  pay  your 
debt  because  I  am  forced  to  do  so,  then  I 
may  recover  the  same ;  for  tlie  law  raises 
a  promise  on  the  part  of  the  person  whose 
del)t  I  pay,  to  reimburse  me.  That  prin- 
ciple was  fullv  established  in  the  case  of 
ExaU  V.  Partridge,  8  T.  R.  308."  — Gris- 
sell  V.  Robinson,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  10.  In  this 
case  the  plaintiffs,  having  agreed  with  the 
defendant  to  give  him  a  lease  of  certain 
premises,  caused  their  attorney  to  prepare 
the  lease,  and  paid  him  for  it ;  and  after- 
wards brought  their  action  against  the  de- 
fendant to  recover  the  amount  so  paid, 
and  declared  in  assumpsit  for  money  paid 
by  them  for  the  defendant's  use.  It  was 
held,  that  they  were  entitled  to  recover, 
the  evidence  showing  that  it  was  the  cus- 
tom for  the  landlord's  attorney  to  draw 
the  lease,  and  for  the  lessee  to  pay  for  it. 
Park,  J.,  said  :  "  As  the  plaintifts  were 
liable  to  their  own  attorney  in  the  first 
instance,  and  all  the  e^'idence  shows,  that 
according  to  the  custom  the  defendant  is 
ultimately  bound  to  pay  for  the  lease,  he 
must  be  taken  to  have  impliedly  assented 
to  the  payment  made  by  the  plaintiffs,  and 
the  action  lies  for  money  paid  to  his  use." 
See  also  Davies  v.  Humphreys,  6  M.  &  W. 
1.53. 


1  As  where  a  person,  to  save  his  own  property  from  being  sold  on  legal  process, 
pays  a  debt  for  which  another  is  legally  bound.      Nichols  v.  Buckuam,  117  Mass.  488. 

500 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


*472 


law  would  imply  the  promise  of  repayment.  The  compulsion  in 
this  case  must  be  a  legal  one ;  or,  in  other  words,  there  must  bo 
an  obligation  which  the  law  will  enforce,  (c) 

And,  in  the  third  place,  where  one  does  voluntarily,  and  with- 
out request,  that  which  he  is  not  compellable  to  do,  for  another 
who  is  compellable  to  do  it.  As  if  one  who  is  not  surety,  nor 
bound  in  any  way,  pays  a  debt  due  from  another.  He  has  not  the 
same  claim  and  right  as  if  he  had  been  compellable  to  pay  this 
debt.  For  now  the  law,  if  there  be  a  subsequent  promise  to  repay 
the  money,  will  indeed  imply  the  previous  request,  as,  if  there 
had  been  a  previous  request,  it  would  have  implied  a  subsequent 
promise ;  but  it  will  not  imply  both  the  promise  and  the 
request,  as  in  the  former  case,  (c?)  i  The  reason  *  is,  that  *  472 
the  debtor  shall  not  be  obliged  to  accept  another  party  as 
his  creditor  without  his  consent.  He  owes  some  one;  and  he 
may  have  partial  defences,  or  other  reasons  for  wishing   to  ar- 


(c)_  Pitt  V.  Purssord,  8  M.  &  W.  538. 
In  this  case  one  of  two  persons,  who,  as 
sureties  for  a  third,  signed  together  witli 
the  principal  a  joint  and  several  promis- 
sory note,  on  the  note  becoming  due,  paid 
the  amount,  though  no  demand  had  been 
made  or  action  brought  against  him  by 
the  holder.  It  was  held,  that  such  paj^- 
ment  could  not  be  considered  voluntary, 
and  tliat  he  might  sue  his  co-surety  for 
contribution.  And  Alderson,  B.,  said  : 
"  This  is  not  a  voluntary  payment,  nor  is 
it  like  the  case  where  one  is  liable  as  prin- 
cipal and  another  as  surety.  Here  the 
sureties  are  not  liable  in  default  of  the 
principal ;  they  are  all  jirimarily  liable, 
and  are  all  equally  so.  Tliis  was  not  a 
payment  made  voluntarily,  Imt  was  a  pay- 
ment in  discharge  of  a  debt  due  on  an  in- 
strument on  which  the  defendant  was  lia- 
ble." 

[d)  Wing  r.  Mill,  1  B.  &  Aid.  104.  In 
this  case  a  pauper  residing  in  the  parish 
of  A  received  ditring  his  illness  a  weekly 
allowance  from  the  parish  of  B,  where  he 
was  settled.  Held,  that  an  apothecary, 
who  attended  the  pauper,  might  maintain 
an  action  for  the  amount  of  his  l)ill 
against  the  overseer  of  B,  who  expressly 
promised  to  pay  the  same.  —  But  without 
such  express  promise,  .such  action,  it 
seems,  could  not  be  maintained.  PajTiter 
r.  Williams,  1  Cr.  &  M.  819.  In  this  case 
a  pauper,  whose  settlement  was  in  the 
parish  of  A,  resided  in  the  parish  of  B, 
and  whilst  there  received  relief  from  the 


parish  of  A,  which  relief  was  afterwards 
discontinued,  the   overseers   objecting    to 
pay  any  more  unless  the  pauper  moved 
into   his  own   parish.      The  pauper  was 
subsequently  taken  ill  and  attended  by  an 
apothecary,  who,  after  attending  him  nine 
weeks,  sent  a  letter  to  the  overseers  of  A, 
upon  the  receipt  of  which  they  directed 
the  allowance  to  be  renewed,  and  it  was 
continued   to   the  time   of    the    paujier's 
decease.      Held,  that  the  overseers  of  A 
were  liable  to  pay  so  much  of  the  apothe- 
cary's bill  as  was  incurred  after  the  letter 
was  received.      And   Bayley,  B.,  said  :  "  I 
am  of  opinion  that  the  parish  is  liable, 
and  that  the   plaintiff   can   maintain  the 
present  action.     The  legal  liability  is  not 
alone   sulBcieut    to   enable   the    party    to 
maintain  the  action,  without  a  retainer  or 
adoption  of  the  plaintiff  on  the   part  of 
the    parish.      The    legal   liability   of    the 
parish  does  not  give  an}-  one  who  chooses 
to  attend  a  pauper  and  supply  him  with 
medicines  a  right  to  call  on  them  for  pay- 
ment.   It  is  their  duty  to  see  that  a  proper 
person  is  employed,  and  tliey  are  to  have 
an  option  who  the  medical  man  shall  be. 
Wing  V.  Mill  does  not  go  the  length  of 
saying  that  a  mere  legal  liability  is  enough  ; 
there  must  >)e  a  retainer  or  adoption.      In 
that  case  the  parish  officers  were  aware  of 
the  attendance,  and  sanctioned  it,  because 
thev  applied  to  him  to   send  in   lais  bill." 
See"  further,   Doty  r.   Wilson,    14  Johns. 
378;    Gleason    v.   Dyke,   22    Pick.    393; 
Dearborn  v.  Bowman,  3  Met.  155. 


1  Curtis  V.  Parks,  55  Cal.  106 ;  Patillo  v.  Smith,  61  Ga.  265. 

501 


472 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book   II. 


range  the  debt  with  him  to  whom  it  is  due,  and  not  with  another ; 
and  if  another  comes  in  without  request  or  necessity  and  pays 
the  debt,  the  debtor  is  not  obliged  to  substitute  him  in  the  place 
of  his  original  ci^editor  unless  he  chooses  to  do  it.  But  he  may 
do  this  if  he  so  wishes ;  and  if,  after  the  debt  is  paid  by  this  third 
party,  the  debtor  choose  to  promise  him  repayment,  he  is  held  to 
such  promise,  and  the  consideration,  although  executed,  is  suffi- 
cient, for  the  law  implies  a  previous  request ;  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  will  not  permit  the  debtor  to  deny  the  allegation  of  such 
request  in  the  declaration. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  observed,  that  where  the  law  implies  both 
the  previous  request  and  also  a  subsequent  promise,  there  no 
other  promise  than  that  which  is  so  implied  can  be  enforced,  if 
the  consideration  for  the   promise  be   an  executed  one.  (e)     In 


(e)  Kaye  v.  Dutton,  7  Man.  &  G.  807. 
This  was  an  action  of  assumpsit  upon  an 
agreement,  whereby,  after  reciting  that 
one  W.  in  his  Hfetime  mortgaged  certain 
premises  to  R.  and  B.  to  secure  £.3,500; 
that  11.  and  B.  required  W.  to  procure 
the  phiintiff  to  join  him  in  a  bond,  as  a 
collateral  security  for  that  sum  and  inter- 
est ;  that  the  defendant  had,  since  the 
death  of  W.,  taken  upon  himself  the  man- 
agement of  the  estate  of  W.,  and  had 
paid  to  R.  and  B.  .£3,370 ;  that  the  plain- 
tiff had  been  called  upon  as  surety,  and 
had  paid  to  R.  and  B.  £130;  that  the  de- 
fendant had  repaid  him  £48,  leaving  £82 
due ;  that  the  defendant  had  agreed  to 
repay  the  plaintiff  the  £82  out  of  the 
moneys  which  might  arise  from  the  sale 
of  the  mortgaged  premises,  and  in  the 
mean  time  to  appropriate  the  rents  towards 
payment  of  the  same,  as  the  plaintiff  had 
a  lien  upon  the  premises  for  the  .same  ; 
that  the  defendant  had  requested  the 
plaintiff  to  release  and  convey  all  his  es- 
tate and  interest  in  the  premises  to  A.  and 
L.,  and  that  that  he  had  alreacli/  clone,  reserv- 
ing to  himself  a  lien  on  the  said  proper! ij,  — 
it  was  witnessed  that,  in  consideration  of 
the  plaintiff's  Jiaving  paid  the  .£130  to  R. 
and  B.  in  part  discliarge  of  the  mortgage, 
and  in  consideration  of  his  having  released 
and  convej^ed  all  his  estate  and  interest  in 
the  premises  to  A.  and  L.,  and  in  order  to 
secure  to  the  plaintiff  the  repayment  of 
the  £82,  the  defendant  undertook  and 
agreed  with  the  plaintiff  to  pay  him  the 
same,  with  interest,  out  of  the  proceeds  of 
the  premises  when  sold,  and,  in  the  mean 
time,  to  appropriate  the  rents  in  liquida- 
tion of  the  same.  The  declaration  then 
stated,  that,  in  consideration  of  the  prem- 

502 


ises,  the  defendant  promised  the  plaintiff 
to  perform  the  agreement ;  and  alleged  for 
breach,  that,  although  tlie  defendant  had 
received  rents  to  a  sufficient  amount,  he 
had  failed  to  pay.  Held,  that  inasmuch 
as  the  declaration  did  not  show  that  the 
plaintiff  had  any  interest  in  the  premises, 
except  that  which  he  reserved,  his  release 
and  conveyance,  thovigh  executed  at  the 
defendant's  request,  formed  no  legal  con- 
sideration for  the  promise  alleged  to  have 
heen  made  by  the  latter.  And  Tindal, 
C.  .J.,  in  that  case  said :  "  Two  objections 
were  made  to  the  declaration,  first,  that  it 
did  not  show  any  consideration  for  the 
promise  by  tlie  defendant ;  secondly,  that 
the  promise  was  laid  in  respect  of  an  exe- 
cuted consideration,  but  was  not  such  a 
promise  as  would  have  been  implied  by 
law  from  that  consideration  ;  and  that,  in 
point  of  law,  an  executed  consideration 
will  support  no  promise,  although  express, 
other  than  that  which  the  law  itself  would 
have  implied.  The  cases  cited  by  tlie  de- 
fendant, namely.  Brown  v.  Crump,  1  Marsh. 
5G7,  6  Taunt.  300;  Granger  ;;.  Collins,  6 
M.  &  W.  458 ;  Hopkins  v.  Logan,  5  M.  & 
W.  241  ;  Jackson  v.  Cobbin,  8  M.  &  W. 
790 ;  and  Roscorla  r.  Thomas,  3  Q.  B.  234 ; 
s.  c.  2  Gale  &  D.  508,  certainly  support 
that  proposition  to  this  extent,  that,  where 
tiie  consideration  is  one  from  which  a 
promise  is  hy  law  implied,  there  no  ex- 
press promise  made  in  respect  of  that  con- 
sideration after  it  has  been  executed, 
differing  from  that  which  by  law  would 
be  implied,  can  be  enforced.  Bi;t  those 
cases  may  have  proceeded  on  the  principle 
that  the  consideration  was  exhausted  by 
the  promise  implied  by  law,  from  the  very 
execution   of  it;  and,   consequently,   any 


CH.  I.] 


CONSIDERATION. 


473 


*  other  words,  no  express  promise  made  after  a  considera-  *  473 
tion  has  been  wholly  executed,  and  founded  wholly  upon 

that  consideration,  can  be  enforced,  if  it  differs  from  the  promise 
which  the  law  implies.  Otherwise,  there  would  be  two  distinct 
and  perhaps  antagonistic  promises  resting  upon  one  consideration. 
From  what  has  been  said,  it  will  be  seen  that  where  the  consid- 
eration is  wholly  executed,  the  law  implies  in  some  cases  a  pre- 
vious request,  provided  a  promise  be  proved ;  but  will  not  imply 
a  request  and  thence  imply  a  promise.  On  the  other  hand, 
wherever  the   law  implies   a   promise,  there   it  will   also 

*  imply  a  request ;  and  hence  it  may  be  said  that  express  *  474 
request  is  unnecessary  where  the  law  implies  a  promise.  (/) 


promise  made  afterwards  must  be  nudum 
pactum,  there  remaining  no  consideration 
to  support  it.  But  the  case  may,  perhaps, 
be  different  where  there  is  a  consideration 
from  which  no  promise  would  be  implied 
by  law ;  that  is,  where  the  party  suing  has 
sustained  a  detriment  to  himself,  or  con- 
ferred a  benefit  on  the  defendant,  at  his 
request,  under  circumstances  which  would 
not  raise  any  implied  promise.  In  such 
cases  it  appears  to  have  been  held,  in 
some  instances,  that  the  act  done  at  the 
request  of  the  party  charged,  is  a  suffi- 
cient consideration  to  render  binding  a 
promise  afterwards  made  by  him  in  re- 
spect of  the  act  so  done.  Hunt  v.  Bate, 
and  several  cases  mentioned  in  the  mar- 
gin of  the  report  of  that  case,  seem  to  go 
to  that  extent ;  as  also  do  some  others 
collected  in  Roll.  Abr.  Action  sur  Case 
(Q.)."  —  So  in  Jackson  r.  Cobbin,  8  M.  & 
W.  790,  a  declaration  in  assumpsit  stated, 
in  substance,  that  the  defendant  agreed  to 
let,  and  the  plaintiff  to  take,  a  certain 
messuage  and  premises  on  certain  speci- 
fied terms,  and  that  afterwards,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  premises,  and  that  the 
plaintiff,  at  the  request  of  the  defendant, 
had  promised  the  defendant  to  perform  his 
part  of  the  agreement,  the  defendant 
promised  the  plaintiff  to  perform  liis  part 
of  the  agreement,  and  that  he  then  had 
power  to  let  the  messuage  and  premises 
to  the  plaintiff,  without  restriction  as  to  the 
purpose  for  ichich  the  same  should  be  used 
and  occupied.  Held,  on  special  demurrer, 
that  such  a  promise  could  not  be  implied 
from  the  relation  of  the  parties,  and  that 
the  consideration  alleged  was  insufficient 
to  sustain  it.  See  also  Hopkins  v.  Logan, 
5  M.  &  W.  241 ;  Lattimore  v.  Garrard,  1 
Exch.  809.  Li  Roscorla  v.  Thomas,  3  Q. 
B.  2.35,  tlie  declaration  stated,  that  in  con- 
sideration that  the  plaintiff,  at  the  request 
of  the  defendant,  had  bought  a  horse  of 


the  defendant  at  a  certain  price,  the  de- 
fendant promised  that  the  horse  was  free 
from  vice ;  but  it  was  vicious.  Held,  liad, 
on  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment ;  for  tliat 
tlie  executed  consideration,  though  laid 
with  a  request,  neither  raised  by  implica- 
tion of  law  the  promise  charged  in  the 
declaration,  nor  would  support  such 
promise,  assuming  it  (as  must  be  assumed 
on  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment)  to  l)e  ex- 
press. But  we  think  tliis  case  goes  too  far 
in  saying,  that  a  consideration  which  would 
not  raise  an  implied  promise  would  not 
sustain  an  express  one.  See  the  observa- 
tions of  Tindal,  C  J.,  in  Kaye  i:  Dutton, 
cited  above. 

( /)  It  follows  from  what  is  stated  in 
the  text,  that  in  declaring  on  an  executed 
consideration,  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege 
a  precedent  request  where  tlie  law  will 
imply  a  promise  without  a  request.  See 
Osborne  v.  Rogers,  1  Wms.  Saund.  264,  n. 
(1),  as  corrected  by  the  learned  note  of 
Mr.  Sergeant  Manninq,  appended  to  the 
case  of  Fisher  v.  Pyne,  1  Man.  &  G.  265. 
Accordingly,  in  Victors  v.  Da  vies,  12  M. 
&  W.  758,  it  was  held,  that  in  a  declara- 
tion for  money  lent,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
aver  that  the  money  was  lent  at  the  defend- 
ant's request.  Parke,  B. :  "  There  is  a  very 
learned  note  of  my  brotlier  Mannim/  on  this 
subject,  in  which  he  goes  into  the  whole 
law  with  respect  to  alleging  a  request, 
and  poiuL.'^  out  the  error  into  which  Mr. 
Sergeant  Williams  appears  to  have  fallen 
in  his  comment  upon  Osborne  v.  Rogers. 
The  note  is  thus  :  '  The  consideration  be- 
ing executory,  the  statement  of  the  re- 
quest in  the  declaration,  though  men- 
tioned in  the  undertaking,  appears  to 
have  been  unnecessary.  In  Osl)oriie  v. 
Rogers  the  consideration  of  a  promise  is 
laid  to  be,  that  the  said  Robert,  at  the 
special  instance  and  request  of  the  said 
WiUiam,  would  serve  the  said  William, 

603 


*474 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book  II. 


and  bestow  his  care  and  labor  in  and 
about  the  business  of  the  said  William ; 
and  the  declaration  alleges,  that  Robert, 
confiding  in  the  said  promise  of  William, 
afterwards  went  into  the  service  of  Wil- 
liam, and  bestowed  liis  care  and  labor  in 
and  about,'  &c.  Here  the  consideration 
is  clearly  executory,  yet  Mr.  Sergeant 
Williams,  in  a  note  to  the  words  '  at  the 
special  instance  and  request,'  says,  '  these 
words  are  necessary  to  be  laid  in  the  dec- 
laration, in  order  to  support  the  action. 
It  is  held,  that  a  consideration  executed 
and  past,  —  as  iti  the  present  case,  the  ser- 
vice performed  by  the  plaintiff  for  the 
testator  in  his  lifetime,  for  several  years 
then  past,  —  is  not  sufficient  to  maintain 
an  assumpsit,  unless  it  was  moved  by  a 
precedent  request,  and  so  laid.'  The 
statement  according  to  modern  practice, 
of  the  accrual  of  a  debt  for,  or  the  mak- 
ing of  a  promise  for  the  payment  of  the 
price  of  goods  sold  and  delivered,  or  for 
the  repayment  of  money  lent,  as  being  in 
consideration  of  goods  sold  and  delivered, 
or  money  lent  to  the  defendant,  at  his  re- 
quest, is  conceived  to   be  an   inartificial 


mode  of  declaring.  Even  where  the  con- 
sideration is  entirely  past,  it  appears  to  be 
unnecessary  to  allege  a  request,  if  the  act 
stated  as  the  consideration  cannot,  from 
its  nature,  have  been  a  gratuitous  kind- 
ness, but  imports  a  consideration  per  se. 
It  being  immaterial  to  the  right  of  action 
whether  the  bargain,  if  actually  con- 
cluded and  executed,  or  the  loan,  if  made, 
and  the  moneys  actually  advanced,  was 
proposed  and  urged  by  the  buyer  or  by 
the  seller,  by  the  borrower  or  by  the 
lender.  Vide  Rastall's  Entries,  tit. 
'  Dette ; '  and  Co.  Ent.  tit.  '  Del)t.'  There 
cannot  be  a  claim  for  money  lent  unless 
there  be  a  loan,  and  a  loan  imports  an 
obligation  to  pay.  K  the  money  is  ac- 
cepted, it  is  immaterial  whether  or  not  it 
was  asked  for.  The  same  doctrine  will 
not  apply  to  money  paid  :  because  no  man 
can  be  a  delitor  for  money  paid,  unless  it 
was  paid  at  his  reciuest.  What  my  brother 
Manniiuj  says,  in  the  note  to  which  I  have 
referred,  is  perfectly  correct."  And  see 
Acome  v.  The  American  Mineral  Co.  II 
How.  Pr.  24. 


504 


CH.  II.]  ASSENT.  *  475 


*  CHAPTER  11.  *475 

ASSENT   OF   THE   PARTIES. 

Sect.  I.  —  What  the  assent  must  he. 

There  is  no  contract,  unless  the  parties  thereto  assent;  and 
they  must  assent  to  the  same  thing,  in  the  same  sense,  (a)  ^  A 
mere  assent  does  not  suffice  to  constitute  a  contract,  for  there 
may  be  an  assent  in  a  matter  of  opinion,  or  in  some  fact  which  is 
done  and  completed  at  the  time,  and  therefore  leaves  no  obliga- 
tion behind  it.  But  a  contract  requires  the  assent  of  the  parties 
to  an  agreement,  and  this  agreement  must  be  obligatory,  and,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  obligation  must,  in  general,  be  mutual.  This 
is  sometimes  briefly  expressed,  by  saying,  that  there  must  be  "  a 

(a)  Hazard   v.  New  England   IVIarine  it  was  held,  that,  unless  both  parties  had 

Ins.   Co.    1     Sumner,  218.     In   Bruce   ?'.  uuderstaudiugly  assented  to  one  of  those 

Pear.son,  3  Johns.  534,  it  was  held,  that  if  views,  there  was  no  special  contract  as  to 

a  person  sends  an  order  to  a  merchant  to  the  price.     Greene  r.  Bateman,  2  Woodb. 

send  him  a  particular  quantity  of  goods  &  M.  3.59.     See  further,  Tuttle  v.  Love,  7 

on  certain  terms  of  credit,  and  the  mer-  Johns.  470 :  Eliason  r.  Henshaw,  4  Wheat, 

chant  sends  a  less  quantity  of  goods,  at  a  225;  Falls  v.  Gaither,  9  Port.  (Ala.)  605; 

shorter  credit,  and  the  goods  sent  are  lost  Keller  i-.  Ybarru,  3  Cal.  147  ;  Hutchison 

by  the  way,  tlie  merchant  must  bear  the  r.  Bowker,  5  M.  &  W.  535 ;  Hamilton  v. 

loss,  for  there  is  no  contract,  express  or  Terry,  10  E.  L.  &  E.  473;  s.  c.  11  C.  B. 

implied,  between  the  parties.     So  where  954 ;  Barlow  w.  Scott,  24  N.  Y.  (10  Smith) 

shingles  were  sold  and  delivered  at  $3.25,  40;  Hutcheson  v.  Blakeman,  3  ]\Iet.  (Ky.) 

but  there  was  a  dispute  as  to  whether  the  80;   Holtzman  r.  Millandon,  18  La.  An. 

$3.25  was  for  a  bunch  or  for  a  thousand ;  29.     See  post,  *  494,  note  (j ). 

1  A  request  to  "  telegraph  how  much  corn  you  wiU  sell,  with  lowest  cash  price," 
and  the  reply,  "  three  thousand  cases,  one  dollar  five  cents,  open  one  week,"  to  which 
response  was  made,  "  sold  corn,  will  see  you  to-morrow,"  do  not  constitute  an  agree- 
ment, Lincoln  v.  Erie  Preserving  Co.  132  Mass.  129;  nor  an  inquiry  by  a  person  as 
to  what  a  firm  was  "  paying  for  stave  bolts,"  with  the  answer  that  the  firm  _"  would 
take  all  he  could  make  and  deliver  at  $2  per  cord,"  Ahearn  v.  Ayres,  38  Mich.  692. 
But  an  oral  offer  if  a  city  "  would  build  one  half  of  a  good  bridge  across  the  river,  the 
offeror  would  build  the  other  half,"  is  sufficiently  definite,  Long  v.  Battle  Creek, 
39  Mich.  323  ;  as  well  as  an  agreement  to  account  by  a  purchaser  on  a  resale  of  land 
for  the  proceeds  aliove  a  "  reasonable  amount "  in  advance  of  the  price  paid  by  him, 
Miller  v.  Kendig,  55  la.  174.  See  Appleby  r.  Johnson,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  158  ;  Utlcy  v. 
Donaldson,  94  U.  S.  29;  National  Bank  v.  Hall,  101  U.  S.  43;  Gowing  r.  Knowles, 
118  Mass.  232;  Harlow  w.  Curtis,  121  Mass.  320;  Demuth  r.  American  Institute,  75 
N.  Y.  502  ;  Maclay  v.  Harvey,  90  111.  525. 

505 


*  476  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  II. 

request  on  the  one  side  and  an  assent  on  the  other."  (i )  ^     A 

mere  affirmation,  or  proposition,  is  not  enough.     Nor  is  this  any 

more  a  contract  if  it  be  in  writing  than  if  spoken  only,  (c)  '^ 

*  476        *  It  becomes  a  contract  only  when  the  proposition  is  met 

by  an  acceptance  which  corresponds  with  it  entirely  and 
adequately.  If  an  assent  is  obtained  by  fraud  to  a  contract  prom- 
ising more  than  the  assentor  intended,  the  contract  is  not  valid 
for  so  much  as  he  intended,  but  is  wholl}^  void.  Thus,  a  note  read 
to  a  promisor  as  bearing  less  interest  than  that  actually  written, 
and  signed  by  him  in  that  belief,  was  held  void,  (cc) 

An  assent,  however,  may  bind  the  party,  although  not  express 
or  in  writing,  if  it  can  be  fairly  inferred  from  his  profiting  by  the 
stipulations  of  the  contract,  (c^)  ^ 

It  may  however  happen, ^tliat  there  is  some  difference  of  under- 
standing as  to  terms  not  directly  referred  to,  either  in  the  offer  or 
acceptance ;  and  it  has  been  held  that  such  a  difference  will  not 
prevent  the  accepted  proposition  from  becoming  a  contract,  {d} 

(h)   Tindul,  C.  J.,  in  Jackson  r.  Gallo-  of  the  terms  proposed  by  the  company, 

way,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  75.  —  In  Eskridge  v.  Glover,  5   Stew.  &  P. 

(c)  Tucker  v.  Woods,  12  Johns.  190.  264,  it  was  held,  that  an  incomplete  con- 
See  also  Bruce  r.  Pearson,  3  Johns.  534 ;  tract  or  agreement,  which  one  of  the 
Tuttle  V.  Love,  7  Johns.  470 ;  Weeks  v.  parties  has  the  option  of  completing  at  a 
Tybald,  Nov,  11  ;  1  Roll.  Abr.  6  (M.),  pi.  particular  day,  raises  a  mutual  right  of 
1.  To  render  a  proposed  contract  bind-  rescission  in  the  other  party,  at  any  time 
ing  there  must  be  an  accession  to  its  before  the  ratification  by  the  fir.st.  Thus, 
terms  by  both  parties,  —  a  mere  voluu-  wliere  A  proposed  to  exchange  horses 
tary  compliance  with  its  conditions  by  with  B,  and  give  B  a  specific  amount,  as 
one  who  had  not  previously  assented  to  it  difference,  which  proposition  B  reserved 
does  not  render  the  other  liable  on  it.  the  privilege  of  determining  upon  by  a 
Johnston  v.  Fessler,  7  Watts,  48  ;  Ball  i\  certain  day ;  and  before  that  day  arrived, 
Newton,  7  Gush.  599 ;  and  see  Meynell  A  gave  notice  to  B  that  he  would  not 
V.  Surtees,  31  E.  L.  &  E.  475.  In  this  confirm  the  offered  contract,  it  was  held, 
case  certain  parties  were  desirous  of  con-  that  no  action  lay  in  favor  of  B  to  recover 
structing  a  railway  on  the  way-leave  prin-  the  difference  agreed  to  be  paid  by  A. 
ciple,  and  for  that  purpose  entered  into  See  also  Cope  v.  Albinson,  16  E.  L.  & 
negotiations  with  a  land-owner,  and  pro-  E.  470;  s.  c.  8  Exch.  185;  Governor  v. 
posed  terms  which  were  discussed  by  the  Petch,  28  E.  L.  &  E.  470;  s.  c.  10  Exch. 
parties,  but  not  agreed  to.     The  company  610. 

went  forward,  however,  and  constructed  {cc)  Stacy  v.  Ross,  27  Tex.  8. 

their  road.     Held,  that  the  acquiescence  (cd)  Smith  v.  Morse,  20  La.  An.  220. 

of  the  land-owner  in  the  construction  of  [d]  Baines  w.  Woodfall,  95  C.  B.  (n.  s.) 

the  road  did  not  amount  to  an  acceptance  657. 

1  It  was  decided  in  Demuth  v.  American  Institute,  75  N.  Y.  502,  that  the  making 
of  an  application  on  furnished  blanks  for  space  in  an  exhibition,  and  the  payment  of 
an  entrance  fee,  where  by  the  conditions  such  payment  was  to  precede  approval,  and 
the  right  to  reject  was  reserved,  did  not  constitute  a  contract  for  the  desired  space. 

2  But  where  the  intention  clearly  is  to  form  a  written  contract,  the  parties  will  not 
be  bound  until  the  agreement  has  been  reduced  to  writing  and  signed  by  them. 
Fredericks  r.  Fasuacht,  30  La.  An.  117. 

^  An  agreement  to  supply  coal,  reduced  to  writing  as  a  draft  merely,  but  not 
formally  executed,  upon  which  one  of  the  parties  wrote  "  approved  "  and  his  name, 

506 


CH.  II.]  ASSENT.  *  477 

But  a  letter  accepting  an  offer,  with  a  qualification  that  the  terms 
of  a  contract  can  afterwards  be  arranged  between  the  parties,  docs 
not  constitute  an  absolute  contract,  upon  which  a  bill  for  specific 
performance  will  be  entertained,  (e) 

When  it  is  proposed  by  publication  to  do  a  certain  thing  on 
certain  terms,  one  who  desires  that  thing  to  be  done  and  if  silent 
as  to  the  terms,  will  be  supposed  to  assent  to  them ;  thus,  it  has 
been  held  at  nisi  jjrius,  that  if  the  publisher  of  a  newspaper  places 
distinctly  in  the  usual  place  of  his  paper,  his  terms  of  advertising, 
one  who  orders  advertising  without  any  special  bargains  as  to 
terms,  is  to  be  regarded  as  assenting  to  the  published  terms. 

Many  cases  turn  upon  the  question  whether  this  assent  to  the 
proposition  was  entire  and  adequate.  The  principle  may  be  stated 
thus  :  The  assent  must  comprehend  the  whole  of  the  proposition ; 
it  must  be  exactly  equal  to  its  extent  and  provisions,  and  it  must 
not  qualify  them  by  any  new  matter.  Thus,  an  offer  to  sell  a 
certain  thing,  on  certain  terms,  may  be  met  by  the  answer,  "  I 
will  take  that  thing  on  those  terms,"  or  by  any  answer  which 
means  this,  however  it  may  be  expressed ;  and,  if  the  proposition 
be  in  the  form  of  a  question,  as,  "  I  will  sell  you  so  and  so, 
will  you  buy  ? "  the  whole  of  this  meaning  may  *  be  con-  *  477 
veyed  by  the  word  "  Yes,"  or  any  other  simply  affirmative 
answer.     And  thus  a  legal  contract  is  completed. 

But  there  are  cases,  where  the  answer,  either  in  words  or  in 
effect,  departs  from  the  proposition ;  or  varies  the  terms  of  the 
offer,  or  substitutes  for  the  contract  tendered,  one  more  satisfac- 
tory to  the  respondent.  In  these  cases  there  is  no  assent,  and  no 
contract.  The  respondent  is  at  liberty  to  accept  wliolly  ;  or  to 
reject  wholly;  but  one  of  these  things  he  must  do;  for  if  he 
answers,  not  rejecting,  but  proposing  to  accept  under  some  modi- 
fications, this  is  a  rejection  of  the  offer.  The  party  making  the 
offer  may  renew  it  ;  but  the  party  receiving  it  cannot  reply, 
accepting  with  modifications,  and  when  these  are  rejected,  again 
reply,  accepting  generally,  and  upon  his  acceptance  claim  the 
right  of  holding  the  other  party  to  his  first  offer. 

(e)  Honeyman  v.  Marryatt,  6  H.  L.  Cas.  112. 

constitutes,  if  acted  upon  by  him,  as  in  sending  coal  in  the  quantities  and  at  the 
prices  named,  and  in  receiving  payment  therefor,  a  binding  contract.  Erogden  v. 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.  2  App.  Cas.  666.  See  Pickrel  v.  Rose,  87  111.  263;  Boyd  v. 
Brinckin,  55  Cal.  427. 

507 


478 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book  II. 


An  answer  or  a  compliance  has  been  sometimes  held  insuffi- 
cient to  make  a  contract,  where  the  difference  of  terms  between 

the  parties  did  not  seem  to  be  very  important.  (/)  ^  In 
*478    *fact  the  court  seldom  inquires  into  the   magnitude  or 

effect  of  this  diversity ;  if  it  clearly  exist,  that  fact  is 
enough.  But  it  is  not  material  by  which  of  the  parties  to  an 
agreement  the  words  which  make  it  one  are  spoken ;  the  intent 


( /■)  Thus  in  Hutchinson  v.  Bowker,  5 
M.  &  W.  535,  the  action  was  assumpsit 
for  the  non-delivery  of  barley.  It  was 
proved  at  the  trial  that  the  defendants 
wrote  to  the  plaintiffs,  offering  them  a 
certain  quantity  of  "good"  bai-ley,  upon 
certain  terms;  to  which  the  plaintiffs 
answered,  after  quoting  the  defendants' 
letter,  as  follows :  "  Of  whicli  offer  we  ac- 
cept, expecting  you  will  give  us  Jine  barley 
and  full  weight."  The  defendants  in  reply, 
stated  that  their  letter  contained  no  such 
expression  as  ^fiite  barley,  and  declined 
to  ship  the  same.  Evidence  was  given  at 
the  trial  that  the  terms  "  good  "  and  "  fine  " 
were  terms  well  known  in  the  trade  ;  and 
the  jury  found  that  there  was  a  distinc- 
tion in  the  trade  between  "  good "  and 
"fine"  barley.  Held,  that  although  it 
was  a  question  for  the  jury  what  was  the 
meaning  of  those  terms  in  a  mercantile 
sense,  yet  that,  tliey  having  found  what 
that  meaning  was,  it  was  for  the  court 
to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
tract ;  and  the  court  held  that  there  was 
not  a  sufficient  acceptance.  See  also  Slay- 
maker  )'.  Irwin,  4  Whart.  369  ;  Gather  v. 
Capper,  26  E.  L.  &  E.  275 ;  s.  c.  15  C.  B. 
39,  696.  And  in  Vassar  v.  Camp,  1  Kern. 
441,  the  defendants  wrote  to  the  plaintiffs, 
offering  them  "  10,000  bushels  of  first 
quality  Jefferson  county  l)arley  of  this 
year's  growth."  The  plaintiffs  replied, 
sending  a  contract  for  the  purpo.se  of 
having  it  signed  by  defendant,  in  which 
the  barley  was  described  as  first  quality 
Jefferson  county  two-rowed  barley,  of  this 
season's  growth."  Held,  that  this  was 
not  an  acceptance  of  the  defendant's  offer. 
So  where  there  is  a  material  variance  be- 
tween the  bouglit  and  sold  notes  delivered 
by  a  broker  to  tlie  vendor  and  vendee,  there 
is  no  sale.  Peltier  v.  Collins,  3  Wend. 
459 ;  Suydam  v.  Clark,  2  Sandf.  133.  See 
the  cases  of  Sivewright  r.  Archibald,  6  E. 
L.  &  E.  286 ;  s.  c.  17  Q.  B.  103 ;  Moore  v. 
Campbell,  26  E.  L.  &  E.  522;    s.  c.  10 


Exch.  323.  So  in  Jordan  v.  Norton,  4 
M.  &  W.  155,  whicli  was  assumpsit  for 
a  mare  sold  and  delivered,  to  which  the 
defendant  pleaded  non-assumpsit.  It  ap- 
peared that  the  defendant  liaving  seen 
and  ridden  the  mare,  wrote  to  the  plain- 
tiff, "  I  will  take  the  mare  at  twenty 
guineas,  o/  course  warranted ;  and  as  she 
lays  out,  turn  her  out  my  mare."  The 
2)laintiff  agreed  to  sell  her  for  twenty 
guineas.  The  defendant  subsequently 
wrote  again  to  him :  "  My  son  will  be  at 
the  World's  End  (a  public  house)  on 
Monday,  when  he  will  take  the  mare  and 
jmy  you;  send  anybody  with  a  receipt, 
and  the  money  shall  be  paid ;  only  say  in 
the  receipt,  sound  and  quiet  in  harness." 
The  plaintiff  wrote  in  reply,  "  She  is  war- 
ranted sound,  and  quiet  in  double  harness ; 
I  never  jjut  her  in  single  harness."  The 
mare  was  brought  to  the  World's  End  on 
tlie  Monday,  and  the  defendant's  son  took 
her  away  without  paying  the  price,  and 
without  any  receipt  or  warranty.  The 
defendant  kept  her  two  days  and  then 
returned  her  as  being  unsound.  The 
learned  judge  stated  to  the  jury  that 
the  question  was  whether  the  defendant 
had  accepted  the  mare,  and  directed  them 
to  find  for  the  defendant  if  they  thought 
he  had  returned  her  within  a  reasonable 
time;  and  desired  them  also  to  say 
whetlier  the  son  had  authority  to  take 
her  without  the  warranty.  The  jury 
found  that  the  defendant  did  not  accept 
the  mare,  and  that  the  son  had  no  authority 
to  take  her  away.  Held,  on  motion  to  enter 
a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  that  there  was 
no  complete  contract  in  writing  between 
the  parties,  that,  therefore,  the  direction 
of  the  learned  judge  was  right ;  that  the 
defendant  was  not  bound  by  the  act  of 
the  son  in  bringing  home  the  mare,  in- 
asmuch as  he  had  thereby  exceeded  his 
authority  as  agent;  and  consequently 
that  the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  re- 


1  Proprietors,  &c.  Credit  Co.  v.  Arduin,  L.  E.  5  H.  L.  64,  was  to  the  point  that  to 
vary  the  terms  of  an  offer,  the  party  accepting  must  distinctly  call  the  attention  of 
the  offerer  to  his  desire  so  to  do. 

508 


CH.  II.] 


ASSENT. 


479 


governs,   and   if  this   be   clear,   and    expressed   with    sufficient 
definiteness,  it  is  enough.  (^) 

This  question  frequently  occurs  in  cases  where  a  guaranty  was 
offered,  and  the  party  receiving  it  acted  on  the  faith  of  such  guar- 
anty. But  this  is  not  enough,  without  a  previous  acceptance  of 
the  guaranty.  (A)  Nor  does  this  rest  on  a  mere  technical 
*  rule.  Justice  to  the  guarantor  obviously  requires  that  *  479 
he  should  have  notice  of  an  intention  to  furnish  goods  or 
money,  or  do  any  similar  thing  on  the  credit  of  his  guaranty. 
And  this  notice  must  be  distinct,  so  that  there  can  be  no  mistake 
about  it,  and  given  in  good  season,  so  that  the  guarantor  may,  if 
he  chooses,  take  proper  measures  to  secure  himself.  Such  a  case 
must,  however,  be  discriminated  from  one  of  absolute  'and  com- 
plete guaranty ;  as  where  one  writes,  "  I  hereby  guarantee  you, 
&c.,"  and  delivers  the  paper.  This  is  not  an  offer,  or  proposition 
to  guarantee,  but  a  declaration  of  the  fact,  and  if  made  on  good 
consideration  binds  the  party,  witliout  further  action  on  the  part 
of  him  who  receives  it.  (i)    But  where  the  guaranty  is  made  only 


(g)  Putnam,  J.,  in  Hubbard  v.  Cool- 
idge,  1  Met.  93.  But  where  a  conversa- 
tion is  relied  upon  as  proof  of  an  agree- 
ment, it  is  for  the  jury  to  decide  whether 
such  an  assent  of  the  minds  of  the  parties 
took  place  as  to  constitute  a  valid  con- 
tract, or  whetlier  what  passed  between 
them  was  a  loose  conversation,  not  un- 
derstood or  intended  as  an  agreement. 
Thurston  r.  Thornton,  1  Cush.  89. 

(h)  Thus  in  Gaunt  r.  Hill,  1  Stark.  10, 
which  was  assumpsit  for  non-payment 
of  £70,  in  consideration  of  forbearance. 
The  defendant's  brother  being  indebted 
to  the  plaintiff  in  the  sum  of  £140,  the 
defendant  offered  by  letter  to  pay  the 
plaintiff  .£70,  provided  he  would  give  his 
brother  a  full  discharge ;  and  directed 
him,  in  case  he  accepted  his  offer,  to  call 
upon  him  the  next  morning.  Held,  that 
the  offer  was  not  binding  upon  the  de- 
fendant, unless  accepted  within  the  time 
appointed,  and  that  at  all  events  it  must 
be  shown  that  the  plaintiff  had  acceded  to 
the  proposal  in  writing.  —  So  in  Mclver 
V.  Richardson,  1  M.  &  Sel.  557,  a  paper 
writing  was  given  hy  the  defendant  to  A. 
(to  whose  house  the  plaintiffs  had  declined 
to  furnish  goods  on  their  credit  alone), 
to  this  effect :  "  I  understand  A.  &  Co. 
have  given  you  an  order  for  rigging,  &c. 
I  can  assure  you,  from  what  I  know  of 
A's  honor  and  probitv,  you  will  be  per- 
fectly safe  in  crediting  them  to  that 
amoimt ;  indeed  I  have  no  ohjection  to  guar- 


antee you  against  any  loss  from  giving  them 
this  aedit ; "  which  pajjer  was  handed  over 
by  A.  to  the  plaintiffs,  together  witli  a 
guaranty  from  anotlier  house,  which  they 
required  in  addition,  and  the  goods  were 
thereupon  furnished.  Held,  that  the  paper 
did  not  amount  to  a  guaranty,  there  being 
no  notice  given  by  the  plaintiffs  to  tlie 
defendant  that  they  accepted  it  as  such, 
or  any  consent  of  the  defendant  that  it 
should  be  a  conclusive  guarant}-.  And 
on  the  authority  of  that  case  the  Court  of 
Exchequer  afterwards,  in  Mozley  v.  Tink- 
ler, 1  C.  M.  &  R.  692,  adopted' the  same 
doctrine.  Li  that  case  there  was  a  guar- 
anty in  the  following  form  :  "  F.  informs 
me  that  j'ou  are  about  publishing  an  arith- 
metic for  him.  I  have  no  objection  to 
being  answerable  as  far  as  fifty  pounds; 
for  my  reference  apply  to  B."  Signed, 
"  G.  T."  B.  wrote  this  memorandum,  and 
added,  "Witness  to  G.  T.— J.  B."  It 
was  forwarded  by  B.  to  the  plaintiffs, 
v.ho  never  communicated  their  accept- 
ance of  it  to  G.  T.  In  an  action  against 
the  latter  on  the  guaranty,  held,  that  the 
plaintiffs,  not  proving  any  notice  of  ac- 
ceptance to  the  defendant,  '^^•ere  not  en- 
titled to  recover.  See  also  Morrow  v. 
Waltz,  18  Penu.  St.  118,  and  Ilarson  v. 
Pike,  16  Ind.  140. 

(i)  The  distinction  between  a  mere 
offer  to  guarantee,  and  an  actual  guar- 
anty, is  well  illustrated  bv  the  erase  of 
Jones  V.  Williams,  7  M.  &"  W.  493.      In 

509 


*  480  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  II. 

as  an  offer,  or  a  proposition,  there  must  be  a  distinct  acceptance 
of  it.  Of  late,  there  are  decisions,  especially  in  New  York,  which 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  an  acceptance  in  part,  of  a  guaranty, 
that  is,  action  on  the  faith  of  it  by  him  to  whom  the  guaranty  is 
given,  holds  the  guarantor  without  any  notice  to  him.  This  sub- 
ject of  guaranty  we  shall,  however,  consider  specifically  hereafter. 
At  a  sale  by  auction,  every  bid  of  any  one  present  is  an  offer 
by  him.  It  becomes  a  contract  as  soon  as  the  hammer  falls,  or 
the  bid  is  otherwise  accepted ;  (j)  but  vmtil  it  is  accepted 

*  480    it  may  *  be  withdrawn  by  the  bidder,  because  until  then  it 

is  not  obligatory  on  him,  for  want  of  the  assent  of  the 
owner  of  the  property,  by  his  agent  the  auctioneer,  (k)  ^ 


SECTION  II. 

CONTRACTS   ON   TIME. 

Propositions  or  offers  on  time  involve  questions  of  the  assent 

of  parties,  which  are  sometimes  difficult.  (Z)     Strictly  speaking, 

that  case  the  defendant's  undertaking  was  called  locus  pcpnitcntifr.     Every  bidding  is 

contained  in  two  letters,  addressed  to  C.  nothing  more  than  an  offer  on  one  side, 

J.,  the  brother  of  the  plaintiff's  intestate,  which  is  not  binding  on  either  side  till  it 

R.  J.,  in  the  first  of  wliich  he  pressed  C.  is  assented  to."      ISee   further  Fisher  v. 

J.  to  join,  and  to  induce  his  brothers  to  Seltzer,  23  Penn.  St.  308.  —  As  sales  at 

join,  in  a  security  for  the  repayment  of  auction  are  clearly  within  the  statute  of 

money  to  be  advanced  to  the  defendant  for  frauds,  Hinde  v.  Whitehouse,  7  East,  568 ; 

carrying  on  a  suit  in  chancery ;  and  in  the  Kenworthy  ?■.    Scofield,  2  B.  &  C.    945; 

second  he  again  urged  that  they  should  Brent  v.  Green,  G  Leigh,  16;  the  assent 

lend   their  names  for   this   purpose,  and  would  not  be  binding  unless  in  writing,  if 

added :  "  I  should  consider  it  a  matter  of  the  case  came  within  the  terms  of  that 

favor  to  myself  if  your  brothers  will  join,  statute. 

and  I  will  see  that  they  come  to  no  harm."  {k)   See  post,  pp.  *539,  *540,  on  the 

Held,   that   the   letters   amounted   to   an  contract  of  sale  by  auctions. 

actual  c/uara/iti/,  on  which  the  defendant  (/)  This  subject  was  discussed  in  the 

was  liable  to  the  plaintiff,  and  not  merely  case   of   Boston   and   Maine   Railroad   v. 

to  a  representation  with   a  view  to   the  Bartlett,  3  Cush.  224.      It  was  there  held, 

parties  doing  an  act,  against  the  conse-  that  a  proposition  in  writing  to  sell  land, 

quences  of  which  they  should  ajhrwards  at  a  certain  price,  if  taken  within  thirty 

be  protected.  days,  is  a  continuing  offer,  which  may  be 

( /)  Payne  r.  Cave,  3  T.  R.  148.      The  retracted  at  any  time;   but  if  not  being 

court  there  said :  "  The  auctioneer  is  the  retracted,  it  is  accepted  within  the  time, 

agent  of  the  vendor,  and  tlie  assent  of  both  such   offer   and    acceptance   constitute  a 

parties  is  necessary  to  make  the  contract  valid  contract,  the  specific  performance  of 

binding ;  that  is  signified  on  the  part  of  which  may  be  enforced  by  a  bill  in  equity, 

the  seller,  by  knocking  down  the  hammer,  Fletcher,  J.,  there  observed  :  "  In  the  pres- 

which  was  uot  done  here  till  the  defendant  ent  case,  though  the  writing  signed  by  the 

had  retracted.     An  auction  is  not  unaptly  defendants  was  but  an  offer,  and  an  offer 

1  An  advertisement  to  sell  at  auction  does  not  amount  to  a  contract  with  any  one 
acting  on  it,  or  to  a  warranty  that  the  sale  will  take  place.  Harris  v.  Nickerson,  L.  E. 
8  Q.  B.  286. 

510 


CH.  II.]  ASSENT.  *  481 

all  offers  are  on  time.  If  one  says,  I  will  sell  you  this  thing  for 
this  money,  and  the  other  answers,  I  will  buy  that  thing  at  that 
price,  all  authorities  agree  that  this  is  a  contract.  But  the 
*  answer  follows  the  offer ;  it  cannot  be  actually  simulta-  *  481 
neous  with  it,  although  it  is  sometimes  said  to  be  so.  But 
the  offer  is  regarded  as  continuing  until  the  acceptance,  if  the 
acceptance  is  made  at  once.  Nor  can  it  be  necessary  that  the  ac- 
ceptance should  follow  the  offer  instantaneously.  Though  the 
party  addressed  pauses  a  minute  or  two  for  consideration,  still 
his  assent  makes  a  contract,  for  the  offer  continues  unless  it  is 
expressly  withdrawn.  But  how  long  will  it  continue  ?  The  only 
answer  must  be,  in  general  a  reasonable  time  ;  (m)  ^  and  what  this 
is  must  be  determined  by  the  circumstance  of  the  case.  If  the 
party  addressed  goes  away,  and  returns  the  next  month  or  the 
next  week,  and  says  he  will  accept  the  proposition,  he  is  too  late 
unless  the  proposer  assents  in  his  turn.  So  it  would  be  probably 
if  he  came  the  next  day,  or  the  next  hour ;  or,  perhaps,  if  he  went 
away  at  all  and  afterwards  returned. 

But  the  proposer  may  himself  determine  how  long  the  offer 

which  might  be  revoked,  yet  while  it  re-  at  once.  A  different  doctrine,  however, 
mained  in  force  and  unrevoked,  it  was  a  prevails  in  France  and  Scotland  and  Hol- 
contiuuing  offer  during  the  time  limited  laud.  It  is  there  lield,  that  whenever  an 
for  acceptance ;  and  during  tlie  whole  of  offer  is  made,  granting  to  a  party  a  cer- 
that  time  it  was  an  offer  every  instant,  tain  time  within  which  he  is  to  be  entitled 
but  as  soou  as  it  was  accepted  it  ceased  to  to  decide  whether  he  will  accept  it  or  not, 
be  an  offer  merely,  and  then  ripened  into  the  party  making  such  offer  is  not  at  lib- 
a  contract.  The  counsel  for  the  defend-  erty  to  withdraw  it  before  the  lapse  of  the 
ants  is  most  surely  in  the  right,  in  saying,  appointed  time.  There  are  certainly  very 
that  the  writing  wlien  made  was  without  strong  reasons  in  support  of  tliis  doctrine, 
consideration,  and  did  not  therefore  form  Highly  respectable  authors  regard  it  as 
a  contract.  It  was  then  but  an  offer  to  inconsistent  with  the  plain  principles  of 
contract;  and  the  parties  making  the  offer  equity,  that  a  person,  who  has  been  in- 
most undoubtedly  might  have  withdrawn  duced  to  rely  on  such  an  engagement, 
it  at  any  time  before  acceptance.  But  should  have  no  remedy  iu  case  of  disap- 
when  the  offer  was  accepted,  the  minds  of  pointment.  But,  whether  wisely  and  equi 
the  parties  met,  and  the  contract  was  com-  tably  or  not,  the  common  law  unyield- 
plete.  There  was  then  the  meeting  of  ingly  insists  upon  a  consideration,  or  a 
the  minds  of  tlie  parties,  which  constitutes  paper  with  a  seal  attached.  The  authori- 
and  is  the  definition  of  a  contract.  The  ties,  both  English  and  American,  in  sup- 
acceptance  by  the  plaintiffs  constituted  a  port  of  this  view  of  the  subject,  are  very 
sufficient  legal  consideration  for  the  en-  numerous  and  decisive;  but  it  is  not 
gagement  on  the  part  of  the  defendants,  deemed  to  be  needful  or  expedient  to  refer 
There  was  then  nothing  wanting  in  order  particularly  to  them,  as  they  are  collected 
to  perfect  a  valid  contract  on  the  part  of  and  commented  on  in  several  reports,  as 
the  defendants.  It  was  precisely  as  if  the  well  as  in  the  text-books." 
parties  had  met  at  the  time  of  the  accept-  (m)  Beckwith  v.  Cheever,  1  Foster 
ance,  and  the  offer  had  then  been  made  (N.  H.),  41;  Peru  v.  Turner,  1  lairf. 
and  accepted,  and  the  bargain  completed  185. 

1  Where  no  time  is  limited,  it  must  be  accepted  within  a  reasonable  time,  otherwise 
proposer  will  not  be  bound.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dana,  43  N.  Y.  240 ;  Judd  v.  Day, 
50  la.  247. 

511 


*  482  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   II. 

shall  continue.  He  may  say,  I  will  give  you  an  hour,  or  until 
this  time  to-morrow,  or  next  week,  to  make  up  your  mind.  Then 
the  party  to  whom  the  proposition  is  made  knows  how  long  the 
offer  is  to  continue.  He  may  avail  himself  of  the  hour,  the  day, 
or  the  week  given  for  inquiry  or  consideration,  or  making  the 
necessary  arrangements ;  and  if  within  the  prescribed  time  he 
expresses  his  assent  (supposing  the  proposition  not  in  the  mean 
time  withdrawn),  he  completes  the  contract  as  effectually  as  if 
he  had  answered  in  the  same  way  at  the  first  moment  after  the 
offer  was  made,  (w)  ^ 

It  seems  irrational  to  say  that  the  proposer  is  not  bound  by 
receiving  such  delayed  assent,  although  it  is  given  within  the 
specified  time,  because  no  consideration  had  been  paid  him  for 
the  delay,  and  for  the  continuance  of  the  offer.  If  it  were  said 
that  where  one  makes  an  offer,  and  the  other  instantly  accepts, 
the  offerer  nevertheless  is  not  bound,  because  there  is  no  consid- 
eration, then  it  might  be  said  consistently  that  he  is  not  bound 
by  an  answer  made  within  a  time  specified  by  him.      But 

*  482    no  one  *  doul^ts  that  the  offerer  is  bound  by  an  instanta- 

neous acceptance,  although  he  received  no  consideration 
for  the  offer.  And  what  difference  can  it  make  as  to  the  consid- 
eration or  the  want  of  it,  whether  the  acceptance  follows  the  offer 
in  a  second,  or  in  a  minute  or  two,  or  in  a  longer,  but  still  rea- 
sonable time,  or  in  a  still  longer  time  limited  and  specified  by 
the  proposer  himself.  All  these  cases  stand  on  the  same  footing 
in  respect  to  consideration. 

Undoubtedly,  if  the  offerer  gives  a  day  for  acceptance,  without 
consideration  for  the  delay,  he  may  at  any  time  within  that  day, 
before  acceptance,  recall  his  offer.  So  he  may  if  he  gives  no 
time.  If  he  makes  an  offer,  and  instantly  recalls  it  before 
acceptance,  although  the  other  party  was  prepared  to  accept  it 
the  next  instant,  the  offer  is  effectually  withdrawn.  But  accept- 
ance before  withdrawal  binds  the  parties,  if  made  while  the  offer 
continues ;  and  the  offer  does  continue  in  all  cases,  either  a  reason- 
able time  (and  that  only),  or  the  time  fixed  by  the  party  himself. ^ 

(n)  Wright  v.  Bigg,  21  E.  L.  &  E.  591. 

1  Longworth  r.  Mitchell,  26  Ohio  St.  334.  See  also  Smith  v.  "Weaver,  90  HI.  392.  — 
An  offer  hy  mail  stating,  in  terms,  "  You  will  confer  a  favor  hj  giving  me  your  answer 
by  return  mail,"  is  released  by  a  failure  to  answer  by  that  mail.  Maclay  v.  Harvey, 
90  111.  52.5. 

2  No  contract  arises  under  an  offer  of  reward  made  by  public  proclamation  until 

512 


CH.  II.]  ASSENT.  *  483 

It  may  be  said,  that  whether  the  offer  be  made  for  a  time 
certain  or  not,  the  intention  or  understanding  of  the  parties  is  to 
govern.  If  the  proposer  fixes  a  time  he  expresses  his  intention, 
and  the  other  party  knows  precisely  what  it  is.  If  no  definite 
time  is  stated,  then  the  inquiry  as  to  a  reasonable  time  resolves 
itself  into  an  inquiry  as  to  what  time  it  is  rational  to  suppose  that 
the  parties  contemplated ;  and  the  law  will  decide  this  to  be  that 
time  which  as  rational  men  they  ought  to  have  understood  each 
other  to  have  had  in  mind,  (o) 

We  hold  this  to  be  the  true  principle,  and  to  be  capable  of 
universal  application.  Thus,  where  many  subscribe  for  a  common 
result  on  a  certain  condition,  the  first  question  may  be  as  to  the 
consideration ;  and  this  we  have  already  discussed.  And  it 
would  be  another  question  how  long  the  parties  are  bound  by  the 
promise  contained  in  such  subscription.  If  no  time  be  agreed 
on,  and  there  be  no  express  withdrawal,  then  the  law  must 
choose  between  the  period  of  legal  presumption,  which 
*  would  generally  be  twenty  years,  and  the  principle  of  *  483 
reasonable  time ;  and  the  first  alternative  would  be  very 
unreasonable,  and  might  be  very  oppressive.  The  court  will 
look  into  all  the  circumstances  of  each  case,  and  inquire  what 
the  parties  actually  understood  or  intended,  or,  regarding  them 
as  rational  men,  what  they  must  be  supposed  to  have  intended. 
And  it  seems  difficult  to  reject  this  rule,  without  holding  princi- 
ples which  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  one  who  offers  goods 
to  another,  and,  receiving  no  answer,  sells  them  to  a  third  person 
a  year  after,  may  still  be  held  by  him  to  whom  the  offer  was  first 
made,  if  he  shall  then  see  fit  to  accept  the  offer ;  a  conclusion  so 
wholly  unreasonable  as  to  be  impossible. 

An  analogous  and  closely  connected  question  has  arisen,  where 
the  proposition  and  the  reply  are  both  made  by  letter.  And  as 
we  think,  it  must  be  governed  by  the  same  principles.  It  is  un- 
questionably true  as  a  general  proposition,  that  a  contract  cannot 
bind  the  party  proposing  it,  and  indeed  that  there  is  no  contract, 

(o)  Moxley  v.  Moxley's  Adm'r,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  309. 

its  terms  are  complied  with,  before  which  time  it  may  be  withfl^a^^-n  in  the  same 
manner,  ignorance  of  which  withdrawal  by  any  subsequent  claimant  being  immaterial. 
Shuey  V.  United  States,  92  U.  S.  73.  Services  entitling  a  person  to  a  reward  must  be 
rendered  with  a  knowledge  of  its  offer  and  for  the  purpose  of  its  acquisition.  How- 
land  V.  Lounds,  51  N.  Y.^604;  Hewitt  v.  Anderson,  56  Cal.  476.  See  Montgomery  v. 
Robinson,  85  111.  174. 

VOL.  I.  33  513 


*484 


THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book    II. 


until  the  acceptance  of  the  offer  by  the  party  receiving  it,  is  in 
some  way,  actually  or  constructively  communicated  to  the  party 
making  the  offer,  (oo)  We  consider  that  an  offer  by  letter  is  a 
continuing  offer  until  the  letter  be  received,  and  for  a  reasonable 
time  thereafter,  during  which  the  party  to  whom  it  is  addressed 
may  accept  the  offer,  and  communicate  the  fact  of  his  acceptance. 
We  hold  also  that  this  offer  may  be  withdrawn  by  the  maker  at 
any  moment ;  and  that  it  is  withdrawn  as  soon  as  a  notice  of  such 
withdrawal  reaches  the  party  to  whom  the  offer  is  made, 
and  not  before,  (^)i  If,  therefore,  that  party  accepts 
*  484  *  the  offer  before  such  withdrawal,  the  bargain  is  com- 
pleted ;  there  is  then  a  contract  founded  upon  mutual 
assent.  And  an  acceptance  having  this  effect  is  made,  and  is 
communicated  under  the  rule  already  stated,  when  the  party  re- 


(oo)  The  general  principle  is  asserted 
in  Hebb's  case,  Law  Rep.  4  Eq.  9. 

(p)  Notwithstanding  the  case  of  Mc- 
CuUoch  V.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  1  Pick.  281,  we 
deem  the  rule  of  the  text  to  be  the  law  in 
England,  and  in  this  country;  although 
furtlier  adjudication  may  be  necessary  to 
define  these  rules  and  determine  all  their 
consequences.  It  was  first  laid  down  in 
England  in  Adams  ?'.  Lindsell,  I  B.  & 
Aid.  681,  in  1818.  The  case  of  Cooke  v. 
Oxley,  3  T.  R.  653,  was  there  relied  upou 
by  counsel,  but  the  court  said,  "that  if 
that  Avere  so,  no  contract  could  ever  be 
completed  by  tlie  post.  For  if  the  defend- 
ants were  not  bound  by  their  offer  when 
accepted  by  the  plaintiffs,  till  the  answer 
was  received,  then  the  plaintiffs  oiight  not 
to  be  bound  till  after  they  had  received 
the  notification  that  the  defendants  had 
received  their  answer  and  assented  to  it. 
And  so  it  might  go  on  ad  infinitum.  The 
defendants  must  be  considered  in  law  as 
making,  during  every  instant  of  the  time 
their  letter  was  travelling,  the  same  iden- 
tical offer  to  the  plaintiffs,  and  then  the 
contract  is  completed  by  the  acceptance 
of  it  by  the  latter.  Then  as  to  the  delay 
in  notifying  the  acceptance,  that  arises  en- 
tirely from  the  mistake  of  the  defendants, 
and  it  therefore  must  be  taken  as  against 
them,  that  the  plaintiffs'  answer  was  re- 
ceived in  course  of  post."  See  also  Ken- 
nedy V.  Lee,  3  Meriv.  441.  And  in  the 
case  of  Potter  v.  Sanders,  6  Hare,  1,  de- 
cided in  1846,  a  purchaser  offered  a  price 
for  an  estate,  and  the  vendor,  by  a  letter 
sent  by  post,  and  received  by  the  purchaser 
the  day  after  it  was  put  into  the  post- 

1  A  revocation  of  an  ofEer  is  not  effectual  until  communicated  to  the  other  party. 
Stevenson  v.  McLean,  5  Q.  B.  D.  346. 

514 


oflSce,  accepted  the  offer.  Held,  that  the 
vendor  was  bound  by  the  contract  from 
the  time  when  he  posted  the  letter,  al- 
though it  was  not  received  by  the  pur- 
chaser until  the  following  day.  And  this 
rule  was  adopted  by  the  House  of  Lords 
in  the  still  later  case  of  Dunloj^  v.  Hig- 
gins,  I  H.  L.  Cas.  381.  It  was  there  laid 
down,  that  a  letter  offering  a  contract 
does  not  bind  the  party  to  whom  it  is  ad- 
dressed to  return  an  answer  by  the  very 
next  post  after  its  delivery,  or  to  lose  the 
benefit  of  the  contract,  but  an  answer, 
posted  on  the  day  of  receiving  the  offer,  is 
sufficient ;  that  the  contract  is  accepted  by 
the  posting  of  a  letter  declaring  its  accept- 
ance ;  that  a  person  putting  into  the  post 
a  letter  declaring  his  acceptance  of  a  con- 
tract offered,  has  done  all  that  is  necessary 
for  him  to  do,  and  is  not  answerable  for 
casualties  occurring  at  the  post-ofiice.  See 
also  vStocken  v.  Collen,  7  M.  &  W.  515. 
With  the  exception  of  Tennessee  (Gilles- 
pie V.  Edmonston,  11  Humph.  553),  the 
doctrine  of  Adams  i\  Lindsell  is  the  estab- 
lished law  in  this  country.  Beckwith  v. 
Cheever,  1  Foster  (N.  H.),  41  ;  Brisban  v. 
Boyd,  4  Paige,  17;  Averill  v.  Hedge,  12 
Conn.  436  ;  Mactier  ?'.  Frith,  6  Wend.  103  ; 
Vassar  v.  Camp,  14  Barb.  341  ;  s.  c.  1 
Kern.  441  ;  Clark  v.  Dales,  20  Barb.  42 ; 
Levy  ?\  Cohen,  4  Ga.  1  ;  Eliason  v.  Hen- 
shaw,  4  Wheat.  228 ;  Chiles  v.  Nelson,  7 
Dana,  281  ;  Falls  v.  Gaither,  9  Port.  (Ala.) 
605  ;  Hamilton  7'.  Lycoming  JMutixal  Ins. 
Co.  5  Penn.  St.  339,  where  the  case  of 
McCulloch  V.  Eagle  Insurance  Co.  is  ably 
examined. 


^^-  I^-]  ASSENT.  «  ^g^ 

ceiving  the  offer  puts  into  the  mail  his  answer  accepting  it  Cpp)  i 
Thus,  if  A,  in  Boston,  on  the  first  da,y  of  January,  writes  to  B  in 
Baltimore,  making  an  offer,  and  this  letter  reaches  Baltimore' on 
the  third,  and  B  forthwith  answers  the  letter,  accepting  the  offer 
putting  the  letter  into  the  mail  that  day ;  and  on  the  second  of 
January  A  writes  withdrawing  the  offer,  and  his  letter  of  with- 
drawal reaches  B  on  the  fourth,  there  is  nevertheless  a  contract 
made  between  the  parties.  If  the  offer  was  to  sell  goods,  B  on 
tendering  the  price,  may  claim  the  goods;  if  the  offer  was  to 
insure  B's  ship,  B  may  tender  the  premium  and  demand  the 
policy,  and  hold  A  as  an  insurer  of  his  ship.  And  so  of  any 
other  offer  or  proposition.  (^) 

Sometimes  a  man  makes  an  offer,  saying  if  there  be  no  answer, 
or  none  by  a  return  mail,  or  by  a  certain  time,  he  shall  consider 
the  offer  accepted.  But  he  has  no  right  to  impose  these  condi- 
tions, and  silence  is  no  acceptance  of  the  offer,  {qq)  2 

(pp)  The  case  of  Tayloe  v.  Merchants'  the  Palo  Alto,  Davies,  344.  In  the  case 
J?  ire  Ins.  Co.  9  How.  390,  is  a  strong  case  of  Duncan  r.  Topham,  8  C.  B  2''5  the 
on  this  subject.  It  was  there  held,  that  same  principle  was  adopted,  and  tlie  con- 
where  there  was  a  correspondence  relating  tract  was  said  to  be  closed  by  mailing  the 
to  the  insurance  of  a  house  against  fire,  letter  of  acceptance,  although  it  never 
the  insurance  company  making  linown  the  reached  its  destination.  All  tlicse  cases 
terms  upon  which  they  were  willing  to  in-  and  some  others  are  fully  considered  in  2 
sure,  the  contract  was  complete  when  the  Parsons,  Marit.  Law  p.  22  note  4 
insured  placed  a  letter  in  the  post-office  (q)  Hutcheson  v.  Blak'eman  3  Met 
accepting  the  terms ;  and  the  house  having  (Ky.)  80. 

been  burned  down  while  the  letter  of  ac-  [qq)  Pelthouse  v.  Bindley  31  L.  J.  C 

ceptance  was  in  progress  by  the  mail,  the  204.  ' 

company  were  held  responsible.     See  also 

^  After  the  mailing  of  a  letter  of  acceptance  by  the  offeree,  the  offerer  is  bound, 
although  it  may  not  have  reached  him,  Stevenson  v.  McLean,  5  Q.  B.  I).  346; 
Byrne  v.  Van  Tienhoven,  5  C.  P.  D.  344;  Thompson  v.  James,  18  Dunlop,  1 ;  but 
the  letter  must  be  posted  within  the  time  limited,  if  any,  or  within  a  reasonable  time, 
and  before  a  revocation  is  communicated.  Potts  r.  Whitehead,  8  C.  E.  (irccn,  512; 
Abbott  r.  Shepard,  48  N.  H.  14;  Stevenson  v.  McLean,  5  Q.  B.  D.  346;  JMaclay  r. 
Harvey,  90  111.  525  ;  the  sending  a  letter  being  an  overt  act  showing  assent,  Howard 
V.  Daly,  61  N.  Y.  362.  Brit.  &  Am.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Colson,  L.  R.  6  Ex.  108,  which  held 
that  one  to  whom  a  letter  of  allotment  of  shares  was  mailed  but  never  received  is  not  a 
shareholder,  was  overruled  by  Household  Ins.  Co.  i'.  Grant,  4  Ex.  D.  216. — A  contract 
may  be  made  and  proved  by  mutual  telegrams  equally  as  well  as  by  letter,  Leonard 
r.  N.  Y.,  &c.  Tel.  Co.  41  N.  Y.  544 ;  Kommel  r.  Wingate,"l03  Mass.  327  ;  Hcnkcl  v.  Pape, 
L.  R.  6  Ex.  7 ;  under  the  same  rules  as  by  letter,  Robinson  Macliine  Works  r. 
Chandler,  56  Ind.  575 ;  Minn.  Oil  Co.  v.  Collier  Lead  Co.  4  Dillon,  431  ;  a  tele- 
graphic contract  being  complete  when  the  acceptance  is  deposited  at  the  telegraph 
office  for  transmission,  Minn.  Oil  Co.  v.  Collier  Lead  Co.  4  Dillon,  431  ;  Robinson 
Machine  Works  v.  Chandler,  56  Ind.  575.  See  further,  Tavlor  v.  Jones,  1  C.  B.  D. 
87;  Hurdle  r.  Waring,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  435;  Will's  Case,  L.  R."l5  Eq.  18;  Battcman  r. 
Morford,  76  N.  Y.  622;  Northampton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tuttle,  11  Vroora,  476;  Washburn 
V.  Fletcher,  42  Wis.  152 ;  Boit  v.  iMaybin,  52  Ala.  252 ;  Bryant  v.  Booze,  55  Ga.  438. 

2  But  Lewis  v.  Browning,  130  Mass.  173,  approving  McCulloch  ;•.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  1 
Pick.  278,  supra,  decided  that  if  an  offer  is  made  by  letter  in  which  the  onerer  requests 
an  answer  by  telegraph  "yes"  or  "no,"  without  which  answer  by  a  certain  date  he 
"  shall  conclude  "  "  no,  the  offer  is  made  dependent  on  an  actual  receipt  of  the  tele- 
gram on  or  before  that  date. 

515 


*  485  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  II. 

We  have  supposed  these  letters  to  be  properly  addressed  and 

mailed,  and  to  reach  the  proper  party  at  a  proper  time.      Cases 

undoubtedly  may  occur  where  there  is  delay  and  hinderance,  and 

the  cause  of  this  may  be  the  fault  of  the  proposer,  or  of  the 

acceptor,  or  of  neither.      Such  cases  may  form  exceptions 

*  485   to  the  *  principle  above  stated,  and  must  be  decided  on 

their  own  facts  and  merits,  and  by  rules  which  are  specially 
adapted  to  them.  But  we  should  state  as  the  general  rule  what 
was  lately  declared  to  be  law  by  the  House  of  Lords ;  that  if  the 
party  receiving  an  offer  by  letter,  puts  his  answer  of  acceptance 
into  the  mail,  this  completes  the  contract,  for  he  has  done  all 
that  he  could  do,  and  is  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  casualties 
of  the  mail  service,  (r) 

(r)  See  Dunlop  v.  Higgins,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  381,  cited  in  note  (p)  sup. ;  Duncan  v. 
Topham,  8  C.  B.  222. 

616 


BOOK   III. 


THE    SUBJECT-MATTER    OF    CONTRACTS. 


*BOOK    ni.  *489 

THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OP  CONTRACTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PEELIMINARY  REMARKS. 

The  subject-matter  of  every  contract  is  something  which  is  to 
be  done,  or  which  is  to  be  omitted.  No  very  precise  or  logical 
division  and  classification  of  these  various  things  is  known  to  the 
common  law.  The  division  stated  and  followed  in  the  Pandects, 
and  referred  to  by  Blackstone,  (a)  is  exact  and  rational.  It  rec- 
ognizes four  species  of  contracts :  Do  ut  Des ;  Facio  ut  Facias ; 
Facio  ut  Des  ;  Do  ut  Facias.  But  this  division  is  not,  in  the  civil 
law,  strictly  followed.  The  whole  subject  of  purchase  and  sale 
(emptio  et  venditio')  is  treated  of  before  this  division  is  intro- 
duced. (6)  Blackstone  says,  "  of  this  kind  (i>o  ut  Des}  are  all 
sales  of  goods."  But  in  fact  it  seems  to  be  confined  to  giving 
a  thing  (not  money)  to  receive  a  thing  in  return. 

It  is  impossible  to  make  much  use  of  this  classification,  in 
exhibiting  the  rules  of  the  common  law  in  relation  to  contracts ; 
and  the  arrangement  of  the  subject-matters  of  contracts  which  we 
have  adopted,  is  the  following.     We  shall  treat  of  Contracts,  — 

1.  For  the  Purchase  and  Sale  of  Real  Estate. 

2.  For  the  Hiring  of  Real  Estate. 

3.  For  the  Purchase  and  Sale  of  Chattels. 

*  4.  For  the  Purchase  and  Sale  of  Chattels  with  War-  *  490 ' 
ranty. 

5.  Of  the  Right  of  Stoppage  in  Transitu. 

6.  For  the  Hiring  of  Chattels. 

7.  Of  Guaranty. 

(a)  2  Bl.  Com.  444.    See  ante,  p.  *430,  (h)  Emptio  et  Venditio.     P.-indects,  lib. 

note  (n).  18,  tit.  18.     Do  ut  des,  etc.     Pandects,  lib. 

19,  tit.  5,  art.  1,  §  4. 

519 


*  490  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   III. 

8.  For  the  Hiring  of  persons. 

9.  For  Service  generally. 

10.  Of  and  in  relation  to  Marriage. 

11.  Of  Bailment. 

12.  Of  Telegraphs. 

13.  Of  Patents. 

14.  Of  Copyrights. 

15.  Of  Trade-marks. 

16.  Of  Shipping. 

17.  Of  Marine  Insurance. 

18.  Of  Fire  Insurance. 

19.  Of  Life  Insurance. 

Before,  however,  considering  these  topics  severally,  a  few  words 
may  be  said  of  the  remedy  which  the  common  law  affords  for 
injury  sustained  by  a  breach  of  a  contract  to  do  a  specific  thing. 

Where  the  thing  to  be  done  is  the  payment  of  money,  there,  in 
general,  the  remedy  is  adequate  and  perfect.  But  where  the 
thing  to  be  done  is  anything  else  than  the  payment  of  money, 
there  the  common  law  can  give  only  a  remedy  which  may  be 
entirely  inadequate ;  for  it  can  give  only  a  money  remedy.  The 
foundation  of  the  common  law  of  contracts  may  be  said  to  be  the 
giving  of  damages  for  the  breach  of  a  contract.  And  even  where 
the  contract  is  specifically  for  the  payment  of  money,  and  for 
nothing  else,  still  the  law  does  not,  generally,  in  form,  decree  an 
execution  of  the  contract,  but  damages  for  the  breach  of  it.  If 
an  action  be  brought  upon  a  promissory  note,  or  a  covenant,  the 
plaintiff  sets  forth  the  contract  and  the  breach,  and  does  not  pray 
for  an  execution  of  it ;  but  he  sets  forth  also  the  damages  he  has 
sustained,  and  claims  them.  The  action  of  debt  may,  it  is  true, 
be  brought,  not  only  on  a  bond,  but  upon  many  simple  contracts ; 
and  in  this  action  the  payment  of  the  money  due  is  directly 
demanded,  and  such  is  the  judgment  if  the  plaintiff  recovers ;  but 
this  action  is  not  much  used  at  the  present  time,  in  this  country 
at  least,  to  enforce  simple  contracts.  Where  the  contract  is  for 
any  other  thing  than  the  payment  of  money,  the  common  law 
knows  no  other  than  a  money  remedy ;  for  it  has  no  power  to 
enforce  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract,  with  the  exception 
only  of  those  money  contracts  for  which  debt  will  lie. 

This  inability  of  the  common  law  was  among  the  earlier  and 
620 


CH.  I.]  PRELIMINARY   REMARKS.  *  491 

most  potent  causes  which  gave  rise  to  courts  of  equity ;  for 
*  these  courts  have,  both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  *  491 
a  very  complete  jurisdiction  over  this  class  of  cases.  Per- 
haps this  apparent  defect  in  the  common  law  may  be  explained, 
by  supposing  that,  originally,  the  action  of  debt  gave  the  power 
of  compelling  performance  in  fact,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases 
which  required  it,  and  that  the  comparative  disuse  of  this  action, 
and  the  coming  into  notice  of  the  great  variety  of  other  cases  in 
which  this  power  was  needed  to  do  justice,  occurred  after  the 
forms  of  the  common  law  had  become  fixed,  and  when  there  was 
a  great  unwillingness  in  the  courts  to  change  or  enlarge  them  ; 
and  when  also  another  court  had  grown  up  which  had  full  power 
in  all  such  cases.  However  this  may  be,  this  defect  in  the  com- 
mon law,  which  must  be  felt  more  and  more  sensibly  as  society 
advances  beyond  the  point  at  which  it  is  willing  to  measure  all 
rights  and  wrongs  by  a  money  standard,  is  one  cause,  undoubt- 
edly, of  the  disposition  which  is  manifesting  itself  in  this  country 
to  bring  together  all  common-law  and  all  equity  powers  of  prevent- 
ing wrong  and  enforcing  right ;  as  has  been  done,  or  attempted  to 
be  done  in  New  York,  by  their  last  Revised  Code ;  and  as  will,  we 
think,  be  done  in  other  States  of  this  Union,  in  some  form  and  in 
some  measure.  Indeed  the  recent  legislation  of  England,  by  giv- 
ing to  the  Common  Law  courts  a  kind  of  summary  equity  juris- 
diction, seems  to  seek  the  same  result. 

521 


*492 


THE   LAW   OP    CONTKACTS. 


[book  in: 


492 


*  CHAPTER  II. 


PURCHASE  AND  SALE  OP  REAL  PROPERTY. 


Conveyances  of  real  property  are  made  by  deed  ;  but  simple 
contracts  are  often  made  for  the  purchase  of  real  estate  and 
the  specific  performance  of  these  contracts  may  be  enforced  in 
equity,  (a)  or  actions  may  be  brought  on  them  at  common  law.  (J) 
Neither  equity  nor  law  will  enforce  such  contract,  if  it  be  founded 
upon  fraud,  (c)  or  gross  misrepresentation,  (c?)  or  upon  an  inten- 
tional concealment  of  an  important  defect  in  or  objection  to  an 
estate  ;  (e)  but  a  mere  inadequacy  of  price  —  not  gross,  and  not 
attended  by  circumstances  indicating  fraud  or  oppression  —  is 
not  sufficient  to  avoid  it.  (/)     And  where  the  land  is  sold  with 


(a)  That  specific  performance  of  con- 
tracts for  the  sale  or  purchase  of  railway 
shares  will  be  enforced  in  equity,  see 
Duncuft  V.  Albrecht,  12  Sim.  189;' Shaw 
V.  Fisher,  12  Jur.  152  ;  "Wynne  r.  Price,  13 
id.  295.  —  The  idea  formerly  entertained, 
that  a  court  of  equity  might  award  com- 
pensation for  non-performance  of  a  con- 
tract of  sale,  is  now  exploded.  Todd  v. 
Gee,  17  Ves.  273;  Sainsbury  ;;.  Jones,  5 
Myl.  &  C.  1. 

(b)  See  Moses  v.  McFerlan,  2  Burr. 
1011  ;  Farrer  v.  Nightingal,  2  Esp.  639; 
Squire  v.  Tod,  1  Camp.  293.  It  seems, 
that  if  the  subject-matter  of  the  contract 
is  such  that  both  vendor  and  purchaser 
would  be  reimbursed  by  damages,  a  court 
of  equity  will  decline  to  interfere,  and  will 
leave  a  party  to  his  remedy  at  law.  This 
is  the  case  in  ordinary  agreements  for  the 
sale  of  stock.  Cud  v.  liutter,  1  P.  Wms. 
570;  Nutbrown  v.  Thornton,  10  Ves.  159. 
—  It  has  been  thought,  however,  that  in 
some  cases  a  bill  in  equity  for  specific  per- 
formance ought  to  be  maintained  in  such 
contracts.     See  2  Story,  Eq.  §§  717,  724. 

(c)  See  Davis  v.  Symonds,  1  Cox,  407 ; 
Seymour  i\  Delancey,  6  Johns.  Ch.  225  ; 
Acker  v.  Phoenix,  4  Paige,  305 ;  Nellis  v. 
Clark,  20  Wend.  24  ;  Miller  v.  Chetwood, 
1  Green,  Ch.  199;  Clement  v.  Raid,  9  Sm. 
&  M.  535. 

522 


(c?)  Cadman  v.  Horner,  18  Ves.  10.  In 
this  case  the  purchaser  was  plaintiff,  and 
was  the  seller's  agent,  and  specific  per- 
formance was  refused,  because  he  had  rep- 
resented to  the  seller  that  the  houses  had 
been  injured  by  a  flood,  and  would  re- 
quire between  £40  and  £50  to  repair  them, 
whereas  40s.  would  have  repaired  the  dam- 
ages. See  also  Lord  Clerment  v.  Tas- 
burgh,  1  Jac.  &  W.  112;  Barker  v.  Harri- 
son, 2  Collyer,  546  ;  Best  v.  Stow,  2  Sandf. 
Ch.  298 ;  Schmidt  v.  Livingston,  3  Edw. 
Ch.  213;  Rodman  v.  Zilley,  Saxton,  320 ; 
Brealey  v.  Collins,  Younge,  317. 

(e)  But  general  statements  by  a  seller, 
although  not  the  whole  truth,  will  not 
amount  to  such  misrepresentation  as  to 
avoid  the  contract.  See  Fenton  v.  Browne, 
14  Ves.  144  ;  Lowndes  v.  Lane,  2  Cox,  363. 

( f)  Whitefield  v.  McLeod,  2  Bay,  380; 
Stewart  v.  The  State,  2  Har.  &  G.  114; 
Knobb  V.  Lindsay,  5  Hamm.  472 ;  Osgood 
V.  Franklin,  2  Johns.  Ch.  1 ;  Coles  v.  Tre- 
cothick,  9  Ves.  (Sumner's  ed.)  234 ;  Wood- 
cock V.  Bennet,  1  Cowen,  733 ;  Minturn  v. 
Seymour,  4  Johns.  Ch.  500 ;  Birdsong  v. 
Birdsong,  2  Head,  289,  where  inadequacy 
of  consideration  is  said  to  be  only  a  badge 
of  fraud.  But  inadequacy  of  price  if  gross, 
and  attended  by  circumstances  evincing 
unconscientious  advantage  taken  by  the 
purchaser  of  the  improvidence  and  distress 


CH.  II.]  PUKCHASE   AND   SALE   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  493 

such  words  as  "  more  or  less,"  but  with  dofinito  and  distinct 
boundaries,  equity  will  not  relieve  against  a  considerable  excess 
or  deficiency  of  land  over  the  description,  if  there  be  neither 
fraud  nor  gross  mistake,  {ff} 

It  may  be  well  to  remark  that  a  mere  return  of  the  deed  to  the 
grantor,  even  with  an  indorsement,  "  I  transfer  the  within  deed 
to  (the  grantor)  again,"  will  not  reconvey  a  freehold  estate  which 
has  once  vested  in  the  grantee.  (/^) 

Delivery  is  requisite,  and  if  a  deed  remains  after  execution,  in 
the  possession  and  control  of  the  grantor,  it  takes  no  effect.  It 
may  be  delivered  as  an  escrow,  to  a  third  party  to  be  delivered 
to  the  grantee  ;  and  if  to  be  delivered  only  on  certain  terms  and 
conditions,  and  the  depositary  delivers  the  deed  in  disregard  and 
violation  of  the  conditions,  and  the  grantee  refuses  or  is  unable 
to  perform  them,  the  deed  would  be  held  void.  (/A) 

In  all  our  States  a  record  is  required  of  conveyances  of  land, 
and  a  recorded  deed  takes  effect  over  a  prior  deed  unrecorded, 
of  which  the  grantee  had  no  knowledge  or  notice.  But  open  and 
visible  possession  by  the  former  grantee  may  be  notice  to  the 
later  grantee.  (/)  The  record  is  said  to  be  notice  to  all  the 
world  ;  but  this  means  to  all  who  are  interested  in  the  title  ;  and  is 
held  not  to  affect  strangers  to  the  title  who  are  put  upon  no  in- 
quiry in  relation  to  it.  (^fj) 

*  Estates  are  frequently  sold  at   auction;  and  in  that    *493 
case,  the  plans  and  descriptions  should  be  such  as  will  give 
true  information  to  such  persons  as  ordinarily  attend  such  sales  ; 
for  if  they  are  deceptive  or  materially  erroneous,  the  purchaser  is 
not  bound  to  take  the  estate ;  (</)  and  if  these  descriptions  are 

of  the  vendor,  will  avoid  the  contract  in  delivered  up,  or  a  sale  rescinded  (unless 
equity,  although  the  contract  be  executed,  its  grossuess  amounts  to  fraud),  yet  it  may 
McKinneyy.Pinckard,  2  Leigh,  149;  Evans  be  sufficient  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  eu- 
V.  Llewellyn,  2  Bro.  Ch.  150.     See  Groves  force  performance.     Osgood  v.  Franklin, 
V.  Perkins,  6  Sim.  576;  Sturge  v.  Sturge,  2  Johns.  Ch.  23;  Mortlock  ).-.  BuUer,  10 
14  Jur.  159.     And  if  the  inadequacy  of  Ves.  292;  Day  v.  Newman,  cited  in  Mort- 
price  is  so  gross  as  to  be  itself  sufficient  lock  v.  Bnller.     See  also,  ante,  p.  *436. 
evidence  of  fraud,  then  the  contract  will  {Jf')  Noble  v.  Gookius,  99  Mass.  231. 
be  void.     See  Rice  v.  Gordon,  11   Beav.  (fg)  Linker   v.   Long,  64  N.  C.  296; 
265.     But  an  inequality  of  price,  in  order  ParshaU  v.  Shirts,  54  Barh.  99. 
to  amount  to  a  fraud,  must  be  so  strong  (fh)  Abbott  v.  Alsdorf,  19  IMich.  157. 
and  manifest  as  to  shock  the  conscience  In  Fewell  v.  Kessler,  30  Ind.  195,  the  deed 
and  confound  the  judgment  of  any  man  was  executed  and  acknowledged  and  left 
of  common  sense.     Osgood  v.  Franklin,  2  with  the  justice  of  the  peace  for  tlie  gran- 
Johns.  Ch.  23 ;  and  see  How  v.  Weldon,  2  tee ;  and  it  was  held  a  valid  delivery. 
Ves.  Sen.  516;  Gwynne  v.  Heaton,  1  Bro.          {Ji)  Cabeen  v.  Breckenridge,  48  111.  91. 
Ch.  2;  Coles  v.  Trecothick,  9  Ves.  246.—          ]//)  Maul  v.  Rider,  59  Penn.  St.  167. 
Although   inadequacy  of  price   is   not  a          (9)  Dykes  v.  Blake,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  463. 
ground  for  decreeing  an  agreement  to  be  In  this  case,  by  the  particulars  of  sale,  lot 


*494 


THE  LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


written  or  printed  and  circulated  among  tl^e  buyers,  or  conspicu- 
ously posted  in  sight,  then  they  cannot  be  controlled  by  ver- 

*  494  bal  declarations  *  made  by  the  auctioneer  at  the  time  of 
the  sale.  (A)     And  even  if  it  be  provided  in  the  terms  of 

sale  that  any  error  or  misstatement  in  the  description  shall  not 

avoid  the  sale,  but  be  allowed  for  in  the  price,  such  provision  will 


13  was  described  as  building  ground,  and 
the  adjoining  lot  12  as  a  villa,  subject  to 
liberty  for  the  purchaser  of  lot  1  to  come 
on  the  premises  to  repair  drains,  &c.,  as 
reserved  in  lot  7.  The  reservation  in  lot 
7  referred  to  a  lease,  which  gave  the  occu- 
pier of  that  and  the  several  adjoining  lots, 
composing  a  row  of  houses,  a  carriage-way 
in  common  in  front  of  the  lots,  and  a  foot- 
way at  the  back,  and  also  a  footway  over 
lot  13.  The  particulars  contained  plans 
which  disclosed  the  carriage-way  in  front, 
and  the  footway  at  the  back  of  the  houses, 
but  not  the  footway  over  lot  13.  But  they 
stated  that  the  lease  of  lot  7  might  be  seen 
at  the  vendor's  office,  and  would  be  pro- 
duced at  the  sale.  The  plaintiff  having 
purchased  lots  12  and  13,  l)y  one  contract, 
in  ignorance  of  tlie  footway  over  lot  13,  it 
was  held,  that  the  misdescription  was  such 
as  to  entitle  lum  to  rescind  the  contract  as 
to  both.  See  also  Adams  v.  Lambert,  2 
Jur.  1078 ;  Robinson  v.  Musgrove,  8  C.  & 
P.  469  ;  Taylor  v.  Mortindale,  1  Y.  &  Col. 
Ch.  658 ;  Symons  v.  James,  id.  490 ;  Mar- 
tin V.  Cotter,  3  Jones  L.  506.  "  If  the  de- 
scription be  substantially  true,  and  be  de- 
fective or  inaccurate,  in  a  sliglit  degree 
only,  the  purchaser  will  be  required  to 
perform  the  contract,  if  the  sale  be  fair 
and  the  title  good.  Some  care  and  dili- 
gence must  be  exacted  of  the  purchaser. 
If  every  nice  and  critical  objection  be  ad- 
missible, and  sufficient  to  defeat  the  sale, 
it  would  greatly  impair  the  efficacy  and 
value  of  public  judicial  sales ;  and  there- 
fore, if  the  purchaser  gets  substantially 
the  thing  for  which  he  bargained,  he  may 
generally  be  held  to  abide  by  the  pur- 
chase, with  the  allowance  of  some  deduc- 
tion from  the  price  by  way  of  compensa- 
tion for  any  small  deficiency  in  the  value, 
by  reason  of  the  variation.  2  Kent,  Com. 
437  ;  King  r.  Bardeau,  6  Johns.  38.  The 
estate  cannot  be  too  minutely  described 
in  the  particulars ;  for  although  it  is  im- 
possible that  all  the  particulars  relative  to 
the  quantity,  the  situation,  &c.,  should  be 
so  specifically  laid  down  as  not  to  call  for 
some  allowance  when  the  bargain  comes 
to  be  executed ;  yet  if  a  person,  however 
little  conversant  with  the  actual  situation 
of  his  estate,  will  give  a  description,  he 
must  be  bound  by  that  whether  conver- 
sant of  it  or  not.     See  Judson  v.  Wass,  1 1 

524 


Johns.  525,  3  Cranch,  270,  2  Bay,  11." 
Dart,  Vendors  and  Purchasers  (Am.  ed.), 
p.  51,  n.  2. 

(/()  Gunnis  v.  Erhart,  1  H.  Bl.  289; 
Bradshaw  v.  Bennett,  5  C.  &  P.  48 ;  Can- 
non V.  Mitchell,  2  Desaus.  320 ;  Sliclton  v. 
Levins,  2  Cr.  &  J.  41 1 ;  Powell  v.  Edmunds, 
12  East,  6;  Ogilvie  v.  Eoljambie,  3  Meriv. 
53 ;  Rich  v.  Jackson,  4  Bro.  Ch.  514 ; 
Wright  V.  Deckline,  Pet.  C.  C.  199;  Ran- 
kin V.  Matthews,  7  Ired.  L.  286.  And  it 
makes  no  difference  that  the  question 
arises  on  a  sub-sale  of  the  same  premises 
by  the  purchaser.  Shelton  v.  Livius,  2 
Cr.  &  J.  411.  The  rule  applies  iu  favor  of 
the  seller  as  well  as  the  purchaser.  Powell 
V.  Edmunds,  12  East,  6.  The  case  of  Jones 
V.  Edney,  3  Camp.  285,  is  not  at  variance 
with  the  rule  stated  in  the  text.  That 
was  a  case  of  a  sale  at  auction  of  the  lease 
of  a  public-house.  The  house  was  de- 
scribed in  the  conditions  of  sale  as  "  a  free 
public-house;"  but  the  lease  under  which 
it  was  held  contained  in  fact  a  proviso  that 
the  lessee  and  his  assigns  should  take  all 
their  beer  from  a  particular  brewery.  At 
the  sale,  the  auctioneer  read  over  the  whole 
lease  in  the  hearing  of  the  bidders,  and 
when  he  came  to  the  proviso,  being  asked 
how  the  house  could  be  called  "a  free 
public-house,"  he  answered,  "  That  clause 
has  been  done  awaj^  with.  There  has  been 
a  trial  upon  it  before  Lord  Ellenborough, 
who  has  decided  it  to  be  bad.  I  warrant 
it  as  a  free  public-house,  and  sell  it  as  such." 
The  plaintiff  bid  off  the  house  and  paid  a 
deposit,  but  afterwards  finding  that  the 
clause  might  still  be  enforced,  lie  brought 
this  action  to  recover  the  deposit  back. 
It  was  held,  that  he  was  entitled  to  recover. 
Lord  Ellenhorough  said :  "  In  the  condi- 
tions of  sale  this  is  stated  to  be  a  'free 
public-house.'  Had  the  auctioneer  after- 
wards verbally  contradicted  this,  I  should 
have  paid  very  little  attention  to  what  he 
said  from  his  pulpit.  Men  cannot  tell 
what  contracts  they  enter  into  if  the  writ- 
ten conditions  of  sale  are  to  be  controlled 
by  the  babble  of  the  auction-room.  But 
here  the  auctioneer  at  the  time  of  the  sale, 
declared  that  he  warranted  and  sold  this 
as  a  free  public-house.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances a  bidder  was  not  bound  to  at- 
tend to  the  clauses  of  the  lease,  or  to  con- 
sider their  legal  operation." 


CH.  II.]      PURCHASE  AND  SALE  OF  EEAL  PROPERTY.       *  495 

not  cover  any  misstatement  of  a  substantial  and  important  char- 
acter ;  but  the  purchaser  may,  on  that  ground,  rescind  the  sale ;  (i) 
as,  if  an  auctioneer  sells  lot  A  to  one  who,  in  good  faith  and  with- 
out fault  supposes  he  is  buying  lot  B,  there  is  no  sale,  and  no  con- 
tract between  the  parties  for  want  of  agreement  of  minds.  (J) 
And  if  the  error  be  wholly  unintentional,  but  such  that  the 
amount  of  compensation  to  be  allowed  therefor  cannot  be  exactly 
calculated,  the  contract  may  be  rescinded.  (A;)  Wherever 
*  there  is  any  material  mistake,  and  no  such  provision  re-  *  495 
specting  it,  the  vendor  cannot  offer  a  pro  tanto  allowance, 
and  enforce  the  sale  against  the  purchaser.  And  these  principles 
would  hold  in  the  case  of  a  sale  not  at  auction,  so  far  as  they 
were  applicable.  (?) 

If  an  estate  be  sold  in  separate  lots,  and  one  person  buy  many 
lots,  there  is,  by  the  later  adjudications  and  the  better  reasons, 
a  distinct  contract  for  each  lot.  (w)  But  where  the  contract  is 
written  and  signed  for  the  purchase  of  several  lots  at  one  aggre- 
gate price,  it  is  one  contract ;  and  this  is  so  where  this  contract 
was  subsequent  to  a  sale  of  the  same  lots  severally  and  at  several 
prices  to  the  same  purchaser,  (n)  And  if  a  vendor  sell  an  estate 
as  one  lot,  and  has  title  to  a  part,  but  not  to  the  whole,  he  can- 
not enforce  the  sale ;  (o)  but  if  he  sells  in  several  wholly  inde- 

(i)  Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Worthy,  1  Camp,  named  in  the  conditions  for  completing 

337  ;    Stewart  v.  Alliston,    1   Meriv.   26 ;  the  purchase,  and  before  action  brought 

Robinson  v.  Musgrove,  2  Mood.  &  E.  92 ;  by  the  vendee,  the  vendor  procured  a  lease 

Leach  i'.  Mullet,  3  C.  &  P.  115.  of  the  yard  for  the  term  to  the  vendee, 

(/)  Sheldon  v.  Capron,  3  R.  I.  171.  and  offered  it  to  him.     See  also  Mills  v. 

(k)  Dobell  V.  Hutchinson,  3  A.  &  E.  Oddy,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  103. 
355.     This  was  a  sale  of  a  leasehohl  inter-  {I)  Hibbert  v.  Shee,  1  Camp.  113 ;  Rob- 

est  of  lands,  described  in  the  particulars  inson  v.  Musgrove,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  92. 
as  held  for  a  term  of  twenty-three  years,  (m)  This  was  expressly  held  in  Emer- 

at  a  rent  of  £55,  and  as  comprising  a  yard,  son  v.  Heelis,  2  Taunt.  38.     See  also  James 

One  of  the  conditions  was,  that  if  any  mis-  v.   Shore,    1    Stark.   426.     The   contracts 

take  should  be  made  in  the  description  of  are  separate,  both  in  law  and  fact.  Id. 

the  property,  or  any  other  error  whatever  Roots  v.  Lord  Dormer,  4  B.  &  Ad.  77 

should  appear  in  .the   particulars  of  the  Baldey  v.  Parker,  2  B.  &  C.  44,  Best,  J. 

estate,  such  mistake  or  error  should  not  Seaton  v.  Booth,  4  A.  &  E.  528 ;  Gibson 

annul  or  vitiate  the  sale,  but  a  compensa-  ?'.  Spurrier,  Peake  Ad.  Cas.  49  ;  Dykes  v. 

tion  should  be  made,  to  be  settled  by  arbi-  Blake,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  463.     But  see  Van 

tration.     The  yard  was  not,  in  fact,  com-  Eps  v.  Schenectady,  12  Johns.  436;  Stod- 

prehended  in  the  property  held  for  the  dart  v.  Smith,  5  Binn.  355  ;  Waters  v.  Tra- 

term  of  £55,  but  was  held  by  the  vendor  vis,  9  Johns.  450. 

from  year  to  year,  at  an  additional  rent.  (n)  Dykes  v.  Blake,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  463. 

It  was  essential  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  See  Chambers  v.  Griffiths,  1   Esp.   150; 

froperty  leased  for  the  tweiitV-three  years.  Drewe  v.  Hanson,  6  Ves.  675  ;  Hepburn  v. 

t  did  not  appear  that  the  vendor  knew  of  Auld,  5  Cranch,  262 ;  Osborne  v.  Bremar, 

the  defect.     The  court  held  that  this  de-  1  Desaus.  486  ;  Cassamajor  r.  Strode,  2 

feet  avoided  the  sale,  and  was  not  a  mis-  Myl.  &  K.  706 ;  Lewin  i:  Guest,  1  Rusa. 

take   to   be    compensated    for  under  the  325 ;  Harwood  r.  Bland,  Flan.  &  K.  540. 
above  condition ;  although  after  the  day  (o)  2  Story,  Eq.  §  778 ;  Reed  v.  Noe,  9 

525 


*  496  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

pendent  lots,  it  would  seem  reasonable  that  he  should  enforce 
it  as  to  those  to  which  he  could  make  title,  as  held  by  Lord 
Brougham ;{ p}  hut  we  should  not  consider  the  lots  as  wholly 
independent,  if  in  point  of  fact  the  buying  of  them  all  was,  for 
any  reason,  a  part  of  the  inducement  or  motive  of  the  buyer  for 
making  the  purchase. 

There   has   been   much   question    whether   a   sale   at   auction 

might  be  avoided  by  the  purchaser,  because  by-bidders  or  puffers 

were  employed  by  the  owner  or   auctioneer.     The  proper 

*  496    *  way  is  undoubtedly  to  give  notice  of  such  a  thing  at  the 

sale ;  but  the  weight  of  authority  in  this  country,  as  well 
as  that  of  some  cases  in  England,  seems  to  be  in  favor  of  permit- 
ting an  owner,  without  notice,  to  employ  a  person  to  bid  for  him, 
if  he  does  this  with  no  other  purpose  than  to  prevent  a  sacrifice  of 
the  property  under  a  given  price,  (g-)  In  a  recent  interesting 
English  case,  it  was  held,  that  a  sale  at  auction  "  without  reserve," 
means,  that  there  shall  be  no  bid  by  or  for  the  vendor  at  the  auc- 
tion, and  that  the  property  shall  be  sold  to  the  highest  bidder, 
whether  the  sum  offered  be  equivalent  to  its  value  or  not.  And 
that  the  highest  bo7id  fide  bidder  may  sue  the  auctioneer  if  he 
knocks  down  the  hammer  at  a  subsequent  and  higher  bidding  of 
or  for  the  owner ;  and  this  whether  the  auctioneer  was  or  was 
not  privy  to  such  bid.  (r)  It  might  be  inferred  from  the  lan- 
guage by  some  of  the  judges  in  this  case,  that  by-bidding  was  not 

Yerg.  283 ;  Dalby  v.  Pullen,  3   Sim.  29  ;  Veazie  v.  Williams,  3  Story.  622 ;  Thor- 

Bates  V.  Delavan,  5  Paige,  300;  Johnson  nett  v.  Haines,  15  M.  &  W.  371  ;  Wheeler 

r.  Johnson,  3  B.  &  P.  162;   Parham  v.  v.  Collier,  Mood.  &  M.  123;  Dart,  Ven 

Randolph,  4  How.    (Miss.)    435.     But   if  dors    and    Purchasers,    p.    89.       Contra, 

the  part  to  which  the  seller  has  title  was  Towle  v.  Leavitt,  3  Foster  (N.  H.),  360; 

the  purchaser's  principal  object,  or  equally  Pennock's    Appeal,    14    Penn.    St.    446 ; 

his  object  with  the  otlier  part,  and  is  itself  Staines  v.  Shore,  16  Penn.  St.  200.     In 

an  independent  subject,  and  not  likely  to  Veazie  v.  Williams,  in  8  How.  134,  the 

be  injured  by  being  separated  from  the  Supreme  Court  seems  to  hold,  that  if  the 

other  part,  equity  will   compel  the  pur-  bids  were  intended  to  enhance  the  price, 

chaser  to  take  it  at  a  proportionate  price,  and  did  so,  the  buyer  should  have  relief  in 

See  McQuin  v.  Farquhar,  11   Ves.  467;  equity.     See,  as  to  bids  by  puffers,  at  auc- 

Bowyer  r.  Bright,  13  Price,  698;  Buck  t'.  tion,    McDowell   v.   Simms,   6    Ired.   Eq. 

McCaughtry,  5   Monr.  230 ;    Simpson   v.  278,  and   Tomlinson  v.  Savage,  id.  430 ; 

Hawkins,  1  Dana,  305 ;  Collard  v.  Groom,  also,  Doolubdass  v.  Ramloll,  3  E.  L.  &  E. 

2  J.  J.  Marsh.  488.  39,  and  Flint  r.  Woodin,  13  E.  L.  &  E. 

(p)  Cassamajor  I'.  Strode,  2  Myl.  &  K.  278;  s.  c.  9  Hare,  618.      Where  property 

706.  was  advertised  for  sale  "to  the  highest 

(q)  This  right,  provided  there  exists  no  bidder,"  a  written  proposal  of  "  five  hun- 

actual  intention  to  defraud,  is  recognized  dred  dollars  more  than  tlie  highest  bid," 

by  many  recent  authorities.     See  Latham  without  naming  any  sum,  was  not  consid- 

»■.  Morrow,  6  B.  Mon.  630 ;  National  Fire  ered  valid.      Webster  v.  French,   11    HI- 

Ins.  Co.  V.  Loomis,  11  Paige,  431  ;  Bowles  154.     See  Davis  v.  Petway,  3  Head,  667. 
«.  Round,  5  Ves.  Jr.  508,  n.  (6)  (Sumner's  (r)  Warlow    v.    Harrison,   Exchequer 

ed.);    Crowder  v.  Austin,  3   Bing.  36S  ;  Chamber,  8  Am.  Law  Reg.  241. 

526 


CH.  II.]  PURCHASE   AND   SALE   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  497 

unlawful  in  cases  of  ordinary  sale  by  auction,  but  would  be  made 
so  if  such  phrases  in  the  advertisement  as  "  without  reserve,"  '*  to 
the  highest  bidder,"  or  any  equivalent  phrases,  were  used.  It 
must  be  often  difficult,  however,  to  draw  the  line  between  an  hon- 
est procedure  of  this  sort  and  a  fraudulent  design.  It  is  certain, 
that  any  unfair  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser  in  regard  to 
his  purchase,  prevents  his  acquiring  any  title  to  the  goods,  (s)  ^ 
But  an  agreement  among  many,  that  one  should  bid  for  all,  will 
not  necessarily  avoid  the  sale,  (t^ 

At  an  auction  the  contract  of  sale  is  not  completed  until 
the  *  auctioneer  knocks  the  property  down  to  the  pur-  *497 
chaser ;  for  he  is  the  agent  of  the  vendor,  and  this  is  his 
assent  to  the  offer  of  the  purchaser,  and  until  such  assent  be 
given  the  offer  may  be  withdrawn,  (m)  But  an  auctioneer  has 
no  authority  to  rescind  the  sale,  for  either  party,  without  specific 
orders,  although  the  purchase-money  be  not  yet  paid,  (v)  ^ 

If  an  auctioneer  does  not  disclose  the  name  of  the  owner  of  the 
property  which  he  sells,  he  is  himself  liable  to  an  action  by  the 
buyer  for  the  completion  of  the  contract,  (w)  And  it  would  be 
so  if  he  sold  or  warranted  without  authority,  (a;)  If  he  has  the 
authority  of  the  owner  to  warrant,  and  does  so,  disclosing  the 
name  of  the  owner,  he  is  himself  exonerated  from  the  warranty, 
and  the  owner  is  liable  upon  it.  (j/)     And  he  has  such  special 

(s)  Fuller  v.  Abrahams,  6  J.  B.  Moore,  (lo)  Hanson  v.  Roberdeau,  Peake,  Cas. 

316;  s.  c.  3  Br.  &B.  116;  Smith  u.  Green-  120;   Frauklyn  v.  Lamond,  4  C.  B.  637; 

lee,  2  Dev.  L.  126.  Mills  v.   Hunt,  20  Wend.  431;   Jones  r. 

{t)  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Loomis,  11  Paige,  Littledale,  6  A.  &  E.  486. 

431;  Switzer  L'.  Skiles,  3  Gilman,  529.  (x)  Sugden,   Law    of    Vendors    (10th 

(m)  Paine  v.  Cave,  3  T  E.  148;  Rout-  ed.),  vol.  1,  p.  70;  Jones  v,  Uyke,  id.  vol. 

ledge  r.  Grant,  4  Biug.  653.     If  the  bid  is  3,  app.  8 ;   Gaby   v.   Driver,   2    Y.  &  J. 

retracted,   the    retraction   must    be  loud  549. 

enough   to   be  heard   by  the   auctioneer,  (y)  An  auctioneer  in  such  case  is  like 

otherwise  it  amounts  to  nothing.    Jones  v.  any  otlier  agent,  and  unless  he  acts  beyond 

Nanney,  McClel.  39;  s.  c.  13  Price,  103.  his  authority,  binds  his  principal,  but  not 

((;)  Boinest  v.  Leignez,  2  Rich.  L.  464.  himself. 

1  That  when  a  sale  is  to  be  "  without  reserve,"  the  secret  employment  by  the  seller 
of  by-bidders  renders  the  sale  voidable  by  the  buyer,  see  Curtis  v.  AspinwaU,  114 
Mass.  187. 

-  An  auctioneer's  advertisement  to  sell  a  certain  article  by  auction  does  not  amoimt 
to  a  contract  to  put  up  the  article  with  any  one  attending  the  sale ;  and  a  withdrawal 
of  such  article  is  not  a  breach  of  contract.  Harris  v.  Nickersou,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  286. 
See  Spencer  r.  Harding,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  561.  An  auctioneer  cannot  buy  in  for  any  one 
property  sold  by  him  at  auction.  Hood  v.  Adams,  128  Mass.  207  ;  Brock  v.  Rice,  27 
Gratt.  812.  If  an  auctioneer  delivers  goods  to  the  wrong  party,  and  his  catalogue 
and  conditions  of  sale  show  that  he  contracted  personally,  he  is  liable.  TVoolfe 
V.  Home,  2  Q.  B.  D.  355.  If  the  terms  of  sale  require  cash  payment,  an  auctioneer 
.has  no  right  to  receive  in  payment  a  check  on  a  bank  where  tlie  buyer  has  no  funds. 
Broughton  v.  Sillaway,  114  Mass.  71.  An  auctioneer  can  deduct  his  commissions  and 
expenses  out  of  the  proceeds  of  sale.    Dowler's  Succession,  29  La.  An.  437. 

527 


498 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book   III. 


property  in  the  goods  that  he  may  bring  an  action  for  the  price, 
even  if  the  goods  be  sold  in  the  house  of  the  owner,  and  were 
known  to  be  his.  (2)  But  the  buyer  may  set  off  a  debt  due  to 
him  from  the  owner,  (a)  And  if  the  auctioneer  sell  the  property 
of  A  as  the  property  of  B,  and  the  buyer  pay  the  price  to  B, 
the  auctioneer  cannot  recover  it  of  the  buyer.  (5)  It  is  said,  that 
after  the  sale  is  finished  the  auctioneer  is  no  longer  the  agent  of 

the  owner,  and  a  payment  to  him  of  the  price  is  not  a  pay- 
*  498    ment  to  the  owner,  (c)     But  where  the  auctioneer,  *  by 

usage,  or  on  other  evidence,  can  be  shown  to  have  authority 


(z)  Williams  v.  Millington,  1  H.  Bl. 
81 ;  Coppin  v.  Walker,  7  Taunt.  237.  But 
where  the  person  employing  the  auctiou- 
eer  to  sell  has  no  right  so  to  do,  the  auc- 
tioneer has  no  claim  upon  the  property 
against  the  rightful  owner,  and  tlie  pur- 
chaser may  refuse  to  pay  the  auctioneer. 
Dickenson  v.  Naule,  1  Nev.  &  M.  721. 
See  ante,  p.  *  132. 

(a)  Coppin  i'.  Craig,  7  Taunt.  243. 

(b)  Coppin  V.  Walker,  7  Taunt.  237. 
(f)  Sykes  i:  Giles,  5  M.  &  W.  645.     In 

this  case  the  plaintiff  having  employed  an 
auctioneer  to  sell  certain  timber  growing 
on  his  estate,  the  following,  among  other 
conditions,  were  read  at  the  sale,  in  the 
presence  of  the  defendant :  "  That  each 
purchaser  should  pay  down  a  deposit  of 
£10  per  cent  in  part  of  the  purchase- 
money,  and  pay  the  remainder  on  or  be- 
fore the  17th  of  August;  but  in  case  any 
purchaser  should  prefer  to  pay  the  whole 
amount  of  his  purchase-money  at  au  earlier 
period,  discount  after  the  rate  of  £5  per 
cent  will  be  allowed."  Also,  "  That  each 
purchaser  shall  enter  into  a  proper  agree- 
ment and  bond,  if  required,  with  such  one, 
two,  or  more  sureties  as  shall  be  approved 
by  the  vendor  or  his  agent  for  the  per- 
formance of  his  agreement,  pursuant  to 
the  above  conditions."  The  defendant 
became  the  purchaser  of  one  lot,  and  paid 
the  deposit.  Some  days  after  the  sale, 
which  was  on  the  14th  of  February,  the 
defendant,  at  the  aixctioneer's  request, 
drew  a  bill  of  exchange  for  the  residue  of 
the  purchase-money,  dated  on  the  day  of 
the  sale,  on  one  J.  M.,  payable  six  mouths 
after  date  to  his  own  order,  and  indorsed 
it  to  the  auctioneer,  wlio,  being  in  difficul- 
ties, indorsed  it  to  a  third  person,  to  whom 
he  was  indebted,  on  his  own  account. 
The  bill  became  due  on  the  17th  of  Au- 
gust, when  the  amount  of  it  was  duly 
paid  to  the  holder.  It  was  never  trans- 
ferred to  the  plaintiff.  Held,  that  under 
these  circumstances  the  delivery  and  pay- 
ment of  the  biU  of  exchange  was  not  a 

528 


valid  payment  of  the  residue  of  the  pur- 
chase-money for  the  timber  purchased  by 
the  defendant,  the  auctioneer  having  no 
authority  to  receive  payment  of  such  res- 
idue, or  to  take  any  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  it ;  but  that,  even  if  he  were 
authorized  by  the  conditions  to  receive 
payment,  the  payment  required  was  a  pay- 
ment in  cash,  and  he  had  no  authority  to 
take  a  bill  of  exchange.  Parke,  B. : 
"  The  question  here  is  what  authority  the 
auctioneer  had.  The  extent  of  that  au- 
thority, in  the  absence  of  any  proof  of 
general  authority,  must  depend  upon  the 
conditions  of  sale.  The  only  authority 
given  to  the  auctioneer  by  these  conditions 
is  to  receive  the  deposit  money ;  the  ven- 
dor reserves  to  himself  or  his  agent  the 
power  to  receive  the  remainder  of  the  pur- 
chase-money. As  no  agent  is  named  for 
that  purpose,  the  payment  must  be  to  the 
principal,  or  some  general  agent,  which 
the  auctioneer  certainly  was  not ;  for  the 
word  '  agent '  in  the  sixth  condition  clearly 
does  not  refer  to  him.  By  the  third  con- 
dition the  remainder  of  the  money  is  to  be 
paid  on  or  before  the  17th  of  August,  but 
such  payment  is  not  to  be  to  the  auction- 
eer but  to  the  vendor.  Then  that  part  of 
the  condition  which  provides  that  the  pur- 
chaser may,  if  he  shall  prefer  it,  pay  the 
whole  money  at  an  earlier  period,  must 
also  be  construed  to  mean  that  he  shall 
pay  it  to  the  same  person,  that  is,  the  ven- 
dor or  his  agent.  But  even  if  the  auc- 
tioneer had  had  authority  to  receive  the 
remainder  of  the  purchase-money,  he  had 
no  authority  to  receive  it  in  this  way  Ity 
means  of  a  bill  of  exchange.  Cash  pay- 
ment was  intended,  and  not  a  bill  of  ex- 
change. My  opinion,  however,  is,  that 
under  the  terms  of  the  conditions  of  sale, 
the  vendor  is  to  receive  the  purchase- 
money,  and  not  the  auctioneer.  The  gen- 
eral rule  may  be  different,  but  the  case 
turns  on  this  peculiar  construction  of  the 
conditions  of  the  sale." 


CH.  II.]      PURCHASE  AND  SALE  OP  REAL  PROPERTY.       *  498 

to  receive  the  money,  such  payment  must  discharge  the  buyer,  ((i) 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  auctioneer  to  obtain  the  best  price  he  fairly 
can ;  to  comply  with  his  instructions,  unless  they  would  operate 
as  a  fraud  ;  to  pursue  the  accustomed  course  of  business,  and  to 
possess  a  competent  degree  of  skill ;  and  if  he  fail  in  either  of 
these  particulars,  and  damage  ensues  to  the  owner,  he  is  respon- 
sible therefor,  (e) 

In  the  preceding  remarks  we  have  given  the  rules  of  law  appli- 
cable to  auction  sales  of  personal  as  well  as  of  real  property. 
They  are  the  same  in  both  cases,  except  so  far  as  they  arc  neces- 
sarily distinguished  by  the  nature  of  the  property  sold. 

{d)  See  Capel  v.  Thornton,  3  C.  &  P.  (e)  See  Guerreiro  v.  Peile,  3  B.  &  Aid. 

352;  Bunney  v.  Payntz,  4  B.  &  Ad.  568.     616;    Bexwell    v.    Christie,    Cowp.   395; 
The  case  of  Sykes  v.  Giles,  above  cited,     Russell  v.  Palmer,  2  Wils.  325. 
does   not   impugn   this   rule,  but  turned 
upon  the  special  conditions  of  the  sale. 

VOL.  I.  34  629 


*499  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 


*499  *  CHAPTER  III. 

HIRING   OF   REAL   PROPERTY. 

Sect.  I.  —  Of  the  Lease. 

The  hiring  of  real  property  is  usually  effected  by  means  of  a 
lease,  which  is  a  contract,  whereby  one  party  —  the  tenant  —  has 
the  possession  and  profits  of  the  land,  and  the  other  party  —  the 
landlord  —  reserves  a  rent,  which  the  tenant  pays  him  by  way  of 
compensation. 

It  is  frequently  a  question  whether  an  instrument  is  a  lease  at 
once,  or  only  an  agreement  to  make  a  lease  hereafter ;  and,  if  it 
be  a  lease,  when  by  its  terms  it  is  to  begin,  and  when  to  end ; 
and  whether  the  tenancy  is  for  years,  or  from  year  to  year,  or  at 
will,  or  upon  sufferance.  But  these  questions  are  properly  ques- 
tions of  construction,  and  so  far  as  they  come  within  the  scope  of 
this  work  will  be  considered  hereafter,  when  we  treat  of  Construc- 
tion, and  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  in  our  Second  Volume. 

If  a  party  accepts  a  lease  and  occupies  the  premises,  without 
signing  the  lease,  he  is  nevertheless  liable  for  the  rent,  (^aa) 

A.ny  general  description  will  sufhce  to  pass  the  demised  prem- 
ises, if  it  be  capable  of  distinct  ascertainment  and  identification. 
And  certain  words,  usually  employed,  as  house,  farm,  land,  and 
the  like,  have,  if  necessary,  a  very  wide  meaning,  (a)  ^  And 
where  such  general  and  comprehensive  terms  are  employed,  all 
things  usually  comprehended  within  the  meaning  thereof  will 
pass,  unless  the  circumstances  of  the  case  show  very  clearly  that 
the  intention  of  the   parties  was    otherwise.  (5)  ^    And    inaccu- 

(aa)  Trapnall    v.    Merrick,    21    Ark.  v.  Wetherhead,  Cro.  C.  17 ;   Gennings  v. 

603.  Lake,  id.  168 ;  Kerslake  v.  Wliite,  2  Stark. 

(a)  Shep.  Touch.  90-92.  508 ;  Ongley  v.  Chambers,  1  Bing.  483, 

\b)  Doe  V.  Burt,  1  T.  R.  701 ;  Bryan  496. 

1  If  the  tract  is  shown  with  reasonable  certainty,  it  will  pass,  though  the  description 
ia  erroneous  in  some  respects.     McLouglilin  v.  Bishop,  6  Vroom,  .512. 

2  The  grant  of  thing  carries  incident.  Riddle  v.  Littlefield,  53  N.  H.  503  ;  as  the 

630 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  500 

racies  as  to  qualities,  names,  amounts,  &c.,  will  be  rejected,  if 
there  is  enough  to  make  the  purposes  and  intentions  of  the 
*  parties  certain,  (c)     So  the  granting  for  hire,  of  a  thing    *  500 
to  be  used,  carries  with  it  all  proper  appurtenances  and 
accompaniments  which  are  needed  for  the  proper  use  and  enjoy- 
ment of  the  thing,  (c?) 


SECTION  II. 

OF   THE   GENERAL   LIABILITIES   OP   THE   LESSOR. 

There  is  an  implied  covenant  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  to  put 
the  lessee  into  possession,  ^  and  that  he  shall  quietly  enjoy,  (e;)  2 
But  unless  the  demise  be  under  seal  there  is  no  implied  covenant 
for  good  title,  but  only  for  quiet  enjoyment.  (/)  And  an  inter- 
ruption by  a  landlord  of  his  tenant's  occupation  without  evict- 
ing him,  has  been  held  not  to  suspend  the  rent,  in  whole  or  in 

(c)  Miller  v.  Travers,  1  M.  &  Scott,  Racket  v.  Glover,  10  Mod.  142;  Shep. 
342,  351 ;  Blague  v.  Gold,  Cro.  C.  473  ;  Touch.  165  ;  Nokes'  case,  4  Rep.  80  b.  — 
Mason  v.  Chambers,  Cro.  J.  34  ;  Wrotes-  Assumpsit  lies  against  a  landlord  on  his 
ley  V.  Adams,  Plovvd.  187, 191 ;  Windham  implied  promise  to  give  possession.  Coe 
I'.  Windham,  Dyer,  376  b ;  Goodtitle  v.  v.  Clay,  3  Mo.  &  P.  57.  And  in  the  ab- 
Southern,  1  M.  &  Sel.  299;  Doe  v.  Gallo-  sence  of  any  proof  to  the  contrary,  the 
way,  5  B.  &  Ad.  43;  Pirn  v.  Currell,  6  tenancy  under  a  written  agreement  be- 
M.  &  W.  234,  269.  gins  from  the  day  on  which  the  agree- 

(d)  Shep.  Touch.  89 ;  Morris  v.  Edg-  ment  professes  to  have  been  executed, 
insxton,  3  Taunt.  24,  31;  Kooystra  v.  Bisliop  u.  Wraith,  26  E.  L.  &  E.  568 ;  Hale 
Lucas,  5  B.  &  Aid.  880;  Harding  v.  Wil-  v.  City  of  London,  &c.  Co.  2  B.  &  S.  737  ; 
son,  2  B.  &  C.  96.  Steel  v.  Frick,  56  Penn.  St.  172. 

(e)  Line  v.  Stephenson,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  (  f)  Bandy  v.  Cartwright,  20  E.  L.  & 
678,  5  id.  183 ;  Holden  v.  Taylor,  Hob.  12 ;  E.  374 ;  s.  c.  8  Exch.  913. 

lease  of  a  ground  floor  carries  the  right  to  have  windows  overlooking  the  lessor's  yard 
unobstructed,  Doyle  v.  Lord,  64  N.  Y.  432 ;  of  a  "  building  "  includes  land  under  the 
eaves,  if  belonging  to  the  lessor ;  and  the  erection  by  him  of  a  wall  is  an  eviction, 
Sherman  r.  Williams,  113  Mass.  481;  of  "machinery"  includes  a  "blast"  on  leased 
premises,  Thropp  v.  Field,  11  C.  E.  Green,  82 ;  but  "adjoining  buildings  "  will  not 
pass  unless  particularly  described,  Ogden  v.  Jennings,  62  N.  Y.  526 ;  nor  will  a  lease 
of  a  single  room  give  the  exclusive  right  to  the  outer  wall,  Pevey  v.  Skinner,  116 
Mass.  129. 

1  Where  a  former  tenant  held  over  without  right  it  was  held  that  a  lessee  with  the 
right  of  possession  was  not  excused  from  rent  in  consequence  of  such  holding  over. 
Field  V.  Herrick,  101  111.  110. 

2  Mack  V.  Patchin,  42  N.  Y.  167.  See  Milliken  v.  Thorndike,  103  Mass.  382. 
Such  an  implied  covenant  means  that  the  lessee  shall  not  be  disturbed  rightfully  in 
his  possession.  Underwood  v.  Birchard,  47  Vt.  305.  Where  an  express  covenant  wa.s 
for  quiet  enjoyment  free  from  disturbance  by  the  "  lessor,  his  successors  or  assigns," 
no  further  covenant  as  to  enjoyment  will  be  implied.  Burr  v.  Steuton,  42  N.  Y.  462* 
If  the  lessor's  covenant  applies  to  acts  of  "  himself  and  his  heirs  and  all  others  claim- 
ing under  him,"  the  lessor  will  not  be  liable  for  a  disturbance  by  the  paramount 
title.  Dennett  v.  Atherton,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  316.  If  ousted  by  a  stranger,  the  tenant's 
only  remedy  is  against  such  stranger.     Moore  v.  Weber,  71  Penn.  St.  429. 

531 


*  501  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

part.  (^)  ^  He  is  not  bound  to  renew,  without  express  cove- 
nant, (^)  nor  are  such  covenants  favored,  if  they  tend  to  perpe- 
tuity, (hy-  but  where  they  are  definite  and  reasonable  the  law  sus- 
tains them.  (^)  A  covenant  to  "  renew  under  the  same  covenants," 
is  satisfied  by  a  renewal  which  omits  the  covenant  to  renew.  (^  )  ^ 
But  a  covenant  to  renew  implies  a  renewal  for  the  same  term  and 
rent,  and,  probably,  on  the  same  conditions  as  before,  except  only 
the  covenant  to  renew  ;  and  if  it  be  "  to  renew  on  such  terms  as 
may  be  agreed  upon,"  this  is  void  for  uncertainty,  (k')  ^  If  there  be 
a  covenant  to  renew  at  the  election  of  the  lessee,  he  must  make  that 
election  before  the  lease  terminates ;  (kk')  and  a  mere  continuance 
in  possession  will  not  operate  as  an  election  to  renew.  (kV) 

*  501        *  A  landlord  is  under  no  implied  legal  obligation  to  re- 

pair, and  it  seems  to  be  law  on  the  weight  of  authority, 
that  the  uninhabitableness  of  a  house  is  not  a  good  defence  to  an 
action  for  rent.  (Z)^  And  if  he  expressly  covenanted  to  repair,  the 
tenant  cannot  quit  and  discharge  himself  of  the  rent  because  the 

iff)  Fuller  V.  Ruby,  10  Gray,  285.  (I)  Arden  v.  Pullen,  10  M.  &  W.  321 ; 

(g)  Lee  v.  Vernon,  7  Bro.  l*.  C.  432;  Hart  v.  Windsor,  12  id.  68;  Izon  v.  Gor- 

Robertson  v.  St.  John,  2  Bro.  Ch.  140.  ton,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  501 ;   Gott  v.  Gandy, 

(h)  Baynham    v.    Guy's    Hospital,   3  22   E.  L.  &  E.  173;   Moffatt  v.  Smith,  4 

Ves.  295 ;    Attorney-General   v.  Brooke,  Conist.  126 ;    Banks  v.  White,  1   Sneed, 

18  id.  319,  326.  613;   Howard  v.  Doolittle,  3  Duer,  464 ; 

(z)  Furnival    v.    Crew,    3     Atk.    83;  Clenes  r  Willoughby,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  83; 

Cooke  V.  Booth,  Cowp.  819;    Willan   v.  Estep  v.  Estep,  22  Ind.  114;   Robbins  v. 

Willan,  16  Ves.  72,  84 ;  Sadlier  v.  Biggs,  Mount,  4  Rob.  553.     But  where  a  house 

27  E.  L.  &  E.  74.  had  been  used  as  a  house  of  ill-fame,  and 

(j)  Carr    v.   Ellison,   20  Wend.    178.  this  was  concealed  by  the  lessor  and  un- 

See  also  Abcel  v.  Radcliff,  13  Johns.  297.  known  to  the  lessee,  it  was  held  to  be  a 

But  see  contra,  Bridges  v.  Hitchcock,  1  defence  or  a  counter-claim  to  an  action 

Bro.  P.  C.  522.  for  rent.      Staples  v.  Anderson,  3  Rob. 

(k)  Rutgers  v.  Hunter,  6  Johns.   Ch.  327.     See  pos^,  ch.  on  Warranty,  p.  *  574, 

215;   Whitlock  v.   Duffleld,  1   HofE.  Ch.  n.  ((/).      Tlie  cases  contra,  as"Collins  v. 

110;  Tracy  v.  Albany  Exch.  Co.  8   Seld.  Barrows,  1  Mo.  &  Rob.  112;  Edwards  v. 

472.  Etherington,  7  Dow.  &  R.  117  ;  Salisbury 

(kk)  Renoud  v.  Daskam,  34  Conn.  512.  v.  Marsliall,  4  C  &  P.  65,  seemed  to  be 

(kl)  Falley  v.  Giles,  29  Ind.  114.  overruled. 

1  Bartlett  v.  Farrington,  120  Mass.  284  ;  Walker  v.  Shoemaker,  4  Hun,  579. 

2  Cunningham  v.  Pattee,  99  Mass.  248.  "  To  renew  and  to  continue  to  renew  "  is 
a  perpetual  covenant.  Page  t-.  Esty,  54  Me.  319;  which  equity  will  enforce,  Banks 
V.  Haskie,  45  Md.  207.     See  Boyle  v.  Peabody  Heights  Co.  46  Md.  623. 

3  Brand  v.  Frumveller,  32  Mich.  215. 

*  Pray  v.  Clark,  113  Mass.  283 ;  Western,  &c.  Co.  v.  Lansing,  49  N.  Y.  499. 

6  Coe  V.  Vogdes,  71  Penn.  St.  383.  Contra,  Bissell  v.  Lloyd,  100  111.  214,  where  it 
was  held  that  an  agreement  by  the  lessor  to  keep  in  repair  a  particular  rooni  implied 
that  the  lessor  would  repair  the  residue  of  the  building  ;  and  the  lessee,  having  aban- 
doned the  premises  because  of  non-repair,  was  excused  from  paying  rent  after  such 
abandonment.  But  in  case  of  a  furnished  house,  reasonalole  fitness  for  habitation  is 
an  implied  condition.  Wilson  v.  Finch  Hatton,  2  Ex.  D.  336.  Infra,  i.  *589,  note  (d). 
So  in  letting  land  there  is  no  implied  covenant  that  noxious  plants  will  not  grow  in  it. 
Erskine  v.  Adeane,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  756. 

532 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OP  REAL   PROPERTY.  *  502 

repairs  are  not  made,  unless  there  is  a  provision  to  tliat  effect,  (m) 
And  if  a  landlord  is  bound  by  custom  or  by  express  agreement 
to  repair,  this  obligation,  and  the  obligation  of  the  tenant  to 
pay  rent,  are,  it  seems,  independent  of  each  other,  so  that  the 
refusal  or  neglect  of  the  landlord  to  repair  is  no  answer  to  a 
demand  for  rent,  (ti)  It  would  seem  from  the  authorities  above 
cited,  to  be  the  law  in  England,  that  a  tenant  is  justified  in 
avoiding  his  lease,  only  by  a  positive  wrong  on  the  part  of  bis 
landlord;  as  by  erroneous  or  fraudulent  misdescription  of  the 
premises,  or  their  being  made  uninhabitable  by  the  landlord,  (o) 
It  is  there  held,  that  if  the  lessor  knows  that  his  house  is  in  a 
ruinous  condition,  and  that  the  lessee  is  ignorant  of  this,  he  is 
not  bound  to  declare  its  condition  to  the  lessee.  It  is  said,  how- 
ever, that  he  must  do  this  if  he  knows  that  the  lessee  takes  the 
house  because  he  believes  it  to  be  sound  and  habitable,  or  if  the 
concealment  will  amount  to  a  deceit.  (/>)  But  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  suppose  a  case  to  which  these  exceptions,  at  least  in  their 
substance,  are  not  applicable.  (5-) 

It  has  been  very  properly  decided  in  New  York  Court  of 
Common  Pleas,  that  a  landlord  is  liable  in  damages  if  he  suffers 
a  chimney  on  the  premises  he  has  demised  to  remain  in  a  ruinous 
condition,  and  by  its  fall  it  injures  his  tenant's  property,  (^qq) 


*  SECTION  III.  *502 

OF   THE   GENERAL   LIABILITY   AND    OBLIGATION   OF   THE  TENANT. 

The  words  "  reserving,"  or  "  yielding,"  or  "  paying,"  a  rent,  or 
any  phraseology  distinctly  showing  the  intention  of  the  parties 
that  rent  should  be  paid,  imply  a  covenant  or  a  promise  on  the 
part  of  the  lessee  to  pay  the  same,  although  the  words  import  no 
promise.      And  he  is  liable  for  an  action  either  for  non-payment 

(m)  Surplice  v.  Farnsworth,  7  Man.  &  (p)  Keates  v.  Earl  Cadogan,  10  C.  B. 

G.  576.  591. 

(n)  Bro.  Abr.  Dette,  pi.  18;  27  H.  6,  (?)  Libbey   i>.   Tolford,   48    Me.   316, 

10  a,  pi.  6.    See  also  the  reporter's  note  to  held,  that  in  a  lease  of  a  store  there  is 

Surplice  v.  Farnsworth,  7  Man.  &  G.  576.  no  implied  warranty,  that  the  building  is 

(0)  See    Surplice    v.    Farnsworth,    7  safe,  well-built,  or  fit  for  any  particular 

Man.  &  G.  570;  Hart  v.  Windsor,  12  M.  purpose. 

&   W.   68  ;    Sutton    v.    Temple,   id.   52 ;  (qq)  Eagle  v.  Swayze,  2  Daly,  200. 

Arden  v.  Pullen,  10  id.  321. 

633 


*  503  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

of  rent,  or  for  refusing  to  take  possession,  (r)  But  a  failure  to 
pay  rent  does  not  forfeit  the  lease,  without  express  agreement  to 
that  effect,  (rr)  ^  He  is  not  bound  to  pay  the  taxes,  unless  he 
agrees  to ;  but  the  agreement  may  be  indirect  and  constructive ; 
as  if  he  agrees  to  pay  the  rent  "  free  from  all  taxes,  charges,  or 
impositions,"  (s)  or  even  to  pay  a  "  net  rent ; "  (f)  or  any  other 
language  is  used,  distinctly  showing  that  this  burden  was  to  bo 
cast  upon  the  tenant.  And  where  a  lessee  of  a  part  of  a  building- 
covenanted  to  pay  taxes,  he  was  held  to  pay  his  proportion  of  the 
taxes  assessed  on  the  whole  building,  a  usage  to  that  effect  being 
shown  to  exist  in  that  locality,  {tt}  ^ 

The  time  when  the  rent  is  due  depends  upon  the  terms  of  the 
contract ;  and,  if  this  were  silent,  the  time  would  depend  upon 
statutory  provision,  if  any  there  were,  and  in  the  absence  of  such 
provision,  upon  the  usage  of  the  country.  Whenever  it  is  due,  if 
no  place  of  payment  is  fixed  by  the  contract,  and  there  is  a  clause 
of  re-entry  and  forfeiture  in  case  of  non-payment,  a  readiness  to 
pay  upon  the  land  would  be  necessary  to  prevent  a  forfeiture,  and 
as  the  law  could  not  in  such  a  case  compel  a  tenant  to  seek  the 
landlord  off  the  land  to  pay  the  rent,  and  at  the  same  time  be 
ready  upon  the  land  with  the  money  to  prevent  a  forfeiture,  it 
would  seem  that  a  readiness  to  pay  upon  the  land  would  also  be 
a  good  plea  of  tender  in  an  action  for  the  rent,  (m)  although  the 
tenant  might,  if  he  chose,  make  a  personal  tender  which 

*  503    would  be  good,  (f)    But  we  hold,  with  the  latest  *  English 

authority,  that  if  there  be  no  clause  of  forfeiture  in  the 
lease,  the  tenant  must  seek  the  landlord  and  tender  the  rent  as  in 
other  cases,  in  order  to  prevent  the  landlord  from  recovering  the 
costs  of  an  action  ;  (w)  although  the  American  cases  lead  to  a 
different  conchision.  (a;)  And  a  tender  of  rent  on  the  day  it  fell 
due,  although   at   a   late   hour   in   the   evening,  has   been   held 

(r)  See  Piatt  on  Covenants,  50.     The  (0^  Bennett  v.  Womack,  3  C.  &  P.  9G ; 

learned  author  of  this  treatise  maintains,  s.  c.  7  B.  &  C.  627. 

however,  with  great  ability  and  learning,  (U)  Codman  v.  Hall,  9  Allen,  335. 

that  an  action  of  covenant  will  lie  in  such  (u)   Haldane  v.  Johnson,  20  E.  L.  &  E. 

case  only  when  the  lease  is  made  by  in-  498  ;  s.  c.  8  Exch.  689. 

denture  executed  by  the  lessee.  (v)  Hunter  v.  Le  Conte,  6  Cowen,  728. 

(rr)  Brown  v.  Bragg,  22  Ind.  122.  (w)   Haldane  r.  Johnson,  20  E.  L.  &  E. 

(s)  Bradbury  v.  Wright,  Dougl.  624.  498;  s.  c.  8  Exch.  689. 

But  see  contra,  Cranston  v.  Clarke,  Sayer,  (r)   Hunter  v.  Le  Conte,  6  Cowen,  728 ; 

78.  Walter  v.  Dewey,  16  Johns.  222. 

1  Brand  v.  Frumveller,  32  Mich.  215.  ^  Amory  v.  Melvin,  112  Mass.  83. 

534 


i 


CH.  III.]  HIRING    OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  503 

good.  (?/)  Most  leases  now  made  in  this  country  contain  a 
clause  of  forfeiture  for  non-payment,  giving  to  the  lessor  the  right 
to  re-enter  thereupon,  and  to  repossess  himself  absolutely  of  the 
premises.  This  provision  is  expressed  in  various  ways,  but  it  is 
substantially  the  same  everywhere.  It  must  be  remembered, 
however,  that  the  law  is  exact,  and  indeed  punctilious,  as  to  the 
exercise  of  this  right  of  re-entry.  It  may  be  said,  in  general,  that 
a  demand  must  be  made  for  the  rent  due,  and  of  the  precise  sum, 
on  the  very  day  on  which  it  becomes  due,  and  at  a  convenient 
time  before  sunset,  and  at  the  very  place  where  it  is  payable,  if 
one  be  prescribed,  and  otherwise  at  the  most  conspicuous  or  noto- 
rious place  on  the  premises  leased.  (2) 

A  landlord  who  without  demanding  rent  the  day  it  is  due,  or 
then  entering,  and  without  giving  due  notice,  subsequently  enters 
upon  land  held  by  a  tenant  at  will,  is  a  trespasser,  (zz) 

A  lessee  for  years  holding  over  though  only  to  remove  his 
goods,  is  held  to  become  thereby  a  tenant  from  year  to  year,  and 
must  give  six  months'  notice  to  determine  his  tenancy,  (za)  ^ 

A  tenant  is  not  bound  to  make  repairs  without  an  express 
agreement.  Such  is  the  general  rule,  sometimes  asserted  quite 
strongly,  (zli)  But,  from  the  weight  of  authority,  and  the  prevail- 
ing usage,  we  should  say  that  the  tenant  must  make  such  repairs 
as  are  made  necessary  by  his  use  of  the  house,  and  are  required 
to  keep  the  premises  in  tenantable  condition.  And  even  if  an 
accident  occur  without  his  having  anything  to  do  with  it,  as  if  a 
window  were  broken,  or  slates  cast  from  the  roof,  he  must  repair, 
if  serious  injury  will  obviously  result  in  case  the  accident  be  left 
without  repair,  (a)  ^  In  general,  an  outgoing  tenant  must  leave 
the  premises  wind  and  water  tight,  but  is  not  bound  to  any 
ornamental  repair,  as  painting,  papering,  &c.,  although  so  broad 
a  covenant  on  his  part  as  "to  leave  the  premises  in  good  and 

(y)  Thomas  v.  Hayden,  cited  in  Per-  [zh)  Brewster  v.  De  Fremery,  33  Cal. 

kins  V.  Dana,  19  Vt.  589.  341, 

(2)  Van  Rensselaer  V.  Jewett,  2  Comst.  (a)  Ferguson  v.  ,  2  Esp.  590; 

135,  141 ;  Jones  r.  Reed,  15  N.  H.  68.     In  Gibson  i'.  Wells,  4  B.  &  P.  290;  Pomfret 

the  latter  case  it  is  said  that  the  demand  v.  Ricroft,  1  Wms.  Saimd.  323  h,  n.  (7) ; 

must  be  made  in  the  afternoon.  Horsefall  v.  Mather,  Holt,  7 ;  Auworth  v. 

[zz)  Cunningham  v.  Holton,  55  Me.  33.  Johnson,   5   C.   &   P.   239;    Torriano   v. 

(za)  Witt  i;.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  Young,  6  id.  8;   Libbey  v.  Telford,  48 

6  Rob.  441.  Me.  316. 

^  A  lessee  from  year  to  year  holding  over  becomes  a  trespasser  or  continues  to  be  a 
tenant,  as  the  landlord  elects.     Clinton  Wire  Cloth  Co.  v.  Gardner,  99  111.  151. 
2  U.  S.  V.  Bostwick,  94  U.  S.  53;  Miller  v.  Shields,  55  Ind.  71. 

535 


*504  THE   LAW    OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   III. 

sufficient  repair,  order,  and  condition,"  might  cover  these  re- 
pairs. (5)  ^  But  if  he  expressly  agrees  to  keep  the  prem- 
*  504  ises  *  in  repair,  and  to  deliver  them  up  in  good  repair,  he 
is  not  justified  in  permitting  them  to  remain  out  of  repair 
by  the  fact  that  they  were  so  when  he  received  them,  (c)  ^  If  the 
landlord  is  under  no  obligation  to  repair,  and  the  tenant  volun- 
tarily makes  them,  the  landlord  is  not  bound  to  repay  him  the 
expense ;  ((^)  ^  but  there  would  be  a  sufficient  consideration  to 
sustain  a  subsequent  promise  by  the  landlord.  If  there  be  an 
express  and  unconditional  agreement  to  repair,  or  to  redeliver  in 
good  order,  or  to  keep  in  good  repair,  the  tenant  is  bound  to  do 
this,  even  though  the  premises  are  destroyed  by  fire,  so  that  he  is 
in  fact  compelled  to  rebuild  them,  (e)*  but  not  if  destroyed  by  the 
act  of  God  or  the  public  enemies.  (/)  It  is,  therefore,  now  usual, 
in  well-drawn  leases,  to  add  to  the  covenant  obliging  the  tenant 
to  repair  and  redeliver  in  good  order,  an  exception,  "  unless  the 
premises  are  injured  or  destroyed  by  fire  or  inevitable  accident." 
It  is  held  that  where  the  lease  stipulates  that  if  the  house  be 
burned  down  the  rent  shall  cease,  such  a  contingency  determines 
the  lease,  and  the  landlord  may  take  possession.  (^)  Where 
the  tenant  contracts  to  repair,  there  is  no  implied  promise  to  use 
premises  in  a  tenant-like  manner,  (^)  but  such  tenant  is  liable  to 
third  parties  for  damages  resulting  from  tlie  ruinous  state  of  the 

(b)  Wise  V.  Metcalf,  10  B.  &  C.  312.  See  also  Mantz  v.  Goring,  4  Bing.  N.  C. 
But  a  declaration  stating,  tliat  in  consid-  451 ;  Burdett  v.  Withers,  7  A.  &  E.  36 ; 
eration  that  tlie  defendant  had  become  Belcher  v.  Mcintosh,  2  Man.  &  R.  186. 
tenant  to  the  plaintiff  of  a  farm,  the  de-  (c?)  Mumford  v.  Bowen,  6  Cowen,  475. 
fendant  undertook  to  make  a  certain  (e)  40  Ed.  3,  6,  pi.  11  ;  Paradine  v. 
quantity  of  fallow,  and  to  spend  £60  Jane,  Aleyn,  27 ;  Bullock  v.  Dommitt, 
worth  of  manure  every  year  thereon,  and  6  T.  R.  650;  Brecknock  Canal  Co.  r. 
to  keep  the  buildings  in  repair,  was  held  Pritchard,  6  T.  R.  750 ;  In  re  Skingley, 
bad  on  general  demurrer  ;  those  obliga-  3  E.  L.  &  E.  91 ;  Allen  v.  Culver,  3  Denio, 
tions  not  arising  out  of  the  bare  relation  284;  Spence  v.  Chadwick,  10  Q.  B.  517, 
of  landlord  and  tenant.  Brown  y.  Crump,  530;  Phillips  v.  Stevens,  16  Mass.  238; 
1  Marsh.  567.      See  also  Granger  v.  Col-  Fowler  v.  Bott,  6  Mass.  63. 

lins,  6  M.  &  W.  458;  Jackson  v.  Cobbin,  (/)  Baylev  v.  Lawrence,  1  Bay,  409; 

8  id.  790.  Pollard  v.  Shaaffer,  1   Dallas,  210.      Seo 

(c)  Payne  v.  Haine,  16  M.  &  W.  541.     Proctor  v.  Keith,  12  B.  Mon.  252. 

But  tlie  age  and  character  of  the  prem-  (Jj^)  Buschman    v.    Wilson,   29    Md 

ises  must  be  considered  in  determining     553. 

the  proper  extent  of  the  repairs.      Id.  (g)  Standen  v.  Christen,  10  Q.  B.  35. 

1  As  to  leaving  rubbish  on  the  premises,  see  Thorndike  v.  Bnrrage,  111  Mass.  531. 

2  He  must  leave  in  as  good  condition  as  can  be  done  without  changing  form  or 
material.     Ardesco  Oil  Co.  v.  Richardson,  63  Penn.  St.  162. 

3  Witty  V.  Matthews,  52  N.  Y.  512;  Colbeck  v.  Girdlers  Co.  1  Q.  B.  D.  234;  as  on 
a  hotel,  Morris  v.  Tillson,  81  111.  607 ;  water-works,  Skillen  v.  Water-works,  49  Ind. 
193;  or  salt-works,  Clark  v.  Babcock,  23  Mich.  164. 

*  Nor  is  it  the  landlord's  duty  to  alter,  for  the  convenience  or  safety  of  the  tenant's 
employees.    Ryan  v.  Wilson,  87  N.  Y.  471. 

636 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OP  REAL  PROPERTY.  *  HOf) 

premises ;  and  the  landlord  is  not,  if  the  premises  were  in  good 
order  when  leased.  (Ji)  i  But  the  tenant  is  not  made  liable  by 
this  agreement  for  acts  done  before  the  execution  of  the  inden- 
ture, although  its  habendum  states  that  the  premises  are  to  be 
held  from  a  day  prior  to  the  day  of  the  execution.  (J)  And  an 
underlessee,  with  covenants  to  repair,  is  liable  to  his  immediate 
landlord  only  for  such  damages  as  result  directly  from  the 
breach  of  his  *  own  contract ;  and  not  for  such  as  the  owner  *  506 
may  recover  from  the  mesne  landlord.  (/)  ^ 

The  tenant  of  a  farm  is  bound,  without  express  covenants,  to 
manage  and  cultivate  the  same  in  such  manner  as  may  be  required 
by  good  husbandry  and  the  usual  course  of  management  of  such 
farms  in  that  vicinity.  And  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  assumpsit  may 
be  maintained  on  the  breach  of  the  implied  promise.  (Jc)  If  he  be 
tenant  for  years,  he  may  cut  on  the  land  a  reasonable  quantity  of 
wood  for  fires  and  repairs,  (kk) 

It  is  no  answer  to  a  demand  for  rent  that  the  premises  are  not 
in  a  fit  and  proper  state  and  condition  for  the  purposes  for  which 
they  are  hired.  (Z)  ^  If,  therefore,  the  premises  are  burned  down, 
and  the  tenant  is  under  no  obligation  to  rebuild  (not  having 
agreed  to  keep  in  repair),  or  are  destroyed  by  the  act  of  God  or 
the  public  enemies,  yet  he  is  bound  to  pay  rent  thereafter,  (w) 

(h)  Bears  v.  Ambler,  9  Penn.  St.  193.  G.  576 ;   Harrison  v.  Lord  North,  1  Ch. 

(i)  Shaw  V.  Kay,  1  Exch.  412.  Cas.  83. 

(/)  Logan    V.    Hall,    4     C    B.    598;  (m)  Pollard  r.  Shaaffer,  1  Dallas,  210; 

Walker  v.  Hatton,  10  M.  &  W.  249 ;  Pen-  Niedelet  v.  Wales,  16  Mo.  214  ;  Fowler  v. 

ley  V.  Watts,  7  id.  601.      But  see  contra,  Bott,  6  Mass.  62 ;  Lemott  v.  Skerrett,  1 

Neale  v.  Wyllie,  3  B.  &  C  533.  Har.  &  J.  42  ;  Wagner  v  White,  4  Har. 

(k)  Powley  v.  Walker,  5  T.  R.  373 ;  &  J.  546 ;   Redding  v.  Hall,  1  Bibb,  536. 

Beale   v.   Sanders,    3   Bing.   N.    C.   850;  But  see   Wood   y.  Hubbell,  5  Barb.  001, 

Brown  v.  Crump,  1  Marsh.  567.    See  also  where  the  buildings  were  burned  after 

Wigglesworth    v.   Dallison,   Dougl.  201;  the  lease  was  executed  but  before  the 

Legh  V.  Hewitt,  4  East,  154;   Senior  v.  term  began,  or  ttie  lessee  took  possession  ; 

Armytage,  Holt,  197  ;  Gough  v.  Howard,  and  he  was  held  not  liable  for  rent.    And 

Peake,  Ad.  Cas.  197;  Dalby  v.  Hirst,  1  in  Warner  r.  Hitchins,  5  Barb.  66,  where 

Br.  &  B.  224,  3  Moore,  536;  Angerstein  the  premises  were  burned  down  during 

V.  Hanson,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  789  ;   Hutton  v.  the  term,  it  was  held  tliat  the  lessee  was 

Warren,    i    M.    &   W.   466 ;    Halifax    v.  not  bound  to  rebuild,  because  there  was 

Chambers,  4  id.  663;  Lewis  ?'.  Jones,  17  no  covenant  to  repair  or  rebuild,  altliougii 

Penn.  St.  262.  there  w-is  a  covenant  to  return  the  prem- 

{kk)   Hubbard  v.  Shaw,  12  Allen,  120.  ises  in  the  same  condition  as  taken,  and 

(L)  Hart    v.   Windsor,    12   M.   &    W.  natural  wear  excepted.      See  Graves  v. 

68 ;   Surplice  v.  Farnsworth,  7  Man.  &  Berden,  26  N.  Y.  498. 

1  Hoy  V.  Holt,  91  Penn.  St.  88.  As  where  a  clause  was  to  "  keep  in  repair  and  leave 
as  found."     Ely  v.  Elv,  80  111.  532 

2  See  Williams  v.  Williams,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  659. 

3  A  tenant  is  still  liable  on  an  express  covenant,  though  the  lessor  has  collected 
insurance  money  and  refuses  to  rebuild,  Bussman  v.  Ganster,  72  Penn.  St.  285 ;  and 
his  guarantor  is  equally  bound,  Kingsbury  v.  Westfall,  61  N.  Y.  356;  and  rent  paid  iu 
advance  cannot  be  recovered  back,  Diamond  v.  Harris,  33  Tex.  634. 

537 


*  506  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

unless,  as  is  now  frequently  done  in  this  country,  the  lease  con- 
tains a  provision,  that  the  rent  shall  cease  or  proportionally  abate 
while  the  premises  remain  wholly  or  in  part  unfit  for  use.  ^ 

In  the  absence  of  express  agreement  to  repair,  the  lessee  is 
not  bound  to  rebuild  a  house,  which  has  been  burned  through  the 
negligence  and  folly  of  his  own  servants,  (7z) 

A  lessee  may  assign  over  the  whole  or  a  part  of  his  term  in 

the  premises.2     If  he  parts  with  the  whole  of  his  interest  it  is  an 

assignment ;  if  with  less  than  the  whole  it  is  an  underleasing, 

leaving  a  reversion  in  the  original  lessee.     An  underlease 

*  506    is  not  *  a  breach  of  a  covenant  "  not  to  assign,  transfer,  or 

set  over  "  the  premises,  or  the  lease,  or  the  interest  or  estate 
of  the  lessee ;  (o)  ^  but  if  there  be  added  to  the  covenant  the 
words  "  or  any  part  thereof,"  it  is  equally  a  breach,  to  underlet 
or  to  assign.  The  assignment  must  be  of  the  whole  term,  to 
make  the  assignee  tenant  of  the  lessor ;  hence  where  the  last  day 
of  the  term  was  reserved  by  the  lessee,  the  assignee  was  liable  to 
him  and  not  to  the  lessor,  (oo)  By  such  breach  the  original  lessee 
becomes  liable  for  damages  ;  but  the  lease  is  not  terminated,  or 
the  interest  of  tlie  sub-lessee  destroyed,  unless  the  original  lease 
is  made  on  condition  that  there  shall  be  no  assignment,  nor  un- 
derleasing ;  or  provides  that  the  original  lessor  may,  upon  any 

(n)  McKenzie   v.   McLeod,   10    Bing.  ter,  8  T.  R.  57.    But  it  is  otherwise  if  the 

385.  assignment  is  the  voluntarij  act  of  tiie  ten- 

(o)  Crusoe  v.  Bugby,  2  W.  Bl.  766  ;  ant.     Doe  r.  Carter,  8  T.  R.  57,  300 ;  Doe 

B.  c.  3  Wils.  234 ;    Kinnersley    v.  Orpe,  v.  Hawke,  2  East,  481.      It  would  seem, 

Dougl.   56 ;    Church   v.   Brown,   15   Vcs.  therefore,  tliat  talcing  tlie  benefit  of  an 

258,  265.  —  But  a  covenant  against  under-  insolvent  law  would  be  a  breach  of  the 

letting  will  restrain  the  alienation  by  as-  covenant.    See  Shee  v.  Hale,  13  Ves.  404. 

signment.      Greenway   v.  Adams,  12  Ves.  And  if  the  lease  is  made  subject  to  a  con- 

395.  —  Letting  lodgings  is  not  a  breach  dition  tiiat  the  premises  shall  be  actually 

of   covenant   not   to   underlet.      Doe   v.  occupied  by  the  lessee,  the  lease  will  of 

Laming,  4  Camp.  73. — And  an  assign-  course  determine  whenever  the  condition 

ment  by  operation  of  law  is  no  breach  of  is  broken,  whether  it  be  by  the  voluntary 

a  covenant  not  to  assign  ;  as  in  a  case  of  act  of  the  party  or  by  operation  of  law. 

bankruptcy,  or  where  tlie  term  is  taken  Doe  v.  Clarke,  8  East,  185. 
on  execution  by  a  creditor.     Doe  v.  Car-  (oo)  Davis  v.  Morris,  36  N.  Y.  569. 

1  A  tenant  should  provide  for  suspension  of  rent  during  the  time  premises  are  unin- 
habitable by  fire  or  other  casualty,  Minot  v.  Joy,  118  Mass.  308  ;  and  it  will  apply  to 
rent  paid  in  advance,  Rich  ;•.  Smith,  121  Jlass.  328;  but  not  to  gradual  decay.  Hatch 
V.  Stamper,  42  Conn.  28;  unless  the  result  of  fire,  Cary  v.  Whitiug,  118  Mass.  363. 
An  oral  stipulation  is  insufficieut.  Martin  r.  Berens,  67  Penn.  St.  459 ;  but  see  Phyfe 
V.  Eimer,  45  N.  Y.  102.  The  bursting  of  boiler  is  such  a  casualty.  Phillips  v.  Sun, 
&c.  Co.  10  R.  I.  458. 

2  If  consent  to  assign  is  not  to  be  arbitrarily  withheld,  an  unreasonable  refusal  gives 
the  lessee  such  a  right.     Treloar  v.  Bigge,  L.  R.  9  Ex.  151. 

8  Eten  i\  Luyster,  60  N.  Y.  252  ;"shaw  v.  Farnsworth,  108  Mass.  357.  That  a 
covenant  against  underletting  will  not  prevent  an  assignment,  see  Field  v.  Mills, 
4  Vroom,  254 ;  Bemis  v.  "Wilder,  100  Mass.  446. 

538 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  507 

assignment  or  underleasing,  enter  and  expel  the  lessee  or  his 
assigns,  and  terminate  the  lease.  If  the  lessees  be  a  copartner- 
ship, a  change  in  the  partners  by  withdrawal  or  addition  is  not 
a  breach  of  the  covenant  not  to  underlet,  (ojt?)  ^  In  a  recent 
English  case  the  underlessee  of  a  tenant  who  had  covenanted  not 
to  carry  on  a  certain  trade,  was  restrained  from  carrying  on  that 
trade,  (oq) 

A  distinction  formerly  prevailed  between  a  proviso  declaring 
that  the  lease  should  be  void  on  a  specified  event,  and  a  proviso 
enabling  the  lessor  to  determine  it  by  re-entry ;  and  it  was  held, 
that  in  the  former  case  the  lease  became  absolutely  void  on  the 
event  named,  and  was  incapable  of  being  restored  by  acceptance 
of  rent,  or  other  act  of  intended  confirmation  ;  while  in  the  latter, 
some  act,  such  as  entry  or  claim,  must  have  been  performed  by 
the  lessor  to  manifest  his  intention  to  end  the  demise,  which  was 
voidable  in  the  interval,  and  consequently  confirmable.  This  dis- 
tinction, however,  is  now  exploded  ;  and  it  is  held  that  the  lease 
is  voidable  only  at  the  election  of  the  lessor,  but  not  of  the  lessee, 
though  the  proviso  expressly  declare  that  it  shall  be  void.  (/^)^ 
And  any  act  will  be  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture,  which  is  a  distinct 
and  voluntary  recognition  of  the  lease  by  the  lessor,  with  a  full 
knowledge  of  the  forfeiture;  as  by  taking  rent,  &c.  (9)^ 
Whether  a  mere  demand  of  *  subsequent  rent  is  a  waiver  *  507 
is  not  so  certain,  (r)  A  waiver  of  tlie  forfeiture  for  one 
breach  does  not  prevent  the  lessor  from  insisting  on  the  forfeit- 
ure for  another,  (s)  The  sub-lessee  is  not  liable  to  the  original 
lessor,  there  being  no  privity  between  them.  But  if  the  whole 
term  and  interest  be  assigned  by  the  termor,  the  assignee  —  who 
is  not  a  sub-lessee,  as  there  is  no  reversion  in  the  termor  —  is 

{op)  Roosevelt  v.  Hopkins,  33  N.  Y.  81.  v.  Birch,  1  M.  &  W.  402 ;  Doe  v.  Rees,  4 

(on)  Clements  v.  Wells,  Law  Rep.  1  Eq.  Bing.  N.  C.  384;  Arnsby  v.  Woodward,  6 

403.  B.  &  C.  500;   Harvie  v.  Oswel,  Cro.  E. 

(p)   See  Piatt  on  Leases,  vol.  ii.  p.  327  ;  572  ;  Goodright  v.  Davids,  2  Cowp.  803  ; 

1  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  19;  and  Taylor,  Land-  Garnliarn  v.  Finney,  40  Mo.  440.     But  see 

lord  and  Tenant  (7th  ed.),  §  492,  where  Importer's  Ins  Co.  r.  Christie,  5  Rob.  169. 
this  point  is  fully  considered,  and  cases  (r)  Doe  ?■.  Birch,  1  M.  &  W.  406. 

cited.  (5)  Doe  v.  Bliss,  4  Taunt.  735;  Doe  v. 

(q)  Roe  V.  Harrison,  2  T.  R.  425;  Doe  Woodbridge,  9  B.  &  C.  37G. 

1  See  Varley  v.  Coppard,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  50.5,  to  the  effect  that  an  express  assign- 
ment, on  dissolution,  by  a  partner  to  his  copartner  was  a  breach. 

2  But  where  a  lease  is  to  terminate  on  a  sale  by  the  lessor,  it  becomes  absolutely 
void  thereby.     Morton  v.  Weir,  70  N.  Y.  247.     See  Rogers  v.  Snow,  118  Mass.  118. 

3  Walrond  v.  Hawkins,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  342;  Murray  v.  Harway,  56  N.  Y.  337; 
Clifford  V.  Reilly,  Ir.  R.  4  C.  L.  218. 

639 


*  508  THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   III. 

now  liable  to  the  original  lessor  for  rent,  by  reason  of  his  privity 
of  estate,  (i) 

Where  the  letting  is  in  the  alternative,  as  for  two,  four,  or 
eight  years,  the  tenant  may  determine  the  tenancy  at  either  of 
these  periods  by  a  proper  notice,  unless  it  be  expressly  agreed 
otherwise,  (m) 

A  tenant  may  not  dispute  his  landlord's  title  ;  for  he  is  es- 
topped from  changing,  by  his  own  act,  the  character  and  effect 
of  his  tenure,  (v)  ^  And  wherever  a  tenant  disclaims  his  tenure, 
or  denies  his  landlord's  title,  or  claims  adversely  to  him,  or 
attorns  to  another  as  having  title  against  him,  he  forfeits  his 
estate.  But  where  the  lease  was  obtained  by  the  fraud  of  the 
landlord,  the  tenant  may  now  defend  against  an  action  brought 
on  the  lease,  by  impeaching  the  landlord's  title,  (w)  ^  It  has 
been  held,  however,  that  this  fraud  must  be  practised  directly 
against  the  tenant ;  and  is  not  enough  that  the  landlord's  title  is 
fraudulent  as  against  other  parties,  against  the  creditors  of  the 
actual  owner,  for  example.  The  landlord  may  enter  at  once, 
and   bring   ejectment   for   the   forfeiture.     But   this   is  a 

*  508    disclaimer   *  of  the   lease   by  the   landlord,  who   cannot 

thereafter  take  any  advantage  from  the  tenancy,  (x)    But  a 

(0  Stevenson  v.  Lambard,  2  East,  575.  reporter;  Willison  v.  Watkins,  3  Pet.  43; 

See  also  o«te,  p.  *  231,  and  note  (s).  Doe  v.  Heath,  13  Ired.  L.  498;  Fussel- 

(u)  Dann  v.  Spurrier,  3  B.  &  P.  399;  man  v.  Worthington,  14  111.  135;  Pierce 
Goodright  v.  Richardson,  3  T.  R.  462.  v.  Minturn,  1  Cal.  470.  But  see  Mount- 
Where  a  house  was  leased  at  a  certain  ney  v.  Collier,  16  E.  L.  &  E.  232 ;  s.  c.  1 
rent,  "  to  be  paid  quarterly,  or  half  quar-  E.  &  B.  630  ;  Den  ".  Ashmore,  2  N.  J.  261 ; 
terly  if  required,"  and  the  tenant  entered  Shultz  v.  Elliott,  11  Humph.  183;  Funk's 
and  paid  his  rent  quarterly  for  one  year,  Lessee  v  Kincaid,  5  Md.  404. 
after  which  the  landlord,  without  previ-  (iv)  Hamilton  i'.  Marsden,  6  Binn.  45; 
ous  demand  or  notice,  distrained  for  half  Baskinr.  Seechrist,6Penn.St.  154;  Brown 
a  quarter's  rent,  alleged  to  be  then  due,  v.  Dysinger,  1  Rawle,  408;  Miller  v.  Mc- 
it  was  held,  that  he  had  no  right  so  to  Brier,  14  S.  &  R.  382. 
do,  but  must  give  previous  notice  of  his  {x)  Greeno  v.  Munson,  9  Vt.  37 ;  Hall 
election.  Mallam  v.  Arden,  10  Bing.  ??.  Dewey,  10  id.  593  ;  Carpenter  i-.  Tliomp- 
299.  son,  3  N.  H.  204 ;  Blake  v.  Howe,  1  Aik. 

{v)  Doe  V.  Barton,  11   A.  &  E.  307  ;  306;  Lord  v.  Bigelow,  8  Vt.  445;  Doe  v. 

Fleming  v.  Gooding,  10  Bing.  549 ;  Doe  Whittick,   Gow,  "195 ;    Doe   v.   Frowd,  4 

V.  Smylhe,  4  M.  &  Sel.  347  ;  Alchorne  v.  Bing.  557  ;  Doe  v.  Grubb,  10  B.  &  C.  816; 

Gomme,  2  Bing.  54;  Gravenor  v.  Wood-  Doe  v.  Pittman,  2  Nov.  &  M.  673;  Doe  v. 

house,  7  J.  B.  Moore,  289  ;  Parry  v.  House,  Long,  9  C.  &  P.  773 ;  Doe  v.  Evans,  9  M. 

Holt,  489,  and  the  learned  note  by  the  &  W.  48. 

1  As  by  buying  in  an  outstanding  title.  Ryerson  v.  Eldred,  18  Mich.  12 ;  Ronaldson 
V.  Tabor,  43  Ga.  230.  So  of  a  tenant  holding  over,  Bonney  v.  Foss,  62  Me.  248  ;  of  a 
tenant's  assignee,  Hardin  v.  Forsj^the,  99  111.  312  ;  Stagg  r.  Eureka  Co.  56  Mo.  317  ; 
of  an  owner  in  fee,  Campbell  r.  Shipley,  41  Md.  81 ;  if  in  possession,  Lucas  v.  Brooks, 
18  Wall.  436;  Prevot  v.  Lawrence,  51  N.  Y.  219. 

2  Must  be  practised  on  the  tenant,  Wyoming  Co.  v.  Price,  81  Penn.  St.  156; 
Wilborn  v.  Whitfield,  44  (Ja.  51  ;  and  deceive  him,  Camarillo  v.  Fenlon,  49  Cal.  202. 
See  Jenckes  v.  Cook,  9  R.  I.  520';  Evans  v.  Bidwell,  76  Penn.  St.  497;  Higgins  v. 
Turner,  61  Mo.  249. 

540 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  .008 

disclaimer  by  a  tenant  will  work  a  forfeiture  only  when  it 
amounts  to  a  renunciation  of  his  character  as  a  tenant,  which 
may  be  either  by  setting  up  a  title  in  another  or  claiming  title  in 
himself,  (y)  A  refusal  to  pay  rent,  together  with  a  rctiuest  for 
further  information  as  to  the  landlord's  title,  or  a  delay  until 
conflicting  claims  are  settled,  seem  not  to  be  sufficient  to  work  a 
forfeiture.  (2)  And  while  a  tenant  may  not  dispute  his  land- 
lord's title,  he  may  show  that  it  has  terminated  ;  (zz)  ^  and  evic- 
tion under  paramount  title  is  a  defence  to  the  tenant,  (za)  Nor 
is  a  tenant  estopped  from  denying  his  landlord's  title  after  he  has 
surrendered  his  possession.  Qzb}  And  he  must  make  this  surren- 
der before  he  can  assert  rights  against  the  landlord,  acquired  by 
the  tenant  after  his  tenancy  began,  (zc) 

The  payment  of  rent  admits,  primd  facie,  a  tenancy  by  impli- 
cation ;  (a)  but  this  inference  may  be  prevented  and  the  evi- 
dence rebutted  by  showing  that  the  payment  was  made  under  a 
mistake.  (5)  ^ 

It  was  always  admitted,  that  an  actual  expulsion  of  the  tenant, 
by  the  lessor,  suspended  the  rent ;  (c)  ^  but  it  was  also  held,  that 
no  conduct  of  the  lessor,  however  offensive,  if  it  were  less  than 
expulsion,  affected  the  obligation  of  rent,  (c^)  But  this  rule  of 
law  has  been  essentially  modified.  It  seems  to  be  now  settled,  at 
least  in  this  country,  that  a  lessor,  by  conduct  of  extreme  outrage 
and  indecency,  is  barred  from  his  action  for  rent,  (e)     And  if  the 

(y)  Doe  V.  Cooper,  1  Man.  &  G.  135.  {b)  Claridge  v.  Mackenzie,  4  Man.  &  G. 

And  see  Elliott  v.  Smith,  23  Penn.  St.  131.  143 ;  Doe  v.  Barton,  11  A.  &  E.  307  ;  Doe 

[z)  Doe  V.  Cawdor,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  398;  v.  Brown,  7  A.  &  E.  447. 
Doe  V.  Stanion,  1  M.  &  W.  695;  Doe  v.  (c)  Salmon  v.  Smith,  1  Wms.  Saund. 

Pasquali,  Peake,  Cas.  196.  202,  204,  n.   (2)  :   Co.   Litt.   148  b ;   As- 

(zz)   18  N.  H.  222.  cough's  case,  9  Rep.  135 ;   Pendleton  v. 

\za)  Moffat  v.  Strong,  9  Bosw.  57.  Dyett,  4  Cowen,  581 ;  Bennett  v.  Bittle, 

(zb)  Zimmerman  v.  Marchland,  23  Ind.  4  Rawle,  339 ;  Page  v.  Parr,  Styles,  432. 
474.  {d)  See  the  cases  in  the  last  note. 

{zc)  Brown  v.  Keller,  32  111.  151.  (e)  Ogilvie  v.  Hull,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  52 ; 

(a)  Gouldsworth  v.  Knights,  11  M.  &  Pendleton  v.  Dyett,  8  Cowen,  727,  revers- 

W.  337  ;  Fonner  v.  Duplock,  2  liing.  10.  ing  the  same  case  in  4  Cowen,  581. 

1  As  by  eviction  or  judicial  sale,  Duff  v.  Wilson,  69  Penn.  St.  316;  Lancashire  v. 
Mason,  75  N.  C.  455 ;  or  by  mortgage  foreclosure,  Ryder  v.  Mansell,  66  Me.  167 ; 
Ramsdell  v.  Maxwell,  .32  Mich.  285  ;  as  then  the  lessor's  right  to  sue  him  ceases,  St. 
John  V.  Quitzlow,  72  111.  334 ;  Silvey  v.  Sumner,  61  Mo.  253  ;  or  if  the  lessor's  wife, 
in  whose  right  he  was  seized,  dies,  Lamson  ??.  Clarkson,  113  Mass.  348.  A  tenant 
may  also  show  that  the  purport  and  effect  of  the  lease  was  entirely  misapprehended. 
Wiggin  V.  Wiggin,  58  N.  H.  235. 

'-^  Anderson  v.  Smith,  63  111.  126. 

8  An  entry  without  eviction  is  a  mere  trespass.  Bartlett  v.  Farrington,  120  Mass. 
284.  So  an  entry  to  put  up  a  sign  "to  let."  Oastler  v.  Henderson,  2  Q.  B.  D.  575 ; 
Pier  V.  Carr,  69  Penn.  St.  326.     See  Colburn  v.  Morrill,  1 1 7  Mass.  262. 

541 


*  509  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  III. 

lessee  proves  an  interference  with  his  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the 
premises,  which  is  material,  and  intentional,  this  would  be  a 
defence  against  such  an  action.  (/)  ^  But  the  interference  must 
be  deliberate  and  intentional,  and  only  by  the  landlord  himself, 
and  not  by  another  tenant,  or  other  person.  (^) 

*  509        *  If  a  landlord  oust  his  tenant  from   any  part   of   the 

demised  premises,  the  tenant  may  surrender  to  him  the 
rest,  and  be  no  further  liable  for  rent.  (A)  ^ 

As  it  is  the  duty  of  the  tenant  to  surrender  the  premises  to  his 
landlord  when  the  tenancy  expires,  if  a  stranger  intrude  the 
tenant  should  take  legal  means  to  recover  possession,  that  he 
may  at  the  proper  time  surrender  the  premises.  And  until  the 
tenant  restores  full  and  complete  possession  to  the  landlord  he  is 
liable  for  his  rent.  (JiK)  ^ 

It  has  been  held  in  England  that  when  on  a  regular  notice  to 
quit,  the  tenant  duly  quitted  the  premises  and  removed  his  goods, 
his  accidental  retaining  of  the  key  for  a  few  days  will  not  make 
him  liable  for  the  rent  of  another  quarter,  (lii) 

If  a  landlord  has  gained  peaceable  possession  of  a  part  of  the 
premises  on  the  termination  of  the  lease,  he  may  use  necessary 
force  for  acquiring  possession  of  the  remainder.  (7y )  ^ 

To  offer  a  surrender  before  the  lease  terminates,  there  must  be 
a  mutual  agreement  between  lessor  and  lessee ;  but  this  agree- 
ment need  not  be  express,  and  may  be  inferred  from  the  conduct 
of  the  parties,  Qik') 

(/)  Cohen  n.  Dupont,  1  Sandf.  260;  (hh)  Schillings.  Holmes,  23  Cal.  227. 

Gilhooley  v.  Washington,  4  Conist.  217;  (hi)  Gray  v.  Eompas,  11  C.  B.  [s.  s.) 

Jackson  v.   Eddy,  12  Mo.  209;   Christo-  520. 

pher  V.  Austin,  1  Ivern.  216.  {hj)  Mugford  v.  Richardson,  6  Allen, 

[g)  Gilhooley  v.  Washington,  4  Comst.  76. 

217.  (hk)    Bedford   v.    Terhune,   3   N.   Y. 

(h)  Smith  V.  Raleigh,  3   Camp.  513;  453. 
Briggs  V.  Hall,  4  Leigh,  484. 

1  If  a  lessor's  acts  merely  diminish  the  beneficial  enjoyment,  the  tenant  must  aban- 
don or  continue  to  pay  rent,  De  Witt  v.  Pierson,  112  Mass.  8 ;  as  where  the  lessor  of  a 
distillery  refused  to  give  the  lessee  a  United  States  certificate,  Grabeuhorst  v.  Nico- 
demus,  42  Md.  236 ;  or  the  lessor's  adjoining  cellar  was  a  nuisance,  Alger  v.  Kennedy, 
49  Vt.  109.     See  Scott  v.  Simons,  54  N.  H.  426. 

2  Rent  is  merely  suspended  until  restoration  of  that  part.  Colburn  v.  Morrill,  117 
Mass.  262  ;  Hayner  v.  Smith,  6.3  111.  430  ;  Skaggs  i'.  Emerson,  50  Cal.  3.  If  the  lessor 
uses  unreserved  privileges  he  cannot  collect  rent  therefor.  Townsend  v.  Nickerson, 
&c.  Co.  117  Mass.  501. 

3  Where  a  statutory  notice  of  intention  to  quit  is  required,  and  the  landlord  refuses 
to  accept  possession  after  the  tenant's  abandonment,  the  tenant  continues  to  be  liable 
for  rent  until  such  notice  is  given.     Rollins  v.  Moody,  72  Me.  135. 

*  See  Stearns  v.  Sampson,  59  Me.  568. 

542 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OP   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  509 


SECTION  IV. 

OP  SURRENDER  OP  LEASES  BY  OPERATION  OF  LAW. 

Such  surrender  takes  place  when  the  lessee  does  something 
incompatible  with  the  lease,  and  the  lessor  assents  or  co-oper- 
ates.i  As  if  the  lessor  gives  and  the  lessee  accepts  a  new  valid 
lease.  (0  There  is,  perhaps,  no  better  definition  of  the  acts 
which  make  a  surrender  in  law,  than  to  say,  that  they  are  such 
acts,  as  in  contemplation  of  law,  are  acts  of  notoriety  ;  as  formal 
and  solemn  as  the  execution  of  a  deed,  or  livery,  entry,  and 
acceptance  of  an  estate,  (y)  The  surrender  may  be  by  substitut- 
ing a  new  lease  between  the  same  parties,  as  we  have  seen,  or  a 
new  lessee  instead  of  the  old  one.  (k)  But  the  mere  agreement 
for  substitution  is  not  enough ;  there  must  be  an  actual  change  of 
possession,  and  an  actual  reception  by  the  lessor  of  the  new 
tenant  in  the  stead  of  the  old  one ;  (J)  otherwise  the  new  tenant  is 
but  the  assignee  or  sub-lessee  of  the  old  one.  Or  it  may  be  a 
surrender  and  abandonment  of  the  premises  to  the  landlord, 
he  accepting  the  same,  and   no   new  contract   substituted,  (m) 

(i)  Lyon  v.  Reed,  13  M.  &  W.  285;  {I)  Graham  v.  Whichelow,  1  Cr.  &  M. 

Doe  V.  Pole,  11  Q.  B.  713.  188 ;  Taylor  v.  Chapman,  Peake,  Ad.  Cas. 

(_;■)  Parke,  B.,  Lyon  v.  Reed,  13  M.  &  19.     See  also  McDonnell  v.  Pope,  13  E. 

W.  309;  Co.  Lit.  352  a.     See  also  Crow-  L.  &  E.  11;  Barlow  u.   Wainwright,  22 

ley  V.  Vitty,  9  E.  L.  &  E.  501 ;  s.  c.  7  Exch.  Vt.  88. 

319.  (m)  Reeve  v.   Bird,  1  C.  M  &  R.  31. 

[k)  Stone  v.   Whiting,  2  Stark.  235 ;  In  Grimman  v.  Legge,  8  B.  &  C.  324,  A. 

Thomas  v.  Cook,  2  Stark.  408 ;   s.  c.  2  demised  to  B.  the  first  and  second  floor 

B.  &  Aid.  119;  Lyon  v.  Reed,  13  M.  &  W.  of  a  house  for  a  year,  at  a  rent  payable 

285;  Doe  I'.  Wood,  14  M.  &  W.  682;  Nick-  quarterly.     During    a    current    quarter, 

ells  V.  Atherstone,  10  Q.  B.  944 ;  Whitney  some  dispute  arising  between  the  parties, 

V.  Meyers,  1  Duer,  266.  B.  told  A.  that  she  would  quit  immedi- 

1  A  written  lease  may  be  surrendered  by  abandonment  with  the  landlord's  assent 
and  reletting,  Stobie  v.  Dills,  62  111.  432 ;  so  by  an  underletting  and  acceptance  of 
the  sub-tenant  by  the  landlord,  and  the  collecting  of  rent  from  the  latter,  Amory  ;;. 
Kannoffsky,  117  Mass.  357;  so  the  receiving  the  key  of  the  premises  and  the  put- 
ting another  tenant  in,  Hanham  v.  Sherman,  114  Mass.  19;  so  where  the  tenant  sur- 
renders, and  a  sub-tenant,  who  had  offered  to  surrender,  quits  the  premises,  Pratt 
V.  Richards,  &c.  Co.  69  Penn.  St.  53.  The  delivery  of  the  keys  to,  and  ncgotiation.s 
by  the  lessor  with,  a  third  party  are  evidence  of  surrender,  Plill  v.  Robinson,  23 
Mich.  244  ;  but  if  the  tenant  abandons  and  liauds  the  key  to  the  landlord,  who 
puts  up  a  notice  "  to  let "  and  makes  repairs,  it  is  no  surrender,  Oastler  v.  Henderson, 
2  Q.  B.  D.  575  ;  Pier  v.  Carr,  69  Penn.  St.  326.  As  to  the  liability  of  retiring  part- 
ner, see  Beall  v.  White,  94  U.  S.  382.  In  Kinsey  v.  Minnick,  43  Md.  112,  held,  that 
after  a  change  of  partners,  surrender  at  the  term  end  is  presumed.  See  Mellor  v. 
Watkins,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  400,  as  to  surrender  affecting  third  persons.  A  surety  for  rent 
is  not  discharged  by  a  surrender.     Kingsbury  v.  Westfall,  61  N.  Y.  356. 

543 


*510 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book    111. 


*  510  An  acceptance  of  rent,  by  the  lessor  from  a  third  *  party, 
is  primd  facie  only  an  acceptance  of  rent  paid  by  the  lessee 
through  an  agent ;  (w)  but  if  this  presumption  be  rebutted  by 
facts  going  to  show  that  the  landlord  had  given  up  the  lessee,  and 
had  nothing  more  to  do  with  him,  and  treated  the  new  occupant 
as  his  lessee,  this  will  amount  to  a  surrender.  For  the  landlord 
cannot  hold  both  as  his  lessees.  (<?) 


SECTION   V. 

OF   AWAY-GOING    CROPS. 

A  tenant  whose  estate  is  terminated  by  an  uncertain  event 
which  he  could  neither  foresee  nor  control,  is  entitled  to  the 
annual  crop  which  he  sowed  while  his  estate  continued,  by  the 
law  of  emblements.  But  a  tenant  for  years  knows  when  his  lease 
will  expire.  Nevertheless  he  has  usually  some  right  to  the  crop 
he  sowed,  and  to  so  much  possession  of  the  land  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  getting  in  the  crop ;  but  this  right  must  depend  either  on 
agreement  or  on  usage.  At  common  law  he  has  no  such  right.  (^)  ^ 
The  local  usages  of  this  country,  in  this  respect,  vary  very  much, 
and  are  not  often  distinctly  defined  or  well  established.  Thus, 
there  is  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  property  in  the  manure  of  a 


ately.  The  latter  answered,  she  might 
go  when  she  pleased.  B.  quitted,  and  A. 
accepted  possession  of  the  apartments  : 
Held,  that  A.  could  neither  recover  the 
rent,  whicii,  by  virtue  of  the  original  con- 
tract, would  have  become  due  at  the  ex- 
piration of  the  current  quarter ;  nor  rent 
pro  rata  for  the  actual  occupation  of  the 
premises  for  any  period  short  of  the  quar- 
ter. See  also  Dodd  v.  Acklom,  6  Man.  & 
G.  672. 

(n)  Copeland  v.  Watts,  1  Stark.  95. 

(o)  Reeve  v.  Bird,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  31  ; 
Walls  V.  Atcheson,  11  J.  B.  Moore,  379; 
Woodcock  V.  Nuth,  8  Bmg.  170;  Thomas 
V.  Cooke,  2  B.  &  Aid.  119;  Jolmstone  v. 
Huddlestone,  4  B.  &  C.  922. 

(p)  Caldecott  v.  Smythies,  7  C.  &  P. 
808;   Wigglesworth  v.  Dallison,  Dougl. 


201.  See  also  Griffiths  v.  Puleston,  13  M. 
&  W.  358 ;  Strickland  v.  Maxwell,  2  Cr. 
&  M.  539 ;  Boraston  v.  Green,  16  East,  71 ; 
Davis  V.  Cannop,  1  Price,  53 ;  Beavan  v. 
Delahay,  1  H.  Bl.  5 ;  Knight  v.  Banett,  3 
Bing.  364 ;  Hutton  v.  Warren,  1  M.  &  W. 
466 ;  Senior  v.  Armytage,  Holt,  197 ;  Webb 
V.  Plummer.  2  B.  &  Aid.  746 ;  Holding  v. 
Pigott,  7  Bing.  465.  By  the  custom  of 
Pennsylvania,  the  right  of  the  tenant  for 
a  definite  term  to  his  away-going  crops, 
seems  to  be  well  established.  Uiffedorffer 
V.  Jones,  cited  in  Carson  v.  Blazer,  2  Binn. 
487,  and  in  Stultz  v.  Dickey,  5  Binn.  289  j 
Comfort  V.  Duncan,  1  Miles,  229 ;  Demi 
V.  Bossier,  1  Penn.  224.  Such  is  tlie  case 
also  in  New  Jersey.  Van  Doren  v.  Ever- 
itt,  2  Southard,  460  ;  Templeman  v.  Bid- 
die,  1  Harring.  (Del.)  522. 


1  Under  a  five  years'  lease,  ending  July  18,  the  tenant  was  allowed  to  take  hay 
maturing  a  week  earlier,  if  good  farming,  though  he  had  the  hay  ripening  in  first 
year  of  lease.     Willey  v.  Connor,  44  Vt.  68. 

544 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  *  .Gil 

farm.  Generally,  in  this  country,  the  outgoing  tenant  cannot  sell 
or  take  away  the  manure,  (^)i  although  it  would  seem  that  in 
England  he  can.  (r) 


♦SECTION  VI.  •511 

OP   FIXTURES. 

The  tenant  may  annex  some  things  to  the  freehold,  and  yet 
retain  the  right  to  remove  them.  These  things  are  called  Fix- 
tures, (s)  2  There  are  no  precise  and  certain  rules,  by  which  we 
can  always  determine  what  are  and  what  are  not  removable.  The 
method  of  affixing  is  a  useful  criterion,  but  not  a  certain  one. 
For  doors,  windows,  blinds,  and  shutters,  although  capable  of 
removal  without  injury  to  the  house,  and  in  fact  detached  at  the 
time  of  transfer,  nevertheless  pass  with  the  house  ;  while  mirrors, 
wardrobes,  &c.,  although  far  more  strongly  fastened,  would  still 

(7)  Lassell   v.   Reed,   6   Greenl.   222 ;  of  it  in  the  deed.     Kittredge  v.  Woods,  3 

Staples  V.  Emery,  7  Greenl.  201 ;  Daniels  N.   H.   503 ;   Conner  v.  CoflSn,  2  Foster 

V.  Pond,  21  Pick.  367,  371 ;  Lewis  v.  Ly-  (N.  H.),  539.     See  also  Parsons  v.  Camp, 

man,  22  Pick.  437,  442;  Middlebrook  v.  11  Conn.  525;  Goodrich  v.  Jones,  2  Hill 

Corwin,  15  Wend.  169;   Lewis  v.  Jones,  (N.  Y.),  142. 

17  Penn.  St.  262.     See  also  Kittredge  v.  (s)  See  Hallen  v.   Runder,  1  C.  M.  cS; 

Woods,  3  N.  H.  503.  R.  266,  276 ;  Elliott  v.  Bishop,  28  E.  L. 

()■)  See  Roberts  v.  Barker,  1  Cr.  &  M.  &  E.  484;  s.  c.  10  Exch.  496;  and  Amos 

808.    In  New  Hampshire  it  has  been  held,  and  Ferrard  on  Fixtures,  p.  2,  for  this  def- 

that  where  land  is  sold  and  conveyed,  inition.     But  the  word  is,  perhaps,  quite 

manure  lying  about  a  barn  upon  the  land  as  often  used  to  denote  those  things  which, 

will  pass  to  the  grantee,  as  an  incident  being  added,  cannot  be  removed, 
to  the  land,  unless  there  be  a  reservation 

1  A  covenant  by  a  lessee  not  to  carry  away  manure,  &c.,  is  a  reservation  to  the  lessor. 
Heald  v.  Builders'  Ins.  Co.  Ill  Mass.  38.  If  manure  is  a  tenant's  personal  property, 
he  does  not  lose  his  title  by  leaving  it  on  the  farm  when  he  quits.  Fletcher  v.  Herring, 
1 1 2  Mass.  382.  If  a  dairy  farm  is  also  cultivated,  the  manure  belongs  to  the  lessor. 
Bonnell ;-.  Allen,  53  Ind.  130.  A  tenant  for  two  years  cannot  take  manure  under  a  provision 
that  he  shall  substitute  dressing  for  hay  removed.     Hill  v.  De  Rochemont,  48  N.  H.  87. 

-  The  character  of  the  thing  attached,  not  the  mode  of  annexation,  determines 
whether  it  is  a  fixture.  Seeger  c.  Pettit,  77  Penn.  St.  437.  The  premises  must  be  left 
in  as  good  condition  after  removal  as  before.  Turner  v.  Cameron,  J.,.  R.  5  Q.  B.  306. 
Fixtures  must  be  removed  before  the  end  of  term  or  possession,  or  they  become  the  land- 
lord's, even  as  against  a  judgment  creditor  with  an  incomplete  lev}',  Thropp's  Appeal,  70 
Penn.  St.  395 ;  but  not  against  a  purchaser  of  the  same,  Saint  v.  Pilley,  L.  R.  10  Ex.  137. 
A  tenant  renewing  must  reserve  right  anew  to  remove  fixtures  or  lose  it.  AYatriss  v. 
Cambridge  Bank,  124  Mass.  571  ;  Loughran  v.  Ross,  45  N.  Y.  792.  So  a  tenant 
holding  over,  Uingley  v.  Buffum,  57  Me.  381 ;  unless  the  term  is  uncertain.  Northern, 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Canton  Co.  30  Md.  347  ;  or  by  fault  of  the  landlord,  Goodman  r.  Han- 
nibal, &c.  R.  Co.  45  Mo.  33 ;  Ex  parte  Ilemenway,  2  Lowell,  496.  AVhere  fixtures  are  to 
be  the  landlord's  at  the  end  of  the  lease,  he  may  sell  at  any  time.  Thrall  v.  Hill,  110 
Mass.  328.  A  tenant  cannot,  after  his  term  ends,  re-enter  to  remove  fixtures  as  against 
a  purchaser  without  notice  of  his  claim.  Dostal  v.  McCaddon,  35  Iowa,  318.  See, 
generally,  as  to  fixtures  and  requisites,  McRea  v.  Central  Bank,  66  N.  Y.  489. 
VOL.  I.  35  545 


511 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


be  chattels,  (^t)  In  modern  times,  this  rule  is  construed  much 
more  strongly  in  favor  of  the  tenant,  and  against  the  landlord, 
than  formerly ;  (u)  and  more  so  in  respect  to  things  put  up  for 
purposes  of  trade  or  manufacture  than  for  other  things.  As 
between  the  seller  and  purchaser  it  is  construed  strongly  against 
the  seller.  Many  things  pass  by  a  deed  of  a  house,  being  put 
there  by  the  owner  and  seller,  which  a  tenant  who  had  put  them 
there  might  have  removed.  In  general,  it  may  be  said,  that  what 
a  tenant  has  added  he  may  remove,  if  he  can  do  so  without  any 
injury  to  the  premises,  unless  he  has  actually  built  it  in,  so  as  to 
make  it  an  integral  part  of  what  was  there  originally.  (i>)  ^ 


(i)  Winslow  v.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  4 
Met.  306,  314. 

(u)  Dubois  V.  Kelly,  10  Barb.  496. 

(v)  We  give  below  a  statement  of  all 
the  things  which  have  been  held  remov- 
able, and  of  those  which  have  been  held 
not  removable.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, that  each  decision  rested  more  or 
'less  upon  the  peculiar  circumstances  of 
the  case,  and  may  fail  as  authority  when 
applied  to  another  case  which  apparently 
resembles  it.  —  1.  List  of  things  Held  not 
to  be  removable  :  Agricultural  erections, 
Elwes  V.  Maw,  3  East,  38;  Contra,  Du- 
bois V.  Kelly,  10  Barb.  496;  Ale-house 
bar,  Ivinlyside  v.  Thornton,  2  W.  Bl. 
1111 ;  Barns  fixed  in  the  ground,  Elwes 
V.  Maw,  supra ;  Beast-house,  id. ;  Benches 
affixed  to  the  house,  Co.  Lit.  53  a ;  Box- 
borders,  not  belonging  to  a  gardener  by 
trade,  Empson  v.  Soden,  4  B.  &  Ad.  655  ; 
Statue  erected  as  an  ornament  to  grounds. 


and  a  sun-dial,  Snedeker  v.  Warring,  2 
Kern.  110;  Carpenter's  shop,  Elwes  v. 
Maw,  supra ;  Cart-house,  id. ;  Chimney- 
piece,  not  ornamental.  Leach  v.  Thomas, 
7  C.  &  P.  327;  Closets  affi.xed  to  the 
house,  Kimpton  v.  Eve,  2  Ves.  &  B.  349; 
Conduits,  Nicholas  v.  Chamberlain,  Cro. 
J.  121 ;  Conservatorv,  substantially  af- 
fixed, Buckland  v.  Butterfield,  2  Br.  &  B. 
54 ;  Doors,  Cooke's  case,  Moore,  177 ; 
Dressers,  Kinlyside  v.  Thornton,  supra, 
Flowers,  Litlledale,  J.,  in  Empson  v.  Sod- 
en, supra;  Fold-yard  walls,  Elwes  v.  Maw, 
supra;  Fruit-trees,  if  tenant  be  not  a  nur- 
sery-man by  trade,  Wyndham  v.  Way,  4 
Taunt.  316  ;  Fuel-house,  Elwes  v.  Maw, 
supra ;  Glass  windows,  Co.  Lit.  53  ii ; 
Herlakenden's  case,  4  Rep.  63 ;  Hearths, 
Poole's  case,  1  Salk.  3G8 ;  Hedges,  Parke, 
J.,  in  Empson  v.  Soden,  supra;  Locks 
and  keys,  Liford's  case,  11  Rep.  50; 
Cowen,  J.,   in    Walker    v.    Sherman,   20 


^  As  between  mortgagor  and  mortgagee  the  following  are  removable :  Portable 
furnace,  resting  by  its  own  weight  on  the  ground,  and  gas  fixtures,  Towne  v.  Fiske,  127 
Mass.  125  ;  Rahway  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Irving  St.  Church,  9  Stewart,  61  ;  gas  fixtures  screwed 
on  and  mirrors  on  supports,  McKeage  v.  Hanover  Fire  Ins  Co.  81  N.  Y.  38 ;  rolling-stock 
of  railroad,  Williamson  v.  N.  J.  S.  R.  Co.  2  Stewart,  311  ;  certain  machines,  Keve  v. 
Paxton,  11  C.  E.  Green,  107  ;  Case  i\  Arnett,  11  C.  E.  Green,  459.  As  to  mirrors  in 
niches  for  the  purpose,  see  Ward  v.  Kilpatrick,  85  N.  Y.  413.  The  following  are  not 
removable :  Looms  afiixed  to  the  floor  by  nails  which  may  be  drawn  without  any 
serious  damage  to  the  floor,  Holland  v.  Hodgson,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  328  ;  Ottumwa 
Woollen  Co.  v.  Hawley,  44  la.  57  ;  a  factory  bell  in  its  tower,  and  a  blower  pipe  for 
taking  air  from  a  blower  to  a  forge,  Alvord  Carriage  Co.  v.  Gleason,  36  Coun.  86 ; 
platform  scales,  for  permanently  weighing  stock  and  grain,  Arnold  v.  Crowder,  81  111. 
56  ;  an  iron  table  weighing  thirty-three  tons,  on  brick  foundations,  and  adapted  only 
for  use  in  a  glass  factory,  where  placed.  Smith  Paper  Co.  v.  Servin,  130  Mass.  511 ; 
an  embossing  press.  Pope  v.  Jackson,  65  Maine,  162  ;  manure,  Chase  v.  Wingate,  68 
Maine,  204.  A  railroad  track  put  down  as  a  permanency  is  not  removable  as  between 
seller  and  buyer.  Van  Keuren  v.  Central  Railroad,  9  Vroom,  165.  Trade  fixtures  may 
be  removed,  as  steam  engines  and  boilers,  Holbrook  v.  Chamberlin,  116  Mass.  155; 
an  ice-house,  Antoni  v.  Belknap,  102  Mass.  193  ;  Crowie  v.  Hoover,  40  Ind.  49  ;  counters 
or  counting-rooms  nailed  to  the  floor,  Guthrie  v.  Jones,  108  Mass.  191  ;  Brown  v. 
Wallis,  115  Mass.  156;  heavy  machinery,  as  a  trip  hammer,  Heffner  v.  Lewis,  73 
Penn.  St.  302. 

546 


CH.  III.] 


HIRING  OF  REAL   PROPERTY. 


512 


*  SECTION  VII. 


*512 


OF  NOTICE   TO   QUIT. 

A  tenant  whose   tenancy  may  be  determined  by  the  will  of 
the   landlord,  is   entitled   to   notice  of  that  dctermiuation,  nor 


Wend.  636,  689 ;  Millstones,  14  H.  8,  25  b, 
pi.  6,  Liford's  case,  supra;  The  Queen 
V.  Wheeler,  6  Mod.  187;  Shep.  Touch. 
90;  Looms  substantially  affixed  to  the 
floor  of  a  factory,  Murdock  v.  Harris,  20 
Barb.  407  ;  Manure,  Daniels  v.  Pond,  21 
Pick.  367 ;  Middlebrook  v.  Corwin,  15 
Wend.  169;  Lassell  v.  Reed,  6  Greenl. 
222;  Sawyer  v.  Twiss,  6  Foster  (N.  H.), 
345.  But  see  Staples  v.  Emery,  7  Greenl. 
201 ;  Partitions,  Kinlyside  v.  Thornton, 
supra;  Pigeon-house,  Elwes  v.  Maw, 
supra ;  Pineries,  substantially  affixed, 
Buckland  v.  Butterfield,  supra ;  Pump- 
house,  Elwes  V.  Jlaw,  supra ;  Trees, 
Empson  r.  Soden,  supra;  Wagon-house, 
Elwes  V.  Maw,  supra ;  Poles  used  neces- 
sarily in  cultivating  hops,  which  were 
taken  down  for  the  purpose  of  gather- 
ing the  crop  and  piled  in  the  yard,  with 
the  intention  of  being  replaced  in  the 
season  of  hop  raising.  Bishop  v.  Bishop, 
1  Kern.  123 ;  Threshing-machines,  fixed 
by  bolts  and  screws  to  posts  let  into  the 
ground,  Wiltshear  v.  Cottrell,  18  E.  L.  & 
E.  142;  s.  c.  1  E.  &  B.  674.-2.  Things 
held  to  be  removable,  though  not  coming 
within  tlie  class  of  trade  fixtures  :  Arras- 
hanging,  Bridgeraan's  case,  1  Rolle.  216 ; 
Barns,  resting  by  weiglit  alone  upon 
foundations  let  into  the  ground,  or  upon 
blocks,  Wansborough  v.  Maton,  4  A.  & 
E.  884,  Bui.  N.  P.  34  ;  Granaries,  resting 
by  weight  alone,  Wiltshear  v.  Cottrell,  18 
E.  L.  &  E.  142;  s.  c.  1  E.  &  B.  674; 
Stables  and  outhouses,  Dubois  v.  Kelly, 
10  Barb.  496 ;  Gas  fixtures,  Lawrence 
V.  Kemp,  1  Duer,  363 ;  Beds  fastened  to 
the  ceiling,  Ex  parte  Quincy,  1  Atk.  477  ; 
Carding  machines,  Walker  v.  Sherman. 
20  Wend.  636;  Taffe  v.  Warnick,  3 
Blackf.  Ill;  Cresson  v.  Stout,  17  Johns. 
116 ;  Gale  v.  Ward,  14  Mass.  352  ;  Tobias 
V.  Francis,  3  Vt.  425 ;  Machinery,  Van- 
derpoel  v.  Van  Allen,  10  Barb.  157 ; 
TeafE  v.  Hewett,  1  Ohio  St.  511,  541; 
Cotton-spinning  machines,  screwed  to 
the  floor,  Ilellawell  v.  Eastwood,  3  E.  L. 
&  E.  562  ;  s.  c.  6  Exch.  309 ;  Ornamental 
chimney-pieces,  Tindat,  C.  J.,  in  Grymes 
V.  Boweren,   6    Bing.    437;    Bishop    v. 


Elliott.  30  E.  L.  &  E.  595;  s.  c.  11  Excii. 
113;  Coffee-mills,  Rex  v.  Londontiiorpe, 
6  T.  R.  379;  Ornamental  cornices,  Avery 
V.  Cheslyn,  3  A.  &  E.  75 ;  Fire-frame, 
Gaffield  v.  Hapgood,  17  Pick.  192;  Fur- 
naces, Squier  v.  Mayer,  Freem.  Ch.  249 ; 
Gates  (if  removable  without  injury  to 
the  premises),  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Grymes 
V.  Boweren,  supra ;  Amos  and  Fcrard  on 
Fixtures,  p.  278  ;  Iron  backs  to  chimneys, 
Harvey  v.  Harvey,  Stra.  1141 ;  Looking- 
glasses,  Beck  V.  Rebow,  1  P.  Wms.  94 ; 
Malt-mills,  Lord  Kemjon,  in  Rex  v.  Lon- 
donthorpe,  supra  ;  Movable  boards,  fitted 
and  used  for  putting  up  corn  in  bins, 
Whiting  I'.  Brastow,  4  Pick.  310;  Mills 
on  posts,  Ward's  case,  4  Leon.  241 ;  Or- 
namental Fixtures,  Amos  and  Ferard  on 
Fixtures,  p.  67 ;  Beck  v.  Rebow,  supra ; 
Padlock  for  a  corn-house,  Whiting  ?'. 
Brastow,  s!t/5ra,-  Pumps  sligiitly  attached, 
Grymes  v.  Boweren,  supra;  Rails  and 
posts,  Fitzherbert  v.  Shaw,  1  H.  Bl.  258; 
A  ladder  fixed  to  the  ground  and  to  a 
beam  above,  and  which  was  the  only 
means  of  access  to  a  room  above ;  a 
crane  nailed  at  top  and  bottom  to  keep 
it  in  its  place,  and  a  bencli  nailed  to  the 
wall,  Wilde  r.  Waters,  32  E.  L.  &  E.  422  ; 
s.  c.  16  C.  B.  637  ;  Stables  on  rollers,  id. ; 
Stoves,  Smith,  J.,  in  Gray  v.  Iloldsiiip,  17 
S.  &  R.  413 ;  Tindid,  C.  J.,  in  Grymes  v. 
Boweren,  supra ;  Greene  v.  First  Parish 
in  Malilen,  10  Pick.  500,  504;  Tapestry, 
Harvey  v.  Harvey,  supra;  Windmill  on 
posts,  Rex  i».  Londontiiorpe,  supra ;  Win- 
dow-blinds, Greene  »;.  First  Parish  in 
Maiden,  supra.  —  3.  Trade  fixtures  iield 
to  be  removable :  Brewing  vessels,  Law- 
ton  V.  Lawton,  3  Atk.  13;  Buildings 
a(!cessory  to  removable  trade  fixtures, 
Dudle}^  V.  Warde,  Ambl.  113;  Cider- 
mills,  Lawton  v.  Lawton,  supra;  Holmes 
V.  Tremper,  20  Johns.  29;  Colliery  ma- 
chines, Lawton  v.  Lawton,  supra ;  Cop- 
pers, Poole's  case,  1  Salii.  368;  Lawton 
V.  hawUm,  supra ;  Dutcii  barns.  Dean  v. 
AUalley,  3  Esp.  11  ;  Engines,  Lawton  v. 
Lawton,  supra;  Dudley  v.  Warde,  supra; 
Jibs,  Davis  v.  Jones,  2  B.  &  Aid.  165; 
Salt-pans,  Lawton   v.  Salmon,  1   H.  Bl. 

54T 


*513  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [bOOK    III. 

*  513  can  *  he  be  dispossessed  by  process  of  law,  without  that 
previous  notice.^  In  England,  this  notice,  in  the  case  of  a 
tenant  from  year  to  year,  is  one  half  of  a  year,  which  is  distin- 
guished from  six  months'  notice,  (w)  ^  In  this  country  there  is 
no  uniform  rule.  In  some  of  the  States  the  English  rule  seems  to 
have  been  adopted,  (a;)    In  others  it  is  regulated  by  statute,  {y) 

259,  n. ;    Shrubs  planted  for  sale,  Penton  the  defendant  was  tenant  to  the  plaintiff, 

V.   Robart,  2   East,  88;   Miller  v.  Baker,  and  that  the  rent  was  payable  monthly, 

1  Met.  27 ;  Soap  works,  Toole's  case,  but  no  evidence  was  offered  to  show  on 
supra ;  Steam-engine,  Pcinberton  v.  King,  what  day  of  the  month  it  became  due. 

2  Dev.  L.  376;  Lemar  v.  Miles,  4  Watts,  On  the  21st  day  of  September,  1848,  the 
330 ;  Stills,  Reynolds  y.  Shuler,  5  Cowen,  plaintiff  gave  the  defendant  notice  to 
S23;  Burk  v.  IJaxter,  3  Mo.  207;  Trees  quit  the  premises,  and  on  the  26th  day  of 
planted  for  sale,  Penton  v.  Robart,  s^pra ;  October  following  brought  his  action  to 
Miller  v.  Baker,  1  Met.  27 ;  Varnish  recover  them.  Tiie  defendant  requested 
house,  Penton  v.  Robart,  supra ;  Vats,  the  court  to  rule,  tliat  the  notice  was 
Poole's  case,  supra.  insufficient,  because  it  ought  to  appear 

(w)  Doe   V.   Smith,    5   A.   &   E.   350;  tliat  the  notice  covered  an  entire  period 

Johnstone  v.  Hudlestone,  4  B.  &  C.  922.  intervening  between  the  times  of  pnying 

See  also  Roe  v.  Doe,  6  Bing.  574 ;  Doe  v.  rent ;  so  that,  if  the  rent  was  payable  on 

Green,  4  Esp.  198.  the  first  day  of  each  month,  and  notice 

(x)  Jackson  v.  Bryan,  1  Johns.  322;  was  given  on  the  21st  of  September,  the 
Hanchctt  v.  Whitney,  1  Vt.  311 ;  Trous-  tenant  was  under  no  obligation  to  re- 
dale  V.  Darnell,  6  Yerg.  431.  move,  and   the  plaintiff  could  not  com- 

(y)  In   Massachusetts,  three   months'  mence   his  action  until  tlie  first  day  of 

noti(je  is  enough  in  all  cases  of  tenancy  November.     The   court    declining  so   to 

at  will,   and   if  tlie  rent  be   payable  at  rule,  the  case  was  carried  to  the  Supreme 

shorter  periods,  then  the  notice  need  only  Court,  where  the  exception  was  sustained 

equal  one  of  those  periods.     R.  S.  ch.  60,  on  the  ground  that  the  R.  S.  had  in  this 

§  26.     A  question  arose  in  the  Supreme  respect  adopted  the  rule  of  the  conmion 

Court  of   Massachusetts,  in  the  case  of  law,   as   to   which    see   13   H.  8,  15  b  ; 

Prescott  V.  Elms,  7  Cush.  346,  as  to  the  Right  v.  Darby,  1  T.  R.  159 ;  Doe  v.  Por- 

construction  of  the  last  part  of  this  pro-  ter,  3  T.  R.  13;  Richardson  v.  Langridge, 

vision.     It  appeared  in    that   case,  that  4  Taunt.  128 ;   Doe  v.  Johnston,  McClel. 

1  A  sub-lessee  is  entitled  to  a  proper  notice  to  quit,  although  the  lessee  voluntarily 
surrenders.  Mellor  r.  Watkins,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  400.  Notice  by  a  lessor  will  euure  to 
the  benefit  of  his  assignee.  Glenn  v.  Thompson,  75  Penn.  St  389.  Payment  of  rent 
in  advance  does  not  dispense  with  notice.  Sprague  v.  Quinn,  108  Mass.  553.  If  a 
tenant  holds  over,  no  notice  is  necessary,  Kuecht  v.  Mitchell,  67  111.  86  ;  unless  so  long 
contin^^ed  that  the  landlord's  assent  will  he  presumed,  Smith  ?•.  Littlefield,  51  N.  Y.  539  ; 
nor  where  a  tenant  is  to  remain  only  while  in  the  landlord's  employ,  Grosvenor  v.  Henr}'^, 
27  la.  269  ;  or  on  condition  of  running  a  saw-mill  which  he  abandons,  Crawley  v. 
Mullins,  48  Mo.  517  ;  or  his  term  is  to  end  on  notice  of  a  sale.  Miller  v.  Levi,  44  N.  Y. 
489  ;  or  "  if  he  suited  the  landlord,"  Whetstone  v.  Davis,  34  Ind.  510 ;  or  as  long  as  the 
tenant  pays  rent  and  the  landlord  can  let,  Wood  v.  Beard,  2  Ex.  D.  30.  But  if  the  act  or 
condition  is  within  the  landlord's  control,  the  tenant  must  have  reasonable  notice.  Shaw 
V.  Hoffman,  25  Mich.  162.  Notice  by  an  unaiithorized  agent  cannot  be  ratified  after  the 
proper  time  has  expired.  Brahu  v.  Jersey  City,  &c.  Co.  9  Vroom,  74.  A  notice  from 
one  to  whom  lessor  agrees  to  convey  is  not  good.  Reeder  v.  Sajre,  70  N.  Y.  180.  An  error 
in  the  address  does  not  vitiate,  if  it  is  received  by  the  one  intended,  Clark  v.  Keliher, 
107  Mass.  406  ;  as  to  a  married  woman  as  "Mr.  C,"  Cook  v.  Creswell,  44  Md.  581. 
Defects  in  a  notice  may  be  waived  by  the  party  receiving  it.  Boynton  v.  Bodwell, 
113  Mass.  531.  The  owner  of  land,  who  forcibly  enters  thereou  and  ejects  without 
unnecessary  force  a  tenant  at  sufferance,  who  has  had  reasonable  notice  to  quit,  is 
not  liable  lo  an  action  for  an  assault.  Low  v.  Elwell,  121  Mass.  309,  where  Gray,  C.  J., 
elaborately  reviews  all  the  authorities. 

-  In  England,  such  a  notice  must  run  from  one  quarterly  feast  day  to  the  next, 
though  more  or  less  than  six  months,  Morgan  v.  Davies,  3  C.  P.  D.  260 ;  but  the  parties 
may  agree  on  any  period,  as  one  week,  Cornish  v.  Stubbs,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  334. 

648 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OF   REAL   PROPERTY.  *  514 

*A  notice  to  quit  is  necessary  in  all  those  cases  in  *514 
which  the  implication  of  law  creates  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year,  or  one  determinable  by  the  landlord,  (z)  But  a  notice 
to  quit  is  not  necessary  where  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
does  not  subsist,  (a)  or  where  the  tenant  distinctly  disclaims  the 
title  of  his  landlord.  (5) 

As  the  tenant  is  to  act  upon  the  notice  when  he  receives  it,  it 
should  be  such  a  notice  as  he  may  act  upon  safely ;  and  there- 
fore it  must  be  one  which  is  binding  upon  all  parties  concerned 
at  tlie  time  it  is  given,  and  needs  no  recognition  by  any  one  of 
them  subsequently ;  (c)  nor  will  such  recognition  make  it  suffi- 
cient. {cT)  But  a  notice  by  one  joint-tenant  for  himself  and  the 
others  is  sufficient ;  (e)  and  so  is  a  notice  by  one  copartner  for 
the  firm.  (/) 

No  particular  form  of  the  notice  is  necessary ;  but  there  must 
be  a  reasonable  certainty  in  the  description  of  the  premises ;  and 
we  think  there  should  be  a  reasonably  certain  statement  of  the 
time  when  the  tenant  must  quit ;  but  this  has  been  denied  in  New 
York,  (jff )  It  seems  that  the  notice  need  state  no  reason  for 
terminating  the  tenancy,  {fg')  The  notice  may  be  oral,  unless 
there  be  an  express  agreement  that  it  should  be  in  writing,  (y) 

&  Y.  141.  But  the  English  rule  applies  Doe  v.  Quigley,  2  Camp.  505.  So  a 
only  where  there  is  a  yearly  tenancy  ex-  member  of  a  firm,  occupying  a  house  of 
pressiy  or  impliedly  created,  and  there  one  of  liis  copartners  during  the  partner- 
is  no  agreement  between  the  parties  in  ship,  is  not  entitled  to  notice  at  its  close, 
relation  to  the  termination  of  the  ten-  Waichman  v.  Miles,  1  Stark.  181.  So  of 
ancy ;  but  where  the  parties  agree  that  a  vendee  in  possession,  who  has  not  paid 
the  tenancy  shall  expire  upon  the  giving  the  price,  nor  been  recognized  as  a  ten- 
of  a  notice  for  a  certain  time,  tlie  notice  ant.  Doe  v.  Lawder,  1  Stark.  308;  Doe 
may  be  given  at  any  time.  Doe  v.  Graf-  v.  Sayer,  3  Camp.  8.  See  also  Doe  v. 
ton,  11  E.  L.  &  E.  488 ;  s.  c.  18  Q.  B.  496.  Chamberlaine,  5  M.  &  W.  14. 
See,  however,  Baker  v.  Adams,  5  Cush.  (b)  Doe  v.  Evans,  9  M.  &  W.  48;  Doe 
89,  and  also  Doe  v.  Cox,  11  Q.  B.  122;  v.  Pasquali,  Peake,  Cas.  196;  Bower  v. 
Post  V.  Post,  14  Barb.  253.  In  Massachu-  Major,  1  Br.  &  B.  4  ;  Doe  v.  Frowd,  4 
setts  a  tenant  at  sufferance  is  not  entitled  Bing.  657;  Doe  ?».  Rollings,  4  C.  B.  188; 
to  notice.  Benedict  v.  Morse,  10  Met.  223 ;  Doe  v.  Clarke,  Peake,  Ad'^  Cas.  239. 
ffinsley  y.  Ames,  2  Met.  29 ;  Hollis  y.  Pool,  (c)  Doe  v.  Cuthell,  5  East,  491 ;  Doe 
3  Met.  350.  See  also  Ellis  v.  Paige,  1  v.  Goldwin,  2  Q.  B.  143.  And  see  Currier 
Pick.  43  ;  Coffin  v.  Lunt,  2  Pick.  70.  v.  Barker,  2  Gray,  224 ;  Steward  v.  Hard- 

(z)  Doe  V.  Watts,  2  Esp.  501 ;   s.  c.  7  ing,  id.  335. 
T.    R.    83 ;    Denn   v.   Rawlins,  10    East  {d)  Parke,  B.,  in  Buron  v.  Denman,  2 

(Day's  ed.),  261,  n.  2.  E.xch.  167,  188;   Doe  r.  Goldwin,  sftpra; 

(a)  Right  V.  Bawden,  3  East,  260 ;  Roe  Doe  v.  Walters,  10  B.  &  C.  626. 
V.  Prideaux,  10  East,  158.     Therefore,  if  («)  Doe   v.   Summersctt,  1   B.  &  Ad. 

a  man  gets  into  possession  of  a  house  to  135;  Doe  v.  Hughes,  7  M.  &  W.  139. 
be  let,  without  the  privity  of  the  landlord,  (/)  Doe  v.  Hulme,  2  Man.  &  R.  483. 

and  they  afterwards   enter  into  a  nego-  [ff)  Burns  v.  Bryant,  31  N.  Y.  453. 

tiation  for   a  lease,  but  differ  upon  the  (fg)  Russell  v.  Allard,  18  N.^H.  222. 

terms,  the  landlord  may  maintain  eject-  (g)  Doe  v.  Crick,  5  Esp.  196;    Doe  i^. 

raent  to  recover  possession  of  the  prera-  Pierce,   2    Camp.  96 ;    Legg   v.  Benion, 

ises    without  giving  any  notice   to  quit.  Willes,  43. 

549 


*  515  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

It   should   be  served  upon  the  tenant,  personally,  or  by 

*  615    leaving  it  with  the  tenant's  wife,  or  servant,  at  *  the  usual 

place  of  abode  of  the  tenant ;  (A)  and  if  so  left  it  is 
sufficient,  although  it  never  reach  the  tenant.  (^)  If  there  is 
more  than  one  tenant,  the  notice  should  be  addressed  to  all,  but 
it  may  be  served  on  either  one.  (/) 

A  valid  notice,  properly  served,  vests  the  premises  in  the  land- 
lord, and  absolutely  terminates  the  tenant's  right  of  possession  at 
the  time  stated,  (k)  ^  But  this  and  all  other  effects  of  the  notice 
may  be  waived  by  the  landlord,  and  is  so  waived  by  his  receiving 
subsequent  rent  from  the  tenant.  (0 


SECTION  VIII. 

OF   APPORTIONMENT   OF   RENT. 

The  lessor  holds  only  the  reversion,  the  lessee  having  the  land. 
It  is  common  to  speak  of  the  lessor  who  makes  a  sale  of  the 
premises,  as  selling  the  land ;  but  in  law,  all  he  can  sell  is  his 
right  to  the  land,  and  this  means  the  reversion.  If  he  sells  the 
whole  of  this  to  one  buyer,  the  buyer  takes  his  place,  acquires 
his  rights,  and  is  subject  to  all  of  his  obligations  which  run  with 
the  land,  (m)  But  if  he  sells  a  part  only  of  the  reversion,  or  if 
he  sells  the  whole  in  parcels  to  different  purchasers,  this  does 
not  extinguish  the  obligations  of  the  lessee,  nor  does  it  transfer 
them  all  to  the  purchaser.  There  must  now  be  an  ajjportionment 
of  the  rent.  And  this  may  arise  also  if  the  lessor,  retaining  the 
reversion,  assigns  a  portion  of  the  rent  to  one  assignee  and  an- 
other part  to  another  person,  (w)     The  common-law  doctrine  of 

(h)  Jones  v.  Marsh,  2  T.  R.  404;   Doe  may  have  his  action  against  the  landlord, 

V.  Lucas,  5  Esp.  183.  seems    to   be    doubtful.     See  Newton  v. 

(?)  Doe  V.  Dunbar,  Mood.  &  M.  10.  Harland,  1  Man.    &  G.  644;    Harvey  v. 

(  /)  Doe  V.  Watkins,  7  East,  551  ;  Doe  Brvdges,   14  M.   &  W.  437 ;   Wright  v. 

V.  Crick,  5  Esp.  196.  Burroughes,  3  C.  B.  685. 

{k)  Turner  v.  Meymott,  1  Bing.  158 ;  (/)     Collins    v.    Canty,    6   Cash.   415; 

Taunton  v.  Costar,  7  T.  R.  481 ;  Lacey  v.  Blythe  v.  Dennett,  6  E.  L.  &  E.  424 ;  s.  c. 

Lear.  Peake,  Ad.  Cas.  210.     Whether  a  13  C.  B.  178.     See  also  Hunter  v.  Oster- 

tenant  in  possession,  who,  after  a  good  hondt,  11  Barb.  33. 
notice  has  expired,  has   been   assaulted  (/«)  See  aji^e,  pp.  *  231,  *232. 

and  forcibly  expelled  from  the  premises,  (n)  Bliss  v.  Collins,  5  B.  &  Aid.  876. 

1  But  if  the  tenancy  is  terminated  between  stated  pay-days,  no  rent  is  recoverable 
after  the  last  preceding  pay-day.     Cameron  v.  Little,  62  Me.  550. 

550 


CH.  III.]  HIRING   OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  *  516 

entirety  of  contract  forbade  this  apportionment.     But  it  was  long 
ago  permitted  from  obvious  necessity. 

*  Where  the  transfer  of  the  land  or  premises  is  by  ali-  *  516 
quot  parts,  as  half,  or  one-third,  to  one  transferee,  and  the 
residue  to  another,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  apportioning  the  rent 
in  the  same  way.  But  if  the  owner  of  a  house  under  lease  sells 
so  many  rooms,  or  the  owner  of  a  farm  sells  so  many  fields,  the 
question  will  arise,  in  what  manner  the  apportionment  is  to  be 
made  ;  that  is,  whether  in  the  ratio  of  quantity,  or  in  that  of  value. 
And  it  is  now  settled,  that  it  must  be  in  proportion  to  value,  and 
not  quantity ;  and  that  this  is  a  question  of  fact,  for  the  jury  to 
settle  upon  the  evidence  offered  them,  (o) 

If  the  owner  and  the  buyer  or  buyers  of  the  reversion  agree 
together  as  to  the  apportionment  of  rent,  the  lessee  is  bound  by 
this,  because  it  is  of  no  importance  to  him  to  whom  he  pays  the 
rent. 

The  rent  must  be  apportioned  also,  if  the  reversion  is  divided 
among  many  persons,  by  act  of  law ;  as  by  descent,  or  sale  on 
execution,  or  by  decree,  (p) 

The  lessor  cannot  himself  apportion  it  by  his  own  wrong.  If 
he  enters  on  a  part  with  the  consent  of  the  tenant,  the  rent  is 
proportionally  abated  ;  but  if  he  enters  wrongfully  and  ousts  the 
lessee  from  a  part  of  the  premises,  the  whole  rent  is  suspended 
until  the  lessee  is  restored,  (^q) 

There  may  also  be  an  apportionment  by  time ;  as  if  the  lessor 
dies  in  the  middle  of  the  term.  At  common  law  there  could  be 
no  apportionment  of  rent  in  this  case,  and  the  lessee  is  free  from 
the  rent  to  the  death  of  the  lessor.  But  by  statutes  in  England,  (r) 
and  by  similar  statutory  provisions  or  usage  in  this  country,  there 
is  always  an  apportionment  in  such  case,  the  lessee  being  liable 
to  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  for  the  rent  until  he  died, 
and  to  the  heir  afterwards,  (s) 

(o)  Crosby  v.  Loop,  13  111.  625;   Van  (r)  11  Geo.  II.  ch.  19,  §  15,  and  4  Wm. 

Eensselaer  v.  Gallup,  6  Denio,  454.  IV.  ch.  22. 

(p)  1  Roll.  Abr.  tit.  Apportionment,  D.  (s)  Gheen  v.  Osborn,  17  S.  &  R.  171 ; 

pi.  3,  4,  5 ;  Wotton  v.  Shirt,  Cro.  E.  742.  Ex  parte  Smyth,   1   Swanst.   338 ;    Nen 

(7)    Smith  V.  Raleigh,  3  Camp.  513;  York  Rev.  Statutes. 
Briggs  V.  Hall,  4  Leigh,  484. 

551 


517  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  111. 


♦517  *  SECTION   IX. 

OP  REMEDY   FOR   NON-PAYMENT   OF   RENT. 

We  have  already  spoken  of  the  right  of  re-entry,  which  only 
prevents  the  accruing  of  further  rent.  For  rents  due  and  unpaid 
the  common  law  provided  what  Chancellor  Kent  calls  the  "  sum- 
mary and  somewhat  perilous  authority  of  distress."  This  word  is 
derived  through  the  secondary  form  "  distrein,"  from  the  law-latin 
verb  "  distringo."  The  power  of  distress,  under  the  feudal  law, 
was  simply  the  power  to  take  all  the  personal  property  or  chattels 
of  the  tenant  on  the  premises,  and  hold  them  as  security  for  the 
unpaid  rent.  What  it  was,  in  its  exercise,  may  be  inferred  from 
the  fact,  that  this  law  word  came,  in  course  of  time,  to  be  used  as 
an  expression  of  the  extremest  suffering.  In  Massachusetts  and 
the  New  England  States  generally,  in  New  York  since  1846,  and 
in  many  of  the  other  States,  the  lessor  has  no  power  of  distress, 
and  no  other  remedy  for  rent  due,  than  the  same  actions  of  cov- 
enant, debt,  or  assumpsit  for  use  and  occupation,  (t)  and  the 
same  attachment  he  would  have  for  other  debts.  In  others  of 
the  States,  (w)  ^  it  is  retained,  but  greatly  and  variously  modified. 

(t)  For  cases  on  the  action  of  assump-  Long  v.  Bonner,  11  Ired.  L.  27  ;   Smith  v. 

sit  for  rent,  see  Hall  v.  Southmayd,  15  Wooding,  20  Ala.  324 ;   Weaver  v.  Jones, 

Barb.  32 ;   Scales  v.  Anderson,  20  Miss.  24  Ala.  420. 

94;    Greenup   v.    Vernon,    16    111.    26;  (m)    New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Indiana, 

Newby  v.    Vestal,   6   Port.    (Ind.)   412;  Illinois,  Virginia,  Maryland,  Kentucky, 

1  A  landlord  has  a  lien  on  the  crop  for  rent  and  on  the  tenant's  personal  property, 
the  former  of  which  he  may  follow  into  hands  of  a  purchaser  or  attaching  creditor, 
Prettyman  v.  Unland.  77  111.  206  ;  Mead  v.  Thompson,  78  111.  62  ;  but  not  the  latter, 
Hadden  v.  Knickerbocker,  70  111.  677  ;  Morgan  v.  Campbell,  22  Wall.  381.  —  There  can 
be  no  distress  unless  the  rent  is  fixed,  or  capable  of  being  fixed,  as  by  arbitration, 
ivfyers  v.  Mayfield,  7  Bush,  212  ;  or  in  proportionate  profits  of  thing  let,  Wilkins  v. 
Taliaferro,  52  Ga.  208;  or  proportioned  to  lessor's  improvements,  Detwiler  v.  Cox, 
75  Penn.  St.  200.  An  undisclosed  principal  of  an  agent,  letting  in  his  own  name,  cannot 
distrain.  Seyfert  ik  Bean,  83  Penn.  St.  450.  The  mere  taking  a  note  for  rent  will  not 
prevent  distraining,  unless  so  agreed.  Atkyns  v.  Byrnes,  71  111.  326.  A  stipulation 
in  a  lease  giving  landlord  "  lien  "  will  prevail  over  a  purchaser,  attaching  creditor, 
assignee  in  bankruptcy,  mechanic's  lien,  and  follow  goods  though  removed  from  the 
premises.  Hale  v.  Omaha  Bank,  49  N.  Y.  626  ;  Groton  Co.  v.  Gardner,  11  R.  I.  626  ; 
Dalton  V.  Laudahn,  27  Mich.  529  _;  McCaffrey  v.  Woodin,  65  N.  Y.  459  ;  Schenley's 
Appeal,  70  Penn.  St.  98.  After  distress  and  before  sale,  a  landlord  cannot  sue  for 
rent.  Lehain  v.  Philpott,  L.  R.  10  Ex.  242.  In  Illinois,  a  tenant  may  recover  damages 
resulting  from  the  impairment  in  value  of  the  use  of  the  premises  by  the  landlord's 
act.    Lynch  v.  Baldwin,  69  111.  210. 

552 


CH.  III.]  HIRING    OF  REAL   PROPERTY.  *  518 

Nor  would  it  be  possible  for  us  to  give  a  detailed  view  of  the  vari- 
ous provisions  which  exist  in  relation  to  this  power,  except  by 
reference  to  the  State  statutes.  We  will,  however,  endeavor  to 
exhibit  such  more  general  rules  on  the  subject  as  seem  to  rest  on 
adjudication. 

Originally,  the  lessor  might  enter  upon  the  premises  and  dis- 
train any  chattels  he  might  find  there ;  but  now,  and  in 
this  *  country  generally,  distress  may  be  made  only  on  the    *  518 
goods  of  the  tenant,  (v} 

The  distress  must  be  reasonable  in  amount,  and  the  property 
distrained  cannot  be  carried  out  of  the  county ;  and  the  distress 
must  not  be  made  at  night,  (^iv') 

Implements  and  beasts  of  husbandry,  tools  of  trade,  household 
goods  to  a  certain  amount,  and  a  great  variety  of  things,  deemed 
by  the  several  legislatures  essential  to  the  subsistence  or  comfort 
of  a  family,  are  exempted  from  distress,  or  attachment,  or  levy, 
by  the  several  State  statutes. 

The  goods  may  be  replevied  by  the  owner,  at  any  time  within 
a  certain  number  of  days,  and  the  question  of  indebtedness,  or 
any  other  which  affects  the  right  of  distress  may  be  tried ;  but  if 
not  replevied,  they  may  be  sold,  and  the  proceeds  applied  to  the 
payment  of  the  rent  due. 

The  landlord  is  punishable  for  unlawful  distress,  by  double 
damages,  or  otherwise ;  and  the  tenant,  for  unlawful  rescue 
of  the  goods  or  prevention  of  distress,  by  treble  damages,  or 
otherwise. 

The  landlord's  power  of  distress  does  not  extend  to  goods 
sold  in  good  faith  and  for  a  valuable  consideration  before  the 
seizure ;  (a;)  nor  to  goods  in  the  custody  of  the  law ;  (3/)  but 
it  has  been  held  in  New  York,  that  goods  mortgaged  by  the 
tenant,  even  if  taken  possession  of  by  the  mortgagee,  and  re- 
moved from  the  premises,  may  be  followed  by  the  landlord, 
and  be  distrained  upon,  (z)  And  the  distinction  has  been 
taken,  that  while  the  goods  of  an  assignee  of  the   tenant  are 

Mississippi,    Georgia,    South     Carolina,  (x)    Craddock    v.    Riddlesbarfrer,    2 

Pennsylvania,  and  perhaps  some  others.  Dana,  205 ;  Neale  v.  Clautice,  7  Har.  & 

(f)    Hoskins   v.  Paul,   4   Ilalst.  110;  J.  372. 
Stone  V.  Matthews,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),429;  (y)     Craddock    v.    Riddlesharger,    2 

Brown  v.  Sims,  17  S.  &  R.  138;   Young-  Dana,  205. 

blood  w.  Lowry,  2  McCord,  39;  Riddle  y.  («)  Reynolds    v.    Shuler,    5    Cowen, 

Welden,  5  Whart.  1.  323. 

{w)  Sherman  v.  Dutch,  16  El.  283. 

553 


*518 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 

liable  to  distress  for  rent,  those  of  a  mere  under-tenant  are  not 
so  liable,  (a)  But  the  process  of  distress  has  been  abolished 
in  New  York.  (5) 

(a)  Acher  v.  Witherell,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),     been  held  to  be  constitutional.     GuUd  v. 

n\  n       c.       .or^      .    ,  Rogers,  8  Barb.  502. 

{b)  Gen.  St.  p.  429.    And  this  law  has 

554 


i 


CH.  IV.J  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  519 


*  CHAPTER  IV.  *519 

PURCHASE   AND    SALE   OP   PERSONAL   PROPERTY. 

Sect.  I.  —  Essentials  of  a  Sale. 

All  that  is  essential  to  the  sale  of  a  chattel,  at  common  law, 
is  the  agreement  of  the  parties  that  the  property  in  the  subject- 
matter  should  pass  from  the  vendor  to  the  vendee  for  a  consid- 
eration given,  or  promised  to  be  given,  by  the  vendee.  Yet  where 
the  parties  have  not  explicitly  manifested  their  meaning,  the  law 
makes  some  important  inferences.  There  is  a  presumption  that 
every  sale  is  to  be  consummated  at  once ;  that  the  chattel  is  to 
be  delivered,  and  the  price  paid,  without  delay.  If,  therefore, 
nothing  appears  but  an  offer  and  an  acceptance,  and  the  vendee 
goes  his  way  without  making  payment,  it  is  held  to  be  a  breach 
of  the  contract  (which  is  presumed  to  have  contemplated  payment 
on  the  spot),  and  the  vendor  is  not  bound  by  the  sale.  But  if 
there  was  a  delivery  of  the  chattel,  or  the  receipt  of  earnest,  or  of 
part  payment,  either  of  these  is  evidence  of  an  understanding  that 
something  should  remain  to  be  performed  in  futuro ;  and  the 
legal  presumption  is  rebutted.  Where  the  terms  of  the  contract 
expressly  postpone  delivery,  or  payment,  or  both,  to  a  future  day, 
here  also  the  sale  is  valid,  and  no  legal  presumption  obstructs  the 
intention  of  the  parties,  but  the  property  in  the  chattel  sold 
passes  immediately.  In  this  case  no  earnest  is  necessary 
to  bind  the  bargain,  (a)     The  *  effect  of  the  Statute  of    *520^ 

(a)  The  law  of  sales,  as  it  stands  at  be  upon  condition,  and  they  can  also  be 

this  moment  at  the  common  law,  is  at  perfect ;  and  yet  no  quid  pro  quo  iinmedi- 

least  as  old  as  the  year-books.     In  14  H.  ately.      And  all  this  depends  upon  the 

8,  17  b,  21  b,  in  the  Common  Pleas,  the  communication  between  you  and  me  ;  as 

law  upon  this  subject  is  thus  stated  by  that  I  shall  have  £20  for  my  horse,  and 

Pollard,  J. :    "  Bargains  and  sales  all  de-  I  agree  ;  now  if  you  do  not  pay  the  money 

pend    upon    communication    and  words  immediately,  this  is  not  a  bargain ;  for 

between   the   parties ;    for   all    bargains  my  agreement  is  for  the  .£20,  and  if  you 

can  be  to  take  effect  instantly,  or  upon  a  do  not  pay  the  money  straiglitway,  you 

thing  to  be  done  thereafter.     They  can  do  not  act  according  to  my  agreement. 

555 


*  520  THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   III. 

Frauds,  in  modifying  the  principles  of  the  common  law  in  relation 
to  sales,  will  be  considered  hereafter. 

It  must  be  remembered,  that  no  one  can  give  what  he  has  not 
himself;  and  therefore  no  one  can  give  good  title  who  has  no 
good  title.^  If  a  mere  finder,»and  still  more  if  a  thief,  sells  what 
he  has  found  or  stolen,  to  A,  and  A  buys  in  good  faith,  and  so 
sells  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  and  C  to  D,  &c.,  the  original  owner  may 
reclaim  his  property  wherever  it  may  be,  and  take  it  without  any 
payment  to  the  holder,  any  more  than  if  that  holder  were  the 
thief  himself.  (5)  ^  In  England,  a  sale  in  market  overt  changes 
the  property  and  divests  the  owner  of  his  rights ;  but  we  have  no 
market  overt  in  this  country.  (<?)  ^  It  has  even  been  held,  that  an 
auctioneer  selling  stolen  goods,  and  paying  over  the  money  to  the 
thief  in  good  faith,  is  liable  in  trover  to  the  true  owner  of  the 
goods ;  ((i)  *  but  this  is  certainly  very  severe.  It  has  also  been 
held  that  one  who  innocently  buys  a  stolen  horse,  and  sells  him 
for  value,  is  liable  to  the  owner  for  his  value ;  (^dd)  but'  this  is 

I  ought,  however,  in  this  case,  to  wait  for  him,  and  I  say  that  I  am  content; 

convenient  leisure,  to  wit,  until  you  have  still,  if  you  do  not  pay  the  money  now, 

counted  your  money.      But  if  you  go  to  hut  depart  from  tlie  place,  this  is  no  bar- 

your  house  for  the  money,  am  I  obliged  gain,  for   I   am   only  content    that   you 

to  wait  ?     No,  truly ;  for  I  would  be  in  should  have  my  horse  for  £10,  and  not- 

no  certainty  of   my  money  or  of  your  withstanding  you  say  you  are  content, 

return ;  and  therefore  it  is  no  contract  the  transaction  is  yet  not  perfect ;    for 

unless  this  [delay]  be  agreed  at  the  com-  you  do  not  pay  the  money,  and  so  do  not 

munication.      But  if  I  sell  my  horse  to  perform  the  agreement."    See  also  Shep. 

you  for  so  much  as  J.  at  S.  shall  say,  tiiis  Touch,  p.  224.      And  also  Noy,  Maxims, 

is  good  if  he  does  say,  and  if  not,  void ;  p.  88.     And  see  Duncan  v.  Lewis,  1  Du- 

and   thus   a   contract    can    be    good    or  vail,  183;    Martin   v.   Hurlbut,   9  Minn, 

void,  depending  upon  matter  subsequent.  142. 

Likewise  if  I  sell  my  horse  for  .£10  to  be  (h)  McGrew    v.    Browder,    14    Mart, 

paid  on  a  day,  now  this  is  good;  and  yet  (La.)  17;  Roland  v.  Gundy,  5  Ohio,  202; 

there  is  no  quid  pro  quo  immediately."  Browning  v.   Magill,  2    Har.   &  J.  308; 

In  the   same  case,  Brudnel,  C.  J.,  said :  Dame  i'.  Baldwin,  8  Mass.  518 ;    VVheel- 

"As  has  been  said,  bargains  and  sales  wright  u.  Depeyster,  IJolms.  479;  Hosack 

are  as  is  concluded  and  agreed  among  v.    Weaver,    1     Yeates,    478 ;    Easton   v. 

the  parties  —  as  their  intentions  can  be  Worthington,  5  S.  &  R.  130;    Lance  v. 

gathered.      For  if  I  sell  my  horse  to  you  Cowan,  1  Dana,  195 ;  Ventress  v.  Smith, 

for  £10,  and  we  both  are  agreed,  and  I  10  Pet.  161. 

accept  a  penny  in  earnest,  this  is  a  perfect  (c)  See   the   cases   cited   in   the   last 

contract ;  you  shall  have  the  horse,  and  note. 

I  shall    have  an  action  for  the  money.  (d)  Hoffman  v.  Carrow,  22  Wend.  285. 

But  if  I  wish  to  sell  my  horse  to  you  for  [dd]  Robinson  v.  Skipworth,  23  Ind. 

£10,  and  you  say  that  you  will  give  £10  311 ;  Sharp  v.  Parks,  48  111.  511. 

1  Bearce  v.  Bowker,  115  Mass.  129;  Moody  v.  Blake,  117  Mass.  23,  26;  Prime  v. 
Cobb,  6.3  Me.  200;  Bryant  v.  Whitcher,  52  N.  H.  L58,  161 ;  Klein  v.  Seibold,  89  111. 
540.     See  Nixon  v.  Brown,  57  N.  H.  34 ;  West.  Un.  R.  Co.  v.  Wagner,  65  111.  197. 

2  Nixon  V.  Brown,  57  N.  H.  34;  Coombs  i\  Gorden,  59  Me.  Ill  ;  Barker  v.  Dins- 
more,  72  Penn.  St.  427  ;  Quinn  v.  Davis,  78  Penn.  St.  15;  Mechanics',  &c.  Bank  v. 
Farmers',  &c.  Bank,  60  N.  Y.  40. 

3  But  such  a  sale  does  not  protect  the  seller.    Ganly  v.  Ledwidge,  Ir.  R.  10  C.  L.  33. 
*  Hills  V.  Snell,  104  Mass.  173 ;  Pease  v.  Smith,  61  N.  Y.  477. 

556 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  521 

not,  we  think,  in  accordance  with  the  authorities  generally.  (Je) 
If  the  owner  has  been  deceived  and  defrauded  into  parting  with 
his  property,  so  that  he  could  claim  it  from  the  taker,  yet  if  he 
voluntarily  parted  with  the  property,  he  cannot  reclaim  it  from 
one  who  in  good  faith  buys  it  of  the  fraudulent  party  ;  and  not 
even  if  the  fraud  amounted  to  felony,  (e)  i  And  this  rule  has 
been  applied  where  it  was  not  a  buyer,  but  a  creditor,  who  took 
the  goods  in  payment  of  a  debt,  (ee)  But  we  think  this  may  be 
questioned.  But  it  is  said  that  a  vendee  with  possession,  and  a 
right  to  acquire  title  by  a  subsequent  act,  cannot,  before  that  act, 
give  title  against  his  vendor  to  a  ho7id  fide  purchaser,  (e/) 

*  It  should  also  be  stated,  that  no  one  can  be  made  to    *  521 
buy  of  another  without  his  own  assent.     Thus,  if  A  sends 
an  order  to  B  for  goods,  and  C  sends  the  goods,  he  cannot  sue  for 
the  price,  if  A  repudiates  the  sale,  although  C  had  bought  B's 
business.  (/)^ 

We  will  now  proceed  to  treat  of  an  absolute  sale,  and  then  of  a 
conditional  sale  of  a  chattel. 


SECTION   II. 

ABSOLUTE   SALE   OF   CHATTELS. 

A  sale  of  a  chattel  is  an  exchange  thereof  for  money ;  but  a 
sale  is  distinctly  discriminated  in  many  respects  from  an  ex- 
change in  law ;  an  exchange  being  the  giving  of  one  thing  and 
the  receiving  of  another  thing ;  while  a  sale  is  the  giving  of  one 
thing  for  that  which  is  the  representative  of  all  values.  (^)  ^ 

{dc)  See     Spooner    v.     Holmes,    102  16  Wis.  659.     So  in  England,  Kingsfcrd 

Mass.  56.  V.  Merry,  34  E.  L.  &  E.  607;   8.  c.  11 

(e)   Malcom    v.   Loverirlge,    13    Barb.  Exch.  577.     This  is  doubted,  however,  in 

.372  ;   Hall  v.  Hinks,  21  Md.  400  ;   Keyser  Sawyer  v.  Fisher,  32  Me.  28. 

V.  Harbeck,  3  Duer,  373.      See  also  Wil-  {ce)  isutters  v.  Hanghwout,  42  III.  0. 

liams  V.  Given,  6  Gratt.  268 ;  Jennings  v.  (ef)  Ballard  v.  Burgett,  47  Barb.  646. 

Gage,  13  111.  610;   Titcomb  y.  Wood,  38  (/)  Boulton    v.    Jones,    2    Hurls.    & 

Me.   561;  Caldwell  v.  Bartlett,  3  Duer,  Norm.  Exch.  564. 

341 ;  Smith  v.  Lynes,  1  Seld.  41 ;  Crocker  [g)  The  distinction  between  sales  and 

V.  Crocker,  31  N.  Y.  507 ;   Hutchinson  v.  exchanges    is    well    pointed    out    in    an 

Watkins,  17  Iowa,  475;  Shufeldt  v.  Pease,  anonymous  case  in  3  Salk.  157,  where  it 

1  Mich.,  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Phillips,  60  111.  190 ;  Young  v.  Bradley,  68  HI.  553. 

2  Boston  Ice  Co.  v.  Potter,  123  Mass.  28. 

8  For  breach  of  agreement  to  exchange,  the  declaration  should  be  special.  Steven- 
son V.  State,  65  Lid.  409;  Edwards  v.  Cottrell,  43  la.  194.     When  the  same  thing, 

557 


522 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


For  a  sale  to  be  valid  in  law,  there  must  be  parties,  a  consid- 
eration, and  a  thing  to  be  sold.     All  persons  may  be  par- 
*  522    ties  to  *  a  sale,  unless  they  labor  under  the  disabilities  or 
restraints  which  have  been  spoken  of  in  reference  to  con- 
tracts generally. 

Of  the  consideration  we  have  spoken  already. 
The  existence  of  the  thing  to  be  sold,  or  the  subject-matter  of 
the  contract,  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  contract,  (h)^     If 


is  said  :  "  Permntatio  vicina  est  emptioni  but 
exchanges  were  the  original  and  natural 
way  of  commerce  precedent  to  buying, 
for  there  was  no  buying  till  money  was 
invented  ;  now,  in  exchanging,  both  par- 
ties are  buyers  and  sellers,  and  botli 
equally  warrant  ;  and  this  is  a  natural 
rather  than  a  civil  contract,  so  by  the  civil 
law,  upon  a  bare  agreement  to  exchange, 
without  a  delivery  on  both  sides,  neither 
of  the  parties  could  have  an  action  upon 
such  agreement,  as  tliey  may  in  cases  of 
selling;  but  if  there  was  a  delivery  on 
one  side,  and  not  of  the  other,  in  such 
case  the  deliverer  might  have  an  action 
to  recover  the  tiling  whioli  he  delivered, 
but  he  could  have  no  action  to  enforce 
the  other  to  deliver  what  he  had  agreed 
to  deliver,  and  which  the  deliverer  was 
to  have  in  lieu  of  that  thing  wliich  he  de- 
livered to  the  other." — If  goods  have 
been  delivered  by  one  party,  and  the 
other  party  agrees  to  deliver  other  goods 
of  a  similar  quality  on  demand,  the 
transaction  is  not  a  sale,  but  an  agree- 
ment to  exchange.  Mitchell  r.  Gile,  12 
N.  H.  390.  —  And  proof  of  an  exchange 
will  not  support  an  averment  of  a  snle  of 
goods.  Vail  v.  Strong,  10  Vt.  457.  —  But 
in  Sheldon  v.  Cox,  3  B.  &  C.  420,  wliere 
A  agreed  to  give  a  horse,  warranted 
sound,  in  exchange  for  a  horse  of  B,  and 
a  sum  of  money  ;  and  the  horses  were 
exchanged,  but  B  refjiised  to  pay  the 
money,  pretending  that  A's  horse  was 
unsound;  it  was  held,  tliat  it  might  be 
recovered  on  an  indebitatus  count  for 
horses  sold  and  delivered. 


(/()  Wood  &  Foster's  case,  1  Leon.  42; 
Grantliam  c.  Hawley,  Hob.  132;  Strick- 
land V.  Turner,  14  E.  L.  &  E.  471 ;  s.  c.  7 
Exch.  208 ;  Robinson  v.  Macdonnel,  5  M. 
&  Sel.  228,  where  it  was  held,  that  an  as- 
signment of  the  freight,  earnings,  and 
profits  of  a  ship,  does  not  extend  to  the 
profits  not  in  existence,  actual  or  poten- 
tial, at  the  time  of  the  assignment. 
Therefore,  where  C.  assigned  by  deed  to 
S.  the  freight,  earnings,  and  profits  of  tlie 
ship  W.,  wiiich  ship  afterwards  in  a  voy- 
age to  the  South  Seas,  obtained  a  quan- 
tity of  oil,  the  produce  of  whales  taken 
in  the  said  vo^'age ;  it  was  held^  that  this 
oil  did  not  pass  to  S.  by  the  assignment ; 
for  the  assignor  had  no  property,  actual 
or  potential,  in  the  oil,  at  the  time  of  as- 
signment, and  the  voyage  was  not  then 
contemplated.  But  wliere  the  plaintiffs 
had  shipped  corn  to  London  in  a  vessel 
chartered  by  them,  and  sent  the  bill  of 
lading,  together  with  the  policy  of  in- 
surance effected  upon  the  property,  to 
the  defendants,  corn-factors  in  London, 
who  were  to  act  under  a  del  credere  com- 
mission, and  the  defendants  on  the  15th 
of  May  sold  the  cargo  to  C,  sending  liim 
a  bought  note,  stating  that  he  had  bought 
of  tiieni  1180  quarters  of  Salonica  Indian 
corn,  of  fair  average  quality  when 
shipped  on  board  the  Kezia  Page  from 
Salonica,  bill  of  lading  dated  February 
22,  at  27s.  per  quarter,  free  on  board, 
and  including  freight  and  insurance  to  a 
safe  port  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
vessel  calling  at  Cork  or  Falmouth  for 
orders,   payment    to    be   upon    handing 


though  changed  in  form,  is  to  be  returned,  it  is  bailment;  when  another  thing  of 
equal  value  may  be  returned,  it  is  a  sale.  Lonergau  r.  Stewart,  55  111.  44 ;  Eahilly 
V.  Wilson,  3  Dillon,  420;  Schlesinger  v.  Strattou,  9  R.  I.  578  ;  Hughes  v.  Stanley,  45 
la.  622  ;  Marsh  v.  Titus,  3  Hun,  550 ;  Frazer  v.  Boss,  66  Ind.  1  ;  Dittmar  v.  Norman, 
118  Mass.  319;  Powder  Co.  v.  Burkhardt,  97  U.  S.  110.  Johnston  v.  Browne,  37  la. 
200.  Where  one  is  to  furnish  another  a  certain  line  of  goods  and  receive  monthly 
accounts  of  sales,  it  is  consignment.  Walker  v.  Butterick,  105  Mass.  237  ;  Converse- 
ville  Co.  V.  Chamhersburg  Co.  14  Hun,  609;  Williams  Bros.  v.  Davis,  47  la.  363; 
Albert  v.  Lindau,  46  Md.  334  ;  Ex  parte  White,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  App.  397  ;  In  re  Linforth, 
4  Sawyer,  370.  As  to  sale  with  right  to  repurchase,  see  Slutz  v.  Desenberg,  28  Ohio 
St  371 

1  Smith  V.  Mvers,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  429  ;  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  139. 

558 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


523 


a  horse  sold  be  dead  before  the  sale,  or  merchandise  be  destroyed 
by  fire,  both  parties  being  ignorant  thereof,  the  sale  is  wholly 
void.  If  a  substantial  part  of  the  thing  sold  be  non-existent,  it  is 
said,  (i)  that  the  buyer  has  his  option  to  rescind  the  sale,  or  take 
the  remainder  with  a  reasonable  abatement  of  the  price.  But 
where  the  parties  are  equally  innocent,  we  think  the  meaning  and 
effect  of  this  rule  is,  that  the  buyer  should  have  only  his  choice 
between  enforcing  or  rescinding  the  contract ;  and  if  he  enforces 
the  contract  and  claims  the  remainder,  he  should  pay  for  it  the 
price  of  the  whole.  For  if  the  remainder  is  to  be  taken  at  a  pro- 
portionate reduction,  or  any  reduction,  from  the  whole  original 
price,  it  should  be  by  a  new  bargain.  Perhaps,  however,  he 
may  take  the  remainder,  if  he  will  pay  for  it  the  original 
price,  with  an  abatement  which  can  be  made  exact  by  a 
mere  numerical  proportion ;  as  where  the  goods  were  *  all  *  523 
of  one  quality,  and  a  certain  part  was  wholly  destroyed, 
and  the  residue  left  wholly  uninjured.  But  if  a  new  price  is 
to  be  made  for  the  remainder,  by  a  new  estimate  of  its  value, 
it  must  be  certain  that  this  can  be  done  only  by  mutual  con- 
sent. 0') 

The  thing  sold  need  not  be  in  the  possession  of  the  vendor,  and 
if  it  has  been  tortiously  converted,  the  owner  may  sell  it,  and  give 
title,  and  the  purchaser  may  after  demand  and  refusal  maintain 
trover  for  it.  (jj} 

A  mere   contingent   possibility,  not  coupled  with  an  interest, 

shipping  documents  ;  it  wa.s  held  (Pollock,  (j)  See  also  Farrar  v.  Nightingal,  2 
C.  B.,  dissenting),  that  the  meaning  of  Esp.  639,  where  Lord  Kenyan  said :  "  I 
the  contract  was,  that  the  purchaser  have  often  ruled,  that  where  a  person 
bought  the  cargo  if  it  existed  at  the  date  sells  an  interest,  and  it  appears  that  the 
of  the  contract,  but  that  if  damaged  or  interest  which  he  pretended  to  sell  was 
lost,  he  bought  the  benefit  of  the  insur-  not  the  true  one;  as,  for  example,  if  it 
ance,  and  therefore,  although  upon  the  was  for  a  lesser  number  of  years  tiian  he 
voyage  the  corn  had  become  fermented  had  contracted  to  sell,  the  buyer  may 
and  so  heated  that  it  was  unfit  to  be  car-  consider  the  contract  as  at  an  end,  and 
ried,  and  was  sold  on  the  24th  of  April  at  bring  an  action  for  money  had  and  re- 
Tunis  Bay,  he  was  bound  to  pay  the  ceived,  to  recover  back  any  sum  of  money 
stipulated  price  in  a  reasonable  time  after  he  may  have  paid  in  part  performance  of 
the  delivery  of  the  shipping  documents,  the  agreement  for  the  sale;  and  though 
and  that,  therefore,  the  defendants  were  it  is  said  here,  that  upon  the  mistake  be- 
liable  to  the  plaintiff,  under  their  del  ere-  ing  discovered  in  the  number  of  years  of 
dere  commission.  Couturier  v.  Hastie,  8  which  the  defendant  stated  liimsclf  to  be 
Exch.  40 ;  s.  c.  sub  nom.  Hastie  v.  Coutu-  possessed,  he  offered  to  make  an  allow- 
rier,  reversed  in  9  Exch.  j  s.  c.  6  H.  ance  pro  tanto,  that  makes  no  difference 
L.  Cas.  673.  in  the  case  ;  it  is  sufficient  for  the  plain- 
(i)  2  Kent,  Com.  469.  —  The  same  rule  tiff  to  say,  that  is  not  the  interest  which 
exists  in  the  French  Law.  Code  Napo-  I  agreed  to  purchase." 
leon,  No.  1601,                                                     (jj)  Tome  v.  Dubois,  6  Wall.  548. 

559 


*524 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  hi. 


is  no  subject  of  sale  ;  as  all  the  wool  one  shall  ever  have ;  (A;)  ^  or 
the  sheep  which  a  lessee  has  covenanted  to  leave  at  the  end  of 
an  existing  term.  If  rights  are  vested,  or  possibilities  are  dis- 
tinctly connected  with  interest  or  property,  they  may  be  sold,  {ly^ 
But  if  one  sells  what  he  has  not  now,  and  has  made  no  contract 
for  purchasing,  and  has  no  definite  right  to  expect,  as  by  con- 
signment, but  intends  to  go  into  the  market  and  buy,  it  has 
been  held  that  he  cannot  enforce  this  contract ;  (m)  ^  and 
*  524  *  although  this  is  questioned,  such  a  contract  if  enforcea- 
ble, as  by  the  later  authority  and  the  better  reason  it  seems 
to  be,  must  certainly  be  regarded  as  a  contract  for  a  future  sale, 
and  not  as  a  present  contract  of  sale ;  and  therefore  the  property 
in  the  thing  when  it  is  acquired  by  the  proposed  vendor,  does  not 


(k)  See  Grantham  v.  Hawley,  Hob.  132. 
See  Langton  v.  Horton,  1  Hare,  556.  But 
a  valid  sale  may  be  made  of  the  wine 
that  a  vineyard  is  expected  to  produce ; 
or  the  grain  that  a  field  is  expected  to 
grow ;  or  the  milk  that  a  cow  may  yield 
during  the  coming  year,  or  the  future 
young  born  of  a  female  animal  then  owned 
by  the  vendor,  McCarty  v.  Blevlns,  5  Yerg. 
195;  Congreve  v.  Evetts,  26  E.  L.  &  E. 
493 ;  s.  c.  10  Exch.  298,  or  the  wool  that 
shall  hereafter  grow  upon  his  sheep.  But 
see  Screws  v.  Roach,  22  Ala.  675. 

(/)  See  Jones  v.  Roe,  3  T.  R.  88.— 
But  the  expectancy  of  an  heir  presump- 
tive, or  apparent  (the  fee  simple  being  in 
the  ancestor),  is  not  an  interest  or  a  pos- 
sibility capable  of  being  the  subject  of  a 
contract.  Carleton  v.  Leighton,  3  Meriv. 
667. 

(m)  Bryan  v.  Lewis,  Ry.  &  M.  386. 
And  see  Lorymer  v.  Smith,  1  B  &  C.  1 ; 
8.  c.  2  Dow.  &  R.  23,  Abbott,  C.  J. ;  Head 
V.  Goodwin,  37  Me.  187 ;  Stanton  v.  Small, 
3  Sandf.  230.  But  this  doctrine  was  di- 
rectly overruled  in  the  case  of  Hibble- 
white  V.  McMorine,  5  M.  &  W.  462,  where 
Parke,  B.,  in  delivering  the  judgment  of 
the  court,  is  reported  to  have  said : 
"  I  have  always  entertained  considerable 
doubt  and  suspicion  as  to  the  correctness 
of  Lord  Tenterden's  doctrine  in  Bryan  v. 
Lewis  ;  it  excited  a  good  deal  of  surprise 
in  my  mind  at  the  time ;  and  when  ex- 
amined I  think  it  is  untenable.  I  cannot 
see  what  principle  of  law  is  at  all  affected 
by  a  man's  being  allowed  to  contract  for 


the  sale  of  goods,  of  which  he  has  not 
possession  at  the  time  of  the  bargain,  and 
has  no  reasonable  expectation  of  receiv- 
ing. Such  a  contract  does  not  amount  to 
a  wager,  inasmuch  as  both  the  contract- 
ing parties  are  not  cognizant  of  the  fact 
that  the  goods  are  not  in  the  vendor's 
possession ;  and  even  if  it  were  a  wager, 
it  is  not  illegal,  because  it  has  no  neces- 
sary tendency  to  injure  third  parties.  The 
dictum  of  Lord  lenterden  certainly  was 
not  a  hasty  observation  thrown  out  by 
him,  because  it  appears  from  the  case  of 
Lorymer  v.  Smith  that  he  had  entertained 
and  expressed  similar  notions  four  years 
before.  He  did  not,  indeed,  in  that  case, 
say  that  such  a  contract  was  void,  but 
only  that  it  was  of  a  kind  not  to  be 
encouraged ;  and  the  strong  opinion  he 
afterwards  expressed  appears  to  have 
gradually  formed  in  his  mind  during  the 
interval,  and  was  no  doubt  confirmed  by 
the  effects  of  the  unfortunate  mercan- 
tile speculations  throughout  the  country 
about  that  time.  There  is  no  indication 
in  any  of  the  books  of  such  a  doctrine 
having  ever  been  promulgated  from  the 
bench,  until  the  case  of  Lorymer  v.  Smith, 
in  the  year  1822;  and  there  is  no  case 
which  has  been  since  decided  on  that  au- 
thority. Not  only,  then,  was  the  doubt 
expressed  by  Bosanqttet,  J.,  in  Wells  i\ 
Porter,  well  founded,  but  the  doctrine  is 
clearly  contrary  to  law."  See  also  Wells 
I'.  Porter,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  722,  Bosanquet,J.; 
Mortimer  v.  McCallan,  6  M.  &  W.  58; 
Stanton  v.  Small,  3  Sandf.  230. 


^  So  a  sale  of  fish  to  be  caught  passes  no  title  to  the  fish  when  caught.  Low  v. 
Pew,  108  Mass.  347.  As  to  corn  growing  in  the  field  at  stipulated  price  for  future 
delivery,  see  Sanborn  v.  Benedict,  78  lU.  309.     See  also  Gittings  v.  Nelson,  86  III.  591. 

2  Thrall  v.  HiU,  110  Mass.  328. 

8  Noyea  v.  Jenkins,  55  Ga.  586  ;  Brown  v.  Combs,  63  N.  Y.  598. 

560 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  525 

pass  at  once  to  the   proposed  vendee  until  the  actual  sale   bo 
made,  (n) 

A  sale  may  be  good  in  part,  and  void  as  to  the  residue ;  good  as 
between  the  parties,  but  void  as  to  creditors ;  good  as  to  some  of 
the  creditors,  but  void  as  to  others,  (o) 


SECTION  III. 

PRICE,   AND   AGREEMENT   OF   PARTIES. 

The  price  to  be  paid  must  be  certain,  or  so  referred  to  a  defi- 
nite standard  that  it  may  be  made  certain  ;  (p)  i  as  what 
another  *  man  has  given  ;  or  what  another  man  shall  say    *  525 
should  be  the  price  ;  but  if  this  third  party  refuse  to  fix  the 

(n)  Black  v.  Webb,  20  Ohio,  304;  wodo  secundum  ejus  cestimationem  et  pretinm 
Stanton  v.  Small,  8  Sandf .  230 ;  Lunn  v.  persolvatur,  et.  res  tradatur,  et  venditio  ad  ef- 
Thornton,  1  C.  B.  385;  Langton  v.  Hig-  fectnm  perdncatur.'  So  it  is  said  in  Ay- 
gins,  4  H.  &N.  402.  liffe,  Civ.  Law,  b.  4,  tit.  4:  'The  price 

(o)  Bradford  t;.  Tappan,  11  Pick.  76,  agreed  on  between  the  parties  ought  to 

79.  be  certain ;  wherefore  a  purchase  is  not 

(p)  Brown  v.  Bellows,  4  Pick.  189,  valid  if  it  depends  on  the  will  of  tlie  buyer 
where  the  price  was  fixed  by  referees,  and  or  seller ;  though  such  price  may  be  well 
the  court  said  in  giving  judgment :  "  It  enough  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  a 
is  objected  that  the  price  should  have  third  person  to  adjudge  and  determine 
been  fixed  by  the  agreement,  whereas  it  the  value  of  the  thing  sold.'  '  And  thus 
was  to  be  ascertained  by  the  referees  ;  the  certainty  of  a  price  may  be  had,  ei- 
and  we  are  referred  to  Inst.  3,  24,  pr.  ther  by  the  determination  of  the  contract- 
where  it  is  said  :  '  Pretium  autem  constitui  ing  parties  themselves,  or  else  by  relation 
oportet,  nam  nulla  emptio  sine  pretiq  esse  po-  had  to  some  person  or  thing.'  In  the  case 
test.'  But  we  apply  another  rule  —  id  cer-  at  bar,  the  referees  have  fixed  the  price, 
turn  est,  quod  cerium  reddi  potest.  It  was,  and  according  to  these  authorities,  and 
indeed,  formerly  doubted  whether,  when  the  reason  of  the  thing,  the  sale  should 
a  thing  was  to  be  sold,  at  whatever  price  be  carried  into  effect,  unless  for  some 
Titiusshould  value  it,  such  contract  would  other  objection  which  has  been  made  by 
be  good ;  but  by  Inst.  3,  24,  1,  it  is  decid-  the  counsel  for  the  defendant,  it  should 
ed  that  it  would  be  'serf  Jiostra  decisio  ita  be  differently  determined."  See  also  Flagg 
hoc  coiistitait,  ut  quoties  sic  composita  sit  ven-  v.  Mann,  2  Sumner,  539;  Cunningham  v. 
ditio,  qiianti  ille  astimaverit,  sub  hac  condi-  Ashbrook,  20  Mo.  553  ;  McCandlish  v. 
tione  siaret  contractus,  ut  siquidem  ille,  qui  Newman,  22  Penn.  St.  4G0. 
nominatus  est,  pretium  dejinierit  tunc  omni- 

1  If  not  fixed,  a  reasonable  price  is  implied,  James  ;;.  Muir,  33  Mich.  223,  227  ; 
as  the  market  price  at  the  time  and  place  of  delivery,  McEwen  v.  Morcy,  60  lU.  32. 
See  Callaghan  v.  Myers,  89  111.  5G6.  The  price  may  he  fixed  by  valuers,  Newlan  v. 
Dunham,  60  111.  233  ;  but  if  they  refuse  to  act,  there  is  no  contract  in  the  ca.se  of  an 
executory  sale,  Wittkowsky  v.  Wasson,  71  N.  C.  451.  If  by  a  referee,  there  is  no  sale 
until  he  fixes  the  price.  Button  v.  Moore,  26  Ark.  382 ;  Vickers  r.  Yickers,  L.  K. 
4  Eq.  .529.  See  Brown  v.  Cole,  45  la.  601.  Where  the  price  of  Avheat  was  to  be 
fixed  by  the  seller  by  a  certain  standard,  and  it  Avas  destroyed  before  so  fixed,  it  was 
held  to  be  the  buyer's  loss.  McConnell  v.  Hughes,  29  AVis.  537  ;  Easterliu  v.  Rylander, 
59  Ga.  292  ;  Ames  v.  Quimby,  96  U.  S.  324. 

VOL.  I.  36  561 


*  526  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

price,  the  sale  is  void.  (  q)  And  the  thing  sold  must  be  specific, 
and  capable  of  certain  identification.  There  must  be  an  agree- 
ment of  mind  as  to  this  ;  and  if  there  be  an  honest  error  as  to  the 
price,  or  as  to  the  substantial  and  essential  qualities  of  the  thing 
sold  (not  as  to  its  mere  worth  or  condition),  the  sale  may  be 
treated  as  null ;  (r)  ^  but  this  perhaps  should  be  confined  to  cases 
where  the  difference  between  the  thing  bought,  and  the  thing 
supposed  to  be  bought,  is  sufficient  to  affect  its  identity.  For 
anything  less  than  this  the  parties  must  be  left  to  the  law  of 
warranty,  (s)  This  agreement  of  mind  may  be  expressed  orally 
or  by  letter  ;  but  we  have  already  considered  these  questions  fully, 
when  treating  of  assent ;  and  we  would  refer  in  this  connection  to 
what  we  there  said,  (0  adding  here,  that  where  a  proposal  to 
purchase  goods  is  made  by  letter  sent  to  another  State,  and  is 
there  assented  to,  the  contract  of  sale  is  made  in  that  State,  and 
if  it  is  valid  by  the  laws  of  the  latter  State,  it  will  be  enforced  in 
the  State  whence  the  letter  is  sent,  although  it  would  have  been 
invalid  if  made  there,  (u) 


SECTION  IV. 

THE   EFFECT   OF   A    SALE. 

Upon  a  completed  sale  the  property  in  the  thing  sold  passes  to 
the  purchaser ;  one  of  these  things  implies  the  other ;  if  the 
*  526    *  property  passes  then  it  is  a  completed  sale ;  and  if  a  com- 
pleted sale  then  the  property  passes,  (v)^    And  no  bill 

(q)  Story  on  Sales,  §  220.     A  sale  may  wood  upon  wliioh  some  machinery  was 

be  made  of  an  article  for  what  it  is  worth,  mounted,  subsequently  discovered  treas- 

for  that  can  be  ascertained  by  experts,  ure    of    considerable    value,    which    had 

See  Hoodley  r.  McLaine,  10  Bing.  487;  been  concealed  witiiin  the  block  by  the 

Acebal  v.  Levy,  id.  382.     See  also  Dick-  intestate,  and  which  was  held  not  to  pass 

son  V.  Jordan,  12  Ired.  L.  79,  and  11  Ired.  by  the  sale. 
L.  106.  (.s)  ^CGpost,  p.  *540,  and  ch.  v.  on  War- 

(r)  See  Kelly  ".  Solari,  9  M.  &  W.  54 ;  ranty. 
Lucas  V.  Worswick,   1  Mo.  &  Rob.  293.  (i)   See  an^e,  p.  *479,  e<  seq.     See  also 

As  to  the  sale  being  controlled  by  the  in-  Routledge  v.  Grant,  4  Bing.  653;  Bean  v. 

tcntion  of  the  parties,  see  Iluthacher  t\  Burbank,  16  Me.  458. 
Harris's  Adm'r,  38  Penn.  St.  491.     In  this  (u)  Mclntyre  v.  Parks,  3  Met.  207. 

case  there  was  an  administrator's  sale  at  (c)   Bajilcii,  J.,  in  Simmons  v.  Swift,  5 

auction,  and  a  purchaser  of  a  block  of  B.  &  C.  862 ;  Dixon  v.  Yates,  2  Nev.  & 

^  As  where  there  i.s  a  mistake  as  to  the  identity  of  thing  sold.  Webb  v.  Odell,  49 
N.  Y.  .583 ;  Bowen  v.  Sullivan,  62  Ind.  281  ;  Kyle  v.  Kavanagh,  103  Mass.  356  ;  Harvey 
V.  Harris,  112  Mass.  32.     See  Hills  v.  Snell,  104  Mass.  173. 

2  Webber  v.  Davis,  44  Me.  147  ;  Bailey  ?'.  Smith,  43  N.  H.  141 ;  Tome  v.  Dubois, 
6  Wallace,  548  ;  CriU  v.  Dovle,  53  Cal.  713;  Sweeting  v.  Turner,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  310. 

562 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  520 

or  memorandum  subsequently  sent  in,  can  by  its  terms  vary  the 
contract,  (vv}  If  it  be  sold  for  cash  and  the  price  be  not  paid, 
or  if  it  be  sold  on  a  credit,  but  by  the  terms  of  the  bargain  is  to 
remain  in  the  hands  of  the  vendor,  the  vendor  has  a  lien  on  it 
for  the  price ;  (tv)  and  only  payment  or  tender  gives  the  vendee 
a  right  to  possession.  And  if  it  be  sold  on  credit,  and  the  buyer 
by  the  terms  of  the  bargain  has  the  right  of  immediate  possession 
without  payment,  but  the  thing  sold  actually  remains  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  seller  until  the  credit  has  expired,  and  the  price  is 
still  unpaid,  it  seems  that  the  seller  then  has  a  lien  for  the 
price,  (a;)  If  it  be  sold  on  credit,  and  there  is  no  agreement  in 
respect  to  the  delivery  or  possession  of  the  goods,  the  prevailing, 
but  not  quite  universal  rule,  gives  to  the  purchaser  at  once  a  com- 
plete right  not  only  of  property  but  of  possession,  (?/)  subject 
only  to  defeasance  under  the  law  of  stoppage  m  transitu. 

If  the  property  passes,  though  not  the  right  of  possession,  and 
the  thing  sold  perish,  the  loss  falls  on  the  purchaser.  (2)  1     The 

M.  202.  Parl-e,  J. ;  Atkin  v.  Barwick,  1  Una;  v.  Baxter,  G  B.  &  C.  362 ;  Felton  v. 

HtTH.  IQ7 , where  Fortesqiie,  J., says :  "Prop-  Fuller,  9  Foster  (N.  IL),  12L  —  See,  liow- 

erty  by  our  law  may  be  divested  without  ever,  Baley  i\  Culverwell,  2  ilood.  &  It. 

an  actual  delivery;  as  a  horse  in  a  sta-  506;  Langfort  v.  Tiler,  1  Salk.  113. 
ble."   Itisexactly  otherwise  in  the  Roman  {vv)   Shucardt  ?'.  Aliens,  1  Wall.  359. 

civil  law,  and  the  laws  of  those  nations  (iv)  Bloxam  v.  Sanders,  4  B.  &  C.  948; 

in  Europe  which  adopt  the  civil  law  as  Cornwall  v.  Haight,  8  Barb.  328;  Bowen 

the   basis   of   their   law.     The   property  c.  Burk,  13  Penn.  St.  146.    See  also  Dixon 

(■lomininm)  does  not  pass  until  delivery,  v.   Yates,  5   B.  &   Ad.  313;    Withers  i'. 

Thus,  if  a  seller  retains  the  thing  sold,  to  Lyss,  4  Camp.  237 ;  Bush  r.  Davies,  2  M. 

be  delivered  a  week  hence,  and  in  the  &  Sel.  3^7 ;  Langfort  i\  Tiler,  1  Salk.  113. 

mean  time  becomes  insolvent,  the  buyer  And  sec  Foley  v.  Mason,  6  Md.  37  ;  Ilen- 

does  not  hold  the  thing,  but  it  goes  with  derson  v.  Lauck,  21  Penn.  St.  359;  Swee- 

liis  assets  to  the  assignees.     All  the  buyer  ney  v.  Owsley,  14  B.  Mon.  413. 
liolds  is  a  claim  against  the  seller  for  the  (x)  New   v.    Swain,    Dan.    &   L.   193; 

value  of  the  thing,  and  for  this  debt  of  Lewis   v.   Covilland    21    Cal.   178;    Wily 

the  seller  the  buyer  takes  only  his  divi-  liams  v.  Young,  21  Cal.  227. 
dend  like  other  creditors ;  for  by  a  sale  (y)  Cartland  v.  Morison,  32  IMe.  191 ; 

only,  without  delivery,  the  buyer  acquires  Kimbro  v.  Hamilton,  2  Swan,  190;  Hall 

only  a  jus  ad  rfui  and  not  a.  jus  in  re.     See  v.  Robinson,  2  Comst.  293.     But  .Magoon 

1  Bell,  Com.  166.  f<  s^7.     But  for  the  com-  v.   Ankeny,  11   111.  558,  and  O'Kccfe  r. 

nion-law  rule,  see  the  cases  cited  in  the  Kellogg,  15  111.  347,  maj'  be  considered  as 

next  note;  also  Noy,  Maxims,  p.  88;  Hinde  denying,  or  at   least  as  qualifying  this 

V.  Whitehouse,  7  East,  558,  Lord  Ellen-  rule. 
borough;  Com.  Dig.  Agreement,  B.  3;  Tar-  {s}  Tarling  v.  Baxter,  6  B.  &  C.  362. 

See  Morse  v.  Sherman,  106  Mass.  430;  Foster  v.  Ropes,  111  Mass.  10;  IIaskin8  v. 
AVarren,  115  Mass.  514;  Townsend  v.  Margraves,  118  Mass.  325,  332;  Lester  v.  East, 
49  lud.  588  ;  Jenkins  >:  Jarrett,  70  N.  C.  255;  Hanauer  r.  Bartels,  2  Col.  514.  _  If  a 
buyer  agrees  to  remove  the  goods  within  a  certain  time,  failure  so  to  do  may  justify 
the  seller  in  repudiating  the  sale.  Kellam  v.  McKinstry,  69  N.  Y.  264 ;  Bolton  v. 
Riddle,  35  Mich.  13.  A  sale  is  complete  when  the  thing  sold  is  so  situated  that  the 
buyer  can  take  it  at  his  pleasure.  Turner  ?•.  Langdon,  112  Mass.  265  ;  Jlarsh  r.  Rouse, 
44  N.  Y.  643 ;  Rattary  v.  Cook,  50  Ala.  352 ;  Partridge  v.  Wooding,  44  Conn.  277 ; 
Siblev  V.  Tie,  88  111.  287. 

1  Goddard  v.  Binney,  115  Mass.  450;  Smith  v.  Dallas,  35  Ind.  255  ;  Whitcomb  v. 

563 


*  527  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

vendor's  lien  is  destroyed  by  a  delivery  of   the  goods,  or  by  a 
delivery  of  a  part,  without  intention  to  separate  it  from 

*  527    the  rest,  but  *  with  an  intention  thereby  to  give  posses- 

sion of  the  whole,  (a)  If  sold  for  cash,  and  the  money 
be  not  paid  within  a  reasonable  time,  the  vendor  may  treat  the 
sale  as  null.  (5)  There  may,  however,  be  a  delay  in  the  payment 
justified  by  the  terms  or  the  nature  of  the  contract. 

The  property  does  not  pass  absolutely  unless  the  sale  be  com- 
pleted ;  and  it  is  not  completed  until  the  happening  of  any  event 
expressly  provided  for,  or  so  long  as  anything  remains  to  be  done 
to  the  thing  sold,  to  put  it  into  a  condition  for  sale,  or  to  identify 
it,  or  discriminate  it  from  other  things,  (c)  ^     Thus  if  one  buys  one 

See   also  Willis  v.   Willis,  6   Dana,  48;  Mass.  1858,  11  Law  Rep.  561.    Of  course 

Macomber  y.  Parker,  13  Tick.  183;   Far-  if  the  vendee  obtains  possession  by  fraud, 

nuni  V.  Perry,  4  Law  Rep.  276  ;  Crawford  he  can  derive  no  rights,  and  the  vendor 

V.  Smith,  7  Dana,  61.  can  lose  none  by  such  a  delivery.      Earl 

(a)  Mere    delivery  of   part    will   not,  of   Bristol  r.  Willsmore,  1   13.  &  C.  514. 

however,  divest  the  vendor  of  his  lien,  as  See   also    Hussey   v.   Thornton,  4  Mass. 

to  the  whole,  if  anything  remains  to  be  405 ;  Donahue  v.  Cromartie,  21  Cal.  80. 
done  by  the  vendor  to  the  part  undeliv-  {b)  Anonymous,  Dyer,  30  a.     See  also 

ered.     Simmons  v.  Swift,  5  B.  &  C.  857.  Langfort  v.  Tiler,  1  Salk.  113.      But  see 

See  on  this  subject  Slubey  v.  Ileyward,  2  Greaves   v.  Ashlin,  3   Camp.  426,  contra. 

II.  Bl.  504 ;  Hammond  r.  Anderson,  4  B.  See  also  Blackburn  on  Contract  of  Sale, 

&  P.  69 ;  Hanson  v.  Meyer,  6  East,  014  ;  p.  328,  et  seq. 

Ward  V.  Shaw,  7  Wend.  404 ;   Payne  r.  (f )  Bailey   ;;.    Smith,   43  N.   H.   141 ; 

Shadbolt,  1  Camp.  427  ;  Brewer  r.  Sails-  Gardner  r.  Lane,  9  Allen,  492  ;  Strauss  v. 

bury,  9   Barb.   511;    Weld    v.   Cutler,  2  Ross,  25  Ind.  300;  McClung  y.  Kelley,  21 

Gray,    195;    Haskall    v.   Rice,   S.   J.   Ct.  Iowa,  508. 

Whitney,  24  Mich.  4*86.  —  Where  goods  were  purchased  to  be  paid  for  when  used  or 
disposed  of,  and  a  part  was  afterwards  destroyed,  it  was  held  that  the  buyer  must  pay 
for  those  destroyed.     Powers  v.  Dellinger,  54  Wis.  389. 

1  Where  anything  remains  to  be  done,  as  weighing,  measuring,  or  testing  to  deter-' 
mine  the  price,  property  does  not  pass  although  goods  be  ascertained  and  they  are  in 
a  state  for  acceptance.  Johnson  v.  Lancashire  R.  Co.  3  C.  P.  D.  499  ;  Foster  v.  Ropes, 
111  Mass.  10 ;  Gibbs  v.  Benjamin,  45  Vt.  124  ;  Lingham  v.  Eggleston,  27  Mich.  324  ; 
Dyer  v.  Libby,  61  Me.  45;  Smart  v.  Batchelder,  57  N.  H.  140  ;  Southwestern  Co.  v. 
Stanard,  44  Mo.  71  ;  Ormsbee  v.  IMachir,  20  Ohio  St.  295  ;  Lester  v.  Ea.'^t,  49  Ind.  588 ; 
Morrison  v.  Dingley,  63  Me.  553;  Leigh  v.  Mobile,  &c.  R.  Co.  58  Ala.  165  ;  Gravett  v. 
Mugge,  89  111.  218';  Burrows  r.  Whittaker,  71  N.  Y.  291.  —  But  the  title  to  specific 
goods  passes  before  delivery,  if  such  intent  is  expressed  or  implied,  although  the 
seller  has  to  do  something  more  to  the  property.  Marble  v.  Moore,  102  Mass.  443  ;  as 
to  test  or  to  count,  Russell  v.  Carrington,  42  N.  Y.  118;  Watts  v.  Hendry,  13  Fla. 
523;  Wilkinson  v.  Holiday,  33  Mich.  386;  Straus  v.  Minzesheimer,  78  111.  492  ;  Groat 
»'.  Gile,  51  N.  Y.  431  ;  Morrow  v.  Reed,  30  Wis.  81  ;  but  if  the  intention  is  that  some- 
thing be  done  before  completion,  whether  by  the  seller,  buyer,  or  a  third  person,  the 
title  does  not  pass,  Foster  r.  Ropes,  111  Mass.'lO  ;  Prescott  v.  Locke,  51  N.  H.  94 ;  Pike 
V.  Vaughn,  39  Wis.  499  ;  Darden  v.  Lovelace,- 52  Ala.  289  ;  Flanders  v.  Maynard,  58 
Ga.  56  ;  although  placed  in  the  buyer's  hands,  Kein  v.  Tupper,  52  N.  Y.  550.  To  pass 
title  to  an  unfinished  specific  chattel,  an  express  intent  must  appear,  Thorudike  v. 
Bath,  114  Mass.  116  ;  with  express  or  implied  acceptance.  Brown  r.  Foster,  113  Mass. 
136  ;  Higgius  v.  Murray,  73  N.  Y.  252  ;  Zaleski  r.  Clark,  44  Conn,  218.  See  Goddard 
V.  Biuney,  115  Mass.  450;  Pratt  v.  Mavnard,  116  Mass.  388;  Shawhan  v.  Van  Nest, 
25  Ohio  St.  490;  Seckel  v.  Scott,  66  111.  106.  Morrow  v.  Delaney,  41  Wis.  149,  de- 
cided that  under  a  contract  declaring  that  the  plaintiff  "  has  this  day  sold  "  certain 
specified  l^s  lying  in  a  certain  place,  "  which  are  to  be  scaled  where  they  now  lie,"  the 

564 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  527 

hundred  bushels  of  wheat  out  of  two  hundred,  and  is  to  send  bags 
or  boxes  for  them  which  the  seller  is  to  till ;  and  the  buyer  sends 
bags  enough  for  twenty  bushels  which  the  seller  fills,  and  after- 
wards the  seller  refuses  to  send  any  wheat  whatever,  it  is  held, 
that  the  property  in  the  twenty  bushels  put  into  the  bags  passes 
to  the  buyer ;  but  not  so  of  the  other  eighty,  {d)  Where  several 
parties  store  grain  in  an  elevator,  in  one  mass,  they  are  tenants 
in  common  of  the  mass  ;  and  if  an  order  of  the  vendor  on  the 
owners  of  the  elevator,  to  deliver  to  a  purchaser  a  certain  quan- 
tity, is  accepted  by  the  owners  in  their  customary  manner,  that 
quantity  passes  to  the  purchaser,  (dd)  ^  It  has  been  held,  that 
where  articles  in  process  of  manufacture  under  an  agreement  to 
make  and  deliver  to  the  vendee,  he  supplying  certain  specified 
parts  necessary  to  their  completion,  are  lost  by  fire,  while  in  pos- 
session of  the  maker,  their  completion  and  delivery  being  delayed 
solely  by  the  neglect  of  the  vendee  to  furnish  the  parts  specified, 
the  loss  must  fall  upon  the  maker,  and  not  upon  the  vendee,  {e} 

(d)  Aldritlge  v.  Johnson,  7  E.  &  B.  885.  (dd)  Gushing  v.  Breed,  14  Allen,  376. 

See  also  Langhton  v.  Higgins,  4  H.  &  N.      See  post,  vol.  2,  p.  *  137,  note  {bl>). 
402,  for   a   direct   authority    upon    this  (e)  McConike  v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  U.  R.  Co. 

point.  20  N.  Y.  (6  Smith),  495.     See  post,  chap- 

ter on  Liens. 

title  passed  to  the  buyer  and  the  logs  were  at  his  risk.  See  Hahn  v.  Fredericks,  30 
Mich.  223,  as  to  the  title  of  hard  wood  mixed  with  soft  in  piles  ])assiug  before  separtir 
tion.  —  The  title  to  goods  not  specified  will  not  pass  until  appropriation.  Indianapolis 
R.  Co.  V.  Maguire,  62  lud.  140 ;  Smyth  v.  Ward,  46  la.  3.39.  See  Chapman  r.  Shep- 
ard,  39  Conn.  413;  Phillips  y.  Ocmulgee  MiUs.  5.5  Ga.  6.33;  Morrison  v.  Dingley,  63 
Me.  553  ;  Cumberland,  &c.  Co.  v.  Andes  Ins.  Co.  64  Me.  466 ;  Keiu  v.  Tuppcr,  52 
N.  Y.  550 ;  Hurff  v.  Hires,  11  Vroora,  581 ;  Ferguson  v.  Northern  Bank,  14  Bush,  555; 
Southwell  r.  Beezley,  5  Oreg.  143;  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass.  490;  Home  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Heck,  65  111.  111.  As  to  election,  see  Lynch  u.  O'Dounell,  127  Mass.  311.  A 
delivery  by  the  vendor  to  a  carrier  bv  the  buyer's  order  is  an  appropriation,  Krulder 
V.  EUison,  47  N.  Y.  36  ;  Odell  v.  B.'&  M.  R.'Co.  109  Mass.  50;  Sneathen  i-.  Grubbs, 
88  Penu.  St.  147;  Green  Bay  Bank  v.  Dearborn,  115  Mass.  219;  Groff  v.  Belclie,  G2 
Mo.  400;  as  well  as  a  discount  of  biU  of  lading  is  such  of  goods  named  therein, 
Holmes  v.  German  Sec.  Bank,  87  Penn.  St.  525 ;  First  National  Bank  v.  Pettit,  9 
HeiskeU,  447.  A  vendor  cannot  send  in  excess  of  an  order  and  make  the  buyer 
select.  Rommel  v.  Wingate,  103  Mass.  327;  Borrowman  v.  Free,  4  Q.  B.  D.  500; 
Tarling  v.  O'Riordan,  2  L.  R.  Ir.  82. 

^  Subject,  however,  to  the  seller's  lien  tintil  the  delivery  is  absolute.  Keeler  v. 
Goodwin,  111  Mass.  490.  A  contract  acknowledging  receipt  of  grain  for  storage, 
with  option  to  return  grain  of  equal  test  and  value,  is  of  bailment,  which  becomes 
sale  when  the  bailee  disposes  of  grain.  Nelson  v.  Brown,  44  Iowa,  455.  See  Irons  v. 
Kentner,  51  la.  88  ;  Sexton  v.  Graham,  53  la.  181.  But  when  grain  is  deposited  with 
a  warehouseman,  and  when  the  depositor  desires  to  sell,  the  former  will  pay  tlie  high- 
est market  price  or  return  like  grain,  it  is  a  sale,  not  a  bailment.  Johnston  r.  Browne, 
37  Iowa,  200.  So  where  the  price  is  to  be  fixed  on  any  day  decided  on  by  depositor. 
Lonergan  v.  Stewart,  55  111.  44.  As  to  tenancy  in  common,  see  Ferguson  v.  Northern 
Bank,  14  Bush,  555;  Russell  v.  Carrington,  42  N.  Y.  118;  Morrison  v.  Woodley,  84 
lU.  192.  Usage  makes  the  possession  of  warehouse  receipts  of  grain  equivalent  to 
its  possession.  BroadweU  v.  Howard,  77  111.  305.  See  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass. 
490 ;  Bailey  v.  Bensley,  87  111.  556. 

5Q5 


528 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


Nor  is  the  sale  completed  while  anything  remains  to  be  done  to 
determine  its  quantity,  if  the  price  depends  on  this ;  unless  this  is 

to  be  done  by  the  buyer  alone.  (/)  And  even  if  earnest, 
*  528    or  a  part  *  of   the  price  be  paid,  the  sale  is  not  complete 

under  these  circumstances,  and  if  it  finally  fail,  the  money 
paid  may  be  recovered  back.  ((/)  But  if  on  a  sale  of  goods,  any- 
thing remains  to  be  done  by  the  buyer,  and  it  nevertheless  appears 
by  the  terms  of  the  contract  that  the  parties  intend  that  the  prop- 
erty should  pass  at  once  by  the  bargain  from  the  seller  to  the 
buyer,  it  will  so  pass.  (^^)  ^  Upon  a  sale  of  goods  in  bond,  the 
property  passes  to  the  purchaser,  upon  delivery  to  a  carrier 
selected  by  him  (although  they  remain  subject  to  lien  for  duties, 
and  to  the  custody  of  the  customs  officers),  during  their  overland 
transit  to  the  port  of  exportation  and  delay  there  until  authority 
to  pass  them  is  received ;  and  although  the  vendor  volunteers  to 
take  the  necessary  steps  for  obtainiug  the  authority,  (^h^ 


if)  Tarling  v.  Baxter,  G  B.  &  C.  360; 
Gillet  ?\  Hill,  2  Cr.  &  .M.  535;  Zagury  v. 
rurnc'll,  2  Camp.  240 ;  Wallace  v.  Breeds, 
13  East,  522  ;  Busk  v.  Davis,  2  M.  &  Sel. 
.397;  Shepley  t-.  Davis,  5  Taunt.  617; 
Rhodes  v.  Tliuaites,  6  B.  &  C.  388;  Al- 
exander V.  Gardner,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  676. 
But  wliere  the  thing  to  be  done  by  tlie 
vendor  is  but  trifling,  or  is  but  a  mathe- 
matical computation,  this  rule  will  not 
apply.  Thus,  wliere  there  was  a  sale  of 
certain  trees,  at  a  fixed  price  per  cubic 
foot,  and  all  tiie  trees  had  been  marked, 
and  the  cubical  contents  of  each  tree  as- 
certained, it  was  held,  that  the  property 
passed  to  the  purchaser,  although  the 
sum  total  of  tlie  cubical  contents  had  not 
been  ascertained.  Tansley  v.  Turner,  2 
Bing.  N.  C.  151;  s.  c.  2  Scott,  238;  and 
see  Cunningliam  v.  Ashbrook,  20  Mo. 
553.  The  general  principle  stated  in  the 
text  is  recognized  in  the  following  Amer- 
ican cases  :  Dixon  v.  Myers,  7  Gratt.  240; 
Ward  V.  Shaw,  7  Wend.  404  ;  McDonald 
V.  Hewett,  15  Johns.  34!);  Barrett  v.  God- 
dard,  3  Mason,  112;  Rapelye  v.  Mackie, 
6  Cowen,  250;  Russell  v.  Nicoll,  3  Wend. 
112;  Outwater  v.  Dodge,  7  Cowen,  85; 
Stevens  v.  Eno,  10  Barb.  95 ;  Damon  v. 
Osborne,  1  Pick.  476 ;  Macomber  v.  Par- 
ker, 13  id.  175 ;  Houdlette  v.  Tallman,  14 
Me.  400;    Cushnaan  v.  Holyoke,  34  id. 


289  ;  Stone  v.  Peacock,  35  id.  385 ;  Golder 
V.  Ogden,  15  Penn.  St.  528;  Lester  v. 
McDowell,  18  Penn.  St.  91;  Nesbit  r. 
Burry,  25  Penn.  St.  208 ;  Riddle  v.  Var- 
num,  20  Pick.  280;  Davis  v.  Hill,  3  N.  H. 
882;  Messer  ;•.  Woodman,  2  Foster  (N. 
H.),  172  ;  Warren  v.  Buckminster,  4 
Foster  (N.  H.),  337;  Crawford  v.  Smith, 
7  Dana,  61.  — But  it  is  held,  tiiat  if  the 
parties  intended  that  the  sale  should 
he  complete  before  the  article  sold  is 
weighed  or  measured,  the  property  will 
pass  before  this  is  done.  Riddle  v.  Var- 
num,  20  Pick.  280.  See  also  Butterworth 
v.  McKinly.  11  Humjili.  206;  Waldron  v. 
Chase,  37  Me.  414;  Moody  r.  Brown,  34 
id.  107  ;  Olyphant  v.  Baker,  5  Denio,  379; 
Dennis  v.  Alexander,  3  Barr,  50;  Crofoot 
v.  Bennett,  2  Comst.  258 ;  Brewer  v.  Sal- 
isbury, 9  Barb.  511 ;  Cushman  i'.  Holy- 
oke, id.  280.  But  see  Waldo  v.  Belcher, 
11  Ired.  L.  609. 

(g)  Nesbit  v.  Burry,  25  Penn.  St.  208; 
Joyce  V.  Adams,  4  Seld.  291. 

(tjg)  Turley  v.  Bates,  2  Hurl.  &  Colt. 
200;  Ford  v.  Chambers,  28  Cal.  13; 
Fitch  y.Burk.  38  Vt.  683;  Young  v.  Mat- 
thews, L.  R.  2  C.  P.  127 ;  Cummings  v. 
Griggs,  2  Duvall,  87 ;  Burr  v.  Willianas, 
23  Ark.  244. 

{h)  Waldron  v.  Roniain,  22  N.  Y. 
368. 


1  Martineau  v.  Kitching,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  436 ;  Burrows  v.  Whitaker,  71  N.  Y.  291 ; 
Hurff  V.  Hires,  11  Vroom,  581  ;  Carpenter  v.  Graham,  42  Mich.  191  ;  or  if  something  j 
is  to  be  done  by  the  vendor  but  at  the  vendee's  direction  and  for  his  convenience. 
Whitcomb  v.  Whitney,  24  Mich.  486. 

566 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  529 

An  agreement  to  sell  is  a  different  thing  from  a  sale,  and  there- 
fore no  mere  promise  to  sell  hereafter,  amounts  to  a  present  sale ; 
so,  an  acceptance  of  a  specific  order  for  certain  chattels,  is  not  itself 
a  sale  of  those  chattels,  either  to  the  drawer  or  to  the  party  in 
whose  favor  the  order  is  drawn,  (i)  And  it  is  always  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury,  whether  a  sale  has  been  completed  or  not.  (j) 
The  frequent  importance  of  this  question  arises  from  the  rule, 
which  we  repeat,  that  if  a  sale  be  complete,  the  property  in  the 
thing  sold  passes  to  the  buyer ;  and  if  the  sale  is  not  complete,  it 
remains  with  the  original  owner.^ 

We  are  aware  of  no  difference  between  the  Roman  civil 
*  and  the  common  law,  in  regard  to  any  part  of  the  law  *  529 
of  contracts,  greater  or  more  definite  in  principle  and 
theory  than  that  which  relates  to  this  subject.  But  in  practice 
the  result  was  not  so  different.  By  the  Roman  law,  the  sale 
without  delivery  did  not  pass  the  property.  It  gave  to  the  buyer 
a  jus  ad  rem,  but  not  a  jus  in  re  until  possession.  Leaving  the 
property  in  the  hands  of  the  seller,  it  created  two  obligations,  — 
one  on  the  part  of  the  buyer  to  pay  the  price,  and,  for  this  debt, 
the  thing  sold  was  a  pignus  in  the  hands  of  the  seller ;  the  other 
on  the  part  of  the  seller  to  deliver  the  thing  so  pledged  on  pay- 
ment of  the  debt.  But  if  the  pledge  perislied  without  the  fault  of 
the  seller,  he  could  not  be  called  on  to  return  the  pledge,  but  might 
still  call  on  the  buyer  to  pay  his  debt,  —  that  is,  the  price,  (/c) 
In  Louisiana,  it  is  held,  that  if  by  the  terms  announced  at  a  public 
sale,  the  purchaser  has  a  certain  time  to  remove  the  goods,  during 
the  whole  of  that  time  they  are  at  the  risk  of  the  seller,  (/c/c) 

(i)  Burrall  v.  Jacob,  1  Barb.  105.  trated  in  Bell's  Commentaries  on  the  Law 

Ij)  De  Ridder  v.  Mclvnight,  13  Johns,  of  Scotland. 
294.  (kk)  Gleason  v.  Sykes,  18  La.  Ann. 

(k)  This  whole  subject  is  well  illus-  6"27. 

1  Lester  v.  East,  49  Ind.  588,  592;  The  Elgee  Cotton  Cases,  22  Wallace,  180;  Leigh 
V.  Mobile,  &c.  R.  Co.  58  Ala.  165  ;  Cardinell  v.  Bennett,  52  Cal.  476 ;  Olney  v.  Howe, 
89  111.  556.  Whether,  upon  an  agreement  to  sell,  the  title  passes,  depends  upon  the 
intention  of  the  parties.  Bethel,  &c.  Co.  v.  Brown,  57  Me.  9,  18 ;  Prescott  v.  Locke, 
51  N.  H.  94,  101  ;  Russell  v.  Carrington,  42  N.  Y.  118  ;  Fitch  v.  Burk,  38  Vt.  683,  689  ; 
Dugan  V.  Nichols,  125  Mass.  43;  Kurd  v.  Cook,  75  X.  Y.  454;  Dyer  v.  Libhy,  61  Me. 
45 ;  Lester  v.  East,  49  Ind.  588 ;  Wilkinson  v.  Holiday,  33  Mich.  386 ;  Ogg  v.  8huter, 
L.  R.  10  C.  P.  159,  162.  As  to  whether  there  is  such  intent  is  for  jury.  Marble  v. 
Moore,  102  Mass.  443  ;  Kelsea  v.  Haines,  41  N.  H.  246,  253 ;  Dyer  v.  Libby,  61  Me.  45  ; 
and  such  intent  must  be  manifest  when  the  bargain  is  made,  Foster  v.  Ropes,  111  Mass. 
10;  Lingham  v.  Eggleston,  27  Mich.  324. 

667 


529  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  III. 


SECTION  V. 

OP  POSSESSION   AND   DELIVERY. 

While,  as  between  the  parties,  the  property  passes  bj  a  sale 
without  delivery,  if  such  is  the  intention,  (kV)  it  is  not  valid,  in 
general,  as  against  a  third  party  without  notice,  without  delivery .^ 
For  if  the  same  thing  be  sold  by  the  vendor  to  two  parties,  by 
conveyances  equally  valid,  he  who  first  gets  possession  will  hold 
it.  (?)  In  general,  where  there  is  a  completed  sale,  and  no  change 
of  possession,  this  retention  of  possession  by  the  vendor  is  a 
badge  of  fraud,  and  will  avoid  the  sale  in  favor  of  a  party  who 
subsequently  acquires  title  to  the  property  in  good  faith,  either  by 

(ki)  Burt  ».  Butcher,  34  N.  Y.  493.  419;   Fletcher   v.  Howard,  2   Aik.   115; 

(/)  2  Kent,  Com.  522 ;  Dawes  v.  Cope,  Bay  v.  Cook,  31  111.  836;  Cullam  v.  Guil- 
4  Bian.  258 ;  Babb  v.  Clemson,  10  S.  &  R.     lot,  18  La.  Ann.  608. 

1  A  sale  of  a  specific  chattel  passes  property  without  delivery.  Buffinton  v.  Ulen, 
7  Bush,  231 ;  Bigler  v.  Hall,  54  N.  Y.  167.  When  nothing  is  said  as  to  payment,  the 
presumption  is  that  payment  of  price  and  delivery  of  possession  are  concurrent  con- 
ditions. Scudder  v.  Bradburv,  106  Mass.  422,  427;  Phelps  v.  Hubbard,  51  Vt.  489; 
Michigan,  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Phillips,  60  111.  190  ;  S.  W.  Freight  Co.  v.  Plant,  45  Mo.  517.  A 
delivery  of  possession  by  the  vendor  without  insisting  upon  the  payment  of  price  waives 
his  right  both  to  title  and  lien.  Freeman  v.  Nichols,  116  Mass.  309  ;  Mackaness  v.  Long, 
85  Peun.  St.  158.  If  a  delivery  is  made  in  expectation  of  immediate  payment,  refusal 
so  to  do  entitles  the  seller  to  reclaim  the  property.  Hodgson  v.  Barrett,  33  Ohio  St.  63 ; 
Owens  V.  Weedmau,  82  111.  409. — Of  ponderous  or  intangible  articles,  a  constructive 
delivery  is  sufficient.  Haydeu  v.  Demets,  53  N.  Y.  426 ;  People's  Bank  i-.  Gridley, 
91  111.  457  ;  Audenreid  v.  liaudall,  3  Cliff.  99  ;  Newcomb  v.  Cabell,  10  Bush,  460 ;  Puck- 
ett  V.  Beed,  31  Ark.  131.  —  A  delivery  by  the  owner  of  a  carrier's  receipt  for  goods  is 
a  symbolical  delivery.  Green  Bay  Bank  v.  Dearborn,  115  Mass.  219.  See  Newcomb 
m  Boston,  &c.  II.  Co.  115  Mass.  230;  StoUenwerck  v.  Thacher,  115  Mass.  224.  But  a 
sale  without  delivery,  actual  or  constructive,  is  invalid  against  subsequent  purchasers, 
attaching  creditors,  and  those  similarly  situated.  Haak  v.  Linderman,  64  Penn.  St. 
499  ;  Mosher  v.  Smith,  67  Me.  172 ;  Crawford  v.  Forristall,  58  N.  H.  114;  Seymour  v. 
O'Keefe,  44  Conn.  128;  Richardson  v.  Rardin,  88  111.  124;  Pettengill  v.  Elkins,  50  Vt. 
431  ;  Uhl  V.  Robinson,  8  Neb.  272  ;  Wilson  v.  Paulsen,  57  Ga.  596  ;  Sutton  v.  Ballon,  46 
la.  517  ;  Conway  v.  Edwards,  6  Nev.  190;  Morgan  v.  Taylor,  32  Tex.  363.  A  bill  of 
sale  of  a  horse,  continued  to  be  kept  in  the  seller's  stable,  is  insufficient  against  his 
creditors,  Dempsey  i\  Gardner,  127  Mass.  381.  An  accepted  offer  to  buy  a  piano,  when 
finished,  the  making  a  bill  of  sale  of  it  and  jiayment  of  the  price  at  a  subsequent  day, 
is  enough  for  a  jury  to  find  a  delivery  and  passage  of  title  against  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser. Thorndike  v.  Bath,  114  Mass.  116.  A  written  transfer  and  delivery  of  a  stock 
certificate  to  a  hondjide  purchaser  is  valid  against  the  seller's  attaching  creditor.  Bos- 
ton Music  Hall  Ass.  v.  Cory,  129  Mass.  435.  If  the  thing  sold  is  in  a  third  person's 
hands,  notice  to  him  is  a  delivery  against  a  subsequent  attaching  creditor.  Dempsey 
V.  Gardner,  127  Mass.  381,  383;  Russell  v.  O'Brien,  127  Mass.  349;  Puckett  v.  Reed, 
31  Ark.  131 ;  Cofield  v.  Clark,  2  Col.  101.  A  survey  of  logs  by  a  mutually  agreed  on 
person,  and  putting  on  them  the  purchaser's  mark,  is  sufficient  delivery  even  against 
subsequent  purchasers,  although  the  vendor  was  bound  to  deliver  the  logs  farther  down 
the  stream.    Bethel,  &c.  Co.  v.  Brown,  57  Me.  9.    See  Thorndike  v.  Bath,  114  Mass.  116. 

668 


CH.  IV.] 


SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


530 


transfer  or  by  attachment,  (11)  and  with  no  knowledge  of  the  sale. 
In  the  days  of  Mansfield  and  Buller,  possession  retained  by  the 
seller  or  mortgagor  of  chattels,  gave  rise  to  an  inference  of  law  of 
fraud.  This  severe  doctrine  has  certainly  been  held  in  many 
cases  down  to  the  present  day,  both  in  England  and  in  this 
country.  But  the  rule  has  been  much  modified  *  in  other  *  530 
cases.  And  there  seems  now  to  be  a  tendency  to  consider 
the  question  of  fraud  in  all  such  cases  as  a  question  of  fact,  in 
relation  to  which  the  circumstance  of  possession  is  of  great 
weight,  though  not  absolutely  conclusive.  The  question  is  thus 
taken  from  the  court  who  should  infer  it  from  a  single  fact,  and 
is  left  to  the  jury,  who  may  consider  all  the  facts,  and  determine 
how  far  the  fact  of  possession  is  explained,  and  made  consistent 
with  an  honest  purpose.  (?n)  ^     And  it  is  said  that  where  the  con- 


(//)  Tanneret  v.  Edwards,  18  La.  Ann. 
G06  ;  Walker  v.  Collier,  37  111.  362. 

(/«)  Although  few  questions  in  the  law 
present  a  greater  conflict  of  authorities 
than  this,  we  believe  that  reason,  anal- 
ogy, and  the  current  of  a  modern  au- 
thority, both  English  and  American,  sup- 
port the  principle  laid  down  in  the  text. 
The  subject  is  ably  examined  in  '2  Kent, 
('om.  515,  et  seq. ;  and  Smith,  Lead.  Cas. 
(4th  Am.  ed.)  vol.  1,  p.  1,  et  seq.  The  fol- 
lowing authorities  adopt  the  views  of  the 
text :  Cadogan  v.  Kennett,  Cowp.  432 ; 
Kastwood  V.  Brown,  Ey.  &  M.  312  ;  Kidd 
i;.  Rawhnson,  2  B.  &  P.  59 ;  Cole  v.  Davies, 
1  Ld.  Raym.  724;  Lady  Arundell  v. 
Phipps,  10  Ves.  145 ;  Watkins  v.  Birch,  4 
Taunt.  823 ;  Latimer  v.  Batson,  4  B.  &  C. 
652;  Steward  v.  Lombe,  1  Br.  &  B.  506; 
Wooderman  v.  Baldock,  8  Taunt.  676 ; 
Hoffman  v.  Pitt,  5  Esp.  22 ;  Armstrong  v. 
Baldock,  Gow,  38 ;  Storer  v.  Hunter,  3  B. 
&  C.  368;  Land  v.  Jeffries,  5  Hand.  (Va.) 
211;  Terry  v.  Belcher,  1  Bailey,  568; 
Howard  v.  Williams,  id.  575 ;  Smith  v. 
Henry,  2  id.  118;  Callen  v.  Thompson,  3 
Yerg.  475 ;  Maney  v.  Killougli,  7  id.  440 ; 
Mitchell  V.  Beal,  8  id.  142;  Baylor  v. 
Smithers,  1  Litt.  112 ;  Goldsbury  v.  May, 
id.  256 ;  Hundley  v.  Webb,  3  J.  J.  Marsh. 
643;  Walsh  v.  Medley,  1  Dana,  269;  Bis- 
sell  V.  Hopkins,  3  Cowen,  166 ;  Thompson 
V.  Blanchard,  4  Comst.  303 ;  Griswold  v. 
Sheldon,  id.  580 ;  Brooks  v.  Powers,  15 
Mass.  244 ;  Bartlett  v.  WiUiams,  1  Pick. 
288 ;  Homes  r.  Crane,  2  id.  607 ;  Wheeler 
V.  Train,  3  id.  255 ;  Adams  v.  Wheeler, 
10  id.  199;  Marden  v.  Babcock,  2  Met. 
99;  Haven  v.  Low,  2  N.  H.  13;  Kendall 


V.  Fitts,  2  Foster  (N.  H.),  1;  Walcott  i-. 
Keith,  id.  198;  Coljurn  v.  Pickering,  3  id. 
415;  Clark  v.  Morse,  10  N.  H.  239;  Reed 
V.  Jewett,  5  Greenl.  96;  Cutter  v.  Cope- 
land,  18  Me.  127 ;  Comstock  v.  Rayford, 
12  Sm.  &  M.  369 ;  Field  v.  Siinco,  2  Eng. 
(Ark.)  269;  Erwin  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky, 
5  La.  Ann.  1 ;  Collins  v.  Pellerin,  id.  99 ; 
Bryant  v.  Kelton,  1  Tex.  415.  See  Ball 
v.  Loomis,  29  N.  Y.  412 ;  State  v.  Evans, 
38  Mo.  150;  George  v.  Norris,  23  Ark. 
121.  —  It  must  be  confessed,  however,  that 
there  is  a  host  of  decisions  in  supjjort  of 
the  opposite  principle,  and  that  it  still  has 
the  sanction  of  very  sound,  respectable, 
and  learned  courts.  The  doctrine  was 
first  laid  down  in  Twyne's  case,  3  Rep. 
87,  and  has  since  been  recognized  or 
adopted  in  the  following  among  other 
cases :  Edwards  v.  Harbcn,  2  T.  R.  587 ; 
Paget  V.  Perchard,  1  Esp.  205 ;  Wordell 
V.  Smith,  1  Camp.  332 ;  liecd  v.  Wilniot, 
5  Mo.  &  P.  553 ;  Hamilton  v.  Russell,  1 
Cranch,  309 ;  Alexander  v.  Deneale,  2 
Munf.  341 ;  Robertson  v.  Ewell,  3  id.  1 ; 
Kennedy  r.  Ross,  2  Rep.  Con.  Ct.  125; 
Hudnal  v.  Wilder,  4  McCord,  294  ;  Ragan 
V.  Kennedy,  1  Overt.  91  ;  Bnimmel  v. 
Stockton,  3  Dana,  134 ;  Laughlin  v.  Fur- 
guson,  6  id.  117 ;  Jarvis  v.  Davis,  14  B. 
Mon.  5:33;  Young  v.  McClure.  2  W.  &  S. 
147;  Brady  v.  Haines,  18  Penn.  St.  113; 
Bowman  v.  Herring,  4  Ilarring.  (Del.) 
458;  McBride  v.  McClcUan,  6  W.  &  S. 
94;  Thornton  v.  Davenport.  1  Scam.  296; 
Chumarv.  Wood,  1  Halst.  155;  Patten  v. 
Smith,  5  Conn.  196 ;  Weeks  v.  Wead,  2 
Aik.  64 ;  Beattie  v.  Robin,  2  Vt.  181  ; 
Farnsworth  v.  Shepard,  6  id.  521;  Wil- 


1  Ingalls  V.  Herrick,  108  Mass.  351 ;  Mead  v.  Gardiner,  13  R.  I.  257. 

5G9 


*  531  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  III. 

tract  is  bond  fide  and  otherwise  completed,  slight  acts  suffice  to 
prove  a  delivery  as  against  the  claims  of  third  parties,  {mrn)  It 
is  held  in  California,  that  where  cattle  roaming  with  those  of 
other  owners  were  sold,  the  purchaser  will  not  be  affected  by 
want  of  delivery,  until  he  has  had  a  reasonable  time  for  selecting 
and  branding  them,  (jmi)  Goods  are  fraudulently  purchased,  if 
the  buyer  intends  not  to  pay  for  them,  and  the  seller  may  recover 
possession  of  them,  from  the  purchaser  or  one  who  buys  from  him 
with  knowledge  of  the  fraud,  (/no)  ^  If  one  resists  the  payment 
of  the  price  on  the  ground  of  fraud  in  the  seller,  he  must  prove 
not  only  that  the  seller  made  false  statements,  but  that  he  knew 
them  to  be  false,  (wjd)  If  a  vendor  proceeds  to  judgment  for  the 
price  after  knowing  the  fraud,  he  loses  his  right  to  retake  the 
goods,  (^mq)  But  a  mere  demand  of  payment  docs  not  defeat  the 
vendor's  right,  (iiir') 

The    delivery    may    be    symbolical,    or    of    a    part    for    the 
whole  ;  (w)  ^  and  a  delivery  of  the  key,  the  property  being 

*  631    *  locked  up,  is  so  far  a  delivery  of  the  goods,  that  it  will 

support  an  action  of  trespass  against  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser who  gets  possession  of  them,  (o)  If  the  goods  are  in 
possession  of  another  than  the  vendor,  an  order  to  him,  with  pay- 
ment of  the  price  by  the  buyer,  completes  the  sale,  (oo)     A  sale 

son  V.   Hooper,  12  id.  653;   Hutchins  v.  (mo)  King  v.  Phillips,  8  Bosw.   603; 

Gilchrist,  23  id.  82  ;  Gibson  v.  Love,  4  Fla.  and  see  Kateau  v.  Bernard,  3  Blatch.  C.  C. 

217  ;  Sturtevant  v.  Ballard,  9  Johns.  337.  244,  and  Anderson  v.  Nicholas,  28  N.  Y. 

—  But  in  those  courts  where  the  doctrine  GOO. 

of  Twyne's  case  has  been  received  with  (m/s)  King  v.  Eagle   Mills,   10  Allen, 

favor,  the  rule  has  not  been  applied  to  548. 

sales  on  execution,  which  are  in  their  nat-  {>nq)  Bank  of  Beloit  v.  Beale,  24  N.  Y. 

ure  public  and   notorious.     Simerson  v.  473. 

Branch  Bank,  12  Ala.  205;   Garland  v.  (mr)  Manning  r.  Albee,  11  Allen,  520. 

Chambers,  11  Sni.  &  M.  337;  Foster  v.  {n)   See  Cliamberlain  v.  Farr,  23  Vt. 

Pugh,  12  id.  416;  Abney  ?;.  Kingsland,  10  265;  Brewer  v.  Salisbury,  9  Barb.  511  ; 

Ala.  .355.  Evans  v.  Harris,  19  id.  416 ;  Packard  v. 

[mvi]  Stinson  v.  Clark,  6  Allen,  340.  Dunsmore,  11  Cusli.  282;  Vining  v.  Gil- 
See  also  Burge  v.  Cone,  6  Allen,  412;  breth,  39  Me.  496. 

Dewarty.  Clement, 48 Penn.  St. 413;  Miles  (o)  Chappel   v.   Marvine,  2  Aik.   79; 

V.  Edelen,  1  ]3uvall,  270 ;  State  v.  Rosen-  Benford  v.  SchcU,  55  Penn.  St.  393. 
feld,  35  Mo.  472.  (oo)  M'Cormick    v.    Hadden,    37    111. 

(mn)  Waldenr.  Murdock,  23Cal.  540.  370. 

1  Oswego  Starch  Factory  v.  Lendrum,  57  la.  573. 

2  As  by  a  tender  of  warehouse  receipts.  Gregory  v.  Wendell,  39  Mich.  337 ;  40 
Mich.  432.  The  delivery  of  a  common  carrier's  receipt  by  an  owner  of  goods,  as 
security  for  an  advance  of  money,  with  the  intention  to  transfer  the  property  in 
the  goods,  is  a  symbolical  delivery  of  them,  and  vests  in  the  person  making  the  ad- 
vance a  special  property  in  the  goods  sufficient  to  maintain  replevin.  Green  Bay 
Bank  v.  Dearborn,  115  Mass.  219  ;  Stollenwerck  v.  Thacher,  Id.  224  ;  Fifth  National 
Bank  of  Chicago  v.  Bayley,  id.  228 ;  Newcomb  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  id.  230 ;  Alder- 
man V.  Eastern  R.  Co.  id.  233. 

570 


I 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  531 

of  cotton  may  be  evidenced  by  a  delivery  of  tbc  giimer's  re- 
ceipts, (o;?)  The  intent  to  deliver  must  accomi)any  the  act, 
whatever  that  is,  to  give  it  the  legal  effect  of  delivery,  (o^) 
Marking  timber  on  a  wharf,  or  goods  in  a  warehouse,  operates  as 
a  delivery ;  goods  bought  in  a  shop,  weighed  or  measured,  and 
separated,  and  left  by  the  owner  until  called  for,  are  sufficiently 
delivered  ;  {p)  i  and  horses  bought  at  livery,  and  remaining  at  liv- 
ery with  the  seller  at  his  request,  are  said  to  be  delivered  to  the 
buyer,  {q)  This  last  case  has  been  questioned,  but  it  seems  to 
come  under  the  general  analogy,  for  the  purchaser  incurs  at  once 
a  liability  for  their  keeping.  It  is  true,  however,  that  later  cases 
apply  a  stricter  rule  than  formerly  to  constructive  delivery ;  and 
the  presumption  of  delivery  is  not  to  be  favored,  because  it  de- 
prives the  seller  of  his  lien  without  payment,  (r)  But  if  goods 
are  sent,  even  under  a  contract  of  sale,  to  be  applied  by  the  re- 
ceiver (who  was  to  be  the  buyer)  to  a  particular  purpose  (as  to 
take  up  certain  bills  of  exchange)  to  which  purpose  they  wore  not 
and  could  not  be  applied,  the  sender  does  not  lose  his  property  in 
them  by  the  delivery,  but  may  recover  them  back,  (s)  And  if 
property  be  awarded  to  one  by  arbitrators,  at  a  certain  price,  the 
tender  of  the  price  does  not  pass  the  property,  unless  the  other 
party  accept  the  price,  {t) 

(op)  Waller  v.  Parker,  5  Cold.  476.  horse  by  the  vendee  within  the  statute  of 

(oq)  Susquehanna,  &c.  Co.  v.  Finney,  frauds.     Althougli  Elmore  v.  Stone  has 

58  Penn.  St.  200.  been  much  doubted,  it  seems  hot  to  have 

(p)   So  selecting  and  marking  sheep,  been  expressly  overruled.     Sec  Smith  v. 

then  in  the  possession  of  one  who  was  re-  Surman,  9  B.  &  C.  570,  Bayley,  J. 
quested  by  the  vendee  to  retain  posses-  (r)   Dole  v.    Stimpson,  21    IMck.  384. 

sion  of  them  for  him,  is  a  sufficient  de-  See  also  Tempest  v.  Fitzgerald,  3  B.  & 

livery.     Barney  v.  Brown,  2  Vt.  374.     For  Aid.  680 ;  Baldey  v.  Parker,  2  B.  &  C.  37. 

other  instances  of  constructive  delivery,  But  these  cases  arose  under  tlie  statute  of 

see  Hatch  v.  Bayley,   12  Cush.  27 ;  and  frauds,  and  turned  upon  what  was  a  suf- 

Hatch  V.  Lincoln,  12  Cush.  31.  ficient   acceptance   within   that   act.     But 

{(j)  Elmore  v.  Stone,  1  Taunt.  458.    But  there  may  be,  perhaps,  a  cletiveri/  good  at 

see  the  subsequent  case  of  Carter  v.  Tous-  connnon  law,  which  would  not  amount 

saint,  5  B.  &  Aid.  855.     In  that  case  a  to   an  acceptance   within   the   statute  of 

horse  was  sold  by  verbal  contract,  but  no  frauds. 

time  was  fixed  for  the  payment  of  the  (s)  Moore  v.  Barthop,  1  B.  &  C.  5 ; 

price.     The   horse  was  to   remain  with  Thomp.son  v.  Tiles,  2  B.  &  C.  422 ;  Giles 

the  vendors  for  twenty  days  without  any  v.  Perkins,  9  East,  12;  Bent  v.  Fuller,  5 

charge  to  the  vendee.     At  the  expiration  T.  R.  294 ;    Zinek  v.  Walker,  2  W.  Bl. 

of  that  time,  the  horse  was  sent  to  grass,  1154 ;  Parke  v.  Eliason,  1  East,  544. 
by  the  direction  of  the  vendee,  and  by  (t)   llunter  y.  Rice,  15  East,  100.     And 

his  desire  entered  as  the  horse  of  one  of  Lord  Ellenboroiyh  said :  "  There  is  a  dif- 

the  vendors.    Upon  these  facts  the  courts  fcrence  between  property  awarded  to  be 

held  that  there  was  no  acceptance  of  the  transferred  by  the  owner  to  another,  and 

1  That  hauling  certain  lumber,  after  the  buyer's  inspector  has  passed  it,  to  a  wharf 
ready  for  shipment  "  oa  rail  of  vessel,"  passes  the  title,  see  Whitcomb  ;;.  Whitney, 
24  Mich.  486. 

571 


*  532  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  HL 

Where  goods  to  be  delivered,  in  payment  of  a  debt,  are  in  readi- 
ness for  delivery,  and  the  buyer  requests  the  seller  to  keep  them 
for  him  this  is  a  delivery  which  vests  the  property  in  the  cred- 
itor, (tt) 

*  532  *  It  is  sometimes  a  question  of  interest  what  is  the  duty 

of  the  seller  as  to  delivery  of  the  articles  sold,  and  as  to 
keeping  them  until  delivery  ;  and  also  what  is  the  duty  of  the 
vendee  as  to  receiving  them.  Usage  determines  this  in  a  consid- 
erable degree  ;  but  from  the  general  usage  and  the  adjudications 
some  rules  may  be  deduced. 

If  no  time  be  appointed  for  delivery,  or  for  payment,  these  acts 
must  be  done  within  a  reasonable  time ;  and  if  neither  party  does 
anything  within  that  period,  the  contract  is  deemed  to  be  dis- 
solved, (u)  1  If  the  goods  are  to  be  delivered  when  requested,  the 
purchaser  may  sue  for  non-delivery  witliout  proving  a  request, 
provided  the  seller  has  incapacitated  himself  from  delivering 
them,  as  by  resale  or  the  like,  (v)  but  in  general  a  request  must 
be  made  before  the  seller  can  be  sued  for  non-delivery,  (w)  And 
if  the  vendee,  either  by  the  express  terms  of  the  contract  or  from 
its  nature,  is  to  designate  the  manner  or  place  of  delivery,  he 
must  do  this  before  he  can  maintain  his  action,  (x) 

If  a  day  be  fixed  either  for  delivery,  or  payment,  the  seller 
has  the  whole  of  it ;  and  if  any  one  of  several  days,  the  whole  of 

that  which  is  actually  transferred  by  the  Sansee  v.  Wilson,  17  Iowa,  582;  Stone  j;. 

contract  of  the  owner  through  the  me-  King,  7  R.  I.  358. 

(lium  of  his  agent."  (r)  Buwdell  v.  Parsons,  10  East,  359; 

{U)  Wheelock    v.   Tanner,   39  N.   Y.  Amory  >'.  Brodrick,  5  B.  &  Aid.  712. 
481.  {w)  Bacli  V.  Owen,  5  T.  R.  409.     See 

(«)  Langfort   v.  Tiler,  1    Salk.    113;  Radford  v.  Smith,  3  M.  &  W.  254;  Ben- 

and  see  Lanyon  v.  Toogood,  13  M.  &  W.  ners  v.  Howard,  1  Taylor,  149.  —  As  to  a 

27 ;  Fletcher  v.  Cole,  23  Vt.  ]  14.     On  the  demand  by  a  servant,  see  Squier  v.  Hunt, 

subject  of  constructive  or  symbolic  deliv-  3  Price,  GS. 

ery,   see  Dixon  v.   Buck,  42   Barb.  70;  (r)  See  West  y.  Newton,  1  Duer,  277; 

Armitage  v.  Insole,  14  Q.  B.  728. 

1  Bolton  V.  Riddle,  35  Mich.  13 ;  Tufts  v.  McClure,  40  la.  317.  If  a  note  is  given 
in  consideration  of  the  delivery  of  flour  on  the  day  of  its  date,  a  failure  so  to  deliver 
is  afadureof  consideration.  Corwith  v.  Colter,  82  111.  585.  The  seller  must  not  tender 
or  deliver  more  or  less  than  the  exact  quantity  contracted  for.  Reuter  v.  Sala,  4  C.  P. 
D.  239  ;  Croninger  v.  Crocker,  62  N.  Y.  151 ;  Highland,  &c.  Co.  v.  Matthews,  76  N.  Y. 
145.  When  goods  are  ordered  from  a  correspondent  wlio  is  agent  for  buying  them,  the 
rule  is  less  rigid.  See  Ireland  v.  Livingston,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  99 ;  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  616 ;  L.  R.  5 
H.  L.  395.  Where,  as  a  general  rule,  no  action  lies  on  the  part  of  a  vendor  upon  a  con- 
tract for  the  sale  and  delivery  of  a  specified  quantity  of  goods  until  the  whole 
quantity  is  delivered,  yet  where  the  whole  deliverj'  is  to  be  at  one  and  the  same 
time,  and  the  vendee  elects  to  receive  a  portion  and  appropriates  the  same  to  his 
own  use.  and  by  his  acts  evinces  that  he  waives  the  condition  precedent  to  a  com- 
plete delivery,  the  vendor  may  recover  for  the  portion  delivered.  Avery  v.  Wiilson, 
81  N.  Y.  341. 

572 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  533 

all  of  them.  It  is  said  he  must  endeavor  to  do  the  needful  act  at 
a  convenient  hour  before  midnight ;  early  enough,  for  instance,  for 
the  buyer  to  count  the  money,  or  examine  the  goods,  and  give  a 
receipt ;  but  this  very  general  rule  does  not  seem  anywhere  de- 
fined. •  If  on  a  certain  day,  at  a  certain  place,  then  it  must  bo 
done  at  a  convenient  time  before  sunset,  because  the  presence  of 
the  other  party  is  necessary,  and  the  law  does  not  require  him  to 
be  there  through  the  twenty-four  hours,  {y)  ^ 

The  seller  is  to  keep  the  thing  sold  until  the  time  for  delivery, 
with  ordinary  care,  and  is  liable  for  the  want  of  that  care,  or  of 
good  faith ;  but  if  he  does  so  keep  it,  he  is  not  liable  for 
its  *  loss,  (2)  unless  it  perish  through  a  defect  against  *583 
which  he  has  warranted.  If  the  parties  are  distant  from 
each  other,  the  seller  must  follow  the  directions  of  the  buyer  as 
to  the  way  of  sending  the  thing  sold  to  him,  and  then  a  loss  in 
the  transportation  will  fall  on  the  buyer,  {a)  unless  attributable  to 
the  negligence  of  the  seller ;  if  the  seller  disregards  such  orders,  the 
loss  in  transportation  falls  on  him,  though  it  does  not  happen 
through  his  neglect.  Delivery  of  the  goods  by  the  seller  to  a  car- 
rier in  accordance  with  the  specific  request  of  the  purchaser,  is  a 
delivery  to  the  purchaser.  («a)  2     If  the  directions  be  general,  as 

(y)  See  Startup  v.  McDonald,  6  Man.  Sims,  6  Port.  (Ala.)  138.     In  Godfrey  v. 

&  G.  395.  Furzo,  3  P.  Wins.  186,  and  in  Vale   o. 

(z)  Where  A  bought  of  B  three  hun-  Bajde,  supra,  Lord  Chief  Justice  Ei/re  is 

dred  barrels  of  resin   "to  be   delivered  said  to  have  MJ,"  That  though  a  trader  in 

when   called   for    within   a   week,"   and  the  country  does  not  appoint  a  carrier,  yet 

paid  for  the  same,  and  within  a  week  B  if  the  goods  be  embezzled  he  shall  be  li- 

manufactured  more  than  that  quantity,  able,  because  he  leaves  it   in  tlie  breast 

which   he   had   ready  for   delivery,   but  of  the  person  to  whom  he  gives  the  order 

did  not  set  apart  any  specific  quantity  to  send  them  by  whom  he  pleases."     The 

for  A,  the  reiin  being  destroyed  by  fire  carrier  is  generally  considered  the  agent 

after  the  end   of  the  week,  it  was  held  of  the  buyer,  and  not  of  the  seller.    l)ut- 

that   A  was   bound   to  call   during   the  ton  (-•.   Solomonson,   3  B.  &  P.  584 ;  An- 

week  ;  that  B  was  not  bound  to  set  apart  derson  v.  Hodgson,  5  Price,  G-30.  As  soon, 

for  A  any  specific  three  hundred  barrels,  therefore,  as  the   goods  are  in   the   due 

and  that  A  having  failed  to  perform  his  and  regular  course  of  conveyance,  they 

part  of  the  contract,  could  not  recover  are  at  tlie  risk  of  the  purchaser,  and  not 

against     B,    either    upon    the    contract  before.     Diversy  y.  Kellogg,  44  111.114; 

to    deliver   or  for  money  had    and    re-  Ullock  v.  Redelin,  Dan.  &  L.  (5 ;  and  see 

ceived    to   recover   the   purchase-money  Bull  v.  'Rnbison,  28  E.  L.  &  E.  586  ;  s.  c. 

paid.     Willard    v.   Perkins,   1    Busb.  L.  10  Exch.  342. 
253.     But  see  ante,  p.  *  529.  (aa)  Glen  v.  Whitaker,  51  Barb.  451. 

(a)  Vale  v.  Bayle,  Cowp.  294 ;    Gas-  See  Bradley  v.  Wheeler,  4  Rob.  18,  and 

sett   v.  Godfrey,  6  Foster   (N.  H.),  415;  Hills  u.  Lynch,  3  Rob.  42. 
Orcutt    1-.  Nelson,  1  Gray,  536 ;  Jones  v. 

1  Where  A.  was  to  deliver  hogs  during  the  "  first  half  of  August,"  to  be  weighed 
at  a  certain  place,  he  was  given  until  noon  of  the  16th,  till  which  time  he  was  to 
keep  hogs  at  the  scales.  Kirkpatrick  v.  Alexander,  60  Ind.  95.  See  Croninger  v. 
Crocker,  62  N.  Y.  151 ;  McClartey  v.  Gokey,  31  la.  505. 

2  A  carrier,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  is  a  bailee  of  the  person  to  whom,  not  by 

573 


*  534  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  III. 

"by  a  carrier,"  without  naming  any  one,  usual  and  proper  precau- 
tions must  be  tal<;en,  and  will  protect  the  seller,  (b)  And  it  is  a 
part  of  his  duty  to  give  such  notice  of  the  sending  them  by  ship  or 
otherwise  as  will  enable  the  buyer  to  insure  or  take  other  pre- 
cautions. ((?) 

If  the  contract  be  to  deliver  the  thing  ordered  at  the  residence 

or  place  of  business  of  the  buyer,  the  seller  is  liable,  although 

such  delivery  becomes  impossible,  unless  it  becomes  so  through 

the  act  of  the  buyer,  (c/)     If  the  seller  refuse  to  deliver  it 

*  534    at  a  *  time  and  place  agreed  on,  and  it  perish  afterwards 

without  his  fault,  he  is  liable  for  it.  But  if  he  be  ready, 
and  the  vendee  wrongfully  refuse  or  neglect  to  receive  it,  the 
seller  is  not  liable,  unless  the  thing  perishes  through  his  gross 
and  wanton  negligence.  And  if  the  vendee  unreasonably  neglect 
or  refuse  to  comply  with  conditions  precedent  to  delivery,  or  to 
receive  the  goods  on  delivery,  the  seller  may,  after  due  delay  and 
proper  precautions,  resell  them,  and  hold  the  buyer  responsible 
for  any  deficit  in  the  price,  (e)  ^     It  is  common,  and  generally 

(b)  Tlie  vendor,  in  delivering  goods  was  liere  licld,  tliat  wliere  a  sliip-owner, 
to  a  carrier,  must  exercise  due  care  and  knowing  tliat  a  port  is  blockaded,  enters 
diligence,  so  as  to  provide  the  consignee  into  a  contract  with  a  merchant  for  the 
with  a  remedy  over  against  the  carrier,  delivery  of  a  cargo  there,  if  lie  after- 
See  Bucknian  v.  Levi,  H  Camp.  414 ;  wards  refuses  to  go,  he  is  liable  to  an 
Clarke  v.  llutchins,  14  East,  475 ;  Alex-  action  for  the  breach  of  the  contract; 
ander  v.  Gardner,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  671 ;  but  whether  the  damages  are  to  be  nom- 
Dawes  v.  Peck,  8  T.  R.  3o0.  inal  or  otherwise  must  depend  upon   the 

(c)  Cothay  v.  Tute,  3  Camp.  129;  opinion  of  the  jury,  as  to  whether,  if  the 
Brown  on  Sales,  §  526;  2  Kent,  Com.  vessel  had  gone  to  the  place,  she  would 
500.  —  If  it  has  been  the  usage  between  have  been  able  to  get  in.  —  So  it  is  no 
the  parties,  in  former  dealings,  for  tlie  defence  to  a  breach  of  a  contract  to  de- 
vendor  to  insure,  or  if  he  receive  specific  liver  certain  goods  at  a  certain  time,  that 
instructions  to  insure  in  any  particular  such  goods  could  not  be  had  in  the  mar- 
case,  he  is  bound  to  insure.  Id. ;  Lon-  ket  at  that  time.  Giipins  v.  Conscqua, 
don  Law  Mag.  vol.  4,  p.  359.  And  see  Pet.  C.  C.  85 ;  Youqua  v.  Nixon,  id.  221. 
Smitlw;.  Lascelles,  2  T.  R.  189.  (c)   McLean    v.    Dunn,   4   Bing.    722; 

(<-/)  Hay  ward  i'.  Scougall,  2  Camp.  56,  Mertens  v.  Adcock,  4  Esp.  251 ;  Girard 
n.;  Atkinson  v.  Ritchie,  10  East,  530;  y.  Taggart,  5  S.  &R.  19;  Sands  i^.  Tay- 
De  Medeiors  v.  Hill,  5  C.  &  P.  182.     It      lor,  5  Johns.  395. 

whom,  goods  are  sent.     Higgins  v.  Murray,  73  N.  Y.  252  ;  Cairo  Bank  v.  Crocker, 

111  Mass.  163,  166  ;  Arnold  v.  Prout,  51  N.  H.  587  ;  Hall  v.  Gaylor,  37  Conn.  550 ;  Ma- 
gruder  v.  Gage,  33  Md.  344.  See  Garretson  v.  Selby,  37  la.  529  Delivery  on  a  vessel 
for  carriage,  bill  of  lading  being  taken,  is  not  a  delivery  to  the  buyer,  but  to  the  captain 
as  bailee  for  delivery  to  the  person  named  in  the  bill  of  lading,  for  whom  they  are  to 
be  carried.  Gabarron  v.  Kreeft,  L.  R.  10  Ex.  274,  281.  The  delivery,  however,  to  a 
buyer  of  a  delivery  order  on  a  carrier,  together  with  a  sample  of  the  goods,  passes 
the  title  to  iiim,  whose  loss  they  are  if  afterwards  destroyed,  and  he  is  liable  for  the 
price.  Webster  v.  Granger,  78  111.  230.  Hobart  v.  Littlefield,  13  R.  I.  341,  decided  that 
goods  delivered  at  the  wliarf  of  a  carrier  with  notice  to  him  are  prima  facie  at  least 
at  the  buyer's  risk,  tliougli  sold  "free  on  board,"  and  destrovcd  before  actually  put  on 
board.     See  Mich.  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Phillips,  60  HI.  190,  and  Finn  v.  Western  R.  Co. 

112  Mass.  524. 

1  The  seller,  after  notifying  the  buyer  to  come  and  take  the  goods,  need  not  give 
him  notice  of  resale.     Ullman  v.  Kent,  60  111.  271. 

674 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  535 

advisable,  to  sell  them  at  auction ;  but  this  is  not  necessary.  (/) 
If  the  seller  sell  on  credit,  the  goods  arc  to  be  delivered  without 
payment ;  but  if  the  buyer  becomes  insolvent  before  the  time  of 
delivery,  the  seller  may  demand  security,  and  refuse  to  deliver 

the  goods  without  it.  (g)  i     If  goods  are  sold  "  on  a  credit  of 

months,  or  cash  at discount,"  and  the  buyer  after  delivery  of 

the  goods  pays  a  part  in  cash,  he  will  be  held  to  have  elected 
cash  and  not  credit,  and  may  be  sued  for  the  balance,  discount 
off.  (70 

If  no  place  of  delivery  be  specially  expressed  in  the  contract, 
the  store,  shop,  farm,  or  warehouse,  where  the  article  is  sold, 
made,  grown,  or  deposited,  is  in  general  the  place  of  deliv- 
ery. (^)  2  If  expressly  deliverable  to  the  vendee,  but  no  place  is 
named,  it  may  be  delivered  to  him  where  he  is,  or  at  his  house, 
or  at  his  place  of  business,  except  so  far  as  this  option  of  the 
seller  is  controlled  by  the  nature  of  the  article.  For  if  the  pur- 
chaser bought  a  load  of  cotton  to  be  worked  in  his  mill,  it 
cannot,  under  an  *  agreement  of  delivery,  be  delivered  at  *  535 
his  distant  dwelling-house ;  nor  should  a  load  of  hay  for 
his  stable,  or  a  cooking  range  for  his  kitchen,  be  delivered  at  his 
store  on  the  wharf. 

Some  cases  distinguish  between  the  duty  of  delivery  arising 
from  a  contract  of  sale,  and  a  contract  to  deliver  goods  in  pay- 
ment of  a  precedent  debt.  In  the  first  case  the  buyer  must  take 
them  where  they  are,  and  in  the  latter  the  owner  must  deliver 
them  at  such  place  as  shall  be  reasonable  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  or  shall  be  pointed  out  by  the  party  receiving  them,  (y) 

(/)  Crooks   r.  Moore,  1  Sandf.  279;  kins,   5  Cowen,   516;   Goodwin   v.    Hol- 

Convvay  v.  Busli,  4  Barb.  564.  brook,  4  Wend.   380;  Barr  i;.  Myers,  3 

ig)  Tooke   v.   HoUingworth,  5  T.   R.  W.  &  S.  295.     If,  however,  a  particular 

215;  and  see  Bloxam  v.  Sanders,  4  B.  &  place  be  appointed  by  the  contract,  the 

C.  948;  Hanson    v.  Meyer,  6   East,  614.  goods  must  be  delivered  there  before  an 

And   if    the   seller   has   despatclied   the  action  will   lie  for  their  price.     Savage 

goods  to  the  buyer,  and  he  becomes  in-  Man.    Co.   v.    Armstrong,    19    Me.    147 ; 

solvent,  the  seller  has  a  right,  by  virtue  Howard  v.  Miner,  20  id.  325. 
of   his  original   ownership,  to   stop   the  (j)  Bean  v.  Simpson,  16  I\Ie.  49.     In 

goods  if  yet  in  transitu.     Mason  v.  Lick-  this  case  it  was  held,  that  if  no  place  be 

barrow,  1  H.  Bl.  357 ;  Ellis  v.  Hunt,  3  T.  appointed  in  the  contract  for  tlie  deliv- 

R.  464.  ery  of  specific  articles,  it  is  the  duty  of 

(h)   Schneider  v.  Foster,  2  Exch.  4.  the  debtor  to  a.sccrtain  from  the  creditor 

(«')  2  Kent,  Com.  505;  Lobdell  v.  Hop-  where  he  would  receive  the  goods;  and 

^  Unless  the  buyer  has  come  into  actual  possession  of  the  goods  sold,  the  seller 
is  not  deprived  of  his  right  of  lien  as  n gainst  the  assignees  of  the  buyer  in  the  event 
of  his  insolvency.     Grice  v.  Richardson,  3  App.  Cas.  319. 

2  See  Devine  v.  Edwards,  101  III.  138. 

575 


*  536  THE  LAW  OF  CONTEACTS.  [bOOK  IH. 

But  in  the  latter  case,  if  the  contract  be  merely  that  the  creditor 
"may  have  them,"  with  no  words  or  acts  implying  that  they  were 
to  be  carried  to  him,  it  should  be  enough  if  they  are  ready  for 
him  when  he  comes  for  them.  There  seems  to  be  also  a  distinc- 
tion between  the  case  of  very  cumbersome  goods  and  those  more 
easily  portable ;  and  the  seller  is  held  more  strictly  to  the  duty  of 
transporting  the  latter,  and  tendering  them  in  specie.  (A;) 

In  general,  if  anything  be  ordered  of  a  mechanic  or  manu- 
facturer, the  maker  may  deliver  it  where  he  makes  it,  unless  he 
have  a  shop  or  depository  where  his  manufactured  articles  are 
usually  taken  for  sale  or  delivery,  in  which  case  such  place  may 
be  the  place  of  delivery. 

The  vendee  is  bound   to  receive  and   pay  for   the  thing   sold 

at  the  time  and  place  expressed  or  implied  in  the  contract  of  sale, 

and  to  pay  all  reasonable  charges  for  keeping  it  after  sale  and 

before  delivery.  (Z)  ^     And  if  he  refuse  so  to  take  or  pay  for  the 

goods  sold,  he  will  be  liable  in  an  action  for  the  price,  or 

*  536    in  a  *  special  action  for  damages,  unless  he  can  show  inca- 

pacity to  contract,  or  sufficient  error,  duress,  or  fraud. 
When  payment  of  a  debt  is  to  be  made  by  some  specific  article, 
it  is  not  quite  settled  where  the  article  is  to  be  delivered  ;  whether 
by  the  payor  at  his  own  residence,  to  the  payee  who  must  come 
for  it,  or  to  the  payee  at  his  residence  or  place  of  business, 
whither  the  payor  must  carry  it.  It  might  seem  from  some  state- 
ments that  local  usages  affect  or  decide  this  question  in  some 

if  this  be  not  done,  the  mere  fact  that  tiffs  sold  to  the  defendants  the  wool  ly- 

the  debtor  had   the  articles  at  his  own  ing  unsacked  in  three  rooms,  to  be  paid 

dwelling-house  at  that  time  is  no  defence,  for  upon  delivery,  the  quantity  to  be  as- 

And    see   Bixby   v.  Whitney,  6   Greenl.  certained  bj'  weighing,  but  without  any 

192.  express  contract  as  to  who  should  be  at 

(k)  Stone    V.   Gilliam,   1   Show.  149;  tlie  expense  of  sacking.     The  plaintiffs 

Currier  v.  Currier,  2  N.  H.  75 ;  2  Kent,  sacked  the  wool  in  sacks  furnished  by 

Com.  508.  the  defendants,  and  then  caused  it  to  be 

(/)  In  Cole  V.  Kerr,  20  Vt.  2J,  it  was  weighed  and  shipped  to  the  defendants ; 

held,  that  there   is   no  implied  contract  and  it  was  held,  that  as  the  sacking  pre- 

upon  the  sale  of  personal  property  that  ceded  the  delivery  of  the  wool,  the  law 

the  vendee  shall  pay  the  vendor  for  any  would  not  imply  a  contract  on  the  part  of 

services,  in  relation  to  the  property,  ren-  the  defendants  to  pay  the  plaintiffs  for 

dered  previous  to  the  completion  of  the  sacking, 
sale  by  delivery.     In  this  case  the  plain- 

1  A  buyer  ought  to  pay  the  price  when  due  without  waiting  for  any  demand,  if 
the  goods  are  ready  for  delivery,  and  if  he  does  not,  he  may  be  sued  at  once.  Bran- 
don'^Manuf.  Co.  V.  Morse,  48  Vt.  322;  Davis,  &c.  Co.  v.  McGinnis,  45  la.  538.  The 
buyer,  if  he  has  agreed  to  assume  the  risk  of  delivery  on  veliich  the  price  is  to  be 
payable,  must  pay  the  price  if  the  goods  are  destroyed.  Martineau  v.  Kitching,  L.  R. 
7  Q.  B.  436.  Wiien  payment  is  to  be  made  after  demand  or  notice,  the  buyer  must 
be  allowed  a  reasonable  time  to  bring  the  money.    Bass  v.  White,  65  N.  Y.  665. 

576 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  537 

cases.  And  possibly  the  distinction  between  bulky  and  portable 
articles  might  be  carried  so  far  as  to  lead  to  the  conclusion  thut 
one  who  has  thus  to  deliver  an  article  easily  carried,  as  a  watch 
or  a  book,  might  be  bound  to  take  it  to  the  payee.  But  we  con- 
sider the  law  in  general  to  be,  that  it  is  enough  if  the  payor  deliv- 
ers the  article  at  his  own  residence  or  shop.  And  if  he  there 
tenders  it  to  the  payee,  and  it  be  in  all  respects  the  article  he 
should  have  tendered,  and  the  payee  refuse  or  neglect  to  receive  it, 
with  no  valid  objection  grounded  on  the  article  itself,  or  on  a  stij)- 
ulation  in  the  contract,  then  the  payor  is  no  further  responsible  Un- 
what  may  happen  to  it.  If  it  were,  for  instance,  a  carriage,  and  he 
had  tendered  it  as  it  stood  in  his  barn  or  warehouse,  he  would  have 
no  right — certainly  none  without  sufficient  notice  to  the  payee — to 
roll  it  out  into  the  street,  and  there  let  it  perish.  For  this  would 
be  a  wanton  injury.  But  if  it  was  in  the  street  when  he  tendered 
it,  and  he  said,  I  offer  it  to  you  as  your  carriage,  and  I  shall  have 
no  more  to  do  with  it,  he  would  not  be  bound  to  take  any  further 
care  of  it. 

But  questions  of  this  kind  generally  arise  in  the  defence  to 
actions  founded  upon  such  contracts ;  and  we  shall  again  consider 
the  subject  of  contracts  for  the  delivery  of  specific  articles,  in  our 
third  volume,  under  the  head  of  Defences. 


♦SECTION  VI.  •537 

CONDITIONAL   SALES. 

In  every  sale,  unless  otherwise  expressed,  there  is  an  implied 
condition  that  the  price  shall  be  paid,  before  the  buyer  has  a  right 
to  possession  ;  and  this  is  a   condition  precedent,  (w)  ^     But  it 

(m)  See  Noy,  Maxims,  p.  88,  where  it  paid  before  delivery  is  said  to  give  the 

is  said  :  "  If  I  sell  my  horse  for  money,  I  vendor  a  lien  on  the  article  sold  until  the 

may  keep   him  vmtil   I   am   paid."     See  payment.  —  But    although    the    vendee 

also  Hinde  v.  Whitehouse,  7  East,  571 ;  may  not  have  a  right  of  possession  in  the 

Cornwall  v.  Haight,  8  Barb.  328.  —  This  article  bought  until  the  price  is  paid,  yet 

implied  condition  that  the  price  shall  be  the  right  of  property  passes  by  the  bargain  ; 

^  A  delivery,  apparently  unrestricted,  of  goods  sold  for  cash  is  a  waiver  of  the 
condition  that  payment  is  to  be  made  before  the  passing  of  the  property  in  the 
goods,  although  the  seller  has  an  undisclosed  intention  not  to  waive  the  condition. 
Upton  V.  Sturbridge  Mills,  111  Mass.  446.  The  title  to  personal  property,  sold  on  con- 
dition that  such  title  should  remain  in  the  vendor  imtil  the  price  is  paid  and  the  prop- 
voL.  1.  37  577 


*  537  THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK    III. 

seems  that  in  an  action  for  non-delivery  the  buyer  need  only  aver 
that  he  was  ready  and  willing  to  receive  and  pay  for  them,  and  that 
the  seller  refused  to  deliver  them,  without  averring  an  actual 
tender,  (ri)  But  where  the  right  to  receive  payment  before  de- 
livery is  waived  by  the  seller,  and  immediate  possession  given  to 
the  purchaser,  and  yet  by  express  agreement  the  title  is  to  remain 
in  the  seller  until  the  payment  of  the  price  upon  a  fixed  day,  such 
payment  is  strictly  a  condition  precedent,  and  until  perform- 
ance the  right  of  property  is  not  vested  in  the  purchaser,  (o)  ^ 

and  if  the  property  is  lost  while  yet  in  that  he  was,  at  the  time,  and  always  had 
the  possession  of  tiie  vendor,  without  his  been,  ready  to  execute  the  mortgage  and 
fault,  the  loss  will  fall  on  the  pur-  bond,  &c.  It  was  hAd,  that  the  cov- 
chaser.  AVillis  v.  Willis,  6  Dana,  49;  enants  were  mutual  and  dependent ;  that 
Wing  V.  Clark,  24  Me.  366  ;  Pleasants  v.  the  averment  of  readiness  to  perform  by 
Pendleton,  6  Rand.  ( Va.)  473.  See  also  the  plaintiff  was  sufficient;  and  that, 
ante,  p.  *  52(>,  note  ('()>  e(  seq.  from  the  nature  of  the  covenant,  he  was 
(w)  Waterhouse  v.  Skinner,  2  B  &  P.  not  bound  to  seal  and  tender  the  mort- 
447 ;  Rawson  v.  Johnson,  1  East,  203.  gage  before  A  had  conveyed  the  land  to 
The  case  of  Morton  v.  Lamb,  7  T.  R.  him,  or  had  offered  a  conveyance.  See 
125,  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  also  Miller  v.  Drake,  1  Caines,  45 ;  Pee- 
laid  down  in  the  text,  as  it  is  explained  ters  v.  Opie,  2  VVms.  Saund.  350,  n.  (3). 
by  the  subsequent  case  of  Rawson  v.  (o)  Porter  i-.  Pettengill,  12  N.  H.  299; 
Johnson,  1  East,  203.  And  there  are  Sargent  v.  Gile,  8  N.  II.  325 ;  Gambling 
many  cases  where  readiness  to  perform  is  v.  Read,  1  Meigs,  281 ;  Bigelow  v.  Hunt- 
equivalent  to  performance.  Thus  in  tlie  ley,  8  Vt.  151 ;  Barrett  v.  Pritchard,  2 
case  of  West  v.  Emmons,  5  Johns.  179,  A  Pick.  512  ;  Ayer  v.  Bartlett,  9  Pick.  156; 
covenanted  to  convey  by  a  good  and  suf-  Tibbetts  v.  Towle,  3  Fairf.  341 ;  Bennett 
ficient  deed  a  certain  lot  of  land  to  B,  on  v.  Sims,  Kice,  421 ;  Smith  v.  Lynes,  1 
or  before  a  certain  day,  and  B  cove-  Seld.  41  ;  Herring  v.  Hoppock,  3  Duer, 
nanted  to  reconvey  the  same  to  A  by  20;  Brewster  ;;.  Baker,  20  Barb.  3(54; 
a  mortgage,  at  the  same  time,  as  se-  Parris  v.  Roberts,  12  Ired.  L.  208 ;  Smith 
curity,  and  also  to  execute  a  bond  for  v.  Foster,  18  Vt.  182;  Buckmaster  i\ 
the  consideration  money;  and  B  after-  Smith,  22  id.  203;  Boot  t'.  Lord,  23  id. 
wards  brought  his  action  of  covenant  568 ;  Aubin  v.  Bradley,  24  id.  55 ;  Bu- 
against  A,  and  in  his  declaration  averred  son   v.  Dougherty,  11    Humph.   50.     In 

erty  delivered  to  the  vendee,  remains  in  the  vendor  even  as  against  a  botid  fide  purchaser 
at  a  judicial  sale.  Bradshaw  v.  Warner,  54  Ind.  58.  Where  payment  and  delivery  are 
to  be  simultaneous,  and  the  buyer,  upon  getting  possession,  omits  or  evades  payment, 
the  seller  may  ai'  once  reclaim.  Adams  i\  O'Connor,  100  Mass.  515;  Paul  i'.  Reed,  52 
N.  II.  136 ;  Kinzey  v.  Leggett,  71  N.  Y.  387.  Where  nothing  is  said,  the  sale  is  for  cash 
concurrent  with  delivery.  S.  W.,  &c  Co.  ».  Plant,  45  Mo.  517.  See  Phillips  i'.  Moor,  71 
Me.  78.  The  seller,  if  not  guilty  of  laches,  may  reclaim,  if  the  price  be  not  paid,  even 
from  the  buyer's  vendee  or  mortgagee  in  good  faith.  Benner  v.  Puffer,  114  Mass. 
376;  Enlow  v.  Klein,  79  Penn.  St.  488 ;  Duncan  r.  Stone,  45  Vt.  114  ;  Fificld  v.  Elmer, 
25  Mich.  48.  See  Zuchtmann  v.  Roberts,  109  Mass.  53.  If  a  buyer  sells  and  then 
tenders  the  price  to  the  seller,  the  title  passes  to  his  vendee.  Day  v.  Bassett,  102  Mass. 
445;  Currier  v.  Knapp,  117  Mass.  324.  As  to  a  buyer's  rights  where  the  seller  has 
taken  back  goods,  part  of  the  price  having  been  paid,  see  Preston  v.  Whitney,  23 
Mich.  260  ;  Latham  v.  Sumner,  89  111.  233;  and  where  part  is  destroyed,  part  taken 
back,  and  part  paid  for,  see  Swallow  v   Emery.  Ill  Mass.  355. 

1  Marquette  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Jeffery,  49  Mich.  283.  But  where  the  vendor  allowed  the 
goods  sold  to  be  mingled  with  the  vendee's  goods  of  the  same  kind,  he  was  estopped 
to  set  up  his  title  as  against  a  subsequent  purchaser  of  the  vendee.  Foster  v.  War- 
ner, 49  Mich.  641.  —  A  seller  may  retain  a  right  over  the  goods,  as  by  making  the 
bill  of  lading  in  his  own  or  agent's  name,  to  secure  the  price,  to  be  transferred 
on  payment  by  indorsement ;  and  the  property  will  not  pass  until  that  is  done. 
Farmers',  &c.  Bank  v.  Logan,  74  N.  Y.  568;  Emery  v.  Irving  Bank,  25  Ohio  St.  360. 

578 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  538 

And  generally,  wherever  in  a  contract  of  sale,  it  *  is  stated  *  538 
that  some  precise  fact  is  to  be  done  by  eitlier  party,  tliis 

most  of  these  cases,  the  question  whether  of  the  vendee,  who  may  seize  and  hold 

the  property  had  passed,  arose  between  the  property    upon   execution.     And   at 

the   parties    tliemselves  or   between    tlie  all  events,  if  an  ad(Htioiial  bill  of  sale  be 

vendor  and   attaching   creditors  of   the  given,  and  the  conditional  vendee  be  thus 

conditional   vendee,   and   the  weight   of  invested  with  all  tiie  Indicia  of  ownersiiip, 

authority  is  as  above.     And  in  Sargent  the  vendor  is  estopjjed  to  set  up  the  con- 

V.  Gile,  8  N.  H.   325,  such  a  conditional  dition  against  a  purchaser  in  good  faith, 

sale  was  held  to  leave  the  right  of  prop-  for    valuable    consideration.      Davis    v. 

erty  in    the  vendor  against    subsequent  Bradley,  24    Vt.  55.     And   whenever  a 

bond  fide  purchasers  from  the  conditional  vendor  in  a  conditional   sale  claims  the 

vendee,  on  the  evident  ground  that  the  property    against    tiie   crcdiiors   of    the 

vendee    had    no   power  to   transfer  any  vendee,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  him 

right  not  his  own.     The  same  view  ap-  to  show  the  condition,  and    that  it  has 

pears  to  be  taken  by  Washington,  J.,  in  not   been   complied    with.      Leighton   v. 

Copland  v.  Bosquet,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  594,  Stevens,  19  Me.  154. —  It   has  been  de- 

and  more  recently  in  Coggill  v.  H.  &  N.  cided  that  such  conditional  sales  are  not 

H.  R.  R.  Co.  3  Gray,  545.     See  also  La-  in  effect  chattel   mortgages,  and   tliere- 

mond  ?;.  Davall,  9  Q.  B.  1030.     But  Hag-  fore  void,  because  not  recorded.     Buson 

gerty  ?;.  Palmer,  6  Johns.  Ch.  437 ;  Kee-  ;'.    Dougherty,    11    Humph.    50.      And 

ler  V.  Field,  1  Paige,  315;  and  Smith  v.  where  upon  a  sale  and  delivery  it  was 

Lynes',  1   Seld.  41,  seem  to  have  settled  agreed  that  the  vendor  should  retain  a 

it  for  New  York  law,  that  such  bond  Jide  Hen   upon    the    property   initil    the   price 

purchaser  without  notice  of   the   condi-  was   paid,   it   was  held,  that  tins   agree- 

tion  sale,  holds  the   pro{)erty.     And   in  ment  of  the  parties  created  a  valid  lien 

Martin  v.  Matliiot,  14  S.  &  R.  214;  Rose  in   the  vendor   against    the  vendee,  and 

V.  Story,  1  Barr,  190,  it  is  decided,  that  purchasers  from  him,  and  that  such  lien 

although   under  a   conditional   sale,  the  was  not  within  the  purview  of  the  stat- 

property  does  not  pass  to  the  vendee,  as  ute  requiring  mortgages  of    chattels  to 

between  the  parties,  yet  that  such  condi-  be    recorded.        Sawyer    v.    Fisher,    32 

tion  is  fraudulent  and  void  as  to  creditors  Me.  28. 

See  Mirabita  v.  Imperial  Bank,  3  E.x.  D.  164 ;  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Bangs,  102  Mass. 
291.  In  so  doing,  the  seller  does  not  reserve  a  lien  only,  in  case  the  buyer  fails  to 
pay  the  price,  but  reserves  a  right  of  disposing  of  the  goods,  so  long  at  lenst  as  the 
buyer  continues  in  default.  Ogg  v.  Shuter,  1  C.  P.  1).  47.  That  a  bill  of  lading 
deliverable  to  the  seller's  order  is  nearly  conclusive  of  an  intention  to  reserve  the  jns 
disponendi  to  prevent  the  title  passing  to  the  buyer,  see  Shepherd  v.  Harrison,  L.  R.  5 
H.  L.  116.  A  seller  may  even  reserve  this  right  when  the  goods  are  placed  on  the 
buyer's  own  ship  free  of  freight  on  that  account,  Schotsmans  r.  Lancashire,  &c. 
R.  Co.  2  Ch.  App.  332.  Where  a  bill  of  exchange  for  the  price  i^  sent  to  a  buyer  for 
acceptance  with  the  bill  of  lading,  to  retain  the  latter  ho  must  accept  the  former, 
and  on  refusing  acceptance  can  acquire  neither  bill  of  lading  nor  the  goods.  Chicago 
Marine  Bank  r.  Wright,  48  N.  Y.  1;  Chicago  Bank  v.  Bayley,  115  Mass.  228,  230; 
Alderman   v.  Eastern   R.   Co.   115  Mass.  233;   Cobb    i-.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  88  111.394. 

A  bill  of  lading  to  shipper's  order,  or  "  to  or  order,"  indorsed  to  or  making 

goods  deliverable  to  a  consignee  by  name  as  security  for  antecedent  advances  vests 
in  him  a  property,  absolute  or  special,  at  the  time  of  their  delivery  on  board.  Bailey 
V.  Hudson  R.  Co.  49  N.  Y.  70;  Straus  v.  Wessel,  30  Ohio  St.  211.  And  in  the  case 
of  animals  the  increase  belongs  to  the  vendor  until  the  performance  of  the  condition. 
Clark  V.  Hayward,  51  Vt.  14.  Where  a  sale  is  made  under  an  agreement  to  give  a 
mortgage  for  the  purchase-money,  the  title  does  not  pass  imtil  the  mortgage  is  given. 
Thorpe  v.  Fowler,  57  la.  541;  Bauendahl  v.  Horr,  7  Blatchf.  548;  Benq^r  v.  Puffer, 
114  Mass.  376;  Ridgeway  v.  Kennedy,  52  Mo.  24;  Drury  v.  Hervey,  126  Mass.  510; 
Hegler  v.  Eddy,  53  Cal.  597;  Carroll  r.  Wiggins,  30  Ark.  402;  Brown  v.  Fitch,  43 
Conn.  512;  Jowers  v.  Blandy,  58  Ga.  379;  Domestic,  &c.  Co.  r.  Arthurhultz,  G3  Ind. 
322;  Jloseley  r.  Shattuck,  43  la.  540;  Boon  v.  Moss,  70  N.  Y.  Ad'^;  Sanders  v.  Kebcr, 
28  Ohio  St.  630;  Holt  v.  Holt,  58  N.  H.  27!);  Pruman  v.  Hardin,  5  Sawyer,  115; 
Re  Binford,  3  Hughes,  295;  Rogers,  &c.  Works  v.  Lewis,  4  Dillon,  158;  Fosdick  v. 
Car  Co.  99  U.  S.  256 ;  Preston  v.  Whitney,  23  Mich.  260 ;  Fifield  v.  Elmer,  25  Mich. 
48 ;  Everett  v.  Hall,  67  Me.  497;  Wood,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooke,  2  Sawyer,  576 ;  Dun- 
can V.  Stone,  45  Vt.  118;  Sage  v.  Sleutz,  23  Ohio  St.  1;  Shaffer  y.  Sawyer,  123 
Mass.  294 ;  Cole  v.  Berry,  13  Vroom,  308. 

579 


*  539  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

may  amoimt  to  a  condition,  though  not  so  expressed.  As  where, 
in  a  contract  for  sale  of  goods,  the  words  are  "  to  be  delivered  on 
or  before"  a  certain  day,  this  is  a  condition  precedent,  and  if  they 
are  not  delivered  on  or  before  that  day,  (p)  the  purchaser  is  not 
bound  to  take  the  goods.  So  if  the  goods  are  to  be  delivered  "  on 
request,"  the  buyer  must  allege  and  prove  a  request,  this  being 
a  condition  precedent  to  his  acquiring  a  complete  right,  (^q)  But 
if  the  seller  has  incapacitated  himself  from  delivering  by  resell- 
ing, or  otherwise,  no  request  is  necessary,  (r) 

If  goods  arc  sold  and  delivered  conditionally,  the  vendor  re- 
tains his  right  to  them  as  against  the  vendee,  but,  in  general,  not 
against  a  ho7id  fide  purchaser  from  the  vendee,  (rr)  ^  But  it  is 
held  in  Massachusetts,  that  if  the  seller  is  to  be  paid  in  specified 
promissory  notes  or  bills  of  exchange,  the  sale  is  conditional,  (rs)  ^ 
and  that  if  the  buyer  receives  the  goods,  and  before  giving  the 
notes  sells  them  to  an  honest  vendee,  no  title  passes  to  the 
vendee,  (r^) 

*  539        *  There   is  another  class  of   sales  on  condition,  often 

called  "  contracts  of  sale  or  return."     In  these  the  prop- 
erty in  the  goods  passes  to  the  purchaser,  subject  to  an  option  in 

{p)    Startup  V.  McDonald,  2  Man.  &  a   request  must  be  alleged   and  proved, 

G.   395.      And    the   delivery  must  have  but  not  otherwise." 

been  made  at  a  reasonable  time  on  that  (/)   Ranay  v.  Alexander,  Yelv.  76,  n. 

day,  or  the  vendee  is  not  bound.     Id.  (Mctcalf's  ed.) ;    Amory  v.  Broderick,  5 

(q)  Bach  v.  Owen,  5  T.  R.  409,  as  ex-  B.    &  Aid.   712  ;  Newcorab   v.    Brackett, 

plained  in  Eadford  v.  Smith,  3  M.  &  W.  16    Mass.    161  ;    Webster    v.    Coffin,   14 

258,  where  Lord  ^/^iwc^'"  said  :    "In  Bach  Mass.   196.      See   also   ante,  note  (r),  p. 

V.  Owen,  the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  *532. 

the  horse  until  lie  offered  his   own  and  (7t)    Wait   v.   Green,   36   N.  Y.    556 ; 

demanded  the  other.     Where  by  the  ex-  Murch  v.  Wright,  46  III.  487. 
press  terms  of  the  contract  a  request  must  (rs)  Whitney  v.  Eaton,  15  Gray,  225. 

precede  delivery,  or  where  that  is  to  be  (rl)   Hirschorn   v.  Canney,   98  Mass. 

implied  from  the  nature  of  the  contract,  149. 

1  Sanders  v.  Keber,  28  Ohio  St.  630,  is  to  the  effect  that  the  seller  retains  his 
right  even  against  a  bond  fide  purchaser  from  his  vendee  ;  and  that  Wait  v.  Green, 
supra,  was  modified  or  overruled  by  Ballard  r.  Burget,  40  N.  Y.  314;  and  that  Munih 
V.  Wright,  supra,  is  unsupported  by  all  well-considered  cases.  —  Where  goods  are  sold  to 
be  paid  for  on  delivery,  if  delivery  is  made  without  requiring  such  payment,  although 
on  condition  that  the  delivery  shall  not  be  considered  complete  so  as  to  pass  the  title 
\mtil  payment  is  made,  a  bond  fide  purchaser  from  the  vendee,  without  notice,  obtains 
a  good  title  discharged  of  the  lien  for  the  purcliase-nioney.  Comer  r.  Cunningham, 
77  N.  Y.  391.  The  seller  may  waive  the  condition,  and  the  goods  will  be  treated  as 
the  buyer's,  Freeman  v.  Nicliols,  llfi  Mass.  309;  but  delivery  is  not  such  a  waiver, 
if  the  understanding  is  otlierwise,  Adams  v.  O'Connor,  100  Mass.  515 ;  Hammett  v. 
Linneman,  48  N.  Y.  399 ;  but  a  secret  understanding  of  the  seUer  is  insufficient. 
Upton  V.  Sturbridge  Mills,  111  ]\Liss.  446. 

2  So  Paul  V.  Reed,  52  N.  H.  136 ;  Osborn  v.  Gantz,  60  N.  Y.  540 ;  Seed  v.  Lord,  66 
Me.  580 ;  Van  Duzor  v.  Allen,  90  111.  499 ;  Salomon  v.  Hathaway,  126  Mass.  482. 
See  Armour  v.  Pecker,  123  Mass.  143;  Wabash,  &c.  Co.  v.  Toledo  National  Bank,  23 
Ohio  St.  311, 

580 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  539 

liim  to  return  them  within  a  fixed  time  ;  or  a  reasonable  time ; 
and  if  he  fails  to  exercise  this  option  by  so  returnintr  them,  tbc 
sale  becomes  absolute,  and  the  price  of  the  goods  may  be  recov- 
ered in  an  action  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  (.s)  i 

In  sales  at  auction  there  are  generally  conditions  of  sale,  and 
where  these  are  distinctly  made  known  to  the  buyer,  they  arc  of 
course  binding  on  him,  and  the  auctioneer  or  the  owner  of  the 
goods  is  bound  on  his  part.  (0  The  question  whether  they  were 
sufficiently  made  known  to  the  buyer  would  be  one  rather  of  fact 
than  of  law.  Thus  where  a  horse  is  sold  by  warranty,  and  it  is 
the  uniform  custom  of  the  auctioneer  to  limit  all  objections  to  the 
space  of  twenty-four  hours  from  the  sale;  if  these  terms  are  a 
part  of  all  the  advertisements  of  the  auctioneer,  and  were  an- 
nounced by  him  at  the  beginning  of  the  sale,  and  the  purchaser 
had  come  in  after  such  announcement,  and  no  direct  proof  of  his 
knowledge  of  this  limitation  was  offered,  evidence  would  probably 
be  admitted  that  he  took  a  paper  containing  such  advertisement, 
and  of  any  other  facts  tending  to  show  such  knowledge,  and  the 
jury  would  be  permitted  to  infer  the  knowledge  from  them  if 
they  deemed  them  sufficient. 

If  it  be  provided  in  the  conditions  of  sale  that  no  error  or 
misstatement  shall   avoid  the   sale,  but  that  there   shall   be   a 

(s)  Moss  V.  Sweet,  16  Q.  B.  493  (over-  Hemp  and  Flax  Man.  Co.  3  Sumner,  530; 
ruling  Iley  i:  Frankenstein,  8  Scott,  N.  Ellis  v.  Thompson,  3  M.  &  W.  445.  — 
R.  839,  and  Lyons  v.  Barnes,  2  Stark.  39) ;  Parol  evidence  of  the  conversations  of 
Beverly  v.  Lincoln  Gas  Light  and  Coke  the  parties  is  admissible  to  show  the  cir- 
Co.  6  A.  &  E.  829  ;  Bayley  v.  Gouldsmith,  cumstances  under  which  the  contract  was 
Peake,  Cas.  56 ;  Dearborn  v.  Turner,  16  made,  and  what  the  parties  thought  a 
Me.  17.  See  Meldrum  v.  Snow,  9  Pick,  reasonable  time.  Cocker  c  Franklin  Henip 
441 ;  Blood  v.  Palmer,  2  Fairf.  414 ;  Eld-  and  Flax  Man.  Co.  supra.  And  where  A 
ridge  v.  Benson,  7  Cush.  485 ;  Neate  v.  delivers  propert}'^  to  B,  on  condition  that 
Ball,  2  East,  116.  And  what  is  a  reason-  if  damaged,  while  in  B's  possession,  B 
able  time  within  which  a  contract  is  to  be  shall  keep  it  and  pay  for  it,  this  is  a  con- 
performed,  or  an  act  to  be  done,  is,  in  the  ditional  sale  ;  and  if  the  property  is  so 
absence  of  any  contract  between  the  damaged,  the  sale  becomes  absolute,  and 
parties,  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  assumpsit  for  goods  sold  and  delivered 
to  be  determined  by  a  view  of  all  the  cir-  will  lie.  Bianchi  v.  Nash,  1  M.  &  W.  545. 
cumstances  of  the  particular  case.  See  See  also  Perkins  v.  Douglass,  20  Me. 
Attwood  V.  Clark,  2  Greenl.  249;  Hiii  v.  317;  Jameson  v.  Gregory,  4  Met.  (Ky.) 
Hobart,  16  Me.  164 ;  Murry  v.  Smith,  1  363. 
Hawks,  41.     But  see  Cocker  i-.  Franklin  (0  Hanks  v.  Palling,  6  E.  &  B.  659. 

1  If  a  seller  receives  part  payment  for  a  chattel,  and  takes  the  buyer's  promise  in 
writing  to  pay  the  balance  on  a  day  specified  or  to  return  the  chattel,  the  title  passes 
unconditionally.  McKinney  v.  Bradlee,  117  Mass.  321.  A  horse,  sold  on  condition 
that  it  be  tried  for  eight  days  and  then  returned  if  unsatisfactory,  died  on  the  third 
day  without  fault  of  either  party,  and  it  was  held,  no  sale.  Elpliick  v.  Barnes.  5 
C.  P.  D.  321.  What  is  a  reasonable  time  is  generally  for  jury ;  but  if  the  delay  is 
too  long  continued,  for  the  court.  Paige  v.  McMillan,  41  Wis.  337 ;  Schlesiuger  v. 
Stratton,  9  R.  I.  578. 

581 


540 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


*  540  proportionate  *  allowance  on  the  purchase-money,  this 
condition  will  not,  in  general,  save  a  sale,  where  the  error 
is  of  a  material  and  substantial  nature,  although  not  fraudu- 
lent, (w)  The  test  of  this  question,  as  a  matter  of  law,  seems  to 
be,  whether  the  error  or  misstatement  is  so  far  material  and  sub- 
stantial that  it  may  be  reasonably  supposed  that  the  buyer  would 
not  have  made  the  purchase  had  he  not  been  so  misled.  And 
such  misstatement  will  also  avoid  a  sale  if  no  reasonably  accurate 
estimate  can  be  made  of  the  compensation  which  should  be  al- 
lowed therefor,  (v)  Any  misstatement,  made  fraudulently,  and 
capable  of  having  any  effect  on  the  sale,  will  avoid  it.  Nor  will 
the  conditions  of  sale  be  binding  against  a  purchaser,  if  so  framed 
as  to  give  the  seller  advantages  which  the  buyer  could  not  readily 
apprehend  or  understand  without  legal  knowledge  or  advice ;  for 
a  buyer  is  discharged  from  a  purchase  made  under  "  catching 
conditions."  (w) 


{u)  The  Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Worthy, 
1  Cainp.  340;  Flight  v.  Booth,  1  Bing.  N. 
C.  370;  Leach  v.  Mullett,  3  C.  &  P.  115. 
See  also  Robinson  v.  Musgrove,  2  Mo.  & 
Rob.  92  ;  s.  c.  8  C.  &  P.  469,  where  it  was 
held,  that  a  condition  of  sale,  "  that  if  any 
mistake  shall  be  made  in  the  description 
of  tiie  premises,  or  any  other  error  what- 
ever sliall  appear  in  tlie  particulars  of  the 
property,  such  mistake  or  error  sliall  not 
annul  the  sale,  but  a  compensation  shall 
be  given,"  &c.,  does  not  apply  where  any 
substantial  part  of  the  property  turns  out 
to  have  no  existence,  or  cannot  be  found ; 
or  where  the  vendor  has  mala  Jide  given 
a  very  exaggerated  description  of  the 
property.  The  purchaser  may  in  such  a 
case  rescind  the  contract  in  tofo.  See  also 
ante,  p.  *494,  note  (/),  et  seq. 

(y)  See  Sherwood  v.  Robins,  1  Mood. 
&  M.  194 ;  s.  c.  3  C.  &  P.  339,  where  it 
was  determined,  that  a  condition  in  ar- 
ticles of  sale,  "  that  any  error  in  the  par- 
ticulars shall  not  vitiate  the  sale,  but  a 
compensation  shall  be  made,"  applies 
only  to  cases  where  the  circumstances 
afford  a  principle  by  which  this  compen- 
sation can  be  estimated.  Therefore  on 
the  sale  of  a  reversion  expectant  on  the 
death  of  A  without  children,  an  error  in  the 
statement  of  A's  does  not  come  within 
the  condition  (as  it  would  if  the  rever- 
sion were  simply  expectant  on  A's  death), 
because  it  affects  the  probability  of  tiie 
other  contingency,  which  is  not  a  sub- 
ject of  calculation ;  and  the  buyer  is 
entitled  to  rescind  the  contract. 

(w)  Adams  v.  Lambert,  2  Jur.  1078  ; 

582 


Dykes  v.  Blake,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  463.  In 
the  case  of  Dobell  v.  Hutchinson,  3  A.  & 
E.  355,  on  a  sale  of  a  leasehold  interest 
of  lands,  described  in  the  particulars  as 
held  for  a  term  of  twenty-three  years  at 
a  rent  of  £55,  and 'as  comprising  a  yard, 
one  of  the  conditions  was,  that  if  any 
mistake  should  be  made  in  the  descrip- 
tion of  the  property,  or  any  other  error 
whatever  should  appear  in  the  particu- 
lars of  the  estate,  such  mistake  or  error 
should  not  annul  or  vitiate  the  sale,  but 
a  compensation  should  be  made,  to  be 
settled  by  arbitration  ;  and  the  yard  was 
not  in  fact  comprehended  in  the  property 
held  for  the  term  at  £55,  but  was  lield 
by  the  vendor  from  year  to  year  at  an 
additional  rent ;  and  such  yard  was  es- 
sential to  the  enjoyment  of  the  property 
leased  for  the  twenty-three  years.  It  was 
held,  though  it  did  not  appear  that  the 
vendor  knew  of  the  defect,  that  this  de- 
fect avoided  the  sale,  and  was  not  a  mis- 
take to  be  compensated  for  under  the 
above  condition,  although  after  the  day 
named  in  the  conditions  for  completing 
the  purchase  and  before  action  brought 
by  the  vendee,  the  vendor  procured  a 
lease  of  the  yard  for  the  term  to  the 
vendee,  and  offered  it  to  him.  But  where 
the  particulars  of  sale  described  the  prop- 
erty as  a  family  residence,  with  the  right 
of  a  pew  in  the  centre  aisle  of  the  parish 
church,  and  the  title  of  the  pew  was  de- 
fective, as  the  use  of  the  pew  was  not  es- 
sential to  the  enjoyment  of  the  property, 
this  error  gave  a  right  to  compensation 
only.     Cooper  i'. ,  2  Jur.  29.    And 


CH.  IV.]  SALE   OP   PERSONAL   PROPERTY.  ♦  541 


*  SECTION   VII.  ♦541 

OP  BOUGHT   AND   SOLD   NOTES. 

Much  of  the  commercial  business  of  the  country  is  transacted 
by  the  agency  of  brokers,  who  buy  and  sell  goods  for  others,  on 
commission.  Though  employed  at  the  outset  by  only  one  of  the 
parties,  a  merchandise  broker  becomes  the  agent  of  the  other 
also,  when  he  treats  with  him.  (a;) 

It  is  the  duty,  though  not  always  the  practice  of  brokers,  to 
make  a  memorandum  of  the  terms  of  the  contract  and  the  names 
of  the  parties,  in  their  books,  to  sign  such  memorandum,  and 
to  transcribe  therefrom  the  bought  and  sold  notes,  (t/)  ^  The 
bought  note  is  addressed  to  the  purchaser,  notifying  him  that 
the  broker  has  bought  for  his  account  of  the  vendor,  the  goods 
described,  stating  price  and  terms,  and  signed  by  the  broker. 
The  sold  note  is  a  similar  statement  addressed  to  the  vendor, 
informing  him  that  he  has  sold  to  the  purchaser,  for  his  account, 
the  same  goods,  giving  the  price  and  terms.     The  broker's  signa- 

where  there  was  a  written  agreement  to  be  calculated  from  the  last  preceding  day 
sell  and  assign  "  the  unexpired  term  of  when  the  rent  was  payable,  and  including 
eight  ijeurs'  lease  and  good-will  "  of  a  pub-  therefore  the  current  half  year.  Any 
lie-house  ;  it  was  held,  that  the  purchaser  fraud  or  material  misdescription,  though 
could  not  refuse  to  perform  the  agree-  unintentional,  would  vacate  the  agree- 
ment on  the  ground  that  when  it  was  en-  ment,  but  the  defendant  might  have  had 
tered  into  there  were  only  seven  years  and  substantially  what  he  had  agreed  to  pur- 
seven  months  of  the  term  unexpired,  chase."  Belworth  v.  Hassell,  4  Camp. 
Lord   Ellenboroiujh   said :     "  The   parties  140. 

cannot  be  supposed  to  have  meant,  that  (x)  Grant  v.  Fletcher,  5  B.  &  C.  436 ; 

there  was  the  exact  term  of  eight  years  Merritt  v.  Clason,  12  Johns.  102  ;    Davis 

unexpired,  neither   more   nor   less  by  a  v.  Shields,   26    Wend.   341 ;    Suj'dam   v. 

single  day.     The  agreement  must  there-  Clark,  2  Sandf.  133;  Toomer  y.  Dawson, 

fore   receive  a  reasonable  construction ;  1  Cheves,  08. 

and  it  seems  not  unreasonable  that  the  (y)    Per   Abbott,  C.   J.,    in    Grant    v. 

period  mentioned  in  the  agreement  should  Fletcher,  5  B.  &  C.  437. 

1  Where  one  keeps  a  bought  or  sold  note,  he  plainly  admits  that  the  broker  acted 
by  his  authority  and  as  his  agent,  and  the  broker's  signature  is  his  signature. 
Thompson  v.  Gardiner,  1  C.  P.  D.  777.  The  following  memorandum  of  a  contract 
of  sale  signed  by  the  agents  of  the  seller  and  purchaser :  "  Sold  for  Messrs.  B.  &  Co., 
Boston,  to  Messrs.  T.  &  Co.,  New  York,  seven  hundred  and  five  (70.5)  packs  first 
quality  Russia  sheet-iron,  to  arrive  at  New  York,  at  twelve  and  three-quarters  (12?) 
cents  per  pound,  gold,  cash,  actual  tare.  Iron  due  about  Sept.  1  '67,  W.  &  II., 
Brokers,"  binds  both  parties  thereto.  Butler  v.  Thompson,  92  U.  S.  412.  "  The  mem- 
orandum in  question,  expressing  that  the  iron  had  been  sold,  imported  necessarily 
that  it  had  been  bought."     Per  Hunt,  J. 

683 


542 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book  III. 


ture  to  the  entry  in  his  book,  or  to  the  notes,  will  satisfy  the 
Statute  of  Frauds,  it  being  in  law  the  signature  of  the  parties  by 

the  agent  of  both  parties.  (2) 
*  542        *  It   is  not  uncommon  for  the  principals  to  sign  their 

approval,  upon  the  note  to  be  handed  to  the  other  party ; 
but  this  proceeding,  though  convenient  as  settling  the  question 
of  the  broker's   authority,  is   not   necessary  to  give  validity  to 


{z)  Hinde  v.  Whitehouse,  7  East,  558  ; 
Heyman  v.  Neale,  2  Camp.  337  ;  Cabot  v. 
Winsor,  1  Allen,  546.  —  This  was  an  ac- 
tion of  contract  to  recover  the  price  of 
475  bundles  of  gunny  bags,  sold  by  the 
plaintiff  to  the  defendant,  of  which  the  ' 
plaintiff  received  and  accepted  200  bun- 
dles, and  declined  to  receive  the  balance, 
as  they  could  not  be  stowed  in  his  ship. 
The  sale  was  elfected  through  the  inter- 
vention of  a  broker,  and  his  sale  note 
approved  by  defendant,  expressed  that 
the  sale  was  of  "  500  bundles  more  or  less 
gunny  bags."  Plaintiff  offered  evidence 
to  show  that  at  the  time  when  the  broker's 
note  was  signed,  he  had  some  521  bundles 
on  hand,  which  he  had  given  orders  to 
liave  compressed  into  bales  ;  that  when 
the  sale  was  made,  a  small  portion  of 
the  lot  had  been  compressed,  and  that  he 
at  once  gave  orders  to  stop  the  work. 
These  facts  were  known  to  both  parties  ; 
and  the  plaintiff,  under  objection,  intro- 
duced evidence  to  prove  that  it  was  the 
uncompressed  bundles  whicli  were  the 
subject  of  the  contract.  It  appeared  in 
evidence  that  the  plaintiff  knew  that  the 
object  of  the  defendant  in  making  tlie 
purchase,  was,  to  complete  the  loading 
of  his  ship,  then  about  to  sail,  and  that 
at  the  time  of  the  sale,  it  was  uncertain 
what  number  of  bundles  would  be  neces- 
sary for  that  purpose.  The  defendant 
claimed  that  under  the  contract,  he  was 
to  have  500  bundles,  more  or  less  than 
that  number,  as  might  be  needed  to  fill 
the  ship,  or  at  his  election  ;  and  that  as 
he  did  not  require  more  than  200,  and 
never  in  fact  received  any  more  than 
that  number,  he  was  only  bound  to  pay 
for  200.  It  was  also  contended  for  the 
defendant,  that  there  was  a  latent  ambi- 
guity in  the  contract,  as  presented  in  the 
sale  notes,  and  that  he  and  the  plaintiff, 
at  the  time  of  the  sale,  understood  it  as 
now  construed  by  the  defendant.  He 
therefore  claimed  to  introduce  parol  evi- 
dence to  show  that  such  was  the  plain- 
tiff's construction.  The  court  below  ruled 
that  there  was  no  latent  ambiguity,  and 
that  the  construction  of  the  contract  was 
for  the  court.  The  judge  instructed  the 
jury   that  the  contract  covered  all   the 

584 


gunny  bags  that  had  not  been  com- 
pressed ;  and  that  a  delivery  of  a  part 
of  the  lot,  under  and  in  pursuance  of  the 
contract,  was  a  delivery  of  the  whole. 
The  defendant  further  contended,  that  a 
delivery  of  475  bundles,  or  a  readiness  to 
deliver  that  number,  was  not  a  compli- 
ance with  the  contract,  which  called  for 
a  delivery  of  "  500  bundles  more  or  less," 
and  requested  the  judge  so  to  instruct  the 
jury.  The  court  declined  so  to  do,  and 
ruled  that,  if  in  point  of  fact  the  lot  re- 
specting which  the  parties  were  negoti- 
ating, consisted  of  475  bundles,  neither 
party  knowing  the  precise  number,  there 
was  no  such  discrepancy  as  to  avoid  the 
contract ;  and  that  the  plaintiff  was 
bound  to  deliver,  and  the  defendant  to 
receive,  475  bundles  in  execution  of  the 
contract.  The  jury  found  for  the  jilain- 
tiff,  for  the  price  of  the  475  bundles,  and 
interest ;  and  exceptions  were  alleged  by 
the  defendant.  In  arguing  the  case  be- 
fore the  Supreme  Court  upon  the  excep- 
tions, the  defendant  claimed  that  the 
alleged  contract  or  sale  notes,  was  but  a 
bill  of  parcels,  so  far  as  relates  to  quan- 
tity and  price,  and  was  not  subject  to  the 
rules  of  law  excluding  parol  evidence. 
The  Supreme  Court  sustained  the  ruling 
of  the  court  below  as  to  the  construction 
of  the  contract,  and  the  exclusion  of 
parol  evidence,  and  overruled  the  excep- 
tions. Upon  the  nature  of  a  bought  and 
sold  note,  Bu/elow,  C.  J.,  remarks  as  fol- 
lows :  "  The  paper  or  writing  on  which 
the  plaintiff  relies  in  support  of  his  case, 
is  not  a  mere  bill  of  parcels,  designed  to 
specify  only  the  quantity  and  price  of 
articles  sold,  nor  was  it  so  intended  or 
understood  by  the  parties.  It  is  a  writ- 
ten memorandum  or  contract  of  sale 
drawn  up  by  a  broker  as  the  agent  of 
both  parties,  in  the  form  of  what  is  usu- 
ally termed  a  sold  note,  and  designed  to 
embody  the  terms  and  conditions  of  a 
bargain  for  the  sale  of  merchandise,  so 
as  to  bind  the  parties  by  an  agreement 
valid  and  sufficient  under  the  statute  of 
frauds.  To  this  contract  the  defendant 
has  bound  himself  by  his  written  accept- 
ance of  its  terms." 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  543 

the  contract,  if   the  broker's   authority  can  be  shown  Ijy  other 
means. 

Formerly  the  question  was  in  some  doubt  whether  the  broker's 
entry  in  his  book,  duly  signed  by  him,  should  not  be  regarded  as 
the  actual  contract  between  the  parties,  and  the  bought 
and  *  sold  notes  as  merely  the  evidence  thereof,  (a)  ^  It  *  543 
certainly  appears  unreasonable  that  the  entry  in  the  bro- 
ker's book,  which  the  parties  do  not  see,  should  be  taken  as  the 
contract  between  them,  when  it  is  obvious  that  their  understand- 
ing of  the  agreement  must  be  drawn  from  the  notes  delivered 
to  them  respectively.  By  retaining  the  note  without  objection, 
either  party  ratifies  the  contract  set  forth  therein.  By  returning 
it  at  once,  with  his  dissent,  he  repudiates  the  contract ;  and  his 
liability  then  depends,  not  upon  what  the  broker  has  done,  but 
upon  the  authority  which  he  actually  gave  to  his  agent. 

The  custom  of  delivering  bought  and  sold  notes  has  at  length 
obtained  so  generally,  that  the  courts  both  in  this  country  and  in 
England  have  been  obliged,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  to  look 
to  them  rather  than  to  the  broker's  book,  for  the  terms  and  con- 
ditions of  the  contract.  It  seems  accordingly  to  be  settled,  under 
the  influence  of  this  custom,  that  the  bought  and  sold  notes,  if 
there  be  any,  are  the  best  evidence  of  the  bargain ;  although  if 
there  be  none,  the  broker's  entry  in  his  book,  if  signed,  will  be 
sufficient.  (^) 

If  these  notes  are  signed  by  the  broker  and  agree,  but  differ 
from  an  unsigned  entry  in  the  book,  the  notes  constitute  the  con- 
tract. If  they  agree,  but  differ  from  a  signed  entry,  and  have 
been  received  and  adopted  by  the  vendor  and  purchaser,  though 
the  entry  present  the  contract  correctly,  as  made,  the  notes  will, 
it  seems,  constitute  a  new  contract,  in  substitution  and  extin- 
guishment of  the  contract  evidenced  by  the  signed  entry,  (c)  ^  If 
the  notes  differ  from  each  other,  and  one  of  them  agrees  with  the 
signed  entry,  the  entry  and  note  agreeing  with  it,  may,  it  seems, 

(a)  See  remarks  of  Ld.  EllenhorouqJi,  s.  c.  8  D.  &  R.  59;  Goom  v.  Aflalo,  6  B. 

in  Dickenson  v.  Lilwal,  1  Stark.  128  ;  but  &  C.  117 ;  s.  c.  9  D.  &  R.  148. 

see  Cumming  v.  Roebuck,  Holt,  N.  P.  (c)  Hawes  v.  Forstcr,  1  Mo.  &  Rob. 

173.  368 ;  and  see  remarks  of  Campbell,  C.  J., 

(6)  Hawes  v.  Forster,  1   Mo.  &  Rob.  in  Sievewright  v.  Archibald,  17  A.  &  E. 

368;  Grant  v.  Fletcher,  5  B.  &  C.  436;  (n.  s.)  121,  126. 

1  Remick  v.  Sandford,  118  Mass.  102 ;  Thompson  v.  Gardner,  1  C.  P.  D.  777. 

2  Jeffcott  V.  No.  Brit.  Oil  Co.  Ir.  R.  8  C.  L.  17. 

585 


*544 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book  III. 


be  taken  together  as  constituting  the  contract  of  sale,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  other  note,  (c?)  It  seems  that  a  printed  sig- 
*  544  nature  *  of  the  broker  is  not  a  sufficient  signing  within  the 
Statute  of  Frauds  in  New  York,  which  requires  that  the 
memorandum  shall  be  subscribed,  (e)  But  it  is  well  settled,  that 
under  the  English  statute,  the  appearance  of  the  vendor's  name 
printed  in  a  bill  of  parcels  is  a  sufficient  signature  to  bind 
him.  (/) 

If  the  broker  does  not  sign  the  same  contract  for  both  parties, 
neither  will  be  bound.  It  has  been  decided  accordingly,  that  where 
the  broker  delivers  different  notes  of  the  contract  to  each  of  the 
contracting  parties,  and  there  is  no  signed  entry  in  his  books  to 
cure  the  discrepancy,  there  is  no  valid  bargain  at  all.  There  is  no 
proof  of  the  assent  of  the  parties  to  the  same  terms,  no  common 
understanding,  and  neither  of  them  has  the  means  of  determining 
whether  the  broker  has  exceeded  the  authority  given  to  him  by 
the  other.  (^)  Where  a  broker's  bought  note  signed  by  him  and 
delivered  to  the  purchaser,  described  the  subject-matter  of  the 
contract  as  "  Riga  Rhine  hemp,"  and  the  sale  note  signed  by  him 
and  delivered  to  the  vendor,  described  it  as  "  St.  Petersburg 
clean  hemp  ; "  and  it  appeared  that  the  description  in  the  first 


[d]  Thornton  v.  Charles,  9  M.  &  W. 
802;  Sievewright  v.  Archibakl,  17  A.  & 
E.  (n.  s.)  104;  Townend  v.  Draket'ord, 
1  Car.  &  K.  20 ;  Goom  v.  Aflalo,  6  B.  & 
C.  117;  s.  c.  9  1).  &  R.  148  ;  Thornton  v. 
Meux,  1  Mo.  &  Malk.  43. 

(e)  Zachrisson  v.  Poppe,  3  Bosw. 
171. 

(/)  Saunderson  v.  Jackson,  2  B.  &  P. 
238;  Schneider  v.  Norris,  2  M.  &  Sel. 
286,  per  Ld.  Eldon,  C.  J. 

ig)  Grant  i-.  Fletcher,  5  B.  &  C.  436  ; 
Heyman  r.  Neale,  2  Camp.  337  ;  Gregson 
V.  Ruck,  4  A.  &  E.  (y.  s.)  737;  Sieve- 
wright V.  Archibald,  17  A.  &  E.  (x.  s.) 
104.  In  this  case  the  broker's  bouglit 
note  specified  "500  tons  of  Dunlop,  Wil- 
son &  Co.  pig  iron,"  and  the  sold  note, 
"  500  tons  of  Scotch  pig  iron,"  and  there 
was  no  signed  entry  in  the  broker's  book. 
There  was  evidence  that  Dunlop's  iron 
was  of  Scotch  manufacture,  but  that 
there  were  other  kinds  of  Scotch  pig 
iron ;  and  the  court  held,  that  the  varia- 
tion in  the  notes  was  material,  and  de- 
stroyed the  contract.  Peltier  v.  Collins, 
3  Wend.  459;  Suydam  v.  Clark,  2  Sandf. 
133.  In  this  case  the  sale  note  sent  to 
the  vendor,  stated  a  sale  of  a  quantitj'  of 
flour,  consisting  of  two  different  brands, 

586 


at  different  prices  for  each,  and  that  the 
flour  of  one  brand  was  to  be  delivered 
when  it  arrived,  but  not  later  than  three 
da}'s  from  the  date  of  sale  ;  nothing  was 
said  therein  as  to  the  time  for  delivery 
of  the  otlier  brand.  The  bought  note, 
sent  to  the  purchaser,  varied  from  the 
other  in  representing  that  the  whole 
quantity  was  to  be  delivered  on  arrival, 
nor  later  than  three  days.  The  pur- 
chaser received  a  portion  of  the  flour 
within  the  time  limited,  but  could  not 
obtain  the  rest  in  season,  and  was  ob- 
liged to  purchase  elsewliere  to  meet  his 
wants.  He  therefore  declined  to  receive 
that  which  arrived  out  of  season,  and  tlie 
vendor  sold  on  his  account  at  less  than 
the  contract  price,  and  sued  him  for  the 
difference.  The  defendant  obtained 
nonsuit  on  the  ground  that  the  bougiit 
and  sold  notes  did  not  constitute  a  con- 
tract, within  the  statute  of  frauds,  by 
reason  of  the  variance.  Upon  the  hear- 
ing before  the  full  court  the  ruling  of 
the  court  below  was  sustained.  Pitts 
Beckett,  13  ]M.  &  W.  743.  "  If  the  broker 
omit  a  material  term  in  drawing  up  the 
contract,  a  party  who  has  not  recognized 
or  adopted  the  contract  as  drawn  up,  will 
not  be  bound." 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  «  545 

note  had  been  inserted  by  mistake,  and  that  it  designated 

an  article  of  a  different  and  *  better  quality,  and  of  higher    *  545 

price  and  value  than  that  described  in  the  second  note  ;  it 

was  held,  that  as  the  parties  were  not  bound  to  the  same  bargain, 

and  had  not  respectively  agreed  to  buy  and  sell  the  same  thing, 

there  was  no  contract  subsisting  between  them.  (^) 

So  an  invoice  of  flour,  described  in  a  bought  note  to  be  of  a 
particular  brand,  which  proved  upon  landing  to  be  of  a  different 
brand,  was  rightfully  refused  by  the  purchaser,  the  court  deciding 
that  the  word  "  Haxall,"  written  in  the  margin  of  the  note  by 
the  broker,  was  a  warranty  that  the  flour  sold  should  be  of  that 
brand,  (i)  A  statement  in  a  bought  note  that  the  broker  has  sold 
the  purchaser  "  seed  to  arrive,"  where  the  purchaser  accepts  it 
after  arrival  and  an  opportunity  offered  him  to  examine  it,  implies 
no  warranty  that  the  article  is  merchantable ;  and  the  purchaser 
has  no  remedy  against  the  seller,  should  it  subsequently  prove  to 
be  unmerchantable.  (/)  In  this  case  the  contract  was  executed. 
But  where  the  contract  is  executory,  such  a  statement  is  regarded 
as  an  engagement  that  the  goods  are  merchantable ;  and  if  they 
prove  not  to  be  so  upon  arrival,  the  purchaser  will  be  released,  (/c) 
But  an  unimportant  or  immaterial  variation  in  the  notes,  will  not 
avoid  the  bargain.  Thus,  where  a  purchaser's  bought  note  speci- 
fied the  day  for  payment,  with  discount  off,  as  did  also  the  copy 
of  the  sold  note  furnished  him  by  the  broker  upon  the  same  paper, 
but  the  vendor's  sold  note  did  not  specify  the  day  for  such  pay- 
ment with  discount,  though  a  copy  of  the  bought  note  on  the 
same  sheet  of  paper  did  so  specify  ;  and  the  purchaser  when 
sued  for  the  non-fulfilment  of  the  contract,  pleaded  this  vari- 
ance, the  court  held,  that  the  mention  of  the  day  in  the  copy  of 
the  bought  note  contained  on  the  same  sheet  with  the  sold 
note,  must  be  taken  to  apply  equally  to  the  sold  as  to  the 
bought  note,  and  that  the  two  corresponded  sufficiently  to  sustain 
the  iontract.  (^ 

A  mistake  made  by  the  broker,  by  describing  erroneously  the 
firm  of  the  vendors,  in  the  bought  and  sold  notes,  will  not 
*  justify  the  purchaser  in  avoiding  the  contract,  after  he    *  546 
has  treated  it  as  a  subsisting  contract,  upon  a  subsequent 

(h)  Thornton  v.  Kempster,  5  Taunt.  {Jc)  Cleu  v.  McPlicrson,  1  Bosw.  480. 

786.  (0  Maclean    v.  Dunn,  4   Bing.   722; 

(i)  Flint  V.  Lyon,  4  Cal.  17.  s.  c.  1  M.  &  P.  701,  770. 
(j)  Moore  v.  McKinlay,  5  Cal.  471. 

687 


*547 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


communicatioii  from  the  vendors,  unless  he  show  that  he  has  been 
prejudiced.  (?w) 

The  non-dehvery  of  one  of  the  notes  to  the  party  entitled  to 
receive  it,  so  that  he  is  ignorant  of  the  contract,  might  possibly 
destroy  the  contract,  on  the  ground  of  want  of  mutuality  of  obli- 
gation. (74)  A  delivery  by  the  broker  of  an  invoice  altered  from 
the  name  of  one  purchaser  to  that  of  the  new  purchaser,  accom- 
panied by  a  letter  to  the  latter,  saying,  that  to  simplify  the  trans- 
action they  had  transferred  to  him  the  invoice  received  by  the 
vendor,  will  be  effective  to  establish  a  valid  contract.  (0)  And  it 
is  sufficient  in  an  action  by  a  purchaser  against  a  vendor,  on  a 
contract  made  through  a  broker,  for  the  plaintiff  to  produce  the 
bought  note  handed  to  him  by  the  broker,  and  show  the  employ- 
ment of  the  latter  by  the  vendor,  (j?)  Where  the  sold  note  varies 
from  the  bought  note,  it  lies  on  the  vendor  to  prove  the  variance 
by  producing  the  former,  (g)  It  is  held  in  New  York,  that  where 
no  sale  note  is  delivered  by  the  broker,  his  entry  on  his  book  must 

agree  with  the  contract  as  actually  concluded,  or  neither 
*  547    party  is  bound,  (r)     Parol  evidence  of  *  mercantile  usage 

is  admissible  to  explain  apparent  variances  between  bought 
and  sold  notes ;  (s)  but  it  is  questionable  whether  such  evidence 
is  admissible  to  explain  their  meaning,  where  there  is  an  actual 


{m)  Mitchell  i'.  Lapage,  Holt,  N.  P. 
253. 

{n)  Per  Best,  C.  J.,  in  Smith  v.  Spar- 
row, 2  C.  &  P.  544 ;  s.  c.  4  Bing.  85,  and 
12  Moore,  26G  ;  per  Hulloclc,  B.,  in  Hen- 
derson V.  Barnewall,  1  Y.  &  J.  304 ;  but 
see  Burrouqli,  J.,  12  Moore,  26G. 

(o)  Pauli  V.  Simes,  6  C.  &  P.  50G. 

\p)  Hawes  v.  Foi'ster,  1  Mo.  &  Rob. 
368. 

(?)  Id- 

()•)  Davis  V.  Sliields,  26  Wend.  341. 
In  giving  the  opinion  of  tlie  Court  of 
Errors  in  this  case,  Walworth,  Cliancellor, 
Bays  :  "  The  broker's  memorandum  was 
fatally  defective  in  not  containing  the 
real  agreement  between  the  parties,  as  well 
as  in  not  being  subscribed  by  the  agent 
of  Davis  &  Brooks.  Although  it  is  not 
necessary  that  both  parties  should  sub- 
scribe the  agreement,  to  make  it  obliga- 
tory upon  the  one  who  does  subscribe  the 
same,  it  is  necessary  that  they  should 
both  assent  to  such  agreement  to  make 
it  binding  upon  either.  Here  Green  was 
not  the  broker  of  the  buyer,  who  made 
his  own  contract.  He  was,  tlierefore,  the 
agent  of  the  vendors  merely ;  and  if  his 

588 


name  had  been  subscribed  to  tiie  memo- 
randum, which  was  never  shown  to 
Shields,  it  would  not  have  made  such  a 
contract,  which  he  had  never  assented  to, 
binding  upon  him ;  nor  even  would  it 
have  been  evidence  of  the  acceptance  of 
such  a  contract  on  the  part  of  Shields ; 
and  without  an  acceptance  on  tiie  part 
of  Shields,  it  could  not  be  binding  on 
Davis  &  Brooks.  The  omission  of  the 
stipulated  time  of  credit  in  the  written 
memorandum,  rendered  tlie  supposed 
agreement  stated  therein,  wholly  inoper- 
ative as  to  both  parties ;  as  to  the  pur- 
chaser, because  he  had  not  signed  any 
such  contract,  or  authorized  any  one  to 
sign  it  for  him,  and  as  to  the  vendors, 
because  he  had  never  consented  to  ac- 
cept such  an  agreement  from  them  ;  and 
there  being  no  contract  which  was  bind- 
ing upon  either  party  at  the  time  the  i 
parol  agreement  was  made,  Shields  could 
not  make  it  a  valid  agreement,  as  against) 
the  other  party,  by  assenting  to  the  writ-| 
ten  memorandum  after  the  subject  of  thej 
contract  had  risen  more  than  twenty-five] 
per  cent  in  value." 

(s)  Bold  V.  liayner,  1  M.  &  W.  343. 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


548 


discrepancy  between  them.  (0  Tlie  true  office  of  mercantile  usaj^c 
is  to  interpret  the  otherwise  indeterminate  intentions  of  partifls, 
and  to  ascertain  the  nature  and  extent  of  their  contracts,  arising 
not  from  express  stipulation,  but  from  mere  implications  and  prc"- 
sumptions,  and  acts  of  a  doubtful  or  equivocal  character ;  or  to 
ascertain  the  true  meaning  of  particular  words  in  an  instrument, 
when  those  words  have  various  senses,  (w) 

Where  upon  a  sale  of  goods  the  vendor  produces  a  sample  and 
represents  the  bulk  as  of  equal  quality,  if  there  be  sale  notes  which 
do  not  refer  to  the  sample,  it  is  not  a  sale  by  sample;  for  the  writing 
is  the  only  evidence  of  the  contract.  (v~)  But  a  warranty  in  the 
sale  of  a  chattel  is  an  essential  part  of  the  bargain,  and  should  ])e 
stated  in  the  bought  and  sold  notes  constituting  the  memorandiun 
of  sale ;  and  it  is  held  in  New  York,  that  the  omission  renders 
the  contract  void,  and  that  parol  evidence,  in  a  suit  for  n<m-|)er- 
formance,  is  inadmissible  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute 
of  frauds,  (iv)  If  the  contract  *  has  been  executed  in  con-  *  548 
formity  with  the  written  memorandum  by  Avhich  it  is  evi- 
denced, it  is  clear  that  parol  evidence  of  a  warranty  not  mentioned 
in  the  writing,  is  not  admissible  in  a  suit  brought  by  the  purchaser, 
for  damages  for  breach  of  warranty,  (a:) 

(t)  Godts  V.  Rose,  17  C.  B.  229.  chaser  for  not  fulfilling  a  contract  for 

(u)    Per  Story,  J.,  in  The  Keeside,  2  the  purchase  of  rice,  and  the  defendant 

Sumn.  567.  resisted  on  the  ground  that  the  entry  of 

(y)  Meyer  v.  Everth,  4  Camp.  22;  the  sale  written  in  the  vendor's  book  of 
Van  Ostrand  i\  Reed,  1  Wend.  424.  But  sales,  and  signed  by  the  broker  who  ef- 
see  Waring  v.  Mason,  18  Wend.  425.  In  fected  the  sale,  did  not  correspond  witii 
this  case  there  was  a  sale  by  sample  of  the  bought  note  which  the  broker  handed 
sundry  bales  of  cotton,  and  a  receipt  of  to  him,  in  not  including  a  guaranty  of  tlie 
the  goods  by  the  purchaser.  Upon  open-  quality.  The  court  regarded  the  part 
ing  the  bales  they  were  found  i)acked  in  omitted  as  one  of  the  substantial  terms 
the  interior  with  masses  of  damaged  cot-  of  tlie  contract,  and  held  that  its  omission 
ton.  The  purchaser  sued  for  damages  was  fatal,  because  it  left  the  actual  con- 
for  breach  of  the  warranty  implied  in  the  tract  witliout  any  written  memorandum 
sale  by  sample  ;  and  the  cotirt  held  "  that  that  would  take  it  out  of  the  statute  of 
parol  evidence  of  a  sale  by  sample  is  ad-  frauds.  Upon  this  point,  Mara/,  J.,  re- 
missible, although  the  broker  who  ef-  marked,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the 
fected  the  sale  made  an  entry  thereof  in  court :  "  Suppose  the  contract  had  been 
his  books  without  mentioning  that  it  was  with  warranty,  and  the  memorandum  in 
a  sale  by  sample  ;  it  not  having  been  the  plaintiff's  sales  book  had  been  signed 
signed  by  the  broker,  and  a  bought  by  the  defendant,  but  the  warranty  clause 
and  sold  note  not  having  been  deliv-  omitted,  and  suppose  the  rice  had  been 
ered  by  him  to  either  of  the  parties."  delivered  and  had  proved  to  be  of  inferior 
The  contract  being  an  executed  one  when  quality  ;  could  the  defendant  liave  shown 
the  action  was  brought,  there  was  no  tiie  warranty  by  parol  ?  The  authorities 
question  as  to  the  validity  of  the  agree-  to  which  I  have  referred  show  abun- 
ment  under  the  statute  of  frauds.  Pick-  dantly  that  he  could  not.  Is  the  rule  of 
ering  v.  Dowson,  4  Taunt.  779;  Kain  v.  proof  different  where  the  memorandum 
Old,  2  B.  &  C.  627 ;  Cabot  v.  Winsor,  1  is  subscribed  by  an  agent  ?  Most  cer- 
AUen,  546.  tainly  not." 

(w)    Peltier  v.  Collins,  3  Wend.  459.  (x)  Reed  r.  Wood,  9  Vt.  285;  and  see 

The   plaintiff  in  this  case  sued  a  pur-  Marcy,  J.,  quoted  m  the  preceding  note. 

589 


*549 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


When  a  broker  docs  not  disclose  the  name  of  his  principal  in 
his  sold  note,  he  is  liable  to  be  looked  to  as  the  purchaser ;  and 
if  the  principal  be  not  revealed  within  a  reasonable  time,  the 
vendor  can  hold  the  broker  on  the  contract.  This  rule,  recog- 
nized in  the  usage  of  trade,  (z/)  ^  is  founded  upon  the 
*  549  general  *  law  of  agency,  which  holds,  that  where  one  con- 
tracts with  another  and  represents  himself  to  be  an  agent, 
but  without  naming  his  principal,  if  he  have  no  principal,  he  will 
himself  be  liable ;  and  if  he  have  one  who  is  subsequently  dis- 
covered, the  other  party  may,  upon  the  discovery,  elect  which  of 
the  two  to  hold.  (2)  If  in  such  case  the  vendor  sue  the  broker, 
for  non-performance  of  the  contract,  the  sold  note  signed  by  the 
latter,  stating  that  he  has  sold  to  his  principal,  will  be  sufficient 


(y)  Thomson  i\  Davenport,  9  B.  &  C. 
78;'Pennell  v.  Alexander,  3  E.  &  B.  77 
Eng.  C.  L.  288 ;  Humphrey  i'.  Dale,  7  E. 
&  B.  90  Eng.  C.  L.  206.  In  this  case  the 
plaintiff  employed  A,  as  a  broker,  to  sell 
a  quantity  of  oil,  who  negotiated  with  the 
defendant,  another  broker,  by  whom  the 
oil  was  bought  for  a  dealer  in  the  article. 
The  sold  note,  signed  by  the  defendant 
and  given  to  A,  stated  tliat  the  oil  was 
sold  by  defendant  for  A,  to  defendant's 
"  principal,"  without  disclosing  the  name 
of  the  purchaser.  A  then  sent  a  sold  note 
to  the  plaintiff,  stating  that  he  had  sold 
the  oil  to  defendant  for  account  of  the 
plaintiff.  By  the  terms  as  set  forth  in 
botii  of  these  notes,  the  oil  was  to  be  de- 
livered within  fourteen  days  of  a  day  six 
months  after  the  date  of  the  sale.  Before 
the  six  months  elapsed  the  purchaser  be- 
came insolvent.  After  the  insolvency, 
on  the  day  before  the  last  of  the  four- 
teen, when  delivery  could  be  made,  the 
defendant  disclosed  the  name  of  his  prin- 
cipal to  the  vendor.  An  action  was 
brought  by  the  latter  against  the  pur- 
chasing broker,  for  the  price  of  goods 
bargained  and  sold,  on  hi.s  personal  lia- 
bihty  as  the  agent  of  an  undisclosed  prin- 
cipal. At  the  trial  at  nisi  prias,  the  aljove 
facts  were  given  in  evidence,  and  it  was 
also  proved,  that  according  to  the  usage 
of  trade,  whenever  a  broker  pureliased 
without  disclosing  the  name  of  his  prin- 
cipal, he  was  liable  to  be  looked  to  as 
the  purchaser.  On  tliis  evidence  the  de- 
fendant contended,  that  the  contract  be- 
tween the  parties,  as  laid  in  the  decla- 
ration, was  not  proved.  A  verdict  was 
taken  for  the  plaintiff,  leave  being  re- 


served to  move  for  a  nonsuit.  A  rule 
nisi  for  a  nonsuit,  being  obtained  on  the 
grounds  that  there  was  no  evidence  of 
the  alleged  contract  of  the  sale  and  pur- 
chase, and  that  evidence  of  the  alleged 
custom  was  not  admissible  ;  the  case  was 
argued  before  the  full  bench,  the  defend- 
ant contending  that  there  was  no  bargain 
with  the  plaintiff,  because  the  sold  note 
relied  upon  as  constituting  the  contract, 
represented  that  the  sale  was  for  account 
of  A  ;  also,  that  the  evidence  of  the  cus- 
tom if  admitted,  would  contradict  the 
language  of  the  written  instrument,  and 
show  a  different  contract ;  that  if  the 
contract  was  with  the  defendant  as  pur- 
chaser, it  was  a  contract  not  shown  by 
any  memorandum  in  writing,  and  there- 
fore not  to  be  enforced  under  the  statute 
of  frauds.  But  the  court  held,  that  the 
parol  evidence  was  competent  to  show 
that  A  acted  as  the  broker  of  the  plain- 
tiff;  also  that  parol  evidence  as  to  the 
usage  of  trade  making  brokers  liable 
where  their  princijjals  are  not  disclosed, 
was  admissible;  on  the  ground  that  it 
did  not  vary  the  terms  of  the  written 
contract,  but  merely  annexed  a  particu- 
lar or  incident  thereto,  which  though  not 
mentioned  in  the  contract,  was  connected 
with  it,  or  with  the  relations  growing  out 
of  it.  It  was  therefore  to  be  admitted 
with  the  view  of  giving  effect  as  far 
as  possible  to  the  presumed  intentions 
of  tlie  parties.  Th-e  rule  to  enter  a  non- 
suit was  accordingly  ordered  to  be  dis- 
charged. 

(z)  2  Smith  Lead.  Cas.  223.     See  ante, 
chapter  on  Agents,  sect.  vii. 


1  A  broker  making  a  sold  note  "  on  account  of  "  a  foreign  principal  is  not  person- 
ally liable  on  the  contract.     Gadd  v.  Houghton,  1  Ex.  D.  357. 

590 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  TERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  550 

evidence  of  the  contract ;  for  the  statement  of  a  sale  to  a  princi- 
pal, though  unnamed,  necessarily  implies  that  he  has  bought  for 
him.  Indeed  the  word  principal  in  that  connection  itself  imports 
a  buyer,  (a) 

Where  the  contract  is  made  through  the  agency  of  two 
brokers,  one  acting  for  the  vendor  and  the  other  for  the  pur- 
chaser, and  the  sold  note  given  by  the  purchaser's  to  the  vendor's 
broker,  states,  that  the  sale  is  made  on  account  of  the  latter 
instead  of  his  principal,  the  vendor  may  nevertheless  treat  the 
contract  as  his  own,  and  enforce  it  upon  the  terms  of  the 
sold  note,  (ft) 

If  the  broker  in  his  bought  note  give  the  name  of  a  wrong 
person  as  the  vendor,  the  purchaser  upon  discovery  of  the  real 
vendor,  may  proceed  against  him  for  the  non-fulfilment  of 
the  contract,  (c) 

Upon  general  principles  we  should  be  inclined  to  the  con- 
clusion, that  the  memorandum  signed  by  the  broker,  whether 
it  be  an  entry  in  his  books,  or  the  customary  sale  notes,  must 
be  signed  by  him  at  the  time  the  contract  is  made,  and  not 
afterwards,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds,  which  requires 
a  signing  by  the  party  to  be  charged  or  his  agent ;  for,  the  broker 
being  the  agent  of  the  principals  only  for  the  purpose  of  effecting 
the  contract,  after  that  duty  is  performed,  he  is  functus  officio, 
and  no  longer  the  agent  of  the  contracting  parties,  (^d)  The 
principals  are  not  however  thus  restricted,  but  may  sign  a  valid 
memorandum  of  the  bargain  thus  effected,  at  any  subse- 
quent *  time,  either  personally  or  by  an  agent  duly  author-  *  550 
ized  to  perform  that  act. 

So,  too,  the  principal  may,  by  ratifying  the  inoperative  signa- 
ture of  the  broker,  render  it  effective  to  answer  the  requirements 
of  the  statute,  and  this  result  would  be  accomplished  by  the 
ratification,  whether  the  original  defect  arose  from  the  broker's 
signing  after  the  contract  was  made,  or  from  a  want  of  authority 
to  make  the  contract.  The  English  statute  of  frauds,  and  gen- 
erally those  of  the  several  States  of  the  Union,  while  they  require 
that  the  memorandum  in  writing  shall  be  signed  by  the  party  to 
be  charged,  or  his  agent,  do  not  provide  as  to  the  mode  in  which 

(a)    Humfrey  v.  Dale,  7  E.  &  B.  90  (d)  See  a  remark  by  Camphdl,  C.  J., 

Eng.  C.  L.  266.  favoring  this  conclusion  in   Sievowright 

(/;)  Id.  V.  Archibald,  17  A.  &  E.  (n.  s.)  p.  12i. 

(c)  Trueman  v.  Loder,  11  A.  &  E.  589. 

591 


*  551  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  HI. 

the  agent  is  to  receive  his  authority,  but  leave  the  question  to 
be  settled  by  the  rules  of  common  law.  By  the  common  law, 
the  subsequent  sanction  of  an  agent's  acts  is  considered  as  the 
same  thing  in  effect,  as  assent  at  the  time,  upon  the  principle 
that  omnis  ratihahitio  retrotraliitur  et  mandato  priori  cequipara- 
tur.  (e) 

By  the  Internal  Revenue  law  of  tlie  United  States,  a  broker's 
note  or  memorandum  of  sale  must  be  stamped  with  a  ten  cent 
stamp,  and  the  penalty  imposed  for  issuing  a  document  of  this 
kind  without  the  prescribed  stamp  is  fifty  dollars.  It  is  also  pro- 
vided by  the  same  act  of  Congress,  that  an  unstamped  instrument 
shall  be  deemed  invalid  and  of  no  effect.  (/)  It  has  been  ruled 
by  the  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue,  that  the  law  applies  to 
both  the  bought  and  the  sold  note,  issued  in  the  same  transac- 
tion. (^)  This  ruling  would  seem  to  be  a  reasonable  construction 
of  the  law,  and  we  cannot  doubt  that  it  would  be  sustained  by  the 
courts  of  the  United  States,  should  the  question  be  brought  before 
them.  It  may  be  a  question,  however,  of  more  uncertainty,  whether 
the  signed  entry  of  the  broker  made  in  his  books,  at  the  time  of 
the  sale,  would  be  liable  to  a  stamp  duty,  and  invalid  if  not 

*  551    stamped.     As  we  have  shown  by  the  *  authorities  cited  in 

the  foregoing  pages,  such  an  entry,  in  the  absence  of  perfect 
bought  and  sold  notes,  will  be  regarded  hj  the  courts  as  sufficient 
written  evidence  to  take  the  contract  out  of  the  statute  of  frauds. 
The  question,  therefore,  becomes  one  of  interest,  whether  such 
an  entry  must  be  stamped  in  order  to  be  valid.  Though  such  an 
entry  might  be  regarded  by  the  courts  as  a  "  memorandum  of 
sale  "  within  the  terms  of  the  law,  yet  as  the  law  only  imposes  a 
stamp  duty  upon  such  a  memorandum,  when  it  is  issued,  and  as 
the  entry  made  by  the  broker  is  not  in  any  sense  issued,  we  are 
inclined  to  think  that  the  decision  would  be,  that  no  stamp  was 
required. 

It  is  held  in  England,  that  where  the  written  contract  is  inad- 
missible in  evidence  for  want  of  a  stamp,  neither  party  can  give 

(e)  Soames  v.  Spencer,  1  Dow.  &  R.  hand,  the  party  must  trust  to  his  agent; 

32;  Maclean  i>.  Dunn,  4  Bing.  724;  s.  c.  if  it  is  given  subsequently  to  the  con- 

1  M.  &  P.  779.     In  this  case,  Best,  C.  J.,  tract,  the  party  knows  that  all  has  been 

says:  "In   my   opinion   the   subsequent  done  according  to  his  wishes." 
sanction    of    a   contract    signed    by   an  (/)  Revenue    Act    of    July   1,  1862, 

agent,  takes  it  out  of  the  operation  of  §§  94,  95. 

the  statute  of  frauds  more  satisfactorily  (^r)  Bout  well's    Tax    System,    ruling 

than    an    authority    given    beforehand.  No.  274,  p.  346. 
When    the    authority  is    given    before- 

592 


CH.  IV.] 


SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


552 


parol  evidence  of  such  contract ;  and  we  presume  the  same  rule 
would  obtain  in  this  country.  (A)  We  have  the  authority  of  the 
English  Court  of  Exchequer  for  the  doctrine,  that  a  factor  selling 
goods  for  his  principal,  has  not  the  same  authority  as  a  broker 
to  bind  the  purchaser  by  bought  and  sold  notes ;  for  he  is  not 
regarded  in  law  as  the  agent  of  the  purchaser.  And  though  the 
sale  notes  be  made  out  by  him  in  the  presence  of  the  two  prin- 
cipals, and  delivered  to  them  respectively,  and  the  purchaser 
receive  the  bought  note  without  objection  at  the  time,  or  even  so 
far  recognize  it  as  to  request  the  factor  to  make  an  alteration  in 
the  date  thereof ;  the  transaction  will  not  thereby  be  taken  out 
of  the  statute  of  frauds,  so  that  the  owner  of  the  goods  can  main- 
tain an  action  against  the  purchaser  for  non-performance.  All 
these  circumstances,  it  is  held,  fall  short  of  authorizing  the  factor 
to  act  for  the  purchaser,  and  unless  express  authority  to  sign  for 
him  be  given  by  the  purchaser,  the  bought  note  will  not 
hold  him.  (i)  This  case  strongly  defines  a  *  distinction  *  552 
between  a  factor  and  a  broker,  making  the  latter  the  agent 
of  both  contracting  parties,  and  the  former  the  agent  of  his  prin- 
cipal only. 


(h)  3  Starkie  on  Evid.  1005,  1006. 
See   1   H.  &  C.  174. 

(i)  Durrell  v.  Evans,  6  H.  &  N.  660. 
The  plaintiff  having  hops  for  sale,  sent 
samples  to  a  hop  factor  in  London  to  sell 
them.  The  defendant  saw  the  samples 
at  the  factor's  and  inquired  the  price. 
Subsequently  he  met  the  owner  at  the 
factor's  and  offered  him  a  certain  price 
for  the  hops,  which  the  owner  upon  the 
advice  of  the  factor,  accepted.  The 
factor  at  once  made  out  bought  and 
sold  notes  which  he  gave  to  the  parties, 
and  upon  request  of  the  defendant  al- 
tered the  date  of  the  bought  note  lianded 
to  him.  A  time  was  then  appointed  for 
the  hops  to  be  sent  up  from  the  country 
and  weighed,  and  the  defendant  caused 
the  samples  to  be  sent  to  his  store. 
When  the  hops  were  weighed,  the  plain- 
tiff and  defendant  were  present,  and  upon 
some  dispute  about  the  weight,  and  ob- 
jection to  the  condition  of  the  hops, 
which  the  defendant  pronounced  to  be 
unsalable,  he  refused  to  perform  the 
contract,  or  to  accept  the  hops.     The  ar- 


ticle had  fallen  in  price  considerably  at 
that  time.  The  plaintiff  sued  the  defend- 
ant for  non-performance  of  the  contract, 
and  the  question  was  reserved  for  the 
Court  of  Exchequer,  whether  the  bought 
note  signed  by  the  factor  was  a  suflBcient 
memorandum  in  writing  to  bind  the  de- 
fendant. That  court  decided  that  it  was 
not.  Pollock,  C.  B.,  in  agreeing  with  the 
rest  of  the  court  that  the  rule  for  a  non- 
suit should  be  made  absolute,  says :  "At 
the  trial  I  thought  it  right  to  reserve  the 
defendant  leave  to  move  upon  it,  and  let 
the  matter  be  discussed.  The  defendant 
did  not  sign  the  note,  nor  was  it  signed 
by  any  one  for  him,  or  on  his  behalf, 
and  the  defendant's  subsequent  conduct 
amounts  to  nothing,  because  a  party 
does  not  adopt  and  ratify  tliat  Avhicli 
was  not  originally  done  on  his  behalf. 
If  the  required  act  was  not  originally 
done  on  his  behalf,  ho  cannot  be  after- 
wards legally  bound  or  said  to  have 
adopted  it.  The  factor  here  was  the 
agent  of  the  seller  only,  and  not  of  the 
buyer  at  all." 


38 


593 


*  553  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 


SECTION   VIII. 

OF   SALES   TO    ARRIVE. 

A  very  common  form  of  contract  at  the  present  day,  is  a  sale 
of  goods  "  to  arrive."  This  is  a  sale  of  merchandise  expected 
from  abroad,  effected  before  arrival,  the  condition  being  that  the 
thing  sold  shall  arrive,  and  that  if  it  do  not,  the  bargain  shall  be 
void. 

Upon  the  question  whether  under  such  a  contract  there  is  a 
present  and  executed  sale,  subject  to  be  defeated  by  the  non- 
arrival  of  the  goods,  or  only  an  executory  contract  to  sell  and 
buy,  there  has  been  much  discussion  ;  but  the  authorities  are 
strongly  in  favor  of  the  latter  view.  Where  however  the  quantity, 
quality,  and  price  of  the  goods  are  specifically  ascertained,  and 
the  bill  of  lading  thereof  is  assigned  by  indorsement  and  delivery 
to  the  purchaser  under  a  contract  of  this  kind,  we  think  that  the 
general  principles  of  the  law-merchant  would  lead  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  was  a  constructive  delivery  and  executed  sale, 
and  that  the  right  of  property  passed,  (/c)  And  if  any 
*  553  *  other  act  of  equivalent  import  to  the  assignment  of  a  bill 
of  lading,  be  performed,  as  an  assignment  upon  the  back  of 
the  invoice,  the  transfer  of  a  policy  of  insurance  upon  the  goods, 
and  the  giving  an  order  on  the  vessel  to  deliver  to  the  purchaser 
on  arrival,  the  effect  might  be  the  same.  (Z)     But  this  conclusion 

(k)  Alexander  r.  Gardner,  1  Bing.  N.  5  Ham.  (Ohio)  89;   Lee  v.  Kimball,  45 

C.  671 ;  1  Scott,  G30 ;  1  Hodges,  147.     In  Me.  172. 

this  case  the  plaintiff  made  a  contract  in  ('')  Gardner  v.  Rowland,  2  Pick.  599; 

London  to  sell  to  defendant  butter  which  Howland  v.  Harris,  4  Mason,  497  ;  in  this 

he  expected  from  Sligo,  Ireland,  and  the  case  the  original  cargo  was  assigned  to 

quality  and  price  were  specified  by  the  the  plaintiff,  while  at  sea,  by  the  owner, 

contract.     The  goods  were  shipped  on  a  bond  fide  in  payment  and  satisfaction  of  a 

specific  day ;    the  defendant  having  ac-  pre-existing  debt,  and  the  return  cargo, 

cepted  the  invoice  and  bill  of  lading.     It  which  was  the  proceeds  of  the  original, 

was  held,  that  the  property  in  the  butter  was  attached  by  the  U.  S.  Marshal  for 

had  passed  to  the  defendant,   and  that  duties  then  owing  to  the  government  by 

though  the  goods  were  lost  by  shipwreck,  the  assignor  upon  a  former  importation, 

the  price  might  be  recovered  of  the  de-  It  was  held,  that  the  assignment  passed  a 

fendant  in  an   action  for  goods  bought  constructive  possession  to  the  vendee,  suf- 

and  sold.  —  Caldwell  v.  Ball,  1  T.  R.  205 ;  ficient  to  enable  him  to  maintain  trespass 

Stubbs  r.  Lund,  7  Mass.  453 ;  Walter  v.  against   a  wrong-doer.     Per  Storij,  J.  — 

Boss,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  283;  Jordoni'.James,  Pratt  r.  Parkman,  24  Pick.  42;  Lanfear 

V.  Sumner,  17  Mass.  110. 

594 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PEESONAL  PROPERTY.  ♦  554 

must  be  subject  to  important  qualifications.  Perhaps  rules  anal- 
ogous to  those  which  give  and  govern  the  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu,  might  be  held  applicable.  If,  for  example,  the  purchaser 
becomes  insolvent  before  the  arrival,  we  cannot  suppose  that  his 
assignees  could  take  the  goods  without  paying  or  securing  the 
price  agreed  upon,  (wi)  But  they  might  take  them  by  so  doing, 
and  make  what  profit  they  could  out  of  them,  for  the  benefit  of 
the  insolvent  eslate.  We  reach  the  same  result  by  simply  sup- 
posing that  the  constructive  delivery  above  spoken  of,  did  not 
terminate  the  common  law  lien  of  the  vendor  for  his  price. 

In  all  cases  of  this  kind,  the  intention  of  the  parties,  as  gathered 
from  the  contract  and  the  attending  circumstances,  will  govern  ; 
and  if  from  these  it  be  apparent  that  the  property  was  to  pass 
immediately,  the  courts  will  so  construe  the  contract ;  for  no 
particular  form  is  required  for  the  sale  of  personal  property.  All 
that  is  necessary  is,  that  the  parties  should  intend,  the  one,  to 
part  with  his  property,  the  other,  to  become  the  owner  of  it. 
The  union  of  intention  constitutes  the  contract  of  sale.  And  it 
may  be  proved  by  any  kind  of  legal  evidence,  parol  or  written  ; 
by  a  formal  conveyance  under  seal,  or  by  a  loose  correspon- 
dence ;  by  a  conversation  direct  between  the  parties,  or  mediate 
through  the  agency  of  other  persons,  (w) 

*  Ordinarily,  a  sale  to  arrive  by  a  specified  vessel,  does  *  554 
not  pass  any  property  in  any  specific  chattel  on  board  the 
vessel  at  the  time  the  bargain  was  made ;  it  being  merely  an 
agreement  for  the  sale  and  delivery  of  a  portion  of  the  cargo  at  a 
future  period,  namely,  when  the  vessel  shall  arrive ;  and  to  fulfil 
this  condition  a  double  event  must  take  place ;  that  is,  the  arrival 
of  the  vessel,  with  the  goods  on  board.  The  contract  is  therefore 
both  executory  and  conditional,  (o)  ^ 

(m)  Benedict  v.  Field,  16  N.  Y.  595.  sell  to  the  plaintiffs,  "  100  tons  nitrate  of 

(n)  Per  Morton,  J.,  in  Pratt  i'.  Park-  soda,  at  18s.  per  cwt.  to  arrive  ex  Daniel 

man,  24  Pick.  42.  Grant,  to  be   taken   from   tlie    quay  at 

(o)   Chitty,    Cent.  *444;     Kussell    '-'.  landing  weights,"  &c.,  and  below  tlie  sig- 

Nichols,  3  Wend.  112  ;   Shields  v.  Pattee,  nature  of  the  brokers  was  tliis  niemoran- 

2  Sandf.  2G2,  4  Comst.  122 ;  Benedict  v.  dum,    "should   the  vessel   be   lost,  this 

Field,  16  N.  Y.  595 ;  Lovatt  v.  Hamilton,  contract  to  be  void."    The  vessel  arrived, 

5  Mco.  &  W.  639 ;  Stockdale  v.  Dunlop,  but  brouglit  no  nitrate  of  soda,  and  the 

6  M.  &  W.  224 ;  Johnson  v.  McDonald,  9  plaintiffs  sued  for  breach  of  contract  in 
M.  &  W.  600.  In  this  case  the  defend-  tlie  non-delivery  of  the  goods.  The  de- 
ant  by  a  bought  and  sold  note  agreed  to  fence  was,  that  the  contract  was  at  an 

1  A  sale  to  arrive  is  executory,  and  the  title  does  not  pass  until  the  arrival  and 
delivery  of  the  goods.    Neldon  v.  Smith,  7  Vroom,  148,  154. 

595 


*  555  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  III. 

Whether  the  expression  used  in  the  contract  be  "  to  arrive  "  or 
"  on  arrival,"  the  construction  will  be  the  same.  Efforts  have 
sometimes  been  made  to  induce  the  courts  to  give  a  more  ex- 
tended meaning  to  the  former  expression,  as  importing  a  warranty 
"tAat  the  article  shall  arrive  if  the  vessel  does.  It  is  held,  how- 
ever, that  the  word  "  to  "  does  not  mean  that  the  goods  "  shall " 
arrive,  but  merely  tliat  they  shall  be  sold  on  their  arrival,  (jt?)  ^ 
Nor  will  this  construction  be  varied  if  there  be  an  express  condi- 
tion appended  to  the  contract,  that  the  contract  itself  shall  be 
void  should  the  vessel  be  lost.  Whether  appending  a  negative 
condition,  —  as,  that  "this  contract  shall  not  be  valid  unless  the 
vessel  arrives,"  would  vary  the  construction  by  excluding  any 
implied  condition,  admits  of  some  doubt.  Baron  Alderson,  in  the 
case  just  cited,  expresses  the  opinion  that  a  negative  instead  of 

an  affirmative  condition,  might  make  a  difference. (g^) 
*  555     *  A  sale  on  arrival  by  a  certain  vessel,  is  held  to  mean 

on  the  arrival  of  the  goods  and  not  the  vessel  only  ;  and  this 
construction  will  always  be  put  upon  the  condition,  unless  the 
language  used  in  the  contract  is  so  plain  to  the  contrary  as  not 
to  admit  of  it.  For  the  courts  are  unwilling  to  assume  that  the 
contracting  parties  meant  to  enter  into  a  mere  wager,  (r)  In 
fact,  the  arrival  of  the  goods  by  that  particular  vessel,  is  held  to 

end,  it  being  conditional  on  the  arrival  (?)  Boyd  v.  Siffkin,  2  Camp.  325.  In 
of  the  requisite  quantity  of  nitrate  of  this  case  the  broker's  note,  proved  at 
soda  by  tlie  Daniel  Grant.  The  case  the  trial,  was  in  the  following  words : 
was  argued  in  the  Court  of  Exeliequer,  "  Sold  to  Mr.  H.  Siffkin,  for  Mr.  M. 
upon  this  point,  the  plaintiffs  insisting  Boyd,  about  32  tons  more  or  less  of  Riga 
that  the  words  "  to  arrive  "  meant  that  Rhine  hemp  on  arrival  per  Fannie  &  Al- 
tlie  seller  warrants  the  arrival  of  the  niira,  at  £82  10s.  per  ton."  The  ship 
goods.  He  also  contended  that  the  effect  arrived  without  the  hemp,  and  the  ac- 
of  the  express  condition  as  to  wlien  the  tion  was  brought  against  the  vendor  on 
contract  should  be  void,  excluded  the  the  note.  Lord  EUenhorough  said,  in  decid- 
implied  condition  upon  non-arrival.  The  ing  that  the  action  was  unmaintainable  : 
court  held  that  the  contract  did  not  "  I  clearly  think  that '  on  arrival '  means 
amount  to  a  warranty  on  the  part  of  the  the  arrival  of  the  hemp.  The  parties 
seller,  that  the  nitrate  of  soda  should  did  not  mean  to  enter  into  a  wager.  By 
arrive  if  the  vessel  arrived,  but  to  a  'bought  and  sold '  in  the  note,  must  be 
contract  for  the  sale  of  goods  at  a  future  understood,  contracted  to  sell  and  buy. 
period,  subject  to  the  double  condition  The  hemp  was  expected  by  the  sliip ; 
of  the  arrival  of  the  vessel,  with  the  had  it  arrived  it  was  sold  to  the  plaintiif . 
specified  cargo  on  board  ;  and  gave  judg-  As  none  arrived,  the  contract  was  at  an 
ment  for  the  defendant.  Hawes  v.  Law-  end."  —  We  think  that  the  whole  of  the 
rence,  4  Comst.  345 ;  Boyd  v.  Siffkin,  2  language  here  used,  is  consistent  with 
Camp.  326,  and  Hawes  v.  Humble,  there  the  doctrine  that  the  contract  was  ex- 
cited, ecutory  and  not  executed  ;  for  the  words, 

{p)   Per  Parke.  B.,  in  .Jolmson  v.  Mc-  "  had  it  arrived,  it  was  sold,"  clearly  ira- 

Donald,  9  M.  &  W.  600.  port  that  the   sale   depended  upon  the 

(q)  Per  Alderson,  B.,  same  case.  arrival. 

1  As  to  what  is  "  arrival,"  see  Montgomery  v.  Middleton,  18  Ir.  C.  L.  173. 

596 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  555 

be  a  conlition  precedent  to  the  vendor's  obligation  to  deliver;  so 
that  if  the  goods  which  are  the  subject  of  the  negotiation,  should 
arrive  by  some  other  vessel,  the  contract  would  be  void,  (s)  ^ 

If  the  sale  is  of  a  definite  quantity  or  number,  as  so  many  hun- 
dred bags  of  an  article,  the  contract  is  not  apportionable,  and  the 
vendor  cannot  recover  damages  for  a  refusal  to  take  any  less 
quantity  or  number,  (ss) 

They  must  also  arrive  at  the  agreed  port  of  delivery,  and  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  trade  and  navigation,  or  the  vendor  will  not  be 
held.  And  if  by  any  accident  such  an  arrival  is  rendered  impos- 
sible, it  seems  that  the  vendor  is  not  obliged  to  adopt  other  means 
of  transportation,  by  which  the  goods  might  readily  be  delivered 
to  the  purchaser  within  the  stipulated  time,  in  order  to  avoid  his 
liability.  (^) 

(s)  Lovatt  V.  Hamilton,  5  Mee.  &  W.  contracts  made  for  the  Mansfield's  cargo. 

639.     This  was  a  contract  whereby  the  The  plaintiff  sued  for  the  non-delivery 

defendants  sold  to  the  plaintiff  50  tons  of   the   oil,   and   the   principal   question 

palm  oil  "  to  arrive "  per  the  Mansfield  raised,  was,  whether  the  arrival  of  the 

from  the  coast  of  Africa;  in  case  of  non-  oil  at  Liverpool  in  the  Mansfield,  was  a 

arrival,   or  the   vessel's    not   having   so  condition    precedent    to    the    plaintiff's 

much  in,  after  delivery  of  former  con-  rigjit  to  the  delivery  of  it,  or   whetlier 

tracts,  the  sale  to  be  void.     The  Mans-  the  arrival  of  the  oil  from  tlie  Mansfield 

field  arrived  with  an  insufficient  quantity  by  another  vessel,  did  not  entitle  iiim  to 

of  oil  to  fill  the  contract,  after  delivery  it.    The  Court  of  Exchequer  were  clearly 

under  the  former  contracts;  but  a  larger  of  opinion  that  the  arrival  of  the  oil  in 

quantity  than  was  necessary  to  make  up  the  Mansfield  was  a  condition  precedent, 

the  deficiency,  had  previously  been  trans-  See  also  Shields  v.  Pattee,  2  Sandf .  202, 

shipped  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  from  the  4  Corast   122. 

Mansfield  to  another  vessel  belonging  to  {ss)   Reimers  v.  Ridner,  2  Rob.  IL 

the  defendants,  and  had  arrived  before  {t}  Idle    v.    Thornton,   3    Camp.   274. 

the  Mansfield.     The  transshipment  was  This  was  a  sale  of  tallow  on  arrival,  to 

made   by   an   agent   of   the   defendants,  arrive  on  or  before  a  certain  day,  or  the 

without  any  instructions  from  them  so  bargain   to    be   void.      The   vessel   was 

to  do,  and  without  any  knowledge  of  the  wrecked  on  the  English  coast,  but  the 

1  A.'s  firm  having  purchased  certain  nitrate  of  soda,  and  chartered  the  Precursor 
to  bring  it  home,  subsequently  sold  to  B.  "the  entire  parcel  of  nitrate  of  soda  ex- 
pected to  arrive  at  port  of  call  per  Precursor.  .  .  .  Sliould  any  circumstance  or  acci- 
dent prevent  the  shipment  of  tlie  nitrate,  or  should  the  vessel  be  lost,  this  contract  to 
be  void."  Before  the  date  of  this  Contract,  and  without  their  knowledge,  the  greater 
part  of  the  nitrate  was  destroyed  by  an  earthquake,  and  the  charter  of  tlie  Precursor 
cancelled.  A.'s  firm  then  purchased  other  soda,  sold  it  to  other  parties,  and  chartered 
the  Precursor  anew,  which  brouglit  it  home,  where  B.  claimed  it  under  the  contract. 
Held,  in  the  Queen's  Bench  (Smith  v.  Myers,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  420),  that  the  contract, 
though  not  for  a  specific  lot  of  nitrate  of  soda,  was  for  a  specific  adventure  or 
voj-age  which  both  parties  contemplated  as  about  to  take  place,  and  did  not  attach 
to  this  second  lot;  in  the  Exchequer  Chamber  (L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  1?>9,  aflfirming  the 
decision  of  the  Queen's  Bench),  that  the  contract  referred  to  a  siiecific  quantity  of 
nitrate  oi  soda,  which  was  prevented  from  being  shipped  by  an  accident,  and  con- 
sequently became  void.  A  lot  of  scrap  iron  was  sold  to  arrive  by  the  Christopher. 
It  came  in  the  St.  Christopher,  and  it  was  held  that  unless  the  misnomer  was  of 
some  consequence  the  buyer  was  not  justified  in  refusing  the  goods.  Smith  v.  Pettee, 
70  N.  Y.  13.  "  Cargo  "  means  a  vessel's  entire  load,  and  the  vendee  is  not  bound  to 
accept  less.  Borrowman  v.  Drayton,  2  Ex.  D.  15.  See  Ireland  i-.  Livingston,  L.  R. 
2  Q.  B.  99;  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  516;  L.  R.  5  H.  L.  395-410. 

597 


*  556  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS,  [BOOK  III. 

*  556        *  A  sale  of  a  specified  quantity  of  goods  to  arrive  by  a 

particular  vessel,  will  become  an  executed  contract  by  the 
arrival  of  that  vessel  with  the  requisite  quantity  of  goods  to  fill 
the  contract,  whether  they  are  consigned  to  the  vendor,  or  sub- 
ject to  his  control  or  not.  The  implied  conditions  of  the  arrival 
of  the  goods,  which  the  law  has  attached  to  contracts  of  sale  to 
arrive,  seem  to  arise  so  naturally  from  a  contract  of  this  charac- 
ter, that  their  recognition  by  the  courts  as  material  terms  thereof, 
meets  with  very  general  approbation.  But  when  it  is  proposed  to 
add  to  these  conditions  an  implication  which  lias  no  foundation  in 
necessity,  and  which  no  merchant  of  ordinary  prudence  could 
suppose  the  law  would  intend  in  his  behalf,  the  well  recognized 
principle,  that  courts  will  not  make  a  contract  for  the  parties 
which  they  have  not  made  tliemselves,  Avill  probably  prevent  the 
courts  from  interpolating  such  an  implied  condition.  There  is 
no  legal  necessity  that  the  vendor  should  be  able  to  dispose  of  the 
goods  at  the  time  he  enters  into  the  contract ;  for  he  may  acquire 
the  ability  to  control  them,  by  purchase  or  otherwise,  subsequently 
to  his  engagement,  and  before  the  goods  must  be  delivered,  (u) 
And  if  he  carelessly  omits  to  guard  against  the  possibility  that 
the  goods  may  arrive  consigned  to  another  instead  of  himself,  the 
fault  is  his  own,  and  he  alone  should  suffer  the  consequences. 

In  a  case  before  the  English  Common  Bench,  where  a 

*  557    *  purchaser   had    sued   his  vendor  for   non-delivery  of  a 

specified  quantity  of  goods,  expected  to  arrive  by  a  partic- 
ular vessel,  the  vessel  having  arrived  with  the  necessary  quantity 


tallow  was  saved,  and  it  might  liave  been  order  to  fulfil  his  engagement ;   and  if 

forwarded  to   London  by  other  convey-  the  real  owner  will  not  part  with  tliem, 

ance  in  season ;  but  was  not.     The  pur-  the  debtor  cannot  insist  that  he  is  dis- 

chaser  sued   for   breach  of   contract   in  charged   from    his  obligation  under  the 

non-delivery,  and  the  court  held  that  "  an  pretext  that  no  man  can  be  obliged  to 

arrival"  meant  at  the  port  of  London,  i)erform  an  impossibility.     For  this  ex- 

and  that  the  defendants  were  not  bound  cuse  is  only  valid  in  case  of  an  absolute 

to  forward  the  tallow  after  the  wreck,  impossibility ;  but  where  the  thing  is  pos- 

there  having  been  no  tender  of  indemnity  sible  in  itself,  the  obligation  subsists,  not- 

by  the  plaintiff.      The  contract  was  void  withstanding  it  is  beyond  the  means  of 

unless   the  commodity,  in    the  ordinary  the  person  obliged  to  accomplish  it ;  and 

course  of  trade  and  navigation,  arrived  he  is  answerable  for  the  non-performance 

at  the  port  of  destination  by  the  appoint-  of    his   engagement.      The   thing   being 

ed  day.  possible  in  its  nature,  it  is  sufficient  to 

('-)  Hibblewhite  v.  M'Morine,  5  M.  &  induce  the  creditor  to  rely  upon  the  per- 

W.  462.     In  Pothier  on  Obhgations,  vol.  formance  of  the  promise.     The  fault  is 

i.  §  133,  it  is  said:  "Even  things  which  imputable  to  the  debtor,  for  not  having 

do  not  belong  to  the  debtor,  but  to  an-  duly    examined   whether    it   was   in    his 

other  person,  may  be  the  object   of  an  power  to  accomplish  what  he  promised 

obligation,  as   he  is  thereby  obliged  to  or  not."     Paradine  y.  Jane,  Alcyn,  27. 
purchase  or  otherwise  procure  them  in 

598 


CH.  ly.] 


SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


558 


on  board,  though  not  shipped  for  or  on  account  of  the  vendor,  tlic 
defendant  resisted  on  the  ground  that,  though  the  expected  (nwn- 
tity  arrived,  it  was  not  consigned  to  him  or  subject  to  his  control. 
But  the  court  were  so  strongly  inclined  to  consider  the  contract 
as  warranting  the  defendant's  power  of  disposal  over  the  goods, 
that  without  further  prosecuting  the  appeal,  he  assented  to  this 
construction,  and  paid  the  damages  as  assessed  upon  that  prin- 
ciple. (?') 

*  A  sale  of  goods  at  sea,  to  be  paid  for  on  delivery  at    *  558 


{v)  Fischel  v.  Scott,  15  C.  B.  69.  The 
defendants  contracted  to  sell  to  tlie  plain- 
tiff, 100  hlids.  Gingelly  oil,  expected  to 
arrive  by  the  ship  Resolute  from  Madras. 
The  vessel  arrived  with  more  than  100 
hhds.  of  Gingelly  oil  on  board,  but  only 
84  hhds.  were  consigned  to,  or  under  the 
power  or  control  of,  the  defendants. 
The  declaration  set  forth,  that  the  100 
hhds.  oil  contracted  for,  did  arrive  by  the 
Resolute,  that  the  defendants  had  not  de- 
livered the  same  to  the  plaintiff,  and  al- 
leged special  damage.  The  defendants 
admitted  that  100  hhds.  and  more,  did 
arrive  from  Madras  in  the  Resolute,  but 
pleaded  that  only  thirty-four  of  the  said 
hhds.  were  shipped  for,  or  on  account  of 
them  ;  that  they  had  no  property  in,  or 
power  to  deliver  the  residue,  and  that 
they  had  tendered  the  34  hhds.,  which 
the  plaintiff  had  refused  to  accept.  To 
this  plea  the  plaintiff  demurred,  on  the 
ground  that  as  100  hhds.  did  arrive  by 
the  vessel,  the  defendants  were  bound  to 
deliver  them  according  to  the  contract. 
In  the  course  of  the  argument  upon  the 
demurrer  by  the  counsel  for  the  defend- 
ents,  Maule,  J.,  said :  "  The  oil  is  de- 
scribed pretty  clearly ;  the  question  is, 
whether  the  oil  which  came  was  'oil  ex- 
pected to  arrive  by  the  Resolute.' " 
Jervis,  C.  J. :  "  It  is  quite  inconsistent 
■with  this  plea,  that  the  oil  contracted  to 
be  sold  to  the  plaintiff  did  not  arrive  by 
the  Resolute.  The  oil  which  was  ex- 
pected did  arrive.  The  defendants  ex- 
pected it  to  come  consigned  to  them  ;  but 
it  turned  out  that  it  was  consigned  to 
some  one  else."  —  "  How  is  this  plea  an 
answer  to  the  declaration?"  —  ''The 
question  is,  whether  the  contract  must 
mean  something  in  which  the  defendants 
have  a  property,  and  which  they  have 
power  to  deliver."  Maule,  J. :  "  The 
contract  simply  says,  that  the  defendants 
agree  to  sell  to  the  plaintiff  certain  oil 
expected  to  arrive  by  a  particular  vessel. 
The  defendants  mean  to  abide  by  their 
contract  if  the  oil  arrives,  whether  there 
is  any  title  or  not."    To  this  last  inter- 


ruption, the  counsel  for  the  defendants 
replied  :  "  If  thjit  be  the  true  construction 
of  the  contract,  undoubtedly  the  plea  is 
no  answer."  Finding  the  impression  of 
the  court  to  be  against  him,  he  asked 
leave  to  amend  his  plea.  Leave  was 
granted ;  but  the  amendment  was  not 
made,  and  the  defendants  settled  the  case 
by  paying  damages,  as  stated  in  tlie 
text.  —  Sec  also  Gorrissen  v.  Perrin,  2  C. 
B.  (n.  s.)  681,  upon  this  point,  where  the 
same  court  say,  in  reference  to  the  rule 
that  the  obligation  of  delivery  is  condi- 
tional upon  the  arrival  of  the  shii),  and 
of  the  goods  being  on  board,  as  laid  down 
in  previous  cases  of  sales  to  arrive: 
"  Without  desiring  at  all  to  interfere 
with  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  cases  re- 
ferred to,  we  may,  in  passing,  observe 
that  we  tliink  it  has  been  carried  far 
enough,  and  that  its  effect  may  have  been 
to  introduce  uncertainty  into  contracts 
which  were  not  intended  by  the  parties 
to  be  contingent  on  accidental  circum- 
stances, sucli  as  the  transfer  of  a  cargo 
from  one  ship  to  anotlier  "  The  case  of 
Fischel  v.  Scott,  above  cited,  having  been 
pressed  upon  the  court  in  the  argument 
of  Gorrissen  v.  Perrin,  the  court,  after  re- 
marking that  there  was  in  that  case  no 
positive  adjudication  by  tlie  court,  and 
showing  that  the  facts  in  that  case  were 
plainly  distinguishable  from  the  one  be- 
fore tlie  court,  proceed  to  say,  in  affirma- 
tion of  the  principle  foreshadowed  in 
Fischel  v.  Scott :  "  Now,  it  may  well  be, 
that  if  a  man  takes  upon  himself  to  dis- 
pose of  goods  expected  to  arrive  by  a 
certain  sliip,  as  goods  over  which  he  has 
a  power  of  disposal,  and  the  goods  after- 
wards arrive  not  consigned  to  him,  he 
shall  be  precluded  from  saying  that,  in 
addition  to  the  contingency  of  their  ar- 
rival, there  was  implied  the  further  con- 
tingency of  their  coming  (consigned  to 
him.  ile  has  dealt  with  them  as  his  own 
and  cannot  be  allowed  to  import  into  the 
contract  a  new  condition,  viz.,  that  the 
goods  on  their  arrival  shall  prove  to  be 
his." 

599 


559 


THE  LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


the  place  of  the  contract,  is  considered  as  equivalent  to  a  contract 
to  sell  and  deliver  on  arrival,  and  will  be  governed  by  the  same 

rules,  (w) 
*  559        *  A  verbal  contract  for  the  sale  of  goods  to  arrive,  from 

its  non-compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the  statute  of 
frauds,  gives  the  purchaser  no  insurable  interest  therein ;  and  if 
there  be  afterwards  an  arrival  and  delivery  of  part  of  the  goods 
thus  bought'  under  an  entire  contract,  such  partial  delivery, 
though  it  will  amount  to  a  ratification  of  the  contract  as  between 
the  parties,  will  not  relate  back  in  its  effects,  so  as  to  confer  on 


(w)  Shields  v.  Pettee,  2  Sandf .  262,  4 
Comst.  122.  This  was  an  action  of  as- 
sumpsit for  a  quantity  of  pig  iron,  sold 
and  delivered ;  but  the  case  turned  upon 
an  alleged  breach  of  contract  by  the 
vendor,  and  a  consequent  claim  of  the 
purchaser  for  a  recoupment  of  damages. 
The  plaintiff  through  a  broker  sold  to 
the  defendant  a  quantity  of  pig  iron,  of 
No.  1  quality,  on  board  the  ship  Siddons, 
then  at  sea,  and  so  understood  to  be,  by 
both  parties.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the 
ship,  this  descrii)tion  of  iron  had  advanced 
in  price  beyond  the  contract  rate,  and 
subsequently  continued  to  advance.  The 
j)laintiff  received  by  the  vessel  a  single 
lot  of  the  kind  of  iron  sold  to  the  de- 
fendant, but  it  was  not  of  No.  1  quality, 
it  being  a  mixture  of  that  and  of  inferior 
qualities,  so  that  the  whole  lot  was  worth 
one  dollar  per  ton  less  than  No.  1.  The 
plaintiff  commenced  delivering  the  iron 
to  the  defendant  upon  the  unloading  of 
the  ship,  and  had  delivered  about  two- 
fifths  of  the  quantity  sold  when  the  de- 
fendant objected  that  the  quality  was  not 
No.  1,  and  that  he  could  not  pay  for  it  as 
such.  Upon  this  the  plaintiff  offered  to 
deliver  the  balance  of  the  lot  in  compli- 
ance with  the  contract,  provided  the  de- 
fendant would  receive  and  pay  for  it  as 
No.  1.  This  vvas  declined  by  the  defend- 
ant, who  was  then  informed  by  the  plain- 
tiff that  if  he  persisted  in  the  refusal  of 
ilic  iron  at  the  price  agreed  upon,  it 
would  be  sold  to  other  parties.  A  bill 
was  subsequently  presented  by  the  plain- 
tiff for  the  quantity  delivered,  and  pay- 
ment demanded.  The  defendant  de- 
clined to  pay  the  bill,  and  insisted  upon 
the  fulfilment  of  the  contract.  The 
plaintiff  then  demanded  tlie  return  of 
the  iron  delivered,  and  the  defendant  not 
returning  it,  the  plaintiff  brought  his  ac- 
tion, claiming  the  market  value,  at  the 
date  of  delivery,  for  the  quantity  deliv- 
ered, which  value  was  proved  to  be,  for 
that  quality,  some  two  dollars  and  fifty 

600 


cents  per  ton  higher  than  the  contract 
price  for  No.  1  iron.  The  defendant  ad- 
mitted his  obligation  to  pay  for  what  he 
had  received,  but  claimed  to  recoup  the 
damage  sustained  by  the  non-delivery 
of  the  article  contracted  for.  The 
court  in  giving  judgment,  denied  the 
right  to  recoup,  on  the  ground  that 
the  contract  between  the  parties  was 
equivalent  to  an  agreement  to  sell  and 
deliver  iron  to  arrive ;  that  it  was  an 
agreement  to  deliver  No.  1  pig  iron  of 
the  kind  specified,  if  any  iron  of  that 
description  arrived  in  the  Siddons,  on 
the  voyage  she  was  then  making.  No 
consignment  of  that  quality  of  iron  hav- 
ing arrived  in  the  ship,  the  court  held 
that  the  contract  was  at  an  end,  and 
therefore,  that  the  defendant  could  not 
claim  to  recoup  in  damages,  and  must 
pay  the  full  market  value  of  the  iron  at 
the  time  of  delivery,  without  regard  to 
the  contract.  This  case  was  affirmed 
upon  appeal  from  the  Superior  Court  to 
the  Court  of  Appeals,  4  Comst.  122 ;  and 
in  giving  the  judgment  of  the  higher 
court,  Hiirlbul,  J.,  says:  "In  my  judg- 
ment, the  contract  was  not  a  sale,  but  an 
agreement  to  sell,  which  was  not  exe- 
cuted, and  which  could  only  be  required 
to  be  executed  on  the  arrival  of  the  ship 
with  the  iron  on  board.  The  arrival  of 
the  vessel  without  the  iron  would  have 
put  an  end  to  the  contract,  which  was 
conditional,  and  a  sale  to  arrive.  TJie 
vessel  was  at  sea  at  the  time  ;  this  was 
known  to  both  parties,  and  neither  could 
be  certain  either  of  her  arrival,  or  of  her 
bringing  the  iron.  If  a  part  o\\\y  had 
arrived,  the  plaintiff  would  not  have 
been  bound  to  deliver,  nor  the  defendant 
to  accept  it.  There  was  no  warranty, 
express  or  implied,  either  that  the  iron 
should  arrive,  or  that  arriving,  it  should 
be  of  a  particular  quality.  The  iron 
called  for  by  tlic  contract,  did  not  arrive, 
but  iron  of  a  different  quality,  and  I 
think  that  the  contract  was  at  an  end." 


I 


CH.  IV.] 


SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


559 


the  purchaser  an  insurable  interest  on  a  part  of  the  goods  which 
were  wrecked  at  a  date  prior  to  the  partial  delivery,  (x)  i 

A  statement  in  a  contract  of  sale  of  goods  to  arrive  by  a  par- 
ticular vessel,  that  the  vessel  sailed  on  or  about  a  day  named,  is 
considered  as  a  representation,  rather  than  a  condition  or  war- 
ranty, as  to  the  time  of  sailing;  and  if  made  without  fraud, 
though  the  vessel  in  reality  sailed  at  a  day  considerably  later 
than  the  day  named,  and  her  arrival  in  port  is  thereby  delayed, 
the   purchaser   is  bound  to  accept   and  pay  for  the   goods,  (y) 


(x)  Stockdale  v.  Dunlop,  6  M.  &  W. 
224.  The  plaintiff  having  made  a  parol 
contract  for  the  purchase  of  200  tons  of 
palm  oil,  to  arrive  by  two  vessels  from 
the  African  coast,  one  of  the  vessels  ar- 
rived safely  with  her  cargo,  and  one 
hundred  tons  of  her  oil  was  delivered  to 
him  by  tlio  vendor,  in  pursuance  of  the 
agreement.  Some  twelve  days  after 
this  partial  delivery,  the  plaintiff  ef- 
fected a  policy  of  insurance  with  the  de- 
fendant, upon  his  valued  profits  on  the 
100  tons  expected  by  the  other  vessel. 
It  subsequently  appeared  that  the  vessel 
was  wrecked  upon  the  coast  of  Africa, 
nearly  two  months  before  tlie  time  of 
the  delivery  of  the  first  hundred  tons  of 
oil,  and  was  condemned  and  sold.  When 
wrecked,  slie  had  only  50  tons  of  oil  on 
board,  wliicli  was  transshipped  and  sent 
to  Liverpool  by  other  vessels.  Suit  was 
brought  by  the  plaintiff  upon  his  policy, 
and  the  defendant  resisted,  on  the 
ground  that  the  plaintiff  had  not  such 
an  interest  in  tiie  goods  or  the  profits  to 
be  derived  from  tliem  as  to  make  him 
capable  of  being  insured.  At  the  trial, 
it  was  proved  that  "  oil  to  arrive  "  was  a 
mercantile  term,  and  that  if  the  oil  did 
not  arrive  by  the  vessel,  the  purchaser 
had  no  right  to  it.  A  verdict  was  taken 
for  the  plaintiff',  with  leave  for  the  de- 
fendant to  move  to  enter  a  verdict  on 
the  above  ground  if  sustained.  After 
argument  before  the  Court  of  Exchequer 
by  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff,  the 
court  declined  to  hear  the  other  side, 
and  gave  judgment  unanimously  for  the 
defendant.  By  Parke,  B  :  "The  con- 
tract is  to  sell  goods  when  they  arrive, 
but  there  was  no  memorandum  in  writ- 
ing, and  consequently  no  contract  which 


was  capable  of  being  enforced,  at  the 
time  either  of  the  insurance  or  of  the  loss ; 
and  if  it  ultimately  did  become  capable 
of  being  enforced,  that  was  only  by  the 
subsequent  part-delivery  and  acceptance, 
which  was  after  the  loss  had  occurred." 
—  By  Ah'mjer,  C.  B. :  "  There  is  a  contract 
to  sell  100  tons  of  palm  oil  to  arrive  by 
the  Maria ;  if  the  vessel  do  not  arrive, 
or  the  goods  do  not  arrive,  the  contract 
is  void.  Then  where  is  the  interest  ? 
The  transaction  amounts  in  effect  to  an 
insurance  of  a  void  contract." 

(y)  Hawes  v.  Lawrence,  4  Comst.  346. 
Tlie  plaintiff,  througii  a  broker,  sold  tlie 
defendant  a  quantity  of  linseed  oil,  as 
stated  in  the  sale  notes,  "  to  arrive  per 
ship  Marcia  from  Liverpool,  sailed  on  or 
about  the  \ljth  of  March  ult."  The  vessel 
did  not  leave  the  London  docks  until  the 
26th  of  March,  and  had  an  uncommonly 
long  passage.  Upon  arrival,  the  defend- 
ant refused  to  accept  the  oil,  and  the 
plaintiff  sued  for  the  breach  of  contract. 
Under  the  ruling  of  the  Superior  Court, 
that  the  sailing  of  the  vessel  on  or  about 
the  loth  of  March,  was  not  a  condition  of 
the  contract,  and  that  tlie  representation 
of  the  time  of  sailing,  if  made  without 
fraud,  did  not  prevent  the  plaintiff  from 
recovering,  the  case  was  carried  up  to  the 
Court  of  Appeals,  where  the  judgment 
of  the  Superior  Court  for  the  ])laintiff 
was  affirmed.  In  giving  judgment,  Pratt, 
J.,  says  :  "  Altliough  it  is  by  no  means 
free  from  doubt,  I  am  inclined  to  tlie 
opinion  that  no  warranty  was  intended 
by  the  parties.  If,  in  the  first  phice,  the 
time  of  sailing  had  been  deemed  impor- 
tant by  the  parties,  and  likely  to  affect 
materially  their  interests,  it  is  somewhat 
strange  that  they  had  not  specified  a  par- 


1  The  purchaser  of  a  "cargo"  of  rice  which  is  to  be  loaded  on  board  a  ship  ex- 
pected to  arrive  at  acertain  port,  where  it  is  to  load  for  a  voyage,  agreeing  to  pay 
a  sum  certain  "  per  cwt.,  cost  and  freight,"  has  no  such  insurable  interest  in  the  pur- 
chase {diss.  Lord  O'Hagan  and  Lord  Selborne),  that  should  the  rice  put  on  board 
be  lost  before  the  loading  is  completed,  he  can  recover  on  a  policy  of  insurance 
effected  on  goods  m  the  vessel.     Anderson  v.  Morice,  1  App.  Cas.  713. 

601 


*560 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   111. 


*  560  *  Indeed,  it  may  be  questionable  whether  even  fraud  in 
fixing  the  time  of  sailing,  could  be  pleaded  in  such  a  case ; 
the  proper  remedy  for  that  being  an  action  for  deceit,  as  appears 
by  a  remark  made  by  the  Court  of  King's  Bench,  in  giving  judg- 
ment in  a  case  somewhat  similar  to  that  above  supposed.  (2) 

A  sale  of  goods  to  arrive  imports  that  they  are  merchantable, 
and  conformable  generally,  in  their  condition  and  appearance,  to 
that  which  would  be  understood  by  the  trade,  from  the  terms 
of   description   used   in   the   contract ;  («)  for   the  contract  be- 


ticular  day,  after  which  if  the  vessel 
should  sail,  the  contract  should  be  void. 
The  fact  that  the  time  was  left  vague, 
raises  a  strong  presumption  that  tlie 
parties  did  not  intend  to  make  the 
time  of  sailing  a  material  part  of  the 
contract.  Neither  party  knew  the  exact 
time  of  sailing,  but  both  supposed  it  was 
near  the  15th.  Again,  if  these  words 
amount  to  a  warranty,  the  plaintiff 
would  have  been  liable  to  the  defendant 
for  any  damages  which  he  might  have 
suffered  in  consequence  of  the  delay. 
Nay  more,  if  for  any  cause  the  vessel 
had  foiled  to  sail  altogether,  the  plaintiff 
would  have  been  responsible  for  any  loss 
of  profits  in  the  adventure  which  the  de- 
fendant miglit  have  sustained,  I  cannot 
think  that  the  parties  would  have  couched 
a  provision  so  important  in  its  bearing 
upon  tlieir  interests,  in  so  uncertain  and 
vague  terms.  I  think  it  should  be  con- 
strued rather  as  a  mere  representation 
of  the  belief  of  the  factor,  which  in  the 
absence  of  any  fraud  or  intentional 
misrepresentation,  cannot  affect  the 
contract."  In  Olive  v.  Booker,  1  Exch. 
41G,  —  which  was  an  action  for  not  load- 
ing a  vessel  in  pursuance  of  the  terms  of 
a  charter-i^arty,  whicli  stated  the  vessel 
to  be  "  now  at  sea,  having  sailed  three  weeks 
ago,  or  thereabouts,"  whereas,  in  point  of 
fact,  the  vessel  had  not  sailed  three 
weeks  before,  but  only  two  weeks,  — it 
was  held,  that  the  time  at  which  the  ves- 
sel sailed  was  material,  and  that  the 
statement  in  the  charter-party  amounted 
to  a  warranty.  Parke,  B.,  in  giving 
judgment  in  this  case,  says  :  "  Here  it  is 
stated  that  the  vessel  was  now  at  sea, 
having  sailed  three  weeks ;  and,  if  the 
time  is  of  the  essence  of  the  contract,  no 
doubt  it  is  a  warranty,  and  not  a  repre- 
sentation. So  also  is  the  case  in  policies 
of  insurance.  It  appears  to  me  that  it  is 
a  warranty,  and  not  a  representation, 
that  the  vessel  had  sailed  three  weeks. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  condition  precedent. 
The  rule  depends  upon  each  particular 
contract,  and  here  time  was  of  the  cs- 

602 


sence  of  the  contract,  as  much  so  as  the 
statement  that  she  was  a  sound  vessel." 

(z)  Hawes  v.  Humble,  2  Camp.  327,  n. 
This  was  an  action  for  a  breach  of  con- 
tract, by  non-delivery  of  a  quantity  of 
barilla,  sold  on  arrival  by  a  named  ves- 
sel. The  barilla  did  not  arrive  in  the 
vessel.  Wood,  B.,  in  giving  judgment 
for  the  defendant,  was  of  opinion  that 
the  contract  was  conditional ;  but  inti- 
mated, that  if  any  negligence  could  have 
been  proved  against  the  captain,  he 
would  have  received  the  evidence.  The 
question  was  carried  before  the  Court  of 
King's  Bench,  wiiere  the  judges  unani- 
mously agreed  that  the  contract  was 
conditional,  and  that  if  there  had  been 
any  fraud  on  the  part  of  the  defendant, 
the  plaintiff's  remedy  was  in  an  action  for 
deceit. 

(«)  Cleu  V.  McPherson,  1  Bosw.  (N. 
y.)  480.  The  defendant  having  bought 
of  the  plaintiff  "25  bales  of  French  wal- 
nuts," to  arrive  per  ship  H.  E.  Miller, 
then  on  her  way  from  Havre  to  New 
York,  and  received  a  broker's  bought 
note  of  the  bargain,  corresponding  with 
a  sale  note  delivered  by  the  broker  to 
tlie  plaintiff  upon  the  arrival  of  the 
goods,  refused  to  receive  or  pay  for 
them,  on  the  ground  that  the  nuts  were 
not  merchantable,  but  unsound,  damaged, 
and  injured.  The  plaintiff  sued  for  breach 
of  contract,  and  tlie  question  of  law, 
whether  the  sale  notes  of  themselves, 
and  without  any  extraneous  testimony, 
implied  that  the  walnuts  were  and  should 
be  merchantable,  was  reserved  for  the 
Court  at  General  Term.  The  court 
{Hoffman,  J.),  in  giving  judgment  for 
the  defendant,  say :  "  In  the  present 
case  the  complaint  states,  that  the  plain- 
tiff, being  in  expectation  of  receiving  a 
large  quantity  of  French  walnuts,  by  the 
ship  H.  E.  Miller,  agreed  to  sell  25  bales 
of  the  walnuts  so  expected ;  and  this 
part  of  the  complaint  may  be  treated  as 
admitted.  The  witness  Paddock  states, 
that  he  showed  to  the  defendant  ftlcPher- 
son,  the  whole  pile  of  nuts  on  the  wharf. 


I 


CH.  IV.] 


SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


5G1 


ing  *  conditional  and  executory,  the  rule  of  tlic  common  *  5G1 
law,  Caveat  emptor,  does  not  apply ;  but  rather  the  rule 
of  the  civil  law,  Caveat  venditor.  Where  an  examination  of  tlie 
goods  is  morally  impracticable,  as  in  the  case  of  goods  sold  before 
their  arrival,  it  seems  but  reasonable  and  just  that  this  implica- 
tion should  be  attached  by  courts  to  the  contract,  (i)  ^ 

A  contract  for  a  sale  of  goods  to  be  delivered  on  their  arrival, 
at  any  time  before  a  specified  date,  does  not  render  the  vendur 
liable  for  the  non-delivery  of  the  goods  if  they  have  not  arrived 
within  the  time  limited ;  for  the  specification  of  the  time  is  held 
to  be  only  a  limitation  fixing  the  period  beyond  which  neither 
party  is  bound  by  the  contract,  and  not  as  warranting  that  the 
goods   shall,   at   all   events,  be  delivered  by  the   day  fixed,  (c) 


landed  from  the  vessel,  that  there  were 
100  bales  of  them,  and  told  him  he  could 
have  any  he  wished.  The  case  is  then 
made  out  of  a  sale  purely  conditional 
and  executor}' ;  of  the  sale  of  an  article 
then  about  being  shipped  at  a  foreign 
port,  or  then  upon  the  seas  ;  of  a  sale 
of  a  parcel  or  number,  out  of  an  aggre- 
gate larger  mass,  not  specially  defined 
and  determined.  In  such  a  case,  we  are 
of  the  opinion  that  there  is  an  implied 
engagement  in  the  contract  itself,  that 
the  article  shall  be  merchantable.  It 
may  be  more  appropriate  to  say,  that 
this  is  a  condition  of  the  agreement  for 
a  sale,  than  an  implied  warranty.  It 
may  also  be  that  the  rule  can  be  carried 
f  urtlier,  and  applied  to  a  case  where  the 
article  is  specific  and  defined  ;  but  it  is 
needless  to  go  this  length  for  the  deci- 
sion of  the  present  cause."  —  Gorrissen  v. 
Perrin,  2  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  681.  In  this  case 
it  appeared  that  the  defendant  had  con- 
tracted to  sell  to  the  plaintiff  a  certain 
number  of  "  bales  of  gambler,"  then  at 
sea,  on  the  way  to  London,  and  tendered 
in  fulfilment  of  his  contract  the  requisite 
number  of  packages  of  tlie  article  re- 
ceived by  him  by  tlie  vessels  named  in 
the  contract.  These  packages  were  much 
smaller  than  the  article  known  in  the 
usages  of  trade  as  a  "  bale  of  gambier," 
containing  only  about  one-third  the  quan- 
tity, and  the  plaintiff  refused  to  receive 
them,  and  sued  for  the  breach  of  con- 
tract in  the  non-delivery  of  the  "  bales  " 
thereby  meant.     The  court  below  admit- 


ted evidence  upon  the  question  of  what 
was  regarded  as  a  "  bale,"  by  the  usage 
of  trade.  The  question  as  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  contract  upon  this  point, 
went  up  to  the  Court  of  Common  Bench, 
and  it  was  there  decided  that  tiie  con- 
tract called  for  the  specified  muiiber  of 
"  bales,"  of  the  usual  size  and  weight,  as 
recognized  by  the  term  in  the  gambier 
trade. 

(b)  Per  Cowen,  J.,  in  Wriglit  v.  Hart, 
17  Wend.  267,  18  id.  419  ;  PaUie.,  J.,  in 
Hargous  v.  Stone,  1  8eld.  8(j;  Chanter  v. 
Hopkins,  4  M.  &  \V.  3y!) ;  Hyatt  o. 
Boyls,  5  G.  &  J.  110;  and  see  Moore  v. 
McKinlay,  5  Cal.  471,  for  distinction  as 
to  warranty  before  and  after  arrival. 

(c)  Russell  V.  NicoU,  3  Wend.  112.  It 
was  held,  in  this  case,  that  a  contract 
made  in  the  city  of  New  York,  for  the 
sale  of  500  bales  of  cotton,  to  be  deliv- 
ered on  its  arrival  at  New  York  from 
New  Orleans,  at  any  time  between  the 
date  of  the  contract  (9th  February)  and 
the  1st  of  June  thereafter,  to  be  paid  for 
in  cash  on  delivery,  the  cotton  to  be 
weighed,  and  two  per  cent  tare  to  be  al- 
lowed, is  an  executory  contract,  and  the 
title  of  the  cotton  does  not  pass.  The 
vendors  are  not  chargeable  for  the  non- 
delivery of  the  cotton  nvtil  its  arrival 
in  New  York ;  and  the  specification  of 
the  time  is  only  a  limitation  fixing  the 
period  beyond  wliich  neither  party  is 
bound  by  the  contract,  and  not  an  agree- 
ment that  the  vendor  shall,  at  all  events, 
deliver  the  cotton  by  the  specified  day. 


1  If  an  article  proves  defective,  the  purchaser  may.  without  returning  or  offer- 
ing to  return,  and  without  notifying  the  vendor  of  such  defects,  sue  for  damages ; 
or  if  sued  for  the  price,  recoup  his  damages  from  the  price  to  be  paid.  Bonnell  v. 
Jacobs,  36  Wis.  59;  Morehouse  v.  Comstock,  42  Wis.  626. 

603 


562 


THE  LAW  OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


*  562  *  Under  such  a  contract  the  obligations  of  the  vendor  and 
purchaser  are  mutual,  the  one,  to  deliver,  and  the  other,  to 
accept,  if  the  condition  of  time  be  fulfilled.  Accordingly  it  is 
held,  that  where  the  contract  is  for  the  sale  of  goods  to  be  deliv- 
ered on  arrival,  but  not  to  exceed  a  specified  day,  the  purchaser 
is  not  bound  to  accept  them  after  that  day.  (d)  But  a  statement 
that  the  goods  contracted  for  are  now  on  the  passage,  and  ex- 
pected to  arrive,  naming  the  vessels  and  the  quantity  in  each,  is 
held  to  be  a  warranty  that  the  goods  were  on  the  passage  at  the 
making  of  the  contract ;  the  term  "  expected  to  arrive,"  in  that 
connection,  being  regarded  as  limited  in  its  operation  to  goods 
that  are  on  the  passage,  and  not  as  rendering  the  shipment  itself 
conditional,  (e) 


(d)  Alevvyn  v.  Pry  or,  Ryan  &  Moo. 
406 ;  and  see  Russell  v.  Nicoli,  3  Wend. 
112,  on  this  point. 

(e)  Gorrissen  v.  Perrin,  2  C.  B.  (n. 
s.)  G81.  This  was  an  action  for  a 
breacli  of  contract,  in  not  delivering 
1170  bales  of  gambler,  pursuant  to  a 
contract  of  sale,  whereby  tiie  defendant 
contracted  to  sell  and  deliver  to  tlie 
plaintiff  that  number  of  bales,  stated  to 
be  "  now  on  passage  from  Singajiore, 
and  expected  to  arrive  at  London  ;  805 
bales  per  Kavenscraig,  and  305  per  Lady 
Agnes  Duff,  at  15s.  Gd.  per  cwt. ;  "  with  a 
proviso,  that  should  eitlier  or  both  ves- 
sels be  lost,  the  contract  was  to  be  void 
for  the  quantity  so  lost.  The  two  vessels 
arrived  with  1170  bales  consigned  to  the 
defendant ;  but  the  bales  were  of  about 
one-third  only  of  the  size  and  weight  of 
the  packages  known  in  the  gambler 
trade,  under  tlie  designation  of  bales, 
and  the  plaintiff  declined  to  accept  them 
as  a  performance  of  the  contract.  By 
arrangement  between  the  parties,  they 
were  received  by  the  plaintiff  without 
prejudice  to  his  rights  under  the  con- 
tract; and  he  brought  this  action  in  re- 
spect to  the  difference.  Besides  the 
small  bales  consigned  to  the  defendant, 
there  came  in  the  two  vessels,  but  con- 
signed to  other  parties,  a  number  of 
bales  of  gambier  of  the  full  and  accus- 
tomed size  and  weight,  suiificient  to  have 
satisfied  the  contract.  Tlie  plaintiff  con- 
tended, in  the  first  place,  that  the  state- 
ment in  the  contract,  that  tlie  bales  were 
then  on  their  passage  from  Singapore,  was 
a  warrant}'  that  1170  bales  of  the  usual 
size  and  weight  were  then  on  the  passage, 
and  claimed  damages  for  the  breach  of 
warranty  ;  and  in  the  second  place,  tiiat, 
if  not  a  warranty,  yet  as  1170  such  bales 

604 


had  arrived  by  the  ships  in  question, 
they  were  entitled  to  a  delivery  of  them 
under  the  contract,  and  claimed  dam- 
ages for  the  non-delivery.  Or,  in  other 
words,  he  contended,  that  either  the  con- 
tract, by  virtue  of  the  warranty,  Avas  an 
absolute  sale,  in  which  case  there  was 
a  breach  of  the  contract  by  omission  to 
deliver  bales  of  the  proper  weight,  ac- 
cording to  the  trade-meaning  of  tlie 
term ;  or,  if  the  contract  was  to  be  re- 
garded as  conditional  upon  the  arrival  of 
the  bales  known  to  the  trade  as  such, 
then  tliis  condition  was  satisfied  by  the 
arrival  in  the  two  sliips  of  the  bales 
which  came  consigned  to  other  parties. 
Tlie  Court  of  Common  Bench  gave 
judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  basing  their 
decision  upon  the  grounds  that  the  con- 
tract called  for  the  bales  known  as 
such  in  mercantile  usage,  and  that  the 
statement  that  the  bales  were  on  their 
passage  at  tlie  date  of  the  contract, 
amounted  to  a  warranty  that  such  bales 
were  on  the  passage.  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  in 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  says, 
in  reference  to  the  bearing  of  the  expres- 
sion, "  expected  to  arrive,"  upon  the 
question  of  conditionality  in  the  contract : 
"  We  are  of  opinion  that  the  statement 
that  the  goods  were  on  board  at  the  time 
the  contract  was  entered  into,  amounts 
to  a  warranty ;  and  although,  if  cir- 
cumstances had  subsequently  occurred 
whereby  the  arrival  of  the  goods  iiad 
been  prevented,  the  defendant  might 
have  been  protected  by  the  words  '  ex- 
pected to  arrive,'  we  tliink  they  cannot 
resort  to  them  to  get  rid  of  the  positive 
assurjmce  that  the  goods  were  on  their 
passage  ;  on  the  faith  of  which,  possibly, 
the  purchaser  may  have  entered  into  the 
contract  to  buy." 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  5G3 

*  A  contract  for  the  sale  of  goods  expected,  may  how-  *  503 
ever  be  construed  to  be  conditional  on  the  arrival  of  the 
vessel  instead  of  the  goods,  if  the  terms  are  so  explicit  as  entirely 
to  exclude  the  implication  that  the  time  of  arrival  applies  to  the 
goods.  In  such  a  case,  the  condition  of  the  arrival  of  the  vessel 
is  regarded  as  precedent  in  its  nature,  and  if  the  vessel  do  not 
arrive  the  vendor  will  not  be  held  under  his  contract.  If  how- 
ever the  vessel  arrives,  he  will  be  liable,  even  though  he  docs  not 
receive  the  goods  expected  by  the  vessel,  and  though  there  be  no 
default  on  his  part.  (/)  In  the  case  cited,  the  court  observed, 
that  the  vendor  had  by  his  own  heedlessness  undertaken  to  jjcr- 
form  an  impossibility  which  he  might  have  provided  against  in 
his  contract,  and  therefore  he,  rather  than  the  innocent  purchaser, 
should  suffer  for  his  failure  to  perform. 

A  ship-owner's  agreement  to  take  freight  at  a  foreign  port,  by 
a  certain  vessel  which  the  owner  says  is  to  arrive  at  that  port,  is 
not  regarded  as  conditional  upon  the  arrival  of  the  vessel,  unless 
expressly  made  so  by  the  terms  of  the  contract.  And  if  the  only 
exceptions  made,  are  the  dangers  of  the  seas  and  fire,  and  the 
non-arrival  is  owing  to  a  different  cause  from  either  of  these,  the 
owner  will  be  held  liable  for  the  damage  which  the  freighter  may 
suffer  by  breach  of  contract,  {g') 

(f)  Hale  I'.  Rawson,  4  Com.  B.  (n.  s.)  ceive  that  such  was  its  true  intent  and 
85.  meaning.     The  agreement  seems  to  us  to 

(g)  Higginson  v.  Weld,  14  Gray,  165.  have  been  an  absolute  one,  that  the  de- 
This  was  an  action  of  contract  upon  a  fendants  would  receive  at  Calcutta  tlie 
written  agreement  between  the  plaintiffs  cargo  which  tlie  plaintiffs  on  their  part 
and  defendants,  whereby  tlie  plaintiffs  undertooli  to  furnish  for  tlie  return  voy- 
agreed  to  furnish  150  tons  of  freight  for  age,  and  that  the  only  exception  was  of 
the  defendants'  ship  at  Calcutta,  at  a  spe-  the  dangers  of '  the  seas  and  tire.'  Tliere 
cified  rate  per  ton,  and  the  defendants  seems  to  be  nothing  in  the  terms  of  the 
agreed  to  receive  such  freight  on  the  contract,  in  its  obvious  purpose  and  ob- 
terms  named,  the  dangers  of  the  seas  and  ject,  or  in  the  relation  of  the  parties, 
fire  excepted.  The  agreement  further  which  should  lead  to  the  restricted  inter- 
stated,  that  it  was  understood  that  the  pi-etation  for  which  the  defendants  argue, 
ship  was  then  on  a  voyage  to  Australia,  '  It  is  understood,'  in  the  ordinary  use  of 
thence  to  Calcutta,  where  she  was  to  load  that  phrase,  when  it  is  adopted  in  a  writ- 
for  Boston  ;  and  a  penalty  of  $2,200  was  ten  contract,  has  the  same  force  as  '  it  is 
stipulated  for  the  non-performance  of  the  agreed.'  ihe  obligation  of  the  plaintiffs 
agreement  by  either  party.  The  ship  was  absolute."  ..."  They  could  have 
came  direct  from  Australia  to  New  York,  no  inducement,  it  would  seein,  to  bind 
without  proceeding  to  Calcutta ;  and  the  themselves  to  furnish  tlie  freight,  with- 
plaintiffs  sued  for  damages  for  the  breach  out  any  corresponding  obligation  to  pro- 
of contract.  The  court  gave  judgment  vide  a  vessel  to  receive  and  transport  it. 
for  the  plaintiffs,  and  in  their  opinion  There  would  be  no  mutuality  in  such  an 
say:  "The  defendants  contend  that  the  agreement.  If  the  defendants  intended 
contract  was  conditional,  and  was  only  to  make  their  contract  conditional  upon 
to  become  obligatory  upon  them  in  case  the  arrival  of  the  vessel  at  Calcutta,  it 
the  ship  arrived  at  Calcutta,  and  there  would  have  been  easy  to  say  so  in  express 
loaded  for  Boston.     But  we  cannot  con-  terms.     In  the  absence  of  such  a  state- 

605 


*  564  THE   LAW    OP   CONTRACTS.  [BOOK   III. 

*  5G4        *  A  sale  of  goods  to  be  shipped  by  a  specified  vessel  at  a 

certain  time,  is  an  absolute  engagement  that  the  goods 
shall  be  shipped  as  indicated,  and  if  they  are  not  so  shipped  the 
vendor  is  liable  for  the  breach  of  contract,  from  whatever  cause 
the  failure  arises,  (/i) 

It  will  be  noticed,  that  in  construing  a  contract  for  the  sale  of 
goods  by  a  particular  vessel,  a  distinction  is  made  between  the 
specification  of  a  day  certain  for  the  shipment,  (i)  and  the  limit- 
ing a  time  for  the  delivery ;(/)  the  former  being  regarded  as  a 
warranty,  and  the  latter  as  merely  a  condition  upon  which  the 
execution  of  the  contract  depends.  If  goods  are  not  shipped 
when  the  vendor  says  they  shall  be,  he  is  liable  in  all  events  to 
the  purchaser  for  their  non-arrival ;  if  goods  are  not  delivered 
within  the  time  limited,  in  consequence  of  non-arrival,  neither 
party  can  compel  the  other  to  perform  the  contract  of  sale.  In 
both  these  cases  time  is  an  essential  element  in  the  contract,  but 
not  for  the  same  purpose  in  both.     In  the  one,  it  fixes  the 

*  565    *  period  when  the  vendor's  absolute  liability  is  to  begin ; 

in  the  other  when  the  conditional  liability  of  vendor  and 
purchaser  is  to  end.  Some  confusion  occasionally  arises  in  dis- 
cussing the  question  in  any  given  case,  whether  time  is  or  is  not 
of  the  essence  of  the  contract ;  but  as  a  general  thing,  we  think 
the  matter  may  be  rendered  clear,  by  considering  whether,  in  the 
particular  case,  the  time  mentioned,  is  or  is  not  subordinate  to 
any  other  condition.     If  it  is,  then  its  observance  is  less  impor- 

ment,  the  court  cannot  add  to  it  by  con-  the  vendor.  The  names  of  the  ships  were 
struction.  —  The  second  clause  of  the  given,  but  they  arrived  in  England  with 
stipulation  of  the  defendants  is  very  ex-  only  a  very  small  portion  of  the  hemp 
plicit  and  free  from  ambiguity  ;  '  that  contracted  for.  The  liemp  designed  for 
they  will  receive  the  said  freight  upon  the  sliips  was  confiscated  as  British  prop- 
the  terms  named,  the  dangers  of  the  seas  erty  on  board  the  lighters  in  the  Baltic, 
and  fire  excepted.'  The  exception  direct-  before  it  was  put  on  board  the  ship,  the 
ly  follows  the  agreement  to  receive,  and  latter  being  obliged  to  cut  cable  and  put 
marks  the  only  limit  of  the  undertaking."  to  sea,  to  avoid  an  embargo.  Lord  Elie.n- 
—  In  reference  to  an  offer  by  defendant  borough  in  giving  judgment  for  the  plain- 
to  sliow  that  the  deviation  in  the  voyage  tiff,  said,  this  case  was  decided  by  that 
was  owing  to  the  insanity  of  the  master,  of  Atkinson  v.  Ritchie,  10  East,  530;  and 
evidence  upon  which  point  was  ruled  out  as  the  defendants  had  absolutely  engaged 
at  the  trial,  the  court  say,  that  the  mas-  that  the  hemp  should  be  shipped,  they 
ter's  insanity  was  no  sufficient  excuse  for  were  liable  for  this  not  being  done,  from 
the  failure  to  furnish  the  vessel,  "  as  that  whatever  cause  the  circumstance  had 
was  a  misfortune  of  which  the  plaintiffs  arisen. 

did  not  assume  the  risk."  (/)  Splidt   v.    Heath,   2  Camp.    57,   n. 

(h)  Splidt  I'.   Heath,  2  Camp.  57,  n.  Atkinson  v.  Eitchie,  10  East,  530;  Gor- 

This  was  an  action  for  the  non-delivery  rissen  v.  Perrin,  2  C.  B.  (n.  s)  681. 
of   certain  quantities  of   St.  Petersburg  ( /)  Russell   v.  NicoU,  3   Wend.   112 ; 

hemp,  to  be  shipped  on  or  before  the  Slst  Alewyn  v.  Pryor,  Ryan  &  Moo.  406. 
August,  0.  S.,  in  ships  to  be  named  by 

606 


CH.  IV.]  SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  566 

tant,  and  it  may  be  regarded  as  not  of  the  essence  of  the  contract. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  be  a  condition,  and  not  subordinate  to 
any  other  condition  of  the  contract,  then,  since  the  parties  have 
seen  fit  to  give  it  this  primary  place  and  controlling  influence  in 
their  contract,  courts  must  hold  it  to  be  of  the  essence  of  the  con- 
tract. 

Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  sale  on  arrival,  the  goods  to  be  delivered 
within  a  certain  time  ;  if  the  question  be  whether  the  mention  of 
a  time  of  delivery  imposes  an  absolute  obligation  to  deliver  by 
that  time,  although  the  goods  have  not  arrived,  the  answer  is, 
that,  as  the  delivery  depends,  by  the  very  terms  of  the  contract, 
upon  the  arrival,  it  is  therefore  subordinate  to  the  arrival,  and  the 
time  limited  for  delivery  cannot  control  the  condition  of  arrival, 
and  cannot  be  so  far  of  the  essence  of  the  contract  as  to  make  the 
seller  responsible  for  the  non-delivery.  But  if  the  goods  arrive 
after  the  time  of  delivery  has  expired,  and  the  question  be, 
whether  the  vendor  is  then  bound  to  deliver,  or  the  purchaser  to 
receive,  the  answer  is,  that,  as  the  arrival  has  already  taken 
place,  there  is  no  longer  anything  to  control  the  delivery  but 
the  specification  of  time,  and  as  the  condition  of  time  is  no  longer 
subordinate,  it  must  be  allowed  its  full  effect  in  determining  the 
liability  of  the  parties,  and  thus  be  regarded  as  of  the  essence  of 
the  contract.  Again,  if  the  question  be,  whether  the  mention  of  a 
time  for  shipment  imposes  an  absolute  obligation  that  the  goods 
shall  be  shipped  at  that  date,  the  answer  is,  that  there  is  no  other 
obligation  in  the  contract  to  which  the  time  of  shipment  is  subordi- 
nate, and  therefore,  since  the  parties  have  seen  fit  to  embody  it  in 
the  contract,  time  must  in  this  case  be  regarded  as  of  the  essence 
of  the  contract. 

When  the  engagement  to  deliver  is  absolute,  the  vendor 
cannot  *  excuse  himself  by  showing  that  he  was  prevented    *  566 
from  completed  his  bargain  by  the  blockade  of  the  port,  or 
by  any  other  inevitable  accident.  (^) 

Where  there  is  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  a  cargo  to  be  shipped 
by  a  particular  vessel  then  on  her  way  to  the  port  of  lading,  and 
the  kind  and  quality  of  the  goods  is  fixed,  as  well  as  the  price, 
and  provision  is  made  for  a  fair  allowance  to  the  buyer  for  an 
inferior   description   of    the    same   kind   of    goods,  the   vendor 

(k)  Atkinson  v.  Ritchie,  10  East,  530;  517;  Hayward  v.  Scougall,  2  Camp.  56; 
Spence  v.  Chadwick,  10  A.  &  E.  (n.  s.)     DeMedeiros  v.  Hill,  6  Car.  &  P.  182. 

607 


567 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book    III. 


also  engaging  to  deliver  what  may  be  shipped  on  his  account 
and  in  conformity  with  his  invoice ;  and  it  is  stipulated,  that 
the  contract  shall  be  void  if  the  vessel  should  make  an  inter- 
mediate voyage,  or  should  be  lost ;  it  is  held  that,  with  the  two  ex- 
ceptions stipulated,  this  is  a  warranty  that  a  cargo  of  the  kind  and 
quality  specified  shall  be  shipped  by  the  vessel,  and  brought  home 

for  the  benefit  of  the  buyers.  (^)  But  if  there  be  also  a 
*  567    *  proviso  that  goods  of  the  kind  and  quality  contracted  for 

are  shipped  on  the  vendor's  account,  and  instead  thereof  a 
cargo  of  an  inferior  description  of  the  same  kind  of  goods  should 
be  shipped,  the  vendor  would  not  in  that  event  be  liable  for  a 
breach  of  warranty ;  nor  could  the  purchaser  claim  the  delivery 
of  such  cargo,  with  the  stipulated  reduction  in  price  for  inferior 


(/)  Simond  v.  Braddon,  2  Com.  B.  324, 
40  E.  L.  &  Eq.  285.  The  plaintiff  bought 
of  the  defendant  a  cargo  of  Arracan  rice, 
per  Severn  then  on  lier  way  to  Akyab ; 
the  cargo  to  consist  of  fair  average  Ne- 
erenzie  rice,  the  price  to  be  lis.  6d.  per 
cvvt.  with  a  fair  allowance  for  Larong,  or 
any  inferior  description  of  rice  (if  any), 
but  the  vendor  engaged  to  deliver  what 
was  shipped  on  his  own  account  and  in 
conformity  with  his  invoice.  The  buyer 
to  have  the  option  of  discharging  the 
vessel  at  any  good  and  safe  European 
port,  within  certain  specified  limits.  The 
contract  to  be  void  jirovided  the  vessel 
made  the  intermediate  voyage  between 
Akyab  and  Calcutta,  allowed  in  the  char- 
ter-party. Payment  to  be  made  in  cash 
on  arrival  of  vessel  with  the  rice,  at  the 
port  of  call  in  England.  There  were 
other  provisions  as  to  the  insurance,  &c., 
and  the  contract  was  to  be  void  if  the 
vessel  was  lost.  The  vessel  proceeded  to 
Akyab,  shipped  a  full  cargo  of  Necrenzie 
rice,  and  arrived  with  it  at  Falmouth, 
Eng.,  her  port  of  call,  in  good  season. 
The  plaintiff  then  paid  the  full  price  for 
the  cargo,  received  the  shipping  docu- 
ments, and  sent  the  vessel  to  Amsterdam, 
her  port  of  discharge.  The  plaintiff  al- 
leged, that  the  rice  proved  inferior  in 
quality  to  what  he  bargained  for,  and 
sued  for  damages.  The  results  of  the  evi- 
dence at  trial  was,  that  the  rice  shipped 
was  not  fair,  average  Necrenzie.  A  ver- 
dict was  found  for  the  plaintiff,  with 
leave  for  defendant  to  move  to  enter  a 
verdict  for  him,  if  the  court  should  be  of 
opinion  that  the  contract  did  not  contain 
a  warranty.  Upon  the  argument  before 
the  Court  of  Common  Bench,  the  defend- 
ant contended,  that  the  contract  con- 
tained   no    warranty,    but    a    condition 

608 


merely ;  that  he  was  bound  to  deliver  what- 
ever cargo  was  shipped,  but  not  any  par- 
ticular cargo  ;  and  that  the  purchaser  on 
the  other  hand,  was  not  bound  to  take  the 
cargo  unless  it  was  of  the  description 
contracted  for.  The  court  decided  unani- 
mously, tiiat,  except  in  the  cases  in  which 
it  was  provided  that  the  contract  should 
be  void,  there  was  a  warranty  on  the 
part  of  the  vendor,  that  he  would  ship 
and  bring  liome  a  cargo  of  Necrenzie  rice, 
and  that  it  should  be  fair,  average  Ne- 
crenzie. The  rule  was  accordingly  dis- 
charged. Cockburn,  C.  J.,  in  his  opinion 
says  :  "Looking  at  the  Avhole,  I  think  the 
true  construction  of  the  contract  is,  that 
there  is  a  warranty  by  the  seller  that  a 
cargo  of  fair,  average  Necrenzie  rice  shall 
be  shipped,  with  a  stipulation  in  favor  of 
Ihe  buyer,  that  he  may  either  claim  per- 
formance of  the  warranty,  or  claim  the 
rice  which  absolutely  arrives ;  and  that 
if  he  does  take  a  cargo  with  inferior  rice 
amongst  it,  he  may  take  advantage  of 
the  contract  to  deliver  fair,  average  Ne- 
crenzie rice,  and  claim  a  deduction  for 
Larong  or  Latoorie  rice.  No  question 
arises  here  as  to  Larong  or  Latoorie,  for 
none  came.  The  plaintiff  is  therefore 
entitled  to  recover  on  the  warranty  of 
fair,  average  Necrenzie  rice."  Crestcell, 
J.,  in  delivering  his  opinion,  seemed  to 
view  the  stipulation  for  a  fair  allowance 
of  Larong  and  any  other  inferior  descrip- 
tion of  rice,  as  a  mode  provided  by  the 
contract  for  satisfying  the  breach  of  the 
warrant}'  in  case  there  was  a  mixture  of 
such  inferior  descriptions  in  the  cargo  ; 
saying,  that,  "  as  there  was  no  stipulation 
of  that  nature  as  to  Necrenzie  rice  of 
inferior  quality,  in  case  any  should  be 
shipped,  the  parties  must  be  presumed  to 
rest  on  the  contract  as  to  that." 


i 


CH,  IV.] 


SALE  OP  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


568 


quality,  if  the  vendor  has  not  expressly  bound  liimsclf  to  deliver 
what  may  be  shipped  on  his  account,  and  in  cunfurniity  with  his 
invoice,  (w) 

A  sale  of  a  cargo  at  sea,  with  a  transfer  of  all  the  indicia 
of  *  property,  is  a  different  contract  from  a  simple  sale  of    *5G8 
goods  to  arrive,  as  we  have  before  intimated,  and  necessarily 
imports  that  the  purchaser  is  to  be  holden,  whether  the  cargo  arrives 
Of  not.     But  this  sale  must  be  subject  to  the  conditions  that  the 
cargo  is  in  existence  at  the  time  of  the  contract,  and  within  the 
power  to  sell  of  the  vendor,  at  that  time.     For  if  the  cargo  has 
previously  been  destroyed,  there  is  nothing  to  which  the  contract 
can  attach ;  and  if  the  property  has  already  been  disposed  of  by 
an  authorized  agent  of  the  vendor,  so  as  to  be  beyond  the  control 
of  the  latter,  the  purchaser  cannot  be  called  on  to  fulfil  the  con- 
tract, though  he  may  have  the  right  to  hold  the  vendor  responsi 
ble  for  non-performance  on  his  part.     A  case  in  which  the  vendor's 


(m)  Vernede  v.  Weber,  1  H.  &  N.  311 ; 
38  E.  L.  &  E.  277.  This  was  an  action 
on  contract  for  tlie  non-delivery  of  a 
cargo  of  rice  sold  by  the  defendant  to 
the  plaintiif.  By  means  of  bought  and 
sold  notes  the  plaintiff  bought  of  tlie  de- 
fendant, "  the  cargo  of  400  tons,  provided 
the  same  be  shipped  for  seller's  account, 
of  Necrenzie  rice,  more  or  less  of  the 
average  quality  as  shipped  per  Minna, 
to  proceed  from  Akyab  to  a  port  in  the 
channel  for  orders,  at  lis.  Qd.  per  cwt. 
for  Necrenzie  rice,  or  at  lis.  for  Larong, 
the  latter  quality  not  to  exceed  50  tons, 
or  else  at  the  option  of  buyers,  to 
reject  any  excess  ;  to  be  paid  for  in  cash 
on  the  arrival  of  the  vessel  at  the  port 
of  call,  on  delivery  of  bills  of  lading, 
charter-party,  and  policy  of  insurance ; 
should  the  vessel  be  lost  before  the  ar- 
rival at  the  port  of  call,  tliis  contract  to 
be  void."  The  vessel  arrived  at  the  port 
of  call  with  a  cargo  of  rice,  consisting  of 
about  two-thirds  Larong  and  one-third 
Latoorie,  and  with  no  Necrenzie  what- 
ever. The  plaintiff  claimed  that  there 
was  a  breach  of  warranty  in  not  ship- 
ping a  cargo  of  Necrenzie  rice,  and  a 
breach  of  the  contract  in  not  delivering 
the  cargo  shipped.  The  defendant  de- 
nied the  warranty,  and  the  obligation  to 
deliver  the  cargo  received,  it  not  being 
Necrenzie  rice.  The  case  came  before 
the  Court  of  Exchequer  upon  these  ques- 
tions, and  upon  both  points  the  judg- 
ment was  given  for  the  defendant.  By 
Alderson,  B.,  for  the  court :  "  We  think 
there  is  no  such  warranty  in  this  con- 


tract as  would  support  the  first  breach. 
The  cargo  contemplated  by  both  ])arties 
—  for  no  fraud  was  imputed  —  was  one 
principally  of  Arracan  Necrenzie  rice. 
This  was  not  an  absolute  contract ;  it 
was  subject  to  the  proviso  that  sucli  a 
cargo  should  be  shipped  ;  and  we  are  of 
opinion  that  there  was  no  absolute  war- 
ranty that  the  rice  shipped  should  be  of 
this  quality."  ..."  We  are  of  opinion 
that  tiie  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  the 
delivery  of  the  entire  cargo.  We  think 
the  contract  was  not  for  sucli  cargo  of 
rice  as  the  vessel  should  bring  to  Europe, 
but  for  rice,  the  price  of  which  was  fixed 
and  agreed  on  between  the  parties.  If 
the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  the  Arracan 
Necrenzie  rice,  a  jury  must  determine, 
in  the  event  of  a  difference  of  opinion, 
the  price  to  be  paid ;  and  we  do  not 
think  either  party  contemplated  the  sale 
of  rice  which  was  not  at  a  stipulated  price, 
and  which  was  to  be  left  to  the  deter- 
mination and  decision  of  a  jury."  The 
plaintiff  having  also  clainied  that  he  was 
entitled  at  all  events,  to  a  delivery  of 
that  part  of  tlie  cargo  received  which 
was  composed  of  Larong  rice,  the  court 
decided  upon  this  point,  that,  the  con- 
tract being  entire,  and  there  being  in  the 
cargo  none  of  the  kind  which  constituted 
the  principal  subject  of  the  contract,  the 
plaintiff  could  not  insist  upon  the  de- 
livery of  that  kind  which  was,  by  the 
terms  of  the  contract,  to  fornj  only 
a  subsidiary  part  of  the  cargo  to  be 
shipped. 

39  609 


*568 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book    III. 


right  under  such  circumstances,  was  adjudicated,  came  before  the 
House  of  Lords  on  writ  of  error  from  the  Exchequer  Chamber, 
and  the  decision  of  the  House  sustaining  that  of  the  Exchequer 
Chamber,  was  against  the  liability  of  the  purchaser.  The  policy 
of  insurance  upon  the  cargo  at  sea  had  been  transferred  to  the 
purchaser  at  the  time  of  sale,  but  the  cargo  had  already  been 
destroyed  as  cargo,  by  damage,  at  the  time  the  sale  was  made, 
though  this  was  then  unknown  to  the  contracting  parties.  It 
was  contended  for  the  owner,  that  the  interest  secured  to  the  pur- 
chaser by  the  transfer  of  the  policy  of  insurance,  was  a  sufficient 
support  to  the  contract.  The  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords 
against  the  vendor,  was  upon  the  ground  that  the  parties  must 
have  contemplated  by  the  contract,  that  there  was  an  existing 
something  to  be  sold  and  bought,  and  if  sold  and  bought,  then  the 
benefit  of  insurance  should  go  with  it.  (n) 


(n)  Couturier  v.  Hastie,  8  Exch.  40; 
9  Exch.  102  ;  5  H.  L.  Cas.  673.  In 
this  case  a  merchant  of  Smyrna  sued 
his  factor  in  London,  for  the  value  of 
a  cargo  of  corn  sokl  by  tlie  latter  on 
a  dd  credere  conniiission.  The  factor 
sold  the  cargo  at  sea,  "free  on  board, 
including  freight  and  insurance,"  and 
the  contract  described  the  corn  "  as  of 
average  quality  when  shipped."  Before 
the  date  of  the  sale,  the  vessel  while  on 
her  voyage  home  had  put  into  a  foreign 
port,  in  consequence  of  the  corn  getting 
so  heated  in  llie  early  part  of  the  voyage 
as  to  render  it  impossible  to  bring  it  to 
England,  and  the  cargo  had  been  landed, 
condemned,  and  sold.  This  was  unknown 
to  the  factor  and  to  the  purchaser  when 
the  sale  was  made.  As  soon  as  the  pur- 
chaser heard  of  it,  he  wrote  to  the  factor, 
repudiating  the  sale,  on  the  ground  that 
the  cargo  did  not  exist  at  the  date  of  the 
contract.  In  answer  to  the  plaintiff's 
declaration,  the  defendant  pleaded  the 
prior  sale  of  the  corn  by  the  captain  of 
the  vessel  as  the  agent  of  the  plaintiff, 
the  destruction  of  the  cargo  by  reason 
of  damage,  unloading  and  sale,  and  the 
consequent  repudiation  of  the  contract 
by  the  purchaser.     At  the  trial  before 


Martin,  Baron,  his  lordship  ruled  that 
the  contract  imported  that  at  the  time  of 
sale  the  cargo  of  corn  was  in  existence 
as  such,  and  capable  of  deliver}-,  and 
that  as  it  had  been  sold  and  delivered  by 
the  captain,  before  the  contract  was 
made,  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover  in 
the  action.  The  case  was  afterwards 
argued  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  and 
this  ruling  reversed  by  a  majority  of  the 
judges,  with  liberty  to  the  defendant  to 
bring  a  bill  of  exceptions.  Upon  argu- 
ment before  the  Court  of  Exchequer 
Chamber  on  the  bill  of  exceptions,  the 
judgment  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer 
was  unanimously  reversed.  Upon  the 
hearing  of  the  case  upon  writ  of  error 
in  tlie  House  of  Lords,  the  judges  who 
were  called  in  by  the  House,  were  unani- 
mous in  the  opinion  that  the  judgment 
of  the  Exchequer  Chamber  was  right, 
and  that  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Exchequer  was  wrong.  Alderson,  B.,  was 
present.  He  was  one  of  the  majority 
judges  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer;  but 
having  changed  his  opinion,  he  now  con- 
curred with  the  other  judges  called  in 
by  the  House.  Judgment  was  accord- 
ingly given  in  the  House  of  Lords  for 
the  defendant  in  error. 


610 


CH.  IV.] 


SALE  OF  PEESONAL  PROPERTY. 


*569 


♦SECTION  IX. 

MORTGAGES   OP   CHATTELS. 


•569 


Sales  of  chattels,  by  way  of  mortgage,  constitute  a  very  im- 
portant, and,  in  recent  times,  a  very  frequent  class  of  safes  on 
condition,  (o)  There  has  not  been  as  yet  much  adjudication  in 
respect  to  them.  Whether  a  mortgage  of  personalty  has  at  com- 
mon law  any  equity  of  redemption  does  not  seem  to  be  positively 
determined ;  but  it  is  believed  that  equity  Avould  interfere  to 
prevent  gross  injustice.  (|>)  This  subject  is  regulated 
*in  many  of  the  States  by  statute,  and,  in  general,  record  *  570 
is  required  if  possession  of  the  goods  be  retained  by  the 
mortgagor ;  and  an  equity  of  redemption  is  allowed,  {q)  It  seems 
that  a  mortgage  of  personal  property,  where  the  mortgagor  retains 
possession,  is  not  valid  against  a  subsequent  bond  fide  purchaser 
or  attaching  creditor,  if  there  be  neither  record  of  the  mort- 
gage, nor  actual  knowledge  of  it  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser  or 
creditor,  (r) 


(o)  See  4  Kent,  Com.  138,  where  the 
distinction  between  a  pledge  and  a  mort- 
gage of  personal  property  is  fully  set 
forth.  A  mortgage  of  goods  is  a  con- 
veyance of  title  upon  condition,  and  if  the 
condition  is  not  performed,  sucli  title  be- 
comes absolute  in  law,  but  equity  will,  it 
seems,  interfere  to  compel  a  redemption. 
Story  on  Bailm.  §  287  ;  Flanders  v.  Bar- 
stow,  18  Me.  357  ;  2  Story,  Eq.  §  1031. 
As  to  what  instruments  will  be  construed 
as  a  mortgage,  and  what  as  merely  a 
pledge,  see  Langdon  v.  Buel,  9  Wend.  80 ; 
Wood  V.  Dudley,  8  Vt.  435 ;  Barrow  v. 
Paxton,  5  Johns.  258  ;  Coty  v.  Barnes,  20 
Vt.  78;  Whitaker  v.  Sumner,  20  Pick. 
399,  and  post,  Bailments  under  the  head 
of  Pledge.  A  mortgage  of  personal 
property,  like  that  of  real  estate,  may 
consist  of  an  absolute  bill  of  sale,  and  a 
separate  instrument  of  defeasance,  given 
at  tlie  same  time.  Brown  v.  Bement,  8 
Johns.  96 ;  Hopkins  v.  Thompson,  2  Port. 
(Ala.)  433;  Winslow  v.  Tarbox,  18  Me. 
132 ;  Williams  v.  Eoser,  7  Mo.  556 ; 
Barnes  v.  Holcomb,  12  Sm.  &  M.  306; 
Knight  V.  Nichols,  34  Me.  208.  And 
although  the  bill  of  sale  is  absolute,  and 
no  writing  of  defeasance  is  given  back, 
parol  testimony  is  still  admissible  to 
prove  that  it  was  intended  only  as  col- 
lateral   security.       Reed    v.    Jewett,    6 


Greenl.  96 ;  Carter  v.  Burris,  10  Sm.  & 
M.  527;  Freeman  v.  Baldwin,  13  Ala. 
246.  But  see  Whitaker  v.  Sumner,  20 
Pick.  399;  Montany  v.  Rock,  10  Mo.  50«. 
It  is  well  settled,  that  mortgages  of  per- 
sonal property  need  not  be  under  seal. 
Despatch  Line  v.  Bellamy  Co.  12  N.  II. 
205;  Milton  v.  Mosher,  7  Met.  244; 
Flory  V.  Denny,  11  E.  L.  &  E.  584  ;  s.  c. 
7  Exch.  581. 

{p)  In  Hinman  i'.  Judson,  13  Barb. 
629,  which  was  an  action  brought  by  the 
mortgagee  of  personal  property,  against 
a  party  claiming  imder  the  mortgagor, 
for  conversion  of  the  property,  it  was 
held,  that  a  mortgagor  of  chattels  may 
redeem  them  after  condition  broken  and 
before  they  are  sold  on  tiie  part  of  the 
mortgagee,  and  that  in  the  present  action 
the  defendant  might  exercise  this  right 
by  reducing  the  damages  to  be  recovered, 
to  the  amount  actually  due  upon  the 
mortgage  debt. 

(q)  Thus  in  Massachusetts,  an  equity 
of  redemption  of  sixty  days  is  allowed 
the  mortgagor  after  condition  broken,  or 
after  notice  of  an  intention  to  foreclose 
given  by  the  mortgagee  for  such  breach. 
R.  S.  ch.  107,  §  40;  Stat,  of  1843,  ch.  72. 
Nearly  similar  provisions  exist  in  Maine. 
R.  S.  ch.  125,  §  30. 

(r)  As  between  mortgagor  and  mortga' 

611 


571 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS, 


[book    III. 


It  has  been  frequently  attempted  to  make  a  mortgage  of  per- 
sonalty extend  over  chattels  not  then  owned  by  the  mortgagor, 
but  to  be  subsequently  purchased.  As  where  a  shopkeeper  makes 
a  mortgage  of  "  all  the  goods  in  his  store,  and  of  all  which  shall 
be  bought  to  replace  or  renew  the  present  stock."  Such  a  mort- 
gage might  operate  against  the  mortgagor  somewhat  by  way 
*  671  of  estoppel ;  but  it  has  been  decided  that  it  is  not  *  valid 
against  a  third  party,  (s)  In  general  one  cannot  transfer 
what  he  has  not  at  the  time  ;  but  an  assignment  of  property,  with 
what  may  be  its  future  increase  or  incidents,  is  valid,  at  least  in 


gee,  a  mortgage  of  personal  property  is 
valid,  altliougli  there  be  no  delivery  of 
the  i)ropertj',  and  no  possession  by  the 
mortgagee,  or  record  of  the  mortgage  on 
the  registry.  Smith  v.  Moore,  UN.  H. 
55 ;  Winsor  v.  McLellan,  '2  Story,  492  ; 
Hall  V.  Snowhill,  2  Green  (N.  J.),  8.  But 
as  to  subsequent  purchasers,  and  attacli- 
ing  creditors  of  the  mortgagor,  witliout 
notice  of  the  e.xistence  of  the  mortgage, 
by  statute  in  several  States,  the  mortga- 
gee must  either  have  and  retain  jiosses- 
sion  of  the  mortgaged  property,  or  the 
mortgage  must  be  recorded  in  the  town 
where  the  mortgagor  resided  at  the  time 
of  its  e.xecution.  Smith  v.  Moore,  supra. 
—  And  where  such  provision  is  made  by 
statute,  the  recording  is  equivalent  to 
actual  delivery.  Forbes  v.  Taiker,  16 
Pick.  462.  But  in  New  York  it  has  been 
decided  that  tlie  record  of  a  mortgage 
does  not  rebut  the  presumption  of  fraud 
occasioned  by  the  mortgagor's  retention 
of  the  property,  such  record  being  merely 
an  additional  requirement.  Otis  v.  Sill, 
8  Barb.  102.  The  necessity  of  delivery 
to  the  mortgagee  or  of  a  record,  is  wholly 
the  effect  of  statutory  provisions,  and  at 
common  law  a  mortgage  of  personal 
property  mi[/ht  he  valid,  in  the  absence 
of  fraud,  even  against  subsequent  I'ond 
Jide  purchasers  and  attaching  creditors, 
although  the  mortgagor  remained  in 
possession,  and  although  no  record  of 
the  mortgage  existed.  Holbrook  v. 
Baker,  5  Greenl.  300;  Bissell  v.  Hop- 
kins, 3  Cowen,  lfi6 ;  Bucklin  v.  Thomp- 
son, 1  J.  J.  Marsh.  223  ;  Letcher  ;■.  Nor- 
ton, 4  Scam.  575;  Ash  v.  Savage,  5  N. 
H.  545 ;  Homes  v.  Crane,  2  Pick.  610. 
Such  continued  possession  by  the  mort- 
gagor may  be  sufficient  evidence  of  fraud, 
but  it  would  not  alone  be,  in  most  States, 
conclusive.  Id.  In  Vermont  it  would 
be.  Russell  v.  Fillmore,  15  Vt.  130. 
Although  the  mortgagor  remain  in 
possession,  and  without  anj*  record  of 
the  mortgage,  it  seems  that  a  subsequent 

612 


purchaser,  or  attaching  creditor,  having 
actual  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  mort- 
gages, acquires  no  riglits  against  the 
mortgagee,  the  latter  being  guilty  of  no 
fraud.  Sanger  v.  Eastwood,  19  Wend. 
514 ;  Stowe  v.  Meierve,  13  N.  H.  46 ; 
Gregory  v.  Thomas,  20  Wend.  17.  The 
contrary  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts. 
Travis  v.  Bisliop,- 13  Met.  304.  And  see 
Denny  v.  Lincoln,  id.  200. 

(s)  Jones  V.  Pvieliardson,  10  Met.  481. 
In  this  case  the  property  mortgaged  was 
thus  described,  namely  :  "  The  whole 
stock  in  trade  of  said  A.,  as  well  as  each 
and  every  article  of  merchandise  wliich 
the  said  A.  (the  mortgagor)  bought  of 
one  T.  W.,  as  everj'  other  article  consti- 
tuting said  A.'s  stock  in  trade,  in  tlie 
shape  the  same  is  and  maii  heroine,  in  the 
usual  course  of  the  said  A.'s  business  as 
a  trader."  It  was  admitted  that  the 
goods  in  question,  which  had  been  at- 
tached by  a  creditor  of  the  mortgagor, 
were  at  the  time  of  the  attachment  tlie  stock 
in  trade  of  tlie  said  A.,  but  that  only  a 
part  of  them  was  owned  by  him,  until 
after  lie  had  made  said  mortgage.  The 
court  after  a  critical  review  of  the  au- 
thorities bearing  upon  this  point,  held, 
that  the  mortgagee  could  not,  as  against 
third  persons,  acquire  under  this  mort- 
gage any  valid  title  to  those  goods  pur- 
chased by  the  mortgagor  after  the  giving 
of  the  mortgage.  The  same  view  is  sup- 
ported bv  the  ease  of  Lunn  v.  Thornton, 
1  C.  B.  379;  Khines  r.  Phelps,  3  Gilman, 
455;  Barnard  v.  Eaton,  2  Gush.  294; 
Pettis  V.  Kellogg,  7  Gush.  471 ;  Winslow 
V.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  4  Met.  306  ;  Otis  v. 
Sill,  8  Barb.  102.  The  case  of  Abbott  v. 
Goodwin.  20  Me.  408,  wliich  may  seem  to 
conflict  with  the  rule  laid  down  in  the 
text,  does  not  seem  to  us  correct,  and 
is  apparently  inconsistent  with  the  views 
of  the  same  court  as  expressed  in  the  later 
case  of  Goodenow  v.  Dunn,  21  Me.  96. 
And  see  also  Hope  v.  Hayley,  5  E.  &  B. 
830. 


CH.  IV.] 


SALE  OF  PERSONAL  PROPERTY. 


71 


equity ;  as  the  assignment  of  a  ship,  with  the  oil  then  in  her,  and 
all  the  oil  to  be  taken  during  the  voyage.  (^)  ^ 

Where  the  mortgagee  permitted  the  mortgagor  to  remain  in 
possession,  for  the  purpose  and  with  the  power  of  selling  the 
goods,  such  mortgage,  although  recorded,  would  not  av(»id  the 
sale,  even  if  it  did  not  express  in  any  Avay  such  purpose  and 
power,  if  they  could  be  inferred  from  the  circumstances.  Supj)0s- 
ing  the  whole  transaction  to  be  bond  fide,  the  mortgagor  would  be 
considered  as  selling  the  goods  as  the  agent  of  the  mortgagee, 
and  the  proceeds  would  belong  to  the  mortgagee ;  and,  if  sold  on 
credit,  the  debt  could  not  be  reached  by  an  attaching  creditor  of 
the  mortgagor  through  the  trustee  process,  (m) 


{t)  Langton  v.  Horton,  1  Hare,  549. 

(«)  Unless  there  is  some  stipulation 
in  the  mortgage,  allowing  the  mortgagor 
to  remain  in  possession  of  the  goods,  the 
right  of  immediate  possession  vests,  to- 
gether with  the  property  in  them,  in  the 
mortgagee ;  and  he  may  have  an  action 
against  any  one  taking  them  from  the 
mortgagor.  Pickard  v.  Low,  15  Me.  48; 
Brackett  v.  BuUard,  12  Met.  308 ;  Coty 
V.  Barnes,  20  Vt.  78.  And  parol  proof 
is  not  admissible  to  sliow  an  agreement 
that  the  mortgagor  should  remain  in 
possession,  the  mortgage  itself  being 
silent  upon  the  subject.  Case  v.  Win- 
ship,  4  Blackf.  425.  And  although  the 
mortgage  contains  an  express  stipulation 
that  the  mortgagor  shall  remain  in  pos- 
session, until  default  of  payment,  and 
with  a  power  to  sell  for  the  payment  of 
the  mortgage  debt,  the  mortgagee  may 
nevertheless  sustain  trover  against  an 
officer  attaching  the  goods  as  the  prop- 
erty of  the  mortgagor.  Melody  v. 
Chandler,  3  Fairf .  282 ;  Forbes  v.  Parker, 
16  Pick.  462 ;  Welch  v.  Whittemore,  25 
Me.  86;  Ferguson  v.  Thomas,  26  Me. 
499.  In  the  case  of  Barnard  v.  Eaton, 
2  Cush.  294,  where  a  mortgage  was 
made  of  all  the  goods  then  in  the  mort- 
gagor's store,  and  of  all  goods,  &c., 
which  might  be  afterwards  substituted 
by  the  mortgagor  for  those  which  he 
then  possessed,  —  the  mortgage  provid 
ing  that  until  default  the  mortgagor 
might  use  and  make  sales  of  the  morXr 


gaged  property',  other  goods,  &c.,  of  equal 
value  being  substituted  therefor,  —  it 
was  held,  that  the  mortgage  could  not 
apply  to  goods  not  in  existence,  or  not 
capable  of  being  identified,  at  the  time 
it  was  made,  or  to  goods  intended  to  be 
afterwards  purchased  to  replace  those 
which  should  be  sold.  It  was  also  held, 
in  the  same  case,  that  an  agreement,  in 
a  mortgage  of  the  stock  of  goods  then  in 
the  mortgagor's  store,  tliat  until  default, 
the  mortgagor  miglit  retain  possession  of 
the  propert}',  and  make  sales  thereof  in 
the  usual  course  of  his  trade,  other 
goods  of  equal  value  being  substituted  by 
him  for  tiiose  sold,  will  not  authorize  tlie 
mortgagor  to  put  the  mortgaged  prop- 
erty into  a  partnership  as  his  share  of 
the  capital.  In  New  York,  tmless  the 
mortgage  is  filed  in  pursuance  with  the 
statute,  the  mortgagor  cannot  remain  in 
possession  for  the  purpose  of  selling  the 
goods.  Camp  v.  Camp,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
628.  See  also  Collins  v.  Mvers,  16  Oliio. 
547.  And  in  Edgell  v.  Hart.  13  Barb. 
380,  where  a  mortgage,  although  re- 
corded, was  intended  to  cover  prop- 
erty afterwards  to  be  procured  by 
the  mortgagor,  and  in  it  the  mortgagee 
gave  him  the  right  to  sell  the  goods  for 
ready  pay,  without  l)eing  under  any 
obligation  to  apply  the  proceeds  to  the 
discharge  of  the  mortgage,  or  any  other 
debt,  it  was  hfild,  that  tlie  mortijatre  was 
void,  as  calculated  to  delay.  Iiinder,  and 
defrau<l  other  creditors  of  the  mortgagor. 


1  As  to  a  valid  chattel  mortgage  upon  the  product  of  property  in  which  the  mort- 
gagor has  a  present  interest,  see  Conderman  v.  Sniitli,  41  Barb.  404  ;  Wilson  v.  Wilson, 
37  Md.  1,  11;  Robinson  v.  Elliott,  22  Wall.  513;  Tennessee  Bank  >:  Ebbert,  9 
Heiskell,  153  ;  Meyer  v.  Johnston,  53  Ala.  237  ;  Gittings  v.  Nelson,  86  III.  5'.U .  In  Cali- 
fornia, a  mortjjage  of  a  crop  before  seed-sowing,  if  the  mortgagor  owns  tlie  land,  may 
be  made.  Arques  v.  Wasson,  51  Cal.  620.  In  Indiana,  after-acquired  property  may 
be  mortgaged.    Headrick  v.  Brattain,  63  Ind.  438.    See  Brett  v.  Carter,  2  Lowell,  458. 

613 


*  573  THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS.  [bOOK   III. 


*573  *  CHAPTER  Y. 

WARRANTY. 

The  warranties  which  accompany  a  sale  of  chattels  are  of  two 
kinds  in  respect  to  their  subject-matter ;  they  are  a  warranty  of 
title  and  a  warranty  of  quality.  They  are  also  of  two  kinds  in 
respect  to  their  form,  as  they  may  be  express  or  implied. 

Blackstone  says,  "  a  purchaser  of  goods  and  chattels  may  have 
a  satisfaction  from  the  seller,  if  he  sells  them  as  his  own,  and 
the  title  proves  deficient,  without  any  express  warranty  for  that 
purpose. "  (a)  But  he  also  says  afterwards,  "  in  contracts  for 
sales,  it  is  constantly  understood,  that  the  seller  undertakes  that 
the  commodity  he  sells  is  his  own,  and  if  it  proves  otherwise,  an 
action  on  the  case  lies  against  him  to  exact  damages  for  this 
deceit."  (5)  From  this  it  might  be  inferred  that  the  action  is 
grounded  on  the  deceit,  and  therefore  does  not  lie  where  there 
is  no  deceit,  as  where  one  sells  as  his  own  that  which  is  not  his 
own,  but  which  he  verily  believes  to  be  his  own.  But  although 
the  English  authorities  are  somewhat  uncertain  and  conflicting, 
we  consider  that  a  rule  is  recognized  in  the  English  courts,  or 
in  some  of  them,  which,  although  not  distinctly  and  positively 
asserted,  nor  so  well  supported  by  direct  decision  as  the  Ameri- 
can rule,  may  yet  be  regarded  as  essentially  the  same,  (c)    And 

(a)  2  Bl.  Com.  451.  commenced  an  action  against  the  pawn- 

(b)  3  Bl.  Com.  166  (Wendell's  ed.),  broker  for  tlie  price  at  which  he  bid  off 
and  note.  tlie  harp,  on  a  warranty  of  title.     It  was 

(c)  Medina  v.  Stoughton,  1  Salk.  210;  agreed  that  there  was  no  express  warran- 
Crosse  v.  Gardner,  Carth.  90.  This  sub-  ty  ;  and  the  court  held,  that  under  these 
ject  was  much  discussed  in  England,  in  circumstances  there  was  no  implied  w'ar- 
the  case  of  Morley  v.  Attcnborough,  3  ranty  of  an  absolute  and  perfect  title,  on 
Exch.  500.  There  a  person  having  hired  the  part  of  tlie  pawnbroker,  but  only  that 
a  harp,  pledged  it  with  a  pawnbroker  for  the  subject  of  the  sale  was  a  pledge,  and 
his  own  debt,  without  authority  from  the  irredeemable,  and  that  the  pawnbroker 
true  owner.  The  liarp  not  being  redeemed  was  not  cognizant  of  anj' defect  of  title 
at  the  stipulated  time,  the  pawnbroker  to  it.  Tliis  case  has  sometimes  been 
sold  it  at  auction  at  his  usual  quarterly  cited  as  deciding  the  general  principle, 
sales.  The  harp  was  advertised  as  for-  that  in  all  cases  of  sales  of  personal  prop- 
feited  property,  pledged  witli  the  broker,  erty  there  is  no  implied  warranty  of  title, 
The  purcliaser  at  the  auction  bought,  not  and  it  has  been  thouglit  to  be  opposed  to 
knowing  that  tlie  harp  did  not  belong  to  tlie  American  doctrine  on  this  subject ; 
the  party  pledging  it;  but  after  the  sale,  and  some  of  the  language  of  Parke,  B., 
being  sued  by  the  former  owner,  he  gave  who  delivered  the  judgment,  may  go 
up  the  harp,  and  paid  the  costs.     He  then  somewhat  to  sustain  such  a  view.     But 

614 


CH.  v.] 


WARRANTY. 


574 


in  this  country  it  is  now  well  settled,  *  by  adjudications  *  574 
in  many  of  our  States,  that  the  seller  of  a  chattel  {d), 
if  in  possession,  warrants  by  implication  that  it  is  his  own, 
and  is  answerable  to  the  purchaser  if  it  be  taken  from  him  by  one 
who  has  a  better  title  than  the  seller,  whether  the  seller  knew 
the  defect  of  his  title  or  not,  and  whether  he  did  or  did  not 
make  a  distinct  affirmation  of  his  title.  But  if  the  *  seller 
is  out  of  possession,  and  no  affirmation  of  title  is  made, 
then  it  may  be  said  that  the  purchaser  buys  at  his  peril. 


575 


And 


this  is  the  established  rule  of  law  in  this  country,  (e)  i     In  any 


we  conceive  that  the  case,  as  an  nnlhoritij, 
cannot  be  pressed  further  than  the  actual 
facts  and  circumstances  warrant ;  and  in 
tills  light  the  decision  itself  seems  not  in 
conflict,  but  in  harmony  witli  the  Ameri- 
can cases.  For  a  sale  by  a  pawnbroker, 
under  the  circumstances  detailed  in  that 
case,  may  be  analogous  to  that  of  a  sale 
of  a  chattel  by  a  sheriff  on  execution. 
And  here  all  authorities,  English  and 
American,  agree  that  the  sheriff  does 
not  impliedly  warrant  the  title  of  the  ex- 
ecution debtor  to  the  property  seized  on 
execution  ;  but  only  that  he  does  not 
know  that  lie  iiad  no  title  to  the  goods. 
Peto  V.  Blades,  5  Taunt.  657 ;  Hensly  v. 
13aker,  10  Mo.  157  ;  Chapman  v.  Speller, 
14  Q.  B.  621;  Yates  v.  Bond,  2  McCord, 
382  ;  Bashore  v.  Whisler,  3  Watts,  490 ; 
Stone  V.  Pointer,  5  Munf.  287  ;  Morgan  v. 
Fencher,  1  Blackf.  10;  Davis  v.  Hunt,  2 
Bailey.  412 ;  Friedly  v.  Scheetz,  9  S.  &  R. 
156  ;  Rodgers  (.'.  Smith,  2  Cart.  (Ind.)  526 ; 
Bostick  V.  Winton,  1  Sneed,  525.  So  a 
sale  by  an  executor,  administrator,  or 
other  trustees,  does  not  raise  an  implied 
warranty  of  title ;  such  person  does  not 
sell  the  property  as  liis  own  ;  he  does  not 
offer  it  as  his  own ;  and  iinless  guilty  of 
fraud,  he  would  not  be  responsible,  if  the 
title  failed.  Ricks  v.  Dillahunty,  8  Port. 
(Ala.)  134;  Forsythe  v.  Ellis,  4  J.  J. 
Marsh.  298;  Bingliam  v.  Maxcy,  15  111. 
295 ;  Prescott  v.  Holmes,  7  Rich.  Eq.  9. 
On  consideration  of  all  the  cases  on  this 
subject,  we  must  believe  the  language  of 
Blackstone  to  be  correct,  that  if  a  person 
in  possession  of  a  chattel  sells  it,  as  his 
own,  there  is  an  implied  warranty  of  title. 
That  the  case  of  Morley  v.  Attenborough 
should  not  be  considered  as  an  authority, 
further  than  the  actual  facts  of  the  case 
warrant,  see  the  case  of  Sims  i'.  Mar^'att, 
7  E.  L.  »Sb  E.  330 ;  s.  c.  17  Q.  B.  281,  where, 


however,  there  was  an  express  warranty. 
Lord  CaiiipbeJl  said :  "  It  does  not  seem 
necessary  to  inquire  what  is  the  law  as 
to  implied  warranty  of  title  on  the  sales 
of  personal  pro])erty,  ir/u'ch  is  not  tjnilc 
satisfdciorili/  settled.  According  to  Morley 
;;.  Attenborough,  if  a  pawnbroker  sells 
unredeemed  pledges  he  does  not  warrant 
the  title  of  the  pawner,  but  merely  under- 
takes that  the  time  for  redeeming  tlie 
pledges  has  expired,  and  he  sells  only  such 
right  as  belonged  to  the  pawner.  Beyond 
that  the  decision  does  not  go,  but  a  great 
many  questions  are  suggested  in  the  judg- 
ment which  still  remain  open.  Although 
the  maxim  of  caveat  emptor  applies  gen- 
erally to  the  purchaser  of  personal  prop- 
erty, there  may  be  cases  where  it  would 
be  difficult  to  appl}'  the  rule."  It  seems 
alwaj's  to  have  been  held,  that  if  a  ven- 
dor sells,  knowing  he  has  no  title,  and 
conceals  that  fact,  he  is  liable  as  for  a 
fraud.  Early  v.  Garret,  9  B.  &  C.  932 ; 
Sprigwell  v.  Allen,  Aleyn,  91.  In  Robin- 
sou  V.  Anderton,  Peake,  Cas.  94,  a  pur- 
chaser of  fixtures,  the  title  of  which  was 
not  in  the  vendor,  was  allowed  to  recover 
their  price  as  money  had  and  received, 
although  the  vendor  was  not  guilty  of 
fraud,  and  bond  Jide  believed  himself  the 
owner.  See  on  warranty  of  title.  Mil- 
ler V.  Tassel,  24  Cal.  458 ;"  Linton  v.  Por- 
ter, 31  111.  107. 

(d)  This  must  be  confined  to  sales  of 
chattels.  In  the  sale  of  re<d  estate  by  deed 
there  are  no  implied  warranties.  The 
words  "containing  so  many  acres,"  &c, 
do  not  import  a  covenant  of  quantity. 
Huntley  v.  Waddell,  12  Ired.  L.  32  ;  Rick- 
ets V.  Dickens,  1  Murphey,  343;  Powell 
V.  Lyles,  1  id.  348;  Roswel  r.  Vaughan, 
Cro.  J.  196.     Sec  ((»/(',  p.  *  501. 

(p)  No  case  more  directly  asserts  the 
implied  warranty  of  title,  in  all  cases  of 


1  In  Pennsylvania,  a  buyer,  to  avail  liimself  of  a  breach  of  warranty  of  title  in  an 
action  for  the  price,  must  show  an  eviction  or  involuntary  loss  of  possession.  Krumb- 
haar  v.  Birch,  83  Penn.  St.  426.    In  California,  there  is  no  breach  until  the  buyer's 

615 


575 


THE  LAW  OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book   III. 


case  where  there  was  this  warranty  of  title,  it  would  seem  to 
follow  from  acknowledged  principles,  that  a  title  subsequently 
acquired  by  the  vendor  would  enure  to  the  benefit  of   the  ven- 


sales  of  personal  property,  than  that  of 
Defreeze  v.  Trumper,  1  Johns.  274  (1806). 
There  the  purchaser  of  a  horse  brought 
a  suit  against  the  vendor  to  recover 
damages ;  the  title  having  been  in  a 
third  person,  and  not  in  the  vendor  at 
the  time  of  the  sale.  The  principal  ob- 
jection at  the  trial  was,  tliat  the  evidence 
did  not  prove  any  warranty,  nor  any 
fraud  in  the  sale.  But  the  court  said : 
"  We  are  of  opinion  that  an  express 
warranty  was  not  requisite,  for  it  is  a 
general  rule  that  the  law  will  imply  a  war- 
ranty of  title  upon  the  sale  of  a  chattel." 
And  this  doctrine  has  been  steadily-  ad- 
hered to  and  uniformly  followed  by  the 
courts  of  New  York.  See  Heermance  v. 
Vernoy,  6  Johns.  5  (1810)  ;  Vibbard  v. 
Johnson,  19  Johns.  77  (1821)  ;  Swett 
V.  Colgate,  20  Johns.  106  (1822)  ;  Reid 
V.  Barber,  3  Cowen,  272  (1824) ;  McCoy  v. 
Artcher,  3  Barb.  323  (1848).  In  this  case 
a  very  able  judgment  was  pronounced  in 
favor  of  the  doctrine  of  the  text,  namely, 
that  in  sales  of  personal  jiroperty,  in  the 
possession  of  the  vendor,  there  is  an  im- 
plied warranty  of  title,  for  the  posses- 
sion is  equivalent  to  an  affirmation  of  title. 
But  it  is  held  otherwise  where  the  prop- 
erty sold  is  then  in  the  possession  of  a 
third  person,  and  the  vendor  made  no 
affirmation  or  assertion  of  ownership. 
And  the  same  was  again  distinctly  af- 
firmed in  the  case  of  Edick  r.  Crim,  10 
Barb.  445.  Dresser  v.  Ainsworth,  9  Barb. 
619,  is  a  valuable  case  upon  tliis  point. 
It  is  there  held,  that  this  implied  war- 
ranty of  title  not  only  means  that  tlie 
vendor  has  a  right  to  sell,  but  it  extends 
to  a  prior  lien  or  incumbrance.  The 
essence  of  the  contract  is,  tliat  the  ven- 
dor has  a  perfect  title  to  the  goods  sold  ; 
tliat  the  same  are  unincumbered,  and 
that  the  purchaser  will  acquire  by  the 
sale  a  title  free  and  clear,  and  shall 
enjoy  the  possession  witliout  disturbance 
by  means  of  anything  done  or  suffered 
by  the  vendor.  So  in  Coolidge  v.  Brig- 
ham,  1    Met.  551,  Wilde,  J.,  says :   "  In 


contracts  of  sales  a  warranty  of  title  is 
implied.  The  vendor  is  always  under- 
stood to  affirm  that  the  property  he  sells 
is  his  own.  And  this  im])lied  affirmation 
renders  him  responsible,  if  the  title  prove 
defective.  This  responsibility  the  ven- 
dor incurs,  although  the  sale  may  be 
made  in  good  faitii,  and  in  ignorance  of 
the  defect  of  his  title.  This  rule  of  law  is 
ivell  established,  and  does  not  trench  un- 
reasonably upon  the  rule  of  the  common 
law,  caveat  emptor."  The  general  doctrine 
of  the  text  is  also  directly  asserted  or 
recognized  in  Bucknam  v.  Goddard,  21 
Pick.  70;  Hale  v.  Smith,  6  Greenl.  420; 
Butler  V.  Tufts,  13  Me.  302 ;  Tiiompson 
V.  Towle,  32  Me.  87  ;  Huntingdon  v.  Hall, 
86  Me.  501  ;  Pobinson  v.  Rice,  20  Mo. 
229 ;  Lines  v.  Smith,  4  Fla.  47 ;  Lackey 
V.  Stouder,  2  Cart.  (Ind.)  376;  Gookin  v. 
Graham,  5  Huinph.  480  ;   Trigg  v.  Faris, 

5  Humph.  343;  Dorsev  v.  Jackman,  1  S. 

6  R.  42  ;  Eldridge  v.  Wadleigh,  3  Fairf. 
372 ;  Cozzins  r.  Whitaker,  3  Stew.  &  P. 
322;  Mockbec  v.  Gardner,  2  Har.  &  G. 
176  ;  Payne  v.  Rodden,  4  Bibb,  304  ;  Inge 
V.  Bond,  3  Hawks,  103,  Taylor,  C.  J.; 
Chism  V.  Woods,  Hardin,  531 ;  Scott  v. 
Scott,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  217  ;  Chancellor  v. 
Wigains,  4  B.  Mon.  201 ;  Boyd  v.  Bopst, 
2  Dallas,  91  ;  Colcock  v.  Good,  3  McCord, 
513;  Ricks  v.  Dillahunty,  8  Port.  (Ala.) 
134  ;  see  also  a  well  reasoned  article  in 
12  Am.  Jur.  311 ;  2  Kent,  Com.  478.  We 
have  been  thus  full  in  the  citation  of  au- 
thorities upon  this  apparently  well-settled 
point,  because  there  is  still  some  conflict 
of  opinion  upon  it,  and  because  the 
American  doctrine  has  been  thought  not 
to  rest  upon  good  foundation.  The  ar- 
guments and  authorities  upon  the  op- 
posite side  of  the  question  are  very  ably 
stated  in  11  Law  Rep.  272,  et  seq.  Scran- 
ton  V.  Clark,  39  N.  Y.  220.  In  this  last 
case  it  was  decided  that  if  the  vendor  be 
not  in  possession  tlure  is  no  warranty, 
and  if  he  afterwards  acquire  a  good  title 
it  will  not  enure  to  the  benefit  of  the 
purchaser. 


possession  is  disturbed  by  the  true  owner.  Gross  v.  Kierski,  41  Cal.  111.  In  Massa- 
chusetts, that  a  buyer  has  not  been  so  disturbed,  is  immaterial.  Perkins  v.  MHielan, 
110  Mass.  542.  In  Iowa,  a  buyer  may  remove  a  lien  and  deduct  from  the  purchase- 
money.  Harper  v.  Dotson,  43  la.  232.  See  Northampton  Bank  v.  Mass.,  &c.  Co.  123 
Mass.  330 ;  McKnight  v.  Devlin,  52  N.  Y.  399 ;  Sargent  v.  Currier,  49  N.  H.  310 ; 
Storm  V.  Smith,  43  Miss.  407;  Rice  v.  Forsyth,  41  Md.  389;  Marshall  r.  Duke,  51 
Ind.  62;  Whitaker  i'.  Eastwick,  75  Penn.  St.  229;  Gross  v.  Kierski,  41  Cal.  Ill; 
Morris  v.  Thompson,  85  111  16. — A  warranty  of  title  is  equally  implied  with  an  ex- 
change as  a  sale.  Hunt  v.  Sackett,  31  Mich.  18;  Patee  v.  Pelton,  48  Vt.  182;  Byrn- 
side  V.  Burdett,  15  W.  Va.  702. 

616 


CH.  v.]  WAERANTY.  ♦  575 

dee.  (/)     If  the  seller  is  in  possession,  but  the  possession 
is  *  of  such  a  kind  as  not  to  denote  or  imply  title  in  him,    *  576 
there  would  be  no  warranty  of  title  in  England,  (^)  and 
we  are  confident  that  there  would  be  none  in  this  countiy. 

All  warranties,  however  expressed,  are  open  to  such  construc- 
tion from  surrounding  circumstances,  and  the  general  cliaracter 
of  the  transaction,  and  the  established  usage  in  similar  cases,  as 
will  make  the  engagement  of  warranty  conform  to  the  intention 
and  understanding  of  the  parties;  provided,  however,  that  tlie 
words  of  warranty  are  neither  extended  nor  contracted  in  their 
significance  beyond  their  fair  and  rational  meaning.  For  these 
words  of  warranty  are  usually  subjected  to  a  careful,  if  not  a 
precise  and  stringent  interpretation,  as  it  is  the  fault  of  the  buyer 
who  asks  for  or  receives  a  warranty,  if  it  does  not  cover  as 
much  ground  and  give  him  as  effectual  protection  as  he  in- 
tended, (h)  1 

(/)  In  the  recent  case  of  Sherman  v.  from   a   sound   price,  as  is  the  case  in 

Champlain  Trans.  Co.  ol  Vt.  162,  it  is  some  States.     Kichardson  r.  Johnson,  1 

laid   down   as    settled   law   by   Redjield,  La.  An.  389.     But  care  should  be  taken 

C.  J.,  that  in  a  sale  of  personal  property  not  to  misunderstand  or  misapply   this 

there  is  always  an  implied  warranty  of  rule.     A  vendor  moy  warrant  against  a 

title,  unless  the  subject  of  the  sale  is  the  defect  which   is  patent  and  obvious,  as 

vendor's   title  and  not  the  thing   itself,  well  as  against  an}'  other.     And  a  gcn- 

Therefore  if  after  such  a  sale  the  vendor  eral  warranty   that  a  horse  was  sound, 

acquire  the  full  title,  it  will  enure  to  the  for  instance,  would  in  our  juilgnient  be 

benefit  of  the  vendee.     See  also  to  the  broken,  if  one  eye  was  so  badly  injured, 

same  effect,  Word  v.  Gavin,  1  Head,  506.  or  so  malformed,  as  to  be  entirely  useless, 

(^r)   See  ante,  p.  *  573,  note  (c).  and  although  this  defect  might  have  been 

(h)  A  qeneral  warranty  is  said  not  to  noticed  by  the  purchaser  at  the  time  of 

cover  defects  plain  and  obvious  to  the  sale.     He   may  choose  to  rely  upon  the 

purchaser,   or   of   which   he   had   cogni-  warranty  of  the  vendor,  rather  than  upon 

zance ;  thus  if  a  horse  be  warranted  per-  his  own  judgment,  and  we  see  not  why 

feet,  and  want  a  tail  or  an  ear.     13  H.  4,  he  should  not  be  permitted  to  do  so.     A 

1  b,  pi.  4;  11  Ed.  4,  6  b,  pi.  10;  South-  warranty  that  a  horse  is  sound  is  broken 
erne  v.  Howe,  2  RoUe,  5 ;  Long  v.  Hicks,  if  he  cannot  see  with  one  eye.     House  v. 

2  Humph.  305;  Schuyler  v.  lluss,  2  Fort,  4  Blackf.  294.  Why  may  not  the 
Caines,  202  ;  Margetson  v.  Wright,  5  vendor  be  equally  liable  if  one  eye  was 
Mo.  &  P.  (i06 ;  Dillard  ;;.  Moore,  2  Eng.  entirely  gone  ?  In  Margetson  v.  Wright, 
(Ark.)  166.  See  also  Birdseye  v.  Frost,  8  Bing.  454,  s.  c.  7  Bing.  603,  a  horse 
34  Barb.  367.  The  same  rule  applies  warranted  sound  had  a  splint  then  ;  this 
whether  the  warranty  is  expected  or  was  risible  at  the  time  of  sale ;  but  the 
whether  a  warranty  is  implied  by  law,  animal  was  not  then  lame  from  it.     He 

1  To  create  a  warranty,  however,  no  special  words  are  necessary.  Sceales  v. 
Scanlan,  6  Ir.  L.  R.  .367,  371;  Robinson  v.  Harvey,  82  111.  58;  Polhemus  v.  Heiman, 
45  Cal.  573.  The  intention  of  the  parties  will  govern,  and,  even  where  the  alleged 
warranty  is  in  writing,  it  may  be  left  to  the  jurj'  to  say  whether  it  is  so  or  not. 
Tewkesbury  v.  Bennett,  31  la.  83  ;  Horton  v.  Green,  66  N.  C.  596.  Any  assertion  by 
the  seller,  not  an  opinion  or  judgment,  respecting  the  kind,  quality,  or  condition  of 
the  article,  upon  which  he  intends  the  buyer  to  rely  as  an  inducement,  and  u])on  which 
buyer  does  rely,  is  an  express  warranty.  Hawkins  v.  Pemberton,  51  N.  Y.  19,s ;  Bishop 
V.  Small,  63  Me.  12;  Warren  v.  Philadelphia  Coal  Go.  83  Penn.  St.  437;  Wolcott  v. 
Mount,  7  Vroom,  262;  Byrne  v.  Jansen,  50  Gal.  024;  Sparling  r.  Marks,  86  111.  125; 
Clark  V.  Ralls,  50  la.  275;  Horn  v.  Buck,  48  Md.  358;  Patrick  v.  Leach,  8  Neb.  6-30. 

617 


*577 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


*  577  *  If  there  be  no  express  warranty,  the  common  law,  in 
general,  implies  none.  Its  rule  is,  unquestionably,  both 
in  England  and  in  this  country,  caveat  ernptor,  ({)  ^  — let  the  pur- 
chaser take  care  of  his  own  interests.  This  rule  is  apparently 
severe,  and  it  sometimes  works  wrong  and  hardship ;  and  it  is  not 
surprising  that  it  has  been  commented  upon  in  terms  of  strong 
reproach,  not  only  by  the  community,  but  by  members  of  the  legal 
profession;  and  these  reproaches  have  in  some  instances  been 
echoed  from  tribunals  which  acknowledge  the  binding  force  of  the 
rule.  But  the  assailants  of  this  rule  have  not  always  seen  clearly 
how  much  of  the  mischief  apparently  springing  from  it  arises 
rather  from  the  inherent  difficulty  of  the  case.  As  a  general  rule, 
we  must  have  this  or  its  opposite ;  and  we  apprehend  that  tlie 
opposite  rule,  —  that  every  sale  implies  a  warranty  of  quality^  — 
would  cause  an  immense  amount  of  litigation  and  injustice.  It  is 
always  in  the  power  of  a  purchaser  to  demand  a  warranty ;  and 
if  he  does  not  get  one  he  knows  that  he  buys  without  warranty, 
and  should  conduct  himself  accordingly ;  for  it  is  always  his  duty 
to  take  a  proper  care  of  his  own  interests,  and  to  use  all  the  pre- 
caution or  investigation  which  such  case  requires ;  and  he  must 
not  ask  of  tlie  law  to  indemnify  him  against  the  consequences  of 


afterwards  became  lame  from  the  effects 
of  it ;  and  the  warranty  was  held  to  he 
broken.  In  Liddard  v.  Kain,  2  Bing. 
183,  an  action  was  brought  to  recover 
tlie  value  of  horses  sold  and  delivered. 
The  defence  was  that  at  the  time  of  the 
purchase  the  plaintiff  agreed  to  deliver 
the  horses  at  the  end  of  a  fortnight, 
sound  and  free  from  blemish,  and  tliat 
at  the  end  of  the  fortnight  one  had  a 
cough,  and  the  otlier  a  swelled  leg;  but 
it  also  appeared,  that  the  seller  informed 
the  buyer  tliat  one  of  the  horses  had  a 
cold  on  him,  and  that  this  as  well  as  tlie 
swelled  leg  was  apparent  to  every  ob- 
server. The  jury  having  found  a  verdict 
for  the  defendant,  a  rule  for  a  new  trial 
was  moved  for,  on  the  ground  that 
where  defects  are  patent  a  warranty 
against  them  is  inoperative.  The  court 
refused  the  rule,  on  the  ground  that  the 
warranty  did  not  apply  to  the  time  of 
sale,  but   to   a  subsequent   period. — In 


Stucky  I'.  Clyburn,  Cheves,  186,  a  slave 
sold  had  a  hernia  ;  this  was  known  to  the 
buyer.  Yet  it  was  held  to  be  within  an 
express  warranty  of  soundness.  So  of  a 
swelling  in  tiie  abdomen,  plainly  visible 
and  known  to  the  purchaser.  Wilson  v. 
Ferguson,  Cheves,  190.  So  where  a  slave 
had  the  scrofula  at  the  time  of  sale. 
Thompson  v.  Botts,  8  Mo.  710.  And 
where  a  defect  is  obvious,  yet  if  the 
purchaser  be  misled  as  to  its  character 
or  extent,  a  warranty  is  implied.  Wood 
V.  Ashe,  3  Strob.  L.  64. 

(/)  Mixer  v.  Coburn,  11  l\Iet.  559; 
Winsor  v.  Lombard,  18  Pick.  59 ;  Parkin- 
son V.  Lee,  2  East,  321;  Stuart  v.  Wil- 
kins,  Dougl.  20 ;  Johnson  v.  Cope,  3  Har. 
&  J.  89;  Seixas  v.  Woods,  2  Caines,  48; 
Holden  v.  Dakin,  4  Johns.  421 ;  Dean  v. 
Mason,  4  Conn.  428;  West  t>.  Cunning- 
ham, 9  Port.  (Ala.)  104 ;  Mores  v.  Mead, 
1  Denio,  378 ;  Mclunney  v.  Fort,  10  Tex. 
220. 


1  Hawkins  v.  Pemberton,  51  N.  Y.  198 ;  Whitaker  v.  Eastwick,  75  Penn.  St.  229 ; 
Roberts  v.  Hughes,  81  111.  130;  Hadley  v.  Prather,  64  Ind.  137.  In  the  sale  of  a 
chattel  in  existence  which  is  inspected  by  the  buyer,  there  is  no  exception  to  the  rule 
of  caveat  emptor.  Morris  v.  Thompson,  85  111.  16;  Byrne  v.  Jansen,  50  Cal.  624; 
Robinson  Works  v.  Chandler,  56  Ind.  575;  Dooley  v.  Gallagher,  3  Hughes  C.  C.  214. 

618 


CH.  v.]  WARRANTY.  *  578 

his  own  neglect  of  duty.  It  is  a  most  reasonable  princi[)lc  and 
is  now  established  as  a  rule  of  law,  that  a  purchaser  who  is  put 
upon  inquiry,  is  chargeable  with  notice  or  knowledge  of  all  those 
facts  which  he  would  have  learned  by  reasonable  inquiry,  and 
such  investigation  as  a  man  of  common  prudence  would  have 
made,  (ii) 

The  decisions  under  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor  have  fluctuated 
very  much,  and  there  is  a  noticeable  conflict  and  uncertainty  in 
respect  to  many  points  of  the  law  of  warranty  ujjon  sales.  But 
some  exceptions  and  qualifications  to  the  general  rule  are  now 
nearly,  if  not  quite,  established,  both  in  England  and  in  this 
country;  and  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor,  as  it  is  now  explained 
and  modified,  may  perhaps  be  regarded  as  upon  the  whole  well 
adapted  to  protect  right,  to  prevent  wrong,  and  to  provide  a 
remedy  for  a  wrong  wliere  it  has  occurred. 

*  One  important  and  universal  exception  is  this  :  the  *  578 
rule  never  applies  to  cases  of  fraud,  never  proposes  to  pro- 
tect a  seller  against  his  own  fraud,  nor  to  disarm  a  purchaser 
from  a  defence  or  remedy  against  a  seller's  fraud.  (/)  ^  It  be- 
comes, therefore,  important  to  know  what  the  law  means  by  fraud 
in  this  respect,  and  what  it  recognizes  as  such  fraud  as  will  pre- 
vent the  application  of  the  general  rule.  If  the  seller  knows  of  a 
defect  in  his  goods,  which  the  buyer  does  not  know,  and  if  he  had 
known  would  not  have  bought  the  goods,  and  the  seller  is  silent, 
and  only  silent,  his  silence  is  nevertheless  a  moral  fraud,  and 
ought  perhaps  on  moral  grounds  to  avoid  the  transaction.  But 
this  moral  fraud  has  not  yet  grown  into  a  legal  fraud.  In  cases 
of  this  kind  there  may  be  circumstances  which  cause  this  moral 
fraud  to  be  a  legal  fraud,  and  give  the  buyer  his  action  on  the 
implied  warranty,  or  on  the  deceit.  And  if  the  seller  be  not 
silent,  but  produce  the  sale  by  means  of  false  representations, 
then  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor  does  not  apply,  and  the  seller  is 
answerable  for  his  fraud.  But  the  weight  of  authority  requires 
that  this  should  be  active  fraud.  The  common  law  does  not 
oblige  a  seller  to  disclose  all  that  he  knows,  which  lessens  the 
value  of  the  property  he  would  sell.  He  may  be  silent,  leaving 
the  purchaser  to  inquire  and  examine  for  himself,  or  to  require  a 

{ii)  Cooper  v.  Newman,  45  N.  H.  339.  (  /)  Irving   v.  Thomas,    18   Me.   418 ; 

Otts'  V.  Alderson,  10  Sm.  &  M.  476. 

1  Warren  v.  Pliiladelphia  Coal  Co.  83  Penn.  St.  437. 

619 


578 


THE   LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


warranty.  He  may  be  silent,  and  be  safe ;  but  if  he  be  more 
than  silent ;  if  by  acts,  and  certainly  if  by  words,  he  leads  the 
buyer  astray,  inducing  him  to  suppose  that  he  buys  with  warranty, 
or  otherwise  preventing  his  examination  or  inquiry,  this  becomes 
a  fraud  of  which  the  law  will  take  cognizance.  The  distinction 
seems  to  be  —  and  it  is  grounded  upon  the  apparent  necessity 
of  leaving  men  to  take  some  care  of  themselves  in  their  busi- 
ness transactions  —  the  seller  may  "let  the  buyer  cheat  himself 
ad  libitum,  but  must  not  actively  assist  him  in  cheating 
himself.  (Jc)  ^ 


[k)  Tlie  case  of  Laidlaw  i".  Organ,  2 
Wheat.  178,  is  the  leading  case  on  tliis 
subject  in  America.  Tlie  facts  were, 
that  one  Shepherd,  interested  witli  Or- 
gan, and  in  treaty  witli  Girault,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  firm  of  Laidlaw  &  Co.,  at  New 
Orleans,  for  a  quantity  of  tobacco,  had 
secretly  received  intelligence  over  night 
of  the  peace  of  1815,  between  England 
and  the  United  States,  which  raised  the 
value  of  the  article  from  thirty  to  fifty 
per  cent.  Organ  called  on  Girault  on 
Sunday  morning,  a  little  after  sunrise, 
and  was  asked  if  there  was  any  news,  by 
which  the  price  of  it  miglit  be  enhanced  ; 
but  there  was  no  evidence  that  Organ 
had  asserted  or  suggested  anything  to 
induce  a  belief  that  such  news  did  not 
exist,  and  luider  the  circumstances  tiie 
bargain  was  struck.  iJaishctll,  C.  J.,  de- 
livered the  opinion  of  the  court,  to  the 
effect  that  the  buyer  was  not  bound  to 
comnmnicate  intelligence  of  extrinsic  cir- 
cumstances which  might  influence  the 
price,  though  it  were  exclusively  in  his 
possession,  and  that  it  would  be  difficult 
to  circumscribe  the  contrary  doctrine 
within  proper  limits,  ichere  the  means  of 
intelligence  are  equality  accessible  to  loth  par- 
ties. Bench  v.  Sheldon,  14  Barb.  6G; 
Kintzing  v.  McElrath,  5  Penn.  St.  4G7, 
also  well  illustrate  the  principle  of  the  text, 
that  where  the  means  of  knowledge  is  ac- 
cessible to  both  parties,  each  must  judge 
for  himself,  and  it  is  neither  the  duty  of 


the  vendor  to  communicate  to  the  vendee 
any  superior  knowledge  which  he  may 
have  of  the  value  of  the  conunodity,  nor 
of  the  vendee  to  disclose  to  the  vendor 
any  facts  which  he  may  have,  rendering 
the  property  more  valuable  than  the 
vendor  supposed.  And  in  the  case  of 
Irvine  v.  Kirkpatrick,  3  E.  L.  &  E.  17,  it 
was  decided  by  the  House  of  Lords  that 
a  concealment  upon  a  sale  of  real  estate,  to 
avoid  the  sale,  must  be  of  something  that 
the  party  concealing  was  bound  to  dis- 
close. See  also  Blydenburgh  v.  Welsh, 
1  Baldw.  331 ;  Calhoun  v.  Vechio,  3 
Wash.  C.  C.  165 ;  Eichelberger  v.  Bar- 
niiz,  1  Yeates,  307  ;  Pearce  v.  Blackwell, 
12  Ired.  L.  49.  The  case  of  Hill  v.  Gray, 
1  Stark.  434,  might  seem  at  first  view  to 
confhct  with  this  doctrine.  There  a  pic- 
ture was  sold,  which  the  buyer  believed 
had  been  the  property  ol  Sir  Felix  Agar, 
a  circumstance  which  might  have  en- 
hanced its  value  in  liis  eyes.  The  seller 
knew  that  the  purchaser  was  laboring 
under  this  delusion,  but  did  not  remove 
it,  and  it  did  not  appear  that  he  either 
induced  or  strengthened  it.  In  an  action 
for  the  price.  Lord  Ellenborowjli  nonsuited 
the  plaintiff,  saying  the  picture  was  sold 
under  a  deception.  The  seller  ought  not 
to  have  let  in  a  suspicion  on  the  part  of 
the  purchaser  which  he  knew  enhanced 
its  value.  He  saw  the  purchaser  had 
fallen  into  a  delusion,  but  did  not  re- 
move  it.      From    the    report    itself,   it 


1  Thus  a  seller  of  a  bill  purchased  by  him  from,  and  known  by  him  to  have  been 
drawn  for  the  accommodation  of,  the  acceptor,  as  a  means  of  l)orrowing  money,  is 
not  bound,  in  the  absence  of  any  inquiry  by  the  buyer,  and  where  the  means  of  infor- 
mation are  open  to  the  latter,  to  disclose  at  the  time  of  the  sale  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  paper  was  made.  People's  Bank  v.  Bogart,  81  N.  Y.  101.  Where 
a  buyer  believes  an  article  offered  for  sale  to  possess  a  certain  quality,  which  it  does 
not,  and  the  seller  is 'conscious  of  the  existence  of  such  belief,  but  does  nothing, 
directly  or  indirectly,  to  bring  it  about,  simply  offering  his  article  and  exliibiting  his 
sample,  remaining  perfectly  passive  as  to  what  was  passing  in  the  mind  of  the  other 
party,  such  "passive  acquiescence  of  the  seller  in  tlie  self-deception  of  the  buyer 
will  not  entitle  the  latter  to  avoid  the  contract."  Per  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  in  Smith  v. 
Hughes,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  597. 

620 


CH.  v.] 


WARRANTY. 


579 


*  r 


579 


«  K 


580 


*As  mere  silence  implies  no  warranty,  neither  do  re- 
marks which  should  be  construed  as  simple  praise  or  con- 
demnation ;  {I)  but  any  distinct  assertion  or  affirmation  of 
quality  made  by  the  *  owner  during  a  negotiation  (ni)  for 
the  sale  of  a  chattel,  which  it  may  be  supposed  was  in- 
tended to  cause  the  sale,  and  was  operative  in  causing  it,  will  be 
regarded  either  as  implying  or  as  constituting  a  warranty,  {mm) 
If  such  affirmation  were  made  in  good  faith  it  is  still  a  warranty  ; 


might  seem  that  Lord  Ellenborowjh  here 
held,  that  silence  alone  was  a  fraudulent 
concealment,  sufficient  to  vitiate  the 
contract.  But  tlie  case  is  explained  in 
the  English  case  of  Keates  v.  Cadogan, 
2  E.  L.  &  E.  318 ;  s.  c.  10  C.  B.  591, 
Jervis,  C.  J.,  saying  in  Hill  v.  Gray,  there 
was  a  '^positive  aggressive  deceit.  Kot 
removing  the  delusion  might  be  equiva- 
lent to  an  express  misrepresentation." 
And  in  that  case  it  was  held,  that  where 
the  intended  lessor  of  a  particular  house 
knows  that  the  house  is  in  a  ruinous 
state,  and  dangerous  to  occupy,  and  that 
its  condition  is  unknown  to  the  intended 
lessee,  and  that  the  intended  lessee  takes 
it  for  the  purpose  of  residing  in  it,  lie  is 
not  bound  to  disclose  the  state  of  the 
house  to  the  intended  lessee,  unless  he 
knows  that  the  intended  lessee  is  influ- 
enced by  his  belief  of  the  soundness  of 
the  house  in  agreeing  to  take  it,  or  un- 
less the  conduct  of  the  lessor  amounts  to 
a  deceit  practised  upon  the  lessee.  See 
also  Fox  /-.  Mackreth,  2  Bro.  Ch.  420, 
and  McEntire  v.  McEntire,  8  Ired.  L. 
297.  —  On  the  other  hand,  the  vendor 
must  not  practise  any  artiiice  to  conceal 
defects,  nor  make  any  representations 
for  the  purpose  of  throwing  the  buyer 
off  his  guard.  See  Matthews  v.  Bliss,  22 
Pick.  48;  Arnot  v.  Biscoe,  1  Ves.  Sen.  95. 
It  is  well  settled,  that  misrepresentations 
of  material  facts,  by  which  a  purchaser 
is  misled,  vitiate  the  contract.  Bench  i\ 
Sheldon,  14  Barb.  fiG;  Doggett  v.  Emer- 
son, 3  Story,  700;  Daniel  v.  Mitchell,  1 
id.  172;  Small  v.  Attwood,  1  Younge, 
407;  Hough  v.  Richardson,  3  Story,  659; 
Warner  v.  Daniels,  1  Woodb.  &  M.  90. 
For  a  case  where  the  suppressio  veil  is 
held  to  be  an  actionable  deceit,  see  Pad- 
dock V.  Strowbridge,  3  Williams,  470. 
The  whole  subject  is  ably  examined  in  2 
Kent,  Com.  482,  et  seq.  See  also  Bean  v. 
Herrick,  3  Falrf.  2f)2  ;  Ferebee  v.  Gordon, 
13  Ired.  L.  350 ;  Wood  v.  Ashe,  3  Strob. 
L.  64 ;  Weimer  v.  Clement,  37  Penn.  St. 
147. 

(/)  Thus  in  Arnott  i;.  Hughes,  Chitty 
on  Cont.  398,  n.,  an  action  was  brought 


on  a  warranty  that  certain  poods  were 
fit  for  the  China  market.  The  i)lain- 
tiff  produced  a  letter  from  the  defend- 
ant, saying,  that  lie  had  goods  fit  for  the 
China  market,  whicii  he  offered  to  sell 
cheap.  Lord  Elloiborottgli  lidd,  that  such 
a  letter  was  not  a  warranty,  but  merely 
an  invitation  to  trade,  it  not  having  any 
specific  reference  to  tiie  goods  actually 
bought  by  tlie  plaintiff.  See  also  Carter 
I'.  Brick,  4  H.  &  N.  412,  where  it  was 
held  that  no  warranty  was  implied  in  a 
purchase  by  sample,  where  both  parties 
upon  inspection  took  it  for  granted  that 
the  article  was  of  the  quality  repre- 
sented by  a  third  party. 

(?«)  It  is  essential  that  a  warranty, 
to  be  binding,  be  made  during  the  nego- 
tiation ;  if  made  after  the  sale  is  com- 
pleted, it  is  without  consideration  and 
void.  Hoscorla  v.  Thomas,  3  Q.  B.  234 ; 
Bloss  V.  Kittredge,  5  Vt.  28  ;  Towell  v. 
Gatewood,  2  Scam.  22.  —  If,  however, 
the  vendor  in  a  negotiation  between  the 
parties  a  few  days  before  the  sale,  offer 
to  warrant  the  article,  the  warranty  will 
be  binding.  Wilniot  v.  Hurd,  11  Wend. 
584;  Lysney  v.  Selby,  Ld.  Uayin.  1120. 
But  see  Hopkins  v.  Tanquerav,  20  K.  L. 
&  E.  254;  s.  c.  15  C.  B.  130.  In  this 
case,  the  defendant  having  sent  his  horse 
to  Tattersall's  to  be  sold  by  auction,  on 
the  day  previous  to  the  sale,  saw  the 
plaintiff  {with  whom  he  was  acquainted) 
examining  the  horse,  and  said  to  him 
bona  fide,  "  You  liaA'e  nothing  to  look 
for,  i  assure  you;  he  is  sound  in  every 
respect;"  to  which  the  i)l!iintiff  replied, 
"  If  you  say  so  I  am  satisfied,"  and  desisted 
from  his  examination.  The  horse  was 
put  up  the  next  day  at  auction,  and  the 
plaintiff  bought  him,  being  induced,  as 
he  said,  by  the  defendant's  assurance  of 
soundness.  Held,  in  an  action  for  breach 
of  warranty,  that  there  was  no  evidence 
to  go  to  the  jury  of  a  warranty,  the  rep- 
resentation not  being  made  in  the  course 
of,  or  with  reference  to  the  sale. 

(mm)  Halin  v.  Doolittle,  18  Wis.  190; 
Marsh  v.  Webber,  13  Minn.  109;  Tewkes- 
bury V.  Bennett,  31  la.  83. 

621 


*580 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


and  if  made  with  a  knowledge  of  its  falsity,  it  is  a  warranty,  and 
it  is  also  a  fraud.  Whether  such  affirmation  was  intended  to  be, 
and  was  received  as,  a  warranty,  seems  to  be  a  question  for  the 
jury;  (mn)  but  whether  the  statements  were  in  law  mere  expres- 
sions of  opinion,  or  affirmations  equivalent  to  warranty  is  a  ques- 
tion of  law.  Some  light  may  be  thrown  on  this  question,  which  is 
sometimes  one  of  much  difficulty,  by  a  comparison  of  two  recent 
cases.  It  was  held  in  California,  that  statements  of  a  seller  of 
mining  stock,  concerning  the  amount  and  richness  of  the  ore 
taken  out  and  the  wood  and  water  within  reach,  were  not  matters 
of  opinion,  but  statements  on  which  the  buyer  had  a  right  to 
rely,  (nio')  While  it  was  held  in  Illinois,  that  statements  by  a 
seller  of  a  patent  right  for  a  certain  kind  of  cast-iron  coffins,  con- 
cerning their  durability  and  probable  sale,  were  only  expressions 
of  opinion,  (wp)  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  statements  in  the 
case  in  California  referred  to  the  past  or  present,  and  those  in 
the  case  in  Illinois  referred  to  the  future. 

The  rule,  on  the  subject  of  representations,  recently  laid  down, 
in  Pennsylvania,  is  substantially  this  :  if  the  parties  to  a  sale  are 
not  in  a  condition  of  perfect  equality  as  to  their  ability  to  judge 
accurately  of  the  thing  sold,  false  representations  of  the  seller 
will  avoid  the  contract,  (^niq^ 

It  is  certain  that  the  word  warrant  need  not  be  used,  nor  any 
other  of  precisely  the  same  meaning.  It  is  enough  if  the  words 
actually  used  import  an  undertaking  on  the  part  of  the  owner  that 
the  chattel  is  what  it  is  represented  to  be ;  or  an  equivalent  to 
such  undertaking,  (w)      It  may  be  often  difficult  to  distinguish 


(mn)  Bond  v.  Clark,  35  Vt.  577. 

(mo)   Gifford  v.  Carvill,  29  C^al.  589. 

{tup)  Miller  v.  Young,  33  111.  354. 

(niq)  Bisler  r.  Plickingers,  55  Penn. 
St.  279.  See  also  Harris  v.  MuUins,  32 
Ga.  704,  and  Overbay  v.  Liglity,  27  Ind. 
27. 

(n)  The  authorities  from  Chandelor  v. 
Lopus,  Cro.  J.  4,  to  the  present  day,  all 
agree  that  a  bare  affirmation,  not  intend- 
ed as  a  warranty,  will  not  make  the 
vendor  liable.  Bacon  v.  Brown,  3  Bibb, 
35 ;  Davis  r.  Meeker,  5  Johns.  354 ;  Biuld 
V.  Fairmaner,  8  Bing.  52,  where  a  receipt 
for  "  a  gray  four-3'ear  old  colt  "  was  held 
only  an  affirmation  or  representation  *^hat 
he  was  four  years  old,  but  was  no  war- 
ranty to  that  effect.  See  also  Seixas  v. 
Woods,  2  Caines,  48,  a  very  strong  case  ; 
Holden  v.  Dakin,  4  Johns.  421 ;  Swett  v. 

622 


Colgate,  20  id.  190  ;  Conner  i:  Henderson, 
15  Alass.  320;  Stewart  v.  Dougherty,  3 
Dana,  479 ;  House  v.  Fort,  4  Blackf.  293 ; 
Adams  v.  Johnson,  15  III.  345.  So  where 
a  horse  was  sold  under  tlie  following  ad- 
vertisement:  "To  be  sold,  a  black  geld- 
ing, five  years  old  ;  lias  been  constantly 
driven  in  the  plough.  Warranted,"  the 
warranty  was  held  to  apply  only  to  his 
soundness,  and  the  statement  as  to  age 
was  considered  only  as  an  affirmation  or 
representation  of  his  age,  and  as  creating 
no  liability  unless  there  was  deceit.  Rich- 
ardson r.  Brown,  1  Bing.  344.  See  also 
Dunlop  u.  Waugh,  Peake,  Cas.  123 ;  Pow- 
er V.  Barham,  4  A.  &  E.  473;  Jendwine 
V.  Slade,  2  Esp.  572;  Willard  v.  Stevens, 
4  Foster  (N.  H.),  271.  On  the  other  hand, 
any  affirmation  of  the  quality  or  condi- 
tion of  the  thing  sold   (not  intended  as 


CH.  v.] 


WARRANTY. 


581 


*  between  such  warranty  as  this,  and  the  naked  praise    *581 
(nuda  laus),  or  simple  commendation  (simjjlex  commenda- 
tio),  which  neither  by  the  common  law  nor  by  the  civil  law  impose 
any  obligation  ;  but,  as  matter  of  law,  the  distinction  is  well  settled. 


matter  of  opinion  or  belief),  made  by  the 
seller  at  the  lime  of  sale,  for  the  i)urpose 
of  assuring  the  buyer  of  the  trutli  of  tlie 
fact  affirmed,  and  inducing  him  to  make 
the  purchase,  if  so  received  and  relied  upon 
by  the  purchaser,  is  an  express  warranty. 
Osgood  V.  Lewis,  2  Har.  &  G.  495,  a  very 
important  case  on  the  subject  of  warranty. 
Hawkins  v.  Berry,  .5  Gilnian,  ^i^j:  Hilman 
V.  Wilcox,  30  Me.  170;  Otts  v.  Alderson, 
10  Sm.  &  M.  470 ;  McGregor  v.  Penn,  9 
Yerg.  74 ;  Kinley  v.  Fitzpatrick,  4  How. 
(Miss.)  59;  Beals  v.  Olmstead,  24  Vt.  115. 
See  also  Towell  v.  Gatewood,  2  Scam.  22  ; 
Pennock  i\  Tilford,  17  Penn.  St.  45(5.  In 
Roberts  v.  Morgan,  2  Cowen,  438,  tlie 
plaintiff  and  defendant  being  in  negotia- 
tion for  an  exchange  of  horses,  the  for- 
mer said  "  he  would  not  excliange  unless 
the  latter  would  warrant  his  horse  to  be 
sound."  The  defendant  answered  :  "  He 
is  sound  except  the  bunch  on  his  leg." 
The  horse  had  the  glanders.  Held,  that 
this  was  an  express  warranty.  See  also 
Oneida  Manuf.  Society  v.  Lawrence,  4 
Cowen,  440;  Chapman  v.  Murch,  19 
Johns.  290.  In  Cook  v.  Mosely,  13  Wend. 
277  (a  sale  of  a  mare),  the  buyer  asked 
the  seller  if  the  mare  was  lame  ;  the  latter 
answered,  "  She  was  not  lame,  and  llmt  he 
would  not  be  afraid  to  warrant  that  she 
was  sound  every  way  as  far  as  he  knew." 
Held,  to  amount  to  a  warranty.  In  Bee- 
man  r.  Buck,  3  Vt.  53,  the  same  principle 
is  adopted.  So  in  Wood  v.  Smith,  4  C.  & 
P.  45,  the  buyer  of  a  horse  said  to  tlie 
seller,  "  She  is  sound,  of  course?  "  The 
latter  said,  "  Yes,  to  the  best  of  my  knowl- 
edge." On  being  asked  if  he  would  war- 
rant her,  he  replied :  "  I  never  warrant.  I 
would  not  even  warrant  myself."  This 
was  held  to  amount  to  a  qualified  war- 
ranty. The  general  rule  of  the  text  is 
well  stated  in  Picks  v.  Dillahunty,  8  Port. 
(Ala.)  134.  See  also  Carley  v.  Wilkins, 
6  Barb.  557,  where  it  was  held,  that  a 
representation  made  by  a  vendor,  upon  a 
sale  of  flour  in  barrels,  that  it  is  in  qual- 
ity superfine,  or  extra  superfine,  and 
worth  a  shilling  a  barrel  more  than  com- 
mon, coupled  with  the  assurance  to  the 
buyer's  agent  that  he  may  rely  upon  such 
representation,  is  a  warranty  of  the  qual- 
ity of  the  flour.  In  Cave  v.  Coleman,  3 
Man.  &  P.  2,  the  vendor  of  a  horse  told 
the  vendee,  "you  may  depend  upon  it, 
the  horse  is  perfectly  quiet  and  free  from 


vice."  This  was  held  to  amount  to  an  ex- 
press warraiUy.  But  see  Krwin  r.  Max- 
well, 3  Mur])hey,  241.  In  Jackson  v. 
Wetherill,  7  S.  &  P.  480,  the  Supreme 
Ci)urt  of  Pennsylvania,  altlu)Ui;h  lecog- 
nizing  the  rule  that  no  particular  W(jr(ls 
were  necessary  to  constitute  a  warranty, 
held,  that  when  the  vendor  of  a  horse  told 
the  purchaser  before  the  sale  that  he  was 
sure  he  was  perffcllii  safe,  kind,  ami  ijenlle  in 
hariiess,  this  created  iio  warranty,  being 
but  a  bare  affirmation  of  quality.  See  also 
McFarland  v.  Newman,  9  Watts,  5(j.  In 
Sheperd  v.  Temple,  3  N.  H.  455,  the  ven- 
dor of  a  lot  of  timber,  most  of  which  was 
covered  with  snow,  declared  that  it  was 
of  as  good  quality  as  some  of  the  sticks 
which  were  visible ;  held,  tliat  this  did 
not  necessarily  amount  to  a  warranty. 
See  Stevens  v.  Fuller,  8  N.  H.  403,  as  to 
what  is  competent  evidence  to  prove  a 
warranty.  A  statement  that  a  horse's 
ej'es  "  are  as  good  as  any  horse's  eyes  in 
the  world,"  does  not,  of  itself,  necessarily 
amount  to  a  warranty.  House  v.  Fort,  4 
Blackf.  293.  The  question  whether  any 
particular  affirmation  amounts  to  a  war- 
ranty is  for  the  jury.  The  criterion  is 
the  understanding  and  intention  of  the 
parties.  Duffee  v.  Mason,  8  Cowen,  25 ; 
Morrill,  v.  Wallace,  9  N.  H.  Ill;  Chap- 
man V.  Murch,  19  Johns.  290.  It  is  for 
the  jury  to  say  whether  the  language 
used  was  intended  as  a  mere  expression 
of  Ojiinion,  or  belief,  or  as  a  representation. 
Whitney  r.  Sutton,  10  AVend.  411 ;  Foster 
V.  Caldwell,  18  Vt.  170;  Bradford  v. 
Bush,  10  Ala.  380  ;  Baum  v.  Stevens,  2 
Ired.  L.  411 ;  Foggart  v.  Black weller,  4 
id.  238;  Tuttle  v.  Brown,  4  Cray,  457. 
A  bare  affirmation  of  soundness  of  a 
horse  which  is  tlien  exposed  to  the  pur- 
chaser's inspection,  is  not,  fier  se,  a  war- 
ranty. It  is  of  itself  only  a  representa- 
tion. To  give  it  the  effect  of  a  warranty, 
it  must  be  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  jury  that  the  parties  intended  it  to 
liave  that  effect.  House  r.  Fort,  4 
Blackf.  296.  See  also  Tyre  r.  Causey,  4 
Harring.  (Del.)  425.  The  affirmation 
must  be  made  to  assure  the  buyer  of  tlie 
truth  of  the  fact  asserted,  and  induce 
him  to  make  the  purcliase,  and  must  be 
so  received  and  relied  upon  by  liim. 
Ender  v.  Scott,  1 1  III.  35 ;  Humphreys  v. 
Comline,  8  Blackf.  508. 

623 


*582 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


If  a  bill  of  sale  be  given,  in  which  the  article  sold  is 
*  582    described,  *  we  consider  it  the  better  rule  that  this  descrip- 
tion has  the  full  effect  of  warranty ;  (o)  ^  although  there  is 


(o)  Henshaw  v.  Robins,  9  Met.  83,  is 
one  of  the  best  considered  eases  upon  this 
subject.  There  the  bill  of  sale  was  as 
follows :  "  Henshaw  &  Co.  bo't  of  T.  W. 
S.  &  Co.  two  cases  of  indigo,  §272. 35." 
The  article  sold  was  not  indigo,  but  prin- 
cipally Prussian  blue.  There  was  no 
fraud  imputed  to  the  vendor,  and  the 
article  was  so  prepared  as  to  deceive 
skilful  dealers  in  indigo.  Tiie  naked 
question  was  presented  whether  the  bill 
of  sale  constituted  a  warranty  that  the 
article  was  indigo.  The  court,  after  an 
able  analysis  of  the  cases  upon  this 
point,  decided  in  the  affirmative  The 
same  question  has  been  very  ably  con- 
sidered by  the  same  court  in  the  prior 
case  of  Hastings  v.  Lovering,  2  Pick.  214. 
In  that  case  the  bill  of  parcels  was : 
"  Sold  E.  T.  H.  2,000  gallons  ]>rime  quality 
winter  oil."  The  article  sold  was  oil,  but 
was  not  prime  qncilily.  In  this  respect, 
the  case  differs  from  the  preceding. 
There  the  kind  of  commodity  was  differ- 
ent ;  here  only  the  quality.  The  court 
applied  the  same  rule,  and  held  the  writ- 
ing to  be  a  warranty  that  the  article  was 
of  the  quality  described.  So,  in  Yates  v. 
Pym,  6  Taunt.  44(3,  the  article  was  de- 
scribed in  the  sale  note  as  "  58  bales  of 
prime  singed  bacon."  It  was  held  to 
amount  to  a  warranty  that  the  bacon 
was  prime  singed.  Osgood  v.  Lewis,  2 
Har.  &  G.  495,  supports  the  same  view ; 
in  that  case  the  words  in  the  bill  of  par- 
cels were  "  winter  pressed  sperm  oil." 
This  was  considered  as  a  warranty  that 
the  oil  was  winter  pressed.  So  in  The 
Eichmond  Trading,  &c.  Co.  v  Farquar,  8 
Blackf.  89,  it  was  lield,  where  wool  was 
sold  in  sacks,  and  the  sacks  marked  by 
the  seller  and  described  in  the  invoice  as 
being  of  a  certain  quality,  that  this  is 
an  express  warranty  that  it  is  of  such 
quality.  And  where  a  vessel  was  adver- 
tised for  sale  as  being  "  copper  f  stenod," 
this  was  held  to  be  a  warranty  that  she 
was  so,  according  to  the  understanding  of 
the  trade.  Shepherd  v.  Kain,  5  B.  &  Aid. 
240.  See  Paton  v.  Duncan,  3  C.  &  P.  336 ; 
Teesdale  v.  Anderson,  4  id.  198  ;  Wilson  v. 
Backhouse,  Peake,  Ad.  Cas.  119.  —  So  in 
Pennsylvania  it  is  held,  tliat  in  a  sale  of 
is   described   in   a  bill   or  sold  note 


there  is  an  implied  warranty  that  the 
commodity  sold  is  the  same  in  specie  as 
the  description  given  of  it  in  tlie  bill. 
Borrekins  v.  Bevan,  3  Pawle,  23.  But 
the  courts  of  that  State  refuse  to  extend 
the  same  doctrine  to  a  statement  of 
(piality  of  the  article  sold.  Therefore, 
where  the  article  was  described  in  the 
bill  of  sale  as  "  superior  sweet-scented  Ken- 
tucky leaf  tobacco,"  the  seller  was  held 
not  liable  on  a  warranty,  if  the  tobacco 
was  Kentucky  leaf,  though  of  a  very 
low  quality,  ill-flavored,  unfit  for  the 
market,  and  not  sweet-scented.  Fraley 
V.  Bispliam,  10  Penn.  St.  320.  And  see 
Jennings  v.  Gratz,  3  Pawle,  168.  See 
also  Hyatt  r.  Boyle,  5  G.  &  J.  110.  A 
contract  for  "  good  fine  wine  "  has  been 
held  to  import  no  warranty,  these  words 
being  too  uncertain  and  indefinite  to  raise 
a  warranty.  Hogins  v.  Plympton,  11 
Pick.  97.  A  warranty  that  certain  oil 
"  should  stand  the  climate  of  Vermont 
without  chilling,"  means,  that  it  will  not 
chill,  when  used  in  Vermont,  in  the  or- 
dinary manner  in  which  lamp  oil  is  used. 
Hart  V.  Hammett,  18  Vt.  127.  So  a  bill 
of  sale  describing  the  article  sold  simply 
as  "  tallow,"  raises  no  implied  warranty 
that  the  tallow  should  be  of  good  quality 
and  color.  Lamb  v.  Crafts,  12  Met.  353. 
And  in  a  bill  of  sale  of  "  certain  lots  of 
boards  and  dimension  stuff'  now  at  and 
about  the  mills  at  P."  there  is  no  implied 
warranty  that  the  boards  are  merchantahle. 
Whitman  v.  Freese,  23  Me.  212.  A  bill 
of  sale  of  a  negro  described  her  as  "be- 
ing of  sound  wind  and  limb,  and  free 
from  all  disease."  Held,  an  express  war- 
ranty that  she  was  sound.  Cramer  v. 
Bradshaw,  10  Johns.  484.  But  a  bill  of 
sale  of  a  horse  as  follows :  "  T.  W. 
bought  of  E.  R.  one  bay  horse,  five  years 
old  last  July,  coustdered  sound,"  signed 
by  the  vendor,  creates  no  warranty  of 
the  soundness  of  the  horse.  Wason  v. 
Rowe,  16  Vt.  525.  See  also  Towell  v. 
Gatewood,  2  Scam.  22;  Baird  v.  Mat- 
thews, 6  Dana,  129.  So  in  Winsor  v. 
Lombard,  18  Pick.  57,  the  bill  of  sale 
described  the  article  as  so  many  "  bar- 
rels No.  1  mackerel,  and  so  many  barrels 
No.  2  mackerel."  The  mackerel  sold 
were  in  fact  branded  by  the  inspector  as 


1  If  an  article  sold  is  described,  the  description  amounts  to  a  warranty  or  a  condi- 
tion precedent  that  it  shall  be  an  article  of  tlie  kind  described.  Per  Lord  Blackburn, 
in  Bowes  v.  Shand,  2  App.  Cas.  455.  Failure  to  correspond  to  a  description  was  held 
a  breach  of  a  condition  precedent  in  Gaylord  Manuf .  Co.  v.  Allen,  53  N.  Y.  515,  519. 

624 


CH.  v.]  WARRANTY.  *  583 

some  disposition  to  *  confine  this  rule  to  cases  where  the  *  583 
buyer  either  could  not,  or  did  not,  examine  into  the  char- 
acter and  condition  of  the  goods  himself;  thus  it  has  been  licld, 
that  a  sale  with  a  bill  of  parcels  implies  no  warranty,  if  the  l)uyer 
actually  inspected  the  articles  for  himself.  ( j?)  ^  But  it  was  held 
that  a  bill  of  sale  of  "  one  horse,  sound  and  kind  "  carried  a  Avar- 
ranty  of  soundness,  although  the  buyer  saw  the  horse  before  the 
sale  and  knew  that  he  was  lame,  and  the  seller,  when  asked,  re- 
fused to  give  a  warranty,  (^pp)  A  renunciation  of  warranty  by 
the  buyer,  does  not  bind  him  if  there  be  fraud  on  the  part  of  the 
seller,  (^pq) 

One  exception  to  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor  springs  from  the  rule 
itself.  For  a  requirement  that  the  purchaser  should  "  beware," 
or  should  take  care  to  ascertain  for  himself  the  quality  of  the 
thing  he  buys,  becomes  utterly  unreasonable,  under  circumstances 
which  make  such  care  impossible.  If,  therefore,  the  seller  alone 
possesses  the  requisite  knowledge,  or  the  means  of  knowledge, 
and  offers  his  goods  for  sale  under  circumstances  which  compel 
the  purchaser  to  rely  upon  the  judgment  and  honesty  of  the 
seller,  without  any  examination  on  his  own  part  as  to  the  quality 
of  the  thing  offered,  it  has  been  held,  that  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor 
does  not  apply,  because  it  cannot  apply,  and  that  the  seller  war- 
No.  1  and  No.  2.  It  was  held,  that  there  Pembcrton.  6  Rob.  42.  In  some  early 
was  no  implied  warranty  that  they  were  cases  in  America,  it  was  li'^ld,  tliat  the 
free  from  rust  at  the  time  of  sale,  although  description  given  to  i)roperty  in  adver- 
it  was  proved  that  mackerel  affected  by  tisements,  bills  of  sale,  sold  notes,  &c., 
rust  are  not  considered  No.  1  and  No.  2.  did  not  enter  into  the  contract,  and 
But  the  general  doctrine  of  this  note  was  therefore  being  but  matters  of  descrip- 
expressly  recognized  by  Shaio,  C.  J.,  who  tion,  created  no  warranty.  Sucli  are  the 
said  :  "  The  rule  being,  that  upon  a  sale  cases  of  Seixas  v.  Woods,  2  Caines,  48  ; 
of  goods  by  a  written  memorandum  or  Barrett  c.  Hall,  1  Aik.  2G1) ;  Swett  i'.  Col- 
bill  of  parcels,  the  vendor  undertakes,  in  gate,  20  Johns.  lUO,  and  some  others ; 
the  nature  of  warranting,  that  the  thing  but  we  think  the  more  modern  cases 
sold  and  delivered  is  that  which  is  de-  have  decided,  that  a  rule  of  law,  in  itself 
scribed,  this  rule  applies  whether  the  sound,  was  in  those  instances  erroneously 
description  be  more  or  less  particular  applied.  See  Henshaw  v.  Kobins,  9  Met. 
and  exact  in  enumerating  the  qualities  83,  and  2  Kent,  Com.  480.  See  also  the 
of  the  goods  sold."  A  sale  of  vitriol  in  valuable  notes  to  Chandelor  v.  Lopus.  1 
casks  as  "blue  vitriol,  sound  and  in  Smith,  Lead.  Cas.  7G,  <t  seq.,  where  will 
good  order,"  is  no  warranty  that  the  be  found  an  able  examination  of  the 
vitriol  is  unmixed  sulphate  of  copper,  whole  subject  of  warranty, 
and    there    being   proof    that   the   term  (/;)   Carson  r.  Bailie,  1!>  Penn.  St.  375; 

"blue  vitriol"  was  used  only  as  a  com-     Lord  v.  Grow,  39  Penn.  St.  88. 
mercial  designation,  the  question  of  war-  (pp)  Brown  v.  Bigelow,  10  Allen,  242. 

ranty  was  left  to  the  jury  in  Hawkins  v.  (pq)  Berans  v.  Farrell,  18  La.  Ann.  232. 

1  "Where  there  is  no  opportunity  to  inspect  the  commodity,  as  in  the  case  of 
canned  fruit  or  vegetables,  the  maxim  caveat  emptor  does  not  apply.  Boyd  v.  Wilson, 
83  Penn.  St.  319. 

VOL.  I.  40  625 


*  584  THE   LAW    OF    CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  III. 

rants  that  the  goods  he  offers  for  sale  are,  in  respect  to  their 
qualities,  what  the  purcliaser  may  fairly  understand  them  to  be ; 
in  other  words,  that  they  are  of  merchantable  value,  and  proper 
subjects  of  trade,  (^q') 

*  584        *  It  might  seem  that  the  reason  of  this  rule  should  apply 

to  all  cases  where  an  article  is  sold  of  which  the  value  is 
materially  affected  by  some  defect  which  the  buyer  cannot  know 
or  discover.  But  it  is  not  yet  conceded  that  in  all  such  cases 
there  is  an  implied  warranty.  The  implication  does  not  appear 
to  extend  to  cases  where  an  examination  would  be  fruitless,  but 
only  to  those  in  which  there  can  be  no  examination.  It  is  true, 
that  in  the  fluctuation  which  has  marked  the  course  of  adjudi- 
cation on  the  subject  of  warranty  with  sale,  there  is  a  series  of 
cases  in  which,  for  a  considerable  time,  a  principle  seemed  to  be 
acquiring  favor,  which  was  almost  equivalent  to  a  rule  that  every 
sale  carried  with  it  an  implied  warranty  of  the  merchantable 
quality  of  the  goods  sold.  Of  course  such  a  rule  would  in  fact 
annul  that  of  caveat  emptor.  But  of  late  the  courts  seem  to  be 
retracing  their  steps  ;  and,  in  this  country  at  least,  we  consider 
the  ancient  rule  as  distinctly  established,  (r)  ^    There  are  but  two 

(7)  Hanks  v.  McKee,  2  Lit.  227.  Gar-  the  place  where  both  vendor  and  vendee 
diner  v.  Gray,  4  Camp.  144,  is  the  leading  resided,  notwithstanding  that  the  ven- 
case  upon  this  point.  In  that  case.  Lord  dor  had  no  better  opportunity  than  the 
EllenboroiKjIt,  speaking  to  tliis  point,  says:  vendee  for  the  inspection  of  tiie  article. 
"  I  am  of  opinion  that  under  such  cir-  The  case  of  Hyatt  v.  Boyle,  5  G.  &  J. 
cumstances  the  purchaser  has  a  right  to  110,  also  holds,  that  the  rule  of  caveat 
expect  a  salable  article  answering  the  enijitor  does  not  apply,  if  the  buyer  has 
description  in  the  contract.  Without  no  opportunity  to  inspect  the  goods,  and 
any  particular  warranty,  this  is  an  im-  in  such  case  the  seller  impliedly  war- 
plied  term  in  every  such  contract,  rants  them  to  be  merchantable.  See  a 
Where  there  is  no  opportunity  to  inspect  strong  case  to  tliis  effect  in  Merriam  v. 
the  commodity,  the  maxim  of  caveat  emp-  Field,  24  Wis.  640.  But  the  mere  fact 
tor  does  not  apply.  He  cannot  without  that  the  examination  is  attended  with  in- 
a  warranty  insist  that  it  siiall  be  of  any  convenience  to  the  purchaser  is  not  suffi- 
particular  quality  or  fineness,  but  the  cient  to  dispense  with  the  rule.  It  must 
intention  of  both  parties  must  be  taken  be  morally  impracticable.  See,  on  the 
to  be,  that  it  shall  be  salable  in  the  mar-  point  tliat  an  opportunity  which  the 
ket  under  the  denomination  mentioned  buyer  has  to  inspect  the  thing  sold  pre- 
in  the  contract  between  them.  The  pur-  vents  an  implied  warranty,  Taymon  v. 
chaser  cannot  be  supposed  to  buy  goods  Mitchell,  1  Md.  Ch.  496,  and  Carley  v. 
to  place  them  on  a  dunghill."  This  case  Wilkins,  6  Barb.  557.  And  see  also,  as 
is  confirmed  by  Wieler  v.  Schilizzi,  17  C.  qualifying  this  rule,  Foster  v.  Swasey,  2 
B.  619.  See  also  the  case  of  Gallagher  Wood.  &^M.  217,  and  Taylor  v.  Fleet,  1 
V.  Waring,  9  Wend.  20,  where  the  court  Barb.  471. 

were  inclined  to  extend  the  rule  to  the  (r)  The  weight  of  authority  decidedly 

case  of  a  sale  of  cotton  in  bales,  lying  in  determines  that  a  sale  for  a  sound  price 

the  storehouse  of  the  vendor,  situate  in  implies  no  warranty  of  quality,  or  that 

1  That  there  is  an  implied  warranty  generally  that  an  article  shall  be  salable 
or  merchantable,  see  Gaylord  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Allen,  53  N.  Y.  515,  518;  Morehouse 
V.  Comstock,  42  Wis.  626.     If  a  manufacturer  undertakes  to  supply  goods  manufac- 

626 


CH.  v.]  WARRANTY.  •  584 

of  our  States  in  which  it  is  an  acknowledged  rule  of  law,  that  a 
sale  of  a  chattel  for  a  full  price  carries  with  it  an  iniijlicd  war- 
ranty. And  in  one  of  these  the  civil  law,  of  which  this  is  a  prin- 
ciple, prevails,  (s) 

This  distinction  has  been  asserted.  If  the  contract  be  exe- 
cuted, the  buyer  must  take  the  thing  sold  with  all  its  defects,  if 
there  be  neither  warranty  nor  fraud ;  but  an  executory  contract 
to  sell  carries  an  obligation  that  the  thing  sold  shall  be  merchant- 
able, (ss)  1    The  reasons  for  this  distinction  are  now  quite  clear. 

If  one  contracts  to  manufacture  for  a  buyer  an  article  of  a 
certain  quality,  and  when  the  article  is  delivered  it  is  so  deficient 
as  to  justify  a  refusal  to  accept,  it  is  held  that  the  buyer  may 
tender  the  article  to  the  seller,  and  if  he  refuses  to  receive  it,  may 
sell  it  for  the  best  price  he  can  obtain  without  giving  notice  to 
the  seller  of  the  time  and  place,  (s^)  ^  And  the  rule  requiring 
that  the  deficient  article  must  be  returned  when  tlic  deficiency  is 

the   article    is    merchantable.     Dean   v.  contract,  although   it   be   a   losing  one. 

Mason,  4  Conn.  428,  is  an  able  case  on  Wliiteficld  v.  McLeod,  2  Bay,  ;J80.     And 

this  subject ;  Holden  v.  Dakin,  4  Johns,  see  Carnochan  v.  Gould,  1  Bailey,  179 ; 

421  ;  Snell  v.  Moses,  1  id.  96;  Johnston  Rose  v.  Beatie,  2  Nott  &  McC.  508.    And 

V.  Cope,  3  Har.  &  J.  89;  Cozzins  v.  Whit-  if   the   parties  expressly  agree  that  tlie 

aker,  3  Stew.  &  P.  322  ;  La  Neuville  v.  buj'er  shall  take  tlie  propert}'  at  his  own 

Nourse,  3  Camp.  3-51  ;  West  v.  Cunning-  risk,  the  vendor  is  not  answerable  for  its 

ham,   9   Port.    (Ala  )    104;  Wetherill  v.  soundness.       Thompson    v.    Lindsay,    3 

Neilson,  20  Penn.  St.  448.  Brevard,  305.     And  a  sound  price  does 

(s)  South  Carolina  and  Louisiana  are  not  imply  a  value  of  the  property  equal  to 

the  only  States  in  which  it  is  held  that  the  price,  but  only  that  there  is  no  un- 

tlie  sale  of  a  chattel  for  a  sound  price  ere-  soundness.     And  such  unsoundness  must 

ates  a  warranty  against  all  faults  known  materially  affect  the  article.      Sniitli   i-. 

or   unknown   to   the   seller.     Timrod   v.  Rice,  1  Bailey,  648.    In  Pre.sbury  v.  Mor- 

Shoolbred,  1  Bay,  324;  Dewees  v.  Mor-  ris,  18  Mo.  165,  it  is  held,  tliat  tlie  sale  of 

gan,   1  Mart.  (La.)  1;  State  v.  Gaillard,  a  land-warrant  carries  with  it  an  implied 

2  Bay,  19 ;  Barnard   v.  Yates,  1  Nott  &  warranty  of  its  validity,  and  the  Court 

McC.  142  ;  Missroon  v.  Waldo,  2  id.  76 ,  of   Claims  holds  that  a  sale  of   govern- 

Melant;on  v.  Robichaux,  17  La.  97.     But  ment  goods   captured   in  war,  carries   a 

this  does  not  extend  to  sales  of  real  es  warranty  of  title  to  the  purchaser.     Post 

tate.     Rupart  v.  Dunn,   1   Rich.  L.   101.  v.  U.  S.  19  Law  Rep.  12. 

And  in  sales  of  personal  property,  if  the  (ss)  McClung  v.  Kelley,  21  Iowa,  508. 

buyer  is  informed  fully  of   all   the   cir-  [st]  Messmore  v.  N.  Y.  Shot  Co.  40  N. 

cumstances,  and  has  a  fair  opportunity  Y.  422. 
of  informing  himself,  he  is  bound  by  his 

tured  by  himself,  or  in  which  he  deals,  and  which  a  buyer  has  had  no  opportunity  to 
inspect,  there  is  an  implied  warranty  tliat  the  articles  supplied  shall  be  merchantable. 
Mann  v.  Everston,  32  Ind.  355.  See  Dounce  v.  Dow,  04  N.  Y.  411 ;  Leopold  v.  Van 
Kirk,  27  Wis.  152  ;  Wilcox  v.  Hall,  53  Ga.  635;  Weiger  v.  Gould,  86  111.  180  ;  Harris 
?;.  Waite,  51  Vt.  480;  Gerst  v.  Jones,  32  Gratt.  518;  Merriam  v.  Field,  39  Wis.  578. 

1  In  tha  case  of  an  executory  sale,  "when  defects  in  the  goods  are  patent,  and 
obvious  to  the  senses,  when  the  purchaser  has  full  opportunity  for  examination,  and 
knows  of  such  defects,  he  must,  either  when  he  receives  the  goods  or  within  what, 
under  the  circumstances,  is  a  reasonable  time  thereafter,  notify  the  seller  that  the 
goods  are  not  accepted  as  fulfilling  the  warranty ;  otherwise,  the  defects  will  be 
deemed  waived."    Locke  v.  Williamson,  40  Wis.  377. 

2  Smith  V.  Love,  64  N.  C.  439. 

627 


585 


THE   LAW   OP    CONTRACTS. 


[book  hi. 


discovered,  has  no  application  where  the  deficiency  was  discovered 
only  by  the  destruction  of  the  article  in  using  it ;   as  in  a  case  of 

guano  sold  and  found  to  be  worthless,  (sm) 
*585  *If  goods  are  sold  by  sample,  there  can  be  no  examina- 
tion of  the  goods,  but  there  may  be  of  the  sample.  There 
is,  therefore,  in  this  country,  an  implied  warranty  that  the  goods 
correspond  to  the  sample,  (t)  i  A  recent  English  case  seems  to 
hold,  that  if  the  goods  do  not  correspond  to  the  sample,  the  vendee 


(sm)  Smith  V.  Love,  64  N.  C.  439. 

(t)  Bradford  v.  Manley,  13  Mass.  139, 
is  a  leading  case  in  America  upon  tliis 
point.  Uneida  Manuf.  Society  v.  Law- 
rence, 4  Cowen,  440;  Andrews  v.  Knee- 
land,  0  id.  354 ;  Gallagher  v.  Waring,  9 
Wend.  20;  Beehee  v.  Kobert,  12  id.  413; 
Boorman  v.  Jenkins,  12  id.  5G6  ;  Moses  v. 
Mead,  1  Dcnio,  386;  Brower  i-.  Lewis,  19 
Barb.  574 ;  Beirne  v.  Dord,  1  Seld.  05 ; 
Hargous  v.  Stone,  id.  73 ;  Borrekins  c. 
Bevan,  3  Rawle,  37 ;  Eose  v.  Beatie,  2 
Nott  &McC.  538 ;  Beirne  r.  Dord,  2  Sandf. 
89,  is  an  excellent  case  upon  this  point. 
It  is  there  liehl,  that  in  order  to  constitute 
a  sale  by  sample,  it  must  appear  that  the 
parties  contracted  solely  in  reference  to 
the  sample,  or  article  exhibited,  and  that 
botli  mutually  understood  they  were  deal- 
ing witli  the  sample,  and  with  an  under- 
standing that  the  bulk  was  like  it.  And 
in  the  same  case  upon  appeal,  1  Seld.  95, 
and  in  Hargous  v.  Stone,  1  id.  73.  it  is  de- 
cided, that  the  mere  exliilntion  of  a  sam- 
ple is  not  sufficient  to  constitute  a  war- 
ranty that  the  bulk  of  the  goods  is  of  the 
same  quality  with  the  sample ;  that  such 
exhibition  is  but  a  representation  that  the 
sample  has  been  fairly  taken  from  the 
bulk  of  tlie  commodity ;  and  tlint  for 
the  production  of  the  sample  to  have  the 
effect  of  a  strict  warranty,  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  parties  mutually  under- 
stood that  there  was  an  agreement  on  the 
part  of  the  seller  that  the  bulk  of  tlie 


conunodity  should  correspond  with  the 
sample.  —  An  opportunity  for  a  personal 
examination  of  the  bulk  is  a  strong  cir- 
cumstance against  considering  the  sale  to 
have  V)een  made  by  sample.  Hargous  v. 
Stone,  1  Seld.  73;  Beirne  v.  Dord,  1  id. 
95.  See  also  Waring  v.  Mason,  18  Wend. 
434.  In  Williams  v.  Spafford,  8  Pick. 
250,  a  leather  hag  of  indigo  was  sold, 
which  the  bill  of  sale  described  as  "  one 
scroon  of  indigo."  There  was  a  small 
triangular  liole  in  one  side  of  the  seroon, 
where  the  purchaser  luight  draw  out  a 
specimen,  and  at  the  sale  the  plaintiff  ex- 
amined the  article  in  this  mode.  The  se- 
roon proved  to  be  mainly  filled  with  other 
substances  tlian  indigo.  It  was  /uld,  a  sale 
"  b}-  sample,"  and  that  there  was  a  war- 
ranty tliat  tlie  bulk  was  of  the  saine  kind 
and  quality  with  tlie  sample.  In  Salis- 
bury V.  Stainer,  19  Wend.  159,  several 
bales  of  hemp  were  sold.  The  purchaser 
was  told  to  examine  the  hemp  for  him- 
self. He  cut  open  one  bale,  and  appeared 
satisfied  with  the  quality.  He  might  have 
cut  open  every  bale  had  he  chosen  to  do 
so.  It  was  proved  that  the  interior  of 
the  bales  consisted  of  tow,  and  of  a  qual- 
ity of  hemp  very  much  inferior  to  that  on 
the  outsidcs  of  the  bales.  This  was  held, 
not  to  be  a  sale  by  sample,  and  that  there 
was  no  warranty  that  the  interior  should 
correspond  with  the  exterior  of  the  bales. 
See  Dickinson  v.  Gay,  7  Allen,  29;  Gun- 
thcr  V.  Atwell,  19  Ind.  157. 


^  But  the  sale  must  be  solely  by  sample.  Day  v.  Eaguet,  14  Minn.  273.  In 
Pennsylvania,  a  sale  by  sample  is  not  a  warranty,  but  a  guaranty  simply  that  the 
goods  are  like  in  kind  and  merchantable.  Boyd  v.  Wilson,  83  Penn.  St.  319.  As 
to  a  sample  being  free  from  any  secret  defect  of  manufacture  not  discoverable  on 
inspection,  and  unknown  to  both  parties,  see  Ileilbutt  v.  Hickson,  L.  P.  7  C.  P.  438. 
If  tlie  goods  sold  by  sample  are  delivered  and  accepted  by  the  buyer,  lie  cannot 
return  them.  Gaylord  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Allen,  53  N.  Y.  515;  Couston  v.  Chapman, 
L.  R.  2  Sc.  &  D.  App.  250.  If  the  goods  are  sold  by  an  average  sample,  it  is  only 
necessary  that  all  the  goods  sold  when  mixed  together  be  equal  to  such  sample. 
Leonard  v.  Fowler,  44  N.  Y.  289 ;  Schnitzer  r.  Oriental  Works,  114  Mass.  123.  Grini- 
oldby  V.  Wells,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  391,  held  that  where  the  bulk  of  goods  sold  by  sample 
are  found  by  the  purchaser  on  inspection  after  delivery  not  to  be  equal  to  the  sample, 
he  may  reject  the  goods  by  giving  notice  to  the  vendor  that  he  would  not  accept 
them,  and  that  they  are  at  vendor's  risk,  and  need  not  send  or  offer  to  send  them 
back  or  i)lace  them  in  neutral  custody. 

628 


CH.  v.]  WAERANTY.  *  586 

can  recover  only  by  showing  some  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 
vendor  of  this  want  of  correspondence.  (?^)  We  doubt  this,  be- 
cause we  hold  that  such  a  sale  implies  warranty.  If  tlicy  do 
correspond,  and  the  sample  itself  has  a  defect,  even  if  this  defect 
be  unknown,  and  not  discoverable  by  examination,  there  is  no 
implied  warranty  against  this  defect,  and  the  seller  is  not  respon- 
sible, (y)  1  If  there  be  an  express  warranty,  an  examination 
*  of  samples  is  no  waiver  of  the  warranty ;  nor  is  any  in-  *  58G 
quiry  or  examination  into  the  character  or  quality  of  the 
things  sold ;  for  a  man  has  a  right  to  protect  himself  by  such 
inquiry,  and  also  by  a  warranty.  («t')  But  if  the  purchaser  is  told 
that  the  sale  must  be  on  examination  of  the  goods,  there  is  no 
warranty,  although  he  chooses  to  make  no  examination,  and  trusts 
to  the  samples,  (wiv^ 

Evidence  of  usage  has  been  refused,  when  offered  as  to  war- 
.ranty  by  sample,  (x)  and  as  to  warranty  in  general ;  (^)  but  this 
cannot  be  a  universal  rule.  Indeed,  we  should  admit  it  only  when 
the  evidence  was  itself  objectionable,  or  the  usage  to  be  proved 
was  insufficient.  (2)  ^ 

If  a  thing  be  ordered  of  the  manufacturer  for  a  special  purpose, 
and  it  be  supplied  and  sold  for  that  purpose,  there  is  an  implied 

[n)  Ormrod   v.    Hutli,    14    M.    &   W.  niodity  was  merchantable  at  the  time  of 

651.  sale,  altlioiigh  a  inercliaiitable  price  was 

(r)   Parkinson  i:  Lee,  2  East,  314,  is  a  given.  —  In  Nichol  v.  Godts,  10  Excli.  191, 

very  important  case  npon  this  subject,  the  plaintiff  agreed  to  sell  to  the  defend- 

which  has  been  much  discussed,  and  some-  ant  a  quantity  of  od,  described  as  foreign 

times  doubted,  but  which,  when  properly  refined  rape  oil,  but  warranted  only  equal 

understood,  seems  to  be  well  supported  to    samples  ;    and    having    delivered    oil 

by  principle  and  analogy.     It  was  a  sale  which  was   not   foreign  refined   oil,  but 

of  five  pockets  of  hops,  with  express  war-  which  corresponded  with  the  samples,  it 

ranty  that  the  bulk  answered  the  samples  was  held,  that  the  defendant  was  not  bound 

by  which  they  were  sold.     The  sale  was  to  accept  the  same,  as  he  was  entitled  to 

in  January,  1801 ;  at  that  tune  the  samples  the  delivery  of  oil  answering  to  the  de- 

fairhj  ansicered  to   the  commoditi/  in   bulk,  scription  of  foreign  refined  raj)e  oil,  and 

and  no  d(fect  ivas  at  that  time  perceptible  to  that  the  statement  in  the  contract  as  to 

the  bui/er.     In  July  following  every  pocket  samples   related   only  to  the  quality  of 

was  found  to  liave  become  unmerchant-  the  oil. 

able  and  spoiled  by  heating,  caused  prob-  (w)  Willings  >:  Consequa,  Pet.  C.  C. 

ably  by  the  hops  having  been   fraud u-  301. 

lently  watered  hy  the  grower,  or  some  {ivw)  Kellogg   v.   Barnard,   6    Elatch. 

other  person,  before  they  were  purchased  279,  and  Barnard  i'.  Kellogg,  10  "Wallace, 

by  the  defendant.     The  defendant  knew  883. 

nothing  of  this  fact  at  the  time  of  sale,  (x)  Beirne  v.  Dord,  1  Seld.  9.5. 

and  it  was  then  impossible  to  detect  it.  (y)  WetherlU  v.  Neilson,  20  Penn.  St. 

It  was  held,  that  there  was  here  no  im-  448. 
plied  warranty  that  the  bulk  of  the  com-  {z}  Carter  v.  Crick,  4  H.  &  N.  412. 

1  Unless  he  is  the  manufacturer  or  grower.    Heilbutt  v.  Hickson,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  438. 

2  Atwater  v.  Clancy,  107  Mass.  369;  Jones  v.  Wasson,  3  Baxter,  211;  Graff  v. 
Foster,  67  Mo.  512. 

629 


587 


THE   LAW   OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book    III. 


warranty  that  it  is  fit  for  that  purpose,  (a)  ^     This  prin- 
*  587    ciple  *  has  been  carried  very  far.      It  must,  however,  be 


(a)  Beals  v.  Olmstead,  24  Vt.  114; 
Jones  V.  Bright,  5  Bing.  533,  is  the  lead- 
ing EngHsli  case  on  the  subject.  There 
the  defendant  was  a  manufacturer  and  ven- 
dor of  copper.  The  plaintiff  applied  to 
him  "for  copper  for  sheathing  a  vessel." 
The  defendant  said :  "  I  will  supply  you 
well."  From  the  defendant's  warehouse 
the  plaintiff's  agent  then  selected  such 
copper  as  was  wanted,  and  applied  it  to  the 
plaintiff's  vessel.  It  proved  to  be  very 
defective,  and  lasted  only  about  four 
months,  in  place  of  four  years,  the  usual 
time  of  wear  of  good  sheathing ;  the  jury 
found  that  the  decay  was  caused  by  some 
intrinsic  defect  in  the  quality  of  the  copper, 
but  that  there  was  no  satisfactory  evi- 
dence of  what  the  defect  was.  No  fraud 
was  imputed  to  the  defendant.  After 
full  argument  and  deliberation,  it  was 
held  by  the  whole  Court  of  Common  Pleas, 
that  there  was  an  implied  warranty  that 
the  article  was  fit  for  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  sold.  See  also  Brenton  v. 
Davis,  8  Blackf.  .317;  Ilodgers  &  Co.  v. 
Niles  &  Co.  11  Ohio  St.  48,  and  Bird  v. 
Mayer,  8  Wis.  .3G2;  Fisk  v.  Tank,  12  Wis. 
276;  Laing  v.  Fidgeon,  6  Taunt.  108,  is 
also  an  important  case.  The  defendant 
was  a  saddle  manufacturer.  He  sent  the 
plaijitiff  a  sample  of  saddles  that  could 
be  made  for  a  certain  price.  The  plain- 
tiff then  gave  him  an  order  for  "goods 
for  North  America,  3  dozen  single  flap 
saddles,  24s.  a  20s.  with  cruppers,"  «&.c. 
The  saddles  delivered  were  inferior  in 
material  and  workmanship,  useless  and 
immerchmtable,  and  did  not  correspond  with 
the  sample  sent.  The  court  held,  the  whole 
transaction  to  amount  to  a  contract  that 
the  article  should  be  merchantable,  and 
the  plaintiff  had  judgment.  Brown  v. 
Edington,  2  Man.  &  G.  279,  also  deserves 
attention.  Tlie  defendant  was  a  dealer 
in  ropes,  and  represented  himself  to  be  a 
manufacturer  of  the  article.  The  plain- 
tiff, a  wine  merchant,  applied  to  him  for 


a  crane  rope.  The  defendant's  foreman 
went  to  the  plaintiff's  premises  in  order 
to  ascertain  the  dimensions  and  kind  of 
rope  required.  He  examined  tlie  crane 
and  the  old  rope,  and  took  the  necessary 
admeasurements,  and  was  told  that  the 
new  rope  was  wanted  for  the  purpose  of 
raising  pipes  of  wine  out  of  the  cellar, 
and  letting  them  down  into  the  street ; 
when  he  informed  the  plaintiff  that  a  rope 
must  be  made  on  purpose.  The  defend- 
ant did  not  make  the  rope  himself,  but 
sent  the  order  to  his  manufacturer,  who 
employed  a  third  person  to  make  it.  It 
was  licld,  that,  as  between  the  parties  to 
the  sale,  the  defendant  was  to  be  consid- 
ered as  the  manufacturer,  and  that  there 
was  an  implied  warranty  that  the  rope 
was  a  fit  and  proper  one  for  the  purpose 
for  which  it  was  ordered.  Tindal,  C.  J., 
said:  "It  appears  to  me  to  be  a  distinc- 
tion well  founded,  both  in  reason  and  on 
authority,  that  if  a  party  purchases  an 
article  upon  his  own  judgment,  he  cannot 
afterwards  hold  the  vendor  responsible, 
on  the  ground  that  the  article  turns  out 
to  be  unfit  for  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  required ;  but  if  he  relies  upon  tlie 
judgment  of  the  seller,  and  informs  him 
of  the  use  to  wiiich  tlie  article  is  to  be  ap- 
plied, it  seems  to  me  the  transaction  car- 
ries witli  it  an  imi)lied  warranty,  that  the 
thing  furnished  shall  be  fit  and  proper  for 
the  purposes  for  which  it  was  designed." 
In  Shepherd  v.  Pybus,  3  Man.  &  G.  868, 
it  was  held,  that  in  a  sale  of  a  barge  by 
tlie  buildi-r,  there  was  an  implied  warran- 
ty that  it  was  reasonably  ft  for  use,  but 
it  was  left  undetermined  whether  there 
was  an  implied  warranty  that  the  barge 
was  fit  for  some  jiarticular  purpose,  for 
which  the  builder  knew  it  was  designed 
by  the  purchaser.  See  also  Chambers  v. 
Crawford,  Addison,  150,  that  a  boat-build- 
er, constructing  a  boat,  is  held  to  warrant 
it  sufficient  for  ordinary  use.  —  In  OUivant 
V.  Bayley,  5  Q.  B.  288,  the  plaintiff  was 


1  White  V.  Miller,  71  N.  Y.  118;  Chicago  Packing  Co.  v.  Til  ton,  87  111.  547;  Rob- 
inson Machine  Works  r.  Chandler,  56  Ind.  575.  In  such  a  case  there  is  a  warranty 
by  the  vendor  that  it  is  reasonably  fit  for  the  purpose,  and  there  is  no  exception  as 
to  latent  undiscoverable  defects.  Randall  ".  Newson,  2  Q.  B.  D.  102.  But  if  a 
purchaser  inspects  for  himself  the  specific  article  sold,  and  there  is  no  express  war- 
ranty, and  the  seller  is  guilty  of  no  fraud,  and  is  not  himself  the  manufacturer  of  the 
article,  and  the  particular  use  wliich  is  to  be  made  of  it  is  not  communicated  by 
the  purchaser  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  there  is  no  implied  warranty  on  the  part  of  the 
seller  that  the  article  is  reasonably  fit  for  tlie  purpose  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied, 
although  the  seller  supposes  that  the  purchaser  intends  to  use  it  for  the  purpose  for 
which  he  in  fact  buys  it.  Hight  v.  Bacon,  126  Mass.  10.  See  Bragg  v.  Morrill,  49 
Vt.  45;  Byers  v.  Chapin,  28  Ohio  St.  300;  Leopold  v.  Van  Ivirk,  27  Wis.  152. 

630 


CH.  v.] 


WARRANTY. 


588 


limited  to  cases  where  a  thing  is  ordered  for  a  special  pur- 
pose, and  not  applied  to  those  where  a  special  thing  is  ordered, 
although  this  be  intended  for  a  special  purpose.  For  if 
the  thing  is  itself  *  specifically  selected  and  ordered,  there  *  588 
the  purchaser  takes  upon  himself  the  risk  of  its  effecting 
its  purpose.  Nor  can  he  rely  upon  statements  and  assertions 
made  by  the  maker  in  circulars  and  advertisements  concerning 
the  article,  as  a  warranty  that  it  will  do  what  is  stated,  (i)  ^  But 
where  he  orders  a  thing  for  a  special  purpose,  or  to  do  a  specific 
work,  there  he  puts  this  risk  upon  the  person  who  is  to  supply  the 
thing,  (c)  2     If   the  thing  were  not  ordered  and  sold  for  a  special 


the  patentee  and  nnanufacturer  of  a  pat- 
ent macliine  for  printing  in  two  cidors. 
The  defendant  saw  the  machine  on  the 
plaintiff's  premises,  and  ordered  one,  the 
plaintiff  undertaking  by  a  written  memo- 
randum to  make  hiin  "  a  two  color  print- 
ing machine  on  my  patent  principle."  In 
an  action  for  the  price,  the  defendant 
excused  himself  from  liability  on  the 
ground  that  the  machine  had  been  found 
useless  for  printing  in  two  colors.  The 
judge,  in  summing  up,  told  the  jury  that, 
if  the  machine  described  was  a  known, 
ascertained  arti(;le,  ordered  by  the  defend- 
ant, he  was  liable,  whether  it  answered 
his  purpose  or  not;  but  that  if  it  was 
not  a  known  ascertained  article,  and  the 
defendant  had  merely  ordered,  and  the 
plaintiff  agreed  to  supply,  a  machine  for 
printing  two  colors,  the  defendant  was 
not  liable  unless  the  instrument  was  rea- 
sonably fit  for  the  purpose.  The  Court 
of  Queen's  Bench  held  this  to  be  a  proper 
direction  ;  and  the  jury  having  found  for 
the  plaintiff  under  it,  they  refused  to  dis- 
turb the  verdict.  See  also  the  next  note. 
In  Barnett  v.  Stanton,  2  Ala.  195,  it  was 
determined,  that  if  manufactured  goods 
are  open  to  inspection,  and  are  actually 
examined  by  the  purchaser,  before  the 
sale,  tliere  is  no  implied  warranty  of  qual- 
ity, although  the  manufacturer  himself 
be  the  vendor.  See  Kirk  v.  Nice,  2  Watts, 
367,  that  a  manufacturer  even  does  not 
always  undertake  that  the  goods  made 
are  merchantable.  The  principle  of  th.e 
text,  and  the  distinction  between  a  sale 
of  a  manufactured  article  by  the  manu- 
facturer himself,  and  of  an  ordinary  sale 


of  a  chattel,  as  to  implied  warranty,  is 
recognized  in  Misner  u.  Granger,  4  Gil- 
man,  69;  and  in  Leflore  v.  Justice,  1  Sin. 
&  M.  3S1,  where  it  is  said,  that  every 
person  who  contracts  to  do  a  ])iece  of 
work,  impliedly  undertakes  to  ajjply  suf- 
ficient skill  and  dexterity  to  its  perform- 
ance to  complete  it  in  a  just  and  work- 
manlike manner.  So  in  Howard  v.  Iloey, 
23  Wend.  3-31,  the  distinction  between 
manufactured  articles  and  others  is  rec- 
ognized. See  also  Hart  v.  Wright,  17 
Wend.  267;  s.  c.  18  id.  449;  Getty  v. 
Rountree,  2  Chandl.  28;  Bull  v.  Robin- 
son, 28  E.  L.  &  E.  586 ;  s.  c.  10  Exch.  342 ; 
Brown  v.  Sayles,  1  Williams,  227 ;  Dick- 
son V.  Jordan,  11  Ired.  L.  166;  Pease  v. 
Sabin,  38  Vt.  432;  Bartlett  v.  Hoppock, 
34  N.  Y.  118. 

(6)  Prideaux  v.  Burnett,  1  C.  B.  (n.  s.) 
613. 

(c)  "If  a  man  says  to  another,  'Sell 
nie  a  horse  fit  to  carry  me,'  and  the  other 
sells  a  horse  which  he  knows  to  be  unfit 
to  ride,  he  may  be  liable  for  the  conse- 
quences ;  but  if  a  man  says, '  Sell  me  that 
gray  horse  to  ride,'  and  the  other  sells  it, 
knowing  that  the  former  will  not  be  able 
to  ride  it,  that  would  not  make  him  lia- 
ble." Maule,  J.,  in  Iveates  r.  Cadogan,  2 
E.  L.  &  E.  320;  s.  c.  10  C.  B.  591.  See 
also  Chanter  v.  Hopkins,  4  M.  &  W.  399, 
which  fully  establishes  the  distinction 
taken  in  the  text,  and  is  a  leading  case 
on  the  subject.  There  the  defendant  sent 
to  the  plaintiff,  the  patentee  of  an  inven- 
tion, known  as  "Chanter's  smoke-consum- 
ing furnace,"  the  following  written  order : 
"  Send  me  your  patent  hopper  and  ap- 


1  There  is  no  warranty  that  a  known  article  ordered  of  a  manufacturer  shall 
answer  a  buyer's  particular  purpose,  although  stated  in  the  order.  Hight  v.  Bacon, 
126  Mass.  10;  Bounce  v.  Dow,  64  N.  Y.  411 ;  Wolcott  v.  Mount,  7  Vroom,  262,  267 ; 
s.  c.  9  Vroom,  496 ;  Port  Carbon  Co.  v.  Groves,  68  Penn.  St.  149 ;  Tilton  Safe  Co.  v. 
Tisdale,  48  Vt.  83 ;  Gerst  v.  Jones,  32  Gratt.  518. 

2  Macfarlane  v.  Taylor,  L.  R.  1  Sc.  &  D.  App.  245 ;  Thorns  v.  Dingley,  70  Me.  100. 

631 


589 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


purpose,  evidence  is  inadmissible  to  show  that  the  buyer  in  fact 

bought  it  intending  to  apply  it  to  a  special  purpose  and  found  it 

unfit,  (cc) 

In  all  sales  of  provisions  for  immediate  domestic  use,  there  is 

an  implied  warranty  that  they  are  wholesome   and  fit  for  use. 

But   this  warranty  extends  no   farther,  and    does    not  cover  a 

sale    of    provisions    for    any   other    than    immediate   consump- 
tion. (c(i)  1 

*  589        *  But  whatever  may  be  the  law  as  to  an  implied  war- 
ranty that  personal  property  bought  and  sold,  or  ordered 

and  manufactured  for  a  particular  purpose,  shall  be  reasonably  fit 


paratus,  to  fit  up  my  brewing  copper  with 
your  snioke-coiisuuiing  furnace.  Patent 
right  £15  15s.,  iron  work  not  to  exceed 
£o  5s. ;  engineer's  time  fixing,  7s.  (kl.  per 
day."  The  plaintiff  accordingly  put  up 
on  the  defendant's  premises  one  of  his 
patent  furnaces,  but  it  was  found  not  to 
be  of  an3^  use  for  the  purposes  of  brewery, 
and  was  returned  to  the  plaintiff.  It  was 
held  (no  fraud  being  imputed  to  tlic  plain- 
tiff), that  tliere  was  not  an  implied  war- 
ranty on  his  part  that  the  furnace  sup- 
plied should  be  fit  for  the  purposes  of 
brewery  ;  but  that,  the  defendant  having 
defined  by  the  order  the  particular  ma- 
chine to  be  supplied,  the  plaintiff  per- 
formed his  part  of  the  contract  by  sup- 
plying that  machine,  and  was  entitled  to 
recover  the  whole  £15  15s.,  the  price  of 
the  patent  right.  See  also  Pridcaux  v. 
Burnett,  1  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  613.  Bluett  v. 
Osborne,  1  Stark.  384,  supports  this  dis- 
tinction. In  that  case  the  plaintiff  sold 
the  defendant  a  bowsprit.  It  appeared 
at  the  time  to  be,  in  every  respect,  good 
and  perfect.  The  defendant  had  ample 
opportunity  to  inspect  it.  Soon  after  the 
bowsprit  was  cut  up  and  found  to  be 
rotten.  The  defendant  resisted  payment, 
on  the  ground  that  there  was  an  implied 
warranty  by  the  vendor  that  the  article 
should  be  made  of  good  and  sufficient 
materials.  No  fraiul  was  attributed  to 
the  vendor.  The  defence  was  not  sus- 
tained, and  the  plaintiff  had  a  verdict  for 
the  whole  price.  Here  there  was  a  sale 
of  a  specific  chattel  —  intendeel /it  is  true, 
for  a  particular  ])urpose  by  the  purchaser, 
but  not  furnished  or  made  for  that  pur- 
pose by  the  vendor.     See  also   Gray  v. 


Cox,  4  B.  &  C.  108;  Dickson  v.  Jordan, 
11  Ired.  L.  ICG;  Burns  v.  Fletcher,  2  Cart. 
(Ind.)  372. 

(cc)  Bartlett    v.   Hoppock,    34   N.    Y. 
118. 

{cfl)  Moses  V.  Mead,  1  Denio,  378. 
And  it  seems  not  to  matter  that  they  are 
purchased  for  domestic  use,  unless  they 
were  exposed  to  sale  for  that  jjurpose,  or 
the  seller  was  a  prorision  dealer.  Burnby 
V.  Bollett,  IG  M.  &  W.  044.  In  this  case, 
A,  a  farmer,  bought  in  the  public  market 
of  a  country  town,  from  B,  a  butcher 
keeping  a  stall  there,  the  carcass  of  a 
dead  i)ig  for  consumption,  and  left  it 
hanging  up,  intending  to  return  after 
completing  other  business  and  take  it 
away.  In  his  absence,  C,  a  farmer,  see- 
ing it  and  wishing  to  buy,  was  referred 
to  A  as  the  owner,  and  subsequently,  on 
the  same  day,  bought  it  of  A,  the  original 
buyer,  without  any  warranty.  It  did  not 
appear  that  any  secret  defect  in  it  was 
known  to  any  of  the  parties.  It  turned 
out  to  be  unsound,  and  unfit  for  human 
consumption.  It  was  held,  that  no  war- 
ranty of  soundness  was  implied  by  law 
between  the  farmers  A  and  C.  But  see 
Divine  v.  McCormick,  50  Barb.  116.  See 
also  Van  Branklin  v.  Fonda,  12  Johns. 
468;  Emerson  v.  Brigham,  10  Mass.  197; 
Hart  V.  Wright,  17  Wend.  267  ;  s.  c.  18 
id.  449  ;  Winsor  v.  Lombard,  18  Pick.  57 ; 
Humphreys  v.  Comline,  8  Blackf.  516. — 
If  an  innkeeper  agree  with  a  brewer  to 
take  all  his  beer  of  him,  he  is  bound  to 
furnish  him  with  beer  of  a  wholesome 
quality.  Plolcombe  v.  Hewson,  2  Camp. 
391 ;  Cooper  v.  Twibill,  3  Camp.  286. 


1  As  in  sale  of  a  live  cow  by  a  farmer  to  retail  butchers,  there  is  no  implied  war- 
ranty that  she  is  fit  for  food,  although  he  knows  that  they  buy  her  for  the  purpose 
of  cutting  her  up  into  beef  for  immediate  domestic  use.  Howard  v.  Emerson,  110 
Mass.  320.  See  also  to  the  same  point,  Ward  v.  Hobbs,  2  Q.  B.  D.  331 ;  3  Q.  B.  D. 
160. 

632 


CH.  v.] 


WARRANTY. 


590 


for  such  a  purpose, — no  such  rule  applies  to  real  estate.  It 
seems,  mdeed,  to  be  quite  well  settled,  that  in  a  lease  or  purchase 
of  a  house  and  land,  there  is  no  implied  warranty  that  it  shall  be 
reasonably  lit  for  habitation,  occupation,  or  cultivation ;  still  less 
that  it  shall  be  fit  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  taken,  (d)  i 

No  warranty  can  be  implied  from  circumstances,  if  there  be  an 
express  refusal  to  warrant,  (e)    And  where  the  contract  of  sale  is 
in  writing,  and  contains  no  warranty,  there  parol  evidence  is 
not  admissible  to  add  a  warranty.  (/)  ^     And  if  there  *  be    *  590 
a  warranty  in  writing,  it  cannot  be  enlarged  or  varied  by 


(d)  Hart  v.  Windsor,  12  M.  &  W.  G8 ; 
Sutton  V.  Temple,  12  M.  &  W.  52,  where 
the  subject  is  very  ably  examined  and 
discussed.  In  the  last  case,  A  hired  in 
writing  the  eatage  of  twenty-four  acres 
of  land  from  B  for  seven  months,  at  a 
rent  of  £40,  and  stocked  the  lands  with 
beasts,  several  of  which  died  a  few  days 
afterwards,  from  the  effect  of  a  poison- 
ous substance  which  had  been  acciden- 
tally spread  over  the  land  without  B's 
knowledge.  Held,  that  A  could  not 
abandon  the  land  for  breach  of  an  im- 
plied contract  in  B,  but  continued  liable 
for  the  whole  rent.  These  decisions  may 
be  in  conflict  with,  and  if  so,  doubtless 
overrule,  the  case  of  Smith  r.  Marrable, 
11  M.  &  W.  5,  where  it  was  held,  that  in 
a  lease  of  a  house  and  fumhure,  for  a 
temporary  residence  at  a  watering-place, 
and  where  the  furniture  formed  the 
greater  part  of  the  consideration  of  the 
contract,  tliere  was  an  implied  warranty 
that  the  house  and  furniture  should  be 
fit  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
hired ;  and  Lord  Abiiif/er,  in  Sutton  v. 
Temple,  attempted  to  distinguish  the 
two  cases.  The  other  judges,  howevijr, 
were  inclined  to  think,  both  in  Sutton  r. 
Temple,  and  Hart  i\  Windsor,  that  Smitli 
V.  Marrable  could  not  be  supported.  And 
the  same  may  be  said  of  Edwards  v. 
Etherington,  Ky.  &  M.  268;  s.  c.  7  Dow. 
&  R.  117  ;  Collins  v.  Barrow,  1  Mood.  & 
K.  112  ;  Salisbury  v.  Marshall,  4  C.  &  P. 
05.  The  doctrine  of  the  text  is  sus- 
tained also  in  two  cases  in  Massachu- 
setts. Thus,  in  Dutton  v.  Gerrish,  9 
Cush.  89,  the  defendant  being  the  owner 
of  a  store,  in  April,  1849,  leased  the  same 
to  the  plaintiffs,  who  filled  it  with  dry 


goods.  In  June,  1849,  tlic  roof  and  wall?* 
of  tlie  store  fell  in,  and  burieil  the  plain- 
tiffs' goods  in  the  ruins  ;  and  to  recover 
the  price  of  these  goods  the  i)laintiffs 
brougiit  their  action.  The  lease  of  tliu 
plaintiffs  ('ontaiiied  no  express  warranty 
tliat  the  building  was  fit  for  a  dry  goods 
warehouse,  or  for  any  other  i)urpose. 
The  plaiiuiffs  disclaimed  any  imputation 
of  fraud  or  misrepresentation  on  tlie  j)art 
of  the  defendant.  The  court  In/d  that, 
as  the  lease  contained  no  express  war- 
ranty, the  plaintiffs  could  not  recover, 
there  being  no  warranty  implied  in  law 
on  the  part  of  the  lessor  of  real  estate, 
that  it  is  fit  or  suitable  for  the  purposes 
for  which  it  is  leased  or  occuj)ie(l.  Tliey 
also  held,  that  decisions  in  reference  to 
leases  of  furnished  lodgings,  and  to  war- 
ranties implied  ujjon  the  sale  of  goods, 
were  not  applicable  to  this  case.  The 
same  doctrine  is  held  in  Foster  i\  Peyser, 
9  Cush.  242.  See  also  the  learned  note 
to  this  last  case,  in  5  Law  Rep.  (\.  s.) 
155,  where  tlie  authorities  on  this  jioint 
are  reviewed.  See  also  ante,  p.  *501, 
note  (/). 

(e)  Rodrigues  v.  Habersham,  1  Spears, 
314.  See  also  Bywater  v.  Richardson,  1 
A.  &  E.  508  ;  Atkins  v.  Howe,  18  Pick. 
10. 

(  f)  This  was  distinctly  adjudged  in 
Vari  Ostrand  r.  Reed,  1  VVend.  424.  It 
rests  upon  the  familiar  principle  that  the 
writing  is  supposed  to  contain  all  tlie 
contract.  Reed  v.  Wood,  9  Vt.  285 ; 
Muniford  v.  McPherson.  1  Johns.  414; 
Wilson  V.  Marsh,  1  Johns.  50o;  Lamb  v. 
Crafts,  12  Met.  3-3.3  ;  Dean  v.  Mason,  4 
Conn.  432  ;  Randall  v.  Rhodes,  1  Curtis, 
90. 


1  Wilson  V.  Hatton,  2  Ex.  D.  336,  however,  approved  and  followed  Smith  v.  Mar- 
rable, stijira,  to  the  effect  that  there  is  an  implied  condition  that  a  furnished  iiouse 
shall  be  in  tenantable  condition  at  the  time  tenancy  is  to  begin,  the  defect  alleged 
being  a  foul  smell. 

'^  JMast  V.  Pearce,  58  la.  579. 

633 


*590 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTEACTS. 


[book   III. 


parol  evidence.  (^)  But  although  there  be  a  writing  between  the 
parties,  if  it  does  not  amount  to  a  contract  of  sale,  as  if  it  be  an 
ordinary  bill  of  sale,  merely  intended  as  a  receipt,  or  an  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  payment  of  the  price,  then  it  seems  that  ijarol 
evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  actual  terms  of  the  sale,  and 
that  there  was  a  warranty.  (A) 

Ships  often  are,  and  any  property  may  be,  sold  "  with  all  faults." 
This  is  an  emphatic  exclusion  of  all  warranty.  But  it  gives  the 
seller  no  right  to  commit  a  fraud,  nor  will  it  prevent  the  sale 
from  being  avoided  on  proof  of  fraud.  And  it  is  fraud  if  the 
seller  conceals  existing  faults,  and  draws  the  attention  of  the 
buyer  away  so  as  to  prevent  his  discovering  them,  or  places 
the  property  in  such  circumstances  that  discovery  is  impossible, 
or  made  very  difficult,  (i)  ^ 


ig)  Kain  r.  Old,  2  B.  &  C  634 ;  Pick- 
ering V.  Dowson,  4  Taunt.  779  ;  Fender 
V.  Fobes,  1  Dev.  &  B.  250 ;  Smith  v.  Wil- 
liams, 1  Murpliey.  42(3. — So,  an  express 
warranty  will  not  be  extended  by  im])li- 
cation  from  other  parts  of  the  contract 
in  which  it  occurs.  Dickson  v.  Zizinia,  2 
E.  L.  &  E.  314  ;  s.  c.  10  C.  B.  602.  In 
this  case  the  declaration  stated,  that  the 
defendants  sold  to  the  plaintiff  a  cargo 
of  corn  then  shipped  at  (Jrfano  on  board 
the  0.,  at  a  certain  price,  including 
freight  to  Cork,  Liverpool,  or  London  ; 
that  it  was  agreed  that  the  quality 
should  be  of  a  certain  average,  and  that 
the  corn  had  been  shipped  on  board 
in  good  and  merchantable  condition. 
Breach,  that  it  was  not  shipped  in  good 
and  merchantable  condition  for  the  per- 
formance of  the  said  voyage.  Held,  that 
it  was  a  misdirection  to  ask  the  jury 
whether  the  corn  was  good  and  mer- 
chantable for  a  foreign  voyage.  And 
Manle,  J.,  said  :  "  It  would  be  most  mis- 
chievous to  superadd  a  tacit  condition 
relating  to  a  circumstance  provided  for 
b}'  the  express  words  of  the  parties.  If 
a  man  sold  a  horse  and  warranted  it 
sound,  and  the  vendor  knew  that  it  was 
intended  to  carry  a  lady,  and  the  horse 
was  sound,  but  was  not  fit  to  carry  a 
lady,  there  would  be  no  breach.  So, 
with  respect  to  any  other  warranty,  tiie 
maxim  to  be  applied  is,  '  cxpressum  farit 
cessare  taciturn.'  Were  the  law  otherwise, 
it  would  very  much  infringe  on  the  lib- 
erty of  parties  making  contracts.  It 
would  in  such  case  be  necessary  to  ex- 
press that  it  is  not  intended  to  go  be- 
yond the  language  employed." 


{h)  Allen  v.  Fink,  4  M.  &  W.  140; 
Herson  v.  Henderson,  1  Foster  (N.  H.), 
224;  Ilogins  v.  Flympton,  11  Fick.  97; 
Bradford  v.  Manly,  13  Mass.  142.  So 
parol  proof  is  admissible  to  show  a 
usage  of  trade  as  to  the  mode  of  mak- 
ing sales,  the  written  memorandum  and 
bought  and  sold  notes  being  silent  upon 
the  subject.  Boorman  v.  Jenkins,  12 
Wend.  567 ;  and  to  prove  that  the  vendor 
informed  the  vendee  at  the  time  of  sale 
of  the  defect  complained  of.  Schuyler 
V.  Iluss,  2  Caines,  202. 

li)  Baglehole  v.  Walters,  3  Camp.  154, 
is  a  leading  case  on  this  subject.  It  was 
there  held,  that  if  a  sliip  is  sold  "  with 
all  faults,"  the  seller  is  not  liable  for 
latent  defects,  irhic/t  he  knew  of,  but  did 
not  disclose  at  the  time  of  sale,  unless  he 
used  some  artijice  to  conceal  them  from  the 
purchaser.  The  case  of  IVIellish  v.  Mot- 
teux,  Feake,  Cas.  115,  where  a  contrary 
rule  was  adopted  by  Lord  Keni/nn,  was 
cited,  but  Lord  EllenhuroiK^h  said  :  "  I  can- 
not subscribe  to  the  doctrine  of  that 
case."  See  also  Fickering  v.  Dowson, 
4  Taunt.  785.  The  doctrine  of  the  text 
was  laid  down  by  Mansfi.ld,  C.  J.,  in 
Schneider  v.  Heath,  3  Camp.  508.  A 
ship  was  sold,  "  to  be  taken  with  all 
faults."  Her  bottom  was  worm-eaten, 
and  her  keel  broken.  When  the  ship 
was  advertised  for  sale,  the  captain  took 
her  from  the  ways  and  kept  her  con- 
stantly afloat,  so  that  these  defects  were 
completely  concealed  by  the  water.  This 
was  held  to  be  a  fraud  upon  the  pur- 
chaser, and  the  sale  was  avoided.  A 
similar  principle  was  applied  in  Fletcher 
V.  Bowsher,  2  Stark.  561,  where  a  vendor 


634 


1  See  also  Whitney  v.  Boardman,  118  Mass.  242. 


CH.  v.] 


WARRANTY. 


591 


*  There  has  been  much  question  as  to  what  is  a  breach  *  501 
of  the  warranty  of  soundness ;  and  what  are  the  rights  and 
remedies  of  a  party  who  bought  with  warranty,  Avhich  warranty 
has  been  broken.  For  an  answer  to  the  first  (juestion  wo  will 
refer  to  the  definitions  and  illustrations  in  our  notes,  (j)  ^  On 
the  second  point,  it  may  be  gathered  from  the  somewhat  conflict- 
ing authorities,  first,  that  the  buyer  may  bring  his  action  at  once, 
founding  it  upon  the  breach  of  warranty,  without  returning 
the  goods  ;  but  his  continued  possession  of  the  goods  *  and  *  592 
their  actual  value  would  be  considered  in  estimating;  the 


of  a  ship  represented  her  to  have  been 
built  in  1816,  when  she  liad  in  fact  been 
launched  tlie  year  before.  She  was  sold 
"  with  all  faults,  as  they  now  are,  with- 
out any  allowance  for  any  di'fect  whatso- 
ever." The  sale  was  held  void.  But 
in  all  these  cases  actual  fraud  in  the 
vendor  must  be  proved  in  order  to  ren- 
der him  liable.  See  Freeman  v.  Baker, 
5  B.  &  Ad.  797 ;  Early  v.  Garrett,  9  B.  & 
C  928.  As  to  tlie  construction  of  con- 
tracts of  the  kind  mentioned  in  the  text, 
see  Freeman  v.  Baker,  snpra  ;  Shepherd 
V.  Kain,  5  B.  &  Aid.  240 ;  Taylor  v.  Bul- 
len,  1  E.  L.  i&  E.  472 ;  s.  c.  5  Exch.  779. 
And  see  ante,  p.  *  578. 

( y )  The  question  has  been  often 
raised,  what  is  soundness  or  unsound- 
ness in  a  horse  or  other  animal,  sold 
with  a  warranty  of  soundness.  The  sub- 
ject was  ably  examined  in  Kiddell  v. 
Burnard,  9  M.  &  W.  608.  Parke,  B., 
there  said :  "  The  rule  as  to  unsound- 
ness is,  that  if  at  the  time  of  sale  the 
animal  has  any  disease,  which  either 
actually  does  diminish  the  natural  use- 
fulness of  the  animal,  so  as  to  make  him 
less  capable  of  work  of  any  description, 
or  which,  in  its  ordinary  progress,  will 
diminish  the  usefulness  of  the  animal; 
or  if  he  has,  either  from  disease  or  acci- 
dent, undergone  any  alteration  of  struc- 
ture, that  either  actually  does  at  the 
time,  or  in  its  ordinary  effect  will  di- 
minish his  natural  usefulness,  such  an- 
imal is  unsound."  See  also  Coates  v. 
Stephens,  2  Mo.  &  Bob.  157 ;  Elton  v. ' 
Jordan,  1  Stark.  127  ;  Elton  v.  Brogdcn, 
4  Camp.  281.  So  if  a  horse  has  at  the 
time  of  sale  the  si-eds  of  disease,  which  in 
its  ordinary  progress  will  diminish  his 
natural  usefulness,  this  is  unsoundness. 
Kiddell  0.  Burnard,  9  M.  &  W.  668.  But 
a  temporary  and  curable  injury,  although 


existing  at  the  time  of  sale,  if  it  does  not 
injure  the  animal  for  present  service,  is  not 
an  unsoundness.  Roberts  v.  Jenlcins,  1 
Foster  (N.  11.),  116.  It  seems  to  be  im- 
material whetiier  the  injury  l)e  perma- 
nent or  temporary,  curable  or  incurable, 
if  it  render  the  animal  less  fit  Un-  imsent 
usefulness  and  convenience.  Koberts  v. 
Jenkins,  snpra;  Elton  v.  Brogden,  4  Camp. 
281  ;  Elton  v.  Jordan,  1  Stark.  127 ; 
Kornegay  v.  White,  10  Ala.  22.5.  But 
see  Garment  v.  Barrs,  2  Esp.  073.  Roar- 
ing has  been  held  to  be  an  unsoundness. 
Gnslow  V.  Eames,  2  Stark.  81  :  contra. 
Basset  v.  Collis,  2  Camp.  523.  But  "  crib- 
bitiny "  has  been  held  not  to  be  an  un- 
soundness. Broennenburgh  v.  Haycock, 
Holt,  630.  If  not  an  unsoundness,  it  is 
a  "  vice,"  and  if  a  horse  is  warranted 
free  from  vice,  it  is  a  breach  of  the  war- 
ranty. Paul  V.  Hardwick,  Chitty  on 
Cont.  403.  n.  (r).  A  "bone  spavin  "  is 
an  unsoundness.  Watson  v.  Denton,  7 
C.  &  P.  85.  A  nerved  horse  is  misound. 
Best  V.  Osborne,  Ky.  &  M.  290.  But  a 
defective  formation,  or  badness  of  siiape, 
which  has  not  produced  lameness  at  the 
time  of  sale,  althougii  it  may  render  the 
horse  liable  to  become  lame  at  some 
future  time  (e..g.  "curby  hocks  ").  is  not 
an  unsoundness.  Brown  v.  Elkington, 
8  M.  &  W.  132.  See  also  Dickinson  v. 
Follett,  1  Mood.  &  R.  299.  Tiie  "  navicu- 
lar disease  "  is  an  unsoundness.  Mat- 
thews r.  Parker,  Oliphant  Law  of  Horses, 
228.  So  of  "  thick  wind."  Alkinson  v. 
Horridge,  id.  229.  "  Ossification  of  the 
cartilages."  Simpson  v.  Potts,  id.  224. 
The  question  of  soundness  or  unsound- 
ness is  particularly  for  the  jury  ;  and 
the  court  will  not  set  aside  a  verdict  on 
account  of  a  prepon<lerance  of  the  testi- 
mony the  other  way.  Lewis  v.  Peake, 
7  Taunt.  153. 


1  Crib-biting  was  held  covered  by  a  warranty  against  vices,  in  Dean  v.  Morey,  33 
la.  120 ;  as  to  which,  however,  see  Walker  v.  Hoisington,  43  Vt.  608.  Corns  were 
held  a  breach  as  to  soundness,  in  Alexander  v.  Dutton,  58  N.  H.  282. 

635 


*593 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


LBOOK   III. 


damages.  (Z:)  ^  Secondly,  he  may  return  the  goods  forthwith, 
and  if  he  does  so  without  unreasonable  delay,  this  will  be  a  rescis- 
sion of  the  sale,  and  he  may  sue  for  the  price  if  he  has  paid  it,  or 
defend  against  an  action  for  the  price,  if  one  be  brought  by  the 
seller.  But  if  he  has  sold  a  part  before  his  discovery  of  the 
breach,  and  therefore  cannot  return  them,  he  may  still  rescind 
the  sale,  and  will  be  liable  for  the  market  value  of  what  he  does 
not  return.  (Z)  And  if  the  vendor  refuses  to  receive  the  goods 
back,  when  tendered,  the  purchaser  may  sell  them  ;  and  if  he  sells 
them  for  what  they  are  reasonably  worth,  and  within  a  reasonable 
time,  he  may  recover  of  the  vendor  the  loss  upon  the  resale,  with 
the  expense  of  keeping  the  goods  and  of  selling  them.  (???)     We 

should  say,  on  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that  if  the  buyer 
*  593    sells  the  goods  with  all  proper  precautions  as  *  to  time, 

place,  and  manner,  to  insure  a  fair  sale,  the  vendor  will  be 


{k)  Fielder  v.  Starkin,  1  H.  Bl.  17,  is 
a  leading  case  upon  this  point.  A  neg- 
lect to  inform  tlie  vendor  of  the  dis- 
covered breach  of  the  warranty  for 
several  months  after  the  sale,  will  not 
bar  the  purchaser's  right  to  an  action 
for  breach  of  warranty.  Pateshall  v. 
Tranter,  3  A.  &  E.  103.  Rutter  v.  Blake, 
2  Har.  &  J.  353,  is  a  strong  American 
case,  that  an  action  may  be  maintained 
for  breach  of  warranty  without  return- 
ing the  goods,  but  it  was  here  held,  that 
the  purcliaser  ought  to  give  the  vendor 
notice  where  the  goods  w'ere  deposited. 
In  Kellogg  V.  Denslow,  14  Conn.  411, 
where  the  authorities  are  very  elabo- 
rately and  critically  examined  by  ilnr- 
man,  J.,  the  rule  of  the  text  is  adopted. 
There  A  agreed  to  furnish  B  with  sundry 
articles  of  machinery,  to  be  delivered  sub- 
sequently, and  to  be  free  from  defect.  A 
delivered  the  articles  accordingly,  which 
were  received  and  used  by  B  for  nearly 
a  year,  without  notice  to  A  of  anj'  de- 
fects therein.  In  an  action  brought  by 
B  against  A  on  the  warrant^',  claiming 
damages  for  defects  in  the  articles  at  the 
time  of  delivery,  it  was  held,  that  the 
effect  of  B's  not  having  given  notice  of 
such  defects  in  a  reasonable  time,  was, 
that  he  had  thereby  affirmed  the  con- 
tract, but  such  omission  constituted  no 
defence  to  the  action,  which  assumed  the 
subsistence  of  the  contract.  See  also 
Waring  v.  Mason,  18  Wend.  425;  Thomp- 
son V.  Botts,  8  Mo.   710 ;    Borreklns  v. 


Bevan,  3  TJawle,  23  ;  Cozzens  v.  Whitaker, 

3  Stew.  &  P.  322 ;  Carter  v.  Stennel,  10 

B.  Mon.  250  ;  Parker  r.  Pringle,  2  Strob. 
L.  242  ;  Milton  i:  Rowland,  11  Ala.  732; 
Ferguson  v.  Oliver,  8  Sm.  &  M.  332. 
The  weight  of  modern  authority  is  de- 
cidedly in  favor  of  the  rule  of  the  text, 
that  an  action  lies  for  breach  of  a  war- 
ranty, express  or  implied,  without  re- 
turning the  property,  or  giving  any 
notice  of  the  defect.  In  Hills  i'.  Ban- 
nister, 8  Cowen,  81,  A  sold  B  a  bell, 
warranting  it  not  to  crack  within  a  year, 
and  promising  to  recast  it  if  it  did.  He 
was  held  not  liable  on  his  warranty, 
without  notice,  and  neglect  to  recast  it. 
Of  course,  if  the  purchaser  has  not  re- 
turned the  goods,  their  real  value  will  be 
deducted  from  his  damages  ;  the  differ- 
ence between  the  price  paid,  or  to  be 
paid,  and  the  real  value,  being  the 
measure  of  damages  Caswell  v.  Cort?,  1 
Taunt.  566 ;  Germaine  v.  Burton,  3  Stark. 
32  ;  Cary  r.  Grunum,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  025  ; 
Voorhees  v.  Earl,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  288; 
Comstock  V.  Hutchinson,  10  Bari).  211  ; 
Hitchcock  f.  Hunt,  28  Conn.  343;  Crab- 
ton  V.  Kile,  21  111.  180;  Plant  v.  Condit, 
22  Ark.  454. 

(/)  Shields  v.  Pettee,  4  Comst.  122. 

(m)  Chesterman  v.  Lamb,  2  A.  &  E. 
129;  McKcnzie  v.  Hancock,  Ry.  &  M. 
436 ;  Maclean  v.  Dunn,  4  Bing.  722,  Best, 

C.  J.;  Woodward  v.  Thacher,  21  Vt. 
580;  Buffington  v.  Quantin,  17  Penn.  St. 
310. 


1  A  purchaser  may,  on  breach  of  warranty,  elect  to  return  the  article  and  recover 
the  price,  or  retain  it  and  recover  damages.     Wright  v.  Howell,  35  la.  288. 

636 


CH.  v.]  WARRANTY.  »  593 

bound  by  the  price  the  goods  bring-,  whether  that  be  in  fact  ••(lual 
to  their  value  or  not;  but  this  may  not  yet  be  estabhshed  bv  ad- 
judication. If  he  has  a  right  to  return  the  goods,  Ids  tender  of 
them  completes  his  right  to  sue  for  the  ])ricc,  wht'tlicr  the  vendor 
receives  them  or  not.  (n)  But  some  authoi-ities  of  great  weight 
limit  his  right  to  return  the  goods  for  breach  of  wari-anty  to  cases 
of  fraud,  or  where  there  was  an  express  agreement  to  that  elfect 
between  the  parties,  (o) 

The  general  rule  for  the  amount  of  damage  would  be  the  price 
paid  if  the  thing  bought  were  returned.  If  not,  it  would  l)0  the 
difference  between  the  price  paid  and  the  actual  value.  But  if 
farther  damage  resulted  directly  from  the  breach  of  warranty,  that 
too  would  be  recovered.  Thus  one  selling  coal  dust  to  bo  used  in 
making  brick,  and  warranting  it  free  from  soft  coal,  was  held 
responsible  for  the  damage  done  to  the  bricks  by  the  soft  coal 
dust  in  that  which  was  sold,  (oo) 

"When  a  seller  with  warranty,  brings  an  action  for  the  price,  it 
seems  to  be  settled  in  England,  that  a  mere  breach  of  warranty, 
which  is  not  accompanied  with  fraud,  or  does  not  go  to  destroy 
the  identity  or  the  value  of  the  thing  sold,  is  not  a  bar  to  the 
action  ;(jc»)  and  the  tendency  of  American  law  is  in  the  same 
direction.  (9) 

In  general,  when  a  buyer  asserts  that  the  goods  he  purchased 
are  not  what  they  were  warranted  to  be,  or  are  so  different  from 
what  he  ordered,  or  from  the  seller's  representation  of  them,  or 
from  the  quality  and  value  such  articles  should  possess,  as  to 
give  him  a  right  to  rescind  and  avoid  the  sale,  he  must  forthwith 
return  the  goods  if  he  would  exercise  this  right.  Delay  in  doing 
so,  or  any  act  equivalent  to  acceptance,  employment,  or  disposi- 
tion of  the  goods,  after  he  knows  or  should  know  their  deficiency, 
if  it  exists,  would  be  construed  either  into  an   admission  that 

(n)    Washington,    J.,    in    Tliornton    v.  son  v.  Sexton,  4  C.  R.  800;   Ollivant  v. 

Wynn,  12  Wheat.  103.  Havlev,  5  Q.  B.  288;  Dawson  r.  Collis,  4 

(o)   See  Carter  v.  Walker,  2  T^icli.  L.  E.  L  &  E.  3:38;  s.  c.  10  C.  li.'523.     And 

40.     This  is  the  rule  in  New  York.    Cary  in  action  brought  for  the  price  of  goods 

V.  Gruman,  4  Hill  (N.  Y. ),  625;  Vonrhees  sold  or  services  pertornieil,  the  defendant 

w.  Earl,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  288.    In  Kentucky,  may  reduce  the  damages  by  showing  a 

Lightburn  i:  Cooper,  1    Dana,  273.      In  breach  of  warranty  on  the  part  of  the 

the   United    States    courts,   Thornton    >•.  plaintiff.     Allen  !-.  Hooker,  20  Vt.  137. 

Wvnn,  12  Wheat.  183.    In  Pennsylvania,  {oo)   Milburn  v.  Belloni,  30  N.  Y.  63. 

Ka'se  V.  John,  10  Watts,  107.      In   Ten-  {/>)  Parson    i:   Sexton,  4   C.   B.   899; 

nessee,  Allen  v.  Anderson,  3  Humph.  581.  Dawson  v.  CoUis,  4  E.  L.  &  E.  3:38;  s.  c. 

It  has  been  said  that  this  is  the  Enulish  10  C.  B.  523. 

rule.    See  Street  t.'.  Blav,2  B.  &  Ad.45G;  (7)  Freeman  r.   Clute,  3  Barb.  421; 

Gompertz  v.  Denton,  1  Cr.  &  M.  207 ;  Par-  West  v.  Cutting,  19  Vt.  530. 

637 


594 


THE    LAW    OF    CONTRACTS. 


[book    III. 


there  was  no  such  deficiency,  or  into  a  waiver  of  his  right  to  re- 
scind the  sale  because  of  such  deficiency,  (r)  ^ 

*  594  *  In  general,  there  is  no  implied  warranty  whatever  aris- 
ing from  judicial  sales,  (s) 


(r)  Thus,  in  Milner  v.  Tucker,  1  C.  & 
P.  15,  a  person  contracted  to  supply  a 
chandelier  sufficient  to  light  a  certain 
room.  The  purchaser  kept  the  chande- 
lier six  months,  and  then  returned  it ;  he 
was  held  liable  to  pay  for  it,  although  it 
was  not  according  to  the  contract.  So  in 
Cash  V.  Giles,  3  C.  &  P.  40/,  a  threshing 
machine  was  kept  several  years,  without 
complaint,  but  only  used  twice  ;  the  ven- 
dee was  held  liable  for  the  price,  although 
it  was  of  little  or  no  value.  And  in  Per- 
cival  V.  Blake,  2  C.  &  P.  514,  keeping 
property  two  months  without  objection 
was  held  to  be  an  acceptance,  and  the 


purchaser  was  bound  to  pay  for  it,  there 
being  no  fraud.  See  Grimaldi  i:  Wliite, 
4  Esp.  95;  Groning  v.  Mendhani,  1  Stark. 
257  ;  Hopkins  i'.  Appleby,  1  Stark.  477  ; 
Kellogg  i\  Denslow,  l4  Conn.  411.  Keep- 
ing a  warranted  article  for  a  lengtli  of 
time  without  objection,  and  selling  part, 
is  evidence  tending  to  prove  that  it  cor- 
responded with  the  warranty.  Prosser 
I'.  Hooper,  1  J.  B.  Moore.  lOG.  But  the 
delay  must  take  place  after  the  discovery 
of  the  deficiency  in  the  goods.  Clements 
V.  Smith's  Administrators,  9  Gill,  156. 

(.s)  The  Monte  Allegre,  9  Wheat.  644 ; 
Puckett  V.  U.  S.  19  Law  Rep.  18. 


Gilson  V.  Bingham,  43  Vt.  410. 


638 


CH.  VI.]  STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU.  *  595 


*  CHAPTER  VI.  ♦59:; 

STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU. 

Sect.  I,  —  What  the  right  of  Stoppage  is,  and  ivho  has  it. 

If  a  vendor,  who  has  sent  goods  to  a  purchaser  at  a  distance, 
finds  that  the  purchaser  is  insolvent,  he  may  stop  the  goods  at 
any  time  before  they  reach  the  purchaser.  This  right  is  called 
the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu.  It  has  been  held,  although  it 
cannot  be  considered  as  settled,  that  the  discovery  of  the  false- 
hood of  material  representations  on  the  part  of  the  buyer,  gives 
the  seller  this  right,  (a)  ^ 

This  right  exists,  strictly  speaking,  only  when  the  vendor  has 
parted  with  the  goods.  If  they  have  never  left  his  possession,  he 
has  a  lien  on  them  for  the  full  payment  of  their  price ;  but  not 
this  right  of  stoppage.  (5)  ^ 

While  insolvency  is  necessary  to  create  this  right,  it  is  not  per- 
fectly well  settled  what  constitutes,  for  this  purpose,  insolvency. 
It  would  seem,  however,  that  it  should  be  not  merely  a  general 
inability  to  pay  one's  debts ;  but  the  having  taken  the  benefit  of 
an  insolvent  law,  or  a  stoppage  of  payment,  or  a  failure  evinced 
by  some  overt  act.  (c)     Or,  as  it  has  been  defined,  "  an  inability 

(a)  Fitzsiramons  v.  Joslin,  21  Vt.  129.  See  also  Gibson  v.  Carrutliers,  8  M.  &  W. 

(b)  Parks  V.  Hall,  2  Pick.  212.     As  to  321 ;  Jones  r.  Bradner,  10  Barb.  103. 
the  difference  between  these  rights,  see  (c)  In  Rogers  v.  Tiionias,  20  ("onn.  54, 
McEwan  v.  Smith,  2   H.  of  L.  Cas.  309.  Storrs,  J.,  on  the  meaning  of  the  piirase 

1  Stoppage  in  transitu  is  called  into  existence  for  the  vendor's  benefit  after  the 
buyer  has  acquired  title  and  right  of  possession,  and  even  constructive  possession, 
but  not  yet  actual  possession,  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass.  490,  492;  Treadwell  v. 
Aydlett,  9  Heiskell,  388 ;  for  the  reason,  it  is  said,  that  the  seller's  property  ought 
not  to  be  used  in  paying  the  buyer's  debts,  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  111  Mass.  490,  402. 
As  to  a  seller  in  such  a  case  becoming  the  bailee  of  the  buyer,  sec  Farmeloe  v.  Bain, 
1  C.  P.  D.  445;  Gunn  v.  Bolckow,  L.  H.  10  Ch.  491.  As  to"  estoppel  of  a  vendor  gen- 
erally who  has  given  a  delivery  order,  see  Voorhis  ?■.  Olnistead,  6(3  N.  Y.  113. 

-  That  his  remedy  is  not  impaired  by  giving  a  delivery  order,  if  countermanded 
before  his  bailee  attorns  to  the  buver,  see  Keeler  v.  Goodwin,  HI  Mass.  490. 

639 


596 


THE   LAW   OP    CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


*596  *to  pay  one's  debts  in  the  ordinary  course  as  persons 
generally  do."  (c?)  ^ 
The  mere  insolvency  or  bankruptcy  of  the  vendee  will  not, 
per  se,  amount  to  a  stoppage  in  trayisitu ;  for  there  must  be 
some  act  on  the  part  of  the  consignor  indicative  of  his  intention 
to  repossess  himself  of  the  goods,  (e)  But  if  it  was  ever  con- 
sidered necessary  for  the  consignor,  or  some  one  in  his  behalf,  to 


insolvency  said:  "  The  cases  on  this  sub- 
ject generally  mention  insolvency  as  one 
of  the  conditions  on  which  tlie  right  of 
stoppage  in  transitu  accrues  ;  but  tliey  are 
wholly  silent  as  to  what  constitutes  such 
insolvency ;  and  therefore  its  sense,  as 
thu-s  used,  is  to  be  gatliered  from  the 
circumstances  of  tlie  cases.  For  it  is  a 
terra  which  is  used  with  various  mean- 
ings. In  a  technical  sense  it  denotes  tlie 
having  taken  the  benefit  of  an  insolvent 
law  ;  in  I  he  popular  sense,  a  general  ina- 
bility to  pay  debts ;  and  in  a  mercantile 
sense,  a  stoppage  of  payment,  or  failure 
in  one's  circumstances,  as  evinced  by 
some  overt  act.  That  a  technical  insol- 
vency is  sufficient  to  authorize  the  exer- 
cise of  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu 
has  always  been  conceiied.  That  it  is 
not  indispensable  for  that  purpose  is 
equally  clear.  Mr.  Smith,  in  liis  Vonipen- 
diuni  of  Mercantile  Law,  p.  549,  n.,  ex- 
presses his  belief  that  merchants  liave 
very  generally  acted  as  if  the  right  to 
stop  goods  was  not  postponed  till  the  oc- 
currence of  insolvency  in  tlie  technical 
sense,  and  pertinently  adds  :  '  The  law  of 
stoppage  in  transitu  is  as  old,  it  must  be 
recollected,  as  1670,  on  the  21st  of  March, 
in  which  year  Wiseman  v.  Vandeput  was 
decided ;  so  that  if  insolvency  is  to  be 
taken  in  a  technical  sense,  the  law  of 
stoppage  in  transitu  has  been  varying  with 
the  varied  enactments  of  tlie  legislature 
regarding  it.'  That  stoppage  of  payment 
amounts  to  insolvency  for  this  purpose, 
is  assumed  in  many  of  the  cases.  Lord 
Ellenboroitgli,  in  Newson  ik  Thornton,  6 
East,  17,  places  the  right  of  the  vendor 
to  stop  the  property  on  the  '  insolvencij'  of 
the  consignee,  where  there  had  been  only 
a  stoppage  of  payment  by  the  vendee, 
when  notice  was  given  to  the  carrier  by 
the  vendor  to  retain  the  goods.  In  Ver- 
tue  V.  Jewell,  4  Camp.  31,  the  terms  used 
were, '  stopped  pavment.'  See  also  Dixon 
V.  Yates,  5  B.  &  Ad.  313.  We  have  been 
able  to  find  no  case  in  which  the  right  of 


stoppage  in  transitu  has  been  either  sanc- 
tioned or  attemjited  to  be  justified  on  the 
ground  of  the  insolvency  of  the  vendee, 
where  there  was  not  a  technical  insol- 
vency, or  a  stoppage  of  payment,  or  fail- 
ure in  circumstances,  evidenced  by  some 
overt  act;  and  Mr.  Blackburn,  in  liis 
Treatise  on  the  Contract  of  Sale,  p.  i:]0, 
where  this  subject  is  very  minutely  ex- 
amined, says,  that  there  seems  to  have 
been  no  such  case;  anil  adds,  that  al- 
though the  textbooks  and  dirta  of  the 
judges  do  not  restrict  the  use  of  the  term 
'insolvent,'  or  'failed  in  his  circum- 
stances,' to  one  who  has  stopped  pay- 
ment, there  must  be  great  practical 
diflaculty  in  establishing  the  actual  insol- 
vency of  one  who  still  continues  to  pay 
his  way  ;  and  as  the  carrier  obeys  the 
stoppage  in  transitu  at  his  peril,  if  the 
consignee  be  in  fact  s6lvent,  it  would 
seem  no  unreasonable  rule  to  require, 
that  at  the  time  the  consignee  was  re- 
fused the  goods,  he  should  have  evi- 
denced his  insolvency  by  some  overt  act. 
Mr.  Smith,  in  his  work  which  has  been 
mentioned,  clearly  favors  the  same  view. 
Comp.  Merc.  Law,  130,  n.  Hence  it  ap- 
pears, that  tlie  authorities  and  text- 
writers  furnish  no  support  to  the  claim, 
that  a  mere  general  inability  to  pay 
debts,  unaccompanied  with  any  visible 
change  in  the  circumstances  of  the  debt- 
or, constitutes  insolvency,  in  such  a  sense 
as  to  confer  the  right  of  stoppage  in  tran- 
situ." But  see  Hays  v.  Mouille,  14  Penn. 
St.  51 ;  Biddlecombe  v.  Bond,  4  A.  &  E. 
332 ;  Naylor  v.  Dennie,  8  IMck.  205 ; 
Chandler  v.  Fulton,  10  Tex.  2;  Lee  v. 
Kilbiirn,  3  Gray,  594. 

{d)  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  4  Gush. 
134;  Shore  v.  Lucas,  3  Dow.  &  R.  218; 
Bayly  v.  Schofield,  1  M.  &  SeL  338; 
Secomb  v.  Nutt,  14  B.  Mon.  320. 

(e)  2  Kent,  Com.  543.  But  the  right 
exists  only  in  cases  of  insolvency  of  the 
vendee.  The  Constantia,  G  Rob.  Adm. 
321. 


1  "  By  the  term,  '  insolvency '  of  the  buyer  is  meant  his  inability  to  pay  his  debts 
in  the  usual  com-se  of  business.  It  is  not  necessary'  that  he  should  have  been 
adjudicated  a  bankrupt  or  insolvent  debtor."  Per  Morton,  J.,  in  Durgy,  &c.  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,  123  Mass.  12,  13. 

640 


CH.  VI.]  STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU.  ♦  597 

take  actual  possession  of  the  goods,  in  order  to  perfect  and  ex- 
ecute his  right,  that  doctrine  is  now  exploded.  Notice  of  the 
consignor's  claim  and  purpose  given  to  the  carrier  before  delivery 
by  him  is  sufficient ;  (/)  and  it  should  be  given  to  the  car- 
rier having  possession  *and  not  to  the  vendee  himself  *597 
without  giving  notice  to  the  carrier.  (^)  i  This  notice  and 
demand  on  behalf  of  the  consignor  need  not  be  made  by  any  per- 
son specially  authorized  for  that  purpose ;  it  may  be  made  by  a 
general  agent  of  the  consignor ;  or  even  by  a  stranger,  if  it  be 
ratified  by  the  vendor  before  the  delivery  to  the  vendee,  (h)  ^ 
But  a  ratification  of  a  notice  and  demand  by  an  unauthorized 
person,  not  made  until  after  delivery  to  the  vendee  will  not  suf- 
fice. (^) 

The  question  has  been  raised  when  the  insolvency  may  take 
place,  in  order  to  give  this  right ;  that  is,  whether  the  right  exists 
by  reason  of  an  insolvency  before  the  sale  ;  and  it  was  held  that 
the  insolvency  must  take  place  between  the  time  of  the  sale 
and  that  of  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  stoppage,  {j)     *  But    *  598 

(/)  Litt  V.  Cowley,  7  Taunt.  169 ;  Quebec,  to  be  delivered  at  Port  Fleetwood 
Hoist  V.  Pownal,  1  Esp.  240 ;  Newhall  v.  in  Lancasliire,  a  notice  of  stoppage  given 
Vargas,  13  Me.  93.  Notice  should  be  to  the  ship-owner  at  Montrose,  while  the 
given,  it  seems,  to  the  carrier,  middleman,  goods  were  on  their  voyage,  whereupon 
or  other  person  having  at  the  time  the  lie  sent  a  letter  to  await  tlie  arrival  of  the 
actual  custody  of  the  goods;  or  given  to  captain  at  Fleetwood,  directing  him  to 
such  a  person,  that  it  may  reach  the  car-  deliver  the  cargo  to  tlie  agents  of  the 
rier  before  delivery.  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  vendor  —  was  held  not  to  be  sufficient 
6  Denio,  629.  But  in  Bell  v.  Moss,  5  notice  of  stoppage  in  transitu. 
Whart.  189,  it  was  given  to  the  assignees  ((/)  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  5  Denio,  029. 
of  the  consignee,  who  had  become  insol-  [h]  Whiteliead  v.  Anderson,  9  M.  & 
vent,  and  was  held  sufficient.  In  Northey  W.  518;  Bell  v.  Moss,  5  Whart.  189; 
V.  Field,  2  Esp.  613,  the  demand  was  on  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  13  Me.  93.  See  ante, 
the  officer  of  the  custom-house  where  the  p.  *49,  note  ((j). 
goods  were  stored.  Whitehead  v.  Ander-  (i)  Bird  (;.  Brown,  4  Exch.  786. 
son,  9  M.  &  W.  518,  is  an  important  case  (j)  Rogers  c  Thomas,  20  Conn.  53,  is 
upon  this  point.  There  it  is  held,  that  a  a  very  able  case  on  this  point.  As  this 
notice  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  to  be  effect-  question  seems  to  have  been  first  raised 
ual,  must  be  given  either  to  the  person  in  this  case,  we  give  the  language  of 
who  has  the  immediate  custody  of  the  Storrs,  J. :  "  The  remaining  inquiry  re- 
goods,  or  to  the  principal  whose  servant  spects  the  time  when  sucli  insolvency 
has  the  custody,  at  such  a  time,  and  under  must  occur,  in  order  to  confer  this  right, 
such  circumstances,  as  that  he  may,  by  On  this  point  we  are  of  opinion  that  it  is 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence,  com-  not  sufficient  that  it  exists  when  the  sale 
municate  it  to  his  servant,  in  time  to  takes  place,  but  that  it  must  intervene 
prevent  the  delivery  to  the  consignee,  between  the  sale  and  the  exercise  of  such 
Therefore,  where  timber  was  sent  from  right.     It  is  well  settled,  that  after  the 

1  Notice  must  be  given  to  the  person  in  possession,  or  if  to  his  employer,  reason- 
able opportunity  must  be  allowed  the  latter  to  give  orders  to  such  person.  Ex  parte 
Falk,  14  Ch.  D.  446. 

2  In  Durgy,  &c.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  123  Mass.  12,  where  the  demand  was  made  by  a 
person  sent  by  the  seller's  agent,  whose  acts  were  subsequently  ratified,  before  the 
buyer  came  into  possession,  but  after  a  creditor  of  the  buyer  had  attached  them,  the 
right  of  stoppage  was  held  to  have  been  reasonably  exercised. 

VOL.  I.  41  G41 


598 


THE   LAW   OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


we  are  far  from  certain  that  the  insolvency  of  the  buyer,  existing 
at  the  time  of  the  sale,  but  then  unknown  to  the  seller,  and  dis- 
covered by  him  before  delivery  to  the  buyer,  does  not  give  this 
right. 

It  has  been  much  disputed,  and  may  not  yet  be  entirely  settled, 
whether  this  is  a  right  to  rescind  the  sale,  (^)  ^  or  only  an  exten- 
sion of  the  common-law  lien  of  the  seller.  (J}     The  difference  is 


sale,  and  before  the  vendor  has  taken 
any  steps  to  forward  the  property  to  the 
vendee,  the  former  has  a  lien  upon  it,  by 
virtue  of  whieh  he  may,  on  the  occur- 
rence of  the  insolvency  of  the  latter, 
retain  the  goods  in  his  possession,  as  a 
security  for  tlie  price.  Tliis  is  a  strictly 
analogous  right  to  that  of  stopping  them 
after  tliey  have  been  forwarded,  and 
while  they  are  on  their  way  to  tlie  ven- 
dee, and  depends  on  the  same  principles. 
And  it  may  be  here  remarked,  that  the 
cases  decided  on  the  subject  of  that  right 
of  lien,  confirm  tlie  views  which  we  have 
expressed  as  to  the  meaning  of  insolvency 
as  applied  to  the  right  of  stoppage,  after 
the  transitics  has  commenced.  The  same 
equitable  principle  which  authorizes  a 
retention  of  the  possession  in  the  one 
case,  and  a  recovery  of  it  in  tlie  other, 
would  seem  to  authorize  the  latter,  where 
the  insolvency  occurred  after  the  sale 
and  before  the  forwarding  of  the  prop- 
erty. The  right  of  stopping  it  after  the 
transitus  has  commenced,  may  not,  there- 
fore, be  limited  to  the  case  wliere  in- 
solvency occurs  after  it  has  left  the 
possession  of  the  vendor,  but  may  extend 
to  cases  where  it  occurred  at  any  time 
after  the  sale.  However  that  may  be, 
we  are  clear  that  it  must  occur  after  the 
sale.  In  favor  of  this  position,  there  is 
the  same  argument,  from  an  entire  ab- 
sence of  authority  against  it,  as  was  de- 
rived from  that  source  on  the  point  which 
we  have  just  considered  ;  and  it  applies 
with  equal  force.  We  find  no  decided 
case  in  whicli  the  right  in  question  has 
been  sanctioned,  excepting  where  the  in- 
solvency occurred  subsequent  to  the  sale. 
And  although  the  language  of  the  courts 
may  sometimes  seem  to  import  that  the 
right  exists  irrespective  of  the  time  when 
the  insolvency  took  place,  it  is  quite 
plain,  that  applying  their  expressions  to 
the  cases  they  were  considering,  and 
which  did  not  involve  this  point,  they 


were  not  intended  to  have  that  construc- 
tion. But  in  most  of  the  decided  cases 
on  this  subject,  it  will  be  seen  that  their 
language  is  most  unequivocal,  and  in 
terms  limits  the  right  of  stoppage  to 
cases  of  bankruptcy  or  insolvency,  oc- 
curring while  the  goods  are  in  transitu, 
and  of  course  after  the  sale."  See  contra 
Reynolds  i'.  Railroad,  43  N.  H.  580. 

(k)  This  question  was  much  discussed 
in  Clay  v.  Harrison,  10  B.  &  C.  99,  but, 
according  to  a  dictum  of  Parke,  J.,  in  Ste- 
phens V.  Wilkinson,  2  B.  &  Ad.  323,  not 
decided.  See  Litt  v.  Cowley,  7  Taunt. 
169 ;  Wilmhurst  v.  Bowker,  5  Bing.  N.  C. 
547 ;  s.  c.  7  M.  &  G.  882  ;  Edwards  v. 
Brewer,  2  M.  &  W.  375;  Key  i'.  Cotes- 
worth,  14  E.  L.  &  E.  435 ;  s.  c.  7  Exch. 
595.  The  old  case  of  Langfort  v.  Tiler, 
1  Salk.  113,  permitting  the  vendor  to  re- 
sell the  goods,  seems  to  proceed  upon 
the  ground  of  a  rescission  of  the  contract. 
The  history  and  character  of  this  right 
were  much  discussed  in  Lord  Ahinger's 
judgment  in  Gibson  v.  Carruthers,  8  M. 
&  W.  336.  And  see  Wentworth  v.  Outh- 
waite,  10  M.  &  W.  451. 

(/)  The  weight  of  authority,  as  well  as 
the  reason  of  tlie  thing,  is  decidedly  in 
favor  of  considering  the  right  as  an  ex- 
tension of  the  common-law  lien  for  the 
price,  or,  as  Lord  Kenyan  observed  in 
Hodgson  V.  Loy,  7  T.  R.  445,  "  an  equi- 
table lien  adopted  by  the  law  for  the  pur- 
pose of  substantial  justice."  And  it 
seems  that  the  right  was  first  introduced 
into  equity  before  it  was  applied  by  the 
common-law  courts.  See  Wiseman  v. 
Vandeput,  2  Vern.  203 ;  Snee  v.  Prescot, 
1  Atk.  246;  D'Aquila  r.  Lambert,  2 
Eden,  75 ;  s.  c.  Ambl.  399.  In  the  fol- 
lowing cases  this  right  has  been  consid- 
ered not  a  rescission  of  the  sale,  but 
merely  an  extension  of  the  lien.  Went- 
worth V.  Outhwaite,  10  M.  &  W.  436; 
Bloxam  v.  Sanders,  4  B.  &  C.  941 ;  Jor- 
dan  V.  James,  6  Hamm.  88;  Rowley  i;. 


^  A  vendor's  right  must  be  considered  as  a  right  of  lien  till  the  price  is  paid, 
not  a  right  to  rescind  the  bargain.  Cross  v.  O'Donnell,  44  N.  Y.  661 ;  Rucker  v. 
Donovan,  13  Kan.  251.  —  Equity  has  jurisdiction  to  enforce  a  seller's  right  of  stop- 
page.   Schotsmans  v.  Lancashire,  &c.  R,  Co.  L.  R.  2  Ch.  332. 

642 


CH.  VI.]  STOPPAGE  IN   TRANSITU.  *  599 

important.  If  stoppage  in  transitu  rescinds  the  sale,  the  vendor 
thereby  takes  possession  of  the  goods  as  his  own,  and  the  debt  is 
at  an  end,  and  the  seller  has  no  claim  on  the  purchaser  for  the 
price.  But  if  it  be  only  the  exercise  of  a  right  of  lien,  then  the 
property  in  the  goods  remains  in  the  purchaser,  or  those  Avho 
represent  him,  and  the  right  to  the  price  of  the  goods  remains 
with  the  vendor,  (w)  Therefore,  if  the  vendor  now  sells  them,  it 
must  be  as  any  one  may  sell  goods  on  which  he  has  a  lien  to 
secure  an  unpaid  debt ;  if  they  bring  more  than  the  debt  *  he  *  599 
must  account  for  the  surplus ;  if  they  bring  less  he  may 
demand  the  balance  from  the  purchaser,  (n)  If  he  sells  them 
only  to  enforce  his  lien,  and  they  bring  more  than  the  price,  he 
must  return  the  balance  to  the  original  buyer. 

This  question  has  been  much  agitated ;  but  we  think  the  strongly 
prevailing  authority  and  reason  are  in  favor  of  its  being  an  exer- 
cise of  a  lien  by  the  seller,  and  not  a  rescission  of  the  sale. 
Doubtless  there  are  difficulties  attendant  upon  either  view  of  this 
question.  Thus,  it  may  be  said  that  a  seller  cannot  retain  a  lien 
who  has  parted  with  his  possession.  And  then  the  right  would 
be  considered  rather  as  a  quasi  lien ;  or,  in  other  words,  the  right 
of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  measured  and  governed  as  to  its  effect 
and  consequences,  rather  by  the  rules  of  law  applicable  to  lien 
than  by  those  which  belong  to  rescission  of  sale.  Perhaps  the 
difference  of  opinion  on  this  subject  may  be  attributed  in  some 
degree  at  least  to  the  difference  in  the  circumstances  of  the  cases 
in  which  the  question  has  arisen.  Thus,  if  there  has  been  a 
complete  sale  of  a  specific  chattel,  agreeably  to  a  specific  order  of 
the  purchaser,  the  property  in  the  chattel  would,  it  should  seem, 
pass  thereby  to  the  purchaser,  subject  only  to  the  exercise  of  the 
seller's  lien  for  the  price.  And,  in  such  a  case,  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  stoppage  would  revest  in  the  seller  only  the  possession, 
just  as  it  was  when  he  sent  the  goods  away  ;  that  is,  subject  to  the 
property  in  the  purchaser,  and  only  for  the  purpose  of  restoring 
and  making  effectual  the  seller's  lien.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  if 

Bigelow,  12  Pick.  307 ;  Newhall  v.  Var-  of    the   goods,   notwithstanding  he  has 

gas,  13  Me.  93;  s.  c.  15  Me.  315;  Rogers  stopped  them  in  transitu,  provided  he  is 

V.    Thomas,   20   Conn.   53;   Gwynne,   ex  ready  to  deliver  them   on   demand  and 

parte,  12  Ves.  379;  Martindale  v.  Smith,  payment.    Kymer  v.  Suercropp,  1  Camp. 

1   Q.   B.   389;    Chandler  v.  Fulton,   10  109.  , 

Xex.  2.  («)  This  was  distinctly  adjudged   m 

(m)  There  would  seem  to  be  no  doubt  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  15  Me.  314,  a   very 

that  the  vendor  may  sue  for  the  price  able  case  on  this  subject. 

643 


*  600  THE  LAW  OP  CONTRACTS.  [BOOK  III. 

A  should  send  to  B  an  order  for  a  certain  quantity  of  goods  of  a 
certain  kind  or  description,  and  B  should  procure  goods  which  he 
supposed  answerable  to  the  order,  and  send  them  to  A,  and  should 
then  hear  of  the  failure  of  A,  and  thereupon  stop  the  goods  on 
their  passage,  B's  rights  might  become  the  same  as  if  he  had 
never  sent  the  goods ;  and  the  property  would  remain  in  him, 
because  they  had  never  been  accepted  by  A,  and  now  never  could 
be.  (o)      Still,  however,  we  think  there  is  a  strong  ten- 

*  600    dency  in  the  courts,  both  of  England  and  this  country,  *  to 

treat  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  as  the  exercise 
of  a  lien. 

In  some  respects  it  is  treated  as  an  absolute  lien,  and  on  this 
ground  denied  to  exist  at  all,  where  it  cannot  exist  as  a  lien. 
Thus  it  is  said,  that  this  right  belongs  only  to  one  who  sold  the 
goods,  or  had  distinctly  the  property  in  them ;  and  not  to  one  who 
has  himself  only  a  lien  on  them,  as  a  bailee  who  has  a  lien  for 
work  done,  or  the  like ;  for  when  such  a  party  sends  the  goods 
away  from  him,  he  parts  with  the  possession,  and  his  own  lien 
ceases,  (jo) 

It  is  indeed  quite  well  settled,  that  the  right  of  stoppage  in 
transitu  exists  only  between  vendor  and  vendee,  or  between  per- 
sons standing  suhstantialhj  in  that  relation.  A  mere  surety  for 
the  price,  upon  whom  there  is  no  primary  liability  to  pay  for  the 
goods,  cannot  stop  them  upon  the  insolvency  of  the  vendee  merely 
to  secure  himself  from  loss,  (^q)  But  if  the  consignor  is  virtually 
the  vendor,  he  may  exercise  the  right.  Thus,  if  a  person  in  this 
country  should  send  an  order  to  his  correspondent  in  Paris  to 
procure  and  ship  to  him  certain  goods,  which  the  latter  should 
procure  on  his  own  credit,  without  naming  the  principal,  and  ship 
to  him  at  the  original  price,  adding  only  his  commission,  he  would 
be  considered  as  an  original  vendor,  so  far  at  least  as  to  give  him 
the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu,  (r)  if  not  for  all  purposes.  So 
a  principal,  who  consigns  goods  to  his  factor  upon  credit,  may  stop 
them  on  the- factor's  insolvency,  (s) 

The  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  not  confined  to  a  sale  of 
goods.  A  person  remitting  money  on  a  particular  account,  or  for 
a  particular  purpose,  may  stop  the  same  on  hearing  of  the  insol- 

(o)  See  Clay  v.  Harrison,  10  B.  &  C.  (7)  Siffkin  v.  Wray,  6  East,  371. 

99,  n.  ;   James  v.  Griffin,  2  M.  &  W.  623,  (r)  Fcise  v.  Wray,  3  East,  93. 

632,  Parke,  B.  (s)  Kinlock  v.  Craig,  3  T.  R.  119. 

(p)  Sweet  I'.  Pyrn,  1  East,  4. 

644 


CH.  VI.]  STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU.  *  GOl 

vency  of  the  consignee,  (t)  i  The  fact  that  the  accounts  between 
the  consignor  and  consignee  are  unadjusted,  rendering  it  uncer- 
tain whether  there  is,  or  will  be,  a  balance  due  the  consignor,  will 
not  prevent  the  consignor  from  exercising  this  right.  («) 
But  goods  shipped  to  pay  a  precedent  and  existing  *  debt,  *  GOl 
cannot  be  stopped  on  the  insolvency  of  the  consignee,  (v) 

A  consignor  may  exercise  this  right,  although  he  has  received 
a  bill  of  exchange  for  the  goods,  and  indorsed  it  over ;  {w)  or  even 
if  he  has  received  actual  payment  for  a  part  of  the  goods,  (a;) 


SECTION  II. 

♦  WHEN   AND   HOW   THE   RIGHT   MAY   BE   EXERCISED. 

The  general  rule  is,  that  this  right  exists  as  long  as  the  goods 
are  in  transitu.  But  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  determine  whether 
the  goods  which  it  is  sought  to  stop  are  still  in  tratisitu.  (y)  ^ 

(t)    Smith    V.    Bowles,    2    Esp.    578.  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  13  Me.  03  —  Qucrre, 

Aider  upon  a   general   remittance   from  wliether  in  those  States  where  a  negotia- 

a   debtor  to   his  creditor  on  account  of  ble  bill  or  note  is  considered  prima   fuciit 

his  debt.  as  payment,  such  a  bill  or  note,  given  for 

(u)  Wood  V.  Jones,  7  Dow.  &  R.  126;  the  whole  price,  would  defeat  the   rigiit 

Vertue  v.  Jewell,  4  Camp.  31.  of  stoppage  1     See  Chapman  r.  Searle,  3 

(v)    Wood  V.  Roach,    1  Yeates,  177;  Pick.  38;  Hutchins  i-.  Olcutt,  4  Vt.  54! » ; 

s.  c.  2  Dallas,  180 ;   Summeril  y.  Elder,  1  White   v.   Douglierty,    Mart.    &  Y.    30'.>. 

Binn.  106 ;    Clark  v.  Mauran,  3  Paige,  See   Horncastle    v.    Farran,  3  B.  &  Aid. 

373.  497  ;    Bunney  v.  Poyntz,  4  B.  &  Ad.  508. 

(w)  And  this  is  true  although  the  bills  [y)  If  part  of  the  goods  have  been  de- 
are  not  yet  mature.  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  livered,  the  rest  may  nevertheless  be 
13  Me.  93;  Bell  ?^  Moss,  5  Whart.  189;  stopped.  Buckley  v.  Furniss,  17  Wend. 
Feise  v.  Wray,  3  East,  93;  Jenkyns  v.  504.  So  held  wliero  the  goods  were  sep- 
Usborne,  7  Man.  &  G.  078,  008  ;  Donatli  arated,  and  one  wagon-load  had  been  de- 
V.  Broomhead,  7  Penn.  St.  301.  And  it  livered  before  the  rest  arrived.  See  also 
is  said  that  the  consignor  need  not  tender  Hanson  v.  Meyer,  6  East,  G14.  In  Tan- 
back  the  bill.  Edwards  v.  Brewer,  2  M.  ner  v.  Scovell,  14  M.  &  AV.  28,  goods  were 
&  W.  375  ;  Hays  v.  Mouille,  14  Penn.  St.  shipped  for  London,  and  were  landed  at  a 
48.  But  of  this  we  should  have  some  wharf,  and  entered  on  the  wharfinger's 
doubts.  books    in  the  consifjnor's  name  ;    he    liad 

(x)   Hodgson    V.   Loy,   7   T.    R.   440;  also  given  the  vendee  an  order  for  their 

1  Thus  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  is  applicable  to  bills  of  exchange.  MuUer 
V.  Pondir,  55  N.  Y.  325. 

=2  Goods  are  liable  to  be  stopped  as  long  as  they  are  in  the  possession  of  a  carrier 
as  carrier.  White  v.  Mitchell,  38  Mich.  390.  The  transitus  is  not  at  an  end  until 
the  goods  have  reached  the  place  named  by  the  buver  to  t])e  seller  as  the  place 
of  destination.  Ex  parte  Golding,  Davis,  &  Co.  13  Ch.  D.  628 ;  TreadwcU  v.  Aydlett, 
9  Heiskell,  388.  But  the  transit  may  be  at  an  end  at  a  place  where  the  buyer  in- 
tends them  to  remain  until  he  chooses  a  fresh  or  final  destination.  Becker  v.  Ilall- 
garten,  86  N.  Y.  167.  An  attachment  of  the  goods  in  transit  as  the  i)roperty  of  tlie 
buyer  does  not  put  an  end  to  the  right.  Durgy,  &c.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  123  Mass.  12; 
Calahan  v.  Babcock,  21  Ohio  St.  281 ;  Morris  v.  Shryock,  50  Miss.  690. 

645 


*602 


THE  LAW    OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


It  seems  to  be  settled,  that  they  are  so  not  only  while 
*  602    *  in  motion,  and  not  only  while  in  the  actual  possession  of 

the  carrier  (although  he  was  appointed  and  specified  by  the 
consignee),  but  also  while  they  are  deposited  in  any  place  dis- 
tinctly connected  with  the  transmission  or  delivery  of  them,  («)  ^ 


delivery,  under  which  he  had  received 
and  sold  the  greater  part ;  held,  notwith- 
standing that  the  transitus  of  the  rest 
might  he  arrested.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  Hammond  r.  Anderson,  4  B.  &  P.  69, 
the  vendor  and  vendee  both  lived  in  tlie 
same  town ;  and  the  goods  lay  at  the 
wharf  of  a  tiiird  person.  Tiie  vendee 
having  received  an  order  for  the  delivery 
of  the  property,  went  to  the  wharf, 
weighed  the  whole,  and  took  away  a  part ; 
it  was  held,  that  the  vendor  had  then  no 
right  to  stop  the  remainder.  So  in  Slu- 
bey  V.  Hey  ward,  2  H.  Bl.  504,  the  whole 
property  arrived  at  the  port  of  delivery  ; 
the  consignees  entered  the  whole  cargo  at 
the  custom-house  ;  they  also  removed  a 
part  before  the  consignor  attempted  to 
stop  the  goods.  It  was  held  too  late. 
See  also  Jones  v.  Jones,  8  M.  &  W.  431  ; 
Bunney  v.  Poyntz,  4  B.  &  Ad.  571,  where 
part  delivery  of  a  portion  of  a  haystack, 
with  intent  to  separate  that  from  the 
remainder,  was  held  not  sufficient.  A 
valid  stoppage  of  a  part  of  the  goods 
forwarded  under  an  entire  contract,  will 
not  abrogate  the  effect  of  an  actual  or 
constructive  possession  acquired  by  the 
consignor  of  the  residue.  Wentworth  v. 
Outhwaite,  10  M.  &  W.  436,  a  very  im- 
portant case.  The  dictinn  of  Taunton,  J., 
in  Betts  v.  Gibbins,  2  A.  &  E.  57,  that  a 
partial  deliver}'  is  prima  facie  a  delivery 
of  the  wliole,  has  been  denied.  See  Tan- 
ner V.  Scovell,  14  M.  &  W.  37.  This 
seems  to  have  been  mainly  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  not  intended  by  the 
vendee,  by  taking  possession  of  part,  to 
take  possession  of  the  whole,  but  to 
separate  that  part,  and  take  possession 
of  it  alone.  In  Crawshay  v.  Eades,  1  B. 
&  C.  181,  A  delivered  a  quantity  of  iron 
to  be  conveyed  to  B  the  vendee.  The 
carrier  landed  a  part  of  the  iron  on 
B's  wharf,  when,  learning  that  B  had 
stopped  payment,  he  reloaded  the  same 
on  his  barge,  and  carried  the  whole  to  his 
own  premises.  Held,  that  the  vendor 
might  stop  all  the  goods,  the  carrier 
having  a  lien  on  the  whole  for  his 
freight,  and  as  he  bad  shown  no  assent 
to  their  delivery  without  payment  of  his 


lien,  no  part  of  the  goods  ever  came  into 
the  possession  of  the  vendee.  See  on 
this  subject  also  Miles  v.  Gorton,  2  Cr.  & 
M.  504 ;  Dixon  v.  Yates,  5  B.  &  Ad.  313  ; 
Blackman  v.  Pierce,  23  Cal.  508. 

(z)  This  point  was  much  discussed  in 
Sawyer  v.  Joslin,  20  Vt.  172.  There  the 
goods  were  shipped  at  Troy,  N.  Y.,  di- 
rected to  the  j)urchaser  at  Vergennes,  Vt. 
They  were  landed  upon  the  wharf  at 
Vergennes,  half  a  mile  from  the  pur- 
chaser's place  of  business.  The  pur- 
chaser's goods  were  usually  landed  at 
the  same  j)lace,  and  it  was  not  customary 
for  the  wharfinger  or  the  carrier  or  any 
one  for  them,  to  have  any  care  of  the 
goods  after  they  were  landed  ;  but  the 
consignee  was  accustomed  to  transport 
the  goods  from  the  wharf  to  his  place  of 
business,  as  was  also  the  custom  with 
other  persons  having  goods  landed  there. 
The  goods  while  on  the  wharf  were  not 
subject  to  any  lien  for  freight  or  charges  ; 
it  was  held,  that  a  delivery  on  the  wharf 
was  a  constructive  delivery  to  the  vendee, 
and  that  the  right  of  stoppage  was  gone 
when  the  goods  were  landed.  The  cases 
on  this  point  were  thus  classified  by  Hall, 
J  ,  who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court : 
"  The  cases  cited  and  relied  upon  by  the 
plaintiff's  counsel,  where  the  transit  was 
held  not  to  have  terminated,  will,  I  think, 
all  be  found  to  fall  within  one  or  the 
other  of  the  following  classes :  1.  Cases 
in  which  it  has  been  held  that  the  right 
of  stoppage  existed,  where  the  goods 
were  originally  forwarded  on  board  of  a 
ship  chartered  by  the  vendee.  2.  Where 
the  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the  vendee 
has  been  deemed  incomplete,  by  reason 
of  his  refusal  to  accept  them.  3.  Where 
goods  remained  in  the  custom-house,  sub- 
ject to  a  government  bill  for  duties.  4. 
Where  they  were  still  in  the  hands  of  the 
carrier,  or  wharfinger,  as  his  agent,  sub- 
ject to  the  carrier's  lien  for  freights.  5. 
Where  the  goods,  though  arrived  at  their 
port  of  delivery,  were  still  on  shipboard, 
or  in  the  hands  of  the  ship's  lighterman, 
to  be  conveyed  to  the  wharf.  6.  Where 
the  goods  had  performed  part  of  their 
transit,  but  were  in  the  hands  of  a  mid- 


1  See  Sherman  v.  Rugee,  55  Wis.  346,  where  the  right  was  not  lost,  although  the 
attaching  officer  had,  with  the  consent  of  the  vendees,  placed  the  goods  in  their 
building. 

646 


CH.  VI.]  STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU.  *  C03 

or  rather,  while  in  any  place  not  actually  or  constructively  the 
place  of  the  consignee,  or  so  in  his  possession  or  under  his  con- 
trol, that  the  putting  them  there  implies  the  intention  of  delivery. 
Thus,  if  goods  are  lodged  in  a  public  warehouse  for  non- 
payment *  of  duties,  they  are  not  in  the  possession  of  the  *  003 
vendee,  and  the  vendor  may  stop  them,  (a)  ^  So  where 
goods  are  still  in  the  custom-house,  the  right  to  stop  them  is  not, 
defeated,  although  the  vendee  has  i)aid  the  freight,  the  goods 
having  been  not  entered  through  loss  of  the  invoice,  (i)  The 
I  entry  of  the  goods  without  payment  of  duties  is  not  a  termination 
of  the  transit,  (c) 

They  are  in  transit  until  they  pass  into  the  possession  of  the 
vendee.  But  this  possession  may  be  actual  or  constructive. 
The  doctrine  that  the  goods  must  come  to  the  "  corporal  touch  " 
of  the  vendee,  as  was  once  said  by  Lord  Kenyon^  has  long  since 
been  exploded.  (cZ)  Thus,  suffering  the  goods  to  bo  marked  and 
resold,  and  marked  again  by  the  second  purchaser,  has  been  con- 
sidered a  constructive  delivery,  (e)  So,  a  delivery  by  the  vendor, 
to  the  vendee,  of  the  key  of  the  vendor's  warehouse,  where  the 

die-man,  to   be  forwarded  on  by   other  v.  Olive,  cited   in  Abbott  on   Shipping, 

carriers."     Tucker  v.  Humphrey,!  Mo.  400;  Mottram  t-.  Heyer,  5  Denio,  029. 
&  P   378,  is  an  important  case.     There  (b)  Donatli  v.  Browuhead,  7  Penn.  St. 

goods  were  shipped  on  board  a  vessel  ad-  301. 

dressed  to  the  defendant's  wharf  for  one  (c)  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  5  Denio,  629; 
Gilbert.  An  invoice  was  sent  to  Gilbert,  s.  c.  1  Denio,  483,  is  an  important  case, 
stating  that  the  goods  were  bought  and  The  defendants  were  merchants  in  New 
shipped  for  him,  and  on  his  account  and  York.  They  ordered  the  plaintiffs  to 
risk ;  and  in  the  ship's  manifest  they  send  them  from  England  a  case  of  hard- 
were  marked  to  be  delivered  "  to  order."  ware.  It  arrived  April  7,  when  the  bill 
Before  the  arrival  of  the  vessel,  the  pur-  of  lading  was  delivered  to  the  plaintiffs, 
chaser  became  bankrupt,  and  after  the  and  the  freight  paid.  On  the  9th,  the 
vessel  reached  the  wharf,  but  before  the  goods  were  entered  at  the  custom-house, 
goods  were  landed,  they  were  claimed  by  and  carried  from  the  ship  to  the  public 
a  person  on  behalf  of  the  consignor,  and  store.  While  there,  and  before  the 
they  were  delivered  to  him.  In  an  ac-  duties  were  paid,  the  defendants  became 
tion  by  the  assignees  of  the  consignee  to  insolvent,  and  the  plaintiffs  demanded 
recover  the  goods,  held,  that  the  consignor  of  them  the  goods.  'They  refused  to  de- 
had  a  right  to  stop  them.  See  other  in-  liver  them,  and  afterwards  paid  the 
stances  in  Richardson  v.  Goss,  3  B.  &  P.  duties,  and  removed  them  to  their  store. 
127  ;  Loeschman  v.  Williams,  4  Camp.  It  was  held,  that  the  demand  was  not  suf- 
181 ;  Mills  V.  Ball,  2  B.  &  P.  457  ;  Rowe  ficient  to  revest  the  title  in  the  plain- 
V.  Pickford,  1  J.  B.  Moore,  526 ;   Leeds  r.  tiffs. 

Wright,  3  B.  &  P.  320 ;   Marshall  r.  Fall,  (d)    Wright    v.    Lawcs,   4   Esp.    82; 

9  La.  An.  92.  Mottram  v.  Heyer,  1  Denio,  483. 

(a)  Northey  v.  Field,  2  Esp.  613  ;  Nix  (e)    Stoveld  v.  Hughes,  14  East,  308. 

1  So  if  the  goods  are  stored  in  a  government  bonded  warehouse,  upon  the  records 
of  which  they  are  transferred  to  the  buyer,  the  right  to  stop  them  is  not  defeated  if, 
by  the  terms  of  the  sale,  the  seller  is  to  forward  them  to  their  destination  on  the 
buyer's  order.    Mohr  v.  Boston,  &c.  R.  Co.  106  Mass.  67. 

647 


604 


THE  LAW  OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


goods  are  stored,  amounts  to  a  delivery.  (/)  ^  So,  demanding 
and  marking  the  goods  by  the  vendee's  agent  at  the  inn  where 
the  goods  arrived  at  their  destination,  (^g) 

If  the  carrier,  by  reason  of  an  arrangement  with  the  consignee, 
or  for  any  cause,  remains  in  possession,  but  holds  the  goods  only 

as  the  agent  of  the  consignee,  and  subject  to  his  order,  this 
*  604    is  *  the  possession  of  the  consignee,  (li)      Yet,  even  in 

cases  where  an  existing  usage  authorizes  a  carrier  to  re- 
tain the  goods  in  his  hands  as  security  for  his  whole  claim  against 
a  consignee,  the  consignor  may  still  stop  them  as  in  transitu,  and 
take  them  from  the  carrier,  by  paying  to  him  the  amount  due 
specifically  for  the  carriage  of  those  goods,  (i)  And  the  master 
of  a  ship  chartered  wholly,  or  even  owned  by  the  consignee,  may, 
nevertheless,  be  a  carrier  in  whose  hands  the  consignor  may  stop 
the  goods,  if  the  goods  are  to  be  delivered  finally  to  the  charterer 
himself ;  but  if  they  are  on  board  the  buyer's  ship  to  be  carried 
to  some  third  party,  they  are  so  far  delivered  to  the  buyer  when 


(  /")  So  thought  Lord  Kenyan  himself 
in  Ellis  V.  Hunt,  3  T.  R.  4(34. 

(g)  Ellis  V.  Hunt,  3  T.  K.  464.  So  if 
the  vendor  agreed  to  let  the  goods  lie  in 
his  warehouse,  for  a  short  time,  although 
free  of  rent,  and  to  accommodate  the  ven- 
dee. Barrett  r.  Goddard,  3  Mason,  107. 
But  see  Townley  v.  Crump,  4  A.  &  E.  58, 
contra.  So  if  rent  he  paid.  Hurry  v. 
Mangles,  1  Camp.  452.  So  delivering  to 
the  vendee  a  bill  of  parcels  with  an  order 
on  the  store-keeper  for  the  delivery  of 
the  goods.  HuUingsworth  v.  Napier,  3 
Caines,  182.  But  (jucere,  see  post.  So 
giving  an  order  by  the  vendor  to  the 
keeper  of  a  warehouse,  for  the  delivery 
of  the  goods.  Harnian  v.  Anderson,  2 
Camp.  243.  See  also  Frazier  v.  Hiliiard, 
2  Strob.  L.  809.  Delivery  to  mercantile 
liouse,  merely  for  transmission  to  the 
vendee,  by  a  forwarding  house,  does  not 
take  away  tlie  right  of  stoppage.  Hays 
i;.  Mouille,  14  Penn  St.  48. 

(h)  This  principle  is  well  illustrated 
bv  the  case  of  Allan  v.  Gripper,  2  Cr.  & 
J"  218;  s.  c.  2  Tyr.  217.  The  goods 
were  conveyed  by  a  carrier  by  water, 
and  deposited  in  the  carrier's  warehouse, 
to  be  delivered  thence  to  the  purchaser 
or  his  customers,  as  they  should  be 
•wanted,  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement  to 


this  effect  between  the  carrier  and  the 
purchaser.  This  was  the  usual  course  of 
business  between  them.  It  was  held,  tliat 
the  carrier  became  the  warehouseman  of 
the  purcliaser  upon  the  goods  being  de- 
posited there,  and  that  the  vendor's  right 
of  stoppage  was  gone.  And  the  case 
was  likened  to  Foster  v.  Frampton,  6  B. 
&  C.  107;  s.  c.  9  Dow.  &  R.  108,  wiiere 
the  vendee  desired  the  carrier  for  his 
own  convenience  to  let  the  goods  renain 
in  his  warehouse  until  he  received  fur- 
ther directions  ;  and  also  took  home 
samples  of  the  goods  ;  but  before  the 
bulk  was  removed,  lie  became  insolvent; 
held,  that  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu 
was  gone.  Scott  v.  Pettit,  3  B.  &  P. 
469,  was  decided  on  the  same  principle. 
Goods  were  sent  from  Manchester  di- 
rected to  the  purchasers  at  London  ;  but 
in  pursuance  of  a  general  order  from  the 
buyer  to  the  seller,  were  sent  to  the 
warehouse  of  the  buyer's  packer,  and  by 
the  warehouseman  were  booked  to  the 
buyer's  account,  and  the  warehouseman 
unpacked  them.  The  transilus  was  held 
at  an  end  when  the  goods  reached  the 
warehouse. 

(i)  Oppenheim  v.  Russell,  3  B.  &  P. 
42,  is  a  very  excellent  case  upon  this 
subject. 


•  The  giving  a  delivery  order  to  the  buyer,  who  gives  it  to  a  warehouseman,  puts 
an  end  to  the  right  of  stoppage.     Croker  v.  Lawder,  9  Ir.  L.  R.  21. 

648 


CH.  VI.] 


STOPPAGE   IN   TRANSITU. 


G04 


they  go  on   board   his   ship,  as   to   destroy  tlic   right  of   stop- 
page,  (i) 


(./)  Stubbs    V.  Lund,    7    Mass.    453, 
recognizes    this   principle.      There    the 
vendors  resided  in  Liverpool,  England; 
the  vendees   in   America.       The    goods 
were   delivered   on   board    the   vendees' 
own  ship,  at  Liverpool,  and  consigned  to 
them   or  assigns,  for  which    the   master 
had  signed  bills  of  lading.     The  vendors, 
hearing  of  the  insolvency  of  the  vendees' 
before  the  vessel  left  Liverpool,  refused 
to  let  the  vessel  sail,  claiming  a  right  to 
stop  the  goods,  and   that  they  had   not 
reached  their  destination.     The  right  of 
stoppage  was  allowed,  mainly,  it  seems, 
on  the  ground  that  the  goods  were,  by 
the  bills  of  lading,  to  be  transported  to  the 
vendees,  and  were   in  transit    until   they 
reached  them  ;  but  it  was  thought  that 
if  the  goods  had  been  intended  for  some 
foreifj/n   market,   and   never  designed  to 
reach  any  possession  of  the  purchasers, 
more  than  tliey  then  had  at  the  time  of 
their  shipment,  the  case  would  be  differ- 
ent, and  the  transit  in  such  a  case  would 
be  considered  as  ended.     Parsons,  C.  J., 
thus   laid  down  the   law  on  this   point: 
"  In  our  opinion,  the  true  distinction  is, 
whether   any   actual   possession   of    the 
consignee    or   his  assigns,  after  the   ter- 
mination of  the  voyage,  be  or  be  not  pro- 
vided for  in  the  bills  of  lading.     When 
such  actual  possession,  after  the  termi- 
nation of  the  voyage,  is  so  provided  for, 
then   the   right   of    stoppage   in   transitu 
remains   after  the   shipment.       Thus,  if 
goods  are  consigned  on  credit,  and  deliv- 
ered  on  board  a  ship  chartered  by  the 
consignee,  to   be   imported  by  him,  the 
right   of   stopping   in   transitu   continues 
after  the  shipment  (3  East,  381),  but  if 
the  goods  are  not  to  be  imported  by  the 
consignee,  but   to   be   transported   from 
the  place  of  shipment  to  a  foreign  mar- 
ket,   the    right   of    stopping    in    transitu 
ceases  on  the  shipment,  the  transit  being 
then  completed ;  because  no  other  actual 
possession  of  the  goods  by  the  consignee 
is    provided  for  in   the   bills  of   lading, 
which   express   the   terms   of    the   ship- 
ment."      The   court   in   this   case,   rely 
upon   Bohtlingk   v.  Inglis,   3   East,  381, 
where  a  person  in  England  chartered  a 
ship   to   go  to  Russia,  and   bring   home 
goods  from  his  correspondent  there,  the 
goods  to  make  a  complete  cargo.     The 
vessel  proceeded  to  Russia,  and  the  cor- 
respondent shipped  the  goods  ordered  at 
the  risk  of   the  freighter,  and  sent  him 
the   invoice   and   bills   of   lading.      The 
goods    were    to    be    conveyed    to    the 
freighter  in  England.     It  was  held,  that 
the  delivery  on  board  the  vessel  was  not 


a  final    delivery,   and    th.it    the    goods 
might  be  stopped   on  the  way ;   and  on 
the  same  ground   as  before   stated    that 
they   "  were  in  their  passage   or  transit 
from  the  consignor  to  the  consignee."    Tlie 
distinction  alluded    to  in  the   next  note, 
was,  however,  fully  recognized.    See  also 
Coxo  I'.  Harden,  4  East,  211.     Newhall  v. 
Vargas,  13  Me.  9.3,  is  also  a  clear  illus- 
tration of  the  rule  of  the  text.     The  pur- 
chaser lived  in  America;   the  consignor 
in  Havana.     The  former  sent  his  own  ves- 
sel to  Havana  for  a  cargo  of   molasses, 
which  was  shipped  on  board  the  vessel, 
consigned  to  the  vendee,  and  to  be  deliv- 
ered to  him  at  his  port  of  residence  ;  it 
was  held,  that  the  vendor  had  the  right 
to   stop   the   goods   at  any  time   before 
they  came  into  the  actual  possession  of 
the  vendee,  and   the  case   of   Stubbs   v. 
Lund,    was   fully   approved.       See   also 
Thompson    v.    Trail,   2    C.    &     T.   334; 
Buckley  r.  Furniss,  15  Wend.  137  ;  8.  c. 
17    Wend.    504.     The   case   of   Bolin   v. 
Huffnagle,  1    Rawle,  1,  seems  in   direct 
conflict  with   these   authorities,  and    we 
think  cannot  be  supported.     But  see  the 
opinion  of  Parke,  B.,  in  Van  Castecl  v. 
Booker,  2  Exch.  708.     The  case  of  Tur- 
ner V.  The  Trustees  of  Liverpool  Docks, 
in  the  Exchequer  Chamber,  G  E.  L.  &  E. 
507;  s.  c.  6  Exch.  548,  is  an  important 
case  on  this  point.     There  A.  &  Co.,  re- 
siding in  Charleston,  America,  consigned 
cotton  to  B    &  Co.,  living  at  Liverpool, 
and  delivered  it  on  B.  &  Co.'s  own  vessel 
at  Charleston,  taking   a   bill  of    lading 
to  deliver  to  their  order  or  their  assigns, 
they   paying   no    freight,    "being  owmr's 
property."    Tlie   consignors  indorsed   the 
bill   to  the   "Bank   of   Liverpool   or  or- 
der."      The   consignees    became    bank- 
rupt before   the  cotton  arrived   at    Liv- 
erpool.    The   consignors,  on   its  arrival, 
claimed    to   stop    the   cargo   in    transitu. 
The    assignees    in    bankruptcy    claimed 
the    cotton,    as    having    been    so    com- 
pletely   delivered     as     to    vest    in     the 
bankrupts    as    soon    as   it   was   put   on 
board    their  own   vessel  at  Charleston, 
specially   appointed    by   them   to    bring 
home    such   cargo.       Palteson,   J.,   said : 
"  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  delivery  of 
goods  on  board  the  purchaser's  own  ship 
is  a  delivery  to  him,  unless  the  vendor 
protects    himself    by   special    terms   re- 
straining the  effect  of  such  delivery.     In 
the   present   case,   the   vendors,   by    the 
terms  of  the  bill  of  lading,  made  the  cot- 
ton deliverable  at  Liverpool  to  their  or- 
der or  assigns,  and   therefore  there  was 
not  a  delivery  of  tJie  cotton  to  the  pur- 

649 


*605 


THE   LAW   OF   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


*  605        *  So,  if  by  the  bill  of  lading  the  goods  are  deliverable 

to  the  order  of  the  consignor  or  his  assigns,  the  property 
therein  does  not  pass  to  the  consignee,  so  as  to  defeat  this  right, 
although  they  may  be  delivered  on  board  the  consignee's  own 
vessel,  (^)  or  on  one  chartered  by  him,  (k¥)  and  although  the  bill 
of  lading  expressed  that  the  consignee  was  to  pay  no  freight,  the 
goods  "  being  owner's  property."  (I)     But  it  might  be  otherwise 

if  it  appeared  by  the  bill  of  lading  that  the  goods  were  put 

*  606    on  board  to  be  carried  for  and  on  *  account  and  risk  of  the 

consignee,  (w)  So  if  the  goods  are  intended  for  a  market 
foreign  to  the  residence  of  the  consignee,  and  never  designed  to 
come  into  the  actual  possession  of  the  charterer,  then  it  would 
seem  that  a  delivery  on  board  of  the  vessel,  whether  owned  or 
hired  by  the  purchaser  or  not,  has  been  held  final,  and  the  right 
of  stoppage  in  transitu  gone,  (n) 


chasers  as  owners,  although  there  was  a 
delivery  on  board  their  ship.  The  ven- 
dors still  reserved  to  themselves,  at  the 
time  of  the  delivery  to  the  captain, 
a  jus  disponendi  of  the  goods,  which 
he  by  signing  the  bill  acknowledged." 
See  also  Ellershaw  v.  Magniac,  6  Exch. 
570,  n. ;  Van  Casteel  v.  Booker,  2  Exch. 
691 ;  Wait  j;.  Baker,  id.  1 ;  Mitchel  v. 
Ede,  11  A.  &  E.  888;  Jenkyns  v.  Brown, 
14  Q.  B.  496  ;  Key  v.  Cotesworth,  14  E.  L. 
&  E.  435;  s.  c.  7  Exch.  595;  Aguirre  v. 
Parmelee,  22  Conn.  473.  See  note  (n), 
post. 

(k)  Wait  V.  Baker,  2  Exch.  1. 

(kk)  Berndtson  v.  Strang,  Law  Rep.  4 
Eq.  481. 

(/)  Turner  v.  Trustees  of  Liverpool 
Docks,  6  E.  L.  &  E.  507 ;  s.  c.  6  Exch. 
643. 

(m)  Van  Casteel  v.  Booker,  2  Exch. 
691;  Wilmshurst  v.  Bowker,  7  Man.  & 
G.  882;  Jenkyns  v.  Brown,  14  Q.  B.  496. 

(n)  This  distinction  is  fully  supported 
by  Fowler  v.  Kymer,  cited  in  3  East,  396, 
and  recognized  in  Stubbs  v.  Liuid,  7  Mass. 
457 ;  Newhall  v.  Vargas,  13  Me.  93 ;  and 
Rowley  v.  Bigelow,  12  Pick.  308,  supports 
the  same  view.  The  court  there  said : 
"  We  think  it  very  clear,  that  a  delivery 
of  the  corn  on  board  of  a  vessel  appoint- 
ed by  the  vendee  to  receive  it,  not  for  the 
purpose  of  transportation  to  him,  or  to  a 
place  appointed  by  him,  to  be  delivered 
there  for  his  use,  but  to  be  shipped  by 
such  vessel,  in  his  name,  from  his  own 
place  of  residence  and  business,  to  a  third 
person,  was  a  termination  of  the  transit, 
and  the  right  of  the  vendor  to  stop  in 
transitu  was  at  an  end."    In  Valpy  v.  Gib- 

650 


son,  4  C.  B.  837,  it  was  held,  that  if  goods 
are  sold  to  be  shipped  to  some  ultimate 
destination,  of  which  the  vendor  had 
knowledge,  but  were  first  to  go  into  the 
hands  of  an  agent  of  the  purchaser,  and 
there  await  the  purchaser's  orders,  the 
right  of  stoppage  in  transitu  was  deter- 
mined on  delivery  to  such  agent.  See 
also  the  still  later  case  of  Cowas-jee  v. 
Thompson,  5  Moore,  P.  C.  105.  There 
goods  contracted  to  be  sold  and  delivered 
"  free  on  board,"  to  be  paid  for  by  cash 
or  bills,  at  the  option  of  the  purchasers, 
were  delivered  on  board,  and  receipts 
taken  from  the  mate  by  the  lighterman 
employed  by  the  sellers,  who  handed  the 
same  over  to  them.  The  sellers  apprised 
the  purchasers  of  the  delivery,  who  elect- 
ed to  pay  for  the  goods  by  a  bill,  which 
the  sellers  having  drawn,  was  duly  ac- 
cepted by  the  purchasers.  The  sellers 
retained  the  mate's  receipts  for  the  goods, 
but  the  master  signed  the  bill  of  lading 
in  tlie  purchasers'  names,  who,  while  the 
bill  they  accepted  was  running,  became 
insolvent.  In  such  circumstances,  held  by 
the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy 
Council  (reversing  the  verdict  and  judg- 
ment of  the  Supreme  Court  at  Bombay), 
that  trover  would  not  lie  for  the  goods, 
for  that  on  their  delivery  on  board  the 
vessel  they  were  no  longer  in  transitu,  so 
as  to  be  stopped  by  the  sellers ;  and  that 
the  retention  of  the  receipts  by  the  sel- 
lers was  immaterial,  as,  after  their  elec- 
tion to  be  paid  by  a  bill,  the  receipts  of 
the  mate  were  not  essential  to  the  trans- 
action between  the  seller  and  purchaser. 
See  also  Schotsmans  v.  Lancashire  R.  R. 
Co.  Law  Rep.  2  Ch.  332. 


CH.  VI.]  STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU.  *  607 

As  the  goods  may  pass  coyistructively  into  the  possession  of  the 
consignee,  so  they  may  be  transferred  by  him  before  they  reach 
him,  in  such  a  way  as  to  destroy  the  consignor's  right  of  stoppage 
in  transitu.  This  may  be  done  by  an  indorsement  and  delivery  of 
the  bill  of  lading.  This  instrument  is  now  (as  we  had  occasion 
to  say  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  work),  (o)  i  by  the  custom  of 
merchants,  which  is  adopted  by  the  courts,  and  made  a  rule  of 
law,  regarded  as  negotiable ;  or,  more  accurately  speaking,  as 
quasi  negotiable,  its  indorsement  and  delivery  operating  as  a  sym- 
bolic delivery  of  the  goods  mentioned  in  it.  (jt?)^  And 
such  transfer,  if  it  is  in  good  faith  and  for  a  *  valuable  *  607 
consideration,  passes  the  property  to  the  second  vendee, 
who  holds  it  free  from  the  right  of  the  original  vendor  to  stop  tlic 
goods  in  transitu.  (5-)     But  a  second  vendee,  to  whom  the  bill  of 

(o)  See  ante,  p.  *289,  and  post,  vol.  Lickbarrow  w.  Mason,  some  of  the  judges 

ii.,  p.  *291,  *292.  did  indeed  liken  a  bill  of  lading  to  a  bill 

( p)  Small   V.   Moates,   9    Bing.   574 ;  of    exchange,   and  considered    that   the 

Dixon   V.  Yates,  5   B.  &   Ad.  313  ;  Jen-  indorsement    of     the     one    tlid     convey 

kyns  V.  Usborne,  7  Man.  &  G.  678.     The  the  property  in  tlie   goods  in  the   same 

case  of   Thompson  v.  Dominy,  14  M.  &  manner  as  the  indorsement  of  the  other 

W.  402,    shows   that   the   mere   indorse-  conveyed    the    sum    for    which    it   was 

ment  of  a  bill  of  lading  does  not  authorize  drawn.      But   in   the  Exchequer  Cham- 

the  indorsee  to  bring  a  suit  in  his  own  ber  there  was   much  argument  to  show 

name  against  the  signers,  for  tlieir  failure  that,   in    itself,    the    indorsement    of    a 

todeliver  the  goods  according  to  its  terms  :  bill    of    lading   was    no   transfer  of   the 

it  would  not  be  correct,  therefore,  to  con-  property,   though    it    migiit    operate,    as 

sider  such    bills    negotiable,   exactly,    al-  other    instruments,    as    evidence    of    the 

though   they   have   sometimes    been   so  transfer."     See  Dows  v.  Cobb,  12  Barb, 

called  (see  Berkley  v.  Watling,  7  A.  &  E.  310. 

29;   Bell   v.  Moss,    5  AVhart.  189,  205),  (7)  The  leading  case  on  this  subject 

but  rather  that  an  indorsement  of  such  is  Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  first  decided  in 

bill  would  amount  to  a  symbolical  delivery,  the  King's  Bench,  1787,  and  reported  in 

And  if  there  were  also  a  bona  fide  sale  2  T.  R.  63,  and  from  thence  carried  to 

accompanying  the  transfer,  the  right  of  the  Exchequer  Chamber,  where.  In  1790, 

the  vendor  to   stop  in   transitu   is   gone,  the   decision    below    was    reversed ;    re- 

Newsom  ;;.  Thornton,  6  East,  41,  shows  ported  in  1  H.  Bl.  357.     The  record  was 

this.      There    Lord    Eilenboroufjh,   C.   J.,  thence  removed  into  the  House  of  Lords, 

said:  "A  bill  of  lading  indeed  shall  pass  where  the   judgment  of   the  Exchequer 

the   property  upon  a   bond  fide  indorse-  Chamber  was  itself  reversed,  and  a  venire 

ment  and  delivery,  where  it  is  intended  de  novo  awarded  in  June.  1793.     Buller's 

so  to  operate,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  able  opinion  before  the  House  of  Lords 

direct  delivery  of  the  goods  themselves  is  reported  in  6  East,  21,  n.     The  cause 

would  do,  if  so  intended.     But  it  cannot  was  again  tried  before  the  King's  Bench 

operate  further."    Lawrence,  J.,  added :  "  In  in  1794,  at  the  head  of  which  Lord  Ken- 

1  A  seller's  right  of  stoppage  is  put  an  end  to  by  a  transfer  of  the  bill  of  lading 
by  the  buyer  to  a  third  person  wlio  lio)id  fide  gives  value  for  it.  Audenreid  v.  Ran- 
dall, 3  CUfford,  99 ;  Kemp  v.  Canavan  15  Ir.  C.  L.  216.  In  Leask  v.  Scott,  2  Q.  B.  D. 
376,  it  was  held  that  a  transfer  of  a  bill  of  lading  for  value  to  a  l>07}d  fide  transferee 
defeats  the  stoppage  in  transitu  of  an  unpaid  vendor,  although  the  consideration  of 
the  transfer  was  past  and  not  given  at  the  time  of  the  transfer.  Contra,  Rodger  v. 
Comptoir  d'Escompte,  L.  R.  2  P.  C.  393. 

^  It  is  not  negotiable  like  a  bill  of  exchange,  Buffalo  Bank  v.  Fiske,  71  N.  Y.  353 ; 
Stollenwerck  v.  Thacher,  115  Mass.  224,  226,  227  ;  and  its  indorsement  gives  no  better 
right  than  that  of  the  indorser,  Farmers',  &c.  Bank  v.  Erie  R.  Co.  72  N.  Y.  188. 

651 


*  608  THE  LAW  OF  CONTRACTS.  [bOOK  III. 

lading  is  not  transferred,  or  not  so  transferred  as  to  carry  good 
title,  and   who   neglects   to   take   actual    or   constructive 

*  608    *  possession,  is  in  no  better  position  than  the  first  vendee, 

under  whom  he  claims ;  and  the  goods  may  be  taken  from 
him  by  the  first  vendor,  on  the  insolvency  of  the  first  vendee. 
And  if  the  bill  of  lading  be  so  transferred  and  indorsed  by  way  of 
pledge  to  secure  the  consignee's  debt,  the  consignor  does  not  lose 
entirely  his  right  to  stop  the  goods  in  transitu.,  but  holds  it  sub- 
ject to  the  rights  of  the  pledgee.  That  is,  he  may  enforce  his 
claim  to  hold  the  surplus  of  the  value  of  the  goods,  after  the 
pledgee's  claim  is  satisfied ;  and  he  holds  this  surplus  to  secure 
the  debt  of  the  consignee  to  him.  (r)  ^  But  the  pledgee's  claim, 
which  the  consignor  is  thus  bound  to  recognize,  would  not  be  for 
a  general  balance  of  account ;  but  only  for  the  specific  advances 
made  upon  the  security  of  that  particular  bill  of  lading.  And 
therefore,  by  paying  or  tendering  that  amount,  the  consignor 
acquires  the  right  of  retaking  all  the  goods,  (s)  ^  And  if  the 
pledgor  had  pledged  some  of  his  own  goods,  together  with  those 
of  the  consignor,  the  latter  would  have  a  right  to  insist  upon  the 
appropriation  of  all  the  pledgor's  own  goods  towards  the  claim  of 

yon  had  in  the  mean  time  been  placed,  note  of  the   goods,  or  a   delivery  order 

and  decided   in  the  same  manner  as   in  for   them,   instead   of    a   bill  of    lading. 

1787,    when    the    case    was    iirst    before  Jenkyns  v.  Usborne,  7  Man.  &   G.  678; 

them.     If    a    writ    of    error    was   again  Akerman    v.  Humphrey,  1   C.  &   P.  53; 

bronght,  it  was  probably  abandoned,  as  McEwan  v.  Smith,  13  Jur.  265,  2  House 

no  fnrther  report  of   the   case   appears,  of  L.  Cas.  309;  Townley  v.  Crmiip,  4  A. 

A  clear  and  succinct  history  of  tiie  law  &  E.  58.      See,  however,  Hollingsworth 

on  this  point  is  given  in  Abbott  on  vSliip-  i\  Napier,  S  Caines,  182.      In  Walter  v. 

ping,  471.     Tiie    case  of    Lickbarrow  v.  Ross,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  283,  is  an  excellent 

Mason  is  to  be  understood   as  deciding  summary  ai  tlie  law  on  tiiis  point.     It  is 

only,  that  if   there   has   been  an  actual  there  held,  tl\at  tlie  indorsement  and  de- 

and  bond  fide,  sale  of  goods  by  the  con-  livery  of  a  bill  of  lading,  or  the  delivery 

signee,  the  consignor  cannot  stop  them,  without  indorsement,  if  b}'  the  terms  of 

if   the   purchaser   of   the  consignee   lias  the  bill  the  property  is  to  be  delivered  to 

also  taken  an  assignment  to  liimself   of  a  particular  person,  amounts  to  a  trans- 

the  original  bill  of  lading  from  tlie  con-  fer  of  the  jiroperty,  but  not  to  defeat  the 

signor  to  tlie   consignee.     The   mere  as-  vendor's   right   of    stoppage   before    the 

signment  of  a  bill  of  lading,  not  based  goods  came  actually  into  the  possession 

on  an  actual  sale  of  the  goods,  it  is  be-  of  the  vendee.    But  goods  at  sea  may  be 

lieved,  would   not   destroy  the   vendor's  sold,  and  if  the  bill  of  lading  is  indorsed, 

right.     The  delivery  of  a  bill  of  lading  the  right  to  stop  in  transitu  is  gone.     See 

merely,  the  same  being  in  the  hands  of  also   Ryberg  v.  Snell,  id.  403,  and  Gur- 

the   original    consignee,   unindorsed,   will  ney  v.  Behrend,  25  E.  L.  Sc  E.  128  ;  s.  c. 

not,  of    course,  interfere  with    the  ven-  3  E.  &  B.  622. 

dor's    right    of    stoppage.        Tucker    v.  (r)   In  re  Westzinthus,  5  B.  &  Ad.  817  ; 

Humphrey,  4  Bing.  516;  s.  c.  1  Mo.  &  P.  Chandler  v.  Fulton,  10  Tex.  2. 
394,  Parke,  J.     And  a  fortiori,  the  deliv-  (s)   Spalding  v.  Ruding,  6  Beav.  376. 

ery  to   the  vendee   of  a   mere  shipping 

1  Kemp  V.  Falk,  7  App.  Cas.  573,  approves  and  confirms  In  re  Westzinthus  and 
Spalding  v.  Ruding,  supra. 

652 


CH.  VI.] 


STOPPAGE  IN  TRANSITU. 


GOO 


the  pledgee,  before  any  of  the  goods  contained  in  the  hill  of 
lading,  (t) 

It  is  said,  that  the  exercise  of  this  right  is  an  act  so  far  adverse 
to  the  vendee,  that  if  the  goods  be  stopped  by  virtue  of  an  agree- 
ment between  the  buyer  and  seller,  it  is  no  longer  a  stoppage  in 
transitu  ;  but  either  a  cancelling  of  the  sale  by  mutual  con- 
sent, or  a  reconveyance  by  the  buyer,  (w)  And  it  *  then  *  609 
becomes  in  some  cases  a  question  of  considerable  difficulty, 
whether  the  buyer  can  dispossess  liimself  of  the  goods,  or  of  his 
right  to  them,  for  the  benefit  of  the  seller  ;  or  must  hold  them  as 
a  part  of  the  funds  to  which  his  creditors  generally  may  look,  (v) 
The .  principle  which  must  decide  such  a  question  would  seem  to 
be  this :  if  the  sale  is  so  far  complete  that  the  property  in  the 
goods  has  passed  to  the  buyer,  and  the  seller  has  become  his 
creditor  for  the  price,  the  buyer  can  have  no  more  right  to  give 
to  the  seller  security  or  satisfaction  or  other  benefit  from  those 
goods  than  from  any  others  which  he  may  possess.  But  so  long 
as  the  transaction  is  incomplete,  the  buyer  may  warn  the  seller 
of  the  danger  of  going  on  with  it,  and  may  aid  him  in  the  use  of 
all  legal  means  to  arrest  the  transaction  where  it  stands,  and  so 
save  to  him  his  property,  (w) 


it)  In  re  Westzinthus,  5  B.  &  Ad.  817. 

(m)  This  question  was  raised  in  Ash 
V.  Putnam,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  302.  So  in 
Naylor  v.  Dennie,  8  Pick.  198,  the  same 
question  was  examined.  It  was  tiaere 
said,  that  althougli  the  right  of  stoppage 
t?j  transitu  is  adverse  to  tlie  consignee, 
that  means  only  that  it  cannot  be  exer- 
cised under  a  title  derived  from  the  con- 
signee ;  not  that  it  must  be  exercised  in 
hostility  to  him.  And  this  right  of  stop- 
page is  not  defeated,  merely  because  the 
consignee  gives  the  consignor  a  writing 
declaring  that  he  revokes  the  order  for 
the  goods,  and  will  not  receive  them,  and 
requests  the  carrier  to  deliver  them  to 
the  consignor.  If  the  consignor,  there- 
fore, without  regard  to  any  such  rescis- 
sion of  the  sale  by  the  consignee,  duly 
exercise  his  right,  no  previous  attach- 
ment by  the  creditors  of  the  consignee, 
made  during  their  transit,  can  be  set  up 
to  defeat  it.  The  consignor  may  rely 
upon  his  original  property  in  the  goods, 
and  not  upon  any  transfer  or  reconvey- 
ance by  the  vendee.  —  It  is  perfectly 
well  settled,  that  the  mere  sale  of  the 
goods  by  the  vendee  during  their  transit, 
unaccompanied  with  any  indorsement 
or  delivery  of  a  bill  of  lading,  &c.,  will 


not  defeat  the  consignor's  right  of  stop- 
page. Craven  v.  Ryder,  G  Taunt.  43^3; 
Whitehouse  v.  Frost,  12  East,  G14 ;  Sto- 
veld  V.  Hughes,  14  East,  308 ;  Miles  v. 
Gorton,  2  Cr.  &  M.  504 ;  Dixon  v.  Yates, 
6  B.  &  Ad.  339;  Stanton  v.  Eager,  IG 
Pick.  4G7.  A  fortiori,  an  attachment,  or 
seizure,  on  execution,  by  the  creditors  of 
the  vendee  will  not.  They  can  take  no 
more  rights  than  the  vendee  himself  iiad. 
Smith  V.  Goss,  1  Camp.  282 ;  Buckley  i'. 
Eurniss,  15  Wend.  137  ;  Naylor  v.  Den- 
nie, 8  Pick.  198. 

(v)  See  Heinecke  v.  Earle,  20  Law- 
Rep.  702. 

(iv)  In  Smith  v.  Field,  5  T.  R.  402,  it 
was  said,  that  a  contract  of  sale  might 
be  rescinded  by  the  consent  of  vendor 
and  vendee,  before  the  rights  of  others 
were  concerned.  But  wliere  the  vendee 
wished  to  return  the  goods,  and  the 
vendor  instituted  an  attachment  to  at- 
tach them  in  the  hands  of  the  packer  as 
the  property  of  tlie  vendee,  it  was  con- 
sidered as  an  election  by  the  former  not 
to  rescind  the  contract ;  and  tlie  vendee 
afterwards  liaving  become  bankrupt,  the 
vendor  was  not  allowed  to  recover  the 
goods  in  trover  against  tlie  packer.  In 
Salte  V.  Field,  id.  211,  goods  were  bought 

653 


609 


THE  LAW  OP   CONTRACTS. 


[book   III. 


by  the  vendee's  agent,  and  lodged  in  the 
hands  of  the  vendee's  packer.  While  there, 
they  were  attaclied  as  the  property  of 
the  vendee  by  some  of  his  creditors. 
The  vendee  had  in  fact  countermanded 
the  purcliase  by  letter  to  his  agent,  writ- 
ten before  the  dehvery  of  the  goods  to 
he  packer,  though  not  received  until 
afterwards.  Held,  the  vendor  assenting 
to  take  back  the  goods,  that  the  prop- 
erty revested  in  him,  and  the  attach- 
ment was  avoided.  See  Atkin  v.  Bar- 
wick,  1  Stra.  165 ;  Harman  v.  Fisher,  1 
Cowp.  125;  Alderson  v.  Temple,  4  Burr. 
2239.  The  consent  of  the  vendor  to 
retake  the  goods  is,  however,  essential, 
where  the  sale  has  been  completed  by 
actual  delivery.     Salte  v.  Field,  5  T.  E. 


211.  See  Eichardson  v.  Goss,  3  B.  &  P. 
119;  Bartram  v.  Farebrother,  Dan.  &  L. 
42.  Such  consent  may  be  inferred  by 
the  jury,  if  the  vendor  use  and  offer  the 
property  again  for  sale,  although  when 
he  received  it  back,  he  said  he  would 
keep  it  "  without  prejudice."  Long  v. 
Preston,  2  Mo.  &  P.  202.  In  Quincy  v. 
Tilton,  5  Grcenl.  (Bennett's  ed.)  277,  it 
is  said,  that  where  parties  agree  to  re- 
scind a  sale,  the  same  formalities  of  de- 
livery, &c.,  are  necessary  to  revest  the 
property  in  the  original  vendor,  which 
were  necessary  to  pass  it  from  him  to 
the  vendee.  See  also  Lanfear  v.  Sum- 
ner, 17  Mass.  110;  Miller  v.  Smith,  1 
Mason,  437. 


654 


END    OP   VOL.    L 


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